1.

 PEOPLE VS. MAGAT

Facts
Magat was charged with raping his daughter on two occasions. The first instance
happened on August 14, 1994, on Ann’s 17th birthday while the second instance was
on September 1, 1996, when she was 19 years old.

During arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the charges, but asked for a lower penalty.
The prosecutor did not object and so the judge imposed a penalty of 10 years for each
rape.

Three months after the trial, the victim sought aa re-trial on the basis that the penalty
imposed was too low. The court granted the request and the accused was re-arraigned
on both information where he entered a plea of guilt. After trial, he was sentenced to
death by lethal injection in both cases.
In this automatic review, the accused contended that his retrial was void because prior
the retrial he was already convicted after a plea of guilt. It has also attained finality so it
cannot be modified.

Issue
Was the “plea-bargaining” in the first trial sufficient to invalidate the conviction on the
second trial?

Held

No. The Supreme Court held that the January 1997 order of the RTC on accused’s plea
of guilt is void because the plea of the accused was not the plea bargaining
contemplated in Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the ROC. In a plea-bargaining, the accused pleads
guilty to a lesser offence which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Hence, the
reduction of the penalty in a plea-bargaining arrangement is the consequence of
pleading guilty to a lesser offense.

But accused, in the case at bar, did not plead guilty to a lesser offense. Instead, he
pleaded guilty to the rape charges but only bargained for a lesser offense.  This is
erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused should also be
sentenced to the penalty of that offense which he pleaded guilty to.

[SC affirmed death penalty in one criminal case, and lowered the penalty in another
from death to RP because Ann was already 19 years old when the second incident of
rape happened]
In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea
bargaining is also void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality for
the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. 12 Thus, since
the judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy
will not lie.

Nonetheless, whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of the accused-appellant

was rectified when he was re-arraigned and entered a new plea. Accused-appellant did
not question the procedural errors in the first arraignment and having failed to do so,
he is deemed to have abandoned his right to question the same 1 and waived the errors
in procedure. 14

He claims that the record of the case fails to support the trial court's assertion that it
conducted a searching inquiry to determine that the accused-appellant voluntarily
entered his plea of guilty with full understanding of the consequences of his plea. He
claims that there is no evidence that the trial court conducted searching inquiry in
accordance with the rules.

Under the present rule, if the accused pleads guilty to capital offense, trial courts are
now enjoined: (a) to conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (b) to require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and (c) to ask the accused if he so desires to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires. 16

The minutes of the proceedings 19 indubitably show that the judge read the
Informations to the accused-appellant both in English and Tagalog, asked him
questions as to his understanding of the consequences of his plea, his educational
attainment and occupation. Accused-appellant could have known of the consequence of
his plea having pleaded twice to the charges against him. In fact, in the two (2) letters
sent to the trial court judge, accused-appellant not only admitted his "sins" but also
asked for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to reform. 20

Moreover, the prosecution has already presented its evidence. Thus, even assuming
that there was an improvident plea of guilt, the evidence on record can sustain the
conviction of the accused-appellant.

Surprisingly, accused-appellant did not present any evidence to rebut the prosecution's
evidence nor testified in his behalf to deny the in culpatory testimony of the
complainant, giving us the impression that he acknowledges the charges against him.

2. PEOPLE VS. HERNANDEZ, GR NO. 108028, JULY 30, 1996

FACTS:
1. Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged with the crime of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale in violation of Article 38 (a) and (b) in relation to
Article 13 (b) and (c) of the New Labor Code
2. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty
3. Private complainants' first encounter with the appellant was on December 12, 1988
when one Josefa Cinco accompanied them to the office of the Philippine Thai
Association, Inc. (Philippine-Thai) in Ermita, Manila to meet the appellant. Introducing
herself as the general manager of Philippine-Thai, appellant asserted that her company
recruited workers for placement abroad and asked private complainants if they wanted
to work as factory workers in Taipeh.
4.  Appellant required private complainants to pay placement and passport fees in the
total amount of P22,500.00 per applicant, to be paid in three installments, When the
complainants-witnesses paid the first two installments, they were issued receipts by
Liza Mendoza, the alleged treasurer of Philippine-Thai signed by the latter in the
presence of the appellant.
5. After having received the entire amount[3] from the witnesses, appellant assured
them that they would be able to leave for Taipeh sometime before the end of
December, 1988. But contrary to appellant's promise, complainants-witnesses were
unable to leave for abroad. They demanded for the return of their money but to no
avail.
6.  The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate/admit that from the record of
the POEA Licensing and Regulation Office, Dept. of Labor and Employment, accused
Cristina Hernandez/Phil. etc., Ass. x x x is neither licensed nor authorized by that office
to recruit workers for overseas abroad
ISSUE:
whether or not Section 4 of Rule 118 -- requiring an agreement or admission made or
entered during the pre-trial conference to be reduced in writing and signed by the
accused and his counsel before the same may be used in evidence against the accused
-- equally applies to a stipulation of facts made during trial.

HELD:
We resolved this issue in the negative.

A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in
open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript
of the proceedings had in court.

The conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is
unnecessary in view of the fact that: "x x x an attorney who is employed to manage a
party's conduct of a lawsuit x x x has primafacie authority to make relevant admissions
by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, x x x which unless allowed to be withdrawn
are conclusive
In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record,
who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are
made x x x for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, x x x they bind the
client, whether made during, or even after, the trial.

It is worth noting that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in the lower court, agreed to the
stipulation of facts proposed by the prosecution not out of mistake nor inadvertence,
but obviously because the said stipulation of facts was also in conformity to defense's
theory of the case. It may be recalled that throughout the entire duration of the trial,
appellant staunchly denied ever having engaged in the recruitment business either in
her personal capacity or through Philippine-Thai. Therefore, it was but logical to admit
that the POEA records show that neither she nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or
authorized to recruit workers.
The stipulation of facts proposed during trial by prosecution and admitted by defense
counsel is tantamount to a judicial admission by the appellant of the facts stipulated on.

3. G. R. No. 146854             April 28, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PASCUAL BALBARONA, appellant.

FACTS:
1. Pascual B. Balbarona was convicted of rape for raping his minor daughter and
imposing on him the supreme penalty of death.
2. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the accusation.
3. The prosecution and defense subsequently entered into a stipulation of facts where it
was admitted that the victim, Odette M. Balbarona, was appellant’s daughter and was
fifteen at the time of the alleged rape; and that appellant was then living with the
victim and his two other daughters.
4. In the afternoon of May 28, 2000, at about 2:00 p.m., the victim, her two younger
sisters Gina and Jocelyn, and their widower father-herein appellant were at their house
in Barangay Tambacan, Iligan City. Gina and Jocelyn soon after left for their neighbor’s
house to watch TV.
The victim, in the meantime, was about to go downstairs, after cleaning the second
floor of their two-storey house, when appellant pushed her back. He then removed her
clothes, made her lie down on the floor, pulled her panty down to her knees, and went
on top of her.
Appalled, the victim asked appellant what he was doing, to which he replied that they
were the only ones left in the house. She thereupon resisted by kicking him at his ear.
The victim’s strength was no match to the appellant’s, however, as he held her hand
and then inserted his penis inside her vagina, drawing the victim to shout in pain.
Appellant thus got up immediately, put on his clothes, and later left the house
ISSUE:
Whether the stipulated facts were supported by evidence
HELD:

As a special qualifying circumstance raising the penalty for rape to death, the minority
of the victim and her relationship to the offender must be alleged in the criminal
complaint or information and proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself.
While the above-quoted information alleged the concurrence of the victim’s minority
and her relationship to appellant as his daughter, the jurisprudentially required evidence
to prove such circumstance is utterly lacking.
Much reliance is had on the stipulation of facts embodied in the trial court’s June 22,
2000 Pre-trial Order whereby appellant admitted to the victim being his daughter and
her being fifteen (15) years old at the time of the rape incident. This Court in People v.
Sitao48 rejected stipulation of facts as a specie of evidence to prove the qualifying
circumstances of rape:
Neither can a stipulation of the parties with respect to the victim’s age be considered
sufficient proof of minority. Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty
to death cannot be the subject of stipulation. An accused cannot be condemned to
suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or his own admissions.
This strict rule is warranted by the seriousness of the penalty of death.
As the prosecution failed to prove then the alleged special qualifying circumstance
attendant to appellant’s commission of the crime of rape, he is guilty only of simple
rape the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua. Accordingly, the award of civil
indemnity must be reduced from ₱75,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. The award of ₱50,000.00
as moral damages stays, however.

4. PEOPLE VS. TAC-AN

FACTS:
        That on or about June 2, 1999 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, he
being the Officer-in-Charge Provincial Warden of the Batangas Provincial Jail located at
Brgy. Cuta Bilibid, Batangas City, and taking advantage of his official position, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a Memorandum Receipt for
Equipment Semi-Expendable and Non-Expendable Property, a public/official document
of the Office of the Provincial Warden of Batangas, by stating in said memorandum
receipt dated June 2, 1999 that Colt MKIV Series 80 Government Model, Pistol Cal. .380
SN-26917 with 40 rounds of ammunitions, is a provincial government property duly
registered with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, Batangas PNP Command, Kumintang
Ilaya, Batangas City, and issued to Mr. Alberto Tesoro, Civilian Agent, for his own use in
connection with the performance of his official duties and functions, when in truth and
in fact said statements are absolutely false when he has the legal obligation to disclose
the truth, as said firearm is not a property of the Provincial Government of Batangas;
that it is not registered with the Firearms and Explosives Units of Batangas PNP
Command, Batangas City and Camp Crame, Quezon City; and that Alberto Tesoro is not
an employee of the Provincial Government of Batangas, to the damage and prejudice of
public interest.
        The trial court set the arraignment of the accused and the initial pre-trial.
Apparently, out of the eleven witnesses listed in the Information, only the first three
witnesses were notified of said arraignment and pre-trial.  On motion of the accused
and over the objection of the public prosecutor, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the case for failure of said witnesses to appear before it. The bail bond
posted by the accused for his provisional liberty was thereby cancelled. The public
prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, contending that the trial
court acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it dismissed the case simply because three
of its witnesses who were notified failed to appear at the initial pre-trial. The public
prosecutor asserted that it had eleven witnesses but only three were subpoenaed by
the trial court. He argued further that the dismissal of the case was not authorized
under Republic Act No. 8493. The trial court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration of the public prosecutor.
        The trial court posits that under R.A. No. 8493 pre-trial is mandatory and the
presence of the complaining witnesses is likewise required during the trial for the
parties to participate in the plea bargaining and stipulation of facts during said
proceedings. If the complaining witnesses are absent, the principal purpose of the pre-
trial cannot be achieved. It was incumbent on the public prosecutor to procure the
attendance of its witnesses for the pre-trial but this, he failed to do. The trial court
stated that there were instances in the past when the public prosecutor manifested to
the trial court that it had no witness for the pre-trial and moved for the dismissal of
criminal cases. The trial court contended that if the dismissal of the case was
precipitate, it was the fault of the public prosecutor and not the trial court.
        The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Order dated August 1,
2000 which dismissed this case during the arraignment and pre-trial due to the non-
appearance of the complaining witnesses, namely SPO3 Gaudencio C. Aguilera and
SPO2 Simplicio M. Mejasa as well as Sofronio Vicencio, despite notice. Material witness
Sofronio Vicencio who had to identify the alleged falsified document also was not
present for the reason that he was already not connected with the Batangas Provincial
Jail where he used to be a provincial jailer. He could not be contacted anymore.
        The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, for the nullification of the orders of the trial court. The
People alleged that the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the dismissal of the
case and denying its motion for reconsideration.
        On April 3, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing
the petition on the ground that the errors committed by the trial court were
mere errors of judgment which are not correctible by a writ of certiorari. The
appellate court also stated that a reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10766 will place
the private respondent in double jeopardy. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present
petition for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in ruling that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it
dismissed Criminal Case No. 10766 simply because three witnesses of its eleven
witnesses failed to appear at the initial pre-trial of the case. In fact, R.A. 8493 does not
contain any provision which mandates a trial court to dismiss a criminal case for failure
of the witnesses of the prosecution to appear at the pre-trial.
HELD: YES
        The petition is impressed with merit.
        Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the prosecution
listed in the Information, whether or not said witness is the offended party or the
complaining witness, is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case. Although
under the law, pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of the private
complainant or the complaining witness is however not required. Even the presence of
the accused is not required unless directed by the trial court. It is enough that the
accused is represented by his counsel.
        Indeed, even if none of the witnesses listed in the information for the State
appeared for the pre-trial, the same can and should proceed. After all, the public
prosecutor appeared for the State. The public prosecutor is vested with authority to
consider those matters catalogued in Section 2 of R.A. 8493.
        The trial court thus acted without jurisdiction when it dismissed the case merely
because none of the witnesses notified by the trial court appeared for the pre-trial. The
State, like the accused is also entitled to due process in criminal cases. The order of the
trial court dismissing the criminal case deprived the State of its right to prosecute and
prove its case. Said order is, therefore, void for lack of jurisdiction, and is of no effect.
By its ruling, this Court is not abetting or even glossing over the failure of the three
witnesses of the prosecution to appear at the initial pre-trial of the case. Said witnesses
may be cited by the trial court in contempt of court if their absence was unjustified.
Undue delay in the prosecution of the case should not also be condoned. But the right
of the State to prosecute the case and prove the criminal liability of the private
respondent for the crime charged should not be derailed and stymied by precipitate and
capricious dismissal of the case at the initial pre-trial stage. To do justice to private
respondent and injustice to the State is no justice at all. Justice must be done to all the
parties alike.
NOTE: As regards to Double Jeopardy (He might ask)
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in
the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court,
(c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People
vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due processs.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case
for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.
RULE 122: Appeal
4. JUDITH YU - versus - HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD (G.R. No. 170979)

For guidance, fresh period rule: “To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration.” (Neypes v CA-discussed in the next case)

Facts
Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for
estafa against Yu was filed with the RTC. The RTC convicted the Yu as charged. 14
days later, or on June 9, 2005, Yu filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging
that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime
for which she was convicted. Judge Samson-Tatad denied the petitioners motion for
new trial for lack of merit.

On November 16, 2005, Yu filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant
to The Supreme Court's ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a fresh period of
15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or
up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal. The prosecution filed
a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is
inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.

Yu
Yu argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions motions when she
filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules
of Court, applying the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes.

People
The OSG filed a manifestation stating that Neypes applies to criminal actions since the
evident intention of the fresh period rule was to set a uniform appeal period provided in
the Rules.

In their comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that Yu cannot seek refuge in Neypes to
extend the fresh period rule to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and
the pronouncement of standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules referred to the
interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases...nowhere in Neypes was the period to
appeal in criminal cases, Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, mentioned.
Issue
Whether the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases.

Supreme Court

The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right it is a statutory

privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided
by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the
law. The period to appeal is specifically governed by Section 39 of BP 129, as amended,
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day
period within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days
from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal.

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts' pronouncement of
a fresh period to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases
under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the
following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based,
makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal
case. (Section 39 of BP 129 states [t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision
appealed from.) Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently
worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two
provisions insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal period stops running upon
the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon
receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. No reason
exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal
cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it
involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
on petitions for review from the RTCs to the CA, and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to
appeals in criminal cases.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA and to the Supreme Court in civil and criminal
cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC to
the CA in civil and criminal cases under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 122
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.

If the Neypes rules was only to apply in civil cases, it would foster and encourage an
absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an
accused in a criminal case a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and
unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of
treatment.

It is held that Yu seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within
the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of
notice denying her motion for new trial.

Rule 126
1. G.R. No. 161106               
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 161266
PLANET INTERNET CORP., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondent.

FACTS:
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence
Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police
filed applications for warrants before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
78, to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web
Corporation (WWC) located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No.
188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of
petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet) located at UN
2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San
Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners were
conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized
Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of
Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage
and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT).
On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
applications for search warrants.
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the
office premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor plans
showing the location of particular computers and servers that would be
taken.
On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for search
warrants.
The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives
of the National Capital Region Police Office.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, and Planet Internet filed their
respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically the
same grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without probable
cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll
bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search
warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant
thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree."
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions to quash.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants
issued were in the nature of general warrants. Thus, the properties
seized under the said warrants were ordered released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on the
ground that it had failed to get the conformity of the City Prosecutor
prior to filing the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
PLDT appealed to the CA, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
26190. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and
declared the search warrants valid and effective.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal despite
the following procedural infirmities:
1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no
personality to question the quashal of the search warrants;
2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.  May an order
quashing a search warrant be the proper subject of an appeal?
II. Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable
cause, considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not
constitute theft.
III. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search
warrants were not general warrants.
RULING:
1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, but it is a
special criminal process; conformity of the public prosecutor is not
necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to question an order
quashing search warrants. A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a
search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is
defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of
the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it
before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process
akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic
in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.

2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued

independently prior to the filing of a criminal action, partakes of a final
order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.
May an order quashing a search warrant be the proper subject of an
appeal?
It depends. Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a
pending criminal case, the quashal of a search warrant is merely
interlocutory. There is still “something more to be done in the said
criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused
therein.”
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in
anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing the
warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends
the judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.In this
case, the applications for search warrants were instituted as principal
proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the
search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there
was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the
search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal
may be properly taken therefrom.

II. Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their

judicial functions. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by reviewing courts
when the finding has substantial basis. Substantial basis means that
the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought
to be searched.
III. No, the CA did not err.  A general warrant is a search or arrest
warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the
property to be seized. It is one that allows the “seizure of one thing
under a warrant describing another” and gives the officer executing
the warrant the discretion over which items to take.
The requirement of particularity in the description of things to be
seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search warrant bear
a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is sought.
In this case, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the
items to be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of
theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for
the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the
premises of petitioners and was then able to confirm that they had
utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting of
computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers,
PABX or switching equipment, and support equipment such as
software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to
support the illegal toll bypass operations.”