MINEABTF00401AA - Geotechnical Benchmarking and Valehaichichi Slope Failure Investigation - v01

Geotechnical Benchmarking and
Valehaichichi
Gold Ridge Mining Limited
Gold Ridge Mine
MINEABTF00401AA
14 May 2012
Kevin Crossling
Technical Services Manager – Mining
Gold Ridge Mining Limited
PO Box 1556, Honiara
Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands
Attention: Kevin Crossling
Dear Kevin
RE: Geotechnical Benchmarking and Valehaichichi Slope Failure Investigation
Please find enclosed the report covering the additional review work and analyses undertaken following
the visit to the Gold Ridge Mine by Michael Morrongiello, 8th – 14th February 2012 and the presentation
on-site of the Progress Summary. This report presents the findings on
 the failure on the west wall of Valehaichichi Pit,
 the dumping strategy involving tipping into the valley of the Chovohio River,
 a preliminary assessment of the level of geotechnical confidence in the current designs,

and
 recommendations as appropriate.
Please contact the undersigned should you have any further queries on the report.
For and on behalf of Coffey Mining Pty Ltd
Michael Morrongiello
Associate Geotechnical Engineer
MINEABTF00401AA
Coffey Mining Pty Ltd ABN 52 065 481 209

126 Trenerry Crescent, Abbotsford VIC 3067 Australia
T (+61) (3) 9473 1300 F (+61) (3) 9473 1305
www.coffey.com
Coffey Mining Pty Ltd
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
Author(s): Michael Morrongiello Associate Geotechnical Engineer
Date: 14 May 2012
Project Number: MINEABTF00401AA
Version / Status: v.01
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Print Date: Wednesday, 16 May 2012
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V01 Reviewed by Don Miller M. Morrongiello 14/5/12
Document Review and Sign Off
Primary Author Supervising Principal

Michael Morrongiello Don Miller
This document has been prepared for the exclusive use of Client Company (“Client”) on the basis of instructions, information and
data supplied by them. No warranty or guarantee, whether express or implied, is made by Coffey Mining with respect to the
completeness or accuracy of any aspect of this document and no party, other than the Client, is authorised to or should place any
reliance whatsoever on the whole or any part or parts of the document. Coffey Mining does not undertake or accept any
responsibility or liability in any way whatsoever to any person or entity in respect of the whole or any part or parts of this document, or
any errors in or omissions from it, whether arising from negligence or any other basis in law whatsoever.
Gold Ridge Mine – MINEABTF00401AA

Geotechnical Benchmarking and Valehaichichi Slope Failure Investigation – 14 May 2012
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1
2 SCOPE .......................................................................................................................................... 1
3 PREVIOUS STUDIES ................................................................................................................... 1
4 VALEHAICHICHI PIT – WEST WALL FAILURE .......................................................................... 3
4.1 Description of Failure........................................................................................................ 3
4.2 Geological and Geotechnical Setting of the Failure ......................................................... 4
4.3 Slope History .................................................................................................................... 6
4.4 Failure Mechanism ......................................................................................................... 10
4.4.1 Kinematic Analysis ................................................................................................ 11
4.4.2 Limit Equilibrium Analysis ...................................................................................... 11
4.4.3 Initial Failure of the west wall ................................................................................ 11
4.4.4 Recent (February 2012) Failure ............................................................................ 14
4.4.5 Summary and Further Work .................................................................................. 16
5 WASTE ROCK DUMPS .............................................................................................................. 17

5.1 Previous Dump Facilities ................................................................................................ 17
5.2 Active Dumps ................................................................................................................. 17
5.2.1 Dumping Strategy and Progress ........................................................................... 17
5.2.2 Observed Dump Conditions .................................................................................. 18
5.2.3 Dump Stability Analysis ......................................................................................... 21
5.2.4 Summary and Further Work .................................................................................. 23
6 SLOPE MONITORING ................................................................................................................ 25

6.1 Existing Program ............................................................................................................ 25
6.2 Development of a Prism Monitoring Strategy ................................................................. 25
7 COMPARISON OF SLOPECONDIFIGURATIONS .................................................................... 27
7.1 Mined Slopes .................................................................................................................. 27
7.2 Local Natural Slopes ...................................................................................................... 27
7.3 Designed Slopes ............................................................................................................ 27
7.4 Summary and Further Work ........................................................................................... 27
8 BENCHMARKING OF GEOTECHNICAL PROGRAM ................................................................ 32
8.1 Published Guidance ....................................................................................................... 32
8.2 Status of the Geotechnical Program at Gold Ridge Mine .............................................. 32
8.3 Summary ........................................................................................................................ 33
8.4 Recommended Immediate Additional Work ................................................................... 34
8.5 Recommended Subsequent Work ................................................................................. 34
9 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 36

List of Tables
Table 1 – Slope History of Valehaichichi Pit west wall 8
Table 2 – Modelled factor of safety of June 2000 slope for groundwater and bedding assumptions 12
Table 3 – Modelled factor of safety of June 2000 slope for a range of material properties assumptions 13
Table 4 – Summary of existing slopes 28
Table 5 – Summary of design slopes for the Valehaichichi Pit 29
Table 6 – Focus of geotechnical program through project cycle 32
Table 7 – Assessed status of the geotechnical program at Gold Ridge Mine 33
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Valehaichichi Pit west wall 4
Figure 2 – Survey Pickup of Valehaichichi west wall from 8 February 2012 5
Figure 3 – Survey of Valehaichichi Pit coloured by elevation and slope dip 9
Figure 4 – Section of Valehaichichi Pit west wall showing June 2000 and Feb 2012 survey 10
Figure 6 – Factor of safety for Valehaichichi Pit west wall prior to initial failure 13
Figure 7 – Factor of safety of ramp over fill and failed rill with saturated conditions 14
Figure 8 – Factor of safety of ramp over fill and failed rill for nearly saturated conditions 15
Figure 9 – Active dump facility to north of Valehaichichi Pit 18
Figure 10 – Dumping strategy north of Valehaichichi Pit 19
Figure 11 – Southern active tip head with Valehaichi Pit in back ground 19
Figure 12 – Active dump facility with northern tip head 20
Figure 13 – Flow of dump material from southern active tip head 20
Figure 14 – Northern tip head model – saturated to 10m from road 21
Figure 15 – Northern tip head model – saturated 20m from road 22
Figure 16 – Model of general case dump – 10m width, drained conditions 23
Figure 17 – Model of general case dump – 50m width, partially saturated conditions 24
Figure 18 – Prototype prism stand 26
Figure 19 – Slope heights and angles of existing slopes in the vicinity of the Vlahaichichi and Namachamata Pit 30
Figure 20 – Comparision of existing and design Gold Ridge slopes with published configurations 31

List of Appendices
Appendix A – Selected Drill Data from Valahaichichi Pit
Appendix B – Summary of Regional Geological Environment
Appendix C – Detailed Field Observations

1 INTRODUCTION
Gold Ridge Mining Limited operates the Gold Ridge Mine on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands.
On 6 February 2012, Mr Kevin Crossling, Technical Services Manager – Mining at the Gold
Ridge Mine, requested Coffey Mining provide a proposal for an on-site assessment of a
recent failure in the Valehaichichi Pit. This followed preliminary discussions prior to the failure
in relation to the geotechnical services Coffey Mining could provide to Gold Ridge Mining.
Michael Morrongiello, Associate Geotechnical Engineer, attended site on behalf of Coffey

Mining to provide an assessment of the failure. He arrived at site on the afternoon of 9
February 2012 and spent four full days on site before returning to Melbourne on the afternoon
of 14 February 2012. Before leaving site a Progress Summary (Coffey, 2012) was presented
to mine staff.
This report details the data collected during the site visit and outlines recommendations based
on subsequent review and analyses of the information gathered. It supersedes previous work
including the preliminary conclusions presented in the Progress Summary on site on 14
February 2012.
2 SCOPE
The scope of this study included the following:
 Inspect and assess the failure on the west wall of Valehaichichi Pit.
 Advise on the dumping strategy involving tipping into the valley of the Chovohio River.
 Undertake a preliminary assessment of the level of geotechnical confidence in the

current designs.
 From this work, provide recommendations as appropriate.
3 PREVIOUS STUDIES
In 1996 Ross Mining commissioned Golder Associates (Golder) to undertake geotechnical

and hydrogeological studies as part of a feasibility study for the Gold Ridge deposit. The
program involved review of earlier drilling, the drilling and geotechnical logging of two
diamond drill holes into the proposed west wall of the Valehaichichi Pit, a program of point
load, UCS and metallurgical tests, and a review of 1990 hydrogeological test data from a hole
in each of the Valehaichichi and Kupers deposits.
Golder recommended a preliminary pit slope design configuration for the Valehaichichi,
Kupers and Dawsons deposits consisting of:
 Stripping of near surface material to a depth of 3 to 5m and 6m back from the slope crest.
 60° batter face angle in oxidised or significantly altered material
Gold Ridge Mine – MINEABTF00401AA Page: 1

 70° batter face angle in unweathered material
 15m high batter faces
 6m wide berm widths
 Depressurisation of the slope as deemed appropriate following a groundwater monitoring

program
Subject to the collection and analysis of structural data from the interim slopes and with
consideration of the groundwater pressures in the slopes, a possible steeper final slope
configuration was suggested as:
 60° batter face angle in oxidised or significantly altered material
 70° batter face angle in unweathered material
 20m high batter faces
 5m wide berm widths
Detailed stability analyses were not undertaken although it was noted that the structural
defects were likely to govern slope stability.
Consideration of RQD and intact rock strength permitted the estimation of achievable ripping
depths using a D9 dozer. Golder relate that Ross Mining found that the inferred ripping depths
for the Valehaichichi Pit strongly correlate with the fresh – transitional interface in the
weathering profile.
Golder (1996) references two earlier geotechnical studies prepared for Arimco by Golder in
1990. These documents were not available for review during the current study.
Based on the material available for review, the distribution of groundwater levels and the need
for slope depressurisation has not been studied to date despite being recommended by
Golder in 1996.
In 2004 Golder reported to CDC Capital Partners and AIG Inc, the owners of the then closed
Gold Ridge Mine, on environmental and geotechnical issues requiring immediate action or
action ahead of the resumption of mining. The report focuses on the tailings storage facility
and on impacts to the catchment environment, particularly from sediment load and acid rock
drainage. In relation to the Valehaichichi Pit, Golder observed that “a large slip has occurred
on the highwall of the pit and has caused the haul road to be cut.” An included photograph
indicates the failure is in virtually the same location as the present failure. No discussion of
possible failure mechanisms or recommendations about managing the instability is provided.
The Gold Ridge Project Feasibility Study prepared by Ausenco in 2007 for Australian
Solomons Gold Limited includes a detailed description of the geological setting and presents
the results of the pit optimisation process. The geological description in Ausenco (2007) is

summarised in the Section 4 of this report. The Whittle optimisation of the pit was done
assuming a nominal overall slope angle of 47.5° with localised variation of design slopes from
40° to 54°. No justification for these slope angles was provided and there is no discussion of
historical slope performance or data support for the design. The batter-berm configuration is
not described although bench heights are specified at 9m.
4 VALEHAICHICHI PIT – WEST WALL FAILURE
4.1 Description of Failure
On 4 February 2012, a portion of the west wall of Valehaichichi Pit failed. No injuries or
property damage were reported. The failure came after a week-long period of intense rainfall
during which approximately two metres of rain fell. It reportedly coincided with the firing of the
B200 shot on the 402 bench above.
The top of the failure intersects the Valehaichichi pit access ramp over a distance of 42m
between 366mRL and 370mRL (Figure 1 and Figure 2). Steep scarps mark the extent of
failure on the southern, western and northern sides and range in height from 5m to 22m. The
rill pile extends from 363mRL at the base of the scarp to 306mRL where it has partially
covered the lower iteration of the access ramp.
At the base of the rill pile are some large blocks with iron oxide staining similar to the country
rock on the southern flank of the failure. Vegetation has taken hold amongst these blocks
since December 2003 and it appeared that little material had been added recently.
Run off was observed flowing over the western scarp from both the ramp above and from a
gully in the high wall. Significant amounts of sediment were being carried by these flows and
deposited on the rill pile where slumping and erosion of the unconsolidated talus was
observed, particularly during periods of increased run off. Additionally, flows from a weep hole
behind the failure were reporting to the top of the rill pile.
The ramp in the area was already narrower at about 6m width compared to locations above
and below on the haul route where the ramp is typically 15m wide. Catch berms on the high
wall above the area are generally full with overspill from the active VC2 cutback.

Figure 1
Valehaichichi Pit west wall, looking northwest (photo taken by Kevin Crossling, 7 February 2012)
444mRL
369mRL
328mRL
314mRL
306mRL
302mRL
278mRL
4.2 Geological and Geotechnical Setting of the Failure
The geological setting for the Valehaichichi Pit is complex. A comprehensive review of the
geological setting was undertaken from previous references to provide a succinct summary as
a basis for understanding the deposit. That summary is appended (Appendix B).
In terms of the slope failure in the west wall of the Valehaichichi Pit detailed observations are
recorded in Appendix C with the following summary:
 There is extensive faulting and shearing in the region. These structures are
predominantly steeply dipping and trending between NNW and NNE.
 Major joint sets are developed that are sub-parallel in trend to the faulting but these joint
sets have a generally shallower dip (50°) to either the SW or SE.
 Bedding has a shallow dip (13°) to the NNE.
 The major rock type exposed in the vicinity of the failure is the Pink Silt Sequence, with a
predominantly a boulder conglomerate texture.

Figure 2
Survey Pickup of Valehaichichi west wall 8 February 2012
 The degree of weathering is described as “transitional” by site geologists. The bulk

density for material with this weathering is estimated at 2.0 t/m3. (Golder 1996). The rock
exhibits moderate argillic alteration overprints mild propylitic alteration.
 The rocks around the failure were found to be weak strength with indentations made by a
firm blow of the hammer and some scratching with a steel ruler (ISRM class R2, verging
on R3). Small scale variability exists: less altered andesite cobbles are considerably
harder and the matrix around some small fractures can be scratched with a fingernail.
 UCS tests on core from hole GR568 were reported in Golder 1996. Interpretation of the
sections in the report suggests this hole was collared at approximately 24,000mE,
41,025mN, 380mRL, drilling west at dip of 60° and passing approximately 130m SSE of
the current failure. UCS measurements from below the rippable depth in GR568 average
approximately 32MPa. A field estimate of R2/R3 class rock gives and estimated
compressive strength in the order of 20-30MPa which is consistent with the UCS data.
Detailed hole logs of GR568 were not available for review although RQD is shown
graphically as being generally greater than 50 and mostly between 60 and 80.

 Field tilt tests conducted on defects from the immediate vicinity of the failure indicate an
average friction angle around 37°. Similar tests on defects remote for the failure ranged
between 40° to 45°. These higher values may reflect the less altered conditions found
away from the failure area.
 The slopes exposed in the vicinity of the failure are assessed as having a GSI in the
range 30 to 40, with poor to very poor surface conditions. An estimate of the Mohr-
Coulomb parameters for the rock mass at the failure was obtained using the program
Rocscience RocLab v.1032. Input assumptions were:
o Intact UCS = 32 MPa
o GSI = 35
o mi = 19 and MR = 310 (assuming a conglomeritic sandstone)
o D = 1.0
o Unit weight = 0.02 MN/m3
o Slope height = 20m (reflecting failure through a 30m wide ramp)3
o This combination gives estimates of cohesion and friction angle in the range
of 82kPa and 37° respectively. With the expected variation in some of these
parameters the cohesion is expected to range +/- 18KPa and 3° respectively.
 Seismicity has not been included in the analysis of the failure as no regional seismic
event was reported with the onset of failure. A small production blast was however
reported immediately before the failure.
 Groundwater is assumed to be near-surface in the vicinity of the failure as a result of

recent heavy rainfall and seepage.
4.3 Slope History
From the information available, it was not possible to precisely define the excavation history of
the west wall of Valehaichichi Pit, nor the initial failure other than to note that it was evident in
December 2003. Changes in ownership and the suspension of mining in June 2000 have
resulted in discontinuous data sets from the period pre-dating the current operators and have
been compounded by the loss of corporate knowledge with staff turnover.
Table 1 outlines the slope history as interpreted from the information available.
Golder (1996) recommended a slope configuration with batter face angles of 60° in weathered
rock and 70° in fresh rock, batter heights of 15m and 6m wide berms.
The pit survey from June 2000 indicates batters were generally cut at face angles between
45° and 55° (Figure 3). Mining bench heights appear to have been nominally nine metres with
single, double and triple bench batters apparent. Batters tend to be steeper with reduced
height in the lower part of the slope (ie below the ramp) than higher in the slope. Berm widths

vary considerably from approximately 3m to 10m, although most berms seem to have been
excavated at 5.5m to 7m width. The survey indicates ‘wander’ in the crests and toes of batters
is not excessive.
Although compliance to design was not assessed, comparison with the configuration
recommended by Golder in 1996 suggests that achievable batter face angles are generally
lower than predicted although batter heights higher than predicted may be stable.
A section through the slope that failed (Figure 4) shows that in 2000 it was 57m high with an
inter-ramp slope angle of 44°. Four batters are discernible with face angles ranging between
44° and 56°. The nominal slope configuration is interpreted to have been 18m high batters at
face angles of 50°. Nominal berm widths appear to be 7.5m and 5m. A narrow berm of limited
length has been excavated at approximately 342mRL below an 11m high face at 55.5°. This
locally steeper zone may represent an attempt to recover additional ore
The failure occurred in the period after abandonment of the operation by Ross Mining in June
2000. A photo taken in December 2003 (Golder 2004, reproduced in Figure 5) shows a failure
in the approximate location of the current failure. Golder notes that
A large slip has occurred on the highwall of the pit and has caused the haul road to
the pit to be cut. This haul road was intended to form part of the haul road to the next
pit development proposed further along the ridge to the south, the Namachamata Pit.
A pit survey from as late as mid 2007 shows that the remaining ramp width behind the failure
is approximately 5.5m. By 2011, the failure had reportedly been backfilled to provide access
for haulage. A small failure in early 2011 was described by site staff and was reportedly
followed by backfilling again to achieve a trafficable width of about 8.5m by the time of the
March 2011 pit survey.
In January 2012, the VC2 cutback of the west wall of Valehaichichi Pit commenced above the
failure. The design provides for both an increase in Valehaichichi Pit size and a haul road near
the top of the slope to provide access to the Namachamata Pit.
Later in January 2012, cracking was observed on the ramp where it subsequently collapsed.
Ramp access was restricted. On 4 February, the ramp failed. The in situ back scarp suggests
the failure removed any backfill still in place and potentially some country rock.

Table 1
Valehaichichi Slope Failure Investigation
Slope History of Valehaichichi Pit west wall
Date Slope status Source
1998 Excavation commenced Inferred
Pre June 2000 Groundwater levels in the slope above the ramp are Inferred date, weep hole observed
found to be high. A weep hole is installed to drain the
slope, collared behind the present failure.
June 2000 Slope excavated to approximately 60m below the top of Legacy data wireframe
failure. No failure at present location (ramp width val_pit_0600.00t
~25m).
Some indication of earlier failure to the north (up ramp)
of the present failure with ramp width reduced to ~15m.
Mine abandoned.
10 December Slope has failed from ramp to pit floor (height estimated Photo in Golder (2004) and
2003 at 60m). reproduced here in Figure 5.
Mid 2007 Failure has reduced ramp to approximately 5.5m width Legacy wireframe dtm_cut.00t
(undated although modified date
on file of 11/09/2007)
Pre 2011 Failure backfilled from above to re-establish width. Inferred
Early 2011 Failure on pit edge of the ramp (likely in fill). Site personnel
Failed area backfilled to regain ramp width
March 2011 Ramp width of 8.5m in end of month survey Wireframe eom_1103_1.msr
11 January 2012 First shot fired in VC2 cutback of west wall above Drill and blast records
current failure
Late January Cracking observed in the ramp where earlier failure had Site personnel
2012 been backfilled.
Ramp access restricted
First week of High rainfall event with fall of approximately 2m in a Site personnel
February 2012 week.
Cracking progresses
4 February 2012 Shot B200 on 402 bench above the failure is fired. Blast video, site personnel
Heavy rain visible in blast video.
Ramp found to have failed after blast
11-13 February Observed fresh cracking to 1m behind failure scarp, Coffey Mining observation
2012 movement/slumping of the failed pile with heavy runoff,
and dilation of the rockmass on the northern side of the
failure.

Figure 3
June 2000 survey of Valehaichichi Pit. Above: coloured by elevation (mRL). Below: Coloured by slope dip
(degrees).
≥440
≤300
≥55

Figure 4
Section through failure on Valehaichichi Pit west wall showing June2000 and February 2012 pickups
Figure 5
Valehaichichi Pit west wall failure, December 2003 (Golder 2004)
4.4 Failure Mechanism
The initial (pre-December 2003) failure appears to be structurally influenced. The failure
surface includes the back structure dipping 51/103 and likely includes breakout to the toe of

the failure through the rock mass. The southern extent of the failure is controlled by the
structure oriented 85/220.
The most recent failure is interpreted to be a circular failure of the back fill and failed material
entirely within the original failure.
4.4.1 Kinematic Analysis

No feasible wedges or planar failures were identified by kinematic analysis of the mapping
data.
4.4.2 Limit Equilibrium Analysis

Limit equilibrium analyses were undertaken to explore possible mechanisms and the
sensitivity of the back fill/failed material to variations in assumed conditions. The limit
equilibrium analysis employed is a two dimensional approach that considers a slice through
the failure. That assumption is acceptable where a failure is long and the conditions at the
section chosen for analysis are not influenced by any end effects. In this case the limited
length of wall that failed may mean the two dimensional approach is under-estimating the
stability and so the results of these analyses should not be considered definitive – rather they
indicate the parameters that influence stability.
The program Rocscience SLIDE v. 6.015 was used to conduct the analyses, using the
Spencer method.
4.4.3 Initial Failure of the west wall

The initial failure of the ramp (ie failure of the profile in the June 2000 survey) occurred in the
rock mass and is modelled using the non-circular block search algorithm. This algorithm
permits the introduction of structural controls on the failure in this case, failure along the back
scarp was observed and constrained the range of possible failure paths.
The analysis of the early failure has been conducted to test the sensitivity of stability to the
location of the water table and a bedding plane and to the estimated rock mass material
properties.
Models were run with the depth to water behind the face at 0m, 1 to 5m, 3 to 10m, and 6 to
20m. A depth to water of 0m implies a fully saturated slope with water table at the slope
surface. The depth ranges for the other scenarios tested reflect that at the toe of a batter,
groundwater is likely to be closer to the surface than at the crest.
A dilated bedding plane was modelled at six depths below the ramp from 10m to 60m. The
bedding plane has a very shallow apparent dip back into the slope reflecting the orientation of
bedding measured in the area.
The average properties of the rock mass were assumed to be cohesion of 82kPa and friction
angle of 37° in the initial phase of the analysis.

The backscarp and the bedding plane were both assumed to comprise a 0.1m wide
weakened zone and were initially assigned cohesion of 1kPa and friction angle of 35° based
on the field observations.
The results of the modelling are summarised in Table 2. They suggest the stability of the
configuration is highly sensitive to the depth of the water table behind the face and quite
insensitive to the depth of bedding. This latter point reflects that the failure paths virtually
ignored the bedding.
Table 2
Modelled factor of safety of June 2000 slope for a range groundwater and bedding assumptions
For rock mass c = 82kPa and Ø = 37°, for defect fill c = 1kPa and Ø = 35°
Depth of bedding plane below ramp (m)

Depth to water table (m) 10 20 30 40 50 60
0 0.799 0.803 0.805 0.801 0.797 0.805
1 to 5 0.934 0.933 0.938 0.931 0.932 0.937
3 to 10 1.130 1.131 1.129 1.135 1.127 1.130
6 to 20 1.493 1.493 1.483 1.482 1.479 1.481
It is unlikely that the rock slope was ever completely saturated but it is possible that the initial
failure was preceded by a period of intense rainfall similar to the event in the first week of
February 2012. For such an event, it is assumed that the water table would likely lie in the 1 to
5m depth range based on observations of the current slope, and given that none of the
models with deeper water tables resulted in a factor of safety less than 1.0. Bedding at 50m
below the ramp resulted in the most consistently low modelled factor of safety for the range of
groundwater conditions trialled. The results for this geometry are shown in Figure 6.
For the second phase of the modelling, it was assumed that the water table lies at 1 to 5m
behind the surface and that a bedding plane exists at 50m below the surface (ie the geometry
shown in Figure 6) and expected ranges of rockmass and defect fill properties were modelled.
The results are summarised in Table 3.
These results indicate that the calculated factor of safety for the slope is more sensitive to the
rock mass friction angle than to the defect friction angle. They also show the results are
somewhat sensitive to the rock mass cohesion.
This sensitivity analysis indicates that the assumed properties of the conglomeritic sandstone
(cohesion of 82kPa and friction angle of 37°) are not unreasonable assuming the water table
at the time of the failure was two or more metres higher than prior to the failure.

Table 3
Modelled factor of safety of June 2000 slope for a range of material properties assumptions.
For water table at 1 to 5m behind surface and bedding at 50m below ramp
Rock mass friction Defect friction angle Rock mass cohesion (kPa)
angle (deg) (deg) 60 82 100
34 30 0.778 0.859 0.926
34 35 0.795 0.877 0.998
37 30 0.839 0.918 0.985
37 35 0.847 0.932 1.002
40 30 0.898 0.980 1.049
40 35 0.909 0.998 1.059
Figure 6
Factor of safety for Valehaichichi Pit west wall prior to initial failure
The analysis also implies that the factor of safety is largely independent of bedding position.
This supports the conceptual mechanism of sliding on the back structure and break out
through rock mass to the pit.

The extent to which these structural conditions exist elsewhere in the current slopes or within
the proposed slopes of Valehaichichi Pit cannot be determined from the data at hand. It is
perhaps notable that the back scarp structure is at the flatter edge of the set window to which
it was attributed and that the structure may represent an outlier dip with lower expected
frequency. There are insufficient structural measurements to confirm this interpretation.
4.4.4 Recent (February 2012) Failure

The February 2012 failure of the ramp is assumed to have been confined to the rill pile and
was modelled using a circular failure algorithm. The upper surface of the rill pile has been
taken from the March 2011 survey with an adjustment made to smooth out a locally very
steep zone just below the ramp that appears to be an artefact of the survey model resulting
from a lack of access for surveyors over the pre-existing failure.
Figure 7
Factor of safety of ramp over fill and failed rill with saturated conditions for 5 to 10m of saturated material
Failed material was assumed to have similar properties to the material being tipped over
waste rock dumps. Cohesion in the failed material is assumed to be 1kPa and a friction angle
of 37° has been used (refer to Section 5.2.3 for the work in support of these values).
A number of groundwater conditions were trialled. It was found that with saturated conditions
in the 5m to 10m of failed material against the conglomeritic sandstone, that the ramp still had

a factor of safety in excess of 1.0 (Figure 7). With this groundwater regime, the lower part of
the slope is modelled as being unstable with factors of safety under 1.0 for the eastern most
40m of the pile. This may be unrealistic given the presence of boulder sized blocks in the
bottom part of the pile that would have the effect of buttressing the finer material above(refer
to Figure 1). Conversely, this may offer insight into the trigger for the cracking reportedly seen
on the ramp ahead of failure in January 2012: if the lower part of the failure had been
disturbed, perhaps to allow widening of the lower ramp iteration or with vibrations from the
recently started blasting above, then localised cracking may have been developed near the
base of the pile and then, over time, propagated back up the slope to the ramp.
Figure 8
Factor of safety of ramp over fill and failed rill for nearly saturated conditions
With the ramp and the pile cracked, infiltration of water into the failed material would be more
pervasive. With sufficient rain falling on and run off entering the pile, near saturated conditions
may develop. This scenario was modelled and it was found that failure surfaces with factors of
safety less than 1.0 extended throughout the failure (Figure 8).
These results indicate that the February 2012 failure of the rill pile beneath the ramp may
have been initiated by either or both disturbance of a locally over steep portion immediately
above the lower ramp iteration and increased water levels in the pile. It is likely that the
subsequent addition of water to the pile almost certainly accelerated the failure.

4.4.5 Summary and Further Work

The most recent failure is interpreted to have been the result of instability within failed material
and back fill placed within an earlier failure that was structurally influenced. The disturbance of
the failed pile by either ramp widening works at its toe or by blasting vibration is a possible
immediate cause for the initiation of the February 2012 failure. Another contributing factor is
likely to have been high ground water levels in the area, evidenced by a flowing weep hole
immediately above the failure. The extent and speed of failure is likely to have been
influenced by the high rainfall witnessed immediately prior to the collapse of the ramp.
The analyses undertaken suggest that the two episodes of failure on the Valehaichichi Pit
west wall can be interpreted as having different failure modes but have in common the
importance of water management in the area. In the context of slope stability, water
management includes both run off and groundwater.
Coffey Mining recommends that:
 Structural data from mapping and diamond drilling be assembled and reviewed for
trends, particularly the distribution of structures oriented close to batter faces such as the
back structure identified for this failure.
 The mechanical properties of the materials comprising slopes be adequately

characterised with consideration to spatial distribution, lithology, weathering and
alteration as a minimum.
 Slope stability analyses be undertaken for proposed slopes and existing slopes above
critical infrastructure or with high exposure of personnel below the slopes.
 Where designed and analysed slopes are steeper than has been previously mined and
found stable, then additional monitoring of deformation and groundwater levels should be
implemented.
 The need for slope depressurisation be assessed as part of the design process for
slopes at Gold Ridge.
 Surface water management practices be updated to include the instruction that run off
should be directed away from cracking and failures to the extent possible.
 Guidelines for stand off periods and re-entry processes be developed for areas of
recognised risk of failure, including with regard overspill from cutbacks above active area.
 Where possible, failures that have ‘come to rest’ not be disturbed and that if they are
mobilised then additional care be taken to limit exposure of personnel to potentially
unstable material and to minimise the inflow of water to the failed pile.
It is notable that the ramp was apparently operable for at least twelve months over back fill.
Coffey Mining cannot be confident this practice was appropriate or safe in the context of
locally high ground water and the potential for high rainfall events. In short, Coffey Mining

cannot recommend the backfilling of the failure and the re-opening of the ramp without
confidence that the material placed is of appropriate quality and that water levels within the
failure are demonstrably lowered.
The limitations of the data at hand (some mapping, limited hard copy structural logging,
limited material properties data, minimal groundwater information) prevented a realistic
assessment of the two proposed cutbacks for the west wall of Valehaichichi Pit. Coffey Mining
offers no specific conclusions as to the stability or otherwise of slopes in the VC2_RVS01_B
and VC2_RVS11_B cutbacks. Comparison of some of these slopes with existing slopes is
included in Section 7.
5 WASTE ROCK DUMPS
5.1 Previous Dump Facilities
Two previous dump facilities were observed. The recent site used by the current operators
and, apparently, by Ross Mining lies to the east of the heavy vehicle workshop in a valley with
comparatively flatter topography. The site was observed from afar and the crests were not
inspected. The older slopes are generally covered with low vegetation while the more recently
dumped material is bare. Slope angles could not be measured reliably in the field from the
location visited. Measurements from survey models show slopes approximately dipping
between 20° and 35°. Flatter slope angles do not seem to be associated with failures, rather
they represent source areas for material eroded and washed down onto the valley floor. Parts
of this site are still active although the percentage of waste delivered is reducing as shorter
haul tip heads are established.
Site personnel advised that a much earlier dump facility was developed in the Charivunga
River valley, downstream of the present Valehaichichi Pit. The timing of this facility is
uncertain with discussion as to whether it represents an early stage in the Ross Mining
operations (ie early 1990s) or waste from much earlier activities (perhaps 1970s or earlier).
Site personnel who grew up in the region recount that the dumps eroded into the river and
that what remains is much flatter than the original facility. The dumps are presently low and
support bushy vegetation and some trees. It was not possible to walk the dumps and make
reliable slope angle measurements.
5.2 Active Dumps
5.2.1 Dumping Strategy and Progress

The most active dump facility is into the Charivunga River valley to the immediate north of the
Valehaichichi Pit. The dumping strategy involves tipping from the level of the main haul road
at 400mRL to 415mRL onto the natural slopes of the valley (Figure 8 and Figure 10). Site
personnel report that the advance of the tip heads out into the valley at grade has been slow
as material has flowed away from the slope rather than built up.

Plans to refurbish the existing silt traps in the valley and to provide extra silt retention capacity
are apparently under way.
Figure9
Active dump facility to north of Valehaichichi Pit
(composite image from southern tip head and looking north)
5.2.2 Observed Dump Conditions

Dumps are being worked with trucks tipping short and the material being pushed to the edge
by a dozer.
The material observed being dumped was generally wet, with a high proportion of sand size
grains and finer (USCS SM Class material), reflecting the stripping of transitional material in
the Valehaichichi and Namachamata Pits. In places surface run off was being directed over
the tip head through gaps in the windrow.
Slope dips were measured at between 35° and 42°, with the lower part of the slope being
generally flatter where the material flows away from the dump (Figure 11 and Figure 12). The
northern tip head appears to be more advanced with the flat area below aiding retention of
tipped material. Site personnel report it is more stable than the southern tip head.
Significant amounts of material are moving from the rill slopes and are being carried down
slope (Figure 13). The flow of material is assumed to be principally water driven with channels
and some grading of material visible.

The lower reaches of the material flow were not observed nor was the condition of the
Charivunga River down slope of the dump.
Figure 10
Dumping strategy north of Valehaichichi Pit
ROM Pad
Proposed direction
of dump advance
Valehaichichi Pit
Figure 11
Southern active tip head with Valehaichichi Pit in back ground (looking south)

Figure 12
Active dump facility with northern tip head at right above a clear flat area (looking south)
Figure 13
Flow of dump material from southern active tip head (looking southeast)

5.2.3 Dump Stability Analysis

The stability analyses for dumps being established from the haul road out into the valley are,
at best, preliminary and should be used for comparative purposes only. Analyses have been
undertaken using the two dimensional limit equilibrium analysis package SLIDE v6 by
Rocscience. The analysis method adopted is Spencer and the failure path is assumed to be
circular. No attempt has been made to calculate probabilities of failure as there is insufficient
data to characterise the materials.
The northern tip head was used to help constrain material properties. The dumped volume
extends approximately 35m from the haul road across a horizontal cleared pad to form a 30m
high slope at 37°. The tipped material was assumed to have a bulk density of 1.8.
In keeping with the reports that this tip head is relatively stable, material properties were
iterated to give a minimum factor of safety greater than 1.0 and a factor of safety >1.1 more
than 2m from the crest.
Figure 14
Northern tip head model - saturated to 10m from road

For the fully drained case, it was found that using a friction angle of 37° and cohesion of 1kPa
satisfied these criteria. Partially saturated cases were run to simulate the impact of heavy rain
and added run off. The modelled factor of safety was found to be sensitive to the water table
profile. For a water table at surface level to 10m into the slope and joining the toe of the slope
by a straight line, the results were similar to the undrained case and the criteria were met
(Figure 14). For a water table extending 20m across the top of the dump then following a
straight line to the toe of the slope, it was found that both criteria were breached (Figure 15).
Figure 15
Northern tip head model - saturated to 20m from road
The general case of a tip head established out from a slope that is steep initially then flattens
into the valley is represented by a profile with a 59m high 37° slope below the road, followed
by a 20m high slope at 16° and a lower slope at 10° starting at 117m from the crest at ramp
level. The progression of the dump was considered with dump thicknesses at surface level of
10m, 20m, 30m, 40, and 50m simulated. This represents an increase in slope height from
39m to 56m.
In the drained case, friction angle of 37° and cohesion of 1kPa resulted in factors of safety
greater than 1.0 for all geometries tested. The thickness of the envelope of material with factor
of safety less than 1.1 ranged from 4.1m in a 10m wide dump (Figure 16) to 5.5m in a 50m
wide slope.

Figure 16
Model of general case dump - 10m width, drained conditions
In the wet case with the water table at surface level to 10m beyond the haul road crest then
following a straight line to the toe of the slope, all five geometries were found to have a factor
of safety less than 1.0 and the majority, if not all, of the dump with a factor of safety less than
1.1. The case with a 50m wide dump was the most stable with approximately 26m of dump
width sitting outside the factor of safety = 1.1 envelope (Figure 17).
These results are corroborated by reports from the field that the southern tip head being
established into the valley has not seen a significant stable advance into the valley while
regular heavy rainfall has occurred.
5.2.4 Summary and Further Work

Both the reported performance of the tip heads and the stability analysis indicate that
attempting to construct a tip head by direct tipping from haul road level is difficult and the
stability of the slope is borderline, especially where the dump foundation slopes down in the
direction of dumping.
In the absence of a supply of more competent broken material, it is recommended that

another dumping strategy be considered given the instability likely to be encountered.

Figure 17
Model of general case dump - 50m width, partially saturated conditions
Alternative dumping strategies that might improve stability while still accommodating large
volumes of material include building the dump in lower lifts from the bottom up, levelling the
dump floor before tipping from the road level, and constructing a permeable bund on the
flatter valley floor and continuing to tip from road level so that the material flows to the bund
and builds up. These options have not been analysed and will each require a more detailed
consideration of the ground conditions and the operational impacts.
If the current strategy is to be persisted with then, as a minimum pooling of runoff on top of the
dump should be avoided and direct drainage over the slope should be prevented. These may
be achieved by ensuring the top of the dump rises away from the road way, thereby forcing
the water back to the roadway and its drainage system.
While environmental issues are outside the scope of this project, it should be noted that the
high sediment load flowing towards the Charivunga River from the dump site has the potential
to cause significant environmental harm and community outrage. The sediment load from
mining activities reporting to the Charivunga River should be managed and kept at a level that
does not harm the use of the river by downstream communities or adversely impact the river
ecology.

6 SLOPE MONITORING
6.1 Existing Program
At the time of visiting, there was no systematic monitoring of slope deformations underway at
the Gold Ridge Mine. Extensometers and crack gauges were not in use although, except for
the cracking associated with the Valehaichichi west wall failure, no other cracking was
observed or reported and therefore the need for crack monitoring was not apparent.
A project was underway to establish a prism monitoring program. The survey department has
a Trimble S6 total station capable of prism monitoring tasks. The survey team advised that the
range of the S6 when shooting to prisms is more than 1000m. Depending on the particular
generation of the S6, manual surveying to passive prisms may have a range up 2500m
(Trimble 2011). The instrument is capable of manual and robotic operation, although in robotic
mode, significantly reduced ranges to passive prisms can be expected. This instrument
appears adequate to commence prism monitoring.
A recently fabricated prototype prism stand was observed in the survey office (Figure 18). The
stand appears adequate for the task although it remains to be confirmed that it can be
attached to benches sufficiently rigidly without the use of a base plate and that airflow past the
‘roof’ does not induce excessive vibration and loosening of the stand, particularly during high
rainfall storms.
6.2 Development of a Prism Monitoring Strategy
The deployment strategy for prism monitoring is in its infancy. The following general points
should be considered in developing the strategy:
 Prisms must be rigidly attached to the stands and the stands rigidly attached to the
ground. Prisms should face towards the total station to ensure maximum return signal to
the total station.
 The length of the prism stand should be high enough to get clear of near-surface thermal
effects but not so long as to be subject to excessive harmonic vibration in a breeze.
Determining the optimal stand length will likely involve iteration of design on review of
actual field data.
 With appropriate prisms or couplings, it is possible to attach prisms directly to the rock
face using mechanical anchors. For illustrative purposes and not intended as a
specification, a Leica GPR112 prism can screw directly onto a Ramset DP10125 124mm
long M8 Dynabolt installed in a solid piece of rock.
 Prisms can be used for pattern monitoring of a slope or for targetted monitoring of areas
of concern. Pattern monitoring involves the installation of prisms at regular spaced
intervals along berms to monitor differential movement over the slope as whole. Prisms
spaced at 50m to 100m on each berm can usually achieve this aim well. Targetted

monitoring can be used on features such as bullnoses, identified wedges and critical
infrastructure. In placing targetted prisms, it is advisable to consider the expected
mechanism of movement and have prisms on both the stable and active parts.
Figure 18
Prototype prism stand
 Instrument stations are ideally established in permanently accessible locations,

preferably not on fill. As the instrument stations are commonly also on the crest of a
slope that may be moving (this may also be the case for stations on fill), provision should
be made to recalibrate the location. This can be done by triangulating to reference prisms
at stable known locations away from the slope, resurveying of the pillar with long epoch
differential GPS measurements or a combination of optical and GPS approaches.
 While virtually all monitoring systems will produce prism data coordinated in mine grid
and give offsets in each of the grid axes, by virtue of the calculations employed, this data
will exhibit more scatter than would the slope distance measurement. Where the direction
of survey is sub-parallel to the expected direction of slope movement, then monitoring on
slope distance alone may be appropriate. If threshold alarms are to be set on the
component vector movements then the sensitivity adopted needs to consider the scatter
in the data that occurs as a function of optical surveying and is unrelated to significant
true deformation of the ground.

 Monitoring frequency should be determined based on both the rate of movement and the
criticality of the slope. Initially, high measurement frequencies are used for a period of
months to collect base line data. The frequency can be relaxed or accelerated as
deemed appropriate based on the observed slope behaviour.
7 COMPARISON OF SLOPECONDIFIGURATIONS
7.1 Mined Slopes
Several mined slopes were reviewed during the site visit. Slope heights and angles were
measured and a GSI rating made. The stability of the slope was assessed in terms of obvious
issues. The results of this survey are presented in Table 4.
Inspection of the three slopes labelled unstable indicates that in each case, the instability was
most likely structurally controlled. No large scale rock mass failure was observed at the site.
7.2 Local Natural Slopes
Natural slopes in the vicinity of Gold Ridge may give an indication of stable configurations
over the longer term. Slopes were identified in the LIDAR survey provided by site staff and
selected from the vicinity of the existing pits on the north western side of the Charivunga
River. This improved the likelihood the slopes were in similar lithologies to the mined slopes
and were subject to similar pervasive structural trends. Slope heights and angles were
measured from the LIDAR survey and the results are included in Table 4.
Assessment of the ground conditions at these sites was not undertaken given time
constraints, difficulty of access and the vegetation cover. For the purpose of analysis, these
natural slopes are assumed to be stable.
7.3 Designed Slopes
Slopes in the two planned Valehaichichi cutbacks were measured for slope height and angle.
This data is included in Table 5.
7.4 Summary and Further Work
Charting of slope heights against slope angles is an approach used by several authors to get
an initial estimate of stable slope configurations by comparison with mined configurations
seen elsewhere (Read & Stacey 2009). The charts are commonly annotated with a curve
bounding the bulk of stable data points and this can be considered an experience envelope.
The underlying assumption is that any failure is failure through rock mass and is not
structurally controlled. It does not provide a rigorous slope design, rather it is best used as a
check on a conventional design to see where it plots amongst existing slopes of known
stability.

Table 4
Valehaichichi Slope Failure Investigations
Summary of existing slopes (coordinates relate to the toe of the slope)
Height Angle
Slope Northing Easting Elevation Stability Facing GSI Description
(m) (°)
Pit 01 40910 23660 428 16 48 Stable E 50 Transitional. Bedding dipping 15° NW
Fairly fresh andesite dyke in pitward dipping poorly sorted conglomertic sandstone.
Pit 02 40816 23589 430 44 25 Stable SE 40
Water flowing from face ~30m to the north
Borderline unstable with unstable wedge developing (may be underscaled after
Pit 03a 40763 23563 430 30 42 Unstable E 55
blasting). Transitional sandstone
Pit 03b 40763 23563 430 52 32 Stable E Overall slope
Pit 04 41386 23908 399 33 42 Stable E 40 Mostly oxidised with some transition at the bottom with 2-3m soil at top.
Pit 05 41665 24553 427 17 49 Stable E 30 Steep cutting in soil and oxide. Few structures visible
Pit 06 40486 23526 440 38 38 Stable SE Bullnose. Water flowing @ 10-20Lt/m through floor of new ramp
Pit 07 41212 23862 406 29 37 Stable E 35 Flat bedding in places. Broken, rocky cobbles
Pit 08a 41569 24158 372 33 35 Stable SE Slopes around waste dump (vegetated)
Pit 08a 41569 24158 372 78 35 Stable SE Overall slope (vegetated)
Pit 09 40998 24043 283 154 29 Stable E Overall excavated Val pit slope, just south of failure
Cutting above lower borrow pit. Gravelly matrix supported conglomerate, weakly
Pit 10a 41335 23702 475 20 60 Stable E
cemented.
Pit 10b 41335 23702 475 10 80 Stable E Overall slope
Pit 11 41005 23960 319 44 37 Stable E Val pit inter-ramp slope around to south from failure
Pit 12 40922 23975 328 19 36 Unstable NE Wedge failure on Val south wall
Pit 13 41113 24167 292 42 30 Stable S Val north wall above ramp
Pit 14 41123 23988 323 50 29 Unstable E Failed Val inter-ramp slope
Pit 15 40946 24048 289 41 44 Stable NE Val pit lower inter-ramp slope, south wall
Mixed 41072 24062 287 230 25 Stable E Mixed natural and excavated slope through Val pit west wall
Valley 1 41495 25073 216 191 34 Stable SE Above bend in Chovohio River
Valley 2 40452 23707 345 85 40 Stable SE Above bend in Chovohio River
Valley 3 41321 24546 311 39 29 Stable SW Side of gully
Valley 4 40774 24234 282 34 33 Stable S Above bend in Chovohio River
Valley 5 41292 24861 230 211 29 Stable S Above bend in Chovohio River
Valley 6 41111 23627 438 75 26 Stable S Side of gully south of borrow pit
Valley 7 40614 23994 302 53 36 Stable SE Slope above Chovohio River
Valley 8 40283 23700 379 44 46 Stable SE Slope above Chovohio River
Valley 9 40975 24436 262 14 31 Stable S Slope above Chovohio River

Table 4
Valehaichichi Slope Failure Investigations
Summary of design slopes for the Valehaichichi Pit
Slope Height Angle Stability Facing Description

vc2_rvs01 18 60 Design E Batter scale
vc2_rvs01 65 37 Design E Highest west wall IR slope - upper single lane area
Overall west wall slope - upper dual lane area &
vc2_rvs01 126 44 Design E
lower single lane
Overall west wall slope - upper single lane area and
vc2_rvs01 122 46 Design E
lower single lane
vc2_rvs01 65 52 Design S Northern slope (no ramps)
vc2_rvs11 113 43 Design NE Overall SW slope with 2 x large berms
vc2_rvs11 94 35 Design S Overall north slope including a ramp
vc2_rvs11 40 30 Design S Slope above north wall ramp
The plot of mined and natural slopes near the Valehaichichi and Namachamata Pits is shown in Figure
19. A curve has been added to bound the population of data points. Excavated slopes cover a wider
range of angles than natural slopes, perhaps reflecting the impact of erosion and weathering. The
unstable slopes plot amidst a cluster of stable slopes, supporting the conclusion that they are
structurally controlled.
When the slopes observed at Gold Ridge are compared to published data (Figure 20), it is apparent
that the local data plots generally lower and flatter than the international collection. This is most likely
associated with the rock mass at Gold Ridge averaging in the R2 Rock Class while the published data
points relate to higher strength rock masses.
Slopes in the two planned Valehaichichi Pit cutbacks (VC2_RVS01_B and VC2_RVS11_B) were
measured and they plot across the Gold Ridge envelope (Figure 20). At lower angles, the slopes lie
within the collection of existing slopes; at higher angles, slopes greater than one batter in height plot on
the high side of the experience curve. At a crude level, this suggests the proposed slopes may be
overly steep and that stability issues may be encountered.
Coffey Mining recommends that geotechnical analysis by more rigorous methods be undertaken for all
designed slopes at the Gold ridge Mine to ensure the proposed configurations are stable.

Figure 19
Slope heights and angles of existing slopes in the vicinity of the Vlahaichichi and Namachamata Pit
Gold Ridge Mine slopes draining west to Charivunga
River
300
250
200
Slope Height (m)
150
100
50
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Slope Angle (degrees)
Gold Ridge Envelope Excavated Slopes ‐ Stable Excavated Slopes ‐ Unstable

Natural Slopes ‐ Stable Mixed ‐ Stable

Figure 20
Existing Gold Ridge slopes, Valehaichichi design slopes and comparison with published configurations (after
Read & Stacey 2009 and Sjoberg 2000)
Valehaichichi design slopes relative to published data

(after Read & Stacey 2009 & Sjoberg 2000)
1200
Gold Ridge Envelope
1000 VC2_RVS11_B
VC2_RVS01_B
Existing Gold Ridge slopes
800
Slope Height (m)
600
400
200
0
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Slope Angle (degrees)

8 BENCHMARKING OF GEOTECHNICAL PROGRAM
8.1 Published Guidance
Read & Stacey (2009) have provided guidelines for the typical level of investigation and
design effort expected at various stages of project development (summarised in Table 6).
These have been adopted as a scale against which to assess the geotechnical program at
the Gold Ridge Mine.
Table 6
Benchmarking of Geotechnical Program
Focus of geotechnical program through project cycle (adapted from Read & Stacey 2009)
Project Level Geotechnical Focus of geotechnical work

level
Conceptual Level 1 Regional scale characterisation of geology, structure and groundwater.
Review of literature and work at sites in similar conditions to guide slope
assumptions.
Pre-feasibility Level 2 Mine scale characterisation of geology, structure and groundwater.
Strength testing of materials from the deposit.
Development of 3D models of geology and geotechnical variability.
Feasibility Level 3 Slope scale characterisation of geology, structure and groundwater.
Delineation of geotechnical domains.
Infill and targeted data collection for geology, structure, groundwater
and material properties.
Refinements to 3D models
Initial estimates of blasting and groundwater management
requirements.
Design and Level 4 Increasing confidence in pit slope designs with additional data collection
Construction and refinements to 3D models.
Commence monitoring of slopes.
Refine groundwater management and blasting activities.
Operations Level 5 Ongoing maintenance of the geology and geotechnical data sets and
models.
Monitoring of slope performance.
Data collection to support slope design optimisation, particularly for
subsequent stages.
8.2 Status of the Geotechnical Program at Gold Ridge Mine
The Gold Ridge project has been the subject of feasibility studies for resources, mining and
processing (Ausenco 2007 and earlier). A gap analysis between the current status and the
geotechnical Level 3, recommended for Feasibility stage projects, has been undertaken. A
summary is presented in Table 7.

Table 7
Benchmarking of Geotechnical Program
Assessed status of the geotechnical program at Gold Ridge Mine and gap analysis to Level 3 status
Geotechnical Level Level Level Level Level

Summary of gaps to Level 3
Level 1 2 3 4 5
Geological Missing a true 3D model of lithology and alteration
model using both drilling and mapping data.
Major
Missing true 3D model using both drilling and
structural
mapping data.
model
No stereographic analysis for the deposits since the
preliminary work by Golder in 1996.
Rock mass
Domain assumptions underpinning slope
fabric model
configuration recommendations to be confirmed
against additional drilling and mapping.
No monitoring program. Groundwater information not
stored coherently.
Hydrogeologi No groundwater model.
cal model Dewatering strategy once pits are below valley floor
level not apparent.
Need for depressurisation not assessed.
Laboratory strength testing needed for representative
Intact rock suite of wall rocks from each deposit.
strength Confirmation of assumed bulk density values.
Collation of data in central location.
Shear
Laboratory strength testing needed for representative
strength of
suite of wall rocks from each deposit.
structural
Collation of data in central location.
defects
Need to compile & document mine-scale geotechnical
Geotechnical
data.
characterisati
Establish geotechnical database and 3D model.
on
Check proposed designs against available data.
8.3 Summary
Coffey Mining has reviewed the geotechnical program at the Gold Ridge Mine and concluded
that it is generally at Level 1 to Level 2 status on the scale proposed by Read & Stacey
(2009). It was not apparent that any pit geotechnical design work had been done since the
study by Golder in 1996. That study was based on a low data density and limited exposures
and focussed on the Valehaichichi, Kupers and Dawsons deposits. No geotechnical work
relating to the active Namachamata Pit was available for review.

At a high level, the key gaps to Level 3 are:
 A lack of true three dimensional models of geology, alteration, structure, groundwater

levels and geotechnical domains.
 Insufficient characterisation of material strengths.
 The impact of groundwater levels on slope stability has not been adequately considered
and the need for depressurisation has not been assessed.
 Limited analysis of the impact of structural trends (mine scale and bench scale) on slope
stability.
Coffey Mining recommends that:
 Efforts be directed to achieve at least Level 3 status for the active deposits as soon as
possible.
 A program to bring the active mining areas to Level 5 status be developed and
implemented.
 The development of the Dawsons and Kupers deposits occur once at least Level 3
status has been achieved for those deposits and that work programs are put in place to
achieve Level 5 status as the pits are established and operated.
8.4 Recommended Immediate Additional Work
The following work is recommended for immediate action in support of pit design and can
probably be undertaken with the skills set available amongst Gold Ridge staff at present:
 Structural mapping of mined slopes and logging of diamond core from within pit
footprints, including the collection of defect properties for use in geotechnical analysis.
 Monitor water levels in open exploration holes and document seepage from natural and
mined slopes around the deposits.
 Document protocols for working around slopes in high rain and on foot.
 Implement the planned prism monitoring program.
 Review ‘legacy’ data from earlier operators and merge into current datasets.
8.5 Recommended Subsequent Work
The following work should be undertaken as part of the effort to achieve Level 3 designs for
active and proposed mining areas:
 Develop (and maintain) 3D models for lithology, alteration, mine scale structure and
water table.

 Collate and review structural data from mapping and drilling. Establish preliminary
geotechnical domains and identify gaps requiring additional drilling or mapping.
 Undertake laboratory strength testing of core samples from the various deposits
representing the range of lithologies and alteration states. Include empirical strength
estimates as part of the logging schema and assess the need for routine index tests of
strength of core samples at site (ie point load testing or similar).
 Establish acceptance criteria for factor of safety and probability of failure to aid in
assessing slope designs.
 Assess the need for slope depressurisation and detailed groundwater modelling.
Included in this work should be an assessment of the sensitivity of stable slope designs
to groundwater conditions.
 Undertake geotechnical reviews of existing slope designs and establish a process to

ensure geotechnical considerations are incorporated into future slope designs. This work
should include both kinematic and rock mass analyses.
This program of work may require external assistance. Coffey Mining can provide support on
both technical matters and in training Gold Ridge personnel to continue work programs.

9 REFERENCES
Ausenco (2007) Gold Ridge Project Feasibility Study. Submitted to Australian Solomons Gold Limited.
Coffey Mining (2012) Valehaichichi West Wall Failure Review and General geotechnical Comments.
Progress Summary, MINEABTF0401AA. 14 Feb 2012.
Golder Associates (1996) Geotechnical Investigation for Open Pit Mining, Gold Ridge Project, Guadalcanal
Island Solomon Islands. Submitted to Ross Mining NL.
Golder Associates (2004) Geotechnical and Environmental Investigation of the Gold Ridge Mine Site,
Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands. Submitted to CDC Capital Partners
Golder Associates (2011) Competent Persons’ Report Gold Ridge Gold Project, Guadalcanal, Solomon
Islands. Submitted to Allied Gold Limited
James, R. (1996) Geology and Resource Evaluation, Gold Ridge Project, Solomon Islands. Ross Mining NL.
To page 21 only.
Read, J. & Stacey, P. (2009) Guidelines for Open Pit Slope Design. CSIRO Publishing, Collingwood
Trimble (2011) Trimble S6 Total Station Datasheet. Accessed 10 February 2012 from
http://trl.trimble.com/docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-208580/022543-
098K_TrimbleS6_DS_1011_LR.pdf
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2011) Solomon Islands: Natural Hazard Risks. Map
OCHA_PHL_Hazard_v3_110606, issued 1 March 2011. Accessed from
http://ochaonline.un.org/roap/MapCentre/HazardMaps/tabid/3725/language/en-US/Default.aspx
United States Geological Survey (2010) Magnitude/Intensity Comparison. Accessed from

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/topics/mag_vs_int.php

Appendix A
Select Drill Data from Valahaichichi Pit Sections
41,050 mN, 41,100 mN, 41,150 mN
Appendix B
Summary of Regional Geological Environment
Appendix C
Detailed Field Observations

MINEABTF00401AA - Geotechnical Benchmarking and Valehaichichi Slope Failure Investigation - v01

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Geotechnical Benchmarking and

Gold Ridge Mining Limited

Gold Ridge Mine

Attention: Kevin Crossling

RE: Geotechnical Benchmarking and Valehaichichi Slope Failure Investigation

 a preliminary assessment of the level of geotechnical confidence in the current designs,

For and on behalf of Coffey Mining Pty Ltd

Coffey Mining Pty Ltd ABN 52 065 481 209

Author(s): Michael Morrongiello Associate Geotechnical Engineer

Date: 14 May 2012

Project Number: MINEABTF00401AA

Version / Status: v.01

F:\MINE\Melb - Mining\Gold Ridge Mining Ltd\MINEABTF00401AA_GRML - Gold Ridge Mine Failure

Print Date: Wednesday, 16 May 2012

Document Change Control

Version Description (section(s) amended) Author(s) Date

Document Review and Sign Off

Primary Author Supervising Principal

Gold Ridge Mine – MINEABTF00401AA

5 WASTE ROCK DUMPS .............................................................................................................. 17

6 SLOPE MONITORING ................................................................................................................ 25

Gold Ridge Mine – MINEABTF00401AA

Table 1 – Slope History of Valehaichichi Pit west wall 8

Table 4 – Summary of existing slopes 28

Table 5 – Summary of design slopes for the Valehaichichi Pit 29

Table 6 – Focus of geotechnical program through project cycle 32

Figure 1 – Valehaichichi Pit west wall 4

Figure 2 – Survey Pickup of Valehaichichi west wall from 8 February 2012 5

Figure 3 – Survey of Valehaichichi Pit coloured by elevation and slope dip 9

Figure 9 – Active dump facility to north of Valehaichichi Pit 18

Figure 10 – Dumping strategy north of Valehaichichi Pit 19

Figure 12 – Active dump facility with northern tip head 20

Figure 18 – Prototype prism stand 26

Gold Ridge Mine – MINEABTF00401AA

Appendix A – Selected Drill Data from Valahaichichi Pit

Appendix B – Summary of Regional Geological Environment

Appendix C – Detailed Field Observations

Gold Ridge Mine – MINEABTF00401AA

Michael Morrongiello, Associate Geotechnical Engineer, attended site on behalf of Coffey

The scope of this study included the following:

 Undertake a preliminary assessment of the level of geotechnical confidence in the

 From this work, provide recommendations as appropriate.

In 1996 Ross Mining commissioned Golder Associates (Golder) to undertake geotechnical

 60° batter face angle in oxidised or significantly altered material

Gold Ridge Mine – MINEABTF00401AA Page: 1

 70° batter face angle in unweathered material

 15m high batter faces

 6m wide berm widths

 Depressurisation of the slope as deemed appropriate following a groundwater monitoring

 60° batter face angle in oxidised or significantly altered material

 70° batter face angle in unweathered material

 20m high batter faces

 5m wide berm widths

Gold Ridge Mine – MINEABTF00401AA Page: 2

4 VALEHAICHICHI PIT – WEST WALL FAILURE

4.1 Description of Failure

Gold Ridge Mine – MINEABTF00401AA Page: 3

4.2 Geological and Geotechnical Setting of the Failure

 Bedding has a shallow dip (13°) to the NNE.

Gold Ridge Mine – MINEABTF00401AA Page: 4

 The degree of weathering is described as “transitional” by site geologists. The bulk

Gold Ridge Mine – MINEABTF00401AA Page: 5

o Intact UCS = 32 MPa