Professional Documents
Culture Documents
EXHIBIT 1
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LAURENCE SCHNEIDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
CHAD A. READLER
Acting Assistant Attorney General
CHANNING D. PHILLIPS
United States Attorney
MICHAEL S. RAAB
ADAM C. JED
(202) 514-8280
Attorneys, Appellate Staff
Civil Division, Room 7240
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
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The named plaintiffs are United States of America, ex rel. Laurence Schneider;
rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Indiana, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Iowa, ex
Laurence Schneider; State of Nevada, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of New Jersey,
ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of New Mexico, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of
New York, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of North Carolina, ex rel. Laurence
Association; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; and Chase Home Finance, LLC. The United
The plaintiff-appellant is appealing from the December 22, 2016 judgment and
decision issued by the Honorable Rosemary M. Collyer, United States District Court
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for the District of Columbia, in Case No. 14-cv-1047, ECF Nos. 118 and 119. The
district court’s opinion and order are reproduced in the Joint Appendix at JA1 and
C. Related Cases
This case has not previously been before this or any other court. The plaintiff-
consent judgment, which was entered in United States v. Bank of America Corp., No. 12-
cv-361 (D.D.C.). This Court heard an appeal arising from that case, United States v.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
GLOSSARY
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 11
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 25
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
ii
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page(s)
Cumberland Coal Res., LP v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n,
717 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ....................................................................................... 15
*Frew v. Hawkins,
540 U.S. 431 (2004) ..............................................................................................13, 15, 16
*Peacock v. Thomas,
516 U.S. 349 (1996) ...................................................................................................... 9, 15
Salazar v. Buono,
559 U.S. 700 (2010) .......................................................................................................... 15
Segar v. Mukasey,
508 F.3d 16 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ........................................................................................... 20
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby,
137 S. Ct. 436 (2016) ........................................................................................................ 23
v
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United States ex rel. Onnen v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 49-5,
688 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................... 24
U.S. Constitution:
Amend. VI ............................................................................................................................. 21
Statutes:
Rule:
Legislative Material:
Other Authorities:
vii
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GLOSSARY
JA Joint Appendix
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LAURENCE SCHNEIDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
This is a qui tam suit brought under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et
seq. (FCA), alleging misconduct by JPMorgan Chase Bank. Among other things, the
relator alleges that Chase falsely claimed to have complied with several requirements
under the National Mortgage Settlement consent judgment to avoid making additional
payments to the United States. The district court dismissed the case, holding, inter
alia, that the FCA claims relating to that settlement could not proceed because the
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declined to intervene in the case. And although we are a party to the National
Mortgage Settlement, we have not asked the district court that issued the consent
judgment to enforce the judgment’s terms against Chase. But the United States, in
whose name and whose behalf this False Claims Act suit was brought, has an interest
in the resolution of the “exhaustion” issue before this Court. The United States is a
party to the National Mortgage Settlement, which involves not just Chase but several
other banks. And the United States is a party to other settlements and contracts that
can give rise to suits under the False Claims Act and to other actions (civil or criminal)
Whether a False Claims Act suit may allege fraud arising from the National
The issue on which we are participating does not directly concern the text of
2
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provisions of the National Mortgage Settlement consent judgment. For the Court’s
The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., is used broadly “in defending the
Federal treasury,” and it is a “powerful tool in deterring fraud.” S. Rep. No. 345, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986). Congress enacted the FCA in 1863 “with the principal goal
of stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by large private contractors during the
Civil War.” Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781
(2000) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). But the Act was intended to
“reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the
Government.” United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968).
Many of the Act’s “prohibitions can be enforced through both criminal and
civil actions by the federal government.” United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., 791
F.3d 112, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2015).1 “In addition, the Act authorizes private individuals—
known as relators—to bring a qui tam civil action ‘in the name of the Government,’
§ 3730(b)(1), (d); see generally Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 781. A civil suit may be
1
The original Act “provided both criminal and civil sanctions.” Rainwater v.
United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 n.8 (1958). “The criminal provision remains on the
books and is currently codified separately, as amended, at 18 U.S.C. § 287.” Vermont
Agency, 529 U.S. at 782 n.11.
3
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brought either by the Attorney General or a relator seeking civil penalties plus three
The FCA imposes civil liability for a variety of deceptive practices involving
government funds and property. Among other things, the Act renders liable any
pay or transmit money or property to the Government,” id. § 3729(a)(1)(G); and any
person who “conspires” to engage in such acts, id. § 3729(a)(1)(C); see id. § 3729(b)(1)
(defining “knowingly”).
In March 2012, the United States, forty-nine states, and the District of
Columbia filed a complaint and proposed consent judgment in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia against several mortgage servicers,
including JPMorgan Chase. JA2; United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., 753 F.3d 1335,
4
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1336 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 2 The complaint alleged a variety of misconduct in
the servicers’ home mortgage practices, and the proposed consent judgment
implemented a negotiated settlement. Ibid.; see Dkt. Nos. 10-14, United States v. Bank
2012) (Consent J.); Consent J. Ex. D. The United States released a number of claims
but did not release “[a]ny liability based upon obligations created by th[e] Consent
The consent judgment also contains provisions for monitoring the banks’
§§ C(1), (5), D; creation of metrics for evaluating compliance with certain servicing
standards, Consent J. Ex. E § C(12), (23) & Sch. E-1; and rules governing
2
The other defendant banks were Ally, Bank of America, Citibank, and Wells
Fargo. See United States. v. Bank of Am., No. 12-cv-361 (D.D.C.).
5
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The parties agreed that if Chase fails to meet its consumer relief obligations,
Chase would “pay an amount equal to 125% of the unmet commitment,” or 140% in
for which there are established metrics, if the Monitor concludes that Chase is
exceeding the allowable error rate, the Monitor notifies Chase of a “Potential
Violation,” and Chase has a right to cure within a set time frame. Consent J. Ex. E,
§§ D(3), (5), E(1)-(6). If Chase cures, there is no other “remedy under th[e] Consent
Judgment . . . with respect to such Potential Violation.” Id. § E(6). If Chase does not
timely cure such a “Potential Violation,” “[i]n the event of an action to enforce
[Chase’s] obligations,” the court can order “non-monetary equitable relief, including
injunctive relief, directing specific performance under the terms of th[e] Consent
Judgment, or other non-monetary corrective action,” and the court “may award”
agreed-to “civil penalties.”4 Id. § J(3)(a), (b). With respect to other alleged
other obligations—the court may order only non-monetary injunctive relief. Id.
§ J(3), (a); see United States v. Bank of Am., 78 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (D.D.C. 2015).
3
If there is a “payment due” under the provision governing unmet consumer
relief obligations, one half “shall be allocated to the United States” and the other half
divided among the state parties. Consent J. Ex. E, § J(3)(c)(3).
4
Penalties based on servicing standards are generally paid to the states, unless
the standard relates to conduct in bankruptcy, in which case it is paid to the United
States or as otherwise directed by the Director of the United States Trustee Program.
Consent J. Ex. E, § J(3)(c)(1)-(2).
6
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The “Enforcement Terms” also state that Chase’s “obligations under this
Consent Judgment shall be enforceable solely in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia” and that “[a]n enforcement action under th[e] Consent
Judgment may be brought by any Party to this Consent Judgment or the Monitoring
enforcement action, a Party must provide notice to the Monitoring Committee of its
intent to bring an action to enforce th[e] Consent Judgment.” Ibid. The committee
then has “21 days to determine whether to bring an enforcement action.” Ibid. If the
committee declines to do so, “the Party must wait 21 additional days . . . before
The United States has not invoked the consent judgment’s procedures or
otherwise asked the district court to enforce the terms of the judgment against Chase.
Based on the information currently available to it, including the reports filed by the
Monitor, the United States is unaware of any violation of the agreed-to terms.
1. The plaintiff in this case is a relator who filed a qui tam suit against
JPMorgan Chase under the False Claims Act and similar state laws. JA27, JA39,
JA94-JA116 (Second Am. Compl.). As relevant here, relator alleges that Chase
violated the so-called “reverse” provision of the False Claims Act when Chase claimed
to have complied with various aspects of the National Mortgage Settlement, thereby
avoiding additional payments and penalties required under the consent judgment.
7
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JA27, JA35, JA70-JA75, JA80-JA95. That FCA provision imposes liability on any
person who, among other things, “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
JA23 (order). As relevant here, the court held that relator could not sue because he
Mortgage Settlement before filing suit.” JA12-JA14. The court reasoned that in a
False Claims Act suit, “Relator stands in the position of the Federal Government,”
and the federal government could not sue Chase before following the consent
included “notice to the allegedly noncompliant bank, the Monitor, and the
days for the Monitoring Committee to consider whether it would sue, and then
5
The United States declined to intervene in the suit, Dkt. Nos. 24, 96, as did
other states, under whose state False Claims Acts the relator had also brought suit,
see, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 25-37, 41, 43, 70-72, 75-76, 83, 95, 97, 104.
8
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
action under th[e] Consent Judgment” governs a specific type of action—one asking
the district court to enforce that judgment, i.e., to compel compliance with the terms
of the judgment. This term does not govern the broader set of actions—civil or
to use its inherent authority to compel compliance with that judgment. The term
governing source of law. And the “enforcement of a judgment” is “[a] court’s action
to compel a person to comply with the terms of a judgment.” Black’s Law Dictionary
645 (10th ed. 2014). This is ordinarily an invocation of a court’s inherent power to
enforce its judgments, see Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1996), and is
equally true for consent judgments, where a “breach of the agreement would be a
violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would
therefore exist.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). In other
judgment.
Conversely, in common legal usage, a suit filed under the False Claims Act is
not described a suit under the contract or program that gave rise to the alleged
9
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Claims Act.” Many garden-variety FCA suits allege that the defendant engaged in
obligations under a contract. It does not follow that compliance with contractual
dispute-resolution mechanisms is necessary before the United States (or a relator) can
bring such FCA suits. Nor does it follow that such mechanisms govern other civil or
If Chase failed to satisfy the requirements of the consent judgment, the United
States could avail itself of the judgment’s remedies and ask the district court to
enforce that judgment. But even if Chase’s alleged misconduct also constituted a
violation of the consent judgment, the FCA suit here is an effort to enforce the
distinct (though overlapping) obligations imposed by the FCA. Indeed, a suit under
the False Claims Act does not merely allege that Chase breached an agreed-to
obligation. The False Claims Act is not a vehicle for punishing garden-variety
requirement. Whatever expectation Chase may have had about the procedures
outlined in the agreement, Chase could have had no reasonable expectation that
would have to be routed through the procedures described in the consent judgment.
If there were any doubts, several other provisions and applicable interpretive
FCA action. These include unitary references to the court where the consent
judgment is filed and enforced; textual clues suggesting that there is only a single type
enforcement action; and a presumption that contracts would not constrain the
ability of the United States and state governments, established by statute, to pursue
STANDARD OF REVIEW
States v. Bank of Am. Corp., 753 F.3d 1335, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
ARGUMENT
The relator in this case filed suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et
seq. (FCA), alleging, among other things, that JPMorgan Chase knowingly engaged in
fraudulent conduct to conceal and to avoid a financial obligation to the United States.
The United States declined to intervene in this suit and does not take the position that
Chase failed to comply with the terms agreed to in the National Mortgage Settlement.
But the United States has a significant interest in the legal theory underlying the
The district court held that before the United States or a relator could bring a
False Claims Act suit premised on fraud in the execution of the settlement agreement,
11
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under th[e] Consent Judgment.” 6 That holding appears to rest on the mistaken
premise that the United States (and the forty-nine state parties) agreed to undertake
the pre-enforcement procedures before bringing any action where the factual
allegations include failure to comply with the agreed-to terms of the consent
judgment.
Judgment” governs a specific type of action—one asking the district court to compel
compliance with the terms of the judgment. It does not govern the broader set of
actions—civil or criminal—where the agreed-to terms are the backdrop for an alleged
fraud and one allegation would also establish noncompliance with the judgment.
6
The district court appears to have made one error in describing those
procedures. In addition to describing the procedure of notifying and waiting for the
Monitoring Committee, the district court stated that “a party wishing to dispute
compliance by a signatory bank” would first have to “give notice to the allegedly
noncompliant bank, the Monitor, and the Monitoring Committee” and “engage in
good faith efforts to reach agreement.” JA13. We do not understand that provision
to apply here or to be a condition precedent to an enforcement action. In a section
titled “Dispute Resolution Procedures,” the consent judgment provides that Chase,
“the Monitor, and the Monitoring Committee will engage in good faith efforts to
reach agreement on the proper resolution of any dispute concerning any issue arising
under th[e] Consent Judgment,” and that “[s]ubject to” the enforcement section
described below, “in the event that a dispute cannot be resolved,” they “may petition
the Court for resolution of the dispute.” Consent J. Ex. E, § G. Those “Dispute
Resolution Procedures” do not refer to the government parties (the United States and
the various states), but just to the “Servicer [(banks)], the Monitor, and the
Monitoring Committee.” Ibid. Moreover, those procedures are not described as a
prerequisite to an enforcement action. Ibid.
12
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under multiple sources of law for the same conduct. And like other actions for fraud,
FCA suits must allege more than a failure to comply with agreed-to terms, including
scienter. In particular, whatever expectation Chase may have had about remedies,
Chase could not have reasonably expected that knowingly making false statements,
United States would be remedied only within the limited procedures set out for
enforcement actions and not under other sources of law, such as the False Claims Act.
The agreement is the backdrop for the alleged misconduct. But the charge of fraud is
injunction, or some other form of specific relief, and that is formally entered by the
court and enforceable by contempt.” 20 Charles Alan Wright & Mary Kay Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 104, at 879 n.2 (2d ed. 2017 Supp.). It “embodies an
agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual in nature.” Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992). “But it is an agreement that the
parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree
that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.” Ibid.;
see Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004). A consent judgment is interpreted
13
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pursuant to “standard principles of contract law.” United States v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
753 F.3d 1335, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (interpreting same judgment).
Ex. E, the judgment provides that it “shall be filed in the U.S. District Court for the
further explains that “obligations under th[e] Consent Judgment shall be enforceable
solely in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia” and that “[a]n
enforcement action under th[e] Consent Judgment may be brought by any Party to
th[e] Consent Judgment or the Monitoring Committee.” Id. § J(2). Ordinarily, “prior
Judgment.” Ibid. The committee then has “21 days to determine whether to bring an
enforcement action.” Ibid. If the committee declines to do so, “the Party must wait
court’s inherent authority to compel compliance with its judgment. The procedures
must occur before “commencing any enforcement action,” which is most naturally
Consent Judgment,” Consent J. Ex. E, § J(2), rather than governing any enforcement
action of any kind (such as an action concerning unrelated subject matter). Although
the word “under” does not have a “uniform, consistent meaning,” Kirtsaeng v. John
14
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Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1359 (2013), the term “enforcement action under”
ordinarily refers to the cause of action and/or the governing source of law. See, e.g.,
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 86 (1998) (“enforcement action under
Know Act of 1986”); General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 535 (1990)
(“enforcement action under § 113(b) of the [Clean Air] Act”); Cumberland Coal Res., LP
v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 717 F.3d 1020, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
comply with the terms of a judgment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 645 (10th ed. 2014); see,
e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 712 (2010). This is ordinarily not an action brought
jurisdiction” to use its “inherent power to enforce its judgments.” See Peacock v.
Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1996); see also Riggs v. Johnson Cty., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
166, 187 (1868) (“if the power is conferred to render the judgment or enter the
decree, it also includes the power to issue proper process to enforce such judgment or
This is equally true with respect to consent judgments. A key reason to submit
a settlement for entry by the court as a consent judgment is to render the agreement
“enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to
other judgments and decrees.” Frew, 540 U.S. at 437; see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
15
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Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 380-381 (1994). A “breach of the agreement would be a
violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would
therefore exist.” Id. at 381; see Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378 (consent decree “is an agreement
that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial
decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and
decrees”); Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990) (describing “inherent
power” to “enforce the consent judgment”); Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 995 F.2d
280, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (similar); see also Frew, 540 U.S. at 439 (“enforcing the
decree vindicates an agreement”); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 292
(1906) (similar).
consent judgments, they are generally referring to requests that courts use their
inherent authority to compel compliance with the judgment. E.g., Thatcher v. Kohl’s
Dep’t Stores, Inc., 397 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (only a party to the consent
decree may “proceed with a contempt action to enforce the judgment under the terms
of the consent judgment”); Tourangeau v. Uniroyal, Inc., 101 F.3d 300, 305, 308, 309 (2d
Judgment”); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629, 639-640 (1st Cir. 1989)
(describing possible “action to enforce the consent judgment”); see also, e.g., Beckett,
995 F.2d at 286 (court had authority in “action to enforce th[e] Consent Decree”
because “a trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce consent decrees”); Sault Ste. Marie
16
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Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 271 F.3d 235, 238 (6th Cir. 2001) (“the continuing
original lawsuit”); Solis v. Current Dev. Corp., 557 F.3d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 2009)
This case is not an enforcement action under the consent judgment. Instead, it
is a suit under the False Claims Act alleging fraud against the United States. As noted,
the term “enforcement action under” ordinarily refers to the cause of action and/or
the governing source of law. Thus, in common legal usage, a suit filed under the False
Claims Act is not a suit under the contract or program that gave rise to the alleged
fraudulent conduct. Instead, it is an “action under the False Claims Act.” See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 929 (2009) (“when the
United States declines to formally intervene in a qui tam action brought under the
False Claims Act”); id. at 932 (“A private enforcement action under the FCA is called
a qui tam action”); United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 595-596 (1958) (“This case . .
forfeitures under the False Claims Act.”); United States ex rel. Burke v. Record Press, Inc.,
816 F.3d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“when resolving an action under the False Claims
Act, including one implicating a contract”); United States ex rel. Davis v. District of
Columbia, 793 F.3d 120, 125 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (describing what can “serve as the basis
17
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for a qui tam action under the [False Claims Act]”) (court’s alteration); United States v.
Van Oosterhout, 96 F.3d 1491, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“The government filed this
action under the False Claims Act to recover monies paid out under Small Business
If Chase failed to satisfy the requirements of the consent judgment, the United
States could avail itself of the consent judgment’s remedies and ask the district court
to enforce the judgment. But even if Chase’s alleged misconduct also constituted a
violation of the consent judgment, the FCA suit here is not an effort to enforce the
enforce the distinct (though overlapping) obligations imposed by the FCA. Indeed,
many garden-variety FCA suits allege that the defendant engaged in fraudulent
conduct in the course of performing (or purporting to perform) its obligations under
mechanisms is necessary before the United States (or a relator) can bring such FCA
7
See also, e.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
1989, 1996, 2002 (2016) (describing misconduct “actionable under the False Claims
Act”); Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008)
(“Recognizing a cause of action under the FCA for fraud directed at private entities”);
United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 308 (1976) (“the Government brought this civil
action in a Federal District Court under the False Claims Act”); cf., e.g., United States ex
rel. Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 930 (“the United States is a ‘real party in interest’ in a case
brought under the FCA”); United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 848 F.3d 1027,
1030 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“McBride brings two claims under the FCA”); Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(f)(1), 123 Stat. 1617,
1625 (applying amendments “to all claims under the False Claims Act . . . pending on
or after that date.”).
18
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suits. Nor does it follow that such mechanisms govern other civil or criminal actions
for fraud.
Even if the alleged conduct would, by itself, violate both the consent judgment
and the False Claims Act, it does not follow that any legal proceeding under the FCA
is also an enforcement action under the consent judgment. Here, as in other contexts,
multiple sorts of actions may be brought under multiple sources of law for the same
conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979) (prosecutors
have discretion to “proceed under” or “charge under” various statutes based on the
same conduct); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Koennecke, 239 U.S. 352, 354 (1915) (cause of
death action could have been brought “under” either of two statutes).
Moreover, a suit under the False Claims Act does not merely allege that Chase
breached an agreed-to obligation. The False Claims Act is not “a vehicle for
ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (2016). It is the “primary litigative tool for the
recovery of losses sustained as the result of fraud against the government,” Avco Corp.
v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 884 F.2d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (emphasis added), and
breaches of contract are not converted into FCA liability.” United States v. Science
Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see, e.g., United States ex
rel. Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy Dist., 842 F.3d 430, 436-437 (6th Cir.
19
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2016) (applying mens rea requirement for “reverse” FCA claim), petition for cert. filed
to the consent judgment would not need to establish in order to seek relief under the
judgment itself. Whatever expectation Chase (or any other party to an agreement with
the United States) may have that procedures outlined in the agreement would be the
exclusive means of alleging innocent or merely negligent violations, Chase could have
had no reasonable expectation that the sorts of claims brought under the False Claims
Act would have to be routed through those procedures. Thus, Chase could not have
reasonably expected that knowingly making false statements, knowingly using false
remedied only within the limited procedures set out in the consent judgment and not
action under the consent judgment, the consent judgment must be read as a “whole,”
and “‘reliance upon certain aids to construction is proper, as with any other
contract.’” Segar v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 16, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting United States
v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975)). Several other provisions and
20
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First, the consent judgment provides that it “shall be filed in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia (the ‘Court’) and shall be enforceable therein”
(Ex. E, § J(1)); and that Chase’s “obligations under this Consent Judgment shall be
enforceable solely in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia” (id. § J(2)).
The unitary reference to the court where the consent judgment is filed and enforced is
enforcement action under a consent judgment is a request that a court enforce its own
judgment. The terms governing where enforcement of the judgment may occur are
an awkward fit for the broader proposition that any action, including an action for
fraud arising from the judgment, is the type of enforcement action to which the
Second, the consent judgment provides that “[a]n enforcement action under
this Consent Judgment may be brought by any Party to this Consent Judgment or the
8
In a civil suit or criminal prosecution based on that fraud, venue is not
necessarily proper in the district that approved the consent judgment. See, e.g., 31
U.S.C. § 3732(a) (FCA venue provision); Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 (criminal venue rules);
U.S. Const. amend. VI (same); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (same). Under Chase’s
and the district court’s apparent premise, after the government followed the pre-
enforcement procedures, it would appear that the government could bring such a civil
or criminal action only if the applicable venue provisions happened to place the
matter in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia or if the parties would
waive any venue rights.
21
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enforcement action, rather than a range of all litigation predicated in part on violations
of the judgment. The fact that such an action can be brought by any party or by the
Monitoring Committee fits comfortably with the understanding that the referenced
enforcement action is an action asking the district court to compel compliance. But
it fits awkwardly with the broader reading that undergirds the district court’s holding.
Neither every party nor the Monitoring Committee can necessarily bring every kind of
fraud action arising from the agreement. Moreover, the district court’s premise seems
provide notice to the Monitoring Committee of its intent to bring an action to enforce
this Consent Judgment.” Consent J. Ex. E, § J(2). The committee then has “21 days
declines to do so, “the Party must wait 21 additional days . . . before commencing an
enforcement action.” Ibid. Like the provision describing who may bring an
action. Thus, the judgment does not expressly say whether, if the Monitoring
Committee brings an enforcement action, the United States may not. That would not
compliance; once one entity initiated the action, no one else would need to. Similarly,
the judgment does not say what would occur if the Monitoring Committee and parties
22
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brought different kinds of actions—if the government provided notice and the
committee asked the district court to compel compliance, could the United States
In addition, these procedures are a poor fit for qui tam suits. Contrary to the
district court’s suggestion (JA14), in our view a relator is not a party to the judgment
and therefore cannot use these procedures. But apart from any uncertainty whether a
stranger to the judgment could invoke its procedures, the district court’s premise
would subvert other provisions of the False Claims Act. The FCA requires relators to
file qui tam complaints under seal to avoid alerting defendants to the possibility of a
government investigation. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2); see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
United States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. 436, 443 (2016). Relators’ invoking the consent
judgment’s procedures before filing suit would undermine that important function.
And if a relator had to ask the United States to invoke the consent judgment’s
procedures before the relator could file suit, that would undermine the role that the
FCA assigns to relators and could perhaps deter relators who fear that the United
States might then bring the FCA suit instead. It seems particularly anomalous to
construe the consent judgment to make a relator’s right to file a qui tam suit
23
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Fourth, the pre-enforcement procedures delay and appear to confer a veto over
the United States’ and state parties’ ability to bring an “enforcement action.” Under
the district court’s premise, the United States could not file an FCA suit, or perhaps a
criminal case, until first notifying the Monitoring Committee and giving the
enforcement action,” it appears that the United States may not be able to do so. The
important power. And the False Claims Act specifically establishes the power to
bring such suits and the procedures governing such suits. Agreements with the
United States must be construed narrowly to avoid foreclosing the later exercise of
sovereign authority. See United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 707
(1987); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982). At the very least, it
would be surprising if the United States and state parties agreed to vastly limit their
own legal authority to proceed against a bank for outright fraud. See Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574-575 (1984) (“it seems highly unlikely” that
a city would “bargain away” important programs and “[h]ad there been any intention”
to make a significant policy change, “it is much more reasonable to believe that there
would have been an express provision to that effect”); cf. United States ex rel. Onnen v.
Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 49-5, 688 F.3d 410, 414-415 (8th Cir. 2012).
remedies. “In the event of an action to enforce [Chase’s] obligations . . . and to seek
remedies for an uncured Potential Violation for which [Chase’s] time to cure has
expired, the sole relief available” is ordinarily “Equitable Relief,” constituting “[a]n
specific performance under the terms of this Consent Judgment, or other non-
monetary corrective action.” Consent J. Ex. E, § J(3)(a). The court “may award”
defined “civil penalties” for uncured “Potential Violation[s],” id. § J(3)(b). It would be
passing strange to so severely limit the remedies available in any action arising, even in
part, from the failure to comply with the consent judgment’s terms—including actions
for fraud.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court should be vacated and remanded for further
proceedings.9
9
Chase raised many other arguments below and may repeat those arguments as
alternative grounds for affirmance. We do not address those issues at this time, as
they have not yet been (and may not be) briefed to this Court.
25
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Respectfully submitted,
CHAD A. READLER
Acting Assistant Attorney General
CHANNING D. PHILLIPS
United States Attorney
MICHAEL S. RAAB
ADAM C. JED
(202) 514-8280
Attorneys, Appellate Staff
Civil Division, Room 7240
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
JUNE 2017
26
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I hereby certify that this brief complies with the requirements of Fed. R. App.
proportionally spaced font. I further certify that this brief complies with the type-
excluding the parts of the brief exempted under Rule 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), according to the
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 14, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing brief
with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
ADDENDUM
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EXHIBIT D
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EXHIBIT E
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Enforcement Terms
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The Monitor shall also have the right to engage one or more attorneys or
other professional persons to represent or assist the Monitor in carrying
out the Monitor’s duties under this Consent Judgment (each such
individual, along with each individual deployed to the engagement by the
Primary Professional Firm, shall be defined as a “Professional”). The
Monitor and Professionals will collectively possess expertise in the areas
of mortgage servicing, loss mitigation, business operations, compliance,
internal controls, accounting, and foreclosure and bankruptcy law and
practice. The Monitor and Professionals shall at all times act in good faith
and with integrity and fairness towards all the Parties.
3. The Monitor and Professionals shall not have any prior relationships with
the Parties that would undermine public confidence in the objectivity of
their work and, subject to Section C.3(e), below, shall not have any
conflicts of interest with any Party.
(a) The Monitor and Professionals will disclose, and will make a
reasonable inquiry to discover, any known current or prior
relationships to, or conflicts with, any Party, any Party’s holding
company, any subsidiaries of the Party or its holding company,
directors, officers, and law firms.
(b) The Monitor and Professionals shall make a reasonable inquiry to
determine whether there are any facts that a reasonable individual
would consider likely to create a conflict of interest for the
Monitor or Professionals. The Monitor and Professionals shall
disclose any conflict of interest with respect to any Party.
(c) The duty to disclose a conflict of interest or relationship pursuant
to this Section C.3 shall remain ongoing throughout the course of
the Monitor’s and Professionals’ work in connection with this
Consent Judgment.
(d) All Professionals shall comply with all applicable standards of
professional conduct, including ethics rules and rules pertaining to
conflicts of interest.
(e) To the extent permitted under prevailing professional standards, a
Professional’s conflict of interest may be waived by written
agreement of the Monitor and Servicer.
(f) Servicer or the Monitoring Committee may move the Court for an
order disqualifying any Professionals on the grounds that such
Professional has a conflict of interest that has inhibited or could
inhibit the Professional’s ability to act in good faith and with
integrity and fairness towards all Parties.
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4. The Monitor must agree not to be retained by any Party, or its successors
or assigns, for a period of 2 years after the conclusion of the terms of the
engagement. Any Professionals who work on the engagement must agree
not to work on behalf of Servicer, or its successor or assigns, for a period
of 1 year after the conclusion of the term of the engagement (the
“Professional Exclusion Period”). Any Firm that performs work with
respect to Servicer on the engagement must agree not to perform work on
behalf of Servicer, or its successor or assigns, that consists of advising
Servicer on a response to the Monitor’s review during the engagement and
for a period of six months after the conclusion of the term of the
engagement (the “Firm Exclusion Period”). The Professional Exclusion
Period and Firm Exclusion Period, and terms of exclusion may be altered
on a case-by-case basis upon written agreement of Servicer and the
Monitor. The Monitor shall organize the work of any Firms so as to
minimize the potential for any appearance of, or actual, conflicts.
Monitor’s Responsibilities
5. It shall be the responsibility of the Monitor to determine whether Servicer
is in compliance with the Servicing Standards and the Mandatory Relief
Requirements (as defined in Section C.12) and whether Servicer has
satisfied the Consumer Relief Requirements, in accordance with the
authorities provided herein and to report his or her findings as provided in
Section D.3, below.
6. The manner in which the Monitor will carry out his or her compliance
responsibilities under this Consent Judgment and, where applicable, the
methodologies to be utilized shall be set forth in a work plan agreed upon
by Servicer and the Monitor, and not objected to by the Monitoring
Committee (the “Work Plan”).
Internal Review Group
7. Servicer will designate an internal quality control group that is
independent from the line of business whose performance is being
measured (the “Internal Review Group”) to perform compliance reviews
each calendar quarter (“Quarter”) in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the Work Plan (the “Compliance Reviews”) and satisfaction
of the Consumer Relief Requirements after the (A) end of each calendar
year (and, in the discretion of the Servicer, any Quarter) and (B) earlier of
the Servicer assertion that it has satisfied its obligations thereunder and the
third anniversary of the Start Date (the “Satisfaction Review”). For the
purposes of this provision, a group that is independent from the line of
business shall be one that does not perform operational work on mortgage
servicing, and ultimately reports to a Chief Risk Officer, Chief Audit
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14. The Work Plan may be modified from time to time by agreement of the
Monitor and Servicer. If such amendment to the Work Plan is not
objected to by the Monitoring Committee within 20 days, the Monitor
shall proceed to implement the amendment to the Work Plan. To the
extent possible, the Monitor shall endeavor to apply the Servicing
Standards uniformly across all Servicers.
15. The following general principles shall provide a framework for the
formulation of the Work Plan:
(a) The Work Plan will set forth the testing methods and agreed
procedures that will be used by the Internal Review Group to
perform the test work and compute the Metrics for each Quarter.
(b) The Work Plan will set forth the testing methods and agreed
procedures that will be used by Servicer to report on its
compliance with the Consumer Relief Requirements of this
Consent Judgment, including, incidental to any other testing,
confirmation of state-identifying information used by Servicer to
compile state-level Consumer Relief information as required by
Section D.2.
(c) The Work Plan will set forth the testing methods and procedures
that the Monitor will use to assess Servicer’s reporting on its
compliance with the Consumer Relief Requirements of this
Consent Judgment.
(d) The Work Plan will set forth the methodology and procedures the
Monitor will utilize to review the testing work performed by the
Internal Review Group.
(e) The Compliance Reviews and the Satisfaction Review may include
a variety of audit techniques that are based on an appropriate
sampling process and random and risk-based selection criteria, as
appropriate and as set forth in the Work Plan.
(f) In formulating, implementing, and amending the Work Plan,
Servicer and the Monitor may consider any relevant information
relating to patterns in complaints by borrowers, issues or
deficiencies reported to the Monitor with respect to the Servicing
Standards, and the results of prior Compliance Reviews.
(g) The Work Plan should ensure that Compliance Reviews are
commensurate with the size, complexity, and risk associated with
the Servicing Standard being evaluated by the Metric.
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Monitor’s Powers
22. Where the Monitor reasonably determines that the Internal Review
Group’s work cannot be relied upon or that the Internal Review Group did
not correctly implement the Work Plan in some material respect, the
Monitor may direct that the work on the Metrics (or parts thereof) be
reviewed by Professionals or a third party other than the Internal Review
Group, and that supplemental work be performed as necessary.
23. If the Monitor becomes aware of facts or information that lead the Monitor
to reasonably conclude that Servicer may be engaged in a pattern of
noncompliance with a material term of the Servicing Standards that is
reasonably likely to cause harm to borrowers or tenants residing in
foreclosed properties or with any of the Mandatory Relief Requirements,
the Monitor shall engage Servicer in a review to determine if the facts are
accurate or the information is correct. If after that review, the Monitor
reasonably concludes that such a pattern exists and is reasonably likely to
cause material harm to borrowers or tenants residing in foreclosed
properties, the Monitor may propose an additional Metric and associated
Threshold Error Rate relating to Servicer’s compliance with the associated
term or requirement. Any additional Metrics and associated Threshold
Error Rates (a) must be similar to the Metrics and associated Threshold
Error Rates contained in Schedule E-1, (b) must relate to material terms of
the Servicing Standards or one of the Mandatory Relief Requirements,
(c) must either (i) be outcomes-based (but no outcome-based Metric shall
be added with respect to any Mandatory Relief Requirement) or (ii)
require the existence of policies and procedures required by the Servicing
Standards or the Mandatory Relief Requirements, in a manner similar to
Metrics 5.B-E, and (d) must be distinct from, and not overlap with, any
other Metric or Metrics. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Monitor may
add a Metric that satisfies (a)-(c) but does not satisfy (d) of the preceding
sentence if the Monitor first asks the Servicer to propose, and then
implement, a Corrective Action Plan, as defined below, for the material
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and ability to challenge the findings and/or the statements in the Monitor
Report as flawed, lacking in probative value or otherwise. The Monitor
Report with respect to a particular Potential Violation shall not be
admissible or used for any purpose if Servicer cures the Potential
Violation pursuant to Section E, below.
Satisfaction of Payment Obligations
6. Upon the satisfaction of any category of payment obligation under this
Consent Judgment, Servicer, at its discretion, may request that the Monitor
certify that Servicer has discharged such obligation. Provided that the
Monitor is satisfied that Servicer has met the obligation, the Monitor may
not withhold and must provide the requested certification. Any
subsequent Monitor Report shall not include a review of Servicer’s
compliance with that category of payment obligation.
Compensation
7. Within 120 days of entry of this Consent Judgment, the Monitor shall, in
consultation with the Monitoring Committee and Servicer, prepare and
present to Monitoring Committee and Servicer an annual budget providing
its reasonable best estimate of all fees and expenses of the Monitor to be
incurred during the first year of the term of this Consent Judgment,
including the fees and expenses of Professionals and support staff (the
“Monitoring Budget”). On a yearly basis thereafter, the Monitor shall
prepare an updated Monitoring Budget providing its reasonable best
estimate of all fees and expenses to be incurred during that year. Absent
an objection within 20 days, a Monitoring Budget or updated Monitoring
Budget shall be implemented. Consistent with the Monitoring Budget,
Servicer shall pay all fees and expenses of the Monitor, including the fees
and expenses of Professionals and support staff. The fees, expenses, and
costs of the Monitor, Professionals, and support staff shall be reasonable.
Servicer may apply to the Court to reduce or disallow fees, expenses, or
costs that are unreasonable.
E. Potential Violations and Right to Cure
1. A “Potential Violation” of this Consent Judgment occurs if the Servicer
has exceeded the Threshold Error Rate set for a Metric in a given Quarter.
In the event of a Potential Violation, Servicer shall meet and confer with
the Monitoring Committee within 15 days of the Quarterly Report or
Monitor Report indicating such Potential Violation.
2. Servicer shall have a right to cure any Potential Violation.
3. Subject to Section E.4, a Potential Violation is cured if (a) a corrective
action plan approved by the Monitor (the “Corrective Action Plan”) is
determined by the Monitor to have been satisfactorily completed in
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accordance with the terms thereof; and (b) a Quarterly Report covering the
Cure Period reflects that the Threshold Error Rate has not been exceeded
with respect to the same Metric and the Monitor confirms the accuracy of
said report using his or her ordinary testing procedures. The Cure Period
shall be the first full quarter after completion of the Corrective Action Plan
or, if the completion of the Corrective Action Plan occurs within the first
month of a Quarter and if the Monitor determines that there is sufficient
time remaining, the period between completion of the Corrective Action
Plan and the end of that Quarter.
4. If after Servicer cures a Potential Violation pursuant to the previous
section, another violation occurs with respect to the same Metric, then the
second Potential Violation shall immediately constitute an uncured
violation for purposes of Section J.3, provided, however, that such second
Potential Violation occurs in either the Cure Period or the quarter
immediately following the Cure Period.
5. In addition to the Servicer’s obligation to cure a Potential Violation
through the Corrective Action Plan, Servicer must remediate any material
harm to particular borrowers identified through work conducted under the
Work Plan. In the event that a Servicer has a Potential Violation that so
far exceeds the Threshold Error Rate for a metric that the Monitor
concludes that the error is widespread, Servicer shall, under the
supervision of the Monitor, identify other borrowers who may have been
harmed by such noncompliance and remediate all such harms to the extent
that the harm has not been otherwise remediated.
6. In the event a Potential Violation is cured as provided in Sections E.3,
above, then no Party shall have any remedy under this Consent Judgment
(other than the remedies in Section E.5) with respect to such Potential
Violation.
F. Confidentiality
1. These provisions shall govern the use and disclosure of any and all
information designated as “CONFIDENTIAL,” as set forth below, in
documents (including email), magnetic media, or other tangible things
provided by the Servicer to the Monitor in this case, including the
subsequent disclosure by the Monitor to the Monitoring Committee of
such information. In addition, it shall also govern the use and disclosure
of such information when and if provided to the participating state parties
or the participating agency or department of the United States whose
claims are released through this settlement (“participating state or federal
agency whose claims are released through this settlement”).
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K. Sunset. This Consent Judgment and all Exhibits shall retain full force and effect
for three and one-half years from the date it is entered (the “Term”), unless
otherwise specified in the Exhibit. Servicer shall submit a final Quarterly Report
for the last quarter or portion thereof falling within the Term, and shall cooperate
with the Monitor’s review of said report, which shall be concluded no later than
six months following the end of the Term, after which time Servicer shall have no
further obligations under this Consent Judgment.
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EXHIBIT F
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any pending adversary proceedings, contested matters, appeals, and other actions filed by the
United States Trustee against any other party wherein the COMPANY, its affiliates, or employees
and officers of the COMPANY or its affiliates, is a party or otherwise involved; or (3) a waiver
of, or restriction or prohibition on, the United States Trustees’ ability, to the extent permitted by
case and based on the Covered Bankruptcy Conduct, but not to impose monetary sanctions or
other punitive relief against the COMPANY or its affiliates in addition to such cure; provided,
however, that this provision shall not constitute a waiver of, or restriction or prohibition on, the
COMPANY’s or its affiliates’ ability to dispute whether the United States Trustees have authority
(10) For the purposes of this Release, the term “affiliated entity” shall mean
entities that are directly or indirectly controlled by, or control, or are under common control with,
the COMPANY as of or prior to 11:59 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, on February 8, 2012. The
term “control” with respect to an entity means the beneficial ownership (as defined in Rule 13d-3
promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) of 50 percent or more of
(11) Notwithstanding any other term of this Release, the following claims of
the United States are specifically reserved and are not released:
(a) Any liability arising under Title 26, United States Code (Internal
Revenue Code);
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officers, and employees of the COMPANY or any affiliated entity) who have received or receive
in the future notification that they are the target of a criminal investigation (as defined in the
United States Attorneys’ Manual); have been or are indicted or charged; or have entered or in the
future enter into a plea agreement, based on the Covered Servicing Conduct, the Covered
Origination Conduct, and the Covered Bankruptcy Conduct (collectively, the “Covered
Conduct”);
(d) Any liability to the United States for any conduct other than the
Covered Conduct, or any liability for any Covered Conduct that is not expressly released herein;
(e) Any and all claims whether legal or equitable, in connection with
interest in a loan, mortgage, or security to, into, or for the benefit of a mortgage-backed security,
trust, special purpose entity, financial institution, investor, or other entity, including but not
limited to in the context of a mortgage securitization or whole loan sale to such entities
limited to, claims based on the following, all in connection with investors or purchasers in or of
securities or in connection with a sale, transfer, or assignment of any interest in loan, mortgage or
security to, into, or for the benefit of a mortgage-backed security, trust, special purpose entity,
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loans, mortgages, or securities, including but not limited to conduct that affected a
(including the United States), or governmental agency and/or that subjects the
U.S.C. § 1833a.
claims made regarding such whole loans, securities, derivatives or other similar
F-31
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otherwise;
or any affiliated entity engaged in the Covered Servicing Conduct in question not
in its capacity as servicer, subservicer or master servicer, but in its capacity as the
F-32
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capacity.
The exclusion set forth above in this Paragraph shall not apply to
Securitization/Investment Claims based on the following conduct, and such claims are included
COMPANY or any current or former affiliated entity where: (1) such conduct was
performed by the COMPANY or any affiliated entity in its capacity as the loan
servicer, master servicer or subservicer, whether conducted for its own account or
pursuant to a third party servicing agreement or similar agreement, and not in its
trustee, securities underwriter, or any other capacity; and (2) such conduct was not
without limitation, Securitization and Investment Claims that the party seeking to
promissory note and mortgage or deed of trust under applicable state law or is
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(f) Any liability arising under Section 8 of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2607, relating to private mortgage insurance, with respect to claims
annual privacy notices, requirements with respect to the communication of non-public personal
information to non-affiliated third parties, or other conduct required by Sections 502 through 509
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 6802-6809), any claims or conduct involving the
obligation of a financial institution under Section 501(b) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15
U.S.C. s. 6801(b)) and its implementing regulations to maintain administrative, technical, and
(h) Any liability arising under the Fair Housing Act; any provision of
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act that is not expressly released in Paragraph 2 of this Release,
including any provision prohibiting discriminatory conduct; the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act;
or any other statute or law that prohibits discrimination of persons based on race, color, national
against any current or former director, officer, or employee for suspension, debarment or
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Finance Agency; (ii) any Government Sponsored Enterprise, including the Federal National
Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (except where the
Government Sponsored Enterprise seeks to impose such liability or pursue such claims in its
capacity as an administrator of the Making Home Affordable Program of Treasury); (iii) the
Conservator); (iv) the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”) arising out of
Ginnie Mae portfolios, including claims for breach of such obligations; (v) the CFPB with respect
to claims within its authority as of the designated transfer date of July 21, 2011 that are not
expressly released in Paragraph 7; (vi) the National Credit Union Administration, whether in its
capacity as a Federal agency, Liquidating Agent, or Conservator; (vii) the Securities and
Exchange Commission; (viii) the Federal Reserve Board and its member institutions; (ix) Maiden
Lane LLC, Maiden Lane II LLC, Maiden Lane III LLC, entities that are consolidated for
accounting purposes on the financial statements of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; (x) the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; (xi)
the USDA (except to the extent claims are released in Paragraph 5); (xii) the VA (except to the
extent claims are released in Paragraph 4); (xiii) the Commodity Futures Trading Commission;
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(l) Any liability to the United States for the following claims alleged
against J.P. Morgan Chase & Company or any of its current or former subsidiaries, affiliates,
officers, directors, employees or agents, including but not limited to Chase Home Finance, LLC,
EMC Mortgage, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, or any other entity or person:
Nev.); and
United States ex rel. Szymoniak v. [Under Seal], Civ. No. 0:10-cv-01465 (D.S.C.)
(W.D.N.C.), except any such claims that are encompassed by the releases
(m) Any action that may be taken by the appropriate Federal Banking
Agency (FBA), as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q), against COMPANY, any of its affiliated
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818, and any action by the FBA to enforce the Consent Order issued
Judgment;
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EXHIBIT 2