PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION G.R.

No. 47065 June 26, 1940

FACTS: Pangasinan Transportation Company Inc. (PTI) has been engaged for 20 years in the
business of transporting passengers in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU buses
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued by
the Public Utility Commission (later called Public Service Commission). The company applied
for an authorization to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the ground that they were
needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the
application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. PSC agreed to grant the authorization, but with two
conditions as provided for by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454: First, that the certificates
of authorization issued to it would be valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the date of
promulgation; and second, that the company may be acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth
with proper payment of the cost price of its equipment, taking into account reasonable
depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of it acquisition. PTI did not agree with
the conditions, and instead asked the Supreme Court to declare Commonwealth Act No. 454.
ISSUE: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 454 is unconstitutional for being undue
delegation of legislative power on the ground that without limitation, guide or rule except the
unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total
abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so
far as those powers are concerned.
HELD: No, the law is not unconstitutional. The law is made subject to a sufficient standard that
the PSC must strictly follow. Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under
section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the
Commission in determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the
public interests in a proper and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of
time," the Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power being
that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146;
Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) The Supreme Court had earlier ruled that "public interest"
furnishes a sufficient standar
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION G.R.
No. 47065 June 26, 1940
FACTS: Pangasinan Transportation Company Inc. (PTI) has been engaged for 20 years in the
business of transporting passengers in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU buses
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued by
the Public Utility Commission (later called Public Service Commission). The company applied
for an authorization to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the ground that they were
needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the
application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. PSC agreed to grant the authorization, but with two
conditions as provided for by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454: First, that the certificates
of authorization issued to it would be valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the date of
promulgation; and second, that the company may be acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth
with proper payment of the cost price of its equipment, taking into account reasonable
depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of it acquisition. PTI did not agree with
the conditions, and instead asked the Supreme Court to declare Commonwealth Act No. 454.
ISSUE: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 454 is unconstitutional for being undue
delegation of legislative power on the ground that without limitation, guide or rule except the
unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total
abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so
far as those powers are concerned.
HELD: No, the law is not unconstitutional. The law is made subject to a sufficient standard that
the PSC must strictly follow. Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under
section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the
Commission in determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the
public interests in a proper and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of
time," the Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power being
that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146;
Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) The Supreme Court had earlier ruled that "public interest"
furnishes a sufficient standar
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION G.R.
No. 47065 June 26, 1940
FACTS: Pangasinan Transportation Company Inc. (PTI) has been engaged for 20 years in the
business of transporting passengers in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU buses
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued by
the Public Utility Commission (later called Public Service Commission). The company applied
for an authorization to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the ground that they were
needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the
application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. PSC agreed to grant the authorization, but with two
conditions as provided for by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454: First, that the certificates
of authorization issued to it would be valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the date of
promulgation; and second, that the company may be acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth
with proper payment of the cost price of its equipment, taking into account reasonable
depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of it acquisition. PTI did not agree with
the conditions, and instead asked the Supreme Court to declare Commonwealth Act No. 454.
ISSUE: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 454 is unconstitutional for being undue
delegation of legislative power on the ground that without limitation, guide or rule except the
unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total
abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so
far as those powers are concerned.
HELD: No, the law is not unconstitutional. The law is made subject to a sufficient standard that
the PSC must strictly follow. Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under
section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the
Commission in determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the
public interests in a proper and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of
time," the Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power being
that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146;
Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) The Supreme Court had earlier ruled that "public interest"
furnishes a sufficient standar
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION G.R.
No. 47065 June 26, 1940
FACTS: Pangasinan Transportation Company Inc. (PTI) has been engaged for 20 years in the
business of transporting passengers in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU buses
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued by
the Public Utility Commission (later called Public Service Commission). The company applied
for an authorization to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the ground that they were
needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the
application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. PSC agreed to grant the authorization, but with two
conditions as provided for by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454: First, that the certificates
of authorization issued to it would be valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the date of
promulgation; and second, that the company may be acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth
with proper payment of the cost price of its equipment, taking into account reasonable
depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of it acquisition. PTI did not agree with
the conditions, and instead asked the Supreme Court to declare Commonwealth Act No. 454.
ISSUE: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 454 is unconstitutional for being undue
delegation of legislative power on the ground that without limitation, guide or rule except the
unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total
abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so
far as those powers are concerned.
HELD: No, the law is not unconstitutional. The law is made subject to a sufficient standard that
the PSC must strictly follow. Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under
section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the
Commission in determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the
public interests in a proper and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of
time," the Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power being
that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146;
Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) The Supreme Court had earlier ruled that "public interest"
furnishes a sufficient standar
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No.
47065 June 26, 1940 FACTS: Pangasinan Transportation Company Inc. (PTI) has been engaged for 20
years in the business of transporting passengers in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU
buses in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued by the
Public Utility Commission (later called Public Service Commission). The company applied for an
authorization to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the ground that they were needed to comply
with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight
Hour Labor Law. PSC agreed to grant the authorization, but with two conditions as provided for by
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454: First, that the certificates of authorization issued to it would be
valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the date of promulgation; and second, that the company
may be acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth with proper payment of the cost price of its
equipment, taking into account reasonable depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of it
acquisition. PTI did not agree with the conditions, and instead asked the Supreme Court to declare
Commonwealth Act No. 454.
ISSUE: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 454 is unconstitutional for being undue delegation of
legislative power on the ground that without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered discretion and
judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its functions
in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so far as those powers are concerned.
HELD: No, the law is not unconstitutional. The law is made subject to a sufficient standard that the PSC
must strictly follow. Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under section 15 is
inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the Commission in
determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the public interests in a
proper and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of time," the Commission will
be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power being that said period shall not exceed
fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146; Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) The Supreme Court
had earlier ruled that "public interest" furnishes a sufficient standard.
 

Leveriza v. IAC G.R. No. L-66614 January 25, 1988

FACTS: Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant
case:
Contract A — a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA)  and.
Leveriza over a parcel of land containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for
25 years.
Contract B — a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between
Leveriza and Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of land, but
reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years; and
Contract C — a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant CAA and
plaintiff Mobil Oil over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square
meters, for 25 years.
There is no dispute among the parties that the subject matter of the three
contracts of lease above mentioned, Contract A, Contract B, and Contract C, is
the same parcel of land, with the noted difference that while in Contract A, the
area leased is 4,502 square meters, in Contract B and Contract C, the area has
been reduced to 3,000 square meters.

It is important to note, for a clear understanding of the issues involved, that it

appears that defendant CAA  as LESSOR, leased the same parcel of land, for
durations of time that overlapped to two lessees, to wit: (1) Leveriza and Mobil
Oil, and the latter, as LESSEE, leased the same parcel of land from two lessors,
to wit: (1) Leveriza and (2) CAA  for durations of time that also overlapped.
Leveriza, the lessee in Contract A and the lessor in Contract B, is now
deceased. This is the reason why her successor-in-interest, her heirs, are sued.
For purposes of brevity, these defendants shall be referred to hereinafter as
Defendants Leveriza.

Mobil Oil  seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on

the ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and depends has
already been cancelled by the defendant CAA  and maintains that Contract C
with the defendant CAA is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the
parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is concerned.

Defendants Leverizas’ claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA
has never been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is
Contract C between plaintiff and defendant CAA which should be declared
void.

CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its
cancellation by Jurado was ineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A
because of the violation committed by Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to
plaintiff by virtue of Contract B without the consent of CAA. CAA further
asserts that Contract C not having been approved by the Director of Public
Works and Communications is not valid.

After trial, the lower courts rendered  judgment:

1.  Declaring Contract A as having been validly cancelled on June 28, 1966,
and has therefore ceased to have any effect as of that date;

2. Declaring that Contract B has likewise ceased to have any effect as of June
28, 1966 because of the cancellation of Contract A;

3. Declaring that Contract C was validly entered into on June 1, 1968, and that
it is still valid and subsisting;

CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that because the lot lease
was properly registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was
only the President of the Philippines or an officer duly designated by him who
could execute the lease contract pursuant to Sec. 567 of the Revised
Administrative Code; that the Airport General Manager has no authority to
cancel Contract A, the contract entered into between the CAA and Leveriza,
and that Contract C between the CAA and Mobil was void for not having been
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Said motion
was however denied.

On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Hence this
petition for Review on certiorari.

ISSUE: There is no dispute that Contract  A  at the time of its execution was a

valid contract. The issue therefore is whether or not  said contract is still
subsisting after its cancellation by CAA on the ground of a sublease executed
by petitioners with Mobil Oil (CONTRACT B) without the consent of CAA and
the execution of another contract of lease between CAA and Mobil Oil
(CONTRACT C)
The issue narrows down to: WON there is a valid ground for the cancellation
of Contract A

HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the
Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
YES

Contract A was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the
lessee specifically “for the purpose of operating and managing a gasoline
station by the latter, to serve vehicles going in and out of the airport.”

As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased
premises, the provision of paragraph 7 of said Contract reads in full:

7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises
but in such eventuality, the consent of the Party of the First Part shall first be
secured. In any event, such transfer of rights shall have to respect the terms
and conditions of this agreement.

Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-mentioned

terms and conditions of the contract. Said paragraph reads:

8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms
and conditions herein agreed upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this
contract by the Party of the First Part without need of judicial demand.
It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of
sublease (Contract B) with Mobil Oil without the consent of CAA (lessor). The
cancellation of the contract was made in a letter by Jurado, Airport General
Manager of CAA addressed to Rosario Leveriza.

Respondent Leverizas and the CAA assailed the validity of such cancellation,
claiming that the Airport General Manager had no legal authority to make the
cancellation. They maintain that it is only the (1)Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, acting for the President, or by delegation of power, the
(2)Director of CCA  who could validly cancel the contract. Petitioners argue
that cancelling or setting aside a contract approved by the Secretary is, in
effect, repealing an act of the Secretary which is beyond the authority of the
Administrator.

Such argument is untenable. The terms and conditions under which such
revocation or cancellation may be made, have already been specifically
provided for in Contract “A” which has already been approved by the
Department Head, It is evident that in the implementation of aforesaid
contract, the approval of said Department Head is no longer necessary if not
redundant

 
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

Ponente: CAMPOS, JR.

FACTS:

Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman,
in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same
section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of
Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code
did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the
other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke
or supplant in its entirety the RAC.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.

HELD:

NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits.

RATIO:

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given
effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that
the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and
manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not
a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first
enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.
The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes
should be read in pari materia. 
Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.

GR No. 86995 03 September 1992

Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western
Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The
notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December
2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the
afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built
Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of
December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of
them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC
for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-
qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of
their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be
directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the
bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground
that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the
preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been
awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary
injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure
project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?
RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by
law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state
universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D.
1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created
in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the
government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and
offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president
of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as
can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had
been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the
funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations
Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree
as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards
to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
 
Chiongbian vs. Orbos G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995
FACTS:

Congress passed the ORGANIC ACT FOR ARMM, calling for a plebiscite in Mindanao. Only four
provinces voted for the creation of ARMM (Lanao Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi Tawi) The other
provinces who did not vote for ARMM shall remain in the existing administrative regions, provided that
the PRESIDENT may by ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION, MERGE THE EXISTING
REGIONS. So, President Cory issued EO 429 which reorganized those regions who did not vote for
ARMM. Petitioners are Congressmen who opposed the issuance of EO 429. They claim that President
Cory had no authority to restructure new administrative regions. They insist that the provinces should
remain as they are.

ISSUE:

Whether the Organic Act for ARMM unduly delegates legislative power to the President by allowing
Cory to merge the existing regions by mere ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION.

Whether the Organic Act provided a standard to guide President Cory’s discretion.

DEFENSE:

The SOLGEN argues that the Act is valid and there is no undue delegation but only a POWER TO FILL
IN THE DETAILS OF LEGISLATION which was given to Cory.

RULING:

ADVERTISEMENT
REPORT THIS AD

SC: LAW VALID. NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT.

While the power to merge regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power
traditionally lodged with the President, in view of the POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. Thus there is no abdication by Congress of its legislative powers in
conferring on the President the POWER TO MERGE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS.
As to the question of STANDARD, a legislative standard NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED. IT MAY
SIMPLY BE GATHERED OR IMPLIED. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be
EMBODIED IN OTHER STATUTES ON THE SAME SUBJECT as that of the challenged legislation.
With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the STANDARD IS TO BE FOUND
IN THE SAME POLICY underlying the grant o the PRESIDENT in RA5434, THE POWER TO
REORGANIZE THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. Under said law, the standard is “to promote
simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government, to enable it to pursue programs consistent with
national goals for acceleration socioeconomic development and to improve the service in the transaction
of public business.” Since the original 11 administrative regions were established with this same law/
policy, it is but logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to merge by administrative
determination, the existing regions (following the rejection of the ARMM by some regions), the purpose
of Congress in enacting the Organic Act of ARMM was to reconstitute the original basis for the
organization of administrative regions.
Preclaro vs Sandiganbayan, 247 SCRA 454
Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011
(Public Officers, Non-Career Service)

Facts: Accused is a project manager/consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division, Industrial Technology
Development Institute, Department of Science and Technology, a component of the Industrial
Development Institute which is an agency of the DOST.

He is to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD building, while the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction
undertook the construction. The structure is jointly funded by the Philippine and Japanese Governments.

While the said construction has not yet been completed, accused either directly requested and/or
demanded for himself the sum of P200,000.00, claimed as part of the expected profit of the contractor.

Petitioner was charged for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for committing said
offense in relation to the performance of his official duties.

Petitioner asserts in a petition for review that he is not a public officer because he was neither elected nor
appointed to a public office, but merely a private individual hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a
particular project and for a specified period. Hence the Sandiganbayan erred in taking cognizance of the
case.

Section 2 (b) of RA 3019 defines a public officer to “include elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service
receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government…”

Issue: WON a private individual hired on a contractual basis by the government is a public officer.

Held: Yes. The word “includes” used in defining a public officer indicates that the definition is not
restrictive. The terms “classified, unclassified or exemption service” were the old categories of position in
the civil service which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service by PD 807
providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission by the Administrative Code of 1987.
A private individual hired on a contractual basis as Project Manager for a government undertaking falls
under the non-career service category of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec
2(b) of RA 3019.

Under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec 6(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, non-career
service in particular is characterized by 1) entrance other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness
utilized for the career service; and 2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is
coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.

Section 9(4) of the same provides that Non-Career Service It shall include Contractual personnel or those
employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or
job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within
a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work
or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner,
vs.
ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA
in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents

G.R. No. 120319

October 6, 1995

Facts:

From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue: whether
or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of
Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on December 1-
15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper
on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the
Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by
LDB. On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion. Hence, this petition for certiorari
and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from
enforcing the same.

Issue:

Which court has the jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities

Held:
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals
shall exercise:

(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to
him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of
the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers
are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a
quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein
A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be
appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular
No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.

This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide
a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities not expressly
excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. In the same
vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration
Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or
submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the
parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to
the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having
jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is
vacated, modified or corrected.

In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court.
Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, ACCORDINGLY, the Court
resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals
Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 538

FACTS: Petitioner ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron
and steel industry.

PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years counting from August 9, 1973. When ISA’s
original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555
dated August 31, 1979.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development
Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an
expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan
City. The construction of such steel mill was considered a priority and major industrial project of the
government. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the
President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of
public land located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.
Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer
plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also
dated November 16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to “negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and
on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the subject
land.

Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed.

ISSUE: WON the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s
term.

RULING: Yes
.
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally associated with juridical
personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or
comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the government. The ISA in fact
appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of
the Government of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or
instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a
juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic.
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic itself is a
body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are
compendiously described as “legal personality.”

When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as
the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed by the RP, in the absence of
special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof, e.g., devolution or transmission of
such powers, duties and functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the
RP.

When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequence of such expiry must be looked for, in
the first instance, in the charters and, by way of supplementation, the provisions of the Corporation Code.
Since in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers,
duties and functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government and
hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have
mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.
In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or
representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under PD 272.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC, even
though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved.

From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration
of ISA’s statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain
proceedings.
BALICAS vs. FFIB, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G. R. No. 145972
March 23, 2004
FACTS: In the development of the Cherry Hills Subdivision (CHS), Philjas
applied for the issuance of ECC from the DENR-Region IV
Respondent BALICAS, PENRO senior environmental management
specialist, monitored the implementation of the CHS Project Development to
check compliance with the terms and conditions in the ECC. She conducted
another monitoring on the project for the same purpose. In both instances,
she noted that the project was still in the construction stage hence, compliance
with the stipulated conditions could not be fully assessed, and therefore, a
follow-up monitoring is proper. It appeared from the records that this August
23, 1995 monitoring inspection was the last one conducted by the DENR.
Immediately after the tragic incident on August 3, 1999, a fact-finding
investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman through its Fact-
Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), which duly filed an administrative
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several officials of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the local government of
Antipolo.

The charge against petitioner involved a supposed failure on her part to

monitor and inspect the development of CHS, which was assumed to be her
duty as DENR senior environmental management specialist assigned in the
province of Rizal.

For her part, petitioner belied allegations that monitoring was not conducted,
claiming that she monitored the development of CHS as evidenced by 3
monitoring reports .She further claimed good faith and exercise of due
diligence, insisting that the tragedy was a fortuitous event. She reasoned that
the collapse did not occur in Cherry Hills, but in the adjacent mountain
eastern side of the subdivision.

The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a decision imposing upon petitioner

the supreme penalty of dismissal from office for gross neglect of duty.

Petitioner seasonably filed a petition for review of the Ombudsmans decision

with the CA. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and
affirmed the appealed decision. It found that the landslide was a preventable
occurrence and that petitioner was guilty of gross negligence in failing to
closely monitor Philjas compliance with the conditions of the ECC given the
known inherent instability of the ground where the subdivision was
developed. The appellate court likewise denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
This petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE: WON Balicas is guilty of gross neglect of duty
HELD: the petition is hereby GRANTED, The CA decision affirming the
Ombudsmans dismissal of petitioner IGNACIA BALICAS from office is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners REINSTATEMENT to her
position with back pay and without loss of seniority rights is hereby ordered.
NO
In order to ascertain if there had been gross neglect of duty, we have to look at
the lawfully prescribed duties of petitioner. Unfortunately, DENR regulations
are silent on the specific duties of a senior environmental management
specialist. Internal regulations merely speak of the functions of the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to which petitioner
directly reports.

Tthe monitoring duties of the PENRO mainly deal with broad environmental
concerns, particularly pollution abatement. This general monitoring duty is
applicable to all types of physical developments that may adversely impact on
the environment, whether housing projects, industrial sites, recreational
facilities, or scientific undertakings.
However, a more specific monitoring duty is imposed on the HLURB as the
sole regulatory body for housing and land development.

P.D. No. 1586 prescribes the following duties on the HLURB (then Ministry of
Human Settlements) in connection with environmentally critical projects
requiring an ECC:

SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and

Projects. The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon
recommendation of the National Environment Protection Council, by
proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as
environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall
undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or
area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by
the President or his duly authorized representative. For the proper
management of said critical project or area, the President may by his
proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions,
corporations or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government
personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements [now
HLURB] shall:
(a) prepare the proper land or water use pattern for said critical project(s) or
area(s);

(b) establish ambient environmental quality standards;

(c) develop a program of environmental enhancement or protective measures

against calamitous factors such as earthquake, floods, water erosion and others;
and
(d) perform such other functions as may be directed by the President from
time to time.

The legal duty to monitor housing projects, like the CHP, against calamities
such as landslides due to continuous rain, is clearly placed on the HLURB, not
on the petitioner as PENRO senior environmental management specialist. In
fact, the law imposes no clear and direct duty on petitioner to perform such
narrowly defined monitoring function.
Funa v. Duque, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014

FACTS:  Then president GMA issued EO 864 which allows tge chairman of the CSC to
be in the board of trustees/directors of certain GOCCs. Funa asserts that EO 864 and
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the independence of the
CSC, which was constitutionally created to be protected from outside influences and
political pressures due to the significance of its government functions. He further asserts
that such independence is violated by the fact that the CSC is not a part of the
Executive Branch of Government while the concerned GOCCs are considered
instrumentalities of the Executive Branch of the Government. In this situation, the
President may exercise his power of control over the CSC considering that the GOCCs
in which Duque sits as Board member are attached to the Executive Department. Funa
claims that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the
prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from holding any
other office or employment. A conflict of interest may arise in the event that a Board
decision of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning personnel-related
matters is elevated to the CSC considering that such GOCCs have original charters,
and their employees are governed by CSC laws, rules and regulations. Respondents
submit that the prohibition against holding any other office or employment under Section
2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution does not cover positions held without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities. 

ISSUE:  W/N the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees

of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the
independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding
of dual or multiple office or employment. 

DECISION:  Yes. The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title
I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of
Duque in an ex officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed
to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
.Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all
government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the
control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch, hence when the CSC
Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF, he may exercise powers and functions which are not anymore derived from
his position as CSC Chairman