RULE 118

1. PEOPLE VS. JUDGE SANTIAGO G.R. No. L-80778 June 20, 1989 PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and SEGUNDINA ROSARIO y SEMBRANO,
respondents.
FACTS: On June 2, 1987 an information for violation of P.D. No. 772 was filed by the Assistant City
Fiscal of Quezon City, with the approval of the city fiscal, in the RTC of the same city against Segundina
Rosario y Sembrano, which reads, among others, as follows: That on or about 16th day of December,
1986, and for sometime prior thereto and persisting up to the present, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused taking advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the University of the Philippines, the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously succeed in occupying and/or possessing a portion of the said property, by then
and there construct his/her house therein for residential purposes, without the consent and against the will
of the said offended party. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty and a pre-trial conference
was held on August 14, 1987 wherein the accused informed the court that she has a title, a building permit
and survey plan covering the subject land. On October 27, 1978, the questioned decision was rendered by
the respondent judge acquitting the accused of the offense charged with costs de oficio. Hence, the herein
petition for certiorari filed by the counsel for the private offended party, U.P., in behalf of the People of
the Philippines. The petition seeks to render null and void the aforesaid decision for want of due process
as the acquittal of the accused was rendered without a trial on the merits.
ISSUES: a) Whether or not double jeopardy attaches in the event of a judgment of acquittal of the
accused without a trial on the merits.
b) Whether or not the complainant or private offended party in a criminal case can file a special civil
action for certiorari questioning the validity of said judgment of acquittal without the intervention of the
Solicitor General.
HELD: a) No. A trial on the merits should be undertaken to determine once and for all whether the place
where the structure was built by the accused belongs to U.P. or to the accused. The acquittal of the
accused is a nullity for want of due process. The prosecution was not given the opportunity to present its
evidence or even to rebut the representations of the accused. The prosecution is as much entitled to due
process as the accused in a criminal case. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked as a bar to another
prosecution in this case. There is double jeopardy only when: 1) there is a valid complaint or information;
2) filed before a competent court; 3) to which defendant had pleaded; and 4) of which he has previously
been convicted or acquitted or which was dismissed or terminated without his express consent.
b) Yes. In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein
it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In
such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant
should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in
name of said complainant. It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus,
in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution.
If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant
may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect
despite the acquittal of the accused.
2. Salvador Estipona vs. Hon. Judge Lobrigo G.R. 226679, 15 Aug. 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner Salvador Estipona, Jr. was accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, for having illegally have in his possession 0.084 gram of shabu.  Under
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, plea-bargaining is prohibited in all drug cases.

On June 15, 2016, he filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,
praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and be allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165 (for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia).

The trial court denied his Motion holding that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 expressly prohibits plea-
bargaining in drugs cases. Estipona filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial
court.

Arguing that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165 is unconstitutional for it encroaches upon the Supreme Court's rule-
making power and therefore violative of the equal protection clause, he filed a Petition before the SC to
declare Sec. 23 unconstitutional.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that (1) Congress was not impleaded, (2) the
constitutionality of the law cannot be attached collaterally, (3) the proper action should have been a
petition for relief before the RTC, and (4) the petition fails to satisfy the requisites for judicial review. 

ISSUES:
1.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING
IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

II.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT

ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF
PROCEDURE.

III.

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165
AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10

HELD:
The SC ruled:

On Matters of Technicality:

On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless, without much
further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of
court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties'
arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural
flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk
from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.

Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial and
transcendental importance are present.  We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal
drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions, and that its disastrously
harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed
the future of thousands especially our young citizens. 

Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should not
deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for
enlightenment and guidance. When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in
order to resolve a constitutional issue.

On SC's Rule-Making Power:

The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no
longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.

It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted
by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz
"without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of
their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this
Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-
existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. 

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by
constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to
this Court.

The power of Congress (to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines under Sec. 13, Art, VIII of he 1935
Constitution), however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re: Cunanan, Congress in
the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law,
enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court
struck down the law as unconstitutional.

The rule making power of this [1987] Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court
was also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal,
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with
the Executive. x xx.

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.  The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of
our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court.  The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural
rules promulgated by the Court. Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the
part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules).

On Plea-Bargaining:

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.
"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the
right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtain redress for their invasions." Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a
rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes
away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the
rule deals merely with procedure.

Does Sec. 23, RA 9165 Violate the Equal Protection Clause?

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the
Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether
or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare
as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules
of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
RULE 119
1. CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA,
JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, Petitioners, vs. RAUL
RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B.
BONJE, Respondents.

G.R. No. 152643, August 28, 2008.

Facts:
On November 4, 1999, respondents (Risos, et. al.) were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Document before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19, through a criminal information dated October
27, 1999, which was subsequently amended on November 18, 1999. The case, arose from the falsification
of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that
petitioner (Concepcion De Manguerra), the owner of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo
property, affixed her signature to the document. Concepcion who was a resident of Cebu City, while on
vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-
intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.
The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter’s deposition due to her weak physical
condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility. The RTC of Cebu granted the motion and
directed that Concepcions deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City. After several
motions for change of venue of the deposition-taking, Concepcion’s deposition was finally taken on
March 9, 2001 at her residence.
 

Issue:
Whether or not Rule 23 of Rules of Court is applicable in the case of Concepcion. Thus, her deposition in
her residence is valid?

Held:
No. Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the
conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the
accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after
reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same
manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 119 of the present
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken before any judge, or, if not practicable, a member of
the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be made by a court of
superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein, the examination of a witness for the
prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be
done only before the court where the case is pending.
2. G.R. No. L-19243, February 29, 1964 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND
APPELLEE, VS. BUENAVENTURA MARIANO Y TABAQUIN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

FACTS: Said defendant is charged in said court with having illegally engaged, in the City of Manila, and
without the authority required therefor, in the business of carrying, conveying or transmitting letters or
packages for monetary consideration in places where the government has provided means for the carriage
of mails. Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty of the charge. Thereafter the case was set for hearing,
which was postponed several times on motion of the defendant, Eventually, it was set for trial on June 7,
1961, but, four (4) days prior thereto, defendant moved for the appointment of assessors. The lower court
denied this motion upon the ground; (1) that the appointment of assessors is discretionary for the court
which, under the circumstances, felt should be exercised adversely to the accused; and (2) that the motion
had merely a dilatory purpose. Hence this appeal.
The Solicitor General assails defendant's right to appeal from the order complained of, the same being
interlocutory (People vs. Sampoli, 51 Off, Gaz., 263). The objection is well taken. In view of the
interlocutory nature of said order, the proper remedy against the same would have been for the defendant
to apply for a writ of certiorari and mandamus. Nevertheless, we deem it fit to dispose of the issue raised
by defendant herein in order that it could no longer be reiterated in the future, should the decision of the
trial court on the merits of the case be unfavorable to him.

ISSUE: Whether the motion had merely a dilatory purpose?

RULING:
Yes. We are fully in accord with this view. Indeed, defendant has. not even tried to explain why it took
him over eight (8) months since his arraignment, on September 26, 1960, and almost seven (7) months
since the case was first set for trial (on November 14, 1960), to ask for the appointment of assessors. It is,
also, noteworthy that the issues of fact, under the information filed against the defendant, are limited to:
(1) whether he had engaged in activities analogous to the carriage of mail, as alleged in said information;
and (2) whether he had the requisite authority therefor. Obviously, the determination of these issues does
not depend materially upon the appreciation or credibility of testimonial evidence, for which the services
of assessors may be of substantial assistance in the administration of justice. This circumstance and the
delay in moving for the appointment of assessors, after several postponements of the hearing upon
defendant's request, indicates clearly that his purpose in filing the motion was purely dilatory. Its denial
by the lower court did not amount, therefore, to an abuse of discretion warranting our intervention for,
"the request for the appointment of assessors should be made at the earliest convenient time so as not to
hinder or delay the trial or to unnecessarily inconvenience the progress of the work of the court" (Berbari
vs. Concepcion, 40 Phil., 320, 323), which would have been the necessary effect of said motion, had it
been granted.
3. G.R. Nos. L-31261-2-3-4-5 April 20, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO CATOLICO, DISTRICT
JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BRANCH III, TIBURCIO SANTERO, and
EPIFANIA ILANO, respondents

FACTS: The undisputed facts, as recited in the petition, show that the five criminal cases were filed on
July 5, 1966 with Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, presided since July, 1969 by
respondent judge. After arraignment of private respondents and their not-guilty pleas on December 20,
1967, the cases were tried jointly, although there were different offended parties, because the evidence
against the common accused was common to all the said five cases. Hearings were set and held every
month in 1968 from February to August, 1968 with the prosecution resting its case on August 6, 1968.
The defense a presentation of its evidence on September 3, 1968 and trial continued on various scheduled
dates in October and November of 1968 and February, 1969. On no single occasion did the prosecution
ask for postponement of the trial but the respondents-accused obtained six postponements.2 At the
hearing scheduled on April 23, 1969, defense counsel obtained the postponement thereof with the
manifestation that at the next hearing, he would present respondent-accused Epifania Ilano as their last
witness and would thereafter rest their case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent acted with “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law” in the four
complaints charged against him.
RULING:
For the obvious reason that all the facts involved in the first three complaints relate to matters of record in
the proceedings in this Court in which respondent had been duly heard, no further administrative
proceedings were held after respondent filed his answer.
In the first charge, the Court has, in a way, admonished the respondent, adding that they “should not lose
the proper judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not
overstep the limitations of their power as laid down by statute and by the rules of procedure”
With reference to the second and third charges of the Secretary, the Court had already reprimanded
respondent for his offense for his refusal to “apply the law” as interpreted by the tribunal.
Anent the fourth charge, the report of the investigator is to the effect that the actuations of respondent
complained of by Mrs. Olaes were not due to any improper or personal motive and were just the result of
the innocuous eccentricities and odd ways and ideas of respondent which could not be categorized as
serious misconduct nor deserving of any heavier sanction than admonition.
While the Court was awaiting said report, however, in a letter dated April 17, 1975, respondent informed
the Court that His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos had accepted his resignation effective
January 11, 1974, “without prejudice to his receiving whatever rights he may be entitled to under the
retirement and other existing laws.” Premises considered, and in line with the established policy regarding
similar situations wherein the President has accepted resignations without prejudice to the grant of legally
possible retirement benefits thus rendering administrative cases pending against the official concerned,
moot and academic, the Court resolved to DISMISS the cases against respondent.
4. People VS Villaluz
Facts:
The petitioners herein were charged by Noemi L. Garcia with the crime of multiple rape in Court. The
petitioners Jaime Claparols, Jr. and Ramon Ignacio Moran were also charged with another offense of
multiple rape by the same complainant. Upon arraignment, the accused-petitioners entered a plea of not
guilty in both cases. A joint trial on the merits of both cases of all the accused was commenced and the
prosecution presented its evidence.
After the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence in chief, the petitioner Claparols, Jr.
filed a motion to dismiss dated November 19, 1976; the petitioner Lopez filed a motion to acquit dated
November 19, 1976; the petitioners Romulo, Santamaria and Joseph filed a motion to dismiss dated
November 22, 1976; and the petitioner Moran filed a motion to dismiss dated November 22, 1976.
The respondent judge, Hon. Onofre Villaluz, then heard the oral arguments of the movants in
amplification of their formal motions to dismiss/acquit and the oral arguments of the prosecution in
support of their opposition thereto and he denied the motions.
The petitioners assail the order of the respondent judge denying their Motions on the following grounds:
Hehad consistently and invariably denied in all criminal cases heard by him demurrers to the evidence on
the opinion that the Rules of Court in omitting provisions for a demurrer to evidence in criminal cases
prohibited it. This opinion denies petitioners their following rights under the Constitution, i.e., 'In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved ...' and 'no
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.' Therefore, the continued prosecution of
petitioners without a just resolution of their demurrers to evidence should be prohibit. The denial of
constitutional rights is reviewable on habeas corpus proceedings at the very least.
ISSUE:
W/N: the respondents were RESTRAINED from continuing with the trial of the Cases which are pending
before the Circuit Criminal Court.
HELD: Yes. The orders of the respondent judge denying the Motion to Dismiss/Acquit of the petitioners
are hereby affirmed and the petition to prohibit the continuation of the trial of Criminal Case No. CCC-
VII-17-00-Rizal and Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1751-Rizal and to compel the respondent judge to
acquit the petitioners is denied. The petition for habeas corpus is also denied.

The petitioners' application for separate trial is meritorious. Section 8, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court
provides:

SEC. 8. Trial of joint defendants. — When two or more defendants are jointly charged
with any offense they shall be tried jointly unless the court. n its discretion upon motion
of the fiscal or any defendant orders separate trials. In ordering separate trials, the court y
order that one or more defendants be each separately tried, or may order that several
defendants be jointly tried in another trials, or may order that each defendant be
separately tried.

The foregoing provision does not state when the application or separate trial may be made. As a matter of
law, the granting of a separate trial when two or more defendant are jointly barged with an offense is
discretionary with the trial court. 
5. People VS Oplado

In a complaint filed on November 26, 1958, before the Municipal Court of Cebu City, Virgilio Oplado
and Visitacion Fernandez Guyot were charged by the latter's husband with the crime of adultery allegedly
committed during the month of June, 1958 and for some time subsequent thereto.

Thereafter, the same complaint was reproduced in an amended information filed by an Assistant Fiscal of
Cebu City before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In view of the failure of the prosecution to arrest
Visitacion Fernandez Guyot, the trial of the case had to be repeatedly postponed, although the persecution
had always been ready to proceed with the trial with respect to the co-accused Virgilio Opiado. Finally,
when the case was again called for trial on March 5, 1962, and still Visitacion Fernandez Guyot was at
large for as yet she had not been apprehended, the Court a quo, upon motion of co-accused Virgilio
Opiado, over the objection of the prosecution, ordered the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, the
City Fiscal took the instant appeal claiming that the provisional dismissal of the case was contrary to law
considering that the prosecution was ready, able and willing to proceed with the trial with respect to
accused Virgilio Oplado. The only issue before us is whether the Court a quo erred in ordering the
provisional dismissal of the case due to the failure of the prosecution to arrest the accused Visitacion
Fernandez Guyot considering that both the prosecution and the accused Virgilio Oplado were then ready
for trial even in the absence of his co-accused. Stated in another way, the question presented is whether
one of the accused in a prosecution for adultery may be separately tried in the absence of the other
accused where both the prosecution and the other accused are ready to go to trial.

It is now well settled in this jurisdiction that while the husband cannot institute a prosecution for the
crime of adultery without including therein both of the guilty parties if they are both living, the statute
docs not require that both must necessarily be tried together. When the complaint is filed by the offended
husband against both of the guilty parties, the proceedings then pass into the hands of the prosecuting
officer, who may move for dismissal of the complaint as to the paramour if he is certain that he cannot
establish guilty knowledge on the part of the man of the fact that the woman was married, and such
dismissal would not of itself require the Court to acquit the woman. Nor would the death of the woman
during the pendency of the action defeat the trial and conviction of the man. (U.S. vs. De la Torre and
Gregorio, 25 Phil. 36) Neither would the fact that the man had left the country and could not be
apprehended defeat the trial and conviction of the woman. And if both are brought before the court to be
tried jointly and one of them claims a separate trial, which the Court would have to grant (Sec. 33,
General Order No. 58), the acquittal of one would not necessarily bar the prosecution and conviction of
the other (U.S. vs. Topiño and Guzman, 35 Phil. 901, 910).

And in a later case, it was stated that "there are numerous cases, after the complaint has been properly
presented, where one or the other of the alleged guilty parties in a criminal action for adultery may be
tried and sentenced separate from the codefendant. For example, where one of the parties died after the
commencement of the action, or where the man was ignorant of the fact that the woman was a married
woman at the time of the commission of the alleged criminal act." (U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289, 292)
And so, the Supreme Court declared that the lower Court in that case did not commit an error in requiring
the paramour to proceed to trial alone in the absence of his codefendant.

It is then clear that a defendant in an adultery case may be tried alone or separately from his codefendant
if the prosecution and the party available are ready for it. The only difference between the old rule
(Section 33, General Order No. 58, as amended) and the present (Section 8, Rule 115, Rules of Court) is
that under the old law, a separate trial can be demanded by a codefendant as of right and the Court had no
authority to deny the petition. (U.S. vs. Remigio, 36 Phil. 719), while under the present rule it is
discretionary upon the trial Court to order a separate trial.

In the instant case, the order of the trial Court appealed from discloses that the adultery case has been
pending for more than three years, that is, since November 26, 1958, when the case was filed, to March 5,
19&2, when the case was called for trial, in view of the failure of the prosecution to apprehend Visitacion
Fernandez Guyot, and that at the hearing of March 5, 1962, the other accused, Virgilio Oplado,
manifested his readiness to enter to trial. Nonetheless, the trial Court granted the motion of the accused
Oplado for the provisional dismissal of the case on the ground that he is entitled to a speedy trial, even if
the prosecution was likewise able and ready to try the case.

This is not only an error but an abuse of discretion, for the very right of accused Oplado to a speedy trial
demanded that the case against him be heard and prosecuted to a conclusion without waiting for the arrest
of his co-accused, there being no advantage to be derived from the provisional dismissal of the case when
trial could be held then and there without further delay and in the interest of said co-accused.

We have, therefore, no other alternative than to set aside the order of dismissal and remand this case for
further proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the lower
Court for further proceedings. No costs.
6. People VS Navarro
Facts:
A petition for certiorari is filed to annul the joint decision of the CFI for it acquits Jaime Catuday of the
charge light threat and frustrated theft while the crime of light threat was not tried in the lower court.
Respondent Catuday was charged in Makati with the crime of light threat allegedly commited against
Henry Diaquina. A year later, while the light threat case was still pending, he was charged in the same
court with a different offense, frustrated theft, allegedly committed against his employers. in two spate
decisions rendered, the municipal court convicted him of the two charges. He appeald both decision on
the CFI.
The theft case was set but was continuously reset for several occasions. Upon retirement of Judge Flores,
respondent Judge Pedro Navarro took over the two cases. The theft case was then rebuttal stage, rebuttal
evidence closed and upon the order of the cour, the parties filed their respective offer and submission of
exhibits. and submitted for decision, respondent judge render one decision, acquitting Catuday of both
charges for lack of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration
but denied.
Issue: W/N the respondent judge erred in acquitting the accused of both charges upon a single decision.
Held:
Yes. In the present case, the respondent Judge, in rendering his judgment of acquittal of private
respondent JAIME CATUDAY in Criminal Case No. 20145 for Light Threat which was never tried in the
respondent Judge's court nor in Branch XI of the CFI of Rizal, acted with abuse of discretion tantamount
to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, this is so grave and patent to justify the issuance of a writ of
CERTIORARI (Lagman v. Dela Cruz, 40 SCRA 101). And, in fine, this Court has, in these words,
defined "grave abuse of discretion" as: "Such capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment, as is
equivalent, in the eyes of the law to lack of jurisdiction." (Palma and Ignacio v. O. & S., Inc., 17 SCRA
98). For such want of jurisdiction, said JUDGMENT is NULL AND VOID AB INITIO. It is one
rendered by a court which had no power so to do; it is as though there had been no judgment or process; it
is coram non judice (People v. Liscomg, 60 NY 559, 568, 569, Am. Rep. 211; 44 Words and Phrases
592). IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court reconsiders and sets aside its resolution of April
17, 1974 dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari for lack of merit; and We hereby sustain petitioner's
petition for a writ of certiorari and declare null and void the decision of the respondent Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch II, dated July 20, 1973, insofar as it acquitted the private respondent Jaime
Catuday, as accused, in Crim. Case No. 20145 for light threat and orders its reinstatement in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal for the corresponding trial.
7. People VS CA, Perez
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner People of the Philippines to set aside the
decision of the then Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate court, which affirmed the order issued
by the then City Court of Lucena, Branch II, denying the prosecution's motion for the exclusion of Miguel
Roncesvalles (co-accused of the private respondents herein named) from the information in Criminal
Case No. 0399 so that he may testify therein as a state witness.
All the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After the prosecution had already presented seven
witnesses, the state prosecutors filed a motion with the court, asking that accused Roncesvalles be
discharged from the information in order that he may be used as a state witness against his co-defendants,
alleging that Roncesvalles had not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude;
that he did not appear to be the most guilty; that there was absolute necessity for his testimony; that there
was no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed and that his
testimony could be substantially corroborated in its material points. The motion was set for hearing and
after the parties were heard, the trial court, issued the questioned order denying the motion on the ground
that, "x xx Miguel Roncesvalles cannot be said to be the least guilty. He would be a principal by direct
participation, or a co-principal if he acted upon instruction of another as the prosecution alleges," and that,
"the prosecution having presented all its witnesses, the Court, after going over their testimony, cannot see
how Roncesvalles' testimony, if ever he is discharged, would be corroborated."[2]
Hence, the People's petition, which complains that "the respondent court acted with grave abuse of
discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in sustaining the Order dated September 15, 1978 issued by the
City Court of Lucena and in holding that the petitioner failed to show that there is absolute necessity for
the testimony of Miguel Roncesvalles whose discharge is requested."
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court prescribes the conditions in order that one or several accused
may be used as witnesses against their co-accused, to wit: "(a) there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the defendant whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available
for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said defendant; (c) the
testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said defendant
does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude."
Respondent appellate court itself sustained the People's contention on this score, simply stating that
"respondent Court erred when it ruled that it could not grant the motion for the discharge of Roncesvalles
because it does not appear that he is the least guilty of the accused. What Section 9, Rule 119 requires as
one of the conditions for the discharge of one of the accused to testify as a witness for the Government is
that said 'defendant does not appear to be the most guilty.'"
But respondent appellate court nevertheless sustained the questioned orders "since the petition failed to
show that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of Roncesvalles". The trial court had denied
discharge on the ground that "the prosecution having presented all its witnesses, the Court, after going
over their testimony, can not see how
A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty at the very outset of
the trial as to everything which may be developed in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty
participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were
practicable or possible, there would be little need for the formality of a trial. In coming to his conclusion
as to the 'necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested'; as to the 'availability or
non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence'; as to which of the accused is the 'most guilty';
and the like, the judge must rely in a large part upon the suggestions and information furnished by the
state prosecutors.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent appellate court's decision affirming the trial court's questioned orders
denying the discharge of Miguel Roncesvalles as a state witness is hereby SET ASIDE. As prayed for, the
trial court is ORDERED to allow the discharge of said accused Miguel Roncesvalles from the information
before it in Criminal Case No. 0399 so that he may testify therein as a state witness
8. People VS Sandiganbayan
9. People v CA, GR No. 62881

In an Amended Information dated 10 February 1977, Ngo Sin, Luciano Tan, and three others were
charged with the crime of Theft of 300 pieces of second-hand rail valued at P243,750.00, belonging to the
Philippine National Railways, before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City,
Branch I II (Criminal Case No. 719-SP).

On 10 July 1981, after the prosecution had already presented one witness, upon motion of the
prosecution, and after the parties were duly heard, the Trial Court ordered the discharge from the
Information of Ngo Sin to be utilized as a State witness after satisfying itself that his testimony could be
substantially corroborated in its material points and that the other conditions for discharge as set forth in
Rule 119, Sec. 9 of the Rules of Court were present.

A Motion for Reconsideration filed by Luciano Tan was denied by the Trial Court in its Order of 11
February, 1982, reasoning inter alia:

“it is pointed out that the prosecuting Fiscal has failed to show the absolute necessity for the
testimony of defendant Ngo Sin. As pointed out by the prosecuting Fiscal Ngo Sin is the only person who
can directly Identify Luciano Tan as the person who instructed him get the rails in San Pablo City, who
gave him a certain amount of money to be used in the hiring of trailers and to be given to certain persons
in San Pablo City, as the person who gave to him the necessary papers he presented in San Pablo City to
effect the taking of the rails in question, this as previously stated in the Motion to Discharge filed by the
City Fiscal dated February 20, 1981”

On Certiorari, Luciano Tan challenged the validity of the aforesaid Orders before respondent Appellate
Court. In a Decision promulgated on 25 June 1982, said Court held that "there was no despotic exercise of
discretion by His Honor in issuing the challenged orders" finding as justified his rationalizations above-
quoted.

Upon a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Luciano Tan, respondent Court reversed its prior Decision
and nullified the Trial Court Orders discharging Ngo Sin to be a State witness rationalizing that the
accused Ngo Sin can be the most guilty among the five accused for it was in his possession that the
missing rails in question were found.

Issue:

WON the respondent Court acted arbitrarily and/or committed grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the trial court for all of its observance of the requirements of law (including due notice, hearing
and fun consideration of the evidence), had committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the fiscal's
motion to discharge Ngo Sin to become State witness. This sudden reversal of a well-reasoned decision is
obviously despotic capricious, and arbitrary, and totally unjustifiable.

Held: Yes

Rationale:

It is believed that the record justifies the discharge of Ngo Sin to be utilized as a State witness considering
the absolute necessity of his testimony for the successful prosecution of the criminal charge if it has to be
established that the accused Luciano Tan had planned and financed the theft. All conditions for discharge
prescribed by Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court have been met. The Rules do not require absolute
certainty in determining those conditions. Perforce, the Judge has to rely in a large part upon the
suggestions and the considerations presented by the prosecuting officer.

... A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty
at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in the course of
the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime
charged in the complaint. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need
for the formality of a trial. In coming to his conclusions as to the necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested,' as to the 'availability or non-
availability of other direct or corroborative evidence;' as to which of the accused is the
most guilty one; and the like, the judge must rely in a large part upon the suggestions and
the information furnished by the prosecuting officer. ... 1

It is also settled that the discharge of a co-defendant is a matter that lies within the sound discretion of the
Trial Court. 2 The Court's is the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the Rules
exist. 3

We see no compelling reason for respondent Appellate Court to have substituted its own findings for
those of the prosecution and the Trial Judge. We find no contrary evidence to justify a reversal of the
Trial Judge's conclusions, who was in a position to evaluate the evidence already available, a like
opportunity to assess the same not having been afforded respondent Appellate Court.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Court's Resolution, dated 4 November 1982 reversing its own prior
Decision of 25 June 1982, as well as its Resolution of 17 December 1982 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Orders of the then Court of First Instance of Laguna and
San Pablo City, Branch III, dated 10 July 1981 and 11 February 1982, in Criminal Case No. 719-SP, are
hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court corresponding to the former Court of First Instance is
now directed to proceed with the trial on the merits accordingly.
10. Barreto v Sandiganbayan, GR No. 573333-37

Cecilia Barretto, Esperanza Magadia and Robert Soriano were charged in five separate informations
before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents.

The cases were tried jointly by agreement of the parties. After the presentation of two witnesses, the
complainant and the paymaster, the prosecution asked for postponement. The prosecution then filed a
motion to discharge accused Esperanza Magadia to be utilized as state witness. This motion was granted
by the respondent court over petitioners' objections. Trial was thereafter resumed, and the prosecution,
after presenting Esperanza Magadia as state witness, closed its case. The petitioners then took the witness
stand, after which the defense rested its case.

On June 11, 1981, the respondent court promulgated its decision convicting petitioners of the crime
charged in the five informations filed against them,

In a resolution promulgated on November 20, 1984, we affirmed the judgment of conviction, but
modified the penalty meted out to petitioners to a total "not to exceed three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed on each of them."

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, to which no objection was interposed by the Solicitor
General. We granted the motion, reconsidered our resolution of November 20, 1984, and gave due course
to the petition.

Upon review of the evidence, we find that in arriving at its judgment convicting Barretto and Soriano, the
respondent court relied on the uncorroborated testimony of the accused-turned-state witness, Esperanza
Magadia. Section 9(c), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court requires, as one of the essential conditions for the
discharge of an accused in order to be utilized as state witness, that his testimony can be substantially
corroborated in its material points. The testimony of Magadia failed to meet this condition, and yet, the
respondent court believed her and utilized her testimony to convict the petitioners.

Issue:

WON, the trial court erred in relying in the testimony of  EsperanzaMagadia. In accordance
Section 9(c), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court requires, as one of the essential conditions for the discharge
of an accused in order to be utilized as state witness, that his testimony can be substantially corroborated
in its material points.

Held: YES

In giving credence to the testimony of Magadia, the respondent court capitalized on the fact that her
testimony at the trial was a mere repetition of her written declaration before the NBI on February 8, 1979,
or long before her discharge to become a state witness and therefore "was not tailored to earn her
discharge, but given in the interest of truth." What the court failed to note in its decision was that Magadia
gave two statements to the NBI. She gave an earlier statement on January 30, 1979, in which she admitted
having falsified the signatures of Austria in the payrolls, but did not implicate Barretto. It is apparent that
her later statement was made in an effort to exculpate herself by pointing to her chief, Cecilia Barretto, as
the person responsible for the scheme of falsifying the payrolls. The trial court obviously failed to
consider this.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are generally accorded great respect, and will not be
disturbed by the appellate court. However, in the case at bar, we are convinced that the trial court
overlooked material facts and circumstances in the appreciation of the evidence which, properly
considered, would affect the result of the case.

Judging from the acts done by Esperanza Magadia, she appears to be the most guilty. As such, she has the
strongest motive to point to petitioners as the guilty parties, in exchange for her discharge and eventual
acquittal. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that petitioner Barretto, as head of the Project
Compassion Office, would jeopardize her position for the paltry amounts involved, totalling only
P520.00.

Without the testimony of Magadia, the petitioners would certainly have been acquitted as there would
have been no evidence to link them to the commission of the offense. The judgment of conviction was
based on the sole testimony of the accused-turned-state witness, Esperanza Magadia. Such testimony,
coming from a polluted source, cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction, without being
corroborated in its material points by other evidence.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court in Criminal Cases Nos. 1812 to 1816 is REVERSED
and set aside. Petitioners are hereby ACQUITTED, and declared without liability of whatever nature
arising from the incidents of this case.
11. Sardinia-Linco v Pineda, GR No. 555939

Facts:

  In Administrative Matter No. 4453-CFI, the Court's majority through its resolution of December
28, 1979 upheld the order of Executive Judge Gregorio G. Pineda denying the motion of Augusto Syjuco,
Jr. for inhibition from further hearing the anti-graft case against former Land Registration Commissioner
Gregorio Bilog, Jr., et al., docketed as Criminal Case No. 27743 of the Court of First Instance, Pasig,
Rizal. 
Respondent Judge denied the motion for inhibition and continued with the trial of the case. What
precipitated the filing of this petition is, while the prosecution was still in the process of presenting
rebuttal evidence, respondent judge terminated the case and verbally ordered petitioner Linco to submit
memorandum on the case within ten (10) days although the verbal order was modified in respondent
judge's written order of January 12, 1981 by requiring petitioners to submit their formal offer of rebuttal
evidence within ten (10) days and to submit their memorandum within thirty (30) days.
Petitioners allege that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion by arbitrarily,
whimsically and capriciously closing the case without allowing the State, represented by the herein
petitioners, to finish or complete its rebuttal evidence, a matter which, besides being contrary to law is an
obvious display of bias, hostility, and partiality. Petitioners pointed out that respondent judge committed
error of law and gravely abused his discretion in compelling petitioner Guerrero to be placed on the
witness stand and cross-examined in the hearing of their motion for inhibition and finding them in
contempt while denying their motion to hold counsel for accused Bilog in contempt of court. They
likewise reiterated their previous stand that respondent judge committed error of law and grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to inhibit himself from trying the criminal case.

Issues:

I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO INHIBIT HIMSELF PROM TRYING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 27743
AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
II
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION IN COMPELLING PETITIONER GUERRERO TO BE CROSS-EXAMINED IN THE
HEARING OF THE SUBJECT MOTION FOR INHIBITION.
III
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING MOTION TO HOLD ATTY. EXEQUIEL
CONSULTA IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND DECLARING PETITIONERS IN CONTEMPT OF
COURT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS' URGENT MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT OF TRIAL
ON JANUARY 12, 1981; FOR ORDERING TERMINATED PROSECUTION'S REBUTTAL
EVIDENCE; FOR GIVING PROSECUTION 10 DAYS WITHIN WHICH TO SUBMIT FORMAL
OFFER OF EVIDENCE AND FOR UNCONCIONABLY DECLARING THE CASE SUBMITTED
FOR DECISION THEREAFTER.

Held:

l. Respondent Judge did not commit any error of law nor grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
inhibit himself from trying Criminal Case No. 27743, there being no valid grounds to warrant
disqualification. Specific instances cited by the petitioners to prove that respondent Judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction are not only unsupported by the records but are
contrary to what appears therein. The issue of "raffle" which was not raised in the lower court and,
therefore, cannot be an issue in this Petition, has already been decided by this Court in its resolution of
December 18, 1979 in AM No. 4453- CFI which sustained the Order of respondent Judge denying the
motion of Augusto Syjuco, Jr. to disqualify said judge on the ground, inter alia, that the raffle was
irregular.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2. Respondent Judge did not commit any error nor grave abuse of discretion in allowing the cross-
examination of petitioner Guerrero at the hearing of subject motion for inhibition. It appears that said
motion for disqualification was set for hearing at the instance of the petitioners (pp. 4-5 of said Motion for
Disqualification); in the hearing of said motion on September 19, 1980, petitioner Guerrero presented
evidence in narrative form and at the next hearing on October 1, 1980, submitted himself to cross-
examination by the defense counsel without objection through 102 pages of the transcript of stenographic
notes. (Annex "P", pet.). It was only at the next hearing of October 6, 1980, for the continuation of said
cross-examination that he objected; but there' is nothing in the record that respondent judge threatened
him with contempt. The petitioner Guerrero not only made manifestations as a prosecutor but actually
testified as a witness. (Annex "P", petition). Hence, his cross-examination by defense counsels for the
oppositors was necessary and proper.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
3. Respondent Judge did not err in declaring petitioners in contempt of court and in denying the
motion to hold Atty. Exequiel Consulta in contempt of court. Two motions for contempt were filed
against the petitioners: (a) one was filed by Atty. Consulta, counsel for accused Bilog for having falsely
represented in court that 'Acting Commissioner of Land Registration Federico B. Alfonso, Jr. had
expressed the belief that the accused Gregorio Bilog, Jr. is capable of intimidating witnesses. Acting
Commissioner Alfonso both in open court and in his letter dated August 22, 1980 categorically denied the
imputations attributed to him; (b) the other motion was filed by accused Felino Cortez on the ground that
they filed a Motion for Disqualification dated August 28, 1980, of the respondent judge, alleging
imputations of partiality and bias on the part of the respondent judge, which the court in the Order dated
January 17, 1981 (Annex 'EE', petition) found to be false. The petitioners filed a motion for contempt
against Atty. Consulta for alleged distortion of the meaning of their allegation in their Manifestation of
August 18, 1980, which does not refer to Gregorio Bilog, Jr. alone but to the 'accused' and to Bilog's well
entrenched friends at the Land Registration Commission, as capable of intimidating witnesses. (Motion to
Hold Atty. Consulta in Contempt of Court; Annex N petition). Respondent judge rendered the Order
dated January 7, 1981 (Annex "EE", Id.), finding petitioners guilty of contempt of court, sentencing each
of them to pay a fine of P100.00 with a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with severely. The motion to hold Atty. Consulta in contempt was denied for lack of merit. Accordingly
to respondent judge, it is immaterial whether the imputation refers to Bilog alone or to all the accused
(including Bilog), the issue being the falsity of the prosecutors' claim that Acting LRC Commissioner
made such imputation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
4. Respondent Judge did not err in denying petitioners' urgent motion for postponement of trial on
January 12, 1981; for ordering terminated prosecution's rebuttal evidence for giving prosecution 10 days
within which to submit formal offer of evidence and for declaring the case submitted for decision. On
January 12, 1981, at the scheduled hearing, petitioner Linco again asked for postponement on the ground
that the last witness she was going to present could not be located because lie bad resigned from the LRC
and on the further ground that they intended to appeal certain orders of the respondent Judge. Counsel for
Bilog vigorously objected to the motion for postponement and asked that since the prosecution had no
witness the rebuttal evidence be deemed terminated and the case submitted for decision, which was
granted, Undoubtedly trial courts have the power to regulate the conduct of trials and direct their course;
and may thus limit the number of witnesses when in its opinion further testimony on the point would be
merely cumulative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Finally if, as petitioner Linco manifested in open court, that witness Ernesto del Rosario who had
already testified for the prosecution, was their last witness (TSN of Jan. 12, 1981 attached as Annex '16',
Answer of Bilog), the Order terminating their rebuttal evidence could not have prejudiced the prejudiced
the prosecution's case, since the defense did not ask for the striking out of the testimony of that witness
for his failure to appear for additional cross-examination.
12. People v City Court of Silay, L-43790

Facts:

That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico
who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022
loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report cards), Apparently, it was proven
and shown that there was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas
were to be false making it appear to be heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then were
charged with “Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document”. After the prosecution
had presented, the respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidences
presented were not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion,
respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused
do not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised penal code defining the
crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that their case be dismissed. People asserts that the
plea of double jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed because according to them, it
was done with the consent of the accused therefore waiving there defense of double jeopardy. The
accused on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to lack of merits of the
prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will bar the prosecution from
prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional for the accused due to
double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff.

Issue: 
Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio, Millan and
Jochico in double jeopardy.

Held: 
Yes, the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the
case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of falsification
was dismissed on a motion of the accused however this was a motion filed after the prosecution had
rested its case, calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the prosecution had not been
able to do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution of another case. As it
was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid
complaint, second would be that such complaint be filed before a competent court and to which the
accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise
terminated without express consent of the accused in which were all present in the case at  bar. There was
indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which
was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also mentioned that the accused
pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it was proven that the case used against the accused were
not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which translates
to acquittal. It explained further that there are two instances when we can conclude that there
is jeopardy when first is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency of evidence
and second, when the proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused
to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was the first on that is very much applicable to our case
at bar where there was dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar the approval
of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the accused which the
law despises.
13. G.R. No. 196685               December 14, 2011

GOODLAND COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ABRAHAM CO and CHRISTINE CHAN, Respondents.

Facts:
That on or about the 29th day of February 2000, in the City of Makati, a place within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Abraham Co and Christine Chan who are private
individuals and Joel T. Pelicano, a Notary Public, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Real
Estate Mortgage, a public document, causing it to appear, as it did appear, that Mr. Gilbert Guy, Vice
President of Goodland Company, Inc., participated in the preparation and execution of said Real Estate
Mortgage whereby complainant corporation mortgaged to Asia United Bank a real property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11645 and by then and there causing aforesaid Real Estate Mortgage to
be notarized by accused Atty. Joel Pelicano, who in fact notarized said document on August 3, 2000
under Document No. 217, Page No. 44, Book No. XVII, Series of 2000 of his Notarial Register, thus
making it appear, that Gilbert Guy has acknowledged the said Real Estate [Mortgage] before him, when
in truth and in fact Gilbert Guy did not appear nor acknowledge said document before Notary Public Joel
T. Pelicano and thereafter herein accused caused the aforesaid Real Estate [Mortgage] document to be
registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of Makati City on March 8, 2001."
After the prosecution formally offered its evidence and rested its case, herein private respondents filed a
Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with attached Demurrer to Evidence claiming
that the prosecution failed to substantiate its claim that they are guilty of the crime charged. Private
respondents alleged that the prosecution failed to establish the second and third elements of the crime as
the prosecution was unable to provide any proof that private respondents caused it to appear in a
document that Mr. Gilbert Guy participated in an act and that the prosecution failed to establish that Mr.
Gilbert Guy did not participate in said act. Thus, private respondents alleged that the prosecution’s
evidence itself showed that Mr. Gilbert Guy signed the REM, delivered the original transfer certificates of
title to AUB and that Mr. Guy was duly authorized by Goodland’s Board of Directors to execute the
REM. They likewise claimed that the prosecution failed to prove that the REM was submitted as a
comfort document as the testimonies of the witnesses (referring to Galvez, Pulido, Calleja, Pelicano and
Ignacio) proving this matter were hearsay and lacked probative value. Also, the prosecution failed to
present direct evidence showing the involvement of private respondents in the alleged falsification of
document.

In its Order8 dated 16 October 2008, the MeTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence of respondents. The
MeTC enumerated the elements for the crime of Falsification of Public Document by making it appear
that a party participated in an act or proceeding when he/she did not:

1. That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position;

2. That the offender caused it to appear that a person or persons have participated in any act or
proceeding;

3. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding;
 4. The falsification was committed in a public or official document. 9

The MeTC found that although Goodland established the first and fourth elements, it failed to prove the
second and third elements of the crime. Goodland was unable to present competent evidence that the Real
Estate Mortgage was indeed falsified. Hence, Goodland erred in relying on the presumption that the
person in possession of the falsified document is deemed the falsifier. Assuming that the Real Estate
Mortgage is indeed falsified, Goodland presented no competent evidence to show that the Real Estate
Mortgage was transmitted to any of the respondents. Guy’s affidavit stated that he delivered the Real
Estate Mortgage to Chan; however, the affidavit is merely hearsay as Guy never testified, and the
affidavit referred to properties in Laguna which are not the subject of the present case.

The MeTC declared that the record shows that other than the fact that Co and Chan are President and
Vice President of Asia United Bank, no other evidence was presented by Goodland to show that Co and
Chan performed acts which amounted to falsification in the execution of the questioned Real Estate
Mortgage.

The MeTC found insufficient the testimonies of Mr. Pulido, Mr. Galvez, NBI Agent Calleja and Atty.
Ignacio to prove that Guy merely signed the Real Estate Mortgage as a comfort document. None of the
witnesses have any personal knowledge of the circumstances of the discussions between Guy and Asia
United Bank. Guy’s non-presentation as a witness raised the disputable presumption that his testimony
would have been adverse to Goodland.

Issue:
WON demurer to evidence constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Rulling:

We have explained "grave abuse of discretion" to mean thus:

An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the
same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal
hostility.23

The CA made its decision after its careful examination of the records of the case. The CA found that Guy
signed the subject Real Estate Mortgage and was authorized by the Board of Directors to do so, and none
of Goodland’s witnesses have personal knowledge of the circumstances of the discussions between Guy
and Asia United Bank. Goodland, however, failed to prove that (1) the subject Real Estate Mortgage was
in blank at the time it was submitted to Asia United Bank; (2) respondents filled-in the blanks in the Real
Estate Mortgage; and (3) Guy did not appear before the notary public. It was with reason, therefore, that
the CA declared that the evidence for Goodland failed miserably in meeting the quantum of proof
required in criminal cases to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence. Grave abuse of
discretion may not be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of evidence.
15. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION), QUINTIN
SALUDAGA Y BORDEOS, et al.
G.R. No. 197953 August 05, 2015
Ponente: BRION, J.

Doctrine: In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer amounts to an acquittal, and the dismissal order
may not be appealed as this would place the accused in double jeopardy but it may be reviewed through
certiorari under Rule 65.For the writ to issue, theburden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate
that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.

Facts:
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas charged the following respondents with the
Sandiganbayan (SB) for falsification of public documents under Article 171 of RPC: (1) QuintinSaludaga
- Mayor ofLavezares, Northern Samar; (2) Arthus E. Adriatico - Revenue Collection Clerk; (3) Romeo
De Luna - private individual. The prosecution submitted that the respondents Mayor Saludagaand
Adriatico connived, confederated with, and mutually helped one another in falsifying the subject Official
Receipt and the mayor's permit to make it appear that De Luna was a bona fide pakyaw contractor. The
respondents pleaded NOT guilty.

After the prosecution presented its witnesses, it rested its case and submitted its formal offer of evidence,
which the Sandiganbayan admitted.The respondents filed a joint motion for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence, whichSandiganbayan granted. On the ground of insufficiency of evidence, the respondents
argued that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy.

SB Ruling:granted the demurrer AND dismissed the criminal case.

In criminal prosecutions for offenses under the RPC, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused had criminal intent to commit the offense charged. The prosecution failed to prove some
of the elements of falsification of documents under Article 171.

The People filed a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 against the SB with the SC.

People’s contentions:
It impute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the SB when
it granted the demurrer. The People disagree that the prosecution failed to establish the respondents' guilt
with moral certainty. Specifically, the People refute the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that the prosecution
failed to prove certain elements of the falsification charged.
Respondents’ contentions:
The respondents further argue that in a petition for certiorari, the Court does not reexamine the trial or
appellate court's appreciation of facts unless the evidence on record does not support their findings or the
judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; and that the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for
certiorari does not include a correction of the Sandiganbayan's evaluation of the prosecution's evidence
but is confined to the issue of grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:
Whether the SB gravely abused its discretion when it granted the respondents' demurrer to evidence.

Held:
NO. In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer (Section 23, Rule 119) amounts to an acquittal, and the
dismissal order may not be appealed as this would place the accused in double jeopardy.Although the
dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it may be reviewed through certiorari under Rule 65.For the writ
to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or
where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void.The burden is on the petitioner to
clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of
its very power to dispense justice.The People failed to overcome this burden. The SB, by examining the
prosecution's evidence vis-a-vis the elements of the crime, adequately laid the basis in resolving to grant
the demurrer. We do not see how this method of arriving at a decision or resolution can be deemed a
grave abuse of discretion.

This is not to say that the SB correctly applied the law to the facts of the case. Our finding is limited to
the issue of grave abuse of discretion; we do not rule on the legal soundness of the Sandiganbayan
resolution.To reiterate, certiorari shall lie only when the respondent court gravely abuses its discretion
such as when it blatantly ignores facts or denies a party due process. Certiorari does not correct errors of
judgment.Thus, even if the Sandiganbayan erred in weighing the sufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence, such error does not necessarily amount to grave abuse of discretion.It is merely an error of
judgment which may no longer be appealed because it would place the respondents in double jeopardy. In
sum, although the SB, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, may have erred in dismissing the
criminal case, such error may no longer be annulled or set aside because it would place the respondents in
double jeopardy.
16. People v. Dominguez
GR no. 229420, Feb. 19, 2018
Facts:
On January 13, 2011, Venson Evangelista, a car salesman, was abducted by a group of men. Evangelista's
charred remains were discovered the following day in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.
Mendiola and Ferdinand Parulan (Parulan) voluntarily surrendered to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and executed extrajudicial confessions identifying respondents Roger and Raymond Dominguez
(Dominguez Brothers) as the masterminds behind the killing. This led to the filing before the Quezon City
RTC of an Information against Mendiola and the respondents for Carnapping with Homicide under the
AntiCarnapping Act. The RTC stated that there is a requirement that Mendiola must testify again as a
regular witness during trial proper to secure his acquittal.

Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of Mendiola should be stricken off the records.
Ruling:
The rule is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge proceeding will only be
inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state witness. However, the
motion hearing in this case had already concluded and the motion for discharge, approved. Thus,
whatever transpired during the hearing is already automatically deemed part of the records of the
Criminal Case and admissible in evidence pursuant to the rule. Mendiola's testimony was not incomplete,
contrary to how Miranda paints it to be.
17. JUANITO VICTOR C. REMULLA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR No. 218040, 2017-04-17
Facts:
petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the February 2, 2015... and March 20, 2015...
dismissed the case filed by Juanito Victor C. Remulla (Remulla) against respondent Erineo S. Maliksi
(Maliksi) for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
He alleged that Maliksi, as governor of Cavite, caused the purchase of certain medical supplies from
Allied Medical Laboratories Corporation in November 2002 without conducting any public bidding,
thereby giving unwarranted benefit or preference to it.
After almost nine (9) years, in a resolution, dated August 27, 2014, the Ombudsman found probable cause
against Maliksi for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Maliksi filed his motion for reconsideration, arguing that there was no probable cause and that there was a
violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case... the Ombudsman filed an information for
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Maliksi before the Sandiganbayan. Maliksi then filed
his Motion to Dismiss,[7] dated November 20, 2014, alleging that the finding of probable cause against
him was null and void, and that his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated.
According to him, the 9-year delay in the proceedings caused him undue prejudice.
the Sandiganbayan found that Maliksi's right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated. Thus, it
dismissed the case against him.
The Sandiganbayan noted that the interval was caused by the delay in the routing or transmission of the
records of the case, which was unacceptable... it was inconsequential to determine whether an accused
had followed up on his case because it was not his duty to do so. The Sandiganbayan opined that it was
the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the resolution of the case within a reasonable time.
OSP filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[9] arguing that the delay in the preliminary investigation
was neither whimsical nor capricious, considering that Maliksi did not complain on the delay.
In its assailed resolution, dated March 20, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for partial
reconsideration. It reiterated that the fact-finding of the case, which lasted for three (3) years, and the
preliminary investigation, which lasted for six (6) years, were due to mechanical routing and avoidable
delay. The Sandiganbayan found that such delays were unnecessary and unacceptable. It also echoed
Coscolluela that it was not the duty of the respondent in a preliminary investigation to follow up on the
prosecution of his case.
Issues:
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CASE
AGAINST RESPONDENT
Remulla argues that the Sandiganbayan should not have dismissed the case as there was a finding of
probable cause; that there was no violation of Maliksi's right to a speedy disposition of his case because
he did not promptly assert his right; that mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
sufficient to invoke inordinate delay... there must be an active assertion of the right to a speedy
disposition of cases before the Ombudsman; and that Coscolluela is inapplicable because the petitioner
therein was completely unaware of his pending case.
Maliksi countered that the petition was defective because it was filed by Remulla, a private party. He
underscored that only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), or, in certain instances, the OSP, may
bring or defend actions for or on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Maliksi also pointed out that
the delay of nine (9) years in the preliminary investigation of his case was clearly an inordinate delay.
Maliksi argued that the petition was a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy because
a dismissal of criminal case due to the right to speedy disposition of a case is tantamount to an acquittal.
the Ombudsman, through the OSP, argued that Court must provide a definitive ruling on the concept of
inordinate delay because the current model was still in a state of perpetual flux. It opined that Coscolluela
was inapplicable in the present case as Maliksi was aware of the pending case against him before the
Ombudsman. The OSP also emphasized that the Sandiganbayan merely dismissed the case against
Maliksi by considering the sole factor of length of delay. It cited the case of Barker v. Wingo,[20] where
the defendant's assertion of, or failure to assert, his right to a speedy trial was one of the factors to be
considered in an inquiry whether there was deprivation of such right. The OSP echoed the argument of
Remulla that an accused who does not take any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the case
was deemed to have slept on his right and have given acquiesces to the supervening delays
Ruling:
The petition was filed by a private partyProcedural law mandates that all criminal actions, commenced by
a complaint or an information, shall be prosecuted under the direction and control, of a public prosecutor.
In appeals of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals (CA) and before this Court, the OSG is the
appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35 (l), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code.[21] In certain instances, the OSP represented the People, when it involved criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Although he claims that he has legal standing as a taxpayer, the present case is criminal in nature and the
People is the real party in interest.[23] Remulla captioned his petition as "People of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and Erineo S. Maliksi"[24] but it is clear that he does not represent the
People.
Only on rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own
behalf such as when there is a denial of due process,[25] or where the dismissal of the case is capricious
shall certiorari lie.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases is a relative conceptThe right to a speedy disposition of a case,
like the right to a speedy trial,[27] is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed
"balancing test" to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of
cases has been violated.
(1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right; and
(4) prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay. None of these elements, however, is either a necessary
or sufficient condition; they are related and must be considered together with other relevant
circumstances. These factors have no talismanic qualities as courts must still engage in.a difficult and
sensitive balancing process.
Harmonizing the two sets of casesThe first set of cases shows that the criminal cases were not dismissed
because of the non-assertion of the accused of their right to a speedy disposition of cases or speedy trial.
Other factors in the balancing test were also considered by the Court, particularly, the reason for the delay
in the proceedings and the prejudice caused by the delay.
the length of delay in these cases were properly justified by the prosecution and the accused therein failed
to take steps to accelerate their cases, the Court found that the there was no prejudice caused, which
would warrant the assertion of their right to a speedy disposition of cases.
In the second set of cases, the lengthy delay in the proceeding against the accused therein was not
satisfactorily explained.
the Court found in those cases that the State miserably failed to give an acceptable reason for the
extensive delay. Due to the manifest prejudice caused to the accused therein, the Court no longer gave
weighty consideration to their lack of objection during the period of delay. It was emphasized in those
cases that it was the duty of the prosecutor to expedite the prosecution of the case regardless if the
accused failed to object to the delay.
Accordingly, both sets of cases only show that "[a] balancing test of applying societal interests and the
rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis."[37]
To reiterate, none of the factors in the balancing test is either a necessary or sufficient condition; they are
related and must be considered together with other relevant circumstances. Corpus v. Sandiganbayan[38]
thoroughly explained how the factors of the balancing test should be weighed, particularly the prejudiced
caused by the delay, to wit:xxx Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant
that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to
minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be
impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare
his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable
to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is
still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often,
hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public
obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond
reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry its
burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or
exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals.
there is no constitutional or legal provision which states that it is mandatory for the accused to follow up
his case before his right to its speedy disposition can be recognized. To rule otherwise would promote
judicial, legislation where the Court would provide a compulsory requisite .not specified by the
constitutional provision. It simply cannot be done, thus, the ad hoc characteristic of the balancing test
must be upheld.
In fine, it has been settled that the factors in the balancing test must be given different consideration and
weight based on the factual circumstances of each case. Applying such principle in this case, the Court
can now determine whether or not the Ombudsman committed inordinate delay and violated Maliksi's
right to a speedy disposition of his case.
the prosecution states that the cases against the accused were resolved by the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon as early as 2007 and were forwarded in the same year to the Ombudsman Proper
for final approval. Unfortunately, final action on the Resolution was allegedly overtaken by disruptive
incidents and political events like the 2010 hostage-taking at the Quirino Grandstand and the
impeachment of Ombudsman Gutierrez that led to her resignation in April 2011... the delay in Maliksi's
case started from the fact-finding investigation of the Ombudsman when he filed his counter-affidavit in
Remulla cases on December 15, 2005 until the completion of the PCSO case on October 24, 2008, or a
span of three (3) years. At that point, the preliminary investigation began, until it was terminated on
August 27, 2014 and the information was filed before the court.in November 2014, or a period of six (6)
years. Thus, the Sandiganbayan observed that the delay incurred in the proceedings lasted for a total
period of nine (9) years. Even if the Court excludes the fact-finding stage of three (3) years, there was still
six (6) years of inordinate delay.
the OSP sought the understanding of the Sandiganbayan and explained that the resolution of the
consolidated cases was overtaken by disruptive events such as the 2010 hostage-taking at the Quirino
Grandstand and the impeachment complaint against the Ombudsman Gutierrez. These excuses, however,
could hardly be considered as enough reason to warrant the delay in the proceedings. Obviously, these
events have no direct relation to the Remulla and PCSO cases to affect their speedy resolution.
The functions of the Ombudsman under the Constitution are not suspended by the occurrence of unrelated
events to its mandate, whether political or not. Moreover, to sustain the argument of the OSP would set a
perilous precedent as the delayed cases pending before the Ombudsman from 2010 to 2014 can simply be
overlooked by citing these occasions.
Based on the foregoing, the explanation provided by the OSP falls short of the reasonable justification to
authorize delay in the proceedings
To summarize, the initial delay began when the Ombudsman did not act with dispatch on the approval or
disapproval of the proposed resolution and decision in the Remulla. Due to its delay, the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon was able to send a memorandum for consolidation with the PCSO case. The mere
routing or transfer of the memorandum to the Ombudsman incurred eight (8) months of delay. Then,
when the memorandum was approved, it took ten (10) months before the records could be transferred
from the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to the Ombudsman. Finally, for a period of four (4) years, the
consolidated cases sat at the Ombudsman. As the OSP did not submit an explanation as to the status of
the case in that 4-year period, the Court can only conduct guesswork on the cause of its delay.Had the
Ombudsman immediately approved or disapproved the proposed resolution and decision submitted to its
office on January 9, 2007, then the case would have been promptly acted upon. If filed before the
Sandiganbayan, the prosecution and the defense could have timely presented their case. Instead, the
Ombudsman chose inaction which led to a chain of delays lasting until July 8, 2014. After the lapse of
nine (9) years of being kept in the dark, Maliksi could not have had the opportunity to timely present, his
case in court due to the extensive delay in the preliminary investigation. Certainly, this protracted period
of uncertainty over his criminal case caused him prejudice, living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and
even, hostility.Further, in light of the circumstances of this case, the Court does not give great weight to
Maliksi's lack of objection over the delay because the OSP miserably failed to defend the Ombudsman's
inaction. The prosecution could not give an acceptable reason to justify the 9-year interval before the case
was filed in court. The proceedings were marred by the delay in the mechanical transfer of documents and
records. No steps were taken by the Ombudsman to ensure that the preliminary investigation would be
resolved in a timely manner. Clearly, the failure of the prosecution to justify the 9-year interval before the
case was filed in court far outweighs Maliksi's own inaction over the delay. As articulated in Coscolluela,
Duterte, Cervantes, People, and Inocentes, the Court reiterates that it is the duty of the prosecutor to
expedite the prosecution of the case regardless of whether or not the accused objects to the
delay.Likewise, Remulla's argument that the Sandiganbayan only took into account the length of delay in
the proceedings deserves scant consideration. Aside from the length of delay, the anti-graft court
thoroughly discussed the Ombudsman's failure to give a suitable reason for the delay and the prejudice it
had caused to Maliksi. The latter's lack of follow up with his case was not given much weight because of
the prosecution's manifest failure to justify the protracted lull in the proceedings. The Sandiganbayan,
after properly taking into consideration all the relevant factors in the balancing test and gave different
weight on each factor based on the particular circumstances of this case, came to a conclusion that the
Ombudsman committed inordinate delay. The case underwent the intricate and difficult balancing test
before Maliksi's right to a speedy disposition of his case was sustained. Thus, the Court rules that the
Sandiganbayan did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal case against
Maliksi. To conclude, the Court finds it proper to reiterate the underlying principle of the constitutional
right to a speedy disposition of cases in the landmark case of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan:[46]xxx Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not
only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy
disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Right (both in the 1973 and the 1987
Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. xxxIt has been
suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for
even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information.
True — but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such
investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected for
now, until man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.[47]WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The February 2, 2015 and March 20, 2015 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan Second Division
in SB-14-CRM-0432 are AFFIRMED
18. G.R. No. 196094, March 05, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. AMADO "JAKE" P. MACASAET,* ENRIQUE P.

ROMUALDEZ AND JOY P. DELOS REYES (DECEASED),**Respondents.

Facts:
These three consolidated cases originated from complaints for nine counts of libel on account of nine
interrelated newspaper articles which appeared in the newspapers Malaya and Abante where statements
allegedly derogatory to then Governor Casimiro "Ito" M. Ynares, Jr. (Ynares) and former Undersecretary
of the Department of Interior and Local Government Atty. Narciso "Jun" Y. Santiago, Jr. (Santiago) were
written by Amado "Jake" Macasaet (Macasaet). Ynares filed the two counts of libel while Santiago filed
the other seven counts of libel.17

Of the nine counts of libel, probable causes for libel were found in relation to the April 21, 1999 issue
of Malaya with respect to the article entitled "Santiago's gambling habits" and the March 1, 1999 issue
of Malaya regarding the article entitled "NCA-UCAP FEUD: Walang trabaho, personalan lang." Both
articles were written by Macasaet. The libel complaint involving the newspaper Abante was dismissed.18

Thus, separate Informations19 for the two counts of libel were filed against Macasaet, Malaya's Publisher,
Chairman and writer, Enrique P. Romualdez (Romualdez), Malaya's Executive Editor, and Joy P. Delos
Reyes (Delos Reyes), Malaya's Editor (collectively, the accused). The present cases revolve around these
two libel cases.

Pursuant to the Court's Resolution20 dated October 14, 2013, the cases were considered closed and
terminated as to Delos Reyes who died on May 3, 2013 per Notice of Death 21 dated June 17, 2013,
pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The October 14, 2013 Resolution became final and
executory on December 13, 2013.22

According to Malaya, "Amado 'Jake' P. Macasaet peacefully was brought home by his Creator at 8:35
am, January 7, 2018 surrounded by his family."23 To date, however, no notice of his death has been filed
with the Court.

The deaths of Delos Reyes and Macasaet notwithstanding, these Petitions have not been mooted because
there remains an accused, Romualdez.
On April 27, 1999, xxx Santiago, who was then the Secretary-General of the National Cockers
Association (NCA), filed an Affidavit-Complaint against [the accused], accusing them of publishing an
allegedly libelous article entitled, "Santiago's gambling habits." 
[The accused] subsequently filed before [the RTC Manila, Br. 37] a motion to dismiss, dated November
26, 2008, stating that their right to the speedy disposition of their cases was violated, considering that
almost ten years had lapsed without any resolution of their cases under preliminary investigation. The
motion was denied in the assailed Order, dated February 19, 2009, thus:
"In any event, accused have voluntarily agreed to be arraigned on January 29, 2009 (Macasaet and
Romualdez) and February 17, 2009 (Delos Reyes). Such consent amounts to a waiver of their right to
raise the issue of any alleged unreasonable delay in the disposition of their case during the preliminary
investigation.
Hence, the first petition, which was filed on May 19, 2011.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment 30 on September 2, 2011. Santiago filed his
Comment/Opposition31 on August 13, 2013. The accused filed a Reply32 on September 26, 2013.
The filing of the second petition on May 3, 2011 antedated that of the first petition. However, the second
petition arose from an incident before the RTC Manila, Br. 37 that occurred after the incident that
precipitated the first petition.

After the denial of the accused's motion to dismiss dated November 26, 2008 based on the ground that the
filing of the Information dated July 9, 2008 violated their constitutionally guaranteed right to speedy
disposition of their cases, the accused filed before RTC Manila, Br. 37 another Motion to Dismiss 33 dated
September 24, 2009 on the ground that the said court has no criminal jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: WON the petitions of the accused be given merit.

Rulling: The Court disagrees with the CA; it finds the Information sufficient.

Paraphrasing the Information, the accused, as publisher/writer, executive editor and editor defamed
Santiago on April 21, 1999, in Manila City, by writing and publishing an article in the Malaya with
address at Port Area, Manila. To the Court, it is clear that Port Area, Manila is where the defamatory
article was written and published because that is the address of Malaya, an unquestionably printed
newspaper, wherein the article appeared. That the Information did not expressly state "first published" is
of no moment because the word "published" does not exclude the first publication.

In turn, the accused do not deny that Port Area, Manila is the editorial and business offices of Malaya and
interestingly, they did not raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction to dismiss Criminal Case No. 08-263272
despite the fact that the Information filed before RTC Manila, Br. 36 is similarly worded as the
Information in Criminal Case No. 08-263273 filed before RTC Manila, Br. 37 as to the address
of Malaya being at Port Area, Manila City and the non-inclusion of the phrase "printed and first
published."

According to Bonifacio, "the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was
printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or
business offices in the case of newspapers."61 The Information in question complies with
the Bonifacio directive because it alleges with particularity Port Area, Manila as the place where the
alleged defamatory article was printed and first published as evidenced or supported by the records of the
case.62 The Information need not parrot the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC and expressly use the
phrase "printed and first published." If there is no dispute that the place of publication indicated in the
Information, which is Manila in the present case, is the place where the alleged defamatory article was
"printed and first published," then the law is substantially complied with. After all, the filing of the
Information before an RTC of the City of Manila would, borrowing the phraseology of Bonifacio,
forestall any inclination to harass the accused. Besides, it is incumbent upon the accused to show that Port
Area, Manila is not the business or editorial office of Malaya in the face of evidence in the records of the
case that it is so.
The DOJ Consolidated Resolution in its summary of the pertinent facts stated that: "Records also show
that Malaya is published by the People's Independent Media, Inc., with editorial and business offices at
Port Area, Manila xxx."63 The Consolidated Review Resolution64 of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal
dated September 28, 2007 which initially dismissed the nine libel complaints of Santiago and Ynares for
lack of jurisdiction indicated the venue where the complaints should be filed, viz.:

In the case of complainant Santiago, Jr., his libel complaints should be filed either in Manila, where the
libelous matters appearing in ABANTE and MALAYA were first printed and published, or in the place
where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. However, the records do
not show Pasig City as to (sic) the actual residence of complainant Santiago, Jr. at the time of the
commission of the offense charged, except to say that he held office at No. 3 West Fourth St., West
Triangle, Quezon City. And even if we consider this address as his actual place of residence, or his office
address as a public official, which he did not state in his complaints, still, the filing of these complaints
before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Rizal violates the rule on venue as provided for in Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code.65
Thus, the CA erred in dismissing the Information in Criminal Case No. 08-263273 and nullifying the
Orders dated November 3, 2009 and January 29, 2010 of the RTC Manila, Br. 37, denying the accused's
motion to dismiss.
The first and third petitions are also meritorious.

The accused posit that the CA erred in affirming the RTC ruling that, even though the delay was not
disputed or the reason for it was not explained by the Prosecution, the accused's right to speedy trial was
not violated, and that the accused are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of their
cases for failing to plead such defense during the preliminary investigation.

Indeed, the Constitution guarantees in the Bill of Rights, Article III, Section 14(2) that: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused xxx shall enjoy the right xxx to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial xxx"
and in Article III, Section 16 that: "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." Congress has also enacted in February 12,
1998 Republic Act No. (RA) 8493, otherwise known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998." For its part, the
Court promulgated Circular No. 38-98 on August 11, 1998 for the purpose of implementing the
provisions of RA 8493. The provisions of the Circular were adopted in the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.66
The Court disagrees with the CA. The CA failed to consider the other factors that must be present before
the right to speedy case determination may be considered to have been waived. The CA did not consider
the length of delay and the reason for the delay. The length of delay must be commensurate with the
reason thereof. In these cases, it must be recalled that in a Consolidated Review Resolution dated
September 28, 2007 of the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor, the complaints filed by Ynares and Santiago were
dismissed, without prejudice, for want of jurisdiction by reason of improper venue. 78 It took the Rizal
Provincial Prosecutor more than eight years from the filing of the complaints to dismiss without
prejudice the complaints. The issue on venue in libel cases is neither a novel nor difficult one. The more
than eight years it took the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor to resolve a rather routine issue is clearly
inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said "that there was no
more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice."
Furthermore, the silence of the accused during such period could not be viewed as an unequivocal act of
waiver of their right to speedy determination of their cases. That the accused could have filed a motion for
early resolution of their cases is immaterial. The more than eight years delay the Rizal Provincial
Prosecutor incurred before issuing his resolution of the complaints is an affront to a reasonable
dispensation of justice and such delay could only be perpetrated in a vexatious, capricious and oppressive
manner.

All told, the CA erroneously denied the accused's petitions questioning the denial by the RTC Manila, Br.
36 and Br. 37 of their motions to dismiss based on their right to speedy disposition of their cases.

Since the dismissal of the complaints against the accused is warranted because of the violation of their
right to speedy disposition of their cases, the Court's finding that the second petition has merit is rendered
superfluous. The dismissal of the Information for libel by the CA in the second petition is maintained but
on a different ground — the denial of the right of the accused to speedy disposition of their case. Thus,
the second petition is denied on that ground.