UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
Paguirigan
CIVIL PERSONALITY
ANTONIO GELUZ v. CA AND OSCAR LAZO G.R. No.
L-16439, July 20, 1961, EN BANC (Reyes, J.)
SINCE AN ACTION FOR PECUNIARY DAMAGES ON
ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH
PERTAINS PRIMARILY TO THE ONE INJURED, IT
IS EASY TO SEE THAT IF NO ACTION FOR SUCH
DAMAGES COULD BE INSTITUTED ON BEHALF OF
THE UNBORN CHILD ON ACCOUNT OF THE
INJURIES IT RECEIVED, NO SUCH RIGHT OF
ACTION COULD DELIBERATELY ACCRUE TO ITS
PARENTS OR HEIRS. In fact, even if a cause of action
did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from one that
lacked of juridical personality under Article 40 of the
Civil Code, which expressly limits such provisional
personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently alive
Dean Viviana M.
Nita Villanueva met Antonio Geluz in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot.
In 1950, she became pregnant by Geluz before they were legally married.
To conceal her pregnancy from her parent, she had herself aborted by Lazo.
After her marriage with Geluz, she again became pregnant but her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient for her employment in COMELEC so she had herself aborted again by Lazo.
Less than two years later, she again became pregnant and was again aborted of a two-month old fetus
by Lazo.
Geluz at this time was in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial
board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes Geluz’s basis in filing this
action and award of damages.
The CA and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of
P3,000.00 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
Is Geluz entitled to damages for the abortion of the fetus?
NO. the Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages
in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article
2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This the Court believes to be error,
for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a
person, does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with
personality; being incapable of having rights and obligations.
SINCE AN ACTION FOR PECUNIARY DAMAGES ON ACCOUNT OF
PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH PERTAINS PRIMARILY TO THE ONE
INJURED, IT IS EASY TO SEE THAT IF NO ACTION FOR SUCH DAMAGES
COULD BE INSTITUTED ON BEHALF OF THE UNBORN CHILD ON
ACCOUNT OF THE INJURIES IT RECEIVED, NO SUCH RIGHT OF ACTION
COULD DELIBERATELY ACCRUE TO ITS PARENTS OR HEIRS. In fact,
even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same
was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can
take place from one that lacked of juridical personality under Article 40 of
the Civil Code, which expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently alive
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have
not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because of
Lazo’s indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the
petitioner herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly
found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it,
that the appellee Lazo was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities
are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition
of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the
causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner.
Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have
taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant.
His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a
large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00
attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record,
was clearly exaggerated.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the
abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a
criminal and morally reprehensible act, that cannot be too severely
condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not
excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of
damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal
basis. The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered
dismissed
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
CITIZENSHIP
Republic vs. Chule Y. Lim (2004) G.R. No.
153883 | 2004-01-13
It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution,
which provides that the CITIZENSHIP OF A
LEGITIMATE CHILD BORN OF A FILIPINO
MOTHER AND AN ALIEN FATHER FOLLOWED THE
CITIZENSHIP OF THE FATHER, UNLESS, UPON
REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, THE CHILD
ELECTED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.9 Likewise, the
Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that LEGITIMATE
CHILDREN BORN OF FILIPINO MOTHERS MAY
ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY EXPRESSING
SUCH INTENTION "IN A STATEMENT TO BE
SIGNED AND SWORN TO BY THE PARTY
CONCERNED BEFORE ANY OFFICER AUTHORIZED
TO ADMINISTER OATHS, AND SHALL BE FILED
WITH THE NEAREST CIVIL REGISTRY. THE SAID
PARTY SHALL ACCOMPANY THE AFORESAID
STATEMENT WITH THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES."10
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory
requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only
to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of
respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child,
considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother
were never married. As such, she was not required to
comply with said constitutional and statutory
requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated
differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having
to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Chule Lim claimes that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was
registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred
her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth
have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.
During the hearing, respondent testified thus:
First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all her
school records and in her marriage certificate.2 She presented a clearance from the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI)3 to further show the consistency in her use of the surname "Yu".
Second, she claims that her father’s name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)"
when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)."
Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her
father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is
Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she
should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondent’s mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both
Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughter’s father were never married because
the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China.
In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of the local civil registries
of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida
Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.
The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence although it
actively participated in the proceedings by attending hearings and cross-examining respondent and
her witnesses.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s petition and rendered judgment.
whether or not lim’s citizenship should be changed from Chinese to Filipino?
To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondent’s
recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what indisputably are
substantial corrections and changes in entries in the civil register. To clarify,
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may
either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made
in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If
the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our
ruling in Republic v. Valencia7 where we held that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where
the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been
fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has
been thoroughly weighed and considered.8
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that THE REPUBLIC’S
FAILURE TO CITE THIS ERROR AMOUNTS TO A RECOGNITION THAT
THIS CASE PROPERLY FALLS UNDER RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES
OF COURT CONSIDERING THAT THE PROCEEDING CAN BE
APPROPRIATELY CLASSIFIED AS ADVERSARIAL.
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent did
not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship
when she reached the age of majority.
It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the
CITIZENSHIP OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD BORN OF A FILIPINO MOTHER
AND AN ALIEN FATHER FOLLOWED THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE FATHER,
UNLESS, UPON REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, THE CHILD
ELECTED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.9 Likewise, the Republic invokes the
provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that LEGITIMATE
CHILDREN BORN OF FILIPINO MOTHERS MAY ELECT PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY EXPRESSING SUCH INTENTION "IN A STATEMENT TO
BE SIGNED AND SWORN TO BY THE PARTY CONCERNED BEFORE ANY
OFFICER AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS, AND SHALL BE FILED
WITH THE NEAREST CIVIL REGISTRY. THE SAID PARTY SHALL
ACCOMPANY THE AFORESAID STATEMENT WITH THE OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES."10
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing
Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the
case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that
her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was
not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to
become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan

respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she

is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority.
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,11 citing In re Florencio
Mallare,12 we held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a
Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be
taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.13
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in
Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old.14 The exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship.15
In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals’
decision in allowing respondent to use her father’s surname despite its finding
that she is illegitimate.
The Republic’s submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow
respondent to use her father’s surname. What it did allow was the correction of
her father’s misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can
remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for
her to use her father’s surname.
Court of Appeals is was correct when it held:
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from
using her father’s surname which she has used for four decades without any
known objection from anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of
the reasons allowed for changing one’s name or surname is to avoid confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the
use of aliases, a person is allowed to use a name "by which he has been known
since childhood."

While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname,18 there is

no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has
already been using since childhood.19

The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false
impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the
proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future
mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community
in general.20 In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China
would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In
respondent’s case, the change in the surname that she has been using for 40
years would even avoid confusion to her community in general.

Maquiling v. Comelec Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent THE USE OF FOREIGN PASSPORT AFTER RENOUNCING ONE’S
G.R. No. 195649 naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP IS A POSITIVE AND VOLUNTARY ACT OF
July 2, 2013 REPRESENTATION AS TO ONE’S NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP; IT
Sereno, J. DOES NOT DIVEST FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP REGAINED BY

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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan

Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of
the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states
REPATRIATION BUT IT RECANTS THE OATH OF RENUNCIATION
REQUIRED TO QUALIFY ONE TO RUN FOR AN ELECTIVE POSITION.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four
times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed.

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s
US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering
and departing the Philippines.
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence exparte. • Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented
himself as an American
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is
acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct
from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by
law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to
take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also
to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate
for public office. • By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges
of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the
express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,
he was not qualified to run for a local election

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer,

COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. The Court ruled that Arnado’s act
of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively
negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to
Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration.

Maquiling: While the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that
the CANCELLATION OF ARNADO’S CANDIDACY AND THE NULLIFICATION OF HIS
PROCLAMATION, MAQUILING, AS THE LEGITIMATE CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE
HIGHEST NUMBER OF LAWFUL VOTES, SHOULD BE PROCLAIMED AS THE WINNER.

COMELEC EN BANC favored Arnado

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, There are three questions posed by the
parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the
result of the first.

whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing
a renunciation earlier made?

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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
(See Article IV, Sections 1 to 5, 1987 Constitution)
MARRIAGE
Calimag v. Macapaz Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with
G.R. No. 191936 Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).
June 1, 2016 On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia)
(respondents) are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.)
and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz... subject property... was duly registered in the names of
the petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue.
It was stated therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the
Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective.
On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away
On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the
action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages
against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.
petitioner averred that the respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on
the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over
Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children
from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father and mother.
petitioner insists that the respondents have no legal right over the estate left by Silvestra for
being illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the legal heir of Silvestra, she,
however, claims that the respondents failed to establish their legitimate filiation to Anastacio,
Sr. considering that the marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not sufficiently proven.
petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth of the respondents do not conclusively
prove that they are legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
whether or not the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra
petition is bereft of merit.
this Court however deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents' relationship to
Silvestra so as to determine their legal rights to the subject property.
documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela,... (1) fax
or photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical certificate of marriage,
cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage without running afoul
with the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court.
"When the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself,... Nevertheless, a reproduction of
the original document can still be admitted as secondary evidence subject to certain
requirements specified by law.
it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made
subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No.
190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public official
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence
other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective
Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office... where Fidela signed
as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.
The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the
facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer (Civil Registrar)
Thus, being public documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are presumed
valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them
"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face.
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order
to be a competent evidence of legitimate filiation does not find support in law and
jurisprudence.
Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,... the declaration of either parent of the new-
born legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil
register, and only in the registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law
require that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the
infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.
the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly executed
consistent with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of legitimate
children
Fidela appear on said documents is of no moment because Fidela only signed as the
declarant or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as legitimate children.
the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela
had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which
they had two children
Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may
be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the couple's public and
open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
Balogbog v. CA
269 SCRA 259
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO v.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO G.R. No. 173540,
22 January 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Perez,
J.)
While a marriage certificate is considered the
primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s
birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva
Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino,
but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and
Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming
that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were
entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. In their answer,
petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died
single and without issue in their parents’ residence at Asturias, Cebu.
To support their claim, the petitioners obtained a certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of
Asturias to the effect that that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina.
The certificate was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that
there was no record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages. On the
other hand, the private respondents presented several pieces of testimonial evidence to bolster
their claim.
Whose claim, as supported by their respective pieces of evidence, will prevail?
FACTS Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the
ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon,
Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of their
marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed.
Thus, only a Certification was issued by the LCR. In her Answer, Peregrina essentially averred
that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao
City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City.
During trial, Tecla presented: (1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco
Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid
marriage with Eustaquio; (2) Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from
1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar (Talibon, Bohol); (3) Certification of
Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil Registrar General,
NSO; (4) Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation
baptismal certificate of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such
nuptial in subsequent documents
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED
The claim of the private respondents will prevail. Under the Rules of Court, the
presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are
legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.
In this case, petitioners’ claim that the pieces of evidence presented by private
respondents was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant
municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any
entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents’ parents. This contention
has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, the defendants, who questioned the marriage of the
plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of
Rosario, Cavite for the month of January, 1916, to show that there was no record of the
alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was
held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is
considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. Here, private
respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were
married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their
marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private
respondents, were recognized by Gavino’s family and by the public as the legitimate
children of Gavino.
Neither is there merit in the argument of the petitioners that the existence of the
marriage cannot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that
Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking
each other as husband and wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been
made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since
the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It
would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite
unnatural for people not to notice its absence. The law favors the validity of marriage,
because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the
family is a matter of constitutional concern.
YES. While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence
teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. In the present case, due
execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during
the marriage ceremony, and of Tecla herself as a party to the event. The subsequent
loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. The loss was shown by the
certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–
testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. The RTC
committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of Adelina, the
sister of Eustaquio who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration
of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and Tecla on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol;
Climaco, the eldest son of Eustaquio and Tecla, who testified that his mother Tecla was
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
of Manila; (5) Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido, Eustaquio Avenido, Jr. and Editha
Avenido; (6) Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish
Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942; (7) Certification that record of birth from 1900
to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of
Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of
Birth of Climaco Avenido; (8) Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on
30 March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla; (9) Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract
between Eustaquio and Peregrina. Conversely, Peregrina testified on her marriage with
Eustaquio and how she took care of him and her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but
was once a common law wife of Eustaquio. She also presented: (1) Marriage Contract between
Peregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March 1979; (2) Affidavit
of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he contracted
marriage with Peregrina although he had a common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with
whom he had four (4) children, among others. The RTC denied Tecla’s petition and Peregrina’s
counter-claim. On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her
marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be
bigamous, and thus, null and void.
Did Tecla’s evidence presented during the trial prove the existence of the marriage of Tecla to
Eustaquio?
Vda. De Jacob vs. CA Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo
312 SCRA 772 E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by
virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In
support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge
Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo
in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46
(entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought
to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as
his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa
and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with
damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr.
Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present
the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr.
Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa
presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978. No copy of
the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer thus giving
the implication that there was no copy of the marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in
the civil registry of Manila;
In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his "thumbmark" on said
contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit
executed between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on
15 September 1975 attesting that both of them lived together as husband and wife for five (5)
years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the
married to his father, Eustaquio, and Tecla herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has
disregarded. The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage. In the case at bar,
the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina,
Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish
priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one
may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.8 Aware of this fundamental distinction,
Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner
was void ab initio, because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage
ceremony.9 We cannot sustain this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the
parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been
established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years.10 An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 Clearly
then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license
under Article 76 of the Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case, because the
questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of the
Family Code.
"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced
in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its
contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document,
or by recollection of witnesses."13 Upon a showing that the document was duly executed
and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary
evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.14
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1)
excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2)
disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary
evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the
marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the
wedding had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested
the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization issued by the
Archbishop — through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino —
ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a
corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana
stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
"thumbmark" was logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacob’s;
Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid?
contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus
confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the
marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception thus:
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the
execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the
contents of the document. It is the contents, . . . which may not be prove[n] by secondary
evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not
dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact,
such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be
shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by
relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that "marriage may be
prove[n] by other competent evidence."17
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or
even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.18 The
Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of
its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character
are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been
unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy
the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."19
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil,
who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to
the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court.
These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary
evidence — testimonial and documentary — may be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were
certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained.20 Even if we were
to agree with the trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we
must emphasize that this certificate is not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob
and petitioner.
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to
1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National
Census and Statistics Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have
waited three years before registering their marriage.27 On both counts, he proceeds from
the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for
record purposes does not invalidate the marriage.28 In the second place, it was not the
petitioner’s duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead,
this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.29
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . . of marriage. Marriage
in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in
the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being,
they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage."
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.

This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.32 Given the undisputed, even accepted,33 fact
that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife, 34 we find that the
presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case.

Republic vs. CA Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas got married without Angelina’s parents’ knowledge. Certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
236 SCRA 257 All docs for marriage was attended by Cardenas. probative value, he being the officer of the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
Marriage license was issued issuances of a marriage license UNACCOMPANIED by any circumstance of suspicion
They had cohabitation for four months but alas was meant to separate pursuant to S29 R 132 ROC
Marriage license was inexistent

RTC: Inability of the certifying officer to locate Marriage Certificate is NOT CONCLUSIVE TO
SHOW that no marriage license was issued.

CA reversed RTC and ordered City of Pasig to Cancel the Marriage Contract.

Is the Evidence presented by PR sufficient to prove that there was no marriage license issued
prior to the marriage?

Silverio vs. Republic
Oct. 19, 2007
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and No, there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment and its effect. The sex of a
sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The petition impleaded the person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
civil registrar of Manila as respondent. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant Civil Register Law (Act 3753). If the
City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth is not attendant by
1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live error, the same is immutable and may not be changed by reason of a sex reassignment
birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male surgery.
transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had
always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he
consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman"
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female
and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." On the
scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made. During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-
Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses. On June 4, 2003, the trial
court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read: Petitioner filed the
present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful
motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
Firstly, the court is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always
felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s
misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him. Likewise, the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused
to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition
would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the
realization of their dreams. Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to

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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
Cagandahan
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
LIBERTY ALBIOS G.R. No. 198780, October
16, 2013, THIRD DIVISION (Mendoza, J.)
“For consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer. A “freely given” consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter
into the marriage.”
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through
the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any opposition.
Whether or not sex reassignment is a ground for change of entry in the birth certificate?
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate
before RTC Laguna alleging that she was born and registered as a female in the Certificate of
Live Birth, but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was
diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that
she has small ovaries and has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected
such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from
Jennifer to Jeff.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael
Sionzon who issued a medical certificate stating that respondent is female, but because her
body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex
organs. He further testified that respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the
change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as
male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her. The RTC granted the petition.
Was it proper to change his name and gender on the ground of her medical condition?
Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia Calo, as evidenced
by a Certificate of Marriage. Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio. Summons was served on
Fringer but he did not file his answer. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to
conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion but stated that she could
not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio since the parties married each other for
convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that she agreed
to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways;
that Fringer returned to the U.S. and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she
did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from
its inception.
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
YES. For respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s
change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a
masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, there is merit in respondent’s change of name.
Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.
CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. Medicine adopted the
term “intersexuality” to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male
or female. Philippine statutes compel that a person be classified either as a male or as a
female, but it cannot be controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification. In the instant case, if respondent is
determined to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate
entry for gender. Otherwise, based on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the birth certificate
entry is in order.
No. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be
real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation,
and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties
must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. Based on the above, consent was not
lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly
and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a
real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application
for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would
be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal. In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the
CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a
pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of
entering into the actual marriage no real intention of entering into the actual marriage
status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a
relation. It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent
G.R. No. 201061, 3 July 2013, Carpio,
SECOND DIVISION Key Doctrine: Words “married
to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.
Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without
proof of actual contribution from either or both
spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article
148 of the Family Code. Art. 148 applies even if both
parties are in bad faith
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Benjamin married Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City on 10 September 1973. In 1979, Benjamin
developed a romantic relationship with Sally Bangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto
parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally
lived together as husband and wife. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father who was
against the relationship, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Pasig City where they signed a
purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered. The Benjamin and Sally had two children and
acquired several properties during the cohabitation (3 properties under the name of both as
spouses and one named to Sally). The relationship ended in 1994 and Sally filed criminal
actions for falsification and bigamy against Benjamin. Benjamin in turn filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage. After
Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally1 filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court
denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and asked for the issuance of a
in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose. The respondent’s
marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can
properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention
to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present. The avowed purpose of
marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and
family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into
in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage
may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There
is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what
the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites precribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be
declared valid. Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of
fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under
Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a
previous conviction involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a
pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws
does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47
(3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to
enter into the sham marriage. Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred
institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would
only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a
marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they
have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous
individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of
convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an
inconvenient situation
While Benjamin only included the four properties mentioned in the case, Sally put in
her answer 37 properties she wants the court to partition.
The CA ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in
the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that
they were acquired by him solely. The Court of Appeals found that the properties under
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive
properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their
purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered
in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared
equally. Their marriage is non-existent and void ab initio. Benjamin’s marriage to
Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced
by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the CA never issued. Sally then refused to
present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court
of Appeals. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Benjamin, it ruled that the second marriage was
void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of the lack of a marriage
license therefore, no bigamy was committed. The court further ruled that Sally could not claim
the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin.
The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase “married to Sally
Go” was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. The CA partially granted the
petition of Sally. It ruled that the property relations of the parties are governed by Art. 148 of
the FC.2 Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage
to Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void
ab initio
What's the status of the relationship of the parties and their property relations?
Sevilla v. Cardenas Herein petitioner, Jaime Sevilla and respondent Carmelita Cardenas were allegedly married
July 31, 2006 without a valid marriage license. The former contended that his marriage with the latter was
contracted through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N.
Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. That they never applied or obtained a marriage license for their supposed marriage,
thus no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. In support for his contention,
petitioner further argued that although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San
Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for
he never applied for any marriage license, Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer,
Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification was issued by Rafael D.
Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever
issued by said office."
However, Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified
the Certificates issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their
office failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered.
Whether or not the marriage is void for lack of a valid marriage license?
entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin
and Azucena was valid and subsisting. On the purported marriage of Benjamin and
Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and
Sally. There is no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Art. 35 of the FC, a
marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Art. 34 where no
license is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or
inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the NCC, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, the CA did
not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent. Bigamy is not committed in this
case, for bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. As to property
relations The court sustained the ruling of the CA that Art. 148 of the FC governs the
property relations of the parties. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
even if both parties are in bad faith.Benjamin and Sally cohabited without the benefit
of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the CA
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. As regards the remaining
properties, the only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 were in the name of Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to Sally.” The
property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally with
the descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the properties under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. Words
“married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of
the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no coownership under Article
148 of the Family Code *the court ruled that Sally waived her right to present evidence.
The TC had already reset the meetings six times all on Sally's instance
No. It has been held by the Court that the certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar
were not sufficient as to invalidate the marriage license no. 2770792 which had been
secured by the parties. It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the
existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work” and that they failed
to locate the book in which the marriage license was entered. Likewise, both
certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was
issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot
locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had
already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence.
It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or
missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts
to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
It is required that the custodian of the document is authorize to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, "PETITIONER"VS.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, "RESPONDENT" G.R.
No.183896, 2013-01-30, VELASCO, JR., J.
KEY DOCTRINE: Marriages solemnized without a
valid marriage license, except those covered by
Chapter 2 of the Family Code, are null and void.
Mallion v. Alcantara
October 31, 2006
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani citizen, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas, a Filipino citizen, with the RTC of Pasay City. Syed alleged
the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive
Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the
annulment of his marriage to Gloria. He alleged that he and Gloria met and got married in
Taiwan. Thereafter, he went to his mother-in-law’s residence in the Philippines to undergo
some ceremony, which was one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not
told of the nature of the ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He
did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified
that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never
resided in that area. He went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on
their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the
marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar issued a certification
that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, was the
number of another marriage license. He also alleged that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against
him in 2001 and 2002. The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and
presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof. She and her mother sought
the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the
sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for
them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign,
which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license
to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and
Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence. Furthermore, she has a daughter with
Syed. Also, she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon
Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage. Gloria stated that she and Syed
had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said
marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese. The RTC held that the
marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio since there was no valid
marriage license which is an absence of a formal requisite. On appeal, the CA reversed the
RTC’s decision in ruling that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that
Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites
laid down by law.
Is the marriage null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license?
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the RTC, Branch 29, of San
Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under
Article 36 of the Family Code, citing respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. After trial on
the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding
that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is
seeking." The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed for failure of
petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999
another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued
and such other relevant data.
YES. It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to
the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona,
Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply
for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of
said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom
Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted
not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was
secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as
the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value. In the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. In the case of Carino v. Carino, it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Carino
further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove
that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.
Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached
is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple
irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as
no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have
been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria's failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license. As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it
may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be
that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove
that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was
Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab
initio
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the
present case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action
nor would it be barred by the principle of res judicata.
The contention is untenable. Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to
the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated
without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a motion to
dismiss, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping.
In an order dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent's motion to dismiss. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was
distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the operative facts
upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different.
Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not
lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no violation
of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment counters that while the present suit is anchored
on a different ground, it still involves
the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and
respondent's marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their
marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping.
Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the
ground he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-
95.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of a
marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code
be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a
party's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?
is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and
matters determined in the former suit."
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and
is founded upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and
necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and
neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part
of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the
former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is —
between the first and the second actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action.
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is
the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the
causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both
actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the
two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are
considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him
seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of
action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the
alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence necessary
to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage
license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same
cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause — the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon
which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split
the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this
controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent's marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void
because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage
license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the
marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now
bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner
raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state
that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain
or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have
been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in
that case.
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res
judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of
presenting his case. It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008 On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the execution of a
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and that being
unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. Then Jose
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent. contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa
filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
G.R. No. 179474 Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner, ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit
vs. stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent. consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing
Chico-Nazario, J.: the complaint for the ground that the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that his
The solemnization of a marriage without prior
marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose filed a Motion for
license is a clear violation of the law and would lead
Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper
or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of
application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 34 of the New Civil Code
fraud against innocent and unwary parties
were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition that the man and the
woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him
and Felisa was false.
Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?
Navarro vs. Domagtoy Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in
259 SCRA 129 relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent
judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the
municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of
Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.
Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between
Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he
merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming
recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing
when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set
forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which
he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action
to recover for the same wrong or injury.
Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements of valid
marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper
because they started living together five months before the celebration of their
marriage. That according to the five-year common-law cohabitation period under
Article 34 “No license shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any
legal impediments to marry each other… “ it means that a five years period computed
back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the
day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved
at any time within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A.
Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.
The Supreme Court ruled that the joint affidavit is insufficient proof to declare wife's
presumptive death.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that “for the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.”
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in
order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been
precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where
it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is
factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first
wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of
respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such
neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With
respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo
and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that:
"Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil
status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by
respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and
Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, MTC of
Basey, Samar. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been
civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation
and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon
and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the
presumption that she is already dead.
1.Whether or not the joint affidavit is sufficient proof of the wife's presumptive death?
2.Whether or not the respondent judge erred when he solemnized the marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction?
Beso vs. Daguman On August 28, 1997, the marriage between Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman was solemnized
323 SCRA 566 by Judge Juan Daguman at J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar. After the wedding, Yman
abandoned Petitioner. Thereafter, Petitioner found that her marriage was not registered at the
Civil Registry. She then filed an administrative complaint against the Respondent charging him
with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority for solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction
and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office
of the Local Registrar.
In his Comment, Respondent averred that the civil marriage had to be solemnized outside his
territory because on that date respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report to his
station in Sta. Margarita and that Beso and Yman unexpectedly came to his house urgently
requesting the celebration of their marriage rites since the complainant, who is an overseas
worker, would be out of the country for a long period and their marriage license would lapse
2. The Supreme Court ruled that Judge Domagtoy erred when he soemnized the
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction. According to article 8 of the Familiy Code “The
marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point
of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.”
There is no proof that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent
judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
One of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer."
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.
Respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.
The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The
legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due
to a lack of comprehension of the law. Judge Domagtoy is SUSPENDED for a period of
6 months.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and
void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
Yes. As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, his
authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his
jurisdiction. Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality
of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog. As provided by Article 8 of the Family
Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a
place other than his sala, to wit:(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at
the point of death;(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; (3)
where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
to that effect. The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
before she could return to the Philippines. He further averred that after handling to Yman the
first copy of the marriage certificate, he left the three remaining copies on top of the desk in his
private office intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the fourth
in his office but said copies were lost; that he diligently searched for them and even subpoenad
Yman to further inquire but was told that Complainant put the copies of the marriage certificate
in her bag during the wedding party and that Complainant already left for abroad.
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority?
Republic vs. Iyoy Private respondent Crasus Iyoy filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage due to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, in relation with Articles 68, 70, and
Sept. 21, 2005
72, with Fely Ada Rosal. According to him, they got married in 1961. The marriage produced five
children. But the marriage faded because Fely was a nagger, extravagant and hot-tempered. In
1984, Fely left for the United States. Barely a year after she left, Crasus received a letter from her
requesting that he sign the divorce papers. But he ignored the request Sometime in 1985, he was
informed that Fely had already married an American. In 1987, she came back to the Philippines
with her American family. In 1990, she came back to attend the wedding of their eldest son, but
in the invitations, she used the surname of her American husband. She returned in 1992 for the
operation of their fourth child. In her Answer to the Complaint, she asserted that she was already
an American citizen in 1988, that she was no longer hot-tempered, nagger and extravagant and
that the only reason she went to the United States was that their income was not enough to
sustain their family, that it was Crasus who was irresponsible and in fact living with another
woman who bore her a child. She also denied that she sent a letter requesting him to sign the
divorce papers. After hearing both sides, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage null
and void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the lower court but this time it had added a ratiocination, stating that Article 26,
2nd paragraph of the Family Code is applicable also to this case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was psychological incapacity on the part of Fely?
2. Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable?
Republic vs. Orbecido In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Ozamis City. Their
October 5, 2005 marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Krsitoffer and Kimberly. In 1986, Lady Myros
left for the US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married an American, Innocent Stanley. Thereafter, Cipriano filed with the trial court
a petition for authority to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. Finding
merit on the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the Republic contends that Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino and an alien.
Whether or not respondent can remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code?
Republic vs. Manalo FACTS:
April 24, 2018
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed to
register the marriage. Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the
Family Code requiring the same not later than fifteen days after the marriage. The
records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part.
Hence, Respondent is guilty of neglect of duty and abuse of authority.
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It was
held in previous rulings that irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity under the said Article.
2. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The second paragraph of Article 26 is not
applicable. As plainly worded, the provision refers to a special situation wherein a
foreigner divorces his or her Filipino spouse. However, in this case, it cannot be applied
because of the simple fact that at the time Fely secured a divorce decree, she was still a
Filipino. Fely admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she married her
American spouse in 1985 but she also admitted that she became and American citizen
only in 1988. Thus, she was still a Filipino citizen and Article 15 of the Civil Code applies,
she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and
legal capacity, even though she was already living abroad.
The Supreme Court was unanimous in holding that par. 2, Art. 26 of the Family Code
should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
The twin elements of Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code are as follows: (1) there is a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner and
(2) a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship at the time of the celebration of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Lady Myros was naturalized
as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between
her and Cipriano. Subsequently, the wife obtained a divorce capacitating him to remarry.
Clearly, the twin requisites are both present in the case. Thus, Cipriano, the ‘divorced’
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, for respondent’s plea to prosper, he must prove that his wife was naturalized
as an American citizen and must show sufficient proof of the divorce decree. Cipriano
failed to do this so the petition of the Republic was granted.
Yes.
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS G.R. No. 186571.
August 11, 2010.| J. Brion
The alien spouse can claim no right under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code. The provision was included
in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by the Japanese court.
Manalo was allowed to testify. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
(1) Court Order finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in
substance; (2)Affidavit of Publication;
(3) Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
(4) Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
(5)Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of
the Notification of Divorce; and
(6) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.
The Office of the Solicitor’s General, as it appeared for the petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
RTC: denied petition for lack of merit, based on Article of Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the
Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the
country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated
their marriage in the Philippines or in another country.
CA overturned the RTC decision: Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable
even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree
they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former capacitating him to remarry
Whether or not their marriage is dissolved even if it is Manalo who filed for divorce
Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and
filed a petition for divorce. The petition for divorce was granted on December 8, 2005. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce,
Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the
Article 26 of the Family Code All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, EXCEPT those prohibited under
Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and(6), 3637 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(As amended by Executive Order 227)
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on the Philippine Courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage . It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of
foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care, and support of
the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our court.
The Court state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Moreover,
invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15
of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule.
In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State
may provide for an exception thereto. Also, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to
certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law.
The Court, however, asserts that it cannot yet write to this controversy by granting
Manalo’s petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by theJapanese
Court. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.
NO. Art. 26(2) of the Family Code does not extend to aliens the right to petition a court
of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. The Family Code
recognizes only two types of defective marriages - void and voidable marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.
Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. The alien
spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. In other words,
only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or
her marital status, settling the doubts created by the
divorce decree.
Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez (Art. 34)
Mar. 8, 2001
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Gerbert filed
a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
with the RTC. Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading and she offered no opposition to
Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented
by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-
in interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. The RTC denied Gerberts petition and concluded
that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in
order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
Whether or not Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Complainant-petitioner Herminia Borja-Manzano (“Herminia”) was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano being married on 21 May 1966. On 22nd of March 1993, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez
(“Judge Sanchez”). That Judge Sanchez should have known that the marriage was a bigamous
one as the marriage clearly stated that both contracting parties were “Separate”.
cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of
the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to
this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse. An action based on the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the
alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law. The unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert
of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. The records show
that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. The Supreme Court deemed it appropriate the remand the
case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law. A remand will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome Gerbert’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. Recording of Divorce Decree in the Civil Register A judgment of divorce is a
judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person's legal capacity and status
that must be recorded. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the
civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto
authorize the decree's registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted
without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect. Cancellation of Entries in the Civil Registry The recognition that the RTC may
extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of
the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of
entries in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of
entries in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.
YES, for Article 31 of the Family Code to apply the provision on legal ratification of
marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must apply:
1.) The man and woman have been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Judge Sanchez claims innocence as to the fact of the previous marriage, and
solemnized their marriage in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
Whether Judge Sanchez should be held liable.
note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22nd of March 1993 and sworn to
before respondent Judge himself. David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also in their marriage contract, it was
indicated that both were separated.
VOID MARRIAGES
Quizon v. Belen Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
G.R. No. 189121 (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
July 31, 2013 Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.
In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at
the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity
of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming
that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with
one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was
alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value,
Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Did the Court err in declaring the marriage of Amelia to Eliseo void?
Castillo v. Castillo On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On
G.R. No. 189607 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
April 18, 2016
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as
they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to
which the solemnizing officer belonged.
RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground
2.) The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other;
3.) The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties
must be present at the time of marriage;
4.) The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they lived
together for at least five years and are without legal
impediment to marry each other.
5.) The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that
he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that
he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Not all this requirement are present in the case at bar. It is significant to
No. The existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was
sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by
the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San
Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a
competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the National
Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not
diminish the probative value of the entries therein.
in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of
rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage. Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that
Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage
to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of
her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in
the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action
for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish
such cause of action.
NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.
The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view
of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a
marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage
was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as
this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent
Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to
strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that the fact that
Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her
marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's
argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior
marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also said that even if respondent eventually had her first
marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her
first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties'
marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in
1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable
law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.
Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (“Emilio”), son of petitioner Federico Suntay (“Federico”), was married to
300 SCRA 760 Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (“Isabel:”) their marriage was celebrated in the Portuguese Colony of Macao.
Martinez, J: Subsequently it was declared as void ab initio or null and void.
The basis of the Court of First Instance for such a ruling was that Emilio suffers from a mental
aberration known as schizophrenia.
Emilio predeceased his mother, decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Isabel, herein
respondent, the daughter of Emilio and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, filed before the Regional Trial Court
a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay.
Petitioner Federico moved to dismiss the case on the ground of Article 922 of the Civil Code
an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her
father or mother. Federico contends that Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabel’s father
Ratio:
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the
law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The
children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in
1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the
provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80,
81, 82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles
83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the
following ways:
1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the
beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled
by a competent court;
2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified
by cohabitation;
3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a
voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked;
4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are
natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment are
considered legitimate; and
5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v.
Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code
contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the
rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated
after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is
now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage. A second marriage contracted
prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous
and void.
YES. the marriage of Emilio Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled
on the basis of Article 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which
are considered voidable. Being conceived and born of a voidable marriage
before the decree of annulment, she is considered legitimate.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the
second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
“Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall
be considered as legitimate”
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
Terre vs. Terre
211 SCRA 6
PER CURIAM
YASUO IWASAWA v. FELISA CUSTODIO
GANGAN, et al. G.R. No. 204169, 2013-09-11,
VILLARAMA, JR, J.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from
the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the
Family Code of the Philippines. And this is what
transpired in the instant case.
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA
MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
predeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. It opened a path to succession by
representation, as a consequence of declaration by the Court of First Instance that the marriage of
respondent Isabel’s parents is null and void. Making Isabel an illegitimate child and has no right nor
interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother – the decedent.
Whether Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco-Suntay is a legitimate child despite the declaration that her
parent’s marriage was void ab initio denying her succession right from her grandmother.
Complaint Dorothy B. Terre met respondent Atty. Jordan Terre for the first time in 1979 as fourth year
high school classmates; Dorothy was then married to Merillo Bercellina. Dorothy and Atty. Jordan went
to manila to pursue their education of personal choosing. Atty. Jordan took up law at Lyceum
Univsersity, still courting Dorothy on the process this time with more persistence. Jordan explained to
Dorothy that their marriage is void ab initio due to the reason that Dorothy and Merlito were first
cousins, convince by his explanation and having secured a favorable advice from her mother and ex in-
laws, Dorothy agreed to marry Atty. Jordan. In their marriage license Atty. Jordan wrote “single” as her
status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, no need to go to court for a declaration.
Later on Dorothy found out that Atty. Jordan was already married to one Helina Malicdem.
When Atty. Jordan prior marriage with Dorothy was subsisting, no judicial declaration was obtained
as to nullity of or any judicial declaration obtained as to nullity of such prior marriage of respondent
with complainant.
Whether Atty. Jordan Terre should be liable for gross immorality.
Petitioner Iwasawa, a Japanese national, met private respondent Custodio sometime in 2002 in one
of his visits to the Philippines. Custodio introduced herself as single and has never married before.
Later that year, they got married. The couple resided in Japan. In 2009, Iwasawa noticed his wife
become depressed. To his shock, his wife confessed to him that she received news that Arambulo, her
previous husband, died. She got married to him in 1994. Consequently, Iwasawa filed a petition for
the declaration of his marriage to Custodio as null and void for being a bigamous marriage. During
trial, aside from his testimony, Iwasawa also offered the certificate of marriage between him and
private respondent, the certificate of marriage between private respondent and Arambulo, certificate
of death of Arambulo, and the NSO certification stating that there are two entries of marriage
recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent. The RTC ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to prove private respondent’s prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while
petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner
who testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled that Iwasawa’s testimony is unreliable because he
has no personal knowledge of Custodio’s prior marriage, of Arambulo’s death, nor in the preparation
of the NSO certification which makes him a complete stranger to those. His MR was subsequently
denied. Hence this petition. Iwasawa argues that the documentary evidence he presented are public
documents which are considered self-authenticating and thus it was unnecessary to call the NSO
Records Custodian as witness. The OSG, likewise, holds the same view. On the other hand, Custodio
indicated that she is not against her husband’ s petition. She admitted that she contracted marriage
with Arambulo and contracted a second marriage with Iwasawa. It was due to poverty and joblessness
that she married Iwasawa without telling him that she was already married. After petitioner found out
the prior marriage, she and petitioner have separated.
Was the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of the
public documents issued by said office necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight?
Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki
The annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the
society formed by the putative spouses, but It cannot destroy consequences
which marital union produced during its continuance.
Yes, respondent Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an
agreement ran counter to the prevailing case law of the court which holds that
for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first a marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential. Even if we are to assume , arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre
held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are
to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage
to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
NO. There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by
petitioner are all public documents. As provided in Art. 410 of the Civil Code,
‘The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto
shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the
facts therein contained.’ The RTC erred when it disregarded said documents
on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of
the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution
since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary.
Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given
evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain
unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor
presented evidence to the contrary. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the
documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the
marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage
is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private
respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that
private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she
married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was
only on said date that private respondent’s marriage with Arambulo was
deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of private
respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first
marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was
contracted.
NO. To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of
foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND
THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE G.R. No. 196049, June 26,
2013, SECOND DIVISION, CARPIO, J.
The parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or
the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who
has the personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay
to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage).” Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2)
that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles
35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). RTC dismissed
because only Marinay or Maekara can file the petition pursuant to Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC. On MR, Fujuki contends that it is a special proceeding. Hence, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not
applicable. MR was denied. The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation that Fujiki may validly file
such petition because he is an injured party. ISSUES: (1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy. (3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the service of
summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial,
the trial and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will
litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is “to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.” The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Rañada, this Court explained that “[i]f every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back
on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation.” Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, Philippine
courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.
Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce
decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse
obtained a divorce decree abroad. 2. YES. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity
of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife”—it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the
parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the
law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who
has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10- SC. 3. YES. To be sure, a
petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10- SC and other related
laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses
and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is
also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be
filed in the Regional Trial Court “where the corresponding civil registry is
located.” In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a
civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is
neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under
R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
MERLINDA OLAYBAR G.R. No. 189538,
February 10, 2014, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta,
J.)
“A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in
the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts. A Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage
by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.”
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan
Olaybar requested from NSO a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for
her marriage. Upon receipt, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean National. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the
alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing
in the marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the
Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion. She testified that she could not have
appeared before Judge Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was
allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao
Pharma. She denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the
named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in
Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a
travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. She
also presented as witness Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC who confirmed that the marriage
of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared
was definitely not her. Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the
marriage contract was forged. The RTC granted the petition and directed the local civil registry to
cancel all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract. However, the Republic
moved for the reconsideration on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical
and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged
marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio but said motion was denied.
Is the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract, which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be
undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding?
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither
can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court
No. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986,
the Court has repeatedly ruled that “even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts
established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the
appropriate adversarial proceeding.” An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where
the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. It is true that in
special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with,
and the remedy is granted upon mere application or motion. However, a
special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule
108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the
petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim
interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also
requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if
any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition
or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary
proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil
register. Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of
Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of
the National Statistics Office that: “To be sure, a petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of
the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,
support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of
the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage
in the civil registry.” Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence
was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed
by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was
not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence
clearly established that the only “evidence” of marriage which is the marriage
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1st Semester 2019-2020. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan

certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of
to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before
the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest
the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent
indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth
as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the
subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage
to speak of

See: Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages effective March 15, 2003

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