Court Rules on Estate Settlement Case

G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001.
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO,

and ISABELITA MANALO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME,
MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN,
ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA
MANALO, respondents.
Pleadings and Practice; Estate Proceedings; Probate Courts; It is a fundamental rule
that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the
character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, shall be controlling; The fact of
death of the decedent
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
136
136 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of
Appeals
and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the
subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.—It is a fundamental rule
that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the
character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be
controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein
petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said
petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of
estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on
February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said
death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the
estate rest. The petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the
names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased
which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed
for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their
deceased father, Troadio Manalo.
Same; Same; Same; A party may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of an essentially
valid petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent by raising matters that are
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition; A trial court, sitting as a probate court, has
limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and
issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action.—It is our view
that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that
are irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial
court, sitting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and
dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an
ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the
jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by
the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were
otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its
proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. So it should be in the instant petition
for settlement of estate.
137
VOL. 349, 137

JANUARY 16, 2001
Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Motion to Dismiss; A party may not take refuge under the
provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify an invocation of Article 222
of the Civil Code for the dismissal of a petition for settlement of estate.—The argument is
misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1,
Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased
Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit: Art. 222.
No suitshall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035.
Same; Same; Article 222 of the Civil Code applies only to civil actions which are
essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family.—The above-quoted
provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term
“suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or others in a
court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for
the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil
action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Besides, an excerpt from
the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code
Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are
essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus: It is difficult to
imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the
same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before
a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that lawsuit
between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than strangers.
Same; Same; Special Proceedings; A petition for issuance of letters of administration,
settlement and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy
whereby the petitioner therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.—It
must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein.
The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of
Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy
whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact of
death of
138
138 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Appeals
their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said
deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Caneba, Flores, Ranee, Acuesta and Masigla Law Firmfor petitioners.
Ricardo E. Aragones for respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda. Manalo,
et al., seeking to annul the Resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the
1 2
Orders of Hie Regional Trial Court and the Resolution which denied petitioners’
3 4
motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:
5
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died
intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and
his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M.
Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo,
Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all
of legal age.
_______________
1 In CA-G.R. SP No. 39851promulgated on September 30, 1996, Petition, Annex “G,” Rollo, pp. 52-
59.
Galvez, J., ponente, Martinez and Aquino, JJ., concurring; Rollo, pp. 52-59.
2
In SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 respectively dated July 30, 1993 and September 15, 1993, Petition,
3
Annexes “D” and “F,” Rollo, pp. 35-44; 51.

4 In CA-G.R. S.P. No. 39851promulgated on May 6, 1997, Petition, Annex “K,” Rollo, pp. 70-77.
5 Petition, Annex “G,” Rollo, pp. 52-59.
139
VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 139
2001
Appeals
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real
properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business
under the name and style Manalo’s Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite
Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at No. 45 Gen. Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving
children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina,
Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with the respondent Regional
6
Trial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father,
7
Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as
administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition
for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila,
and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs
named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court
issued an order “declaring the whole world in default, except the government,” and
set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993.
However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion
of herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo,
Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days within which to
file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through
counsel, culminating in the filing of an Omnibus Motion on July 23, 1993 seeking:
8
(1) to set aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which
denied the motion for additional extension of time to file opposition; (2) to set for
prelimi-
_______________
6 Petition, Annex “A,” Rollo, pp. 18-25.

7 Branch 35, Presided by Judge Ramon P. Makasiar.
8 Petition, Annex “C,” Rollo, pp. 27-34.
140
140 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
nary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to
declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order which resolved, thus:
9
1. A.To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on
July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;
2. B.To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their
affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said
affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and
issue of the present proceeding;
3. C.To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
oppositors;
4. D.To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding
Judge;
5. E.To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular
administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for
hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after their motion
for reconsideration of the Order dated July 30, 1993 was denied by the trial court
in its Order dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for certiorari with the
10
appellate court, they contend that: (1) the venue was improperly laid in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3)
the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4)
there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the
same family; and (5) no certification of nonforum shopping was attached to the
petition.
_______________
9 Petition, Annex “D,” supra.

10 Petition, Annex “F,” supra.
141
2001
Appeals
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
certiorari in its Resolution promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997
11
the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed. 12
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned
orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright
dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the
petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving
members of the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition but
that the same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually
an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. They point out that
it contains certain averments which, according to them, are indicative of its
adversarial nature, to wit:
xxx
Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father,
TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the
properties of the deceased father, TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. x x x the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties
aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage x x x.
xxx
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the
deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of
the herein petitioners and their coheirs x x x.
xxx
Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to
bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur
expenses of not less than, P250,000.00
_______________
11 Petition, Annex “G,” supra.

12 Petition, Annex “K,” supra.
142
142 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and for
attorney’s fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court x x x. 13
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under

Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to
dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filing
the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to
aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the
filing of the petition pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
14
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the
15 16
complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny

of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners’ claim
that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains
sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of
a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February
14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death.
The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration
of the estate rest. The petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 also contains an
17
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the
_______________

14 Now Article 151 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
15 De Tavera vs. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., 112 SCRA 243, 248 (1982).
16 Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing Corporation, 317 SCRA 327, 335
(1999).
17 Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Dumlao, 206 SCRA 40, 46 (1992).
143
2001
Appeals
deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition,
the reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the
intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:
1. (a)That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO

MANALO for the administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO
MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable
Court may fix.
2. (b)That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been
inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal
heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO
MANALO be settled and distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance with
law.
3. c)That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00
and attorneys fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00
per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be
taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO. 18
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments
which may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors
therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called
Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer
containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and
compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus
attorney’s fees and costs in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary
19
civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section l(j) of the
Rules of Court vis-á-vis, Article 222 of the Civil Code.
_______________

19 Petition, Annex “D,” Rollo, pp. 39-43.
144
144 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of
the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio
Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition.
It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting as a probate court, has limited
and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and
20
issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In
addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as
well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the
complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise,
it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its
proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. So it should be in the instant
21
petition for settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626
were to be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 222 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the
dismissal of the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the “rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object
and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.” Petitioners contend that the term “proceeding” is
so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge
under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the
invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of
the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch
as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit:
_______________
20 Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil. 61, 62 (1917); Borja vs. Borja, et al., 101 Phil. 911, 925 (1957) cited in
the Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Volume V-A Part I, 1970 Ed. By Vicente J. Francisco.
21 Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33, 36 (1998).
145
2001
Appeals
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless
it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035 (italics supplied). 22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions.
This is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons
against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the
remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement
of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a
23
court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong. Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code
24
Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make

that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially
adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is
known that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than strangers. 25
_______________
22 Article 151 of the Family Code of the Philippines now reads:

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it
is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
23 Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed., 1990, citing Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367, 375, 23 L.Ed. 449; Weston
v. Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 464, 7 L.Ed. 481; Syracuse Plaster Co. v. Agostini Bros. Bldg.
Corporation, 169 Misc. 564, 7 N.Y. S.2d 897.
24 Rule 1, Section 3(a) of the Rules of Court.
25Report of the Code Commission, p. 18 cited in the Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 1995 Ed. By Arturo M. Tolentino, p. 505.
146
146 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appeals
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued
in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was
impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special
proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners therein (private
26
respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and
subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that
they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests
title to the land of the estate in the distributees, and if the decree is erroneous, it
should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding
effect is like any other judgment in rem. (Salandanan vs. Court of Appeals, 290
SCRA 671 [1998])
An heir becomes owner of his hereditary share the moment the decedent dies,
thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because
the heir has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of his share in the
estate of the decedent. (Opulencia vs. Court of Appeals,293 SCRA 385 [1998])
——o0o——
_______________
VOL. 366, OCTOBER 2, 385

2001
Natcher vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133000. October 2, 2001. *
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE

HEIRS OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO—LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL
ROSARIO-MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO
FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO
DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
Actions; Special Proceedings; Words and Phrases; “Action,” and “Special Proceeding,”
Distinguished.—As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction
between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one’s right
in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method
of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term “special
proceeding” may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right
of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is
granted generally upon an application or motion.”
Same; Same; Estate Proceedings; Probate Courts; Reconveyance; An action for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person partake of the nature of a special
proceeding; Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent
fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.—Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annul-
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
386
386 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
ment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement
of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent,
partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. Clearly, matters which
involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive
province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been
made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, i.e., a probate court.—Thus, under Section 2, Rule
90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made
by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction
of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir. While it may be true that the Rules used the
word “may,” it is nevertheless clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court
when it speaks of the “court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; A Regional Trial Court acting in its general jurisdiction,
is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of
the real property in favor of an heir.—Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant
case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and
resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher,
inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages
is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the
present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a
probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the
decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court is not unaware of its pronouncement in Coca v.
Borromeo, 81 SCRA 278 (1978), and Mendoza v. Teh, 269 SCRA 764 (1997), that whether
a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a
mere question of procedure involving a mode of practice “which may be waived.”—In
resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeoand Mendoza vs. Teh that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
Regional Trial Court (then
387
VOL. 366, 387
OCTOBER 2, 2001
Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate
jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is
a procedural question involving a mode of practice “which may be waived.”
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents
inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trial court,
acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the
decedent to petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although generally, a probate court may not decide a
question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is
one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to decide the question of ownership.—Analogously, in a train of decisions, this
Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although generally, a
probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties
are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, orthe parties consent to
the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that the net estate of the decedent must
first be ascertained.—Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal
share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken
first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable
obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time
of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible
estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established;
and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes.

Jose De Luna for petitioner.
Ma. Teresa A. Lorico Gonzales for private respondents.
388
388 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action

for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters
relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on
questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is
the decision of public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which
1
declares:
“Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed
and set aside and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano
Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Matcher, and ordering the Register of
Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the
filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a
proper court. No costs.
“So ordered.”
Spouses Graciano Del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of
a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951,
Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia,
Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana’s estate
on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real
property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14
share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said
property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the six children.
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an “Agreement
of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with
_______________
1 CA. Decision in CA. G.R. No. CV No. 51390, promulgated on 09 December 1997, penned by Justice
Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and concurred in by JJ.Ruben T. Reyes and Hilarion L. Aquino; Rollo, pp.
23-31.
389
2001
Waiver of Rights” where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children,
share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38
square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano’s
name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No.
35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land
area of 80.90 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second
lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443.
Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot to a third person but retained ownership
2
over the second lot. 3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher.

During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his
wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059 was issued in the latter’s name.
4
On 07 October 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six
children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of
5
Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano’s
death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation
and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 1987 in favor of herein petitioner resulting
6
in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT No. 186059 in the
name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said
complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been
impaired.
In her answer dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that
7
she was legally married to Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law,
she was likewise considered a com-
______________
2 TCT No. 107442.

3 TCT No. 107443.
4 Annex “C; Records, p. 5.
5 Records, pp. 1-7.
6 Exhibit “E”; Decision in Civil Case No. 94-71075; Rollo, p. 205.
7 Records, pp. 20-23.
390
390 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
pulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano’s
lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children,
hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano’s
estate or against herein petitioner’s property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision
dated 26 January 1996 holding: 8
1. “l)The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia
Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence
that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that
there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the
spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
2. “2)The deed of sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was
equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
3. “3)Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may
however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher
being a compulsory heir of the deceased.”
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court’s decision
ratiocinating, inter alia:
“It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution
of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance/annulment of
title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. x x x
“x x x Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance
inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the)
sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted
for that purpose. x x x”
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the
expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court’s
decision “for being contrary to law and the facts of the case.”
_______________
8Rollo, p. 25.
391
2001
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and
special proceedings, in this wise:
“x x x a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
“A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for
ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
“x x x
“c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right or a particular fact.”
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between
an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one’s right in
a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the
method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The
term “special proceeding” may be defined as an application or proceeding to
establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so
provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion.” 9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds

further:
“It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are
instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to
actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings
which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some
special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted
without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. x x x A special
proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
_______________
9 Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880[1920].

392
392 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of
a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice.”
10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a
deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake
of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application
of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the
decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of
its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may
be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word “may,” it is nevertheless clear
that the same provision contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the “court
11
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings.”

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general
jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue
of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher,
inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question.
Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was
not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question
of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein
petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court’s disquisition is elucidating:
_______________
10 Francisco, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. V-A, 1970 ed., p. 596 citing 1
CJS 1094-1095.
11 Section 2, Rule 90.
393
2001
“Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must
first settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at
hand, the court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and
assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee
without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the
aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve
to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to specific
prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an
advance inheritance.” 12
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement
in Coca vs. Borromeo and Mendoza vs. Teh that whether a particular matter
13 14
should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a
jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is a procedural
question involving a mode of practice “which may be waived.” 15
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private
respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the
authority of the trial court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific
issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the
long standing principle that although generally, a probate court may not decide a
question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are
_______________
12 Rollo, p. 30; CA Decision, p. 8.

13 81 SCRA 278 [1978].
14 269 SCRA 764 [1997].
15 Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227[1948].
394
394 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership. 16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh,we had occasion to hold:

“In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking
appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of
estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court. (emphasis supplied)
17
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken
first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable
18
obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at
the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it.
With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or
heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not
a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. 19
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the

present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of
procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This
Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-
entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a
probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to
ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters
involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario’s estate.
_______________
16 Coca vs. Borromeo, supra; Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 [1942]; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833,
August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892 [1965]; Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 [1948]; 3 Moran’s Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 473.
17 269 SCRA 764, 769 [1997].
18 Pagkatipunan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 718 [1991].

Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864[1969].
19
395
2001
Santos vs. Santos
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Judgment affirmed, petition dismissed.
Notes.—The probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership
of a property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings, but such
determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a
separate action to resolve title. (Philippine Commercial International Bank vs.
Court of Appeals, 344 SCRA 596 [2000])
The Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises but limited
jurisdiction. (Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes vs. Reyes, 345 SCRA 541 [2000])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 168799. June 27, 2008.*

EUHILDA C. TABUADA, petitioner, vs. HON. J. CEDRICK O. RUIZ, as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City, ERLINDA
CALALIMAN-LEDESMA and YOLANDA CALALIMAN-TAGRIZA, respondent.
Actions; Compromise Agreements; Special Proceedings; While a compromise
agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly encouraged, the failure to
consummate one does not warrant any procedural sanction, much less provide an authority
for the court to jettison the case; Given the non-contentious nature of special proceedings
(which do not depend on the will of an actor, but on a state or condition of things or persons
not entirely within the control of the parties interested), its dismissal should be ordered
only in the extreme case where the termination of the proceeding is the sole remedy
consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the parties therein.—
While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly encouraged,
the failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural sanction, much less
provide an authority for the court to jettison the case. Sp. Proc. No. 5198 should not have
been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on account of the mere failure of the
parties to submit the promised amicable settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment
Based On An Amicable Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature of special
proceedings (which do not depend on the will of an actor, but on a state or condition of
things or persons not entirely within the control of the parties interested), its dismissal
should be ordered only in the extreme case where the termination of the proceeding is the
sole remedy consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the
parties therein.
Same; Same; An order requiring submission of an amicable settlement does not find
support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an erroneous interpretation and
application of the law and rules.—The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes
the motu proprio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules or
any order of the court, cannot even be used to justify the
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
295
VOL. 556, JUNE 295
27, 2008
Tabuada vs. Ruiz
convenient, though erroneous, termination of the proceedings herein. An
examination of the December 6, 2004 Order readily reveals that the trial court neither
required the submission of the amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion for Judgment,
nor warned the parties that should they fail to submit the compromise within the given
period, their case would be dismissed. Hence, it cannot be categorized as
an order requiring compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an affront to the
court and the rules. And even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties cannot
be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly encouraged, but are not
obligated, to consummate a compromise. An order requiring submission of an amicable
settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an erroneous
interpretation and application of the law and rules.
Speedy Disposition of Cases; Inconsiderate dismissals neither constitute a panacea
nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets—while they lend a deceptive aura of
efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning
between the parties.—The Court notes that inconsiderate dismissals neither constitute a
panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend a deceptive aura
of efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning
between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is
better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases
before the court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Raul M. Retiro for petitioner.
Franklin J. Andrada for respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner assails the March 2, 2005 Order1 of
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 57-58.

296
296 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tabuada vs. Ruiz
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Special Proceedings
(Sp. Proc.) No. 5198 and the May 20, 2005 Resolution2 of the trial court denying
the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged order.
The very simple issue raised for our resolution in this case surfaced when the
parties in Sp. Proc. No. 5198 (the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Jose and Paciencia Calaliman) manifested to the RTC their
desire to amicably settle the case. In light of the said manifestation, the trial court
issued the following Order3 on December 6, 2004:
“In view of the strong manifestation of the parties herein and their respective counsel
that they will be able to raise (sic) an amicable settlement, finally, on or before 25
December 2004, the Court will no longer be setting the pending incidents for hearing as
the parties and their counsel have assured this Court that they are going to submit a
“Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement” on or before 25 December 2004.
Atty. Honorato Sayno Jr., Atty. Gregorio Rubias and Atty. Raul Retiro are notified in
open court.
Serve a copy of this Order to Atty. Rean Sy.
SO ORDERED.”4
The RTC, however, on March 2, 2005, invoking Section 3,5Rule 17, of the Rules
of Court, terminated the proceedings on
_______________
2 Id., at p. 70.
3 Id., at p. 56.
4 Id.
5 Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.—If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear
on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for
an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint
may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to
the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This
dismissal shall have
297
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 297
Tabuada vs. Ruiz
account of the parties’ failure to submit the amicable settlement and to comply
with the aforequoted December 6, 2004 Order. The trial court, in the challenged
order of even date, likewise denied all the motions filed by the parties.6
Petitioner, the administratrix of the estate, and private respondents separately
moved for the reconsideration of the March 2, 2005 Order arguing, among others,
that the termination of the case was premature, there being yet no payment of the
debts and distribution of the estate, and that they had already prepared all the
necessary papers for the amicable settlement.7 Despite the said pleas for
reconsideration, the trial court remained firm in its position to terminate the
proceedings; hence, in the assailed May 20, 2005 Resolution,8 it
_______________
the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
6 The pertinent portions of the March 2, 2005 Order reads:

xxxx
To date, however, the herein parties and/or their counsel have egregiously failed to abide by the
aforequoted (sic) Order of the Court to the monumental detriment of the Court’s avowed goal of
rendering justice with dispatch. Ineluctably, with this actuation of the parties and/or their counsel, the
Court is of the gnawing impression that they have completely lost interest in the prosecution of the
motions extant and/or may have already settled their differences extrajudicially which is, of course,
salutary.
In view of this, and in line with the provisions of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the pendant motions should now be disposed of by the Court with finality.
WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the instant motions and all their corollary and
concomitant ramifications are all hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY and the proceedings in re
TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED. (Supra note 1).
7 Rollo, pp. 59-69.
8 Id., at p. 70.
298
298 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tabuada vs. Ruiz
affirmed its earlier order. Dissatisfied, petitioner scuttles to this Court via Rule
45.9
The petition is granted.
While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly
encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural
sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the case.10 Sp.
Proc. No. 5198 should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on
account of the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable
settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement.
Given the non-contentious nature of special proceedings11 (which do not depend on
the will of an actor, but on a state or condition of things or persons not entirely
within the control of the parties interested), its dismissal should be ordered only
in the extreme case where the termination of the proceeding is the sole remedy
consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the parties
therein.12
The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu
proprio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules or
any order of the court,13 cannot even be used to justify the convenient, though
erroneous, termination of the proceedings herein. An examination of the December
6, 2004 Order14 readily reveals that the trial court neither re-
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 4-15.

10 Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Magwin Marketing Corporation, 450 Phil. 720, 738;
402 SCRA 592, 601 (2003), citing Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 498, 506
(1992).
11 Section 3(c), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court defines special proceeding as “a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact;” see Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402
Phil. 152, 165; 349 SCRA 135 (2001).
12 Dayo v. Dayo, 95 Phil. 703, 707 (1954).
13 Supra note 5.
14 Rollo, p. 56.
299
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 299
Tabuada vs. Ruiz
quired the submission of the amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion for
Judgment, nor warned the parties that should they fail to submit the compromise
within the given period, their case would be dismissed.15 Hence, it cannot be
categorized as an order requiring compliance to the extent that its defiance
becomes an affront to the court and the rules. And even if it were worded in
coercive language, the parties cannot be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they
are only strongly encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a compromise.
An order requiring submission of an amicable settlement does not find support in
our jurisprudence and is premised on an erroneous interpretation and application
of the law and rules.
Lastly, the Court notes that inconsiderate dismissals neither constitute a
panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend a
deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone
the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit
or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the
merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court.16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED. The March 2, 2005 Order and the May 20, 2005 Resolution of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Sp. Proc. No. 5198 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Reyes,
JJ.,concur.
_______________
15 Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10.

16 Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Magwin Marketing Corporation, supra note 10, at pp.
742-743.
G.R. No. 164108. May 8, 2009.*

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS
HOLDING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OFAPPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS
BENEDICTO, respondents.
Wills and Succession; Settlement of Estates; Intervention; Notwithstanding Section 2
of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent
whose credit is based on a contingent claim—the definition of “intervention” under Rule 19
simply does not accommodate contingent claims.—It is not immediately evident that
intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in
special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of
special proceedings under the Rules of Court, not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2,
Rule 72 further provides that “[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.”
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set
forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claim. The definition of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
465
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 465
2009
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Torts; Actions for tort or quasi-delict, being as they are civil,
survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.—Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been
based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should have filed their claim,
even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court
immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the administrator
immediately after the issuance of such notice. However, it appears that the claims against
Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom,
Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within
the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These
actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced
against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate
that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was
successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case was already
pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.
Same; Same; Same; While there is no general right on the part of a creditor or any
person interested in the estate to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for
under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the
estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be
protected—it is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by
petitioners.—In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a
creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of
the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such
persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general
right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain
prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if
the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is
no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under
this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.466
466 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Same; Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records
of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the
service of court processes and pleadings upon them; Nonetheless, in the instances that the
Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all “interested parties, petitioners
as “interested parties” will be entitled to such notice.—Allowing creditors, contingent or
otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable
precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In
either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved
and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their
right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order
or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on
the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a
viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to
any or all “interested parties” the petitioners as “interested parties” will be entitled to
such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided
in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the
account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition
to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the
application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the
administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending
cases filed by the petitioners.
Same; Same; Same; There are reliefs available to compel an administrator to return
to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
within three (3) months from appointment and to render an account of his administration
within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration, but a
person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so.—
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from
appointment, while Section 8 of Rule467
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 467
2009
85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one
(1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt
that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a
person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so.
Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context
of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under
Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.
Same; Same; Same; While Section 2, Rule 82 is silent as to who may seek with the
court the removal of the administrator, the Court does not doubt that a creditor, even a
contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief.—Concerning complaints
against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the
removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision
is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not
doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such
relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of
sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the
administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
Andres H. Hagad, Daniel H. Hagad, Victor Cabalusa & Ralph A.
Sarmiento for petitioners.
Dominador R. Santiago for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May
2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto
(administratrix468
468 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of
his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the
petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as
one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending
with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs
therein.2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC
of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor,
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was
raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition
acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, “net of
liabilities.”3On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private
respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing
letters of administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent
submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and
Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.5 In the List of Liabilities
attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities,
the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod
City courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding
to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40
for Civil Case No.
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 45.
2 Id., at p. 13.
3 Id., at p. 56.
4 Id., at pp. 67-69.
5 Id., at pp. 76-85A.
6 Id., at p. 85-A.
469
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 469
11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a
complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,9 praying that they be furnished with
copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private
respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of
petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before
the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus
motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private
respondent of the required inventory of the decedent’s estate.10 Petitioners also
filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part
of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and
inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties
within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The
petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the
civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
_______________
7 Id.
8 Id., at p. 87.
9 Id., at p. 101-104.
10 Id., at pp. 121-125.
11 Id., at pp. 132-133.
470
470 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing
the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate
court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited
the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent
or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before
other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts
erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the
estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in
support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other
provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.13
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the
courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished “copies of all
processes and orders issued” by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed
by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14 Second, they prayed that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission
thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.15Third, petitioners
moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the adminis-
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 45-52. Decision penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino of the Sixteenth
Division, and concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Magdangal M. De Leon.
13 More particularly, the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons. See Rules 73 to 91,
Revised Rules of Court.
14 See Rollo, p. 103.
15 Id., at p. 124.
471
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 471
trator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date
for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and
other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the
estate.16
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely
informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of
Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that an intervenor “has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court x x x” While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not
literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case
law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor “must
be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant.”17
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of
Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The
settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special
proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section
2, Rule 72 further provides that “[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings.”
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention
as set forth under Rule 19 does not
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 124-125.

17 Batama Farmers’ Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Rosal, etc., et al., 149
Phil. 514, 519; 42 SCRA 408, 412 (1971).
18 See Section 1(a), Rule 72, Rules of Court.
472
472 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The
definition of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate
contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had
sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their
recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have
no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean
the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to
intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be,
let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle “any interested
persons” or “any persons interested in the estate” to participate in varying
capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions
before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of “any person
interested” to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for
administration”; (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of
hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors,
and “to any other persons believed to have interest in the estate”; (3) Section 1,
Rule 76, which allows a “person interested in the estate” to petition for the
allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested
in the estate of the deceased “to complain to the court of the concealment,
embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the
decedent’s title or interest therein”; (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice
of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s
account “to persons interested”; (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the
court to give notice “to the persons interested” before it may
473
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 473
hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties
of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows “any person interested in
the estate” to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate
of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract,
whether express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if
contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court
immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the
administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.19 However, it appears
that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his
actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil
actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under
the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are
civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the
administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the
intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully
impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21 was already
pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled
in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In
the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the
right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what
extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
_______________
19 See Rules of Court, Rule 86, Secs. 1 & 3.

20 See Aguas v. Llemos, et al., 116 Phil. 112; 5 SCRA 959 (1962); Leung Ben v. O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182,
189-194 (1918).
21 88 Phil. 477 (1951).
474
474 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and
it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts
therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages
against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial
court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had
sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead
Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a
verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying
that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased,
and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been
terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took
cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate
proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial
partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings
pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.
“If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it
was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the
property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only
property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the
court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the
unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily
reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and
distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does
not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence
because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as
having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
_______________
22 G.R. No. L-3342, 18 April 1951.

475
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 475
Appellants’ claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of
the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason
that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings
until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated,
cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that
“action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon,
and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may
be commenced against the executor or administrator.” What practical value would this
provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its
termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without
first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the
ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part
of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and
should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules
would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed
by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x”23(Emphasis supplied) [Citations
omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed
to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake
of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court,
citing Dinglasan, stated: “[t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect
that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do
so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action.”24
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 480-481.

24 Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501, 503 (1953); citing 2 Moran, 432, 1952 revised edition, citing the
case of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Lee Liong, Dinglasan, et al. v. Ang Chia, et al., G.R. No. L-3342,
April 18, 1951.
476
476 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but
they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special
Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also “any person interested” or “persons
interested in the estate” various specified capacities to protect their respective
interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action
for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time
judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already
been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be
enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a
creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every
aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific
instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem
that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they
may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary
to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the
Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we
assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed
by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such
relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the
intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a
running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should
their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to
complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or
fraudulently conveyed.477
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 477
At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and
contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate
proceedings. We are mindful of respondent’s submission that if the Court were to
entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court,
then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would
have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the
claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all
court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less
contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings,
and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly
disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized
by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core
concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings.
In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the
same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed
access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had
denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that
“the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available
for the inspection of any interested person x x x.” The Court ruled that petitioners
were “interested persons” entitled to access the court records in the intestate
proceedings. We said:
“Petitioners’ stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt
compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets
of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by
the Administratrix of an annual accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in
the complaints for sum of money against Roberto
_______________
25 G.R. No. 163155, 21 July 2006, 496 SCRA 282.

478
478 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate.
They are in fact “interested persons” under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x”26
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the
intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the
service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of
the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in
accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to
access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order
or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less
cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the
decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in
the estate are preserved.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require
notice to any or all “interested parties” the petitioners as “interested parties” will
be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested
parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of
examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b)
of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to
sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and;
(3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for
distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has
acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed
by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set
for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete
inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax ap-
_______________
26 Id., at p. 301.
479
VOL. 587, MAY 8, 2009 479
praisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal
of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline
for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon
submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation,
preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within
three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the
administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from
receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there
are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a
person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled
to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these
duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections
enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with
contingent claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator,
the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court
the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a
contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the
interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets
to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the
administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct.
Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their
prerogatives under480
480 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that
petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are
entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the
Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special
Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (Acting Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De
Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.
**
Petition denied.
Notes.—The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute
and can only be exercised “so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts
and expenses of administration.” (Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals,
252 SCRA 541 [1996])
The appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory, discretionary on
the part of the Regional Trial Court and non-appealable, though it may be subject
of certiorari if it can be shown that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
or lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. (Jamero vs. Melicor, 459 SCRA 113 [2005])
——o0o——
_______________
** Per Special Order No. 619, Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro is hereby designated as
additional member of the Second Division in lieu of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, who is on official
leave.

Court Rules on Estate Settlement Case

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Court Rules on Estate Settlement Case

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001.

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO,

VOL. 349, 137

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

motion for reconsideration.

Annexes “D” and “F,” Rollo, pp. 35-44; 51.

5 Petition, Annex “G,” Rollo, pp. 52-59.

6 Petition, Annex “A,” Rollo, pp. 18-25.

9 Petition, Annex “D,” supra.

11 Petition, Annex “G,” supra.

Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny

13 Petition, Annex “A,” Rollo, pp. 21-23.

1. (a)That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO

18 Petition, Annex “A,” Rollo, pp. 23-24.

petition for settlement of estate.

Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make

22 Article 151 of the Family Code of the Philippines now reads:

VOL. 366, OCTOBER 2, 385

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action

over the second lot. 3

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher.

2 TCT No. 107442.

5 Records, pp. 1-7.

6 Exhibit “E”; Decision in Civil Case No. 94-71075; Rollo, p. 205.

7 Records, pp. 20-23.

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds

9 Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880[1920].

having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings.”

12 Rollo, p. 30; CA Decision, p. 8.

15 Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227[1948].

Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh,we had occasion to hold:

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the

18 Pagkatipunan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 718 [1991].

G.R. No. 168799. June 27, 2008.*

1 Rollo, pp. 57-58.

6 The pertinent portions of the March 2, 2005 Order reads:

9 Id., at pp. 4-15.

15 Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10.

G.R. No. 164108. May 8, 2009.*

16 Id., at pp. 124-125.

19 See Rules of Court, Rule 86, Secs. 1 & 3.

22 G.R. No. L-3342, 18 April 1951.

23 Id., at pp. 480-481.

25 G.R. No. 163155, 21 July 2006, 496 SCRA 282.

You might also like