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A. Course Description/Concept
Sumbilla vs Matrix Finance GR No. 197582
Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable... and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.[22] Upon finality of the...
judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule. The Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its
own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and when justice requires it
After all, procedural rules were... conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder
rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter

Estino vs People GR 163957-58

FACTS:
For review before the Court under Rule 45 are the April 16, 2004 Decision and June 14, 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in the
consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 26192 and 26193 entitled People of the Philippines v. Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera.
In G.R. Nos. 163957-58, petitioners Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera appeal their conviction of violation of Section 3(e),
Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for failure to pay the Representation and Transportation
Allowance (RATA) of the provincial government employees of Sulu. In G.R. Nos. 164009-11, petitioner Pescadera alone appeals his
conviction of malversation of public funds under Article 217 Of the Revised Penal Code for failure to remit the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) contributions of the provincial government employees amounting to PhP 4,820,365.30.
In these consolidated appeals, petitioners pray for their acquittal.

ISSUE:
Whether a new trial is proper in the determination the guilt of the petitioners in non-payment of RATA in violation of Sec 3(e) of RA
3019.

RULING:
YES. Petitioner’s defense is anchored on their payment of RATA, and for this purpose, they submitted documents which allegedly
show that they paid the RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget. They also claim that the COA Report did not sufficiently prove that
they did not pay the RATA because the alleged disbursement vouchers, which were supposed to be annexed to the COA Report as
proof of nonpayment of RATA, were not submitted with said report. Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial
before a judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change
the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that petitioners
were mistaken in their belief that its production during

Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes final when new and
material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are
strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was
unnecessary.

Cariaga vs. People

G.R. No. 180010; July 30, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioner Cenita M. Cariaga is a municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela whose been charged with three separate cases before the
Regional Trial Court of Isabela, all for malversation of public funds. Cariaga was convicted for the said cases. Hence, an appeal was
filed before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction thereon. Petitioner, admitting the procedural error committed by her former counsel, implores the Court to
relax the Rules to afford her an opportunity to fully ventilate her appeal on the merits and requests the Court to endorse and
transmit the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan in the interest of substantial justice.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE APPEAL OF [PETITIONER] WRONGFULLY DIRECTED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT OR BE
ENDORSED AND TRANSMITTED TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN WHERE THE APPEAL SHALL THEN PROCEED IN DUE COURSE.

HELD:
Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty due to a procedural lapse militates
against the Courts dispensation of justice, the Court grants petitioners plea for a relaxation of the Rules.
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For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that any rigid and strict application
thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided.
In Ulep v. People, the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when it found that
x x x petitioners failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was inadvertent. The omission did not appear to be a dilatory
tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose had that been the case as her appeal could be dismissed outright for lack of
jurisdiction which was exactly what happened in the CA.
The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the case to the proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is
unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned ordered the pertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to the great prejudice
of petitioner. Cases involving government employees with a salary grade lower than 27 are fairly common, albeit regrettably so. The
judge was expected to know and should have known the law and the rules of procedure. He should have known when appeals are to
be taken to the CA and when they should be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and carefully
observed this responsibility specially in cases such as this where a persons liberty was at stake. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The slapdash work of petitioners former counsel and the trial courts apparent ignorance of the law effectively conspired to deny
petitioner the remedial measures to question her conviction.[11]
While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made exceptions thereto, especially in criminal cases where
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; when its application will result in outright
deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so require. [12] It can not be gainsaid that the case of
petitioner can fall under any of these exceptions.
Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and defense as well as a proper application
of the imposable penalties in the present case by the Sandiganbayan would do well to assuage petitioner that her appeal is decided
scrupulously.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514 are SET ASIDE. Let the records of the cases be
FORWARDED to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition

B. Prosecutory Power/ Jurisdiction of Ombudsman

CARMELO F. LAZATIN v. ANIANO A. DESIERTO AS OMBUDSMAN, GR No. 147097, 2009-06-05

Facts:

On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as
OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code and... violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his
CDF; he signed... vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant,
eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito
A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David,... was allegedly able to convert his CDF into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a
Resolution[2] dated May 29, 2000 recommending the filing against herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of
Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman;
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions
were granted by the Sandiganbayan
The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. In a Memorandum[4] dated
October 24, 2000, the OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the...
trial of the cases against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving
the OSP Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and ordering the aggressive prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were then
returned to the
Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal proceedings.

Issues:
Petitioners allege that:

I.THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION.

II.THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.

Ruling:
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770
granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional... infirmity.
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The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v.
Office of the Ombudsman.
The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.[9] More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Valera,[10] the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in
Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively
suspend is lodged... only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman.[11] The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the
Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision
in

Perez v. Sandiganbayan,[12] where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of
informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the

Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP
under the Office of the Ombudsman.

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in a manner described above. Clearly, the Ombudsman
was acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercised its power of control and supervision over the OSP when it
disapproved the
Resolution dated September 18, 2000.
It should also be noted that the petition does not question any order or action of the Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it should
not have been included as a respondent in this petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

Principles:
ection 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those
conferred... on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently refers to the
Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove any of
the Tanodbayan's/Special
Prosecutor's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office
of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is
indubitable then that
Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein,
Congress may remove some of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or
grant the Office of the Special
Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did through the passage
of R.A. No. 6770.

Castro vs Deloria GR No. 163586

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS (2013 – 2014) G.R. No. 163586 CASTRO vs. DALORIA January 27, 2009 Austria-Martinez, J.
Petitioner: Sharon Castro Respondents: RTC Judge Hon. Merlin Deloria,

CA CASE SUMMARY: Sharon Castro was a BIR Officer in Guimaras who was charged with Malversation of Public Funds,
misappropriating worth P556,000. The Ombudsman was tasked to prosecute her, but she questioned the authority of the
Ombudsman, citing the original decision of Uy vs. Sandiganbayan decided in 1999 which held that the Ombudsman had no
prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by RTC. The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman’s powers were plenary and
unqualified, covering all offending “public officers”, and that the later Resolution of the Uy case prevailed, curing the restrictive
defect in the Ombudsman’s powers.

ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR RTC denied the Motion to Quash, recognizing the authority of the Ombudsman in the case. RTC cited
the Resolution of Uy vs. Sandiganbayan in 2001 which reversed the original decision in Uy vs. Sanidganbayan 1999, and expressly
recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the RTC.

ISSUES: 1. W/N the Ombudsman had the authority to file a case against petitioner, as of May 31, 2001, in the light of the FIRST
DECISION in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case (1999), which limited the powers of the Ombudsman. 2. W/N the Resolution of the Uy
vs. Sandiganbayan case (2001) violates the constitutional provisions against ex-post facto laws and the denial of due process.
 4

HELD: FACTS:

Ombudsman’s powers UPHELD.

Sharon Castro, a Revenue Officer of BIR Buenavista, Guimaras, was charged before the Ombudsman with Malversation of Public
Funds. She was accused of misappropriating public funds worth P556,681.53 despite notice and demand upon her account for the
funds.

RATIO:

Castro filed a Motion to Quash, stating that the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction. She said that the Information failed to allege her
salary grade—a material fact in the crime charged. Citing Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, since she had a salary grade of 27, her case should
be within the jurisdiction of the RTC. She also added that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman are limited to the cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

The decision on Uy vs. Sandiganbayan in 1991 was that the Ombudsman’s prosecutorial powers were limited to Sandiganbayan
cases, while the Resolution on the same case in 2001 expressly held that the Ombudsman shall have power on all criminal cases
involving public officials. Petitioner contends that the decision in 1991 should apply to her case, instead of the 2001 Resolution,
because the Ombudsman instituted the action against her in April 26, 2000. Hence, the Information filed against

Castelo Chan-Gonzaga Evardone Gacutan Gana Gutierrez Lopez Miclat Mercado Tan Torres Valdez Varela

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS (2013 – 2014) her was void because at that time, the Ombudsman had no authority over her case.
The Court finds no merit in her petition. 1. The Ombudsman’s prosecutorial powers are PLENARY and UNQUALIFIED. Time and time
again, the Court has held that the Ombudsman has power to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but also cases within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. The powers of the Ombudsman are plenary and
unqualified. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Enoc)

ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR it to reveal the true intent of the lawmakers. Therefore, the Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting
the Ombudsman Act is part of the law dated December 7, 1989. “Where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial
interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation”. The Resolution in Uy set aside an
erroneous pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act manifested in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan (1999).

FINAL VERDICT: Case DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The clause “any illegal act or omission of any public official” is broad enough to embrace the any crime committed by a public officer
or employee is within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction to prosecute. Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction
to “take over, at any stage from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases” cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the
Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. 2. The Resolution of Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan in 2001 is NOT ex-post facto; it is meant to cure the defect in limiting the Ombudsman’s powers. Resolution 2001 is a
judicial interpretation of the statute. As such, it constitutes part of the original law which is the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Such
interpretation does not create new law, but rather construes
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DOJ vs Liwag GR No. 149311

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order dated June 22, 2001 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated June 25, 2001 issued
by the late Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 01-100934.

The facts are as follows:

Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit on January 8, 2001 before the Ombudsman against PNP
General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private
individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and
Aquino. The cases were docketed as OMB Case Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-00-77, 4-01-00-80, 4-01-00-81, 4-01-00-82, and 4-01-00-84.
The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance and thus required the respondents
therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and
prayed that the charges against them be dismissed.

Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI, alleging the same facts
and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman.1 NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a
letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino,
other PNP officials, and private individuals for the following alleged crimes:

a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;

b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and

c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.2

In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this recommendation was made after taking the sworn statements of
Mary Ong and other witnesses such as Chong Kam Fai, Zeng Kang Pang, and Quenna Yuet Yuet. The sworn statements of these
witnesses were attached to the letter.3

On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, Aquino and the other persons named in the
witnesses’ sworn statements. Lacson and Aquino received the subpoena on May 8, 2001. The subpoena directed them to submit
their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI on
May 18, 2001 at the DOJ Multi-Purpose Hall. However, Lacson and Aquino, through their counsel, manifested in a letter dated May
18, 2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaints
pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents. Furthermore, they claimed that
according to the Court’s ruling in gr_ Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of Government, the investigation of such cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such as private
respondents.5

The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and, on May 28, 2001, denied the dismissal of the cases before it
through an Order that stated the following as basis of the denial:

It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not allowed under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure[;]

It appearing further that respondent’s rank and/or civil service classification has no bearing in the determination of jurisdiction as
the crimes charged herein do not involve violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property [or]
Bribery, nor are they related to respondents’ discharge of their official duties;

It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice No. 95-001
dated October 5, 1995, provides that offenses committed not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be
investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall rule thereon with finality;6

On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order, the Solicitor General received a copy of a petition for prohibition filed
by Lacson and Aquino before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In the said petition for prohibition, Lacson and Aquino
maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation on the complaints submitted by Mary Ong and the
other witnesses. They argued that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was violating the Ombudsman’s mandate of
 6

having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Again, they relied on Uy
v. Sandiganbayan to bolster their claim.

On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed prohibiting the Department of Justice from conducting the
preliminary investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is hereby GRANTED, and accordingly a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is hereby ISSUED, enjoining the respondents and their subordinates, agents[,] and other persons acting in their behalf, individually
and collectively, from conducting a preliminary investigation in IS No. 2001-402, insofar as petitioners here are concerned, and
directing the petitioners to file their counter-affidavits in said case until such time that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disclaimed jurisdiction over the offenses subject matter of the investigations before it, or until such Office shall have categorized the
said offenses as being committed by the petitioners not in relation to their respective offices.

Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore, issue without bond, as there is no showing whatsoever in the
pleadings of the parties that the respondents will suffer any injury by reason of the issuance of the writ prayed for, in accordance
with Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED. 7

Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ, through then Secretary Hernando Perez, the NBI, through Director
Reynaldo Wycoco, and the panel of prosecutors designated by the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 2001-402.
In their petition, they raise the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL CLEAR AUTHORITY OF
PETITIONERS DOJ AND THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08, SERIES OF 1990 OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND SECTION 4 OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES
OF COURT.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN
OVER THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL OF AN
ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY BEFORE THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ AND
THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MARY ONG BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AS INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY THE SAME
OFFENSES, RESPONDENTS AND ALLEGED VICTIMS.

IV

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING RELIEF TO RESPONDENT MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO
DESPITE THE GLARING FACT THAT HE IS CHARGED WITH SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN AND THE DOJ.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE FOR PROHIBITION BY GRANTING
THE SAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE ONLY HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE MERIT OF
THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.8

A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition puts forth one central question to be resolved: whether or not the
DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving
the same accused, facts, and circumstances. The addition of other names in the second proceedings does not alter the nature
thereof as being principally directed against the respondents herein in connection with substantially the same set of facts alleged.

First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.

 7

Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial court to reconsider the assailed Order. They maintain that it
was imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy administration of justice and that this is all the more compelling, in this
case, considering that this involves the high-ranking officers of the PNP and the crimes being charged have already attracted
nationwide attention.

Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not only be the safety of witnesses who risked life
and limb to give their statements to the authorities, but also the rights of the respondents, who may need to clear their names and
reputations of the accusations against them. Procedural laws are adopted not as ends in themselves but as means conducive to the
realization of justice. The rules of procedure are not to be applied when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for
their conception and existence.9

Now, to the merits.

The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under
Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which states:

Section 1. Declaration of policy. – It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government with a principal law agency which
shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted
processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional
system; . . .

Section 3. Powers and Functions. – To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following powers and functions:

...

(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system;

...

Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11, 1978, provides:

Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of Justice. – There is hereby created
and established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the
Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and
City Fiscal’s Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases
involving violations of penal laws.

Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over the cases filed against them, to the
exclusion of any other investigatory agency of Government pursuant to law and existing jurisprudence. They rely on the doctrine in
Uy v. Sandiganbayan aforementioned, and contend that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of the said primary jurisdiction, may take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including police
and military officials. They likewise claim that it should be deemed that the Ombudsman has already taken over the investigation of
these cases, considering that there are already pending complaints filed therewith involving the same accused, facts and
circumstances.

Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; ….10

The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation of the case or cases in question to the
exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. In granting the petition for prohibition, RTC Judge Liwag gave the
following rationale:

Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the matter, it is
the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on the same matter under the
pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other investigative agencies of the Government have no power
and right to add an input into the Ombudsman’s investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative agencies are expressly
 8

allowed by the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the investigation, subject to the final
decision of the Ombudsman. That is the situation. It is not otherwise. To allow the respondents to meddle with the investigation of
similar cases being investigated by the Ombudsman would put them to a higher plane than the source of their powers with respect
to such cases. This is, of course, anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is contrary to ordinary common sense. It would
certainly be presumpt[u]ous, if not ridiculous, for the Department of Justice to be making recommendation as to its preliminary
investigation to the Ombudsman in matters being handled by such Office itself. Such recommendation would be pre-emptive of the
actions of the said Office. Such a situation must thus be disallowed.

The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman may take over, at any stage, from any investigative agency of
the Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such as the petitioners. It is
the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot find comfort in that provision of the law. That situation presupposes the
conduct by other Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public officials in cases not theretofore being taken
cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot
take over, at any stage of the proceedings, the investigation being conducted by another agency. It has the case before it.
Rudimentary common sense and becoming respect for power and authority would thus require the respondents to desist from
interfering with the case already handled by the Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized
prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates absolutely the
exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority. The hierarchy of powers must be remembered. The principle of agency
must be recalled.11

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any
malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or employees.12 To discharge its duty effectively, the Constitution
endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with special features which puts it a notch above other grievance-handling, investigate
bodies. First and foremost, it extended independence to the Ombudsman and insulated it from the intrusions of partisan politics.
Thus, the Constitution provided for stringent qualification requirements for the selection of the Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e.,
they should be natural-born citizens, of recognized probity and independence and must not have been candidates for any elective
office in the immediately preceding election.13 The Ombudsman and his deputies were given the rank and salary equal to that of the
Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, with a prohibition for any decrease in their salary during
their term of office.14 They were given a fixed term of seven years, without reappointment.15 Upon their cessation from office, they
are prohibited from running for any elective office in the immediately succeeding election.16 Finally, unlike other investigative
bodies, the Constitution granted the Office of the Ombudsman fiscal autonomy.17 Clearly, all these measures are intended to
enhance the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as the principal and primary complaints and
action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted more than
the usual powers given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to investigate complaints against a public office or officer on its
own initiative, even without a formal complaint lodged before it.18 It can inquire into acts of government agencies and public
servants based on reports in the media and those which come to his attention through sources other than a complaint. The method
of filing a complaint with the Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that may be required from a complainant
is sufficient information detailing the illegal or improper acts complained of. The ordinary citizen, who has become increasingly
dependent on public agencies, is put to minimal expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Vis-à-vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to investigate public officials is given
preference over other bodies.

As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant role played by the Office of Ombudsman when it enacted Republic
Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases. This power to take over a
case at any time is not given to other investigative bodies. All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is notco-equal with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate the
power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.

Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to
investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers and employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional
creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted to the
Ombudsman.

Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means
equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter,19 the settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of
the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.20 Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between
the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained
freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the
 9

investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to
proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.

None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a factual situation similar to that of the present case. In Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),21 the Court upheld the special authority of the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, issued by then President Aquino, creating the
PCGG. While the Court emphasized in Cojuangco that the power of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation over said
cases is not exclusive but a shared authority, the complaints for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds were filed directly with the
PCGG. No complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case will disclose that the Court
recognized the primary, albeit shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all ill-gotten wealth cases.22 In fact, it ordered
the PCGG to desist from proceeding with the preliminary investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the PCGG to conduct the
investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of sequestration orders against petitioner’s assets.

In Sanchez v. Demetriou,23 the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed a complaint with the DOJ against petitioner Mayor Sanchez
for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. After the DOJ panel prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation, a
warrant of arrest was issued and the corresponding Informations were filed in court by the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that
it is only the Ombudsman who has the power to conduct investigation of cases involving public officers like him. The Court reiterated
its previous ruling that the authority to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of public officers is not an exclusive authority of the
Ombudsman but a shared authority. However, it will be noted that the complaint for preliminary investigation in that case was filed
solely with the DOJ.

In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,24 a letter-complaint charging petitioners with sedition was filed with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ panel of prosecutors, the corresponding Information was filed in court. The
pertinent issue raised by petitioners was whether the prosecutors can file the said Information without previous authority from the
Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the affirmative and reiterated its ruling regarding the shared authority of the DOJ to investigate the
case. Again, it should be noted that the complaint in that case was addressed solely to the provincial prosecutor.

The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v. Felix25 and Honasan v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ26
where the letter-complaint against petitioners public officers were brought alone to the DOJ prosecutors for investigation.

In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed ahead with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies and no risk of conflicting findings
or orders. In stark contrast with the present case, Mary Ong filed a complaint against respondents initially with the Office of the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the
records, she thereafter refiled substantially the same complaint with the NBI and the DOJ.

Not only this.

The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed against the
respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a
casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.27 When one is hailed before an investigative body on specific charges, the very act of filing said complaint
for preliminary investigation immediately exposes the respondent and his family to anxiety, humiliation and expense. To allow the
same complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would
also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body
where the same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or
defense.

There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same
time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents.

Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable and limited
resources of Government, inaduplication of proceedings already started with the Ombudsman.

From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge.

Criminal Procedure; Procedural laws are adopted not as endsin themselves but as means conducive to the realization of justice— the
rules of procedure are not to be applied when such applicationwould clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception
andexistence.
—Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motionbefore the trial court to reconsider the assailed Order. Theymaintain that it
was imperative for them to do so for the sake of thespeedy administration of justice and that this is all the morecompelling, in this
 10

case, considering thatthis involves the high-ranking officers of the PNP and the crimes being charged havealready attracted
nationwide attention. This Court finds that time isof the essence in this case. At stake here may not only be the safetyof witnesses
who risked life and limb to give their statements to theauthorities, but also the rights of the respondents, who may need toclear
their names and reputations of the accusations against them.Procedural laws are adopted not as ends in themselves but as
meansconducive to the realization of justice. The rules of procedure are notto be applied when such application would clearly defeat
the veryrationale for their conception and existence.
Same; Preliminary Investigations; Department of Justice(DOJ); The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminaryinvestigation is
based on the provisions of the 1987 AdministrativeCode.
—The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminaryinvestigation is based on the provisions of the 1987 AdministrativeCode under
Chapter I,

Uy vs Sandiganbayan GR No.105965-70 March 20, 2001 (CrimPro 2016)

FACTS: Petitioner George Uy was the deputy comptroller of the Philippine Navy designated to act on behalf of Captain Fernandez,
the latter‟s supervisor, on matters relating the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch. Six informations for Estafa through falsification
of official documents and one information for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act) were filed with
the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Uy and 19 other accused. The petitioner was said to have signed a P.O. stating that the unit
received 1,000 pieces of seal rings when in fact, only 100 were ordered. The Sandiganbayan recommended that the infomations be
withdrawn against some of the accused after a comprehensive investigation. Petitioner filed a motion to quash contending that it is
the Court Martial and not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused.
Petitioner further contends that RA 1850 which provides for the jurisdiction of court martial should govern in this case The court
ruled that: It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner since he was a regular officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850,
“Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-
martial over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines” As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not
fall within the “rank” requirement stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested
in the regular courts ,as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that “In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade „27‟ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.”

In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against
Uy in the RTC. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In February 20, 2000,
a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial motion for reconsideration was filed by the Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor, which was then denied. The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000.

Issue: Wether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of
regular courts?

Held: No. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman us plenary and unqualified. It has been held
that the clause “any illegal act or omission of any public officials” is broad enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance,
and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.

malfeasance – bad and illegal acts, especially by a public official.

Misfeasance – An act that is legal but performed improperly.
Nonfeasance – omission to do a duty.

The court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an
exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8
issued by the Office of Ombudman provides: The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct
exclusive control and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman. The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the
Office of the Ombudsman and other investigate agencies of government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts.
 11

Castro vs Deloria GR No.163586

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS (2013 – 2014) G.R. No. 163586 CASTRO vs. DALORIA January 27, 2009 Austria-Martinez, J.
Petitioner: Sharon Castro Respondents: RTC Judge Hon. Merlin Deloria, CA CASE SUMMARY: Sharon Castro was a BIR Officer in
Guimaras who was charged with Malversation of Public Funds, misappropriating worth P556,000. The Ombudsman was tasked to
prosecute her, but she questioned the authority of the Ombudsman, citing the original decision of Uy vs. Sandiganbayan decided in
1999 which held that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by RTC. The Supreme Court ruled that the
Ombudsman’s powers were plenary and unqualified, covering all offending “public officers”, and that the later Resolution of the Uy
case prevailed, curing the restrictive defect in the Ombudsman’s powers.

ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR RTC denied the Motion to Quash, recognizing the authority of the Ombudsman in the case. RTC cited
the Resolution of Uy vs. Sandiganbayan in 2001 which reversed the original decision in Uy vs. Sanidganbayan 1999, and expressly
recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the RTC.

ISSUES: 1. W/N the Ombudsman had the authority to file a case against petitioner, as of May 31, 2001, in the light of the FIRST
DECISION in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case (1999), which limited the powers of the Ombudsman. 2. W/N the Resolution of the Uy
vs. Sandiganbayan case (2001) violates the constitutional provisions against ex-post facto laws and the denial of due process.

HELD: FACTS:

Ombudsman’s powers UPHELD.

Sharon Castro, a Revenue Officer of BIR Buenavista, Guimaras, was charged before the Ombudsman with Malversation of Public
Funds. She was accused of misappropriating public funds worth P556,681.53 despite notice and demand upon her account for the
funds.

RATIO:

Castro filed a Motion to Quash, stating that the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction. She said that the Information failed to allege her
salary grade—a material fact in the crime charged. Citing Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, since she had a salary grade of 27, her case should
be within the jurisdiction of the RTC. She also added that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman are limited to the cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

The decision on Uy vs. Sandiganbayan in 1991 was that the Ombudsman’s prosecutorial powers were limited to Sandiganbayan
cases, while the Resolution on the same case in 2001 expressly held that the Ombudsman shall have power on all criminal cases
involving public officials. Petitioner contends that the decision in 1991 should apply to her case, instead of the 2001 Resolution,
because the Ombudsman instituted the action against her in April 26, 2000. Hence, the Information filed against

Castelo Chan-Gonzaga Evardone Gacutan Gana Gutierrez Lopez Miclat Mercado Tan Torres Valdez Varela

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS (2013 – 2014) her was void because at that time, the Ombudsman had no authority over her case.
The Court finds no merit in her petition. 1. The Ombudsman’s prosecutorial powers are PLENARY and UNQUALIFIED. Time and time
again, the Court has held that the Ombudsman has power to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but also cases within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. The powers of the Ombudsman are plenary and
unqualified. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Enoc)

ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR it to reveal the true intent of the lawmakers. Therefore, the Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting
the Ombudsman Act is part of the law dated December 7, 1989. “Where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial
interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation”. The Resolution in Uy set aside an
erroneous pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act manifested in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan (1999).
 12

FINAL VERDICT: Case DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The clause “any illegal act or omission of any public official” is broad enough to embrace the any crime committed by a public officer
or employee is within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction to prosecute. Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction
to “take over, at any stage from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases” cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the
Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. 2. The Resolution of Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan in 2001 is NOT ex-post facto; it is meant to cure the defect in limiting the Ombudsman’s powers. Resolution 2001 is a
judicial interpretation of the statute. As such, it constitutes part of the original law which is the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Such
interpretation does not create new law, but rather construes
Castelo Chan-Gonzaga Evardone Gacutan Gana Gutierrez Lopez Miclat Mercado Tan Torres Valdez Varela

C. Jurisdiction

JURISDICTION • It is the power to hear and determine matters in controversy according to the established rules of law and to carry
the sentence or judgment the court into execution. (Morando vs Rovira) • It is vested in the court not in the judges. • It conferred
only by the Constitution or law and cannot be fixed by the will of the parties.

JURISDICTION • Derived from the 2 latin words “juris"and “dico”(I speak by the law). • It is the authority to hear and determine a
cause of action. (Herrera vs Barreto) • It is the right that put the wheel of justice in motion and to proceed to the final determination
of the cause upon the pleadings and evidence. (PP vs Mariano, supra)

• JURISDICTION— is substantial, it is the power of the court to decide the case on the merits. (Crisostomo vs Echiverri)

14. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION • A court may act: • 1. Without power or jurisdiction (judgment is wholly void as though it has not
been done) • 2. Having power or jurisdiction, may exercise it wrongfully. (so it must be reversed upon error) • 3. Irregularly (must be
corrected by motion)— (Herrera vs Barreto supra)

15. REQUISITES OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION • 1. The offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance; • 2. The
offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction • 3. Person charged with the offense must have been brought to
its presence for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission over the territory where the offense was
committed and the jurisdiction over the person of the accused. (PP vs Rivera)

ACCUSATORIAL • It is grounded in the due process school of criminology that there be moral certainty of guilt to
defeat the constitutional presumption of innocence. (PP vs Egot) • GENERAL RULE: a court proceeding in our
Judicial set up is accusatorial or adversarial and not inquisitorial in nature. (it contemplates two contending parties
before the court which hears them impartially and renders a judgment only after trial. (Questo vs Catolico)

Jurisdiction over the Person of the Accused. Basically: the court cannot just rule on an accused who never showed up — that violates
due process, since he cannot defend himself, among others; the court must first have jurisdiction over the accused. There are two
ways for a court to acquire jurisdiction over the person: (1) through the enforcement of a warrant of arrest; or (2) through the
accused’s voluntary appearance.

. Criminal Jurisdiction of Courts

Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter. Basically: the court cannot rule on a criminal case if it does not have jurisdiction over the crime
involved. According to Riano, subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of the court to hear and determine the particular case; it is
basically jurisdiction over the offense charged. Still a little confusing? Okay, different courts have different jurisdictions, as will be
explained further later. Some courts can rule on certain crimes, and some courts cannot rule on certain crimes. A court has to have
jurisdiction over the subject matter (basically, the crime involved in the case) before it can rule on the case. Hence, jurisdiction over
the subject matter is essential.

Jurisdiction over the Person of the Accused. Basically: the court cannot just rule on an accused who never showed up — that violates
due process, since he cannot defend himself, among others; the court must first have jurisdiction over the accused. There are two
ways for a court to acquire jurisdiction over the person: (1) through the enforcement of a warrant of arrest; or (2) through the
accused’s voluntary appearance.

Territorial Jurisdiction. Basically: the court cannot rule on a case involving a crime committed outside its territory. Generally, the
criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
 13

any of its essential ingredients occurred (see Rule 110, Sec. 15). So, where the crime was committed determines the court which has
territorial jurisdiction.

The court has to have all three, or the case can be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

BATAS PAMBANSA Blg. 129

AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER

Section 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980."

Section 2. Scope. – The reorganization herein provided shall include the Court of Appeals, the Court of First Instance, the Circuit
Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts,
and the Municipal Circuit Courts.

CHAPTER I
COURT OF APPEALS
Section 3. Organization. – There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which consists of a Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justice
who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment, and the
Associate Justice shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two
or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were issued by the President. Any
member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other position in the government shall retain the precedence
to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes, be
considered as continuous and uninterrupted. (as amended by Exec. Order No. 33,, July 28, 1986.)

Section 4. Exercise of powers and functions. – The Court Appeals shall exercise its powers, functions, and duties, through seventeen
(17) divisions, each composed of three (3) members. The Court may sit en banc only for the purpose of exercising administrative,
ceremonial, or other non-adjudicatory functions. (as amended by Exec. Order No. 33,.)

Section 5. Succession to Office of Presiding Justice. – In case of a vacancy in the absence of inability to perform the powers,
functions, and duties of his office, the associate Justice who is first in precedence shall perform his powers, functions, and duties
until such disability is removed, or another Presiding Justice is appointed and has qualified.

Section 6. Who presides over session of a division. – If the Presiding Justice is present in any session of a division of the Court, he
shall preside. In his absence, the Associate Justice attending such session who has precedence shall preside.

Section 7. Qualifications. – The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justice shall have the same qualifications as those provided in
Constitution for Justice of the Supreme Court.

Section 8. Grouping of Divisions. – (Expressly repealed by Section 4, Exec. Order No. 33, July 28, 1986.)

Section 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall Exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, Except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree
No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth
paragraph od Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
 14

The court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant
and conduct new trials or Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the
Chief Justice. (as amended by R.A. No. 7902.)

Section 10. Place of holding sessions. – The Court of Appeals shall have its permanent station in the City of Manila. Whenever
demanded by public interest, the Supreme Court, upon its own initiative or upon recommendation of the Presiding Justice, may
authorize a division of the Court to hold sessions outside Manila, periodically, or for such periods and at such places as the Supreme
Court may determine, for the purpose of hearing and deciding cases.

Section 11. Quorum – A majority of the actual members of the Court shall constitute a quorum for its session en banc. Three
members shall constitute a quorum for the session of a division. The unanimous vote of the three members of a division shall be
necessary for the pronouncement of a decision of final resolution, which shall be reached in consultation before the writing of the
opinion by any members of the division. In the event that the three members do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice
shall request the Raffle Committee of the Court for the designation of two additional Justice to sit temporarily with them, forming a
special division of five members and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision or final resolution. The designation of such additional Justice shall be made strictly by raffle.

A month for reconsideration of its decision or final resolution shall be resolved by the Court within ninety (90) days from the time it
is submitted for resolution, and no second motion for reconsideration from the same party shall be entertainment. (as amended by
Exec. Order No. 33, July 28, 1986.)

Section 12. Internal Rules. – The court en banc is authorized to promulgate rules or orders governing the constitution of the divisions
and the assignment of Appellate Justices thereto, the distribution of cases, and other matters pertaining to the operations of the
Court of its divisions. Copies of such rules and orders shall be furnished by the Supreme Court, which rules and orders shall be
effective fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, unless directed otherwise by the Supreme Court.

CHAPTER II
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. – There are hereby created thirteen (13) Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the
following judicial regions:
The First Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mountain Province, and
Pangasinan, and cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laog and San Carlos;
The Second Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Batanes, Cagayan, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao, Nueva Viscaya, and Quirino;
The Third Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan (except the municipality of valenzuela), Nueva Ecija,
Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales, and the cities of Angeles, Cabanatuan, Olongapo, Palayan and San Jose;
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the
municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and
Valenzuela;
The Fourth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque, Mindoro Occidental, Mindoro
Oriental, Palawan, Quezon, Rizal (except the cities and municipalities embraced within the National Capital Judicial Region0,
Romblon, and Aurora, and the cities of Batangas, Cavite, Lipa, Lucena, Puerto Princessa, San Pablo, Tagaytay, and Trece Martires;
The Fifth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Sur, Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate, and
Sorsogon, and the cities of Legaspi, Naga and Iriga;
The Sixth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, La Calota, Roxas, San Carlos, and Silay, and the
subprovince of Guimaras;
The Seventh Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Negros Oriental, and Siquijor, and the cities of Bais, Canlaon,
Cebu, Danao, Dumaguete, Lapu-lapu, Mandaue, Tagbilaran, and Toledo,
The Eighth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces or Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern, Samar, Southern Leyte, Ormoc, and
Tacloban:
The Ninth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Dapitan,
Dipolog, Pagadian, and Zamboanga;
The Tenth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis Occidental,
Misamis Oriental, and Surigao del Norte, and the cities of Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Gingoog, Ozamis, Oroquieta, Surigao, and
Tangub;
The Eleventh Judicial Region, consistingnof the provinces of Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, and
Surigao del Sur, and the cities of Davao, and General Santos; and
The Twelfth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Sultan
Kudarat, and the cities of Cotabato, Iligan, and Marawi.
In case of transfer or redistribution of the provinces, subprovinces, cities or municipalities comprising the regions established by law
of purposes of the administrative field organization of the various departments and agencies of the government, the composition of
the judicial regions herein constituted shall be deemed modified accordingly.
 15

Section 14. Regional Trial Courts.

Section 15. Qualifications. – No persons shall be appointed Regional Trial Judge unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
at least thirty-five years of age, and for at least ten years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held a
public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.

Section 16. Time and duration of sessions. – The time and duration of daily sessions of the Regional Trial Courts shall be determined
by the Supreme Court: Provided, however, That all motions, except those requiring immediate action, shall be heard in the
afternoon of every Friday, unless it falls on a holiday, in which case, the hearing shall be held on the afternoon of the next
succeeding business day: Provided, further, That the Supreme Court may, for good reasons, fix a different motion day in specified
areas

Section 17. Appointment and assignment of Regional Trial Judges. – Every Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which
shall be his permanent station, and his appointment shall state the branch of the court and the seat thereof to which he shall be
originally assigned. However, the Supreme Court may assign temporarily a Regional Trial Judge to another region as public interest
may require, provided that such temporary assignment shall not last longer than six (6) months without the consent of the Regional
Trial Judge concerned.

A Regional Trial Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city or municipality within the same region as public
interest may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station within the meaning of this section.

Section 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. – The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a
branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of
the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as
determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over the said branch may
exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to
the people of the different parts of the region and making the attendance of litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as possible.

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);

(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in such other
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)

Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.

Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
 16

(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced
in any part of their respective regions; and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.

Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be
decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be
appealable by petition for review to the

Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error
of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.

Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts
to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall
under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in
the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Section 24. Special Rules of Procedure. – Whenever a Regional Trial Court takes cognizance of juvenile and domestic relation cases
and/or agrarian cases, the special rules of procedure applicable under present laws to such cases shall continue to be applied, unless
subsequently amended by law or by rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court.

CHAPTER III
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

Section 25. Establishment of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. – There shall be
created a Metropolitan Trial Court in each metropolitan area established by law, a Municipal Trial Court in each of the other cities or
municipalities, and a Municipal Circuit Trial Court in each circuit comprising such cities and/or municipalities as are grouped together
pursuant to law.

Section 26. Qualifications. – No person shall be appointed judge of a Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 30 years of age, and, for at least five years, has been
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines, or has held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of
law as an indispensable requisite.

Section 27. Metropolitan Trial Courts of the National Capital Region. – There shall be a Metropolitan Trial Court in the National
Capital Region, to be known as the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, which shall be composed of eighty-two (82) branches.
There shall be:

Section 28. Other Metropolitan Trial Courts. – The Supreme Court shall constitute Metropolitan Trial Courts in such other
metropolitan areas as may be established by law whose territorial jurisdiction shall be co-extensive with the cities and municipalities
comprising the metropolitan area.

Every Metropolitan Trial Judge shall be appointed to a metropolitan area which shall be his permanent station and his appointment
shall state branch of the court and the seat thereof to which he shall be originally assigned. A Metropolitan Trial Judge may be
assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch within said metropolitan area as the interest of justice may require, and such
assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station within the meaning of this section.

Section 29. Municipal Trial Courts in cities. – In every city which does not form part of a metropolitan area, there shall be a Municipal
Trial Court with one branch, except as hereunder provided:

Section 30. Municipal Trial Courts. – In each of the municipalities that are not comprised within a metropolitan area and a municipal
circuit there shall be a Municipal Trial Court which shall have one branch, except as hereunder provided:

Two branches each for Antipolo and Binangonan, both in Rizal.

Section 31. Municipal Circuit Trial Court. – There shall be a Municipal Circuit Trial Court in each area defined as a municipal circuit,
comprising one or more cities and/or one or more municipalities. The municipalities comprising municipal circuits as organized
under Administrative Order No. 33, issued on June 13, 1978 by the Supreme Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537, are
hereby constituted as municipal circuits for purposes of the establishment of the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the appointment
thereto of Municipal Circuit Trial Judges: Provided, however, That the Supreme Court may, as the interests of justice may require,
further reorganize the said courts taking into account workload, geographical location, and such other factors as will contribute to a
 17

rational allocation thereof, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 537 which shall be applicable insofar as they are
not inconsistent with this Act.

Every Municipal Circuit Trial Judge shall be appointed to a municipal circuit which shall be his official station.

The Supreme Court shall determine the city or municipality where the Municipal Circuit Trial Court shall hold sessions.

Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. –
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses
or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage
to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (as amended by R.A, No. 7691)

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional
remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between
the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)

Section 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases
covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots the where the value of which does not exceed One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in
these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)

Section 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. – In the absence of all the Regional Trial Judges in a province or city, any
Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Judge may hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus or applications for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where the absent Regional Trial Judges sit.

Section 36. Summary procedures in special cases. – In Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts with at least two
branches, the Supreme Court may designate one or more branches thereof to try exclusively forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases, those involving violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, violations of the rental law, and such other cases requiring
summary disposition as the Supreme Court may determine. The Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or procedures applicable to
such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical rules. Such
simplified procedures may provide that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the
periods for filing pleadings shall be non-extendible.

Section 37. Preliminary investigation. – Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts, except those in the National Capital Region, of Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall have authority to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes alleged to have
been committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions which are cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts.
 18

The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 1, paragraphs (a), (b), (c),
and (d), of Presidential Decree No. 911: Provided, however, That if after the preliminary investigation the Judge finds a prima facie
case, he shall forward the records of the case to the Provincial/City Fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information with the
proper court.

No warrant of arrest shall be issued by the Judge in connection with any criminal complaint filed with him for preliminary
investigation, unless after an examination in writing and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, he finds
that a probable cause exists.

Any warrant of arrest issued in accordance herewith may be served anywhere in the Philippines.

Section 38. Judgments and processes. –

(1) All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing, stating clearly the facts and the law on which they were based,
signed by the Judge and filed with the Clerk of Court. Such judgment shall be appealable to the Regional Trial Courts in accordance
with the procedure now prescribed by law for appeals to the Court of First Instance, by the provisions of this Act, and by such rules
as the Supreme Court may hereafter prescribe.

(2) All processes issued by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in cases falling
within their jurisdiction, may be served anywhere in the Philippines without the necessity of certification by the Judge of the
Regional Trial Court.

CHAPTER IV
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases
shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from:
Provided however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment
appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages
prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under
applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.

Section 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. – Every decision of final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and
distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which it is based, which may be contained in the decision or final
resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed from.

Section 41. Salaries. – Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal Trial Judges, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the
guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1597.

Section 42. Longevity pay. – A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and
Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary;
Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary
of the Justice or Judge next in rank.

Section 43. Staffing pattern. – The Supreme Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the
effectivity of this Act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing
order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately succeeding section.

Section 44. Transitory provisions. – The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order
to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts
shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as
declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents
thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted
pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel.

The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the appropriate courts constituted pursuant to this Act, to be
augmented as may be necessary from the funds for organizational changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said funding shall
thereafter be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
 19

Section 45. Shari'a Courts. – Shari'a Courts to be constituted as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the
"Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines," shall be included in the funding appropriations so provided in this Act.

Section 46. Gratuity of judges and personnel separated from office. – All members of the judiciary and subordinate employees who
shall be separated from office by reason of the reorganization authorized herein, shall be granted a gratuity at a rate equivalent to
one month's salary for every year of continuous service rendered in any branch of the government or equivalent nearest fraction
thereof favorable to them on the basis of the highest salary received: Provided, That such member of the judiciary or employee shall
have the option to retire under the Judiciary Retirement Law or general retirement law, if he has met or satisfied the requirements
therefor.

Section 47. Repealing clause. – The provisions of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, of
Republic Act No. 5179 as amended, of the Rules of Court, and of all other statutes, letters of instructions and general order or parts
thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly modified.

Section 48. Date of Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect immediately.

LICERIO A. ANTIPORDA v. FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, GR No. 133289, 1999-12-23

Facts:

Accused... were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos in an Information... filed with the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan... the Court issued an order giving the prosecution... thirty (30) days within which to submit the amendment to the
Information.
The prosecution on even date complied with the said order and filed an Amended Information, which was admitted by the
Sandiganbayan... the accused filed... a Motion to Quash the Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The Sandiganbayan denied
The petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because the original information did
not allege that one of the petitioners... took advantage of his position as mayor of Buguey, Cagayan... lacking jurisdiction a court can
not order the amendment of the information.

Issues:

CAN THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACQUIRE SUCH JURISDICTION BY THE SIMPLE EXPEDIENT OF AMENDING THE INFORMATION
CAN THE AMENDED INFORMATION BE ALLOWED WITHOUT CONDUCTING ANEW A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Ruling:

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise

Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving... offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office... when they filed a motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Court's authority.

the voluntary appearance of the accused at the pre-suspension hearing amounted to his submission to the court's jurisdiction even if
no warrant of arrest has yet been issued.

The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It
was only after the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted... therein.

However... the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to
motion for reconsideration... it was they who

"challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the
said crime is work connected... therefore... the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was thus
vested with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.

The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
pleads... the reinvestigation is not necessary anymore

A reinvestigation is proper only if the accused's substantial rights would be impaired... we do not find that their rights would be
unduly prejudiced if the Amended Information is filed without a... reinvestigation
 20

The amendments made to the Information merely describe the public positions held by the accused... a preliminary investigation is
essentially inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information.

It is not a trial of... the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause... the absence in the information... of an allegation that petitioner had committed the offense
charged in relation to his office is immaterial and easily remedied.

the amendment may be made before the Sandiganbayan without surprising the petitioner or prejudicing his substantive rights.

Principles:

a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

Union Bank, Tomas vs People GR 192565

Facts:

Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Then, she was charged of deliberately violating Article
183 of the RPC (perjury) “by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she
did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency”. The Certification was
notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay City, while the Information against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in
Makati.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City Court (where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged
Tomas with perjury.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v.
Bildner which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.

Issue:

Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati City, where the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.

Held:

The SC denied the petition and held that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the
perjury case against the petitioners.

The criminal charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the
applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who “makes
an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires.” The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the
statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, SC held that its ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule
110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and
swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is
committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the
testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
 21

civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where
the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

Gimenez vs. Nazareno

Facts:
On 3 August 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and Teodoro de la Vega, Jr., were
charged with the crime of murder. The accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following
the arraignment, the judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for 18 September 1973 at 1:00 p.m. All the accused
were duly informed of this. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the de la Vega escaped from his detention center and on
the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (Fiscal Celso M. Gimenez and Federico B.
Mercado) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the accused praying that de la
Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Pursuant to the above-written
provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave de ala Vega the opportunity to take the witness
stand the moment he shows up in court. After due trial, or on 6 November 1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the
case against the other five accused (Suan, et. al.) while holding in abeyance the proceedings against de la Vega. On 16 November
1973, Gimenez and Mercado filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the dispositive portion of the court's decision on the
ground that it will render
nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order
dated 22 November 1973. Gimenez and Mercado filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether judgment upon an accused tried should be in abeyance pending the appearance of the accused before the court.

Held: The second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that a "trial in absentia" may be had when the
following requisites are present:
(1) that there has been an arraignment
(2) that the accused has been notified;
(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.

Herein, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. De la Vega was arraigned on 22 August 1973 and in the
said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this
is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter that
de la Vega escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was
given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified.
The lower court correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence of
de la Vega, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to de la Vega and rendered a decision as to the other accused only.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not
wait for the time until the accused who escape from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and cross-
examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional
provision on trial in absentia. Still, the accused remain to be presumed innocent, a judgment of conviction must still be based upon
the evidence presented in court, and such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. There can be no violation of
due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice,
he virtually waived the rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. Thus, an escapee who has been duly tried in
absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against
him.

Doctrine:
 22

The trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should have been brought to its ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial
court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment
accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitives’ re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who testified against them

David vs. Agbay G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application
despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225

FACTS: Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement, petitioner and his
wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential
house. However, the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone. Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous
Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own
land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. The CENRO rejected
petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which
was void ab initio. An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued
against the petitioner. Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed before
he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Petitioner
elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The
petition was denied.

DECISION: Denied

RATIO DECIDENDI: Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs
to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization
in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the
required oath of allegiance. For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not
necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats
those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became
foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of
which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity. Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA,
a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian
citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was
among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his
dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document
under Article 172, paragraph 1.

People vs Benipayo GR No. 154473

Fact:
On January 31, 2002 Respondent, then Chairman of the Commission on Elections delivered a speech in a “Forum on Electoral
Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines” and was subsequently published in Manila Bulletin. Petitioner corporation,
believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint for
libel.

On March 13, 2002, respondent, was a guest of the talk show televised nationwide. In that episode, the respondent said statement
which Petitioner considered as defamatory, and, through its authorized representative, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for libel.

Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor in both
cases.

On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged Order dismissing the Cases and while the RTC found that respondent was no
longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office—he delivered the
speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the
 23

exclusion of all other courts. On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with
jurisdiction to hear the libel case. Aggrieved, Hence this case.

Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all other courts.

Held:
Yes, declare herein that the law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written
defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of
a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or modification, the
specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by similar means. The grant
to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction
of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the
offense is committed in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8249, cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the RTC. Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it is
unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached
by the trial court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and
deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error.

MANUEL S. ISIP v. PEOPLE, GR NO. 170298, 2007-06-26

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before Branch XVII of the RTC of Cavite City... on or about March 7,
1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines... accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven carat diamond (men's
ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the... purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale
thereof or return the jewelry if not sold... but the herein accused once in possession of the above-described articles, with intent to
defraud and with grave abuse... of confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert the same to his own personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the
return of the jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds... of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the
aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency.

Later, appellants learned that, although all the transactions were entered into in Manila, complainant filed the cases herein before
the Cavite Regional

Trial Court... accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. However, in Crim.
Case No. 136-84, he is hereby found guilty of Estafa... petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following
as errors

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND DECIDING THE CASES AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE
SAME UPON THE GROUND THAT NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED THEREIN WAS COMMITTED
WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE IMPUTED TO PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS
CONVICTED

Ruling:

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional.[14] The place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.[15] It is... a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal... cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus,
it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
 24

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that
the offense... was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the same to be in order.

MONDEJAR VS. MARINO

Not Cited Recently
FIRST DIVISION A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349, July 12, 2001 BERNADETTE MONDEJAR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN,
MTCC, TACLOBAN CITY BRANCH 1, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

In a sworn letter complaint dated May 31, 1999, complainant Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC, Tacloban
City, Branch 1, with gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity and grave misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 98-
07-CR-133 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar and Arlette Mondejar" for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
She alleged that respondent judge issued a "hold departure order" against her on October 23, 1998 in violation of Supreme Court
Circular No. 39-97 which provides that "hold departure orders" shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts. She further alleged that respondent judge did not give her an opportunity to be heard before issuing the
questioned order.

When required to comment on the matter, respondent judge admitted having issued said order because he was not aware of the
Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97. He alleged that he was not furnished a copy of the circular and managed to secure a copy only
after he instructed his legal researcher to get one from the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. Accordingly,
on April 14, 1997, he issued an order lifting and setting aside the hold departure order dated October 23, 1998. As regards the issue
of denial of due process, respondent judge averred that complainant and her counsel were duly notified of the scheduled hearing
but neither appeared on said date.

The Court Administrator after finding that respondent judge erred in issuing the assailed "hold departure order," recommended that
he be severely reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

The recommendation of the Court Administrator is well-taken.

Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts.
Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that "hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts." Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do
not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the part of respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case.

Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be "faithful to the law and maintain professional competence."
The Court, in exercising administrative supervision of all lower courts, has not been remised in reminding the members of the bench
to exert due diligence in keeping abreast with the development in law and jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new
circular. It was circularized in 1997 and violation of which has been accordingly dealt with in numerous cases before the Court.
 25

Herein judge, therefore, cannot be excused for his infraction. Judges should always be vigilant in their quest for new developments
in the law so they could discharge their duties and functions with zeal and fervor.

In recent cases,[1] involving similar violations, this Court imposed the penalty of reprimand on erring judges. Hence, the same
penalty should be imposed on respondent judge.

WHEREFORE, Judge Marino S. Buban is hereby REPRIMANDED with the warning that a repetition of the same and similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

Facts:

Petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr and Danny Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel. Upon arraignment, they were assisted by counsel
de parte and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial thereafter ensued, finding both of them guilty. Petitioners moved for
recon but was denied. Dissatisfied, they appealed to CA who affirmed in toto the RTC decision. They then filed a motion for recon
which CA denied. In their petition to the SC, petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them with libel
did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.

Issue: WON the RTC of Iloilo City had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged.

Held: SC ruled on the negative. The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the
offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation: The criminal action and civil action for damages in
cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first
instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense:

The allegations in the Information that “Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and
throughout the region” only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish
that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information,
and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that
the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set
aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.
 26

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1662 June 8, 2007

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-1858-P]

AURORA E. BALAJEDEONG, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE DEOGRACIAS K. DEL ROSARIO, MCTC, PATNONGON, ANTIQUE, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint1 filed by Aurora E. Balajedeong (Balajedeong), against Judge Deogracias K. Del Rosario (Judge Del
Rosario), Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Patnongon, Antique, for Grave Misconduct; Conduct
Unbecoming a Judge, and Delay in the Disposition of a Case, relative to Civil Case No. 367 entitled, "Paterno Colago v. Sps. Willy and
Salvacion Odi," pending before said court.

Complainant Balajedeong is the attorney-in-fact of Paterno Colago, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 367, filed against the Spouses Odi
for Forcible Entry with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order before the MCTC, Patnongon, Antique, presided over by
respondent Judge Del Rosario. She narrated that after a preliminary conference was held on 12 May 2003, the parties were ordered
by respondent Judge Del Rosario to submit their respective position papers within 10 days. Colago, through his representative and
herein complainant Balajedeong, allegedly filed his position paper on 24 June 2003, while Spouses Odi failed to do so. On 13
February 2004, Colago’s counsel filed a Motion for Early Decision, but despite said motion, respondent Judge Del Rosario never
entertained his plea.

In his Comment2 dated 26 July 2006, respondent Judge Del Rosario claims that Spouses Odi submitted their memorandum on 2 June
2003, while Colago through his representative and herein complainant Balajedeong, submitted his position paper on 30 June 2003.
Respondent Judge Del Rosario admits that the delay in the disposition of the subject case is due mainly to his failing health as he
claims that sometime in July 2003 and September 2003, he had been hospitalized due to heart ailment and was advised to undergo
by-pass operation. Thereafter, he was hospitalized several times more. Respondent Judge Del Rosario further states that there was a
time when he was assigned as Presiding Judge of the 4th MCTC, Barbaza, Antique where he reported twice a week to conduct trial
and preliminary examination. Respondent Judge Del Rosario further informs this Court that Civil Case No. 367, subject matter of this
instant administrative complaint, was already decided on 15 June 2006.

On 24 November 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its report,3 recommending that -

This instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter, and respondent Judge, in view of the
previous cases where he was sanctioned to pay fines, be penalized to pay a FINE in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with even more severely.
 27

On 15 January 2007, we required4 the parties herein to manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing to submit the matter
for resolution based on the pleadings filed.

On 16 February 2007, complainant Balajedeong submitted her manifestation5 stating that she was submitting the case for resolution
based on the pleadings filed.

Respondent Judge Del Rosario failed to file his manifestation despite notice sent to and received by him.

Resultantly, the case is submitted for decision based on the pleadings filed.

We agree with the recommendation of the Court Administrator except in the penalty imposed.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.6

The office of the judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of official
duties.7 Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must be decided or
resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for decision or resolution. Moreover, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, directs judges to "dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." Judges
must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the integrity, competence, and independence of the
judiciary and make the administration of justice more efficient.8 Time and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe this
duty so as not to negate our efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long
plagued our courts. Finally, Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the
disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts, to wit:

6. PROMPTNESS

He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.

7. PUNCTUALITY

He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of
value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice.

Also relevant is Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1988, which requires all magistrates to observe scrupulously the
periods prescribed in Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution, and to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters
pending before their courts.

With respect to cases falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure, first-level courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt
of the last affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render judgment.9

Section 10 of the Rules on Summary Procedure explicitly provides:

SEC.10. Rendition of judgment. – Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of
the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.

Clearly, respondent Judge Del Rosario failed to decide the aforementioned case within the thirty-day period prescribed by the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Herein complainant Balajedeong, on behalf of her principal Colago, and the Spouses Odi,
parties in Civil Case No. 357, allegedly filed their position papers in June 2003; thus, respondent Judge Del Rosario had thirty days
thereafter to render a decision. But the decision was rendered only on 15 June 2006 or almost three years later. Respondent Judge
Del Rosario’s act is contrary to the rationale behind the Rules on Summary Procedure which was promulgated for the purpose of
achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases."10 For this reason, respondent Judge Del Rosario should be
administratively sanctioned. As held in Sanchez v. Vestil11 :

This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that
justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary.
Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitute gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction on them.
 28

Indeed, we have consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the principle that
justice delayed is justice denied. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious
violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.12

We cannot overstress this policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the
erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards.13 Failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reason, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative
sanction on the defaulting judge.14

Respondent Judge Del Rosario ascribes the delay in the resolution of Civil Case No. 367 to his failing health, as he was hospitalized
several times due to heart ailment. Even if he was stricken by an illness which hampered the due performance of his duties, still it
was incumbent upon respondent Judge Del Rosario to inform this Court of his inability to seasonably decide the cases assigned to
him. His illness should not be an excuse for his failure to render the corresponding decision or resolution within the prescribed
period. While we sympathize with his woes, the demands of public service cannot abide by his illness.15 In case of poor health, the
Judge concerned needs only to ask this Court for an extension of time to decide cases, as soon as it becomes clear to him that there
would be delay in his disposition of his cases.16 We note that respondent Judge Del Rosario made no such request. Also, if his health
problems had indeed severely impaired his ability to decide cases, respondent Judge Del Rosario could have retired voluntarily
instead of remaining at his post to the detriment of the litigants and the public.

Respondent Judge Del Rosario also presented as an excuse to the delay in deciding Civil Case No. 367 the additional work given to
him when he was assigned as Presiding Judge of the 4th MCTC, Barbaza, Antique, where he reported twice a week to conduct trials
and preliminary examinations. This will not exonerate him. His failure to decide the case on time cannot be ignored. As we ruled in
Española v. Panay,17 if the case load of the judge prevents the disposition of cases within the reglementary periods, again, he should
ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the cases involved. This is to avoid or dispel any suspicion that
something sinister or corrupt is going on. The records of this administrative matter do not show that any attempt was made by
respondent Judge Del Rosario to make such a request. Instead, he preferred to keep the case pending, enshrouding the same in his
silence.

Respondent Judge Del Rosario should have known that if his caseload, additional assignments or designations, health reasons or
other factors prevented the timely disposition of his pending cases, all he had to do was to simply ask this Court for a reasonable
extension of time to dispose of his cases. The Court, cognizant of the heavy case load of some judges and mindful of the difficulties
encountered by them in the disposition thereof, is almost always disposed to grant such requests on meritorious grounds.18 But for
all his excuses, respondent Judge Del Rosario failed to file any motion for extension despite the availability of this remedy.

It must be noted also that respondent Judge Del Rosario was already penalized for his first offense involving undue delay in A.M. No.
MTJ-96-1091. He should have known better than to simply let the reglementary period pass by again in another case.

All told, we find respondent Judge Del Rosario guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision in Civil Case No. 367 which, under
Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, is classified as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, the
penalty for such charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three
months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

In the Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 29 and 59, Toledo City,19 the Court observed the following
factors in the determination of the proper penalty for failure to decide a case on time:

We have always considered the failure of a judge to decide a case within ninety (90) days as gross inefficiency and imposed either
fine or suspension from service without pay for such. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases
not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, to wit: the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances- the
damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, etc. x x x.

As may be gleaned from the case above-quoted, several factors shall be considered in imposing the proper penalty, such as: the
presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age
of the judge, etc.

In the present case, the delay for which respondent Judge Del Rosario is being found liable pertains to only one case, Civil Case No.
367. There are the mitigating circumstances of his admission of his fault to decide the case on time, and his failing health. While we
recognize respondent Judge Del Rosario’s heavy case load and his poor health, such factors cannot exonerate him from his
administrative liability. They can only serve to mitigate the imposable penalty.

As heretofore cited, records show that he was previously penalized in A.M. No. MTJ-96-1091,20 and was fined P8,000.00 with
warning, for not deciding a criminal case despite the lapse of three years, despite his reason for the inaction being that he personally
believed that he could not decide a case which was heard by another judge.
 29

In A.M. No. MTJ-03-1515-MTJ,21 respondent Judge Del Rosario was found administratively liable for his unjustified failure to
comment on an administrative complaint against him, and was fined P21,000.00. In A.M. No. MTJ-94-949,22 he was fined P5,000.00
with warning for Gross Misconduct and Negligence for his refusal to comply with the directives of the OCA and of the Commission on
Audit.

In the present case, the fine of P30,000.00 recommended by the OCA is, to our mind, too severe. We find the amount of P20,000.00
reasonable under the premises.

As we have often stressed, the judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. Thus, he must be the
first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid committing even
the slightest infraction of the Rules.23

WHEREFORE, Judge Deogracias K. Del Rosario is found guilty of undue delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 367 and is hereby
ordered to pay a FINE of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal records. The Court Administrator is directed to
furnish all concerned copies of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

493 Phil. 356

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Judge Henry B. Avelino of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Pontevedra-Panay, Pontevedra, Capiz, was charged[1] by
Manuel B. Arcenas with gross inefficiency for failure to decide an ejectment case within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days.

Complainant Arcenas is the attorney-in-fact of Demetrio Arcenas and Leah Arcenas, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 391 for Unlawful
Detainer and Damages. He narrated that defendants therein spouses Manolo and Rosemarie Amador, were served with summons
requiring them to file their answer within ten (10) days which they failed to do so.[2]

On 21 June 2001, respondent Judge issued an Order directing the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Capiz,
to conduct a relocation survey to determine the extent of the twenty (20) meters reservation for public easement as noted in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21277 in order to ascertain the exact location of the house of the defendants.

Respondent Judge issued on 22 August 2001 another order[3] directing the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in
coordination with the DENR, to conduct a relocation survey, to determine anew the metes and bounds of the twenty (20) meters
public easement.

On 05 May 2003, Jurlie D. Zubiaga, Chief, Survey Party of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) for Capiz,
filed a Commissioner's Report dated 14 April 2003. Dissatisfied, respondent Judge, together with May D. Baldomar, the court
stenographer, Julius Abella, Engineer II, DPWH-Capiz Engineering District of Roxas City, Ana Desales, a casual of DPWH, Roxas City,
Elmer Acolentaba, Carthographer-Surveyman of the DENR, Roxas City, and plaintiff Manuel Arcenas, proceeded to the place and
conducted an ocular inspection on 18 June 2003.

On 17 November 2003, plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Motion[4] to Render Judgment pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. Respondent Judge did not act on the motion.

On 16 March 2004, plaintiffs filed another motion[5] to remind respondent Judge of his failure to decide the case. Up to the time of
filing of this administrative case, respondent Judge has not rendered any judgment.

On 02 July 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required[6] respondent Judge to comment within ten (10) days from
receipt of notice.

In his comment dated 31 August 2004, respondent Judge admitted that he knew that the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
provides that if no answer has been filed, the court, motu proprio, or upon motion of the accused, shall render judgment within
ten (10) days. Respondent Judge, however, argued that since plaintiffs' title contains a 20-meter public easement reservation, he
 30

sought the assistance of other government entities, i.e., the DENR, the DPWH, and the PENRO, to determine if defendants' house is
within the lot of plaintiffs and within the 20-meter public easement. He claims that if defendants' house is inside said public
easement, he would be exceeding his authority if he will immediately rule on the ownership thereon. He added that because he was
not satisfied with the reports on the surveys he ordered, he personally conducted his own ocular inspection. His inspection revealed
that defendants' house was not within the plaintiffs' titled property but was within the twenty meters public easement. He
concluded that plaintiffs filed the two motions to render judgment because they knew of the adverse result of the ocular inspection
he conducted. Respondent Judge also reasoned out the additional workloads in other courts and lack of typewriters, as cause of
delay in deciding the case. He disclosed that he already rendered judgment on the case on 07 May 2004 and the records thereof
have already been transmitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Roxas City.

On 05 January 2005, the OCA submitted its report,[7] recommending -

. . . that this case be redocketed as a regular administrative matter and that the respondent be found guilty of undue delay in the
rendition of judgment. For this he should be SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for a period of TWO (2)
MONTHS and warned that a repetition of the same or the commission of another violation of Rule 140, will be dealt with more
severely.
We agree in the recommendation of the Court Administrator.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[8]

The rules require courts to decide cases submitted for decision generally within three (3) months from the date of such submission.
[9] With respect to cases falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure, first level courts are only allowed thirty (30) days following
the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render
judgment.[10] Moreover, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge shall dispose of the court's
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.[11]

Section 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure clearly provides:

SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court,
motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and
attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable.
In the case at bar, respondent Judge failed to render judgment after defendants failed to file their answer (which he duly
acknowledged in his Order dated 26 June 2001) or even after PENRO officer, Dionisio S. Molina, Jr., filed his report[12] or even after
the two (2) motions dated 17 November 2003[13] and 16 March 2004[14] filed by plaintiffs requesting him to render judgment. It
took respondent Judge almost three (3) years, counted from the time of his knowledge that defendants failed to file answer or on 27
May 2004 to finally dispose of the case.

Respondent Judge's act of seeking assistance from other government agencies in order to justify the delay will not excuse him from
complying with Section 10 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Section 10 of the Rules on Summary Procedure explicitly
provides:
SEC.10. Rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the
period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.

However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying
the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days
from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits, or
the expiration of the period for filing the same.

The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the rendition of the judgment.
The above-quoted rule allows the court to clarify matters if the same is necessary, in the manner provided therein. The respondent
Judge starkly deviated from the required procedure and instead conducted his own inspection after the agency submitted its report.
There is no logic behind the respondent Judge's act of seemingly taking up the cudgels for the defendants. There was already a
report submitted by the PENRO officer who, without doubt, is more knowledgeable on the issue of whether or not defendants'
house is within the public easement.

Clearly, respondent Judge failed to decide the aforementioned case within the thirty-day period prescribed by the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure. Respondent Judge's act is contrary to the rationale of the Rules on Summary Procedure, which in particular,
was promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases."[15] For this reason, he
should be administratively sanctioned. As held in Sanchez v. Vestil:[16]
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that
justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary.
 31

Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitute gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction on them.
Respondent Judge also attempted to excuse the delay by citing his duties in the courts of Panitan, Maayon, Pres. Roxas-Pilar,
Mambusao, Sigma-Sapian-Jamindan, and Dumalag-Dao-Ivisan, Capiz. This will not exonerate him. His inaction to decide the case on
time cannot be ignored. As ruled in Espanola v. Panay,[17] if the caseload of the judge prevents the disposition of cases within the
reglementary periods, he should ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the cases involved. This is to avoid
or dispel any suspicion that something sinister or corrupt is going on. The records of this administrative matter do not show that any
attempt was made by respondent Judge to make such a request. Instead, he preferred to keep the case pending, enshrouding the
same by his silence.

All told, we find respondent Judge guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision which, under Section 9(1),[18] Rule 140, of the
Revised Rules of Court, is classified as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more
than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.[19] In the Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 29 and 59, Toledo
City,[20] the Court observed the factors considered in the determination of the proper penalty for failure to decide a case on time:
We have always considered the failure of a judge to decide a case within ninety (90) days as gross inefficiency and imposed either
fine or suspension from service without pay for such. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases
not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, to wit: the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances- the
damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, etc.
In the present case, there is a mitigating circumstance of admission by respondent Judge of his fault to decide the case on time, and
the aggravating circumstance of undue damage to the complainant caused by the delay. Thus, the recommendation of two (2)
months suspension by the OCA is proper.

WHEREFORE, Judge Henry B. Avelino is found guilty of gross inefficiency and is hereby ordered to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to his personal records.

SO ORDERED.
ALBERTO SIBULO, complainant,
vs.
Judge LORINDA B. TOLEDO-MUPAS, Municipal Trial Court, Dasmariñas, Cavite, respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.
This is an administrative case for abuse of authority against respondent Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas, who, as of now, has already
been dismissed from service.

The Facts
In his verified complaint-affidavit received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on January 18, 2007, Alberto Sibulo
charged MTC Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas with abuse of authority.
Complainant alleged that he is the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 06-0402 to 03 for Grave Threat and Slight Physical Injuries, which
are pending before respondent's court; that on August 9, 2006, respondent directed complainant to submit his counter-affidavit
within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order1 and set the case for "conference" on October 11, 2006; that as the parties failed to
amicably settle, the case was submitted for resolution; and that on October 25, 2006, respondent set the case for arraignment after
finding probable cause to indict complainant of the crimes charged. Complainant asserted that respondent, being a judge of a first
level court, no longer had authority to conduct preliminary investigation under Rules 112 and 114 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended.

On February 27, 2007, respondent filed her Comment praying for the summary dismissal of the complaint. She argued that even
with the amendment of Rules 112 and 114 the cases against complainant are still within the jurisdiction of the MTC, considering that
the crimes involved are Grave Threats and Slight Physical Injuries which are defined and penalized by Articles 282 and 266,
respectively, of the Revised Penal Code, and governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure which no longer requires the conduct of
preliminary investigation. Respondent claimed that complainant is merely using this administrative complaint to evade his own
liability on the pending criminal cases.

The OCA Findings

In its August 28, 2007 Report, the OCA noted that the criminal cases filed against complainant are indeed covered by the provisions
of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. However, it found that respondent did not observe Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the
Rule which provide that after the accused has submitted his counter-affidavit and the judge found reasonable ground to hold him for
trial, the court should set the case for arraignment and, thereafter, conduct a preliminary conference before trial proper. "Basic" and
"elementary" as the rules are, the OCA opined that respondent displayed gross ignorance of the law and procedure when she
conducted the conference before complainant was arraigned.
 32

Also, the OCA considered that this administrative matter is not the first time for respondent since she had already been previously
sanctioned in: Español v. Mupas (A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 13), where she was meted a fine of P21,000
for gross ignorance of the law and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct; Loss of Court Exhibits at MTC-Dasmariñas, Cavite (A.M.
No. MTJ-03-1491, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 313), where she was suspended for three (3) months without pay for gross misconduct
and gross ignorance of the law; Bitoon v. Toledo-Mupas (A.M. No. MTJ-05-1598, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 17), where she was again
suspended for three (3) months without salary and benefits and fined in the amount of P40,000 for gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence;2 and in Español v. Toledo-Mupas (A.M. No. MTJ-03-1462, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 403), where she was finally
ordered dismissed from service for gross ignorance of the law. Hence, it was proposed that respondent be ordered to pay a fine in
the amount of P40,000, to be deducted from whatever benefits are due her.

The Court's Ruling

As correctly pointed out by complainant, judges of first level courts are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.
This is pursuant to the amendment made by this Court on August 30, 2005 in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC Re: Amendment of Rules 112 and
114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by Removing the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation from Judges of the First Level
Courts, which took effect on October 3, 2005.3

Even so, the determination of whether respondent judge has authority to conduct preliminary investigation in the criminal cases
filed against complainant is not decisive in the resolution of this administrative case. As the OCA fittingly observed, the Rules on
Summary Procedure govern the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Said Rules state:

Sec. 12. Duty of court. -

(a) If commenced by complaint. - On the basis of the complaint and the affidavits and other evidence accompanying the same, the
court may dismiss the case outright for being patently without basis or merit and order the release of the accused if in custody.
(b) If commenced by information. - When the case is commenced by information, or is not dismissed pursuant to the next preceding
paragraph, the court shall issue an order which, together with copies of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the
prosecution, shall require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as any evidence in his
behalf, serving copies thereof on the complainant or prosecutor not later than ten (10) days from receipt of said order. The
prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after receipt of the counter-affidavits of the defense.

Sec. 13. Arraignment and trial. - Should the court, upon a consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits submitted
by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise, the court
shall set the case for arraignment and trial.

If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be immediately arraigned and if he enters a plea of guilty, he shall
forthwith be sentenced.

Sec. 14. Preliminary conference. - Before conducting the trial, the court shall call the parties to a preliminary conference during
which a stipulation of facts may be entered into, or the propriety of allowing the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense
may be considered, or such other matters may be taken up to clarify the issues and to ensure a speedy disposition of the case.
However, no admission by the accused shall be used against him unless reduced to writing and signed by the accused and his
counsel. A refusal or failure to stipulate shall not prejudice the accused.

Sec. 15. Procedure of trial. - At the trial, the affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the
witnesses who executed the same. Witnesses who testified may be subjected to cross-examination, redirect or re-cross examination.
Should the affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not be considered as competent evidence for the party presenting the affidavit, but
the adverse party may utilize the same for any admissible purpose.

Except in rebuttal or surrebuttal, no witness shall be allowed to testify unless his affidavit was previously submitted to the court in
accordance with Section 12 hereof.

However, should a party desire to present additional affidavits or counter-affidavits as part of his direct evidence, he shall so
manifest during the preliminary conference, stating the purpose thereof. If allowed by the court, the additional affidavits of the
prosecution or the counter-affidavits of the defense shall be submitted to the court and served on the adverse party not later than
three (3) days after the termination of the preliminary conference. If the additional affidavits are presented by the prosecution, the
accused may file his counter-affidavits and serve the same on the prosecution within three (3) days from such service.

Hence, the order of respondent for complainant to submit his counter-affidavit is but proper. The directive should not be taken as a
requirement of preliminary investigation but one simply intended to comply with the provisions of the Rules that state that the
affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same and that failure to
submit the same would not allow any witness to testify, except by way of rebuttal or surrebuttal.

In this case, however, respondent committed an error not subject of the complaint. As the OCA found, instead of conducting the
preliminary conference after arraignment and prior to trial, respondent held the conference before complainant was arraigned. To
 33

the OCA, this constitutes gross ignorance of the law considering that the rule itself is "basic" and "elementary"; hence, deserving of a
fine amounting to P40,000.

The Court does not agree.

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official
duties must not only be found to be erroneous but must be established to have been done with bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or
some similar motive.4 In this case, the record is wanting in any showing that respondent was moved by wrongful, improper or
unlawful conduct in setting the preliminary conference before the accused was arraigned. Complainant failed to substantiate any
bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose that may have been present at the time the mistaken procedure was carried out by respondent.

Moreover, the fact that a judge failed to recognize a "basic" or "elementary" law or rule of procedure would not automatically
warrant a conclusion that he is liable for gross ignorance. What is significant is whether the subject order, decision or actuation of
the judge unreasonably defeated the very purpose of the law or rule under consideration and unfairly prejudiced the cause of the
litigants. This was not present here. Note that even if the conference was held prior to the arraignment of complainant, the
resolution of respondent finding probable cause against him was issued on October 25, 2006, or just a little over a month after he
filed his counter-affidavit on September 22, 2006. Thus, no remarkable delay in the proceedings resulted. Further, no substantial
injury was caused to the accused or to the private complainant in the criminal cases.

In light of these, the Court holds that an order to pay a fine of P40,000 would not be commensurate to the error of respondent. A
penalty of reprimand would be sufficient for the mistake. Considering, however, respondent's severance from judicial service as of
last year, such penalty no longer finds relevance.

This ruling does not grant tolerance to non-compliance with the rules of procedure. The Court even now strongly reiterates that
incumbent judges should relentlessly be mindful that the Rules on Summary Procedure were issued for the purpose of achieving "an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases"5 and were espoused primarily to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to
the speedy disposition of cases;6 hence, strict adherence to their letter and intent should at all times be earnestly observed.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint is DISMISSED.

CAPT. SALVADOR BERNALDEZ (ret.), Complainant,
vs.
Judge HENRY B. AVELINO and Clerk of Court GUILLERMO E. ACOLOLA, Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Panay-Pontevedra,
Pontevedra, Capiz, Respondents.
CORONA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint1 for abuse of authority against respondents Judge Henry B. Avelino and clerk of court Guillermo
E. Acolola, both of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Panay-Pontevedra in Pontevedra, Capiz (MCTC-Pontevedra).
On December 2, 1997, complainant Capt. Salvador Bernaldez (ret.)2 filed a case for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No.
371, against Castor Calinao, Jr. in the MCTC-Pontevedra.3 On January 2, 1998, Calinao asked for the dismissal of the action,4
contending that the MCTC lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter.5
A preliminary conference was held on January 27, 1998.6 Respondent judge, finding a semblance of an agrarian dispute, referred the
matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)7 for it to determine whether the case was appropriate for trial or not.8

On April 21, 1998, the provincial agrarian reform officer advised respondent judge that pursuant to Section 76 of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law:9
[T]he court can take cognizance of the case for the purpose of determining whether or not it has jurisdiction to try [this] case
because of the defense of tenancy interposed by the defendant.10

Certain that the MCTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondent clerk of court scheduled a preliminary conference11 on
June 19, 1998. The complainant filed an urgent motion for postponement due to unavailability of counsel.12 The motion was
granted and the preliminary conference was moved to August 28, 1998.13 But on that date, the complainant moved for another
postponement because of the unavailability of counsel.14 The motion was again granted and respondent clerk of court rescheduled
the preliminary conference on October 9, 1998,15 and again on November 13, 1998.16 Complainant filed an urgent motion to
postpone it because his attorney-in-fact had to go to Manila.17 The motion was again granted, for the third time.
The preliminary conference was repeatedly postponed and rescheduled several more times in the following years.18
On July 3, 2000, respondent judge denied Calinao’s motion to dismiss.19 The case was once more set for preliminary conference on
August 21, 2000 and April 24, 2001 but both (scheduled) preliminary conferences did not push through.20 Thereafter, no further
proceedings took place and the case remained dormant for almost two years.
On January 28, 2003, the complainant moved to set the case for preliminary conference.21 Acting on the motion, respondent clerk
of court scheduled one on March 4, 200322 but respondent judge postponed it due to an illness.23 No subsequent preliminary
conference was scheduled and the case again remained idle.
On July 5, 2004, the complainant filed this complaint in the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). He alleged that respondents
abused their authority in inordinately delaying the resolution of Civil Case No. 37124 which was governed by the Rule on Summary
 34

Procedure (the rule). Despite the specific mandate of the rule to dispense with cases falling under its scope25 within a specified
period,26 Civil Case No. 371 remained unresolved for almost 10 years.

Respondents denied the complainant’s allegation.

According to respondent judge, the delay in resolving Civil Case No. 371 was not his fault. He claimed that the complainant filed
numerous motions for postponement (of the scheduled preliminary conferences) which delayed the case.27 He, on the other hand,
cancelled only one preliminary conference (due to an illness) and ordered the respondent clerk of court to inform the parties
beforehand of its postponement.28 Hence, the delay was attributable to the complainant. Moreover, aside from being the presiding
judge of MCTC-Pontevedra, respondent judge was assigned to other courts due to vacancies and/or the inhibition of other judges.29
These additional assignments made it difficult for him to decide his cases within the prescribed period.30

Respondent clerk of court reiterated the arguments of respondent judge and added that the complainant should have simply called
his attention (and informed him that he wanted to present evidence) instead of filing this case.31
After considering the respective contentions of the complainant and respondents, the OCA concluded that, because the complainant
asked for the postponements, the delay could not solely be due to respondents. Respondent judge’s leniency in granting
postponements did not amount to patent and gross abuse of power since he neither evaded nor refused to perform his legal duty.
Nevertheless, respondent judge still could not evade liability since the case had been pending for almost a decade despite the fact
that it involved relatively simple summary proceedings. Hence, according to the OCA, he was liable for undue delay in disposing of
his cases.32

Undue delay in the disposition of cases is a less serious charge.33 Section 11(B) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides:
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or,
2. A fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.

The records of OCA reveal that, in 2005, respondent judge was administratively sanctioned for his failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period.34 Since this complaint involved a similar offense, the OCA recommended that the maximum fine of ₱20,000 be
imposed and that respondent judge be directed to immediately decide the case.35

With regard to the respondent clerk of court, the OCA found that he faithfully performed his administrative duty as clerk of court by
scheduling preliminary conferences in Civil Case No. 371.36 For this reason, the OCA recommended that respondent clerk of court
be exonerated.37
We adopt the findings of the OCA with modifications.
Respondent Judge Deserves a More Severe Sanction
Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into
disrepute.38 Article III, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.
Pursuant to this mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct instructs judges to "perform all judicial duties, including
the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness."39 Similarly, the Code of Judicial Ethics holds
that a judge should be "prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice
denied."40
Civil Case No. 371 was an unlawful detainer case. Its prompt resolution was a matter of public policy as unlawful detainer cases41
are subject to summary procedure. The rule was adopted to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of
cases.42 Hence, it is disappointing when it is the judge himself who causes the delay.43
Respondent judge could have facilitated the prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 371. He could have denied the motions for
postponement since he had full control of the proceedings. He could have even dismissed the action for failure to prosecute.44
Instead, he allowed the case to remain pending for years.

Moreover, his additional assignments were no excuse for the delay in resolving the case. We have held that the designation of a
judge to preside over another sala is an insufficient reason to justify delay in deciding a case.45

As noted by the OCA, this was not the first time respondent judge failed to act promptly on matters pending in his court.1avvphi1 He
was sanctioned for gross inefficiency in 2005.46 For this reason, we find that the recommended fine of ₱20,000 is not sufficient. He
should also be suspended from office for three months without pay.

Respondent Clerk of Court is Liable for Simple Neglect of Duty

Branch clerks of court are administrative assistants of presiding judges. Their duty is to assist in the management of the calendar of
the court and all other matters not involving the exercise of discretion or judgment of judges. Clerks of court must diligently
supervise and manage court dockets and records.47 The 2002 Manual of Clerks of Court provides:

1. CLERK OF COURT48
 35

1.1. Office of the Clerk of Court

1.1.1. Adjudicative Functions
c. Prepares and signs monthly report of cases.49
1.1.2. Non-Adjudicative Functions
i. Studies and recommends to the Executive Judge ways and means to improve both adjudicative and administrative support;

Indeed, clerks of first level courts share in the duty to efficiently manage the court system. For this reason, they are expected to act
promptly on their assigned tasks to prevent the clogging of cases in court and to assist in the administration of justice without
delay.51

While clerks of court are not guardians of a judge’s responsibility, they are expected to assist in the speedy disposition of justice.52
Thus, as an administrative assistant, respondent clerk of court should have reminded respondent judge that Civil Case No. 371 had
been pending for almost 10 years and that it called for immediate action, being summary in nature. He should have noted these on
the monthly reports53 he submitted to respondent judge.54 Moreover, he should have adopted a system whereby long-standing
cases could be given priority over more recent ones. Because Civil Case No. 371 remained undecided for an unreasonable length of
time, respondent clerk of court obviously failed to perform what was expected of him.

We thus find him liable for simple neglect of duty. But since this is his first offense, he deserves some leniency.

WHEREFORE, Judge Henry B. Avelino is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, Section 5,
Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the provision on promptness (no. 6) of the Code of Judicial Ethics. Accordingly, he is
suspended from office without salary and benefits for three months55 effective upon notice hereof and ordered to pay a fine of
₱20,000.00. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. He is also directed to
promptly dispose of Civil Case No. 371.

Clerk of court Guillermo E. Acolola is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and is hereby SUSPENDED from office without salary
and benefits for three months.56 He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondents in the Office of Administrative Services, Office of the
Court Administrator.

Criminal Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

People vs Sandiganbayan GR No. 169004

Facts:
The accused, Rolando Plaza was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, with a salary grade 25. He was
charged in the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 or The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Allegedly, he failed to
liquidate the cash advances he received by reason of his office on December 19, 1995 in the amount of P30,000. On April 7, 2005,
Plaza filed a motion to dismiss with the Sandiganbayan which was found to be with merit.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the case. So, the petitioner filed this case to the Supreme Court
contending that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal cases involving public officials and employees enumerated under
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, whether or not occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not
only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to their office.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is
below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.

Held: Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.

Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the
positions enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads ( Sec. 4 (1) (a)
of P.D. 1606); city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads (Sec. 4 (1) (b) of P.D. 1606); officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher;
Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of
higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
 36

In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of P.D. 1606 provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

So, those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or
felonies in relation to their office. The Supreme Court ruled in earlier cases that: as long as the offense charged in the information is
intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have
committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for “an offense committed in relation” to
his office. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the said offenses
themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were
committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office.

Bayani Subido Jr. and Rene Parina, petitioners vs. Sandiganbayan, respondent
G.R. No. 122641, 20 January 1997, 266 SCRA 379.

Doctrine – The reckoning point for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over the accused andthe offense charged is the time of
the commission of the crime. The information filed in CriminalCase 22825 alleged that petitioners Subido and Parina committed acts
constituting Arbitrary Detention while they were performing their official functions. Moreover, the penalty for
Arbitrary Detention due to Maksimuk’s detention of forty-three (43) days is prision mayor (6 years 1 day – 12 years) and under E.O.
184, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over such offenses.

A procedural and curative statute may validly be given retroactive effect, there being no
impairment of contractual or vested rights.

Type of Appeal/Action – Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 on ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners Bayani Subido Jr. and Rene Parina sought to set aside the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution (dated 25 October
1995) denying their Motion to Quash and its Order (dated 10 November 1995) denying their Motion for
Reconsideration.

Facts – Petitioners Subido and Parina were charged with Arbitrary Detention (penalized under Revised Penal Code) in an information
filed on 28 July 1995. The case was docketed as Criminal case 22825. The information alleged that then Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation nBayani Subido Jr. and then BID Special Agent Rene Parina willfully, unlawfully and feloniously caused
the issuance and implementation of an arrest warrant dated 25 June 1992 against James J. Maksimuk, in conspiracy with each other
and while performing their official functions. The said warrant caused Maksimuk’s detention for forty-three (43) days. The
petitioners then filed on 28 August 1995 a Motion to Quash, where they alleged that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over
their person and the offense charged and they should be tried in RTC of Manila, as Arbitary Detention (penalized under the Revised
Penal Code) is not
covered under R.A. No. 7975. Also, they argued that R.A. 7975 should be given prospective bapplication because when the case was
filed, Subido was already a private person since he separated from government service on 28 February 1995 while Parina did not
hold a position corresponding to Salary Grade 27.
The prosecution filed their opposition to the Motion to Quash on 28 September 1995, contending that under Sec. 4(b) of R.A. 7975,
the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the petitioners and the offense charged and that the basis of Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is
“the position of the accused in the government service when the offense charged was committed and not the nature
 37

of the offense charged, provided the offense committed by the accused was in the exercise of his
duties and in relation to his office.” The petitioners’ Motion to Quash was denied by the Sandiganbayan (in its Resolution dated 25
October 1995). The Sandiganbayan ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case, as stated in Sec. 4
(a)e of R.A. 7975.
As the arraignment was 10 November 1995, the petitioners filed on 9 November 1995 Motion for Reconsideration, but the
Sandiganbayan that motion through its Order dated 10 November 1995.
Hence, this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 on ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Issues – W/N the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the petitioners and the offense of
Arbitrary Detention charged against them?

Legal Provisions –
Section 2 of Rep. Act. 7975 states that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation
to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Further, section 7 of the same law states “upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.” Held – The petition of Subido and Parina was DISMISSED by the Supreme
Court.

Ruling – The Court ruled that as per Sections 2 and 7 of Rep. Act 7975, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense, as the
information in Criminal Case 22825 stated that the petitioners “willfully, unlawfully and feloniously caused the issuance and
implementation of an arrest warrant dated 25 June 1992 against James J. Maksimuk, in conspiracy with each other and while
performing their official functions.” Moreover, the penalty for the Arbitrary Detention due to Maksimuk’s detention of forty-three
(43) days is prision mayor (6 years 1 day – 12 years), and under E.O. 184, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over such offense. It
also stated that the petitioners overlooked that the reckoning point for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over them and the
offense charged is the time of the commission of the crime. Moreover, Subido never denied in the lower court that at time when he
committed the offense, he was classified under Salary Grade 27 for the position of Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation.
Contrary to the petitioner’s argument, the Court also ruled that the Sandiganbayan Law (PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975) is not a
penal law which defines crimes and provide punishment for such acts, but a procedural law which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion. Thus, as a procedural and curative statute, R.A. No. 7975 may
validly be given retroactive effect, there being no impairment of contractual or vested Rights
 38

PANFILO M. LACSON vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999

Fact:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an
organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent
Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management
Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task
Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led
by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief
Superintendent Romeo Acop.

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations5 before the
Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other.
One of the accused6 was dropped from the case.

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under
the amended information’s, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and
c) of Republic Act No. 7975.7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or
more of the “principal accused” are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief
Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of
only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M.
Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases — in fact, no order of arrest has been issued — the
Sandiganbayan has competence to take cognizance of the cases. Hence this case.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused.
 39

Held:
No, The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which
the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. SC believe that the mere allegation in
the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That
phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense
charged and the discharge of the accused’s official duties. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information
that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense
charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. Consequently, for failure to show in the
amended information that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused
PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

II. Rule 110- Prosecution of Offenses

Filing of Criminal Complaint/ Information

Alba vs Nitorreda GR No. 120223

DOCTRINE: The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege. Due process may be
satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal for the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard and
to present evidence in support of one's case.

FACTS: Dr. Ramon Y. Alba in his capacity as Director III of the Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) was charged with
violating certain provisions of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards For Public Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713). For such
gross misconduct, petitioner was meted a suspension of thirty (30) days without pay, after he was given all opportunity to be heard,
albeit through pleadings. When petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the foregoing resolution was denied by the Ombudsman,
he filed an "Appeal Petition for Certiorari ..." with the Supreme Court.

HELD: (A) YES. The thirty (30)-day suspension of Petitioner, without pay and "unappealable", imposed by respondent DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN, Cesar E. Nitorreda, was in accordance with a valid or constitutional law/legislation. Section 27 of R.A. 6770
(otherwise known as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989") states that: ...Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported
by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month's salary (sic) shall be final and unappealable. Section 7, Rule III, of Administrative Order No.
07, dated April 10, 1990 (otherwise known as the "RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN" . . .), states that:
Sec. 7. Finality of decision. — Where the respondent is absolved of the charged (sic) and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one 1 month salary, the
decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from
receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall have been filed by him as
prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.

ISSUES: Whether or not the thirty (30)-day suspension of Petitioner, without pay and "unappealable", imposed by respondent
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, Cesar E. Nitorreda, was: (A) in accordance with a valid or constitutional law/legislation, (B) in accordance
 40

with due process, (C) supported by substantial evidence and is not arbitrary, whimsical and a grave abuse of discretion or authority
on the part of said Nitorreda. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS Compliance with one of the requisites of judicial due process that
jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant.

METROBANK v. REYNADO
G.R. No. 164538; 9 August 2010
R. 110: Section 5
-
Who Must Prosecute
Doctrine:
Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Courtmandates that all criminal actions must be
commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the
Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor.
Thus the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against
whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible f or the offense.
The proper remedy under the circumstances where persons who ought to be charged were
not included in the complaint of the private complainant is definitely not to dismiss the
complaint but to include them in the information.

Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions.

—
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the
offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of
the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority cease upon actual intervention
of the prosecutor or upon ele vation of the case to the Regional Trial
Court. effective May 1, 2002)
xxx
Emergency recit:
In this case, a complaint
for estafa was filed by Metrobank against respondents Reynado and Adrandea alleging that
they acted with fraud, deceit and abuse of confidence in connivance with their client
Universal Converter Phils. Preliminary investigation was carried out and Prosecu
tor Edad dismissed the case on the ground that the crime of estafa did not exist since the
parties already entered into Debt Settlement Agreement which already novated their contract.
SC ruled that Prosecutor Edad committed grave abuse of discretion for failure to give
merits on the sufficiency of the evidence on hand.

Facts:
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) charged respondents Rogelio
Reynado and Jose Adrandea with the crime of estafa under Art. 315 parag. 1(b) of the RPC.
It was alleged that the special audit conducted on the cash and lending operations
of its Port Area branch uncovered anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by
respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal);
that respondents were the only voting members of the branch’s credit committee authorized
to extend credit accommodation to clients up to P200,000.00; that through the so-called Bills
Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paid-up capital of only P125,000.00 and actual
maintaining balance of P5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.00
against uncleared regional checks deposited in its account at petitioner’s Port Area branch;
that, consequently, Universal was able to utilize petitioner’s funds even before the seven-day
clearing period for regional
checks expired; that Universal’s withdrawals against uncleared regional check deposits were
without prior approval of petitioner’s head office; that the uncleared checks were later
 41

dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed"; and, that respondents
acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.
Respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and claimed
that they only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit
accounts and daily transactions.
Meanwhile, Metrobank and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement
whereby the latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total amount of
P50,990,976.27 and undertook to pay the same in bimonthly amortizations of
P300,000.00 as covered by postdated checks, "plus balloon payment of the remaining
principal balance and interest and other charges, if any.”

After preliminary investigation, prosecutor Edad found petitioner’s evidence
insufficient to hold respondents liable for estafa. According to her, the execution of the
Debt Settlement Agreement puts Metrobank in estoppel to argue that the liability is criminal.
Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this case, the relations between
the parties have change[d], novation has set in and prevented the incipience of any
criminal liability on the part of respondents. Thus, the dismissal of the case is recommended.
Likewise, the DOJ dismissed the petition averring that no estafa exists in the instant case as
it was not clearly shown how respondents misappropriated the P53,873,500.00.
Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the Executive Committee and the Credit
Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which they approved. Also,
no damage was caused as Metrobank agreed to settle with Universal.
MR was filed by petitioner which was denied. Aggrieved, it went to the CA to file
for certiorari and mandamus. CA affirmed the twin resolutions of the DOJ Sec, and
accordingly, just as Universal cannot be held responsible under the bills purchase
transactions on account of novation, private respondents, who acted in complicity with the
former, cannot be made liable [for] the same transactions.And since the dismissal of the
complaint is founded on legal ground, respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to
file an information in court. Although, the OSG, in sharing the views of petitioner contended
that failure to implead other responsible individuals in the complaint does not warrant its
dismissal, suggesting that the proper remedy is to cause their inclusion in the
information, nevertheless, CA disposed of the petition.

Issue/s
:
Whether or not prosecutor Edad committed grave abuse of discretion.
-
Yes.
Held
:
Determination of the probable cause, a function
belonging to the public prosecutor; judicial review allowed where it has been clearly
established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.
In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof.The
Secretary of Justice, however, may review or modify the resolution of the prosecutor.
A close scrutiny of the substance of Prosecutor Edads Resolution dated July 10, 1997 readily
reveals that were it not for the Debt Settlement Agreement, there was indeed probable
cause to indict respondents for the crime charged.
From her own assessment of the Complaint
-
Affidavit
of petitioners auditor, her preliminary finding is that
Ordinarily, the offense of estafa has been sufficiently established.
 42

Interestingly, she suddenly changed tack and declared that the agreement altered the
relation of the parties and that novation had set in preventing the incipience of any criminal
liability on respondents. In light of the jurisprudence herein earlier discussed, the prosecutor
should not have gone that far and executed an apparent somersault. Compounding
further the error, the DOJ in dismissing petitioners petition, ruled out estafa contrary to the
findings of the prosecutor.
The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are
matters of defense best left to the trial courts deliberation and contemplation after
conducting the trial of the criminal case.
To emphasize, a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause is not a part of the trial.
A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence is not required, but only such as
may engender a well grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof.A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.
It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a
Prima facie bcase of estafa exists against respondents.As perused by her, the facts as
presented in the Complaint- Affidavit of the auditor are reasonable enough to excite her
belief that respondents are guilty of the crime complained of.In
Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevaswe had occasion to rule that the presence or absence of
the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be
passed upon after a fullblown trial on the merits.
Thus confronted with the issue on whether the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion in disposing of the case of petitioner, given the
sufficiency of evidence on hand, we do not hesitate to rule in the affirmative.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or
tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.

EBARLE VS. SUCALDITO

FACTS
The petitioner, Bienvenido Ebarle, is the then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and
a candidate for election for the same position. He has been charged for the violation of certain
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. RA No. 3019, and various provisions of
the Revised Penal Code by the herein respondents. The petitioner claims on his defense that
the respondents failed to comply with the provisions of EO N.O. 264, “Outlining the Procedure
by Which Complainants Charging Government Officials and Employees with Commission of
Irregularities Should Be Guided”, prior to their criminal recourses.

ISSUE
Whether or not the provisions of EO No. 264 are applicable to the respondents.

HELD
No, EO No. 264 has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The title
speaks of “commission of irregularities”. There is no mention, not even by implication, of
criminal offenses, that is to say, crimes. Even though crimes amount to irregularities, the
aforesaid Order could have very well referred to the more specific term, had it intended to
make itself applicable thereto.

. Prescription of offenses
 43

Article 90. Prescription of crime. - Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall
prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable
by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the
application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by RA
4661, approved June 19, 1966).

Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

Article 92. When and how penalties prescribe. - The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows:

1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;

2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;

3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in
five years;

4. Light penalties, in one year.

Article 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties. - The period of prescription of penalties shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be
interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which
this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period
of prescription.