g.
Impeachment By Prior Inconsistent Statement
Villalon, Jr. v. IAC, 144 S 443 (1986)
A party may impeach a witness by introducing into evidence their previous testimony in his
disbarment proceedings which are inconsistent with their current testimony. An attorney may waive
the confidential nature of his own disbarment proceedings.
Facts:
On May 16, 1979, a case for "Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale, Recovery of Possession and
Damages" was filed by private respondent Catalina NEVAL Vda. de Ebuiza, mother of the other private
respondents all surnamed Ebuiza, against petitioner Atty. Roman R. Villalon, Jr. and his sons for the
recovery of a parcel of land located at Urbiztondo, San Juan. La Union. The property involved was also
the subject of a Disbarment Case previously filed on July 22, 1975 with this Court by private
respondent Francisco EBUIZA, charging petitioner Villalon with falsification of a deed of absolute sale
of that property in his and his sons' favor, but which petitioner Villalon claimed to have been his
contingent fee for the professional services he had rendered to EBUIZA's parents. The Disbarment
Case was referred by this Court to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation where testimonial evidence was received. The case still pends thereat. In the course
of the trial of the Civil Case, petitioners introduced in evidence the testimonies of some of the private
respondents, namely, NEVAL, EBUIZA, and Justina Ebuiza San Juan (NEVAL, et als.), in the
Disbarment Case for the purpose of impeaching their testimonies in the Civil Case. Private
respondents filed a Motion to Strike from the records of the Civil Case all matters relating to the
proceedings in the Disbarment Case. Over petitioners' opposition, on September 20, 1985, the TC
issued its questioned Order granting the Motion to Strike. Their MR was denied so they filed a petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus with the IAC which denied their petition.
Held:
By issuing its Order to strike, the Trial Court deprived petitioners of their right to impeach the
credibility of their adverse parties' witnesses by proving that on former occasions they had made
statements inconsistent with the statements made during the trial, despite the fact that such
statements are material to the issues in the Civil Case. The subject matter involved in the disbarment
proceedings i.e., the alleged falsification of the deed of absolute sale in petitioners' favor, is the same
issue raised in the Civil Case wherein the annulment of the said deed of absolute sale is sought. The
offer of evidence, suggested by respondent Appellate Court as a remedy
The offer of evidence suggested by respondent Appellate Court as a remedy open to petitioners, while
procedurally correct, would be inadequate and ineffective for purposes of impeachment. The broader
interests of justice would then require that petitioners be given sufficient latitude to present and
prove their impeaching evidence for judicial appreciation.
People v. Resabal, 50 Phil 780 (1927)
To impeach a witness by prior inconsistent statements, he must be given ample
opportunity to explain the discrepancies by a reading to him of such prior statement.
Mere presentation of the statement, without said declaration having been read to the
witness while he testified, is no ground for impeaching his testimony.
Escolin: Note that the accused now does not have the right to cross-examine the witness
during the preliminary investigation. He can only give questions to the investigating
officer to be propounded to the witness.
Facts: The evidence shows, as an indisputable fact, that in the early morning of April 25,
1926, one Primo Ordiz died at his own home in the barrio of Bogo, municipality of
Maasin, Leyte, form the effects of an internal hemorrhage caused by a sharp wound in
the left lung, as appears from the death certificate.
The defense argues that Glicerio Orit is not a credible witness, because of his having
been excluded from the information to be used as a witness for the prosecution; and,
because, moreover, of the contradiction in his testimony at the preliminary investigation
and during the trial.
The TC convicted the accused of murder.
Counsel for the defense alleges that the trial court erred in not ignoring Glicerio Orit's
testimony, and in not acquitting the accused Alejo Resabal on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Held: We are of the opinion that the mere fact of having been excluded from the
information to be used as a witness for the Government, does not prevent this witness
from telling the truth in this case, especially in the absence of proof showing the interest
he might possibly have in testifying against the accused. Neither is the apparent
contradiction which may be noted in his declarations before the court of the justice of
the peace, and before the court of first instance sufficient to discredit his testimony, for
the simple reason that this witness was not given ample opportunity, by a reading to him
of his declarations before the court of the justice of the peace, to explain the
discrepancies noted by counsel for the accused. The mere presentation of Exhibit 1,
without said declaration having been read to the witness while he testified in the Court
of First Instance, is no ground for impeaching his testimony.
U.S. v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984)
h. Impeachment By Other Means
U.S. v. Mercado, 20 Phil. 127 (1913)
Mosley v. Commonwealth, 420 SW2d 679 (1967)
Coles v. v. Harsh, 276 P. 248 (1929)
U.S. v. Medical Therapy Services, 583 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978)
Newton v. State, 127 A. 123 (Md. 1924)
State v. Oswalt, 381 P. 2d 617 (1963)
Exclusion of Witnesses
People v. Sandal, 54 Phil. 883 (1930)
Facts: Sandal, Arimao, Lonsing, Mama and Pampang were charged and convicted for the
murder of Eleno Lamorena in the CFI of Lanao.
On appeal, said persons assigned as error the trial court’s refusal to admit a certain
witness presented by the defense on the ground that said witness had been present
during a hearing despite the court’s order that all witnesses leave the court.
Issue: Whether or not the exclusion of the witness was proper?
Held: Yes. Conviction affirmed.
Under the circumstances of the case, it lies within the discretion of the court to admit or
reject the testimony of the witness. Although the SC is of opinion that the lower court
should have admitted the testimony of the witness, especially when he said that he did
not hear what the other witnesses testified, yet there is nothing to show that this error
has affected appellant’s defense especially since there is no indication whatsoever as to
what the witness would have stated in his testimony.
State v. Bishop, 492 P2d 509 (1972)
Facts: Joe Berry Bishop was convicted of sale and possession of dangerous drugs. When
the case was called for trial, defense counsel requested all witnesses be excluded. The prosecutor
stated that most of his witnesses were police officers. Counsel for the
defendant argued that his client would be prejudiced by allowing the officers to remain
and moved for their exclusion. This motion was denied because the trial court wanted
the police officers who would be witnesses to be able to view the trail as an educational
experience, and wanted them to be able to see the fruits of their labor. Hence, this
appeal to the CA of Oregon.
Issue: Whether or not the TC erred in not excluding the witnesses and was the
defendant prejudiced by this failure to exclude the witnesses?
Held: Yes, the trial court erred. A review of Oregon SC cases reveals that a motion to
exclude witnesses is normally granted. The practice of excluding witnesses from the
courtroom except while each is testifying is to be strongly recommended, particularly
here the testimony of the witnesses is in any measure cumulative or corroborative.
However, these authorities mean that when one party moves to exclude witnesses and
the other party voices no objection, the motion should always be granted. When the
motion is opposed, the trial court’s discretion comes into play. The trail court must
weigh the “good cause shown” for not excluding witnesses against policy favoring
exclusion. Thus, if the record contains some showing of good cause for not excluding
the witnesses and if the trial court made a reasonable choice between the good cause
shown and the policy favoring exclusion, its decision will not be disturbed on appeal. But if the record
contains no reason for not excluding witnesses, or an insufficient reason,
then the trial court has abused its discretion. In this case, the CA found that the reasons
advanced by the trial court were not relevant to the purpose of the trail, namely, the
determination of whether the defendant was guilty of the crime charged. Balanced
against the danger that the witnesses memories might be confused by other testimony,
and the other reasons for the rule of sequestration (exclusion), the reasons advanced by
the court were insufficient.
Yes, he was prejudiced. The State has the burden to prove the lack of prejudice from
denial of defendant’s motion to exclude witnesses, and when a trail court has abused its
discretion by not excluding witnesses, prejudice will be assumed unless the record
affirmatively reflects the contrary.
j. Refreshing Recollection
State v. Peoples, 319 S.E. 2d 177 (1984)
U.Authentication and Proof of Documents
1. Rule 132 §19-33
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by
law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)
Public documents
a. written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;
b. notarized documents, except last wills and testaments; and
c. public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.
Public documents Private documents
Genuineness and authenticity presumed Must prove genuineness and due
execution
Binding against the parties and 3rd persons Binds only parties to the document
Certain transactions are required to be in a public
document (e.g. donation of real property)
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered
as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker. (cf with Rule 132, Sec. 22)
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be. (21 a)
Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a
person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. (23 a)
Sec. 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary. –
Where a private document is more than thirty years old, is produced from a
custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by
any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
authenticity need be given. (22 a)
Requisites for admissibility of private document
a. offered as authentic – due execution and authenticity must be proved
i. either by
1. anyone who saw the document executed or written; or 2. evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.
a. any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because
he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
1. upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
2. has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person
b. a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge
ii. Unless it is an ancient document; requisites
1. more than 30 years old
2. produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and
3. unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion
b. not offered as authentic – identified as that which it is claimed to be
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. – Documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are
evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter. (24 a)
Documents consisting of
a. entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer – prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
b. all other public documents – evidence, even against a 3rd person, of the fact which
gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19 (official acts), when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in
a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25 a)
The record of public documents of official acts may be evidenced by
a. an official publication thereof or
b. a copy
i. attested by
1. the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
2. his deputy, and
ii. if the record is not kept in the Philippines
1. accompanied by a certificate that such officer has the custody made by
a. secretary of the embassy or legation
b. consul general
c. consul
d. vice consul, or
e. consular agent or
f. any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept
2. authenticated by the seal of his office.
Procedure in obtaining copy of foreign official acts
a. get a copy from the legal custodian
b. have the legal custodian attest that the copy is correct
c. have the Philippine consul certify that the person in #2 is the legal custodian of a
copy of official act
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26 a)
Attestation of copy must
a. state the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be
b. be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk
of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. – Any public record, an official copy
of which is admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the office in
which it is kept, except upon order of a court where the inspection of the
record is essential to the just determination of a pending case. (27 a)
GR: Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must not be
removed from the office in which it is kept
Exception: upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential to the
just determination of a pending case
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. – An authorized public record
of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy
thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate
certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a)
Public record of a private document may be proved by
a. the original record, or
b. a copy thereof
i. attested by the legal custodian of the record
ii. with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody
Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer
having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent
search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of
his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as
evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. (29)
Proof of lack of record
a. A written statement
i. signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
ii. that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist
in the records of his office,
b. accompanied by a certificate that such officer is supposed to have custody
If a notarized document is lost, get certifications of loss from
a. notary public
b. bureau of archives
c. clerk of court who commissioned the notary public
Sec. 29. How judicial record impeached. – Any judicial record may be
impeached by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial
officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the
record, in respect to the proceedings. (30 a)
Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of
a. want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer
b. collusion between the parties, or
c. fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings
Sec. 30. Proof of notarial documents. – Every instrument duly acknowledged
or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie
evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. (31 a)
Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by
law
a. may be presented in evidence without further proof
b. the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of
the instrument or document involved
Sec. 31. Alterations in document, how to explain. – The party producing a
document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been
altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must
account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by
another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties
affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the
alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he
fails to do that the document shall not be admissible in evidence. (32 a)
The party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and
appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the
question in dispute
a. must account for the alteration, either as
i. made by another, without his concurrence, or
ii. made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or
iii. otherwise properly or innocently made, or
iv. the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument
b. If he fails to do that the document shall not be admissible in evidence
Sec. 32. Seal. – There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed
private documents insofar as their admissibility as evidence is concerned. (33
a)
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. – Documents
written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless
accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption
of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation
prepared before trial. (34 a)
Documents written in an unofficial language
a. shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into
English or Filipino
b. parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before
trial.
2. Cases
a. Proof of private documents
Buñag v. CA, 158 SCRA 299 (1988)
The authenticity and due execution of a private document is not proven by testimony
that the party thumbmarked it. The circumstances of the presence of the witness during
the execution must be related. There must be proof that the party understood it,
considering he was illiterate (implied from the thumbmarking). There must be showing
that the document was duly read, explained and translated to the illiterate party.
Facts: These is a case for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in Pampanga
between Bunag and Bautista. Bunag claims that the property in question was originally
owned by his father Apolonio Bunag Aguas as shown by Tax Declaration Nos. 546 for
1941 and 320 for 1960 (Exhs. B & E). They had transferred their residence to Tarlac
from Pampanga and Jose Bautista Santiago, a nephew-in-law, was allowed by his father
to erect a house on said lot and lived therein on the condition that he would pay for the
land taxes as compensation for the use of the land. He admitted, however, that he only
learned about this agreement from his father. On September 15,1962, and September
24,1962 he sent written demands to defendant Bruno Bautista, thru his lawyer, to vacate
the lot and remove the houses thereon, (Exhs. A & B). On the other hand, Bautista
testified that he is the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale, of
January 3, 1941, signed by Apolonio Bunag with his thumbmark; that Bunag first offered
it for sale to his brother Jose Bautista, but as the latter had no money, he referred the
matter to his father; that after he was contacted in Baguio by his father, he sent the
P100.00 as consideration of the sale and so the sale was consummated between his
father and Bunag; that he came down from Baguio and had the house repaired and he
stayed there with his family until liberation when they left the house and allowed his
sister Estrudes Bautista to live therein; that he planted bananas, chicos, trees,
calamansi, eggplants, thereon; that he had been paying the land taxes thereon (Exhs. 5
to 5-M); that the property is declared in his name (Exh. 6); and he denies that her sister
Estrudes requested Apolonio Bunag to allow her to stay on the property as her sister had
a house of her own then. Brigida Bautista testified that her brother bought the said
property from Apolonio Bunag and that she was present when Bunag affixed Ms
thumbmark on the document (Exh. 1); that aside from this deed, there were other
documents supporting the sale as the note (Exh. 2) containing the consideration and the
parties. Assessor's Field Sheet of the property (Exh. 3) and the letter of the assessor to
Bunag in 1941 informing him of the revision of the assessment. (Rollo, pp. 15-18). The
trial court decided in favor of petitioner. The CA, finding the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) to
have been validly executed and rueld in favor of Bruno. MR was denied by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale was authentic and validly executed?
Held: Note here that the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) was not acknowledged before a notary
public and neither are there any signatures in the blank spaces for the signatures of
attesting witnesses. The document is typewritten in English and over the similarly
typewritten words "APOLONIO BUNIAG" is a thumbprint. The deed of sale is not
notarized and is, therefore, a private writing whose due execution and authenticity must
be proved before it can be received in evidence.
Proof of the due execution and authenticity of private writings is required under Section
21, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. — Before any private
writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By a subscribing witness.
To support its conclusion as to the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale,
the CA relied on the testimony of Brigida Bautista, a sister of private respondents.
However, the TC had ruled otherwise since it received the testimony of Brigida with
caution, coming as it does from a sister of the defendants. The circumstances other
alleged presence during the "execution" of the deed of sale was not related. Neither
does she give any light as to whether Apolonio Bunag understood the document. It
should be noted that the deed was written in English. Since it appears that said
document was merely thumb-marked, it could reasonably be inferred that Apolonio
Bunag, the supposed vendor, was illiterate. Under the circumstances, the minimum proof
necessary to establish due authenticity should, in the least, include evidence that the
document (Exhibit "1") was duly read, explained and translated to Apolonio Bunag.
Unfortunately, no such evidence was presented.
The SC also considered the lack of instrumental witnesses in the document. The mischief
that lurks behind accepting at face value a document that is merely thumb-marked.
without any witnesses to it, and not acknowledged before a notary public could be one of
the reasons behind the requirement of the rules on evidence that a private writing must
be shown to be duly executed and authenticated. The probative value of the testimony
of Brigida Bautista, who did not furnish us with any details surrounding the execution of
Exhibit "l," coming as it does from a person whose partisanship can not, and should not,
be overlook falling short the minimum requirements of credibility. The testimony of an
eye-witness as to the execution of a private document must be positive. He must state
that the document was actually executed by the person whose name is subscribed
thereto. It is not sufficient if he states in a general manner that such person made the
writing. More so if the document was merely thumb-marked.
The Court adopts the TC's findings and its conclusion that the due execution and
authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) was not proved and thus such private
document should be excluded.
b.Ancient documents
Bartolome v. IAC, 183 SCRA 102 (1990)
Where the offeror’s witness testified that the document had a missing 4th page, the
document can not qualify as an ancient document because it is blemished by alteration
or circmstance of suspicion. An incomplete document is akin to an altered document,
more so if the missing page contains the signature of the parties to the document. Proof
of the document’s authenticity and due execution is therefore necessary.
Heirs of Lacsa v. CA, 197 SCRA 234 (1991)
Lack of signatures on the first pages of a document alone is not a blemish that would
disqualify a document from being an ancient document. Allegations that the pages had
been substituted should be proven in order to disqualify the document from being an
ancient document, more so if the documents were shown to be exact copies of the
original on file with the Register of Deeds. Proof of their due execution and authenticity
is no longer required.
de Leon: Note that the document was actually a public record because it had been
registered with the Registry of Deeds. Therefore, the court did not have to determine
whether the document was in fact an ancient document because it was in the first place
a public document whose authenticity and due execution need not be proven. The
problem with this case is it is now authority to say that private documents whose first
pages are not signed by the parties can qualify as ancient documents. Keep in mind that
crucial to the ruling in Lacsa was the fact that the document presented matches the one
on file in the Registry of Deeds. Had there been no matching copy in the Registry of
Deeds, I submit that the document can not qualify as an ancient document.
Facts: An action for recovery of possession was field by Songco and Doe alleging that
Lacsa owed the disputed piece of and by showing an OCT and that the respondent
occupied the land by fraud. Respondents denied the allegation and said that the OCT
relied upon by the petitioners was superseded by a TCT by virtue of a document (Exh. 3)
and later by superseded by another document (Exh. 7). Petitioners submit that the
documents are not ancient documents for it must not only be 30 yrs. old but also found
in the proper custody and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from
suspicion. They allege that the document cannot be considered as such because the
first 2 pages did not bear the signatures of the parties to the document.
Issue: Whether or not the documents are ancient documents?
Held: Yes, under the rule, the documents must be atleast 30 yrs. old and this was shown
by the fact that exh. 3 was executed on April 7, 1923 and Exh. 7 on January 20, 1924.
The next requisite that it be found or produced from a custody in which it would naturally
be found was shown when the document was found under the care of the Register of
Deeds as they certified that both documents are copies of the original. The petitioner’s
contention that the lack of signature on the first two apges cast doubt on the
authenticity of the document was answered by the SC saying that “we cannot uphold
this surmise absent any proof whatsoever.” As the petitioner failed to show proof of the
irregularity, the SC ruled that the document is valid. As a contract appearing honest and
lawful on its face must be treated as such and one who assails the genuineness must
present conclusive evidence of fabrication.
c. Proof of foreign judgments
Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988)
To be enforceable, the foreign judgment must be proven as a public document of a
written official act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
The offeror must submit an attestation issued by the proper foreign official having legal
custody of the original judgment that the copy is a faithful reproduction of the original,
which attestation must be authenticated by a Philippine Consular officer having
jurisdiction in that country.
Facts: Teodoro Rances was engaged by Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation
(Pascor) as Radio Operator of a vessel belonging to Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-
East Ship Management Limited. Four (4) months later, and after having been transferred
from one vessel to another four times for misbehaviour and inability to get along with
officers and crew members of each of the vessels, the foreign principal terminated the
services of Rances citing the latter's poor and incorrigible work attitude and incitement
of others to insubordination.
Pascor filed a complaint against Rances with the POEA for acts unbecoming a marine
officer and for “character assassination.” Rances denied the charges set out in the
complaint and by way of counterclaim demanded an amount of US$ 1,500.00 which a
court in Dubai had, he contended, awarded in his favor against petitioner's foreign
principal. The POEA found Rances liable for inciting another officer or seaman to
insubordination and challenging a superior officer to a fist fight and imposed six (6)
months suspension for each offense or a total of twelve (12) months suspension. The
POEA decision passed over sub silentio the counterclaim of Rances.
Later, Rances filed a complaint against Pascor where he sought to carry out and enforce
the same award obtained by him in Dubai allegedly against Pascor's foreign principal
which he had pleaded as a counterclaim in the first POEA Case. Rances claimed that be
had filed an action in the Dubai court for US$ 9,364.89, which claim was compromised by
the parties for US$ 5,500.00 plus "a return ticket to (private respondent's) country," with
the proviso that "the opponent" would pay "to the claimant" US$ 1,500.00 'in case the
wife of the claimant Rances doesn't agree with the amount sent to [her] and that since
his wife did not "agree with" the amount given to her, he was entitled to recover the
additional US$ 1,500.00." As evidence of this foreign award, Rances submitted what
purports to be an "original copy of the decision" of the Dubai court written in Arabic
script and language, With a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator
and a copy of a transmittal letter dated 23 September 1984 signed by one Mohd Bin
Saleh "Honorary Consul for Philippines." In its answer filed on 11 December 1985,
petitioner Pascor made four principal arguments: (1.) that the copy of the Dubai decision
relied upon by Rances could not be considered as evidence, not having been properly
authenticated; (2.) that Pascor was not a party to the Dubai court proceedings; (3.) that
the POEA had no jurisdiction over cases for the enforcement of foreign judgments; and
(4.) that the claim had already been resolved in POEA Case No: M-84-09-848, having
been there dismissed as a counterclaim.
In its decision, the POEA held Pascor liable to pay Rances the amount of US$ 1,500.00
"at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment." The POEA denied Pascor's
appeal for having been filed out of time. On 29 May 1986, the POEA denied private
respondent's Motion for a Writ of Execution and elevated the case to the NLRC. On 14
August 1986, NLRC denied petitioner's appeal as filed out of time.
Issue: (Related to evidence) Whether or not the Dubai decision was admissible in
evidence as proven?
Held: The appeal should have been allowed by the NLRC because there was a real effort
and legal cause for the said appeal. In the end, the decision of the POEA was set aside.
Ruling on the merits,
An examination of the complaint filed by Rances in the POEA shows that the cause of
action pleaded by Rances was enforcement of the decision rendered by the Dubai Court
which purported to award him, among other things, an additional amount of US$
1,500.00 under certain circumstances. Petitioner argues vigorously that the POEA had
no authority and jurisdiction to enforce the judgment of a foreign court. Under Section 1,
Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations, it will be seen that the POEA has
jurisdiction to decide all cases 'involving employer employee relations arising out of or
by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment,
including seamen." Respondent Rances, however, relied not upon the employer -
employee relationship between himself and petitioner corporation and the latter's
foreign principal, but rather upon the judgment obtained by him from the Dubai Court
which had apparently already been partially satisfied by payment to respondent Rances
of US$ 5,500.00. The POEA has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim for
enforcement of a foreign judgment. Such a claim must be brought before the regular
courts. The POEA is not a court; it is an administrative agency exercising, inter alia,
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. Neither the rules of procedure nor the rules of
evidence which are mandatorily applicable in proceedings before courts, are observed in
proceedings before the POEA.
Even assuming in arguendo that the POEA has jurisdiction, still Rances cannot rely upon
the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision was not properly proved before the POEA. The
Dubai decision purports to be the written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country, and therefore a public writing under Section 20 (a) of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Sections 25 and 26 of Rules 132 prescribe the manner
of proving a public of official record of a foreign country in the following terms:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied. if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country,
the certificate maybe be made by a secretary of embassy or litigation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 26. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a writing is attend
for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the
proper Dubai official having legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai
Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original
decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular
Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, dated 23 September 1984,
signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' does not comply with the
requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor the authentication envisaged
by Section 25.
There is another problem in respect of the admissibility in evidence of the Dubai
decision. The Dubai decision is accompanied by a document which purports to be an
English translation of that decision., but that translation is legally defective. Section 34 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that documents written in a non-official
language like Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a
translation into English or Spanish or Filipino. In the instant case, there is no showing of
who effected the English translation of the Dubai decision which respondent Rances
submitted to the POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been made by
an official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai Government.
Neither the Identity of the translator nor his competence in both the Arabic and English
languages has been shown. The English translation submitted by the respondent is not
sworn to as an accurate translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that
translation been agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one.
The foregoing does not exhaust the difficulties presented by reliance upon the Dubai
decision. The Dubai Court decision, even on the basis of the English translation
submitted by respondent Rances, does not purport on its face to have been rendered
against petitioner Pascor nor against the foreign principal of petitioner. Respondent
Rances simply assumed that the decision was rendered against petitioner's foreign
principal. The Dubai decision does not Identify the parties to the litigation that was
resolved by said decision. Accordingly, the Dubai decision can scarcely be enforced
against petitioner Pascor. Further, even if the Dubai decision had on its face purported to
be rendered against petitioner Pascor, we must note that petitioner Pascor has expressly
denied that jurisdiction had ever been acquired by the Dubai court over the person of
Pascor in accordance with the Rules of Procedure applicable before the Dubai Court.
Respondent Rances has not proved the contents of the Dubai Rules of Procedure
governing acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant.
Finally, if it be assumed (arguendo, once more) that the Dubai Court had indeed
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Pascor's foreign principal — Gulf East Ship
Management Ltd. — it still would not follow that Pascor would automatically be bound by
the Dubai decision. The statutory agency (or suretyship) of Pascor is limited in its reach
to the contracts of employment Pascor entered into on behalf of its principal with
persons like respondent Rances. Such statutory inability does not extend to liability for
judgments secured against Gulf East Ship Management Ltd., in suits brought against Gulf
East outside Philippine territorial jurisdiction, even though such a suit may involve a
contract of employment with a Filipino seaman.
Zalamea v. CA, 228 SCRA 23 (1993)
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. Mere testimony of a witness is not
sufficient to prove foreign law.
Facts: Zalamea purchased two tickets from the Manila agent of TWA. Cesar and
Suthira’s tickets were purchased as a 75% discount, while Liana’s was a full fare ticket.
They all had confirmed reservations. In NY, on the appointed date, they checked in an
hour earlier but they were placed in the wait-list. Eventually, only Cesar was able to
board while the 2 others had to book with American Airlines. Upon their arrival in Manila,
they filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage. The LC
ruled in their favor, while the CA modified it as regards moral damages, on the ground
that there was no fraud or bad faith, since ‘. . . overbooking of flights is specifically
allowed by the Code of Federal Regulations” by the CAB.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith
because it has a right to overbook flights?
Held: The US law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been
proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must alleged and prove. Written law may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officers having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Phil. stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and authenticated by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied solely on the testimony of it
customer service agent that the Code of the CAB allows overbooking. Aside from said
statement no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s
finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations
has no basis in fact.
d.Documents in unofficial language
Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988)
A document written in an unofficial language should be translated into either English or
Filipino. The translator should be identified either as an official interpreter of the court, or
as a competent translator of both languages. The translation should be either sworn to
as an accurate translation of the original, or agreed upon by the parties.
People v. Monleon, 74 SCRA 263 (1976)
Affidavits written in an unofficial language and not accompanied with a translation are
inadmissible in evidence.
Escolin: The NIRC provides that all notarial documents which don’t have the required
documentary stamp tax will not be admitted in evidence.
Facts: One night, Monleon arrived at his house drunk. He inquired from Concordia, his
wife, whether their carabao had been fed by their ten-year old son, Marciano. She
assured him that the carabao had been fed. He repaired to the place where the carabao
was tethered to check the veracity of her statement. He discovered that the carabao had
not been adequately fed. He became furious.
When he was about to whip Marciano, Concordia intervened. A violent quarrel ensued
between them. He placed himself astride his wife's chest, squezzed her neck, pressed
her head against a post, and kicked her in the abdomen. He shouted: "What do I care if
there would be someone who would be buried tomorrow. You let your brothers and
sisters stand up and I will also include them." Felicisimo, one of the couple's six children,
pulled away his father and stopped his assault on Concordia.
The following morning Concordia vomitted blood. She died at eleven o'clock on that
morning of June 2. Death was due to "acute abdomen" (Exh. B), a pathologic condition
within the belly, requiring surgical intervention
Sixteen days after Concordia death, Monleon thumbmarked a confession, written in the
Cebuano dialect and sworn to before the town mayor (Exh. C). He admitted in that
confession that he assaulted his wife and that he had repented for the wrong which he
had done to her. He orally admitted to Perfecto Bongo, a lieutenant in the Cebu City
police department and a relative of Concordia, that he (Monleon) assaulted his wife
because he was drunk and she was a nagger.
On July 31, 1970 or about two months after Concordia's death, a medico-legal officer of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) exhumed her body. He found bluish-black
discolorations on the sphenoid temporal bones of her skull, on the atlas or cervical
vertebra below the skull or at the base of the neck, and on the first ribs. The
discolorations were due to internal hemorrhage "caused by trauma or external violence."
The doctor ventured the opinion that the "acute abdomen" could have been caused "by
external violence"
Monleon denied that he used violence against his wife. He testified that he and his wife
had merely a verbal quarrel and that Clemencia, the sister of Concordia and the wife of
his elder brother, testified against him because Clemencia and Monleon had a boundary
dispute regarding the lands inherited by Clemencia and Concordia from their father,
Victor Bongo. Monleon said that Lieutenant Bongo asked him to sign a "recibo" that he
would take care of his children. He also said that some persons threatened to kill him if
he did not affix his thumbmark to his confession.
The trial court convicted Monleon of parricide. In this appeal, his counsel de oficio
alleged that the trial court erred in giving credence to Monleon's confession, the affidavit
of his son, Marciano, and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the NBI
medico-legal officer, Doctor Ceferino Cunanan; in treating the alleged declarations of
Concordia Bongo to Clemencia's husband as part of the res gestae and in rejecting the
testimonies of Monleon and his two children, Marciano and Felicisima.
Held: TC’s judgment affirmed but lowered to reclusion perpetua. The court herein held
that:
The corpus delicti or the fact of the commission of the crime of which Concordia Bongo
was the victim was established by the prosecution witnesses, Clemencia Bongo-Monleon
and Epifania Bongo. Hence, Monleon's extrajudicial confession (Exh. C) was corroborated
by evidence of the corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133 and sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
The discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not destroy the
probative value of the confession nor negate Monleon's admission therein that he
assaulted his wife. A court may reject portions of the confession by reason of the
improbability of the facts or statements therein or because of their falsity or
untrustworthiness.
The mayor and Lieutenant Bongo testified that Monleon was not forced to affix his
thumbmark to the confession. There is no evidence that he was tortured or maltreated.
Monleon could have complained to the fiscal during the preliminary investigation that he
was forced to execute his confession. He did not do so.
Appellant's counsel argues that the trial court erred in admitting Marciano Monleon's
affidavit which was written in the Cebuano dialect (Exh. E) and which was not
accompanied with the corresponding translation. That confession is well-taken. The trial
court erred in admitting that affidavit over the objection of appellant's counsel because
section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that documents written in an
unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a
translation into English, Spanish or the national language "To avoid interruption of
proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared
before trial"
The trial court, also, erred in ruling that the alleged declarations of Concordia Bongo to
the husband of Clemencia Bongo Monleon, as to the violent acts inflicted upon her
(Concordia) by appellant Monleon, are part of the res gestae. That ruling was made in
connection with Clemencia's testimony (not on direct examination but in answer to the
questions of the trial judge) that at eight o'clock in the evening of June 1, 1970, or about
an hour after Concordia was assaulted by Monleon, she (Concordia) left her house and
went to Clemencia's house three hundred meters away and recounted to Clemencia's
husband (appellant Monleon's brother) how she was beaten by Monleon. Appellants
counsel observed that it was incredible that Concordia, after being severely maltreated
by Monleon (according to the prosecution's version), would still have the strength to go
to Clemencia's house which was located on a hill. Clemencia's testimony reveals that she
must have been confused in making that assertion, assuming that it was accurately
translated and reported. A careful scrutiny of her entire testimony reveals that what she
really meant was that Concordia on the following day, June 2, recounted to her, as
Concordia recounted also to Epifania, how she was maltreated by Monleon. In all
probability what happened was that Clemencia, on arriving at her house at around eight
o'clock in the evening of June 1, apprised her husband that she witnessed the assault
made by Monleon on her sister, Concordia.
People v. Salison, 253 SCRA 758 (1996)
Facts: At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of November 30, 1990, witness Maria
Magdalena Ayola saw appellant Salison approach the victim, Rolando Valmoria, who was
then watching television in a store. Salison placed his arm around Valmoria's shoulder
and brought him behind a neighbor's house where there was a mango tree. There,
appellant Salison boxed Valmoria in the abdomen.
During the fistfight between Salison and Valmoria, the three other accused Andiente,
Dignaran and Fediles suddenly appeared and joined the fight and simultaneously
attacked Valmoria. It was then when witness Emilia Fernandez approached them that the
three co-accused disappeared, leaving Salison and Valmoria behind. Fernandez was able
to separate Salison from Valmoria. However, the three co-accused returned and started
to maul Valmoria again, with Salison rejoining the three in assaulting the victim.
When Valmoria fought back, accused Salison, Fediles and Andiente picked up pieces of
wood and started to hit Valmoria at the back on his nape, and on the rear part of his
head, Valmoria fell to the ground and, upon finding a chance to do so, he stood up and
ran towards his house which was a few meters away. The assailants followed Valmoria
but failed to further hit the victim because Valmoria was able to hide inside his house.
During this time, the victim remained seated inside the house. Shortly thereafter,
Valmoria started to complain of dizziness and pain in his head which was bleeding at that
time.
Consequently, at the request of Valmoria, his parents accompanied him to the house of
witness Patricia Alcoseba, the purok leader. The victim asked Alcoseba to write down his
declaration regarding the incident explaining that if he should die and no witness would
testify, his written declaration could be utilized as evidence.
After making that declaration in the house of witness Alcoseba, Valmoria and his parents
proceeded to the hospital. Subsequently, the victim was allowed to go home. However,
at 4:00 o'clock the following morning, he started to convulse and was rushed to the
hospital. After three days there, Valmoria died.
Issue: May the statement of the victim be admitted as a dying declaration?
Held: What further strengthens the case of the prosecution was the declaration of
Valmoria, made and signed by him right after the incident, as to who were responsible
for the injuries he sustained.
Appellant, however, maintains that said written statement, which was reduced into
writing by witness Patricia Alcoseba and purporting to be a dying declaration, is
inadmissible as evidence since it was in the Cebuano regional language and was not
accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino. The appellant further contends that
the declaration was not made under the consciousness of an impending death.
The records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of
the declaration. Thus, the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the
time of its submission as evidence. The declaration can be translated into English or
Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence and forms part of the record.
As earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain.
He expressed a belief on his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be
used as evidence regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say so if he
believes he would recover and be able to testify against his assailants. At all events,
assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as
part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under
the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive.
People v. Lazaro, 317 SCRA 435 (1999)
Facts: The accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. To
prove that the accused was not a registered owner of a gun, the Prosecution introduced
as evidence a certification dated August 20, 1991, issued by Supt. Antonio T. Sierra,
Chief of the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) at Camp Crame. The certification
stated that accused-appellant is not a licensed or registered firearm holder of any kind or
caliber.
The defense objected saying that it was hearsay because the person certifying was not
presented in court. The TC however admitted the same.
The accused was found guilty by the TC.
Issue: Whether or not the certificate is admissible and if it is, was it sufficient.
Held: On several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a
representative of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting
that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the second element of possession of illegal firearms. Moreover, the rule on
hearsay evidence admits of several exceptions.
One such exception is that provided for under Rule 130, Section 44, Entries in official
records.
Relative to this provision, Rule 132, Section 28 of the same Rules allows the admission of
the said document.
In the case at bench, the Certification issued by the Commanding Officer of the PNPFirearm
and Explosives Office, which is the repository of all records regarding firearms in
the Philippines, is competent and admissible evidence to prove that accused-appellant is
not a licensed holder or possessor of a firearm of any kind or caliber. Indeed, the
certificate of a custodian that he has diligently searched for a document or an entry of a
specified tenor and has been unable to find it ought to be as satisfactory an evidence of
its non-existence in his office as his testimony on the stand to this effect would be.
IBM Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117221, April 13, 1999
V.Offer and Objection
1. Rule 132 §34-40
Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified. (35)
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Sec. 35. When to make offer. – As regards the testimony of a witness, the
offer must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of
a party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed
by the court to be done in writing.(n)
When to make offer
a. testimony – the time the witness is called to testify
b. documentary and object – after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence
Offer of evidence shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.
Offer of evidence Identification of evidence
Sec. 36. Objection. – Objection to evidence offered orally must be made
immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of
a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days
after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.(36 a)
When objection to evidence offered must be made
a. orally – immediately after the offer is made.
b. in writing – within 3 days after notice of the offer, unless a different period is
allowed by the court.
c. a question propounded in the course of the oral examination – as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
The grounds for the objections should always be specified.
Grounds for objection
a. Hearsay
b. argumentative
c. leading
d. misleading
e. incompetent
f. irrelevant
g. best evidence rule
h. parole evidence rule
i. question has no basis
j.
Sec. 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. – When it becomes
reasonably apparent in the course of the examination of a witness that the
questions being propounded are of the same class as those to which objection
has been made, whether such objection was sustained or overruled, it shall
not be necessary to repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse
party to record his continuing objection to such class of questions. (37 a)
Requisites for a proper continuing objection
a. in the course of the examination of a witness
b. objection has been made
c. reasonably apparent that the questions being propounded are of the same class as
those to which objection has been made
d. adverse party records his continuing objection to such class of questions
Sec. 38. Ruling. – The ruling of the court must be given immediately after
the objection is made, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to
inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall always be made
during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it is made
an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated.
However, if the objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining
the objection on one or some of them must specify the ground or grounds
relied upon. (38 a)
The ruling of the court on an objection
a. must be given immediately after the objection is made
b. unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question
presented; but the ruling shall always be made
i. during the trial and
ii. at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to
meet the situation presented by the ruling.
GR: The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated.
Exception: If the objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the
objection on one or some of them must specify the ground or grounds relied upon.
Escolin: The parties may ask for the ground for the ruling, even if the rules does not
require the judge to so state.
Sec. 39. Striking out answer. – Should a witness answer the question before
the adverse party had the opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same,
and such objection is found to be meritorious, the court shall sustain the
objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers
which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. (n)
Requisites for Striking out an answer
a. witness answers the question before the adverse party had the opportunity to
voice fully its objection
b. objection is found to be meritorious
c. court order that the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which are
incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper.
Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. – If documents or things offered in
evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to
or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may
state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness
and the substance of the proposed testimony. (n)
If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the
offeror may
a. have the same attached to or made part of the record, if the evidence is object or
documentary
b. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record
i. the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
ii. the substance of the proposed testimony. People v. Cariño, 165 SCRA 664 (1988)
2. Cases De los Reyes v. IAC, 176 SCRA 394 (1989)
a.When evidence considered offered The petitioner obtained a loan in the amount of P3,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Bauan and secured
People v. Franco, 269 SCRA 211 (1997) the payment thereof with a real estate mortgage on a piece of land belonging to her. For her failure to
The court shall consider no evidence, even an extra-judicial confession, which has not pay the debt, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the land was sold at public auction to
been formally offered. Mere fact that evidence has been identified and marked in the the private respondents for P4,925.00 on April 29, 1976. 1 The certificate of sale was registered with
course of the examination of a witness, without the contents being recited in his the Register of Deeds of Batangas on May 4,1977. 2
testimony, does not mean that it has been formally offered as evidence. Identification of On August 26, 1977, the private respondents filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
documentary evidence is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the Batangas asking the petitioner to vacate the property and remove her improvements thereon. The
marking of the evidence as an exhibit, while the formal offer of documentary evidence is petitioner countered that the auction sale was irregular and void and asked that the complaint be
done only when the party rests its case. dismissed.
PB Com v. CA, 195 SCRA 567 (1991) While this case was pending, the petitioner wrote a letter dated April , 1978, to the Provincial Sheriff
Where the genuineness and due execution of documents of an instrument attached to a of Batangas tendering the amount of P4,925.00 plus interest as the redemption price for the subject
complaint are deemed admitted by failure to specifically deny it under oath, such land. In a reply dated April 26, 1978, the said officer refused to accept the tender on the ground that
instruments are considered as evidence although they were not formally offered. the period of redemption had already expired. He added, though, that the petitioner's request was
Escolin: cf Rule 8, Sec. 8 "being seriously considered."
Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. — When an action or defense is founded upon a written The petitioner's letter 3 is reproduced as follows:
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, MENDOZA, PANGANIBAN & MACARANDANG LAW OFFICE
the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse Cor. Rizal Avenue & P. Zamora St., Batangas City
party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the Manghinao, Bauan Batangas
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the April , 1978
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused. The Provincial Sheriff
(8a) Province of Batangas
Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991) Capitol Site, Batangas City
Mere fact that a document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has been offered as Dear Sir:
evidence. Marking at the pre-trial was only for the purpose of identifying them at that I hereby tender to your good office the redemption price of FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
time. However, if an exhibit has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and has TWENTY FIVE (P4,925.00) PESOS, plus the interest of 1 % per month for the said principal amount
itself been incorporated into the records (i.e. recital of the contents of the exhibit). for the land your Office allegedly sold at auction sale on April 29, 1976 at Bauan, Batangas. The land
b.When objection make subject of said sale is more particularly described as follows:
People v. Java, 227 SCRA 668 (1993) A residential and horticultural land under Tax Declaration No. 20729 in the names of plaintiffs, located
Objection to testimony on the ground of lack of a formal offer of the testimony should be at Manghinao, Bauan, Batangas with a total area of 1,608 square meters, more or less and a total
done when the witness was called to testify. assessed value of P 3,640.00 bounded on the North by Manghinao Bridge, on the East by Manghinao
Catuira v. CA, 236 SCRA 398 (1994) River, on the South by Basilia de los Reyes and on the West by Provincial Road.
Failure to object upon the time a witness is called to testify on the ground that there was I wish to inform your good office that while the alleged sale of afore-described property was made on
no formal offer of the testimony is a waiver of the objection. Objection on such ground April 29, 1976, the registration of the sale was made on May 4, 1977.
after the witness has testified is too late. Please acknowledge receipt hereof.
Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990) Truly yours,
Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered (i.e. (Sgd.) JUANA DE LOS REYES
when the party rests its case) as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time The reply 4 of the Provincial Sheriff ran thus:
(e.g. identification of the evidence) is premature. Mere identification and marking is not REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
equivalent to a formal offer of the evidence. A party may decide to not offer evidence OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
already identified and marked. BATANGAS CITY
de Leon: Note that the court also said that there was no continuing objection because April 26, 1978
continuing objections are applicable when there is a single objection to a class of Mrs. Juana de los Reyes
evidence. This ruling is no longer applicable because the new rules on evidence is now Manghinao, Bauan, Batangas
clear that continuing objections are applicable only to testimonial evidence. Madam:
de Leon: Does this mean that party may remain silent when inadmissible evidence is Replying your letter dated April 1978, much to our desire to accommodate your request, we regret to
being identified and marked, and then object when it is formally offered? Interpacific inform you that we could not for the meantime accept the redemption amount you are tendering to
Transit was explicit when it said “What really matters is the objection to the document at this Office for as per Certificate of Sale dated April 29, 1976, the period of redemption of the property
the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.” described in your said letter had already expired. Nevertheless, your request is being seriously
de Leon: What if after an exhibit has been identified, marked, and its contents recited, considered by this office.
the offeror decides not to formally offer it into evidence. Is the court authorized to  
consider such exhibit on the strength of the ruling in Tabuena? I would say “yes” Very truly yours,
because the recital of the contents of the exhibit is now part of the testimony of the (Sgd.) EUSTACIO C. CUEVAS
witness which has been formally offered. Provincial Sheriff
On May 9, 1978, the trial court issued the following order: 5
It appearing from the pleadings that the question involved here is whether the redemption period, as
alleged in the complaint, begins from the date of the extrajudicial sale of the property in question on
April 29, 1976, and not on May 4, 1977, the date on which the sale was registered with the Register
of Deeds as contended by the defendant, and that the defendant is ready to pay the redemption price
but which was refused by the plaintiffs; that, in fact, the defendant tendered payment to the
Provincial Sheriff of Batangas on April 25, 1978, which tender is still under consideration by said
officer;
Wherefore, the defendant is hereby allowed to deposit the amount for the redemption of the property
with this Court.
SO ORDERED.
On February 8, 1982, the trial court, after holding that there was no genuine issue on the material
facts and that the only question of law to be resolved was the timeliness of the redemption, rendered
a summary judgment in favor of the private respondents. 6 The petitioner appealed. Judge Romeo R.
Silva's decision was affirmed in toto 7 by the respondent court, which is now sought to be reversed in
this petition for review.
This petition was originally denied by the Court in a resolution dated October 6, 1986, for lack of
merit. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in which he complained that his
reply to the private respondents' comment had not been taken into account when the said resolution
was issued.
Filing of a reply is not a matter of right and may be done only if required or allowed by the Court;
otherwise, it need not be considered at all (especially if, as in this case, it was hardly
legible).lâwphî1.ñèt Even so, in view of the serious issues raised in the said motion, the Court
resolved to direct the private respondents to comment thereon (to which a reply was submitted,
followed by a rejoinder and then a sur-rejoinder all without being required or permitted by the Court).
Finally, in our resolution dated September 22, 1987, we decided to give due course to this petition
and to require the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda.
We find that several of the issue raised in this litigation can be resolved at the outset as they pose no
serious controversy.
First, the private respondents argue that the tender of payment made by the petitioner was
inefficacious because it was made to the sheriff and not the purchaser as required by Rule 39, Section
30, of the Rules of Court. However, while it is admittedly stated therein that the judgment debtor or
redemptioner "may redeem the property from the purchaser," it is also provided in Section 31 of the
same rule that:
... The payments mentioned in this and the last preceding sections may be made to the purchaser or
redemptioner, or for him to the officer who made the sale.
And as observed by Chief Justice Moran in his definitive work on the Rules of Court:
... It is expressly provided that the tender of the redemption money may be made either to the
purchaser or redemptioner, or to the sheriff who made the sale, and, in the last instance, it is the
duty of the sheriff to accept the tender and execute the certificate of redemption. 8
xxx
The sheriff to whom payment may be made, is not necessarily the same sheriff who conducted the
sale, if the latter is no longer in office, in which case payment may be made to his successor. And
when the sale was made by a deputy sheriff, the redemption money may be paid to the provincial
sheriff. 9
Second, on the sufficiency of the amount tendered, Section 30 clearly states that it should be
equivalent to the amount of the purchase price plus one per cent monthly interest up to the time of
the redemption. In the petitioner's letter to the provincial sheriff, she tendered the amount of
P4,925.00 with interest. This was refused by the said officer on the ground that the redemption period
had expired. The trial and respondent courts, for their part, later considered the tender insufficient.
It must be recalled that pursuant to the order of the trial judge on May 9, 1978, the petitioner
deposited on that date the amount of P6,107.00. This was exactly equivalent to the purchase price
plus the accrued 1% monthly interest thereon as of that date.
Finally, there is the question of the starting point of the redemption period which, the petitioner
argues, started on May 4, 1977, and ended on May 4, 1978. This means that the tender she made to
the Provincial Sheriff on April 26,1978, was within the one-year period prescribed by the Rules of
Court.
While agreeing that the period did end on May 4, 1978, the trial and respondent courts held
nevertheless that this was exceeded by the petitioner because the original amount tendered on April
26, 1978 was insufficient. As the discrepancy was corrected only on May 9, 1978, the redemption was
in their view made four days late.
We have already observed that the amount tendered on April 26, 1978, was not insufficient as the
petitioner offered the sum of P 4,925.00 "plus the interest of 1% per month for the said principal
amount." In fact, the deposit made on May 9, 1978, was merely an affirmation of the earlier offer and
was not even necessary at all. According to Chief Justice Moran again:
Where the judgment debtor or a redemptioner validly tenders the necessary payment for the
redemption and the tender is refused, it is not necessary that it be followed by the deposit of the
money in court or elsewhere, and no interest after such tender is demandable on the redemption
money. 10
The basic question in this case is whether or not the petitioner's letter tendering the redemption price
to the sheriff and the latter's reply thereto may be taken into account in determining the timeliness of
the redemption.
The private respondents question the admissibility of these documents, stressing that they have not
at any time been formally offered. The petitioner contends otherwise. She maintains that they were
part of the record of the case and that the trial judge had a right and duty to consider them in
arriving at his summary judgment.
The private respondents insist that the two letters had never been offered in evidence as required by
Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. This provides that:
Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
We find, however, that the letters were formally submitted during the hearing of the petitioner's
motion to dismiss on May 9,1978, at which counsel for both parties were present. 11 Judge Benjamin
Relova took cognizance of the correspondence and even noted in his order of the same date that "the
defendant tendered payment to the Provincial Sheriff of Batangas on April 25, 1978, which tender is
still under consideration by said officer. 12 The same posture was taken by the respondent court,
which observed from the petitioner's letter that "what was tendered to the sheriff was only the
amount of the bid, P4, 925, 13 and held this to be insufficient.
In other words, both courts found as established facts the tender made by the petitioner and the
rejection thereof by the sheriff as manifested in their respective letters.
While the above-cited provision must be strictly interpreted in ordinary trials, such a policy is hardly
applicable in summary proceedings where no full-blown trial is held in the interest of a speedy
administration of justice. It is noted that when the two letters were presented at the hearing on May
9, 1978, the private respondents did not object to their admission. They did so only when the case
was already on appeal. Furthermore, the rule on summary judgments is that the judge must base his
decision on the pleadings, depositions, admissions affidavits and documents on file with the court.
This is what the trial judge did, presumably after examining the authenticity and credibility of the
evidence before him.
We hold therefore that the lower court did not err when it took into account Exhibits A and A-1,
without objection from the private respondents, as evidence of the petitioner's timely offer of
redemption and its erroneous rejection by the sheriff.
At this point, it is well to recall the following pronouncements from this Court:
Finally, the appellant bank objects to the redemption on the ground that the amount tendered is
inadequate to meet the redemption price. Considering, however, that the sum tendered was the
amount of the purchase price paid at the auction sale and that the tender was timely made and in
good faith, we believe that the ends of justice would be better served by affording the appellees the
opportunity to redeem the property by paying the bank the auction purchase price plus 1% interest
per month thereon up to the time of redemption. 14
xxx
Considering that appellee tendered payment only of the sum of P317.44, whereas the three parcels of
land she was seeking to redeem were sold for the sums of Pl,240.00, P21,000.00, and P30,000.00,
respectively, the aforementioned amount of P 317.44 is insufficient to effectively release the
properties. However, the tender of payment was timely made and in good faith; in the interest of
justice we incline to give the appellee opportunity to complete the redemption purchase of the three
parcels, as provided in Section 26, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from the
time this decision becomes final and executory. In this wise, justice is done to the appellee who had
been made to pay more than her share in the judgment, without doing all injustice to the purchaser
who shall get the corresponding interest of 1 % per month on the amount of as purchase up to the
time of redemption. 15
The rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of the property. The fact
alone that he is allowed the right to redeem clearly demonstrates the tenderness of the law toward
him in giving him another opportunity, should his fortunes improve, to recover his lost property. This
benign motivation would be frustrated by a too literal reading that would subordinate the warm spirit
of the rule to its cold language.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated February 8, 1982, is SET ASIDE. The decision of the
respondent court dated April 3,1986, is also REVERSED insofar as it denies the petitioner the right of
redemption. The private respondents are hereby directed to allow the petitioner to redeem the
disputed property for the amount of P6,107.00, now on deposit with the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas. It is so ordered.
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 940 (1955)
In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan
Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having
conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City). Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the
prosecution had been presenting its evidence. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while
the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of
Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made
before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso
Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it
was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The Court below
ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the
prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a
number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. Thereafter, according to the transcript, the
following remarks were made:
FISCAL LUSTRE:
May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the confession of Consunji as
against the accused Consunji himself?
COURT:
That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a
confession unless you prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and
circumstances as required by law. Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9
The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but again the
motion was denied. Wherefore, this petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the
Solicitor General, for the review and annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding any
evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban
without prior proof of conspiracy.
We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete
exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the
stage of the trial when the ruling was made.
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession
of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.
SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt
as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be
competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove
conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession
of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43
Phil. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been
admitted as such.
The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of
Rule 123, providing that:
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the
unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession
made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9
Phil., 613; U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718; People vs. Nakpil, 52
Phil., 985).
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two
accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in
tape recordings) had not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for
the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less formally offered in evidence. For all we know,
the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and
Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that
section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was premature for the
respondent Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of
conspiracy.
It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis
of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which
the Court issued motu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession as evidence of
the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the
Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection to the confessions — that it could
not be admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such
conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely excluded
the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere
privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably
made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard
the evidence (Marcella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).
We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual
extrajudicial confessions of two or more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between
them through the identity of the confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not
before us and have not even been formally offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that
the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the
parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the
prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the
charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should
be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of
evidence, should be excluded.
Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix
Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:
In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously
administered in the courts where trial objections to the admission of proof are received with least
favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical
objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible
for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any
certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the
part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon
the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be
remembered that in the heat of the battle over which the presides, a judge of first instance may
possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact
shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court,
upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error
without returning the case for a new trial, — a step which this Court is always very loath to take. On
the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form,
materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial
judge is supposed to know the law; and it is duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish
the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause
is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court then has all the material before it
necessary to make a correct judgment.
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to
admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the
erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no
longer appeal.
Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban
is annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with
law and this opinion. Costs against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban. So ordered.
PHILAMGEN v. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194 (1992)
A maritime suit 1 was commenced on May 12, 1978 by herein Petitioner Philippine American General
Insurance Co., Inc. (Philamgen) and Tagum Plastics, Inc. (TPI) against private respondents Sweet
Lines, Inc. (SLI) and Davao Veterans Arrastre and Port Services, Inc. (DVAPSI), along with S.C.I. Line
(The Shipping Corporation of India Limited) and F.E. Zuellig, Inc., as co-defendants in the court a
quo, seeking recovery of the cost of lost or damaged shipment plus exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and costs allegedly due to defendants' negligence, with the following factual backdrop yielded by
the findings of the court below and adopted by respondent court:
It would appear that in or about March 1977, the vessel SS "VISHVA YASH" belonging to or operated
by the foreign common carrier, took on board at Baton Rouge, LA, two (2) consignments of cargoes
for shipment to Manila and later for transhipment to Davao City, consisting of 600 bags Low Density
Polyethylene 631 and another 6,400 bags Low Density Polyethylene 647, both consigned to the order
of Far East Bank and Trust Company of Manila, with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics, Inc., Madaum,
Tagum, Davao City. Said cargoes were covered, respectively, by Bills of Lading Nos. 6 and 7 issued by
the foreign common carrier (Exhs. E and F). The necessary packing or Weight List (Exhs. A and B), as
well as the Commercial Invoices (Exhs. C and D) accompanied the shipment. The cargoes were
likewise insured by the Tagum Plastics Inc. with plaintiff Philippine American General Insurance Co.,
Inc., (Exh. G).
In the course of time, the said vessel arrived at Manila and discharged its cargoes in the Port of
Manila for transhipment to Davao City. For this purpose, the foreign carrier awaited and made use of
the services of the vessel called M/V "Sweet Love" owned and operated by defendant interisland
carrier.
Subject cargoes were loaded in Holds Nos. 2 and 3 of the interisland carrier. These were commingled
with similar cargoes belonging to Evergreen Plantation and also Standfilco.
On May 15, 1977, the shipment(s) were discharged from the interisland carrier into the custody of the
consignee. A later survey conducted on July 8, 1977, upon the instance of the plaintiff, shows the
following:
Of the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. 25 or (2)6, supposed to contain 6,400 bags of Low Density
Polyethylene 647 originally inside 160 pallets, there were delivered to the consignee 5,413 bags in
good order condition. The survey shows shortages, damages and losses to be as follows:
Undelivered/Damaged bags as tallied during discharge from vessel-173 bags; undelivered and
damaged as noted and observed whilst stored at the pier-699 bags; and shortlanded-110 bags (Exhs.
P and P-1).
Of the 600 bags of Low Density Polyethylene 631, the survey conducted on the same day shows an
actual delivery to the consignee of only 507 bags in good order condition. Likewise noted were the
following losses, damages and shortages, to wit:
Undelivered/damaged bags and tally sheets during discharge from vessel-17 bags.
Undelivered and damaged as noted and observed whilst stored at the pier-66 bags; Shortlanded-10
bags.
Therefore, of said shipment totalling 7,000 bags, originally contained in 175 pallets, only a total of
5,820 bags were delivered to the consignee in good order condition, leaving a balance of 1,080 bags.
Such loss from this particular shipment is what any or all defendants may be answerable to (sic).
As already stated, some bags were either shortlanded or were missing, and some of the 1,080 bags
were torn, the contents thereof partly spilled or were fully/partially emptied, but, worse, the contents
thereof contaminated with foreign matters and therefore could no longer serve their intended
purpose. The position taken by the consignee was that even those bags which still had some contents
were considered as total losses as the remaining contents were contaminated with foreign matters
and therefore did not (sic) longer serve the intended purpose of the material. Each bag was valued,
taking into account the customs duties and other taxes paid as well as charges and the conversion
value then of a dollar to the peso, at P110.28 per bag (see Exhs. L and L-1 M and O). 2
Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into between petitioners, as plaintiffs, and
defendants S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig, upon the latter's payment of P532.65 in settlement of the
claim against them. Whereupon, the trial court in its order of August 12, 1981 3 granted plaintiffs'
motion to dismiss grounded on said amicable settlement and the case as to S.C.I. Line and F.E.
Zuellig was consequently "dismissed with prejudice and without pronouncement as to costs."
The trial court thereafter rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners on this dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Philippine General American
Insurance Company Inc. and against the remaining defendants, Sweet Lines Inc. and Davao Veterans
Arrastre Inc. as follows:
Defendant Sweet Lines, Inc. is ordered to pay said plaintiff the sum of P34,902.00, with legal interest
thereon from date of extrajudicial demand on April 28, 1978 (Exh. M) until fully paid;
Defendant Sweet Lines Inc. and Davao Veterans Arrastre and (Port) Services Inc. are directed to pay
jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of P49,747.55, with legal interest thereon from April 28,
1978 until fully paid;
Each of said defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs the additional sum of P5,000 is reimbursable
attorney's fees and other litigation expenses;
Each of said defendants shall pay one-fourth (1/4) costs. 4
Due to the reversal on appeal by respondent court of the trial court's decision on the ground of
prescription, 5 in effect dismissing the complaint of herein petitioners, and the denial of their motion
for reconsideration, 6 petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, faulting respondent
appellate court with the following errors: (1) in upholding, without proof, the existence of the so-
called prescriptive period; (2) granting arguendo that the said prescriptive period does exist, in not
finding the same to be null and void; and (3) assuming arguendo that the said prescriptive period is
valid and legal, in failing to conclude that petitioners substantially complied therewith. 7
Parenthetically, we observe that herein petitioners are jointly pursuing this case, considering their
common interest in the shipment subject of the present controversy, to obviate any question as to
who the real party in interest is and to protect their respective rights as insurer and insured. In any
case, there is no impediment to the legal standing of Petitioner Philamgen, even if it alone were to
sue herein private respondents in its own capacity as insurer, it having been subrogated to all rights
of recovery for loss of or damage to the shipment insured under its Marine Risk Note No. 438734
dated March 31, 1977 8 in view of the full settlement of the claim thereunder as evidenced by the
subrogation receipt 9 issued in its favor by Far East Bank and Trust Co., Davao Branch, for the
account of petitioner TPI.
Upon payment of the loss covered by the policy, the insurer's entitlement to subrogation pro tanto,
being of the highest equity, equips it with a cause of action against a third party in case of contractual
breach. 10 Further, the insurer's subrogatory right to sue for recovery under the bill of lading in case of
loss of or damage to the cargo is jurisprudentially upheld. 11 However, if an insurer, in the exercise of
its subrogatory right, may proceed against the erring carrier and for all intents and purposes stands in
the place and in substitution of the consignee, a fortiori such insurer is presumed to know and is just
as bound by the contractual terms under the bill of lading as the insured.
On the first issue, petitioners contend that it was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse the
appealed decision on the supposed ground of prescription when SLI failed to adduce any evidence in
support thereof and that the bills of lading said to contain the shortened periods for filing a claim and
for instituting a court action against the carrier were never offered in evidence. Considering that the
existence and tenor of this stipulation on the aforesaid periods have allegedly not been established,
petitioners maintain that it is inconceivable how they can possibly comply therewith. 12 In refutation,
SLI avers that it is standard practice in its operations to issue bills of lading for shipments entrusted
to it for carriage and that it in fact issued bills of lading numbered MD-25 and MD-26 therefor with
proof of their existence manifest in the records of the case. 13 For its part, DVAPSI insists on the
propriety of the dismissal of the complaint as to it due to petitioners' failure to prove its direct
responsibility for the loss of and/or damage to the cargo. 14
On this point, in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals resolved that
although the bills of lading were not offered in evidence, the litigation obviously revolves on such bills
of lading which are practically the documents or contracts sued upon, hence, they are inevitably
involved and their provisions cannot be disregarded in the determination of the relative rights of the
parties thereto. 15
Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of prescription, since that defense was so
considered and controverted by the parties. This issue may accordingly be taken cognizance of by the
court even if not inceptively raised as a defense so long as its existence is plainly apparent on the
face of relevant pleadings. 16 In the case at bar, prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably
raised by SLI in its answer, 17 except that the bills of lading embodying the same were not formally
offered in evidence, thus reducing the bone of contention to whether or not prescription can be
maintained as such defense and, as in this case, consequently upheld on the strength of mere
references thereto.
As petitioners are suing upon SLI's contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as contained
in the bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable documents which under the
Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, 18 and the genuineness and
due execution of which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse
party. 19 The rules on actionable documents cover and apply to both a cause of action or defense
based on said documents. 20
In the present case and under the aforestated assumption that the time limit involved is a prescriptive
period, respondent carrier duly raised prescription as an affirmative defense in its answer setting forth
paragraph 5 of the pertinent bills of lading which comprised the stipulation thereon by parties, to wit:
5. Claims for shortage, damage, must be made at the time of delivery to consignee or agent, if
container shows exterior signs of damage or shortage. Claims for non-delivery, misdelivery, loss or
damage must be filed within 30 days from accrual. Suits arising from shortage, damage or loss, non-
delivery or misdelivery shall be instituted within 60 days from date of accrual of right of action. Failure
to file claims or institute judicial proceedings as herein provided constitutes waiver of claim or right of
action. In no case shall carrier be liable for any delay, non-delivery, misdelivery, loss of damage to
cargo while cargo is not in actual custody of carrier. 21
In their reply thereto, herein petitioners, by their own assertions that —
2. In connection with Pars. 14 and 15 of defendant Sweet Lines, Inc.'s Answer, plaintiffs state that
such agreements are what the Supreme Court considers as contracts of adhesion (see Sweet Lines,
Inc. vs. Hon. Bernardo Teves, et al., G.R. No. L-37750, May 19, 1978) and, consequently, the
provisions therein which are contrary to law and public policy cannot be availed of by answering
defendant as valid defenses. 22
thereby failed to controvert the existence of the bills of lading and the aforequoted provisions therein,
hence they impliedly admitted the same when they merely assailed the validity of subject stipulations.
Petitioners' failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of
the instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by
the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are
conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown
to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 23 Moreover, when
the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse
party's failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented
formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact. 24
Even granting that petitioners' averment in their reply amounts to a denial, it has the procedural
earmarks of what in the law on pleadings is called a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with
the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It
is in effect an admission of the averment it is directed to. 25 Thus, while petitioners objected to the
validity of such agreement for being contrary to public policy, the existence of the bills of lading and
said stipulations were nevertheless impliedly admitted by them.
We find merit in respondent court's comments that petitioners failed to touch on the matter of the
non-presentation of the bills of lading in their brief and earlier on in the appellate proceedings in this
case, hence it is too late in the day to now allow the litigation to be overturned on that score, for to
do so would mean an over-indulgence in technicalities. Hence, for the reasons already advanced, the
non-inclusion of the controverted bills of lading in the formal offer of evidence cannot, under the facts
of this particular case, be considered a fatal procedural lapse as would bar respondent carrier from
raising the defense of prescription. Petitioners' feigned ignorance of the provisions of the bills of
lading, particularly on the time limitations for filing a claim and for commencing a suit in court, as
their excuse for non-compliance therewith does not deserve serious attention.
It is to be noted that the carriage of the cargo involved was effected pursuant to an "Application for
Delivery of Cargoes without Original Bill of Lading" issued on May 20, 1977 in Davao City 26 with the
notation therein that said application corresponds to and is subject to the terms of bills of lading MD-
25 and MD-26. It would be a safe assessment to interpret this to mean that, sight unseen, petitioners
acknowledged the existence of said bills of lading. By having the cargo shipped on respondent
carrier's vessel and later making a claim for loss on the basis of the bills of lading, petitioners for all
intents and purposes accepted said bills. Having done so they are bound by all stipulations contained
therein. 27 Verily, as petitioners are suing for recovery on the contract, and in fact even went as far as
assailing its validity by categorizing it as a contract of adhesion, then they necessarily admit that
there is such a contract, their knowledge of the existence of which with its attendant stipulations they
cannot now be allowed to deny.
On the issue of the validity of the controverted paragraph 5 of the bills of lading above quoted which
unequivocally prescribes a time frame of thirty (30) days for filing a claim with the carrier in case of
loss of or damage to the cargo and sixty (60) days from accrual of the right of action for instituting an
action in court, which periods must concur, petitioners posit that the alleged shorter prescriptive
period which is in the nature of a limitation on petitioners' right of recovery is unreasonable and that
SLI has the burden of proving otherwise, citing the earlier case of Southern Lines, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. 28 They postulate this on the theory that the bills of lading containing the same
constitute contracts of adhesion and are, therefore, void for being contrary to public policy,
supposedly pursuant to the dictum in Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves, et al. 29
Furthermore, they contend, since the liability of private respondents has been clearly established, to
bar petitioners' right of recovery on a mere technicality will pave the way for unjust
enrichment. 30 Contrarily, SLI asserts and defends the reasonableness of the time limitation within
which claims should be filed with the carrier; the necessity for the same, as this condition for the
carrier's liability is uniformly adopted by nearly all shipping companies if they are to survive the
concomitant rigors and risks of the shipping industry; and the countervailing balance afforded by such
stipulation to the legal presumption of negligence under which the carrier labors in the event of loss of
or damage to the cargo. 31
It has long been held that Article 366 of the Code of Commerce applies not only to overland and river
transportation but also to maritime
transportation. 32 Moreover, we agree that in this jurisdiction, as viewed from another angle, it is
more accurate to state that the filing of a claim with the carrier within the time limitation therefor
under Article 366 actually constitutes a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against
a carrier for damages caused to the merchandise. The shipper or the consignee must allege and prove
the fulfillment of the condition and if he omits such allegations and proof, no right of action against
the carrier can accrue in his favor. As the requirements in Article 366, restated with a slight
modification in the assailed paragraph 5 of the bills of lading, are reasonable conditions precedent,
they are not limitations of action. 33 Being conditions precedent, their performance must precede a
suit for enforcement 34 and the vesting of the right to file spit does not take place until the happening
of these conditions. 35
Now, before an action can properly be commenced all the essential elements of the cause of action
must be in existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions precedent to
the institution of the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by agreement of the
parties or implied by law must be performed or complied with before commencing the action, unless
the conduct of the adverse party has been such as to prevent or waive performance or excuse non-
performance of the condition. 36
It bears restating that a right of action is the right to presently enforce a cause of action, while a
cause of action consists of the operative facts which give rise to such right of action. The right of
action does not arise until the performance of all conditions precedent to the action and may be taken
away by the running of the statute of limitations, through estoppel, or by other circumstances which
do not affect the cause of action. 37 Performance or fulfillment of all conditions precedent upon which
a right of action depends must be sufficiently alleged, 38 considering that the burden of proof to show
that a party has a right of action is upon the person initiating the suit. 39
More particularly, where the contract of shipment contains a reasonable requirement of giving notice
of loss of or injury to the goods, the giving of such notice is a condition precedent to the action for
loss or injury or the right to enforce the carrier's liability. Such requirement is not an empty
formalism. The fundamental reason or purpose of such a stipulation is not to relieve the carrier from
just liability, but reasonably to inform it that the shipment has been damaged and that it is charged
with liability therefor, and to give it an opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the injury.
This protects the carrier by affording it an opportunity to make an investigation of a claim while the
matter is fresh and easily investigated so as to safeguard itself from false and fraudulent claims. 40
Stipulations in bills of lading or other contracts of shipment which require notice of claim for loss of or
damage to goods shipped in order to impose liability on the carrier operate to prevent the
enforcement of the contract when not complied with, that is, notice is a condition precedent and the
carrier is not liable if notice is not given in accordance with the stipulation, 41 as the failure to comply
with such a stipulation in a contract of carriage with respect to notice of loss or claim for damage bars
recovery for the loss or damage suffered. 42
On the other hand, the validity of a contractual limitation of time for filing the suit itself against a
carrier shorter than the statutory period therefor has generally been upheld as such stipulation merely
affects the shipper's remedy and does not affect the liability of the carrier. In the absence of any
statutory limitation and subject only to the requirement on the reasonableness of the stipulated
limitation period, the parties to a contract of carriage may fix by agreement a shorter time for the
bringing of suit on a claim for the loss of or damage to the shipment than that provided by the statute
of limitations. Such limitation is not contrary to public policy for it does not in any way defeat the
complete vestiture of the right to recover, but merely requires the assertion of that right by action at
an earlier period than would be necessary to defeat it through the operation of the ordinary statute of
limitations. 43
In the case at bar, there is neither any showing of compliance by petitioners with the requirement for
the filing of a notice of claim within the prescribed period nor any allegation to that effect. It may then
be said that while petitioners may possibly have a cause of action, for failure to comply with the
above condition precedent they lost whatever right of action they may have in their favor or, token in
another sense, that remedial right or right to relief had prescribed. 44
The shipment in question was discharged into the custody of the consignee on May 15, 1977, and it
was from this date that petitioners' cause of action accrued, with thirty (30) days therefrom within
which to file a claim with the carrier for any loss or damage which may have been suffered by the
cargo and thereby perfect their right of action. The findings of respondent court as supported by
petitioners' formal offer of evidence in the court below show that the claim was filed with SLI only on
April 28, 1978, way beyond the period provided in the bills of lading 45 and violative of the contractual
provision, the inevitable consequence of which is the loss of petitioners' remedy or right to sue. Even
the filing of the complaint on May 12, 1978 is of no remedial or practical consequence, since the time
limits for the filing thereof, whether viewed as a condition precedent or as a prescriptive period, would
in this case be productive of the same result, that is, that petitioners had no right of action to begin
with or, at any rate, their claim was time-barred.
What the court finds rather odd is the fact that petitioner TPI filed a provisional claim with DVAPSI as
early as June 14, 1977 46 and, as found by the trial court, a survey fixing the extent of loss of and/or
damage to the cargo was conducted on July 8, 1977 at the instance of petitioners. 47 If petitioners had
the opportunity and awareness to file such provisional claim and to cause a survey to be conducted
soon after the discharge of the cargo, then they could very easily have filed the necessary formal, or
even a provisional, claim with SLI itself 48 within the stipulated period therefor, instead of doing so
only on April 28, 1978 despite the vessel's arrival at the port of destination on May 15, 1977. Their
failure to timely act brings us to no inference other than the fact that petitioners slept on their rights
and they must now face the consequences of such inaction.
The ratiocination of the Court of Appeals on this aspect is worth reproducing:
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted, at this juncture, that the aforestated time limitation in the presentation of claim for
loss or damage, is but a restatement of the rule prescribed under Art. 366 of the Code of Commerce
which reads as follows:
Art. 366. Within the twenty-four hours following the receipt of the merchandise, the claim against the
carrier for damage or average which may be found therein upon opening the packages, may be made,
provided that the indications of the damage or average which gives rise to the claim cannot be
ascertained from the outside part of the packages, in which case the claims shall be admitted only at
the time of the receipt.
After the periods mentioned have elapsed, or the transportation charges have been paid, no claim
shall be admitted against the carrier with regard to the condition in which the goods transported were
delivered.
Gleanable therefrom is the fact that subject stipulation even lengthened the period for presentation of
claims thereunder. Such modification has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court. In the case of Ong
Yet (M)ua Hardware Co., Inc. vs. Mitsui Steamship Co., Ltd., et al., 59 O.G. No. 17, p. 2764, it ruled
that Art. 366 of the Code of Commerce can be modified by a bill of lading prescribing the period of 90
days after arrival of the ship, for filing of written claim with the carrier or agent, instead of the 24-
hour time limit after delivery provided in the aforecited legal provision.
Tested, too, under paragraph 5 of said Bill of Lading, it is crystal clear that the commencement of the
instant suit on May 12, 1978 was indeed fatally late. In view of the express provision that "suits
arising from
. . . damage or loss shall be instituted within 60 days from date of accrual of right of action," the
present action necessarily fails on ground of prescription.
In the absence of constitutional or statutory prohibition, it is usually held or recognized that it is
competent for the parties to a contract of shipment to agree on a limitation of time shorter than the
statutory period, within which action for breach of the contract shall be brought, and such limitation
will be enforced if reasonable . . . (13 C.J.S. 496-497)
A perusal of the pertinent provisions of law on the matter would disclose that there is no
constitutional or statutory prohibition infirming paragraph 5 of subject Bill of Lading. The stipulated
period of 60 days is reasonable enough for appellees to ascertain the facts and thereafter to sue, if
need be, and the 60-day period agreed upon by the parties which shortened the statutory period
within which to bring action for breach of contract is valid and binding. . . . (Emphasis in the original
text.) 49
As explained above, the shortened period for filing suit is not unreasonable and has in fact been
generally recognized to be a valid business practice in the shipping industry. Petitioners' advertence
to the Court's holding in the Southern Lines case, supra, is futile as what was involved was a claim for
refund of excess payment. We ruled therein that non-compliance with the requirement of filing a
notice of claim under Article 366 of the Code of Commerce does not affect the consignee's right of
action against the carrier because said requirement applies only to cases for recovery of damages on
account of loss of or damage to cargo, not to an action for refund of overpayment, and on the further
consideration that neither the Code of Commerce nor the bills of lading therein provided any time
limitation for suing for refund of money paid in excess, except only that it be filed within a reasonable
time.
The ruling in Sweet Lines categorizing the stipulated limitation on venue of action provided in the
subject bill of lading as a contract of adhesion and, under the circumstances therein, void for being
contrary to public policy is evidently likewise unavailing in view of the discrete environmental facts
involved and the fact that the restriction therein was unreasonable. In any case, Ong Yiu vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 50 instructs us that "contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready-made
form of contract on the other . . . are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres he gives his consent." In the present case,
not even an allegation of ignorance of a party excuses non-compliance with the contractual
stipulations since the responsibility for ensuring full comprehension of the provisions of a contract of
carriage devolves not on the carrier but on the owner, shipper, or consignee as the case may be.
While it is true that substantial compliance with provisions on filing of claim for loss of or damage to
cargo may sometimes suffice, the invocation of such an assumption must be viewed vis-a-vis the
object or purpose which such a provision seeks to attain and that is to afford the carrier a reasonable
opportunity to determine the merits and validity of the claim and to protect itself against unfounded
impositions. 51 Petitioners' would nevertheless adopt an adamant posture hinged on the issuance by
SLI of a "Report on Losses and Damages," dated May 15, 1977, 52 from which petitioners theorize that
this charges private respondents with actual knowledge of the loss and damage involved in the
present case as would obviate the need for or render superfluous the filing of a claim within the
stipulated period.
Withal, it has merely to be pointed out that the aforementioned report bears this notation at the lower
part thereof: "Damaged by Mla. labor upon unloading; B/L noted at port of origin," as an explanation
for the cause of loss of and/or damage to the cargo, together with an iterative note stating that
"(t)his Copy should be submitted together with your claim invoice or receipt within 30 days from date
of issue otherwise your claim will not be honored."
Moreover, knowledge on the part of the carrier of the loss of or damage to the goods deducible from
the issuance of said report is not equivalent to nor does it approximate the legal purpose served by
the filing of the requisite claim, that is, to promptly apprise the carrier about a consignee's intention
to file a claim and thus cause the prompt investigation of the veracity and merit thereof for its
protection. It would be an unfair imposition to require the carrier, upon discovery in the process of
preparing the report on losses or damages of any and all such loss or damage, to presume the
existence of a claim against it when at that time the carrier is expectedly concerned merely with
accounting for each and every shipment and assessing its condition. Unless and until a notice of claim
is therewith timely filed, the carrier cannot be expected to presume that for every loss or damage
tallied, a corresponding claim therefor has been filed or is already in existence as would alert it to the
urgency for an immediate investigation of the soundness of the claim. The report on losses and
damages is not the claim referred to and required by the bills of lading for it does not fix responsibility
for the loss or damage, but merely states the condition of the goods shipped. The claim contemplated
herein, in whatever form, must be something more than a notice that the goods have been lost or
damaged; it must contain a claim for compensation or indicate an intent to claim. 53
Thus, to put the legal effect of respondent carrier's report on losses or damages, the preparation of
which is standard procedure upon unloading of cargo at the port of destination, on the same level as
that of a notice of claim by imploring substantial compliance is definitely farfetched. Besides, the cited
notation on the carrier's report itself makes it clear that the filing of a notice of claim in any case is
imperative if carrier is to be held liable at all for the loss of or damage to cargo.
Turning now to respondent DVAPSI and considering that whatever right of action petitioners may
have against respondent carrier was lost due to their failure to seasonably file the requisite claim, it
would be awkward, to say the least, that by some convenient process of elimination DVAPSI should
proverbially be left holding the bag, and it would be pure speculation to assume that DVAPSI is
probably responsible for the loss of or damage to cargo. Unlike a common carrier, an arrastre
operator does not labor under a presumption of negligence in case of loss, destruction or deterioration
of goods discharged into its custody. In other words, to hold an arrastre operator liable for loss of
and/or damage to goods entrusted to it there must be preponderant evidence that it did not exercise
due diligence in the handling and care of the goods.
Petitioners failed to pinpoint liability on any of the original defendants and in this seemingly wild
goose-chase, they cannot quite put their finger down on when, where, how and under whose
responsibility the loss or damage probably occurred, or as stated in paragraph 8 of their basic
complaint filed in the court below, whether "(u)pon discharge of the cargoes from the original carrying
vessel, the SS VISHVA YASH," and/or upon discharge of the cargoes from the interisland vessel the
MV "SWEET LOVE," in Davao City and later while in the custody of defendant arrastre operator. 54
The testimony of petitioners' own witness, Roberto Cabato, Jr., Marine and Aviation Claims Manager
of petitioner Philamgen, was definitely inconclusive and the responsibility for the loss or damage could
still not be ascertained therefrom:
Q In other words, Mr. Cabato, you only computed the loss on the basis of the figures submitted to
you and based on the documents like the survey certificate and the certificate of the arrastre?
A Yes, sir.
Q Therefore, Mr. Cabato, you have no idea how or where these losses were incurred?
A No, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Mr. Witness, you said that you processed and investigated the claim involving the shipment in
question. Is it not a fact that in your processing and investigation you considered how the shipment
was transported? Where the losses could have occurred and what is the extent of the respective
responsibilities of the bailees and/or carriers involved?
x x x           x x x          x x x
A With respect to the shipment being transported, we have of course to get into it in order to check
whether the shipment coming in to this port is in accordance with the policy condition, like in this
particular case, the shipment was transported to Manila and transhipped through an interisland vessel
in accordance with the policy. With respect to the losses, we have a general view where losses could
have occurred. Of course we will have to consider the different bailees wherein the shipment must
have passed through, like the ocean vessel, the interisland vessel and the arrastre, but definitely at
that point and time we cannot determine the extent of each liability. We are only interested at that
point and time in the liability as regards the underwriter in accordance with the policy that we issued.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Mr. Witness, from the documents, namely, the survey of Manila Adjusters and Surveyors Company,
the survey of Davao Arrastre contractor and the bills of lading issued by the defendant Sweet Lines,
will you be able to tell the respective liabilities of the bailees and/or carriers concerned?
A No, sir. (Emphasis ours.) 55
Neither did nor could the trial court, much less the Court of Appeals, precisely establish the stage in
the course of the shipment when the goods were lost, destroyed or damaged. What can only be
inferred from the factual findings of the trial court is that by the time the cargo was discharged to
DVAPSI, loss or damage had already occurred and that the same could not have possibly occurred
while the same was in the custody of DVAPSI, as demonstrated by the observations of the trial court
quoted at the start of this opinion.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the dismissal of the
complaint in the court a quo as decreed by respondent Court of Appeals in its challenged judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Sheraton Palace v. Quijano, (C.A.) 64 O.G. 9116
FACTS:
The plaintiff in this case, Sheraton had instituted a suit for the recovery of a sum of money
amounting to $1,257.34 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency from defendant Cristina Quijano
for the latter’s alleged unpaid hotel charges when the defendant stayed and lodged in plaintiff’s
hotel in San Francisco, California. 
Plaintiff relies upon Exhibit E-1, which is a letter of Mueller and McLeod, plaintiff’s lawyer in the US, to
plaintiff’s counsel in the Philippines, in an attemptto show that it was the defendant who asked that
her hotel accounts be charged against FredDevine and Company, but the latter declined to pay the
bills claiming that it had not authorizedthe defendant to charge any of her hotel bills
to it. Such evidence was presented together with thetestimony of Atty. Syquia, the plaintiff’s counsel. 
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint alleging that defendant’s stay at the hotel
was as a guest of a certain Fred Devine whohad assumed to pay all the costs for his account.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Exhibit E-1 constitutes proof of facts related therein independent of the testimony of
Atty. Syquia.
RULING:
A document or writing which is admitted not as an independent evidence but
merely as part of the testimony of a witness or merely insofar as such witness has made reference
thereto in the course of his testimony, does not constitute proof of facts related therein. It was correct
forthe trial court not to admit the said documentary evidence as an independent piece of
evidence but merely as part of the testimony of Atty. Syquia or merely insofar as Atty.
Syquia has made reference thereto in the course of his testimony so that it cannot
constitute proof the facts relatedin the said exhibit.
Hence, the recitals contained in it about defendant’s request that the bills be charged against Fred
Devine, that the plaintiff extended credit to defendant but Fred Devine refused to pay on the ground
that it did not authorize the defendant to charge it with her hotel bills cannot now be considered as
evidence in this case as the appellant had not assigned as an error the ruling of the trial acourt
admitting the said exhibit merely as part of testimony of Atty. Syquia and not as independent
evidence.
Besides, the statements in Exh. E-1 to the effect that “when Ms. Quijano came to the hotel, she told
them that her bills would be charged to Fred Devine and Company” and that her request, credit was
extended to her and her bills were sent to Fred Devine and Company, which refused to pay the same
are hearsay in nature as they are based on info furnished to plaintiff’s lawyer in America, who wrote
the letter, thus having no probative force.
Vda. de Oñate v. CA, 250 SCRA 283 (1995)
Petitioners challenge the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by respondent court, for lack of basis.
They argue that the lower court and the Court of Appeals erred in considering evidence not formally
offered by private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The controversy involves Lot No. 1571, a riceland located at Toran, Aparri, Cagayan covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5168. On January 10, 1980, an action for specific performance with
damages was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan, Branch II by Eulalia Marcita Taguba
in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Leonor Taguba against Elvira Mato Vda.
de Oñate.
As the trial court found, the deceased Leonor Taguba bought the subject parcel of land from Elvira
Mato Vda. de Oñate sometime in 1976 for a consideration of P5,000.00 payable in four (4)
installments. Accordingly, she paid P2,250.00 on January 20, 1976, 1 P750.00 on February 23,
1976,2 P1,000.00 on March 20, 19763 and P1,000.00 on July 29, 1976.4 After full payment was made
on July 29, 1976, the parties however failed to reduce their contract in writing. On December 30,
1976, Leonor Taguba died. The instant complaint was filed when demand was made upon Elvira Mato
Vda. de Oñate to execute a public document of sale in favor of the deceased and her heirs and she
refused.
The trial court rejected the petitioners' defense that Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate contracted a verbal
loan from Leonor Taguba in the amount of P12,000.00 payable within a period of 4 years with 12%
interest. Also disbelieved was the allegation that two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. 5167 and
TCT No. 5168 (the land in dispute) were mortgaged by Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate to Leonor Taguba
as security for the payment of the loan and that only P5,000.00 of the P12,000.00 loan was given by
Taguba.
On July 12, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the agreement between the late Leonor Taguba and deceased defendant Elvira Mato Vda.
de Oñate entered into on 20 January 1976, as a contract of "to sell";
2. Ordering the defendants to execute the proper document to give effect to the contract within thirty
(30) days, otherwise, this Court shall be forced to order the cancellation of the certificate of title
covering Lot No. 1571 of the Aparri Cadastre, and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan to issue another
certificate of title in the name of the Estate of Leonor Taguba;
3. Ordering the plaintiff to prosecute their money claims against deceased defendant's estate in
accordance with Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioners appealed to respondent Court of Appeals faulting the trial court's factual findings. They
contended that the trial court erred when it took cognizance of the plaintiff's evidence, particularly
Exhibits "F," "F-1," "F-2" and "F-3", which had been marked but never formally submitted in evidence
as required by the Rules of Court. Consequently, it was claimed that the trial court erred in relying on
the said evidence in deciding for private respondents.
On December 13, 1993, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court. 6 In sustaining the
lower court, the respondent court held that Exhibits "F, "F-1," "F-2" and "F3" though not formally
offered, may still be admitted in evidence for having complied with the two (2) requisites for
admission enunciated in our jurisprudence,7 that is, (1) evidence must be duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and (2) it must be incorporated in the records of the case.
A motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied for lack of merit on June 13, 1994. 8
Hence, the present petition for review. Petitioners ascribe to the respondent court the following
errors, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE
MARKED AS EXHIBITS BUT NOT FORMALLY OFFERED ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT SINCE THERE WAS NO FIXED
PURCHASE PRICE OF THE LAND AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE COULD
NOT BE AVAILED BY THE BUYER TO FORCE THE OWNER OF THE LAND TO EXECUTE A DEED OF
SALE.9
Section 35 (now Section 34) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally
offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit
does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. In Interpacific
Transit, Inc. v. Aviles,10 we had the occasion to make a distinction between identification of
documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is done in the course of
the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the second is done
only when the party rests its case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his
evidence if he believes that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to
do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
However, in People v. Napat-a11 citing People v. Mate,12 we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following
requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.
In the case at bench, we find, as respondent court did, that these requisites have been satisfied.
The evidence in question refers to Exhibits "F," receipt for P2,250.00 dated January 20, 1976; "F-1,"
receipt for P750.00 dated February 23, 1976, "F-2," receipt for P1,000.00 dated March 20, 1976; and
"F-3," receipt for another P1,000.00 dated July 29, 1976, all showing the varying amounts paid by
Leonor Taguba to Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate. These exhibits were marked at the pre-trial for the
purpose of identifying them. In fact, the payment of P5,000.00 was admitted by herein petitioners in
the same pre-trial. On March 5, 1984, Eulalia Marcita Taguba identified the said exhibits in her
testimony which was duly recorded. She testified as follows:
ATTY. LUCERO:
Q Now, you said that the offer of P5,000.00 selling price accepted by your sister and that she paid
P2,250.00 on January 20, 1976 (Exhibit "F") how about the balance on the consideration?
A The amount of Seven hundred fifty (P750.00) pesos to make it Three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos
was paid on February 23, 1976 and the two (2) at One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) were paid on
March 20, 1976 and July 29, 1976, ma'am.
COURT:
Was that admitted by the other party?
ATTY. LUCERO:
May we put it on record that the amount of P750.00 was paid by Miss Leonor B. Taguba on February
23, 1976, Your Honor.
COURT:
First receipt is P2,250.00.13
x x x           x x x          x x x
ATTY. LUCERO:
The receipt for the amount of Two Thousand two hundred fifty (P2,250.00) pesos be marked as
Exhibit "F", Your Honor.
COURT:
Mark it as Exhibit "F."14
ATTY. LUCERO:
May we request Your Honor that the amount of 750.00 receipt be marked as Exhibit "F-1" dated
February 23, 1976; Exhibit "F-2" is the receipt for P1,000.00 paid on March 20, 1976; all in all, the
amount is P5,000.00 including Exhibit "J" or rather Exhibit "F-3" which is the amount of P1,000.00
and was paid apparently on July 29, 1976 as partial payment for the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 5167 (sic),Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q Will you look at Exhibit "F3" and tell the Court if you know this Exhibit and why do you know this?
A This was the receipt prepared by my sister paid to Elvira M. Vda. de Oñate the amount of One
thousand (P1,000.00) pesos as the payment of the land she purchased.
Q Why do you say that the same receipt was prepared by your late sister Leonor Taguba?
A Yes ma'am because I was present when she made that receipt. 15
Likewise, extant from the records is the witness' explanation of the contents of each of the said
exhibits. Also telling is petitioners' counsel vigorous cross-examination of the said witness who
testified on the exhibits in question.16
Herein subject exhibits were also incorporated and made part of the records of this case. 17
Finally, petitioners' allegation that an action for specific performance cannot be availed of in this case
because the parties did not agree on a fixed price is likewise devoid of merit. Private respondent's
evidence and testimony remain unrebutted that the contract price for the parcel of land in question is
P5,000.00.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error on the part of respondent court, the decision appealed from
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
W. Weight & Sufficiency of Evidence
1. Rule 133
Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. (1 a)
MEMORIZE!
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider
a. all the facts and circumstances of the case
b. the witnesses' manner of testifying
c. their intelligence
d. their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying
e. the nature of the facts to which they testify
f. the probability or improbability of their testimony
g. their interest or want of interest
h. their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
i. number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater
number.
An cause of action on the ground of reformation of instrument must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence.
Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. – In a criminal case, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only
is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. (2 a)
MEMORIZE!
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt
a. does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty.
b. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind.
A defense of self-defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. – An
extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (3)
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if;
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if
a. There is more than one circumstance
b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and
c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. – In cases filed before administrative or quasijudicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)
MEMORIZE!
In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence
Substantial evidence – that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion
Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. – The court may stop the
introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence
upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be
reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be
exercised with caution. (6)
Sec. 7. Evidence on motion. – When a motion is based on facts not
appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions
presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter
be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (7)
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record
a. the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the
respective parties
b. but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions.
2. Cases
People v. Cruz, 134 SCRA 512 (1985)
Facts: In a prosecution for arson committed in Davao City, there were no eyewitnesses.
However, there was evidence as to the presence of the accused at the scene of the
crime before and at the time the fire started, that he moved out hurriedly and running
away from the burning premises, that he had previously manifested resentment against
the owner of the premises and even hinted that he would burn the owner’s house, that
he abandoned his job, left Davao City without leaving a word to anyone, and went into
hiding in Manila, that he concealed his identity by disguising himself with long hair, long
moustache, and colored eyeglasses, that he exhibited indifference and unperturbed
attitude towards the fate suffered by the victims, that he did not even condole with the
bereaved family and relatives or pay them a visit, that he did not attend the wake or the
funeral, and that he had a serious misunderstanding and strained relationship with the
owner of the burned premises.
Held: There are enough circumstantial evidence to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
U.S. v. Lasada, 18 Phil. 90 (1910)
Facts: Agapito Lasada, Santiago Lasada, Macario Lasada, and Panfilio clasa were
charged with the crime of murder (of Pedro Sopriengo, a Chinaman). The 2 principal
witnesses for the prosecution, Moldes and Resardo, positively identified the 4 defendants
as the assailants. 3 other witnesses for the prosecution testified that they saw Agapito
Lasada carrying a stick or a club and dressed in cañamo and accompanied by 3 men
walking around the town. On the other hand, the defense sought to establish an alibi,
and for this purpose presented witnesses testifying that Agapito Lasada was sick with
beri-beri and could hardly walk, and that at the time of the incident he was at the house
of Vicente Tuazon, the municipal president of the town of Abuyog.
Issue: Whether or not defendants are guilty? Whether or not the testimony of the
defense’s witness should be accepted?
Held: To determine whose testimony is to be accepted as true, an analysis of the proofs
is necessary. There are several modes of impeaching a witness. One mode is by crossexamination
to involve the witness in contradiction and discrepancies as to material
facts stated by him. But if the conflicts cannot be reconciled, the court must adopt that
testimony which it believes to be true, and in reaching this conclusion it can take into
consideration the general character of the witness, his manner and demeanor on the
stand, the consistency of his statements, their probability and improbability, his ability
and willingness to speak the truth, his intelligence, his motive to speak the truth or
swear a falsehood.
The SC believed the prosecution witnesses. (Although the dissent believed the defense
witnesses.) Vicente Tuazon the principal witness for the defense was deeply interested
in the case because he had been directed to confine the defendant in accordance with
the decision of the court. Doctor Stallmen’s testimony provided that Agapito could
hardly walk but defendant could and in fact did walk around town and never was in a
condition that he could not travel. The testimony of Barbasan and Mundala wherein they
stated that they, together with Moldes and Resarda were invited to the house of Julia
Sopriego and that Julia offered them P200 each on condition that they would testify that
the defendant and his brothers killed he father is so unreasonable that it can not be
believed.
People. v. Abendan, 82 Phil. 711 (1948)
Facts: Abendan was convicted in the CFI of Pangasinan for the murder of Doria. It was
alleged that, during his term as Chief of Police, the accused arrested Doria, took him to a
cemetery, tried to bury him alive and then finished him off. The prosecution presented
three witnesses, Samson, Delfin and Arzadon who were allegedly ith the accused when
the incident happened.
Issue: Whether or not the testimonies of the three witnesses is sufficient to convict the
accused of murder?
Held: No. Acquitted.
The truthfulness of the witnesses is doubtful since they had every reason to be hostile to
the accused appellant.
It is shown that the appellant had caused the arrest of Samson and Delfin because of
certain criminal charges. While Aazon had been investigated by the appellant for the
theft of cement. It also appears that on one occasion the appellant slapped and kicked
Delfin because of the latter’s admission of illegal acts.
It is improbable that the appellant would have utilized the three witnesses in
perpetrating a heinous crime without a showing that they were of his confidence.
Dissent, J. Tuazon – The evidence is conclusive and airtight. The witnesses were all
simple folks who gave simple, flawless narration of the murder. None of them have been
shown to have sufficient reason to lie.
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
Facts: SPO3 Jose Niño narrated that at about 9:00 p.m., July 9, 1992, with CAFGU
members Teofilo Llorad, Jr. and Cecilio Cenining, he went to Bgy. Caulangohan, Caibiran,
Biliran. They were to conduct an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of
armed persons there. From there, they proceeded to Bgy. Onion where they met Nilo
Solayao and four others. Niño became suspicious when they observed that the latter
were drunk and that Solayo was wearing a camouflage uniform. Solayao’s companions,
upon seeing the government agents, fled.
Niño introduced himself as "PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which
the Solayao was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm
locally know as "latong."
When he asked Solayao who issued him a license to carry said firearm, Solayao
answered that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño
confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran
who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm.
Solayao, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that
this was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was
still wrapped in coconut leaves. He claimed that he was not aware that there was a
shotgun concealed inside the coconut leaves since they were using the coconut leaves
as a torch. He further claimed that this was the third torch handed to him after the
others had been used up. Solayao’s claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano that
he indeed received a torch from Hermogenes Cenining which turned out to be a shotgun
wrapped in coconut leaves.
On August 25, 1994, the TC found Solayao guilty of illegal possession of firearm under
Sec. 1 of PD 1866. It found that Solayao did not contest the fact that Niño confiscated
the firearm from him and that he had no permit or license to possess the same. It hardly
found credible Solayao’s submission that he was in possession of the firearm only by
accident.
Issue: Whether or not the TC erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm?
Held: In People v. Lualhati, it was ruled that in crimes involving illegal possession of
firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof,:
the existence of the subject firearm and
the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess the same.
As to the argument that the subject firearm was the product of an unlawful warrantless
search - In this case, Solayao and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the
suspicion of Niño's group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage
uniform and that upon espying the peace officers, his companions fled. It should be
noted that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports
that armed persons were roaming around the bgys of Caibiran. This case is similar to
Posadas v. CA being a "stop and frisk" situation. There was probable cause to conduct a
search even before an arrest could be made.
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the second element, that is, the
absence of a license or permit to possess the subject firearm, the SC pointed out that the
prosecution failed to prove that Solayao lacked the necessary permit or license to
possess the subject firearm. It is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays
such burden upon the prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority
constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm, and
every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the
prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the prosecution was
only able to prove by testimonial evidence that Solayao admitted before Niño that he did
not have any authority or license to carry the subject firearm. In other words, the
prosecution relied on Solayao’s admission to prove the second element.
The SC stated that this admission is not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of illegal possession of firearm. An admission by the accused, in
this case Solayao, can take the place of any evidentiary means establishing
beyond reasonable doubt the fact averred in the negative in the pleading and
which forms an essential ingredient of the crime charged. By its very nature, an
"admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstance from which guilt
may be inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to
establish his guilt.” It is a "statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues
pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but
which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction."
Said admission is extra-judicial in nature thus not covered by Section 4 of Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court, “An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course
of the trial or other proceedings in the same case does not require proof.” Not being a
judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even
establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not
stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license.
The SC agrees with the argument of the Sol. Gen. that "while the prosecution was able to
establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the possession
of appellant, w/o the latter being able to present any license or permit to possess the
same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry
such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to
establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing
evidence, like a certification from the government agency concerned."
People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624 (1995)
Facts: Agapito and accused Dolores Lorenzo were spouses residing in Cagayan and
among their neighbors are Bgy Captain Isabelo Liban, Romeo Racheta and Robert
Santos.
In the evening of July 30, 1990, SPO1 Jose Eclipse responded to a report that a there was
a stabbing incident in said Bgy 12.
Policeman Eclipse rushed to the reported crime scene. On his way, he met PO1 Dolores,
a policewoman of his own Station who immediately surrendered to him a blood-stained
bolo and a fan knife and told him, "I killed my husband".
The two proceeded to where the victim was and in front of the Bgy. Capt.’s store, Eclipse
saw Agapito on the ground w/ blood all over his body.
Eclipse called for Bgy Capt. Liban to come out of his house. In the presence and within
the hearing of said barangay official, Policewoman Lorenzo again said, "I'm surrendering
because I killed my husband".
Eclipse ordered somebody to get a tricycle to bring the lifeless body of Agapito to a
funeral parlor while he and Dolores went to the PNP Station. Policeman Eclipse turned
over Dolores together with the bolo and knife to the Desk Officer. Eclipse then orally
made his report to the Desk Officer which was noted down in the Police Blotter.
The defense contended that it was not Dolores but a Robert Santos who killed Agapito. In
the p.m. of July 30, 1990, Agapito and his neighbor Robert were in the former's house
passing the time over a bottle of beer grande. When Dolores arrived home from work,
Agapito, in the presence of Robert Santos, met her with the following intemperate
questions: “Your mother's cunt, why do you arrive only now? Where did you come from?”
Dolores just kept quiet, and then went to the market. To buy something to cook for
supper. Upon returning home, while cooking in the kitchen, she heard an argument
between them pertaining to some bullets and a hand grenade w/c the latter gave Santos.
Dolores tried to pacify them but Santos was running out of the house with a bolo and
being chased by Agapito who was holding a knife and whose clothes were bloodied. A
struggle ensued between Agapito and Robert and, while wrestling, Agapito dropped the
knife which Dolores picked up and tried to stab Robert but she was so overwhelmed by
nervousness, falling unconscious. When she regained consciousness, found herself
beside her dying husband, Dolores picked up the knife and bolo. It was at this precise
time when Eclipse arrived at the scene of the incident. Dolores gave the knife and bolo
to Eclipse. Eclipse invited her to go with him to the Tuguegarao PNP Station and when
they arrived there, Eclipse, in the presence of Dolores, reported that she killed her
husband. Since the policewoman had not yet fully recovered her composure, she did not
say anything.
The TC convicted Dolores giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. It found nothing on record which showed that their impartiality had been
vitiated or compromised or that they had any motive to falsely impute upon the
appellant the commission of the crime. It further declared that when the appellant
surrendered the knife and bolo to SPO1 Eclipse and volunteered the information that she
killed her husband, she made an extrajudicial confession and nothing more was needed
to prove her culpability. The trial court held that the confession was admissible for it was
not made in violation of paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The
appellant was neither under police custody nor under investigation in connection with
the killing of her husband.
The trial court rejected the story of the defense.
First, she testified that she did not confess to Eclipse in the presence of Barangay
Captain Liban. If her denial is true, why did she not correct or even protest what Eclipse
did or reported?
Second, she blamed Robert Santos who did her husband in. If this is true, why did she
not tell it to Eclipse and Bgy. Capt. Liban at the scene of the crime? Why did she withhold
such a very vital information when she was brought to the Tuguegarao PNP Station
shortly after the incident?
Third, the accused never filed a counter-affidavit during the PI, since, it afforded the
accused the best opportunity to explain her innocence and to identify the "real killer" of
her husband.
Fourth, accused version is simply implausible. How can a man injured be able to chase
another man and wrestle him to the ground? appellant and, having been duly proved, together with the other facts and
Fifth, the version of accused and her witness Romeo Racheta are at variance at a very circumstances, the burden of the evidence was shifted to the appellant to disprove, by
vital point particularly the wrestling of the bolo. Racheta said that when the two men strong evidence, that she made the admission or, admitting it, to prove that she was not
caught up with one another Robert could no longer run anywhere else, he turned around, guilty of killing her husband.
faced Agapito and hacked and stabbed him many times. Such inconsistency in the The circumstances described in the TC decision constitute an unbroken chain which
version of the two defense witnesses cannot but heighten one's conviction that the leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the appellant, to the exclusion
defense theory is a conjured one. of all others, as the guilty person. The requirements then of Section 4, Rule 133 of the
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Bgy. Rules of Court on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to convict the appellant are
Capt. Liban and SPO1 Eclipse? present.
Held: SC held that the Ruling of the TC affirmed. In appellant's favor, however, is the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
The TC held that prosecution witness Eclipse told the truth when he declared under oath
that the appellant surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife and told him
that she killed her husband.
If there was any bias, it should have been, logically, in favor of the appellant because of
esprit de corps. Eclipse did not allow that sentiment to compromise his official and public
duty as a peace officer. It is settled that the absence of evidence as to an
improper motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed
and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit, for, indeed, if an
accused had nothing to do with the crime, it would be against the natural
order of events and of human nature and against the presumption of good
faith for a prosecution witness to falsely testify against the accused.
Liban's testimony does not have to corroborate Eclipse's testimony or the confession of
the Dolores. What must be corroborated is the EJ confession & not the testimony of the
person to whom the confession is made, & the corroborative evidence required is not the
testimony of another person who heard the confession but the evidence of corpus delicti.
Except when expressly required by law, the testimony of a single person, if credible and
positive & if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
is sufficient to convict. In determining the value & credibility of evidence, witnesses are
to be weighed, not numbered.
As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the appellant herself does not
question its presence because she knows that it has been overwhelmingly established in
this case. Corpus delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been
committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a house
burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was
committed. It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for
example a man has died or a building has been burned, and (b) that some person is
criminally responsible for the act. Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court does not
mean that every element of the crime charged must be clearly established by
independent evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that there should be
some evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession.
Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a species of proof would vanish if it were
necessary, in addition to the confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify
conviction independently of such confession. Otherwise stated, the other evidence need
not, independently of the confession, establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable
doubt.
However, the TC’s characterization of the appellant's declaration that she killed her
husband as an extrajudicial confession is wrong, it is only an admission. In a confession.
there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of
guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged. Underhill distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows: “A confession
is defined as an acknowledgment of guilt of the crime charged or of the facts which
constitute the crime; but it is an admission and not a confession if the facts
acknowledged raise an inference of guilt only when considered with other facts.”
Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was admissible against the