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Development in Africa

Article  in  World Affairs · October 2018

DOI: 10.1177/0043820018805307

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 1
2
3
4
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 5
6
7
8
9
Riccardo Pelizzo 10
University of the South Pacific 11
12
13
Abel Kinyondo 14
University of Dar Es Salaam 15
16
17
Zim Nwokora 18
Deakin University 19
20
21
The purpose of this article is to analyze Africa’s progress along the developmental 22
path in the past few decades, to understand what factors were responsible for such 23
success and to identify the risk factors that may compromise further development 24
in the region in the years to come. We advance three basic claims: that Africa has 25
experienced an almost unprecedented (by its standards) level of economic success 26
in the first 15 years of the new millennium, that this success was made possible 27
by a combination of domestic and supranational conditions, and that some of 28
the enabling conditions that supported Africa’s growth and development in the 29
new millennium may be disappearing. The study also suggests that while Afri- 30
can countries may not be able to influence the global conditions on which their 31
economic success depends, they do have the ability to influence the domestic condi- 32
tions. This is why, we suggest, in addition to ensuring longer and healthier lives 33
for their citizens, African countries should consolidate democracy and promote 34
good governance. 35
36
Keywords: Development, Africa, Economic Success, Domestic Conditions, 37
Global Conditions, Global Influence, Democratization in Africa, Demo- 38
cratic Consolidation, Governance, The African Crisis. 39
40
41

SUMMER 2018    1
 DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1 El desarrollo en África
2
3 El propósito de este documento es analizar el progreso de África en el trayecto del
4 desarrollo en las últimas décadas para comprender qué factores fueron responsables
5 de este éxito y para identificar los factores de riesgo que podrían comprometer el
6 desarrollo futuro de la región en los próximos años. El documento presenta tres afir-
7 maciones básicas: que África ha experimentado un nivel de éxito económico casi sin
8 precedentes (para sus estándares) en los primeros quince años del nuevo milenio;
9 que este éxito fue posible gracias a una combinación de condiciones domésticas y
10 supranacionales; y que algunas de las condiciones favorables que respaldaron el cre-
11 cimiento y el desarrollo de África en el nuevo milenio pueden estar desapareciendo. El
12 documento también sugiere que, si bien los países africanos pueden no ser capaces de
13 influir en las condiciones globales de las que depende su éxito económico, sí tienen la
14 capacidad de influir en las condiciones internas. Es por eso que el documento sugiere
15 que además de asegurar vidas más largas y saludables para sus ciudadanos, los
16 países africanos deberían consolidar la democracia y promover la buena gobernanza.
17
18 Palabras clave: desarrollo, África, éxito económico, condiciones domésti-
19 cas, condiciones globales, influencia global, democratización en África,
20 consolidación democrática, gobernanza.
21
22 非洲的发展
23
24 摘要：本文目的是分析非洲在过去几十年间在发展道路上的进程，进而
25 理解哪些因素促成了经济成功，同时识别出可能损害未来发展的风险因
26 素。本文提出三个主张：1.非洲在新千禧年的前15年中取得了前所未有
27 的经济成功（与过去的非洲相比）；2.这项成功可能是由国内形势和超
28 国家形势二者共同决定的；3.支持非洲发展的一些有利条件可能会消
29 失。本文还认为，尽管非洲国家可能不能够对其经济成功所依赖的全球
30 形势产生影响，但它们有能力影响自己国内的形势。这也是为何本文认
31 为，除去保证国民更长久、更健康的生活之外，非洲国家应该加强民主
32 并推动良好治理的原因。
33
34 关键词：发展，非洲，经济成功，国内形势，全球形势，全球影响，非
35 洲民主化，民主加强，治理
36
37
38 From the mid-1980s to the beginning of the new millennium,
39 scholars have almost unanimously underlined Africa’s economic woes:
40 economic recession (Shaw 1986), mass poverty (Onimode 1988), eco-
41 nomic stagnation or decline (Ake 2001), an absence of sustained

2     WO R LD A F FA I R S
 R i c c ardo Peliz z o , Ab el K iny ondo, and Zim N wok or a

growth in real export earnings (Svedberg 1993), and rapidly escalating 1

foreign debt (Business Daily 2018; Jackson 1984). Even those scholars 2
who were willing to acknowledge that the African situation was not, and 3
should not be reduced to, a “uniform developmental disaster” often 4
ended up suggesting that Africa, after independence, had experienced 5
more spells of crisis than anything else (see, for example, Nzomo 1996; 6
Van de Walle 2001). 7
Building on the work of Arrighi (2002), in the present article we 8
plan to show that actually the African reality is more complex than the 9
uniform or unconditional disaster discussed by the literature (see, for 10
example, Arrighi, Aschoff, and Scully 2010). Africa, as Arrighi (2002) 11
pointed out, had its fair share of success stories in the 1960s and in the 12
early 1970s, and, after the crisis that plagued it in the 1980s and in the 13
1990s, experienced a new wave of developmental successes. 14
The purpose of the study is to analyze Africa’s economic successes in 15
the past half-century, to understand not only what made these successes 16
possible but also—and more importantly—what risk factors may com- 17
promise them (or have already done so). With that objective in mind, we 18
aim to identify and discuss the main drivers of growth across the region. 19
The article is divided into four sections. The first section presents 20
some historical information on the performance of Africa’s economy. 21
This section advances three basic claims: (1) that Africa’s economy inter- 22
mixed years of economic growth with years of stagnation or contraction; 23
(2) that there is significant cross-national variation as to how well the 24
economy has performed in the Sub-Saharan region; and (3) that from 25
1991 onward, Africa has had more success stories than in the 1960s 26
and 1970s. The second section explores the conditions, domestic and 27
external, that have facilitated Africa’s successful economic performance. 28
Building on this analysis, the third section discusses whether Africa will 29
be able to sustain its recent growth in the years to come, or whether 30
changes in domestic, regional, and global arenas may derail the progress 31
made so far. The fourth and final section draws together our conclusions 32
and formulates some recommendations as to what could be done to 33
secure strong economic growth and development in Africa. 34
35
Africa’s Success Stories 36
37
In his analysis of the African crisis, Arrighi (2002) observed that 38
Africa has had its fair share of success stories. Building on the work 39
of Berthélemy and Söderling (2001), Arrighi (2002) argued that an 40
economic success story could be equated to a “strong sustained growth 41

SUMMER 2018    3
 DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1 Figure 1. [AQ: 9]
2 GDP growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1961–2016.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Source. The World Bank (n.d.).
17 Note. GDP = gross domestic product; GNI = gross national income.
18
19
experience,” which “is defined as ‘an uninterrupted period of 10 years
20
or more, during which time the five-year moving average of annual GDP
21
growth exceeds 3.5 per cent’” (Arrighi 2002, 12). Figure 1 and Table 1
22
show that African economies experienced strong growth for most of the
23
1960s, as well as how they slowed down in the 1980s and in the 1990s,
24
experienced strong growth in the first five years of the new millennium,
25
peaked in 2004, and went on to record slower economic growth from
26
2005 onward. This conclusion is supported by the analysis of the gross
27
national income (GNI) of the region (see Figure 2). Although gross
28
domestic product (GDP) captures the output produced by a country’s
29
residents, GNI captures the value of the output produced by its citizens.
30
The economic growth that Sub-Saharan Africa experienced for so
31
many years, in the new millennium, increased the region’s wealth. The
32
GNI per capita increased from $503.8 in 2000 to $1,516.4 in 2016 (see
33
Figure 3).
34
The data in Table 2 shows that, while we talk of Africa as a single
35
entity, there are significant differences in the growth patterns of the var-
36
ious parts of the continents and also within each of these regions.
37
The analysis reveals, first, that in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are what
38
Arrighi (2002) called “success stories” and that they have been more
39
frequent in recent years than they had been in the past (see Table 3). In
40
fact, of the 49 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, 34 have enjoyed at least
41

4     WO R LD A F FA I R S
 R i c c ardo Peliz z o , Ab el K iny ondo, and Zim N wok or a

Table 1.[AQ: 10] 1

2
GDP Growth, Five-Year Average, 1991–2015.
3
Country 1991– 1996– 2001– 2006– 2011– 4
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 5
Angola –3.78 6.43 6.33 12.59 4.74 6
Burundi –2.40 –1.34 2.20 4.49 2.71 7
Benin 4.22 5.04 3.91 3.85 4.68 8
Burkina Faso 3.96 6.77 6.38 6.12 4.79 9
Botswana 4.59 5.25 3.64 4.76 4.86
10
11
Central African Republic 1.09 1.42 1.92 3.24 –4.69
12
Cote d’Ivoire 1.51 3.19 0.01 2.22 6.63
13
Cameroon –1.73 4.67 3.71 2.91 5.20
14
Congo 0.50 2.48 4.09 5.29 4.02 15
Democratic Republic of Congo –7.12 –3.89 3.86 5.55 7.78 16
Comoros 0.89 3.36 2.30 1.60 2.44 17
Cape Verde 10.89 12.10 5.75 6.00 1.51 18
Djibouti –3.07 –0.43 2.97 4.84 5.36 19
Eritrea 12.51 3.16 2.63 –0.65 8.68 20
Ethiopia 1.33 4.67 6.61 10.89 10.21 21
Gabon 3.13 0.41 1.74 1.19 5.24 22
Ghana 4.28 4.32 5.04 6.53 7.71 23
Guinea 3.90 3.92 3.08 2.17 2.13 24
Gambia 2.11 4.50 3.11 4.69 2.38 25
Guinea-Bissau 3.18 –0.71 1.76 3.29 3.14 26
Equatorial Guinea 15.78 56.84 30.31 6.64 0.18 27
Kenya 1.61 2.16 3.65 5.05 5.52
28
29
Liberia –21.66 39.79 –3.11 7.23 5.12
30
Lesotho 5.34 3.04 2.80 4.88 4.52
31
Madagascar –0.28 3.84 2.60 2.93 2.62
32
Mali 3.28 5.02 7.14 4.60 3.54
33
Mozambique 3.37 11.81 8.91 7.44 7.10 34
Mauritania 3.26 2.37 4.67 5.30 4.71 35
Mauritius 4.89 5.80 3.07 5.47 3.63 36
Malawi 3.52 3.92 2.22 7.43 4.09 37
Namibia 3.88 3.51 5.00 4.54 5.51 38
Niger 0.81 2.92 4.00 5.24 6.01 39
40
(continued)
41

SUMMER 2018    5
 DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1 Table 1. (continued)
2
Country 1991– 1996– 2001– 2006– 2011–
3
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
4
5 Nigeria 0.50 3.26 11.15 7.22 4.70
6 Rwanda –3.95 9.62 8.14 8.33 7.56
7 Sao Tome and Principe 4.61 5.93 4.51
8 Sudan 5.13 6.05 6.41 7.22 2.11
9 Senegal 2.09 4.12 4.68 3.54 4.09
10 Sierra Leone –5.05 0.47 7.85 5.80 4.95
11 Somalia
12 South Sudan 5.27 –8.11
13 Swaziland 3.06 2.85 3.79 3.32 3.91
14 Seychelles 2.90 5.73 –0.16 4.51 5.47
15 Chad 2.44 2.65 17.17 4.95 4.67
16 Togo 0.61 4.52 1.14 3.21 4.98
17 Tanzania 1.80 4.31 7.21 6.09 6.85
18
Uganda 7.05 6.05 6.71 8.06 5.42
19
South Africa 0.89 2.80 3.84 3.13 2.20
20
Zambia –0.14 3.64 6.21 8.71 5.17
21
Zimbabwe 1.39 2.41 –7.19 –0.13 7.88
22
23 Note. GDP = gross domestic product.
24
25 Figure 2.
26 GNI, growth, 1982–2015.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41 Source. The World Bank (n.d.).
Note. GNI = gross national income.

6     WO R LD A F FA I R S
 R i c c a rdo Peliz z o , Ab el K inyo ndo, and Zim N wok or a

Figure 3. 1
GNI per capita, 1990–2016. 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Source. The World Bank (n.d.). 17
Note. GNI = gross national income. 18
19
Table 2. 20
Average GDP Growth, 1991–2015. 21
22
Number Average Minimum Maximum 23
of years growth growth growth 24
Country observed rate (%) rate (%) rate (%)
25
Angola 25 5.26 –24.70 22.59 26
Burundi 25 1.13 –8.00 5.38 27
Benin 25 4.34 1.71 7.19 28
Burkina Faso 25 5.61 0.23 11.01 29
Botswana 25 4.62 –7.65 11.34 30
Central African Republic 25 0.60 –36.70 7.20 31
Cote d’Ivoire 25 2.71 –4.39 10.71 32
Cameroon 25 2.95 –7.93 5.93 33
Congo 25 1.24 –13.47 9.51 34
Democratic Republic of Congo 25 3.28 –5.49 8.75 35
Comoros 25 2.12 –5.40 10.85 36
Cape Verde 25 7.25 –1.27 19.18 37
Djibouti 25 1.94 –6.62 6.50
38
39
Eritrea 19 3.78 –9.78 21.22
40
(continued) 41

SUMMER 2018    7
 DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1 Table 2. (continued)
2
3 Number Average Minimum Maximum
4 of years growth growth growth
Country observed rate (%) rate (%) rate (%)
5
6 Ethiopia 25 6.74 –8.67 13.57
Gabon 25 2.34 –8.93 7.09
7
Ghana 25 5.58 3.30 14.05
8
Guinea 25 3.04 –0.28 5.18
9 Gambia 25 3.36 –4.33 7.05
10 Guinea-Bissau 25 2.13 –28.10 11.60
11 Equatorial Guinea 25 21.95 –9.13 149.97
12 Kenya 25 3.60 –0.80 8.40
13 Liberia 25 5.47 –35.09 106.28
14 Lesotho 25 4.11 0.48 6.97
15 Madagascar 25 2.34 –12.67 9.78
16 Mali 25 4.72 –3.22 15.38
17 Mozambique 25 7.73 –5.23 26.85
Mauritania 25 4.06 –4.04 18.87
18
Mauritius 25 4.57 1.24 9.03
19 Malawi 25 4.24 –10.24 16.73
20 Namibia 25 4.49 –1.58 12.27
21 Niger 25 3.80 –6.52 11.81
22 Nigeria 25 5.37 –0.62 33.74
23 Rwanda 25 5.94 –50.25 35.22
24 Sao Tome 15 5.02 2.38 9.12
25 Sudan 25 5.38 –1.97 11.52
26 Senegal 25 3.70 –0.02 6.68
27 Sierra Leone 25 2.81 –20.49 26.27
28 Somalia No
observations
29
South Sudan 7 –4.29 –46.08 13.13
30 Swaziland 25 3.39 0.82 6.86
31 Seychelles 25 3.69 –5.89 11.96
32 Chad 25 6.38 –15.71 33.63
33 Togo 25 2.89 –15.10 14.98
34 Tanzania 25 5.25 0.58 8.46
35 Uganda 25 6.66 3.14 11.52
36 South Africa 25 2.57 –2.14 5.60
37 Zambia 25 4.72 –8.63 10.30
38 Zimbabwe 25 0.87 –17.67 16.33
39 Source. The World Bank (n.d.).
40 Note. GDP = gross domestic product.
41

8     WO R LD A F FA I R S
 R i c c ardo Peliz z o , Ab el K iny ondo, and Zim N wok or a

Table 3. 1
2
Periods of Sustained Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.
3
End of GDP growth period 4
Start of
5
GDP growth Ongoing GDP growth
period 2001–2005 2006–2010 2011–2015 period 6
7
1991–1995 Guinea, Cape Verde, Benin, Burkina Faso,
Malawi (1) Equatorial Botswana, Ghana,
8
Guinea, Mauritius, Namibia, 9
Sudan Senegal. Uganda 10
1996–2000 Cameroon Angola, Ethiopia, Mali, 11
Mozambique, Rwanda, 12
Tanzania, Zambia 13
2001–2005 Congo, Democratic 14
Republic of Congo, 15
Kenya, Mauritania, Niger,
16
Nigeria, Sao Tome and
Principe, Sierra Leone, 17
Chad 18
2006–2010 Djibuti, Liberia, Lesotho, 19
Malawi (2) 20
Note. GDP = gross domestic product.
21
22
23
one “sustained strong growth experience,” which, as we noted above,
24
corresponds to a 3.5 percent five-year moving average GDP growth for
25
ten years.
26
Only Burundi, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Comoros,
27
Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Somalia, South
28
Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, South Africa, and Zimbabwe failed to have
29
at least one sustained strong growth experience. Malawi had two such
30
experiences, as shown in Table 3 (and in Table 1).
31
This “sustained strong GDP growth experience” started at different
32
points in time. In some countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, etc.)
33
it started in the 1991–1995 period, in other countries (Angola, Ethio-
34
pia, Mali, etc.) it started in the 1996–2000 period, in a third group of
35
countries (Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, etc.) it began
36
in the 2001–2005 period, and in a fourth group of countries (Djibouti.
37
Liberia, Lesotho) it started in the 2006–2010 period. The reasons
38
behind the timing of growth also varied across countries. For instance,
39
while growth in Botswana was the result of a resource (diamond)
40
boom, in Liberia, Somalia, and Djibouti growth was mainly a conse-
41
quence of a peace and stability dividends. Meanwhile, in countries like
SUMMER 2018    9
 DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1 Kenya, improved manufacturing and horticulture export earnings were

2 responsible for growth. This “sustained strong GDP growth experience”
3 also varied in terms of how strong it was (see Table 2).
4 There is also variation as to how long the growth period lasted: it
5 lasted about a decade in Guinea, Malawi, and Cameroon; for about 20
6 years in Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan; while the growth
7 in Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal,
8 and Uganda is still ongoing. This is the third interesting aspect of this
9 new wave of success stories: from 1991 onward, 29 of the 34 success
10 stories are still ongoing. Sustainability is a cause for concern as Africa’s
11 growth has been mainly driven by either resource booms—oil in Nige-
12 ria, Angola, Congo, Sudan and South Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
13 Chad, Ghana, and Cameroon; aluminum in South Africa; bauxite in
14 Guinea; chromium in South Africa; cobalt in the Democratic Republic
15 of Congo, Madagascar, South Africa, and Zambia; iron ore in South
16 Africa; lead in South Africa; lithium in Zimbabwe; manganese in Gabon;
17 nickel in South Africa and Madagascar; platinum in South Africa and
18 Zimbabwe; silicon in South Africa; titanium in South Africa, Kenya, Mad-
19 agascar, and Mozambique (The World Bank 2017)—and/or the services
20 sector (telecommunications, tourism). The former is exhaustible and
21 susceptible to price fluctuations. The latter is not inclusive as the services
22 employ relatively few, highly educated people, especially compared with
23 agriculture which, in the wake of the previous limited and generally
24 unsuccessful industrialization (Bates 2014), employs the majority of
25 Africans; namely, two-thirds of the working population and yet makes an
26 increasingly smaller contribution to the GDP (see Figure 4).
27 The countries where the “sustained strong growth experience” has not
28 ended can be subdivided into four groups. The first group includes those
29 countries in which the economic growth in 2016 has been higher than
30 3.5 percent. This group includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, and so
31 on. There is a second group of countries where economic growth, though
32 strong, was below the 3.5-percent level. The countries in this category
33 include Botswana, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, and
34 Namibia. In a third group of countries (e.g., South Arica and Zimbabwe),
35 economies failed to grow and finally there is the group of countries where
36 the economy suffered a severe setback and where it will be very hard to
37 sustain the “strong growth experience.” In 2016, the economy decreased
38 by 1.54 percent in Nigeria, it decreased by 1.86 percent in the Republic
39 of Congo and in Chad it dropped by 7 percent (World Development Indi-
40 cators). So, while there are many ongoing success stories, the evidence
41 above clearly indicates that some of them may be soon coming to an end.

10     WO R LD A F FA I R S
 R i c c a rdo Peliz z o , Ab el K inyo ndo, and Zim N wok or a

Figure 4. 1
Agriculture, value added (percentage of GDP). 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Source. The World Bank (n.d.). 16
Note. GDP = gross domestic product. 17
18
It is not entirely clear whether the structure of these economies, 19
that is the composition of their GDP, sheds any light as to why they per- 20
form as well as they do (see Table 4). In the countries of the first group, 21
agriculture still represented a large portion of the GDP and larger than 22
industry, while the service sector represented less than three-fifths of the 23
GDP. In the countries of the second group, agriculture made a smaller 24
contribution than industry to their respective GDP, and the service sector 25
made a larger contribution to the GDP than it had done in the countries 26
of the first group. In South Africa and Zimbabwe, which belong to the 27
third group, the service sector represents more than two-thirds of the 28
GDP, industry less than one-third, and agriculture is fairly negligible. 29
The countries in the fourth group have little in common in terms of eco- 30
nomic structure, but much in common in terms of problems. Chad and 31
Nigeria are the two countries in the Chad basin that are most affected 32
by the terrorist activities of Boko Haram, which, in addition to displacing 33
millions of people and millions of children, has also contributed to the 34
disruption of the local economies.1 35
However, there is no doubt that Africa had more success stories 36
from 1991 onward than it had from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s. To 37
understand whether these success stories may continue in the future or 38
39
40
1
See UNICEF (2016). 41

S U M M E R 2 0 1 8     11
 DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1 Table 4.
2 Composition of GDP.
3
4 Country Agriculture Service Industry
5 Benin 25.6 51.1 23.4
6 Burkina Faso 30.8 43 26.1
7 Rwanda 31.5 50.8 17.6
8 Botswana 2.2 63.1 34.7
9 Democratic Republic of Congo 21.9 44.6 33.5
10 Lesotho 5.8 57.4 36.8
11
Namibia 6.9 61.8 31.3
12
South Africa 2.4 68.6 28.9
13
Zimbabwe 11 66.3 22.8
14
Nigeria 21.2 60.4 18.4
15
16 Republic of Congo 8.7 41.1 50.2
17 Chad 51.1 35.1 14.8
18 Source. The World Bank (n.d.).
19
20 not, we need to understand what made this success possible and what
21 may prevent some African countries from remaining as successful as
22 they have been in the recent past. The next two sections of this article
23 will try to answer these questions.
24
25 Explaining African Success
26
27 The International Factors
28 Africa’s success was the result of the interaction of several factors.
29 At the international level, well before the adoption of the Millennium
30 Development Goals (Sachs and McArthur 2005), which placed a consid-
31 erable emphasis on promoting development and reducing poverty, the
32 international community had changed its approach to development,
33 developing countries, and, subordinately, to Africa.
34 The international community abandoned the traditional notion of
35 development and the reductionist view that equated development with
36 economic growth, and realized that development is a multifaceted phe-
37 nomenon—which includes a human, social, and participative compo-
38 nent, and should be sustainable. Thus, it began to see that development
39 is the product not only of economic factors but also of political and insti-
40 tutional ones. Hence, a whole debate emerged about the dividends of
41 good governance (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón 2000) and the

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international community adopted a new approach to lending—as evi- 1

denced by the launch of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP; 2
Craig and Porter 2003). 3
The new approach of the international community toward pov- 4
erty and development is evidenced by several steps that International 5
Organizations (IOs) have taken from 1990 onward. In 1990, the World 6
Bank published “Making Adjustments Work for the Poor” and its World 7
Development Report was entirely devoted to poverty reduction; the Con- 8
ference of Rio (1992) identified the requisites for achieving sustainable 9
development (environmental protection constitutes an integral part 10
of the development process; international actions should be taken to 11
help developing countries; unsustainable patterns of production and 12
consumption should be reduced or eliminated; clean technology and 13
energy should be adopted; citizen participation leads to better policy 14
making; environmental legislation should be implemented; environ- 15
mental impact assessment shall be undertaken for proposed activities 16
that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment, 17
etc.). It also adopted Agenda 21, which detailed what individual coun- 18
tries should do to make development sustainable. The priorities were 19
identified as the need to protect the atmosphere, combat deforestation, 20
manage fragile ecosystems, promote sustainable agriculture, preserve 21
biological diversity, protect the oceans, protect freshwater resources, 22
and manage (urban, toxic, and radioactive) waste properly.2 At the 23
World Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995, 24
the United Nations (UN)—in collaboration with the United Nations 25
Development Program (UNDP)—introduced the notion of social devel- 26
opment, and in 1997 the UNDP proposed the notion of Sustainable 27
Human Development (Anand and Sen 1996) which assesses develop- 28
ment not in terms of overall wealth, but in terms of human develop- 29
ment—the development of human capability—intergenerational equity 30
and justice (Anand and Sen 2000). 31
This new understanding of, and approach to, development, poverty, 32
aid, and cooperation changed how developing countries were financed. 33
The new development approach was also reflected in the way that the so- 34
35
36
2
37
As noted in the portal of the Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, “Agenda
21 is a comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by orga-
38
nizations of the United Nations System, Governments, and Major Groups in every area 39
in which human impacts on the environment.” See https://sustainabledevelopment. 40
un.org/outcomedocuments/agenda21. 41

S U M M E R 2 0 1 8     13
 DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1 Figure 5.
2 External debt as percentage of GNI (Sub-Saharan Africa excluding high income).
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Source. The World Bank (n.d.).
17 Note. GNI = gross national income.
18
19
called “developed world” treated the foreign debt that had had a devas-
20
tating impact on African economies for most of the 1980s (Greene 1989).
21
African countries were heavily indebted. The external debt repre-
22
sented a sizable portion of their GDP and of their exports of goods and
23
services (see Figures 5 and 6).
24
The international community came to realize, as scholars had already
25
made clear (Helleiner 1992), that debt relief was a necessary condition for
26
securing sustainable growth and development in the developing world.
27
In the wake of the 1994 Naples’s G7 summit, the Club of Paris, an
28
informal group of officials from the major lending countries, deliberated
29
a reduction of 67 percent of developing world foreign debt. In 1996,
30
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) launched the
31
Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPCI) which was designed to
32
bring developing countries’ foreign debt to an acceptable level (see Fig-
33
ures 5 and 6).3 In other words, the international community reduced the
34
35
36 3
The Club of Paris defines itself as “an informal group of official creditors whose
37
role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties
38 experienced by debtor countries” (see http://www.clubdeparis.org). There are 22
39 permanent members of the Paris Club, namely: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
40 Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, the
41 Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the
United States of America.
14     WO R L D A F FA I R S
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Figure 6. 1
External debt as percentage of exports of goods and services (Sub-Saharan Africa 2
excluding high income). 3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Source. The World Bank (n.d.). 18
19
debt on one hand, and, on the other, provided more aid to Sub-Saharan 20
Africa. The amount of aid money increased: Sub-Saharan Africa, which 21
had received $17.8 billion in aid in 1990, received $47.7 billion in 2013, 22
$46.6 billion in 2014, and $45.8 billion in 2015—which means that even 23
if the amount of aid has started to decrease from its 2013 peak, it is still 24
more than twice the amount disbursed in 1990 (see Figure 7). 25
So, the first reason why the economic fortunes of African economies 26
started improving from the early 1990s onward is that the International 27
Community’s Approach to Development and Developing Countries 28
had started to change as evidenced by the elimination of debt and the 29
increase in international aid. 30
31
Globalization 32
33
Globalization also contributed to the economic success of Sub-Saha-
34
ran Africa, though some have noted that globalization’s contribution to
35
development has not been matched by a corresponding contribution to
36
poverty reduction (see, for example, Datta 2002; Stiglitz 2002). Capital
37
seeks profit-making opportunities, and the economies of poor develop-
38
ing nations often have greater growth potential than the economies of
39
already industrially advanced nations. The prospects of making higher
40
returns in developing countries is a necessary, but in itself insufficient,
41
condition for attracting capital. Capital also needs security as investors
S U M M E R 2 0 1 8     15
 DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1 Figure 7.
2 Net official development assistance received in billion (current U.S. dollars).
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17 Source. The World Bank (n.d.).
18
19 tend to discount the profit opportunities by the risk associated with a
20 given investment.
21 But as the international community started providing aid to develop-
22 ing countries, and as developing countries increased their level of good
23 governance, the risk associated with investing in developing nations
24 started to decline and Sub-Saharan Africa became increasingly more
25 attractive for international capital than it had been in previous decades
26 (Asiedu 2006; Morisset 1999). International aid, in terms of the Net Offi-
27 cial Development Assistance,
28
29 consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of
30 repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the mem-
31 bers of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral
32 institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic develop-
33 ment and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA
34 recipients.4
35
36 Although this international aid increased by roughly 268 percent
37 between 1990 and 2013, when it reached its peak, the net inflow of
38 foreign direct investment (FDI), which “is the sum of equity capital,
39
40
41 4
Taken from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?locations=ZG/.

16     WO R L D A F FA I R S
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Figure 8. 1
Foreign direct investment, net inflows. 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Source. The World Bank (n.d.).
16
17
18
reinvestment of earnings, and other capital” in the same period grew
19
by more than 36 times from 1.22 billion in 1990 to 43.6 billion in 2014
20
(see Figure 8).
21
So, globalization, by liberalizing financial markets and by allowing
22
the free movement of capital, was instrumental in helping Sub-Saharan
23
Africa to attract much-needed foreign capital (Hanson and Ramachan-
24
dran 1990). In this respect, Hanson and Ramachandran (1990, 210)
25
noted that “African countries turned to financial liberalization in the
26
1990s, often in the context of stabilization and reform programs sup-
27
ported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.” And,
28
as the inflow of FDI increased, so did the growth of the African economy
29
from 1990s onward (Adams 2009).[AQ: 1]
30
31
The Demise of the Old International Political Order 32
A third global factor played a role, and quite possibly a crucial one, 33
in creating the conditions for Africa’s economic success between 2000 34
and 2015: the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union 35
and the end of the bipolar order (West vs. Communist Bloc), Africa was 36
freed from its previous incarnation as a proxy front in the Cold War. As 37
Fage (1995, 531) explained, 38
39
the Soviet Union and other eastern bloc regimes . . . could no longer 40
afford to subsidize satellite states in Africa or to seek strategic allies 41

S U M M E R 2 0 1 8     17
 DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1 there. It followed that there was no practical advantage to be gained by

2 an African government asserting that it governed according to Marx-
3 ist principles. From 1989 onwards, Marxism ceased to be the official
4 political philosophy of the rulers of such countries as Mozambique and
5 Ethiopia.
6
7 At the same time, Western governments no longer felt compelled to
8 support the unpopular dictatorship that had sided with them during the
9 Cold War (Fage 1995, 531).
10 That is precisely when the “third wave” of democratization (Hun-
11 tington 1993), that had already spread through Southern Europe, South
12 America, and South East Asia, swept across the African continent in
13 conjunction with the “good governance matters” message that the IOs
14 were now preaching across the region. The “good governance matters”
15 agenda served three different purposes.
16 First, as we have already mentioned, it was an essential feature of the
17 PRSP. With the launch of the PRSP agenda, developing countries were no
18 longer expected to implement structural adjustment programs (Easterly
19 2000), but could design and take ownership of their own development
20 and poverty reduction programs. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Pro-
21 grams meant that developing countries had to identify their own needs,
22 to draw a plan as to how those needs could be successfully addressed,
23 and to request appropriate funds to implement the locally owned plan.
24 The only condition—as there is no lending without at least some condi-
25 tions—was that they [the countries receiving aid] made some progress
26 in improving the quality of government or in the level the of good gov-
27 ernance: better rule of law, better regulatory qualities, more stability, less
28 corruption, more accountability, and more government effectiveness.
29 Second, the “good governance matters” agenda, by ensuring that
30 countries had a genuinely good reason—money—to improve their
31 level of good governance, signaled to international investors that the
32 risks associated with investing in these countries were decreasing. This,
33 in turn, created the conditions for a massive increase in foreign direct
34 investments.
35 Third, the “good governance matters” agenda served, surreptitiously,
36 another purpose, that of promoting the substance of democracy (voice
37 and accountability) without having to use the “d-word,” which remained
38 rather unpalatable for those political leaderships that were not keen to
39 forfeit the possibility of endless terms in office.
40 The third wave of democratization brought democracy to Cape Verde,
41 Ghana, and Nigeria in Western Africa; it brought an end to apartheid

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in South Africa; and Rwanda, in Central Africa, was converted to a thriv- 1

ing democracy in the wake of the genocide. Consequently, Africa found 2
itself not only with more democracies but also with an improved quality 3
of democracy. The improvements in the quality of democracy were asso- 4
ciated with greater political stability: African countries in general, and 5
Africa as a whole, were becoming more stable. Polity IV computes the 6
State Fragility index for virtually all countries in the world, including 47 7
countries from Sub-Saharan Africa. The index is a composite variable, 8
which includes indicators to capture state effectiveness, legitimacy, and 9
resilience. In the 1995–2015 period, state fragility index scores increased 10
in only three African countries: South Sudan, Central African Republic, 11
and Ivory Coast. Index scores remained constant in Eritrea, Guinea, Guin- 12
ea-Bissau, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zimbabwe. However, in 13
the other 39 cases, state fragility decreased.5 14
Major episodes of armed conflict and adverse regime changes, which 15
peaked in the 1990s, declined. With greater political stability, and with 16
the higher democratic quality, Africa was able to capitalize on favorable 17
international conditions. More aid arrived to support these changes, 18
and all of this contributed to attracting more foreign direct investments. 19
20
A Changing World Economic System 21
22
The rise of the East was apparent from at least the late-1980s, when 23
many believed that the Japanese economy could eventually outperform 24
the American one. The rise of Asia was reaffirmed when over the past 25
15 years or so, China has established itself as the most economically 26
dynamic place on the planet (Babones 2011). The numbers of China’s 27
economic success are staggering: in 1960, China’s GDP amounted to 28
roughly 4.4 percent of the global GDP, by 2016 China’s GDP amounted 29
to 14.8 percent. As China’s economy grew, it established itself as a 30
regional hegemon in Asia, became the world’s second largest economy, 31
and was instrumental in accelerating Africa’s economic growth (Zafar 32
2007). 33
China’s success contributed to Africa’s economic performance in two 34
ways. First, as China developed it required increasingly large amounts 35
of resources, especially commodities, and demands for Africa’s exports 36
increased accordingly. Africa may not have exported sophisticated goods 37
38
39
5
See http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. The global report on state fragility 40
can be found at http://www.systemicpeace.org/globalreport.html. 41

S U M M E R 2 0 1 8     19
 DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1 with high value added, but exporting increasingly larger amounts of

2 increasingly more expensive commodities greatly contributed to the
3 region’s rapid economic growth from 2000 to 2015. Second, as China
4 developed, it started investing in the African continent: China invested
5 in the construction of infrastructures and provided aid without the kind
6 of conditions that, sometimes, make aid (and loans) from the West (or
7 Western-dominated IOs) much less attractive.
8 Thus, trade with China and aid from China and Chinese investments
9 were the fourth element that contributed to creating the conditions for
10 Africa’s economic success at the beginning of the new millennium.
11
12 The Domestic Factors
13
14 The end of the Cold War, the rise of China, a new understanding of
15 development, more aid, and more investment all contributed to Africa’s
16 economic success. But while these were necessary for creating the con-
17 ditions for sustained strong economic growth, they were in themselves
18 insufficient. These favorable conditions at the global level were able to
19 have a positive impact on Africa’s fortunes because African countries
20 were also undergoing significant changes for the better at the domestic
21 level.
22 A factor that contributed to the economic success of Sub-Saharan
23 Africa was the improvement in public health. According to the Atlas
24 of African Health Statistics (World Health Organization [WHO]
25 2016, 17), Sub-Saharan Africa improved in nearly every respect: gov-
26 ernment health expenditures increased, utilization of health services
27 increased, and fewer deaths were caused by factors such as HIV/
28 AIDS, respiratory infections, diarrhea diseases, malaria, stroke, birth
29 complications, ischemic heart disease, protein-energy malnutrition,
30 and meningitis.
31 Sub-Saharan Africa started developing in socioeconomic terms
32 (as evidenced by the fact that infant mortality dropped from 108.5
33 per thousand in 1990 to 56.3 per thousand in 2015), life expectancy
34 at birth increased from 49.9 years to 58.9, while GDP per capita
35 increased from $607.3 in 1990 to $1,592.2 in 2015 (The World Bank
36 n.d.). Although Africa remains poor, it has developed and, in doing
37 so, it has created wealth. At least some of this wealth has percolated
38 through the society, which is why, regardless of how one measures
39 development (life expectancy, GNI per capita, infant mortality, etc.),
40 one can detect significant improvements. Unfortunately, however, and
41 in large part because of the persistence of serious corruption, much of

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the wealth—both in terms of GDP and wealth per capita that has been 1
generated—has not been effectively redistributed or used in ways that 2
are socially efficient.6[AQ: 2] 3
But precisely because Africa has not managed in the past to capital- 4
ize upon its success, it is worth investigating whether and to what extent 5
Africa will be able to capitalize upon its current economic success in the 6
near future. Thus, we might ask, “what are the main threats to sustain- 7
ing strong growth in the years to come? And what solutions could be 8
adopted to minimize such risks?” 9
10
Africa at a Crossroads 11
12
As explained previously, Africa’s economic progress in the 2000– 13
2015 period was facilitated by several favorable conditions at the global 14
level. There are several reasons to believe that the situation may already 15
be changing. The economic crisis that took such a heavy toll of the 16
accounts of many advanced economies reduced the amount of money 17
that these governments can commit to aid purposes, and the volume of 18
aid money has already started to shrink. 19
This aid money, which we measure on the basis of net development 20
assistance received, more than tripled between 2000 and 2013, but this 21
amount has been shrinking ever since. Indeed, it declined to 46.6 billion 22
in 2014 and to 45.8 percent in 2015 and given the new approach to Afri- 23
ca’s development adopted by the new U.S. Administration, there is every 24
reason to believe that aid money may decline even further in the next few 25
years.7 In two years, aid decreased by 1.9 billion, an amount greater than 26
Cabo Verde’s or Djibouti’s GDP in 2016, more than three times the GDP 27
28
29
6
Wealth per capita is defined as “the private wealth held by all the individuals living in 30
each country. It includes all their assets (property, cash, equities, business interests)” 31
(AfrAsia Bank 2017, 10). A High Net Worth Individual is a person with a wealth (prop-
erty, cash, equity, business interests minus liabilities) of at least $1 million. The number
32
of HNWIs has increased by 19 percent from 2006 to 2016. Africa is home to 145,000 33
HNWI whose combined wealth was estimated in $800 billion (AfrAsia Bank 2017, 5–6). 34
[AQ: 11] 35
7
The U.S. government, at the moment, does not seem to have a strategy for Africa, 36
but it has repeatedly indicated that aid is mostly a waste of money. The “America First” 37
manifesto proposed cutting the amount of U.S. aid and eliminating several programs,
initiatives, and foundations. As these proposed cuts were mostly rejected by Con-
38
gress (see http://allafrica.com/stories/201703210483.html), the U.S. President has 39
promised to push for more cuts to aid in the next budget (see http://allafrica.com/ 40
stories/201705030377.html). 41

S U M M E R 2 0 1 8     21
 DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1 of Comoros in 2016, more than seven times the GDP of Sao Tome and
2 Principe, and as large as the GDP of Comoros and Seychelles combined.
3 Insofar as aid money was instrumental in fostering and sustaining
4 growth in Africa, the decline in the aid money represents an alarming
5 development for the continent. Globalization allowed Africa to attract
6 more FDI. Whether Africa will be able to attract such levels of FDI in the
7 future remains to be seen, but what is clear is that the volume of foreign
8 direct investment has declined since reaching its peak.8
9 Finally, the rise of China, with its appetite for commodities, favored
10 Africa’s integration into the world economic system and its economic
11 improvement. But even in this respect some changes have occurred.
12 The pace of China’s economic growth, which had been rapidly growing
13 since the late 1970s, reached its peak in 2007 and then its growth rate
14 started decelerating. After recording a 14.2 percent growth rate in 2007,
15 China’s economy grew by 9.6 percent in 2008, 9.4 percent in 2009, 10.6
16 percent in 2010, 9.5 percent in 2011, 7.8 percent in 2012, 7.7 percent
17 in 2013, 7.3 percent in 2014, 6.9 percent in 2015, and 6.7 percent in
18 2016 (The World Bank n.d.). Hence, in so far as the speed of China’s
19 economic growth is a determinant of Africa’s commodity exports, the
20 slowing down of China’s economy suggests that Africa may not be
21 able to export as much as it did when the pace of growth in China was
22 faster and/or accelerating. Moreover, as the demand for commodities
23 declines, their price declines accordingly—which means that instead of
24 exporting more for a higher price, Africa may be exporting less for a
25 lower price. This change may be rather detrimental. For countries where
26 government expenditure is the single most important if not the only
27 engine of growth, smaller revenue means either less expenditures (and
28 thus less growth) or an expansion in the deficit or both.
29 Domestic factors were also crucial to secure Africa’s progress along
30 the developmental path: more political stability, more democracy, and
31 better health conditions were all instrumental in securing that African
32 economies would grow, but even in this regard the situation seems to be
33 changing. There are signs that Africa’s stability may not be as enduring as
34 one might have hoped. In 2012, the State Fragility Index (see http://www.
35 systemicpeace.org/globalreport.html) increased in Swaziland and South
36
37
38
8
39 See Figures 7 and 8, data were taken from World Bank’s the World Development Indi-
40 cators (The World Bank n.d.).
41

22     WO R LD A F FA I R S
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Africa, in 2013 state fragility increased in five countries (Benin, Central 1

African Republic, Eritrea, Gambia, and Senegal) and has not declined 2
since; in 2014 state fragility increased in the Ivory Coast and Lesotho; and 3
in 2015 state fragility increased in six countries (Burkina Faso, Burundi, 4
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ghana, Niger, and Tanzania). 5
African states are still, in the aggregate, less fragile than they had 6
been in the mid-1990s, but the number of countries where state fra- 7
gility is increasing, and as a result the ensuing risk of instability, is 8
also on the rise. The increasing instability is due to quite different 9
drivers. For example, Somalia and Northern Mali, along with parts of 10
Cameroon, Nigeria, and Kenya, have been destabilized by terrorism; 11
Kenya has also experienced instability as a result of the conduct of 12
its presidential elections that were contested along bitter tribal lines; 13
the Democratic Republic of Congo has been destabilized by the pres- 14
ence of refugees who came from Rwanda following the 1994 genocide 15
and have since formed armed groups, as well as by the fact that the 16
president is engaging in all kinds of tactics to remain in office—from 17
postponing the elections scheduled for December 2016 to scaring off 18
political opponents. 19
What’s more, Africa is still grappling with severe corruption that con- 20
tinues to hold her back. According to a 2002 African Union study, the 21
cost of corruption to the continent is roughly $150 billion (S. Hanson 22
2009). This number is huge especially when compared with the aid flow 23
of $22.5 billion that the developed world provided to Sub-Saharan Africa 24
in 2008 (S. Hanson 2009). The direct costs of corruption in the region 25
include, but are not limited to, inaccessibility to public services by the 26
poor and increased costs of doing business, both of which have a bearing 27
on the ability of the continent to develop (Pring 2015). 28
In addition, Sub-Saharan Africa’s ills are entrenched on the fact 29
that the region has weak institutions (Van de Walle 2001). Following its 30
colonial inheritance, postindependence Africa pursued institutions that 31
centralized political and economic power, concentrating it within the 32
connected few, usually of the same ethnicity, party affiliation, and class 33
(Gumede 2012). This has undermined governance in the continent, 34
leaving it prone to corruption issues talked about earlier and managerial 35
incompetence. 36
Another burning issue hampering economic development in the 37
continent is the ever-swelling debt. Indeed, according to Business Daily 38
(2018), lending to the continent has more than quadrupled since the 39
40
41

S U M M E R 2 0 1 8     23
 DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1 2008 global financial crisis.9 For instance, the debt owned by Kenya has
2 increased by 32 percent, by 57 percent in Uganda, by 63 percent in Tan-
3 zania, and by a massive 299 percent in Mozambique in the same period
4 (Business Daily 2018).[AQ: 3]
5 Some African countries (for instance, Ethiopia) were able to expe-
6 rience authoritarian modernization (Joseph 2014) along the lines envi-
7 sioned by Huntington (1968). But insofar as democracy had been
8 instrumental in creating the conditions for sustained strong growth in
9 the continent, by the middle of the second decade of the new millen-
10 nium the situation was deteriorating, with democracy on the retreat
11 (Joseph 2014). According to Freedom House (2017), in the course of
12 the 2007–2017 period, six of the ten countries that experienced the
13 worst decline in the level of democracy were African countries (Central
14 African Republic, Gambia, Mali, Burundi, Mauritania, and Ethiopia).
15 In 2016–2017, there was a net decline in the quality of democracy in 21
16 African countries and, Freedom House (2017, 11) noted, “some of the
17 stronger democracies in Southern and East Africa exhibited worrying
18 signs of dysfunction during the year.” Signs, one fears, that are becoming
19 even more worrying. Insofar as a democracy is good for development,
20 the contraction of democracy across the continent may prevent further
21 economic and developmental success in the years to come.
22 Improvement in the health of the region’s population was the final
23 factor that facilitated Africa’s economic success in the first decade of
24 the new millennium. However, from 2015 onward, some of the progress
25 made in the 2002–2012 period, in terms of public health, is coming
26 undone. Cholera seems to be on the rise: from January 2015 to July 21,
27 2017, there have been 44,415 cases of cholera in the Democratic Repub-
28 lic of Congo; from April 2015 to July 2017 there have been 30,231 cases
29 of cholera in Tanzania; from October 2016 to July 2017 there were 1,206
30 cases of cholera in Kenya; and sharp rises in several other countries
31 including Angola, Zambia, and Nigeria. There have been recent out-
32 breaks of acute hepatitis E in Chad, Niger, and Nigeria; measles in the
33 Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Kenya; dengue in Ivory
34
35
36
9
37 This increase in debt initially came about as a result of quantitative easing and low
interest rates in the West during the crisis. However, with the crisis arrested, interest
38 rates have been on the rise (see Business Daily 2018), making these loans currently a lot
39 more expensive. At the time of the transactions, Africa counted on a forecasted com-
40 modity boom only for the anticipated windfall to dissipate. The result has been brutal
41 to most of African countries.

24     WO R LD A F FA I R S
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Coast, Kenya, Seychelles, and Togo; food insecurity in Kenya, Madagas- 1

car, and Uganda; humanitarian crises in Cameroon, Central African 2
Republic, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, and South Sudan; and of course, 3
malaria which has infected more than 4.8 million people in Burundi 4
alone since 2015.10 5
These diseases are not necessarily deadly, and, thanks to the improve- 6
ment of the health sector, their deadliness has declined. But large-scale 7
epidemics can have profound economic consequences (Sambo 2012). 8
The Ebola outbreak that hit Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, from 9
2014 to the end of 2015, had a devastating impact on these economies. 10
The cholera outbreak in Zambia which started toward the end of last 11
year not only claimed the lives of at least 70 people, it also forced the 12
government to close restaurants in all major cities in the country indef- 13
initely (Hond 2018). There is every reason to believe that the recent 14
malaria epidemic in Burundi, which has affected nearly 50 percent 15
of the population, may also have a hugely detrimental impact on the 16
Burundian economy. Hence, the failure to prevent and possibly eradi- 17
cate such diseases may continue to threaten African countries’ ability to 18
sustain and prolong their economic growth experience. 19
20
Conclusion 21
22
In the course of this article, we advanced three claims: that Africa 23
has experienced an almost unprecedented (by its standards) level of 24
economic success in the first 15 years of the new millennium; that this 25
success was made possible by a combination of domestic and suprana- 26
tional conditions; and that some of the enabling conditions that sup- 27
ported Africa’s growth and development in the new millennium may be 28
disappearing. 29
Given Africa’s position in the world system, it may not be able to 30
create, in the international arena, the conditions that could favor its 31
economic performance. But African countries do have the ability to 32
prevent enabling conditions at the national level from disappearing. In 33
this respect, they should be attempting to stabilize their political systems, 34
to reduce corruption, to improve their regulatory frameworks, to adopt 35
properly functioning institutions, and to create the conditions for the 36
37
38
10
These data are taken from several issues of the WHO’s Outbreaks and Emergencies 39
Bulletin at http://www.afro.who.int/health-topics/disease-outbreaks/outbreaks-and- 40
other-emergencies-updates. 41

S U M M E R 2 0 1 8     25
 DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

1 emergence of better political leaders through the continent and for

2 alternation in power.
3 Giovanni Sartori (1994) noted a curious paradox; namely, that in
4 some countries government instability—that is, the frequency with
5 which governments are voted in and out of office—was coupled with
6 the fact that political leaders in such systems enjoyed remarkably long
7 and stable careers in office. African states portray a rather similar par-
8 adox because, in spite of the fact that many African countries are or
9 perceived to be politically unstable, some African presidents remain in
10 power for remarkably long periods of time. Political instability, coupled
11 with long tenure in office, are both symptomatic of low levels of politi-
12 cal development or institutionalization (Huntington 1968). Low levels
13 of institutionalization are problematic; African countries should tackle
14 this problem. And they should have the ability to do so. They may wish
15 to debate whether to implement the good governance agenda, whether
16 to adopt the prescriptions of the international community by adapting
17 them to their contextual conditions, or whether to devise country-spe-
18 cific solutions for country-specific problems and needs. But while there
19 may be some debate as to how higher levels of political development (or
20 institutionalization) may be achieved, there is no doubt about the fact
21 that this is what Africa needs.[AQ: 4]
22 Furthermore, African countries should do more and better to reduce
23 the incidence of tropical diseases, including those that are generally
24 neglected.11 The so-called “Worm Index,” which computes the num-
25 ber of infections, was devised to assess the impact of these Neglected
26 Tropical Diseases (NTDs). The Worm Index is highly correlated with
27 the Human Development Index; a strong correlation that is due to the
28 fact that people in poorer countries are more likely to contract these
29 infections but also because the incidence of these diseases is a cause of
30 poverty (Balog 2015). Hence, by tackling these NTDs, in addition to
31 tackling all those diseases that take a toll on the population of Sub-Sa-
32 haran Africa, it would be possible to create or improve the conditions
33 for socioeconomic development. Development may need more than a
34 healthy population in a stable democracy, but these conditions should
35 be considered among the most basic of requisites.
36
37
38 11
According to WHO, the presence and the incidence of the so-called Neglected Trop-
39 ical Diseases (NTDs) provides a precise indication of the level of poverty a country
40 experiences (see http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/9789241564861/en/). The
41 list of NTDs can be found here: http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en/.

26     WO R LD A F FA I R S
 R i c c ardo Peliz z o , Ab el K iny ondo, and Zim N wok or a

About the Authors 1

2
Riccardo Pelizzo is a professor in the School of Management and Public Administra- 3
tion in the Faculty of Business and Economics of the University of South Pacific. A
political development specialist, he holds a master’s degree (in political science) and a
4
PhD (in political science) from Johns Hopkins University. 5
6
Abel Kinyondo is the senior lecturer at the University of Dar Es Salaam and a principal 7
research fellow at REPOA[AQ: 5]. Previously he worked as a director of strategic re- 8
search at REPOA and head of economics and geography department at the University
of Dar Es Salaam. He has also worked for the UNDP. He holds a PhD from Monash
9
University (Australia), a distinction in master of art (economics) degree from the Uni- 10
versity of Botswana and a first-class economics degree from the University of Namibia. 11
He has more than ten years of researching experience having published in internation- 12
ally reputable journals such as in the Oxford’s Development Studies and Parliamentary 13
Affairs. He has also led several teams of experts in formulating various socioeconomic 14
policies, regulations, and codes of ethics in Tanzania and beyond. He currently in-
vestigates issues pertaining to tourism, gender, enterprise development, employment,
15
industrialization, natural resources management, as well as governance. 16
17
Zim Nwokora is a lecturer in politics and policy studies at Deakin University. A com- 18
parative political scientist by training, he holds a bachelor’s degree (in politics and 19
economics), a master’s degree (in comparative government), and a doctorate degree
(in American politics), all from the University of Oxford.
20
21
22
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