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248 International Journal of Maritime History
period to its end. During the second Punic War, (starting in 218 B.c.),
the rising Roman power built and relied on a large fleet of galleys.
This was the origin of sea power as a vital military force. Prior to the
Romans, warships had rarely played a decisive role in the fate of
nations. Starr concludes by following the course of the Roman Empire
to its collapse. Where the records allow, he emphasizes the role, if not
the influence, of sea power.
Setting aside, for the moment, Starr's purpose and stated
analytical approach, the book gives the maritime historian valuable
data on sea transport and sea warfare during the pre-Roman and
Roman eras. It describes developments in the design and construction
of galleys, their advantages and limitations, their successes and failures,
and their manning and fitting out. Where the subject cannot be
covered fully, the bibliography points the way. The bibliography is tied
to the text by notes assembled at the end of the book. The reader
would be saved some trouble if the notes were at the foot of the page,
or failing that were numbered serially throughout the book, instead of
for each chapter. Also, the four maps included in the book are
inadequate to follow the text, unless the reader has an intimate
knowledge of the geography of the ancient Mediterranean. In spite of
these drawbacks, the main value in the book lies in having all this
material accessible through one source.
That having been said, this review will evaluate The Influence
of Sea Power on Ancient History in relation to its purpose and
approach, quoted above. In any analytical work, a good deal of
narrative is required to set out the basis of the analysis. Starr has
allowed the narrative to take over, and his analyses are of limited
extent and inconclusive, granting that the available historical records
are fragmental. Where he does analyze or comment on some item, it
is usually to refute or support the writings of other modern historians.
This introduces rather too many quotations from books and articles of
the twentieth century, but there are also too many other quotations,
without comment, from modern sources. The difficulty with the book
is the author's struggle with the old dilemma of the historian-as-
reporter versus the historian-as-commentator. In view of his purpose,
surely the latter should have been his choice.
An exception to this criticism is Starr's account of the Second
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Book Reviews 249
Punic War, the example quoted by Mahan in his 1890 work. This is not
the place to discuss Mahan's theories, beyond saying that Mahan
believed that sea power was the determinant for success in war, giving
as an example Hannibal's failure to take Rome during the Second
Punic War. Starr sets out his main arguments against Mahan's opinion
in one paragraph which seems to lie at the centre of his topic, judging
by his choice of title, his introduction, and his purpose. Starr argues
that Hannibal freely chose to use cavalry and elephants, which could
not be transported by sea, and that the war ended in stalemate rather
than defeat. The Carthaginians were finally defeated in the Third
Punic War, when sea power was not a decisive factor.
If Starr had left it at that, it would have been a point well made,
but in his epilogue, Starr introduces the ideas of a British geographer,
Halford Mackinder, who said that whoever controlled the heartland of
Europe controlled the world. Having introduced this idea, which, if it
was not preposterous in 1919 when it was written, certainly was by the
time Starr used the quotation, he explicitly leaves it to the reader to
choose between Mackinder and Mahan. The historian-as-reporter has
the last word.
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