DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

SABBAVARAM, VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT TITLE: GIFT OF MOVABLES AND CONFLICT ISSUES

SUBJECT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

NAME OF THE FACULTY: DR. NANDINI CP

Name of the Candidate: G SUNAND

Roll No: 2017031
Semester: 8th
 AKNOWLEDGEMENT

“I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher NANDINI CP who

gave me the golden opportunity to do project on GIFT OF MOVABLES AND
CONFLICT ISSUES which also helped me in doing a lot of research and I came to
know about so many new things I am really thankful to Ma’am”
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

LITERATURE RIVIEW

CASE ANALYSIS

RULES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH REGARD TO GIFT OF

MOVABLES

THE NECESSITY OF DELIVERY IN GIFTS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND

CONFLICT ISSUES

GIFT CAUSA MORTIS AND CONFLICT ISSUES

CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION

Conflict of laws which is also known as private international laws comes into operation
whenever the court seised of foreign element. The preliminary and basic issue before any
court of law concerns its right to adjudicate the matter submitted to it. A conflict case is a
case containing any foreign element. The court therefore must answer this preliminary
question of jurisdiction in the first instance. Further the court should also find out which
substantive law will apply to determine the rights of the parties. “The main source of conflict
of laws is the decisions of the courts. However, certain statutes and juristic writings have also
contributed to the development of this aspect of law later. While some countries in Europe
(e.g., Austria) provide a single specific statute for the whole of conflict of laws certain other
countries such as Britain and India have various statutes on individual topics on conflicts
principles. In UK the UK-Wills Act, 1861, Family Law Act, 1986, Private International Law
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995, In India the Arbitration Act, 1996 (Part II); Indian
Succession Act, 1925 (Part II), etc.” Further under the Indian Succession Act (s. 5) has also
incorporated the well-known rule of Private International Law that succession to movables is
governed by the lex domicilii of the deceased at the time of his death, and succession to land
in India by Indian law as the Lex Situs. With regard to this project the main focus is kept on
Gift of Movables and conflict issues.

LITERATURE RIVIEW

Article: Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws

Author: A.V Dicey

This article briefly explains about the various principles of private international law which
are followed by English courts related to movable properties. This article also discusses
various English judgements with regard to gift of movables.

The Necessity of Delivery in Gifts of Personal Property

Source: Columbia Law Review, Nov., 1924, Vol. 24

This article talks about the essential ingredients that required for a valid gift. This article
explains the necessity of delivery of gifts with the help of various judicial decisions of the
English court.

Apprehension of Death in Gifts Mortis Causa

Source: Columbia Law Review, Apr., 1932, Vol. 32,

This article explains about the issues and nature of gift when it is in nature of donatio mortis
causa. The main observation is made on the principle which governs for this kind of gifts
when there is a conflict of laws.

TANGIBLE PROPERTY AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

Author: WENDELL CARNAHAN

In this article the author explains about the tangible properties and conflict of laws and
discusses various other sources of conflict of laws. Also explains various cases regarding
tangible property in conflict of laws.

CONFLICT OF LAWS

SOURCE: 54 HARV. L. REV. 330 (1940)

This article talks about the conflict issues in transfer of certificates of stocks and shares of a
company. This article explains that if transfer of shares and bonds were done according to
law of corporation of such bonds then it is valid even though such gift were incomplete where
made.

CASE ANALYSIS

CASE: JEWISH NATIONAL FUND INC. VS. ROYAL TRUST CO.

CITATION: [1965] SCC 49

FACTS: One Frank Schechter, died in Victoria, British Columbia, on May 2, 1961, domiciled
in British Columbia. He was unmarried. He left a will dated September 17, 1932, probate of
which was granted to the Royal Trust Company, the executor named in the will, on October
13,1961. He gifted all the residue of movables and personal estate unto my Trustees upon
trust, to sell, call in and convert the same into money, and subject to the payments of my
debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, legacies and any duties payable on any legacies
bequeathed or any real property devised by me herein, as to both capital and income to pay
the same to the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael) Inc., III Fifth Avenue, New
York, U.S.A. to be used by the trustees of the said Jewish National Fund as a continuing and
separate trust apart from all other funds, for the purchase of a tract or tracts of the best lands
obtainable, in Palestine, the United States of America or any British Dominion, and the
establishment thereon of a Jewish colony or colonies. The validity of this bequest questioned
by the next of his kin as it was void for uncertainty and alternatively that it created a
perpetual trust which was not charitable and therefore void.

ISSUE: Whether gift of movables which infringes the rule against perpetuities in force in the
country of the testator's domicile is invalid though it is valid under place of administration?

JUDGEMNENT: Court held that the next-of-kin say that the law of the State of New York
has nothing to do with the administration of this trust, that the law of the situs of the purchase
of land will govern and that the will permits the trust to be administered in a multitude of
places and that the trust fails if it would be non-charitable in any of them. Also, with regard to
movables it was held that the Rule Against Perpetuities, the opinion is expressed that if the
gift is valid by the perpetuities law of the place of administration but invalid by the
perpetuities law of the place of the testator's domicile, the governing law should be that of the
place of administration. The court taken help of the case Queensland case Re Mitchner;
Union Trustee Co. of Australia v. The Attorney General of Australia in which a testator
domiciled in Queensland bequeathed movables to trustees’ resident in Germany to be applied
on trusts which infringed the rule against perpetuities in force in Queensland but which were
valid by German law. The trusts were held to be valid. Therefore, court allowed Appeal.

CASE: IN RE CRAVEN'S ESTATE. LLOYDS BANK V. COCKBURN

CITATION: [1936. C. 2009.] [1937] Ch. 423

FACTS: An English woman domiciled in England, being possessed of certain moneys and
securities in a bank in Monaco, gave her son a power of attorney in respect of them.
Subsequently, having in mind a pending operation which might prove fatal, she directed him
to get this property into his own name because she wished it to be his in the event of her
death, and he accordingly gave instructions to this effect to the bank, which complied with
them. The testatrix died as a result of the operation, and her estate was administered in
England.

ISSUES: whether there was a valid donatio mortis causa and which law applies?

JUDGEMENT: FAREWELL J expressed that judgment must be decided by English law,

subject only to this; it being necessary according to English law that there should be an
effective parting with dominion over the property, that which is said to constitute the parting
with dominion must be an act which would be effective in the place where the property is
situate according to the law of that place. As it was understood the evidence as to the law of
Monaco there is nothing whatever which prevents what was done being a sufficient parting
with dominion. So far as the power of attorney alone is concerned, the court thought that
there is no real difference between the law of Monaco and the law of this country. In both
cases the donee of the power is a mere agent and there is no question of the donor of the
power parting with dominion to the agent at all although the agent is clothed with authority to
deal with the property so far as the power permits, in the same way as the principal could
have dealt with it. But since, in my judgment, the mere giving of the power of attorney would
be insufficient in English law, it is immaterial to consider what the foreign law might be with
regard to that. It was found nothing whatever in the evidence as to the foreign law to suggest,
nor can It can be believed, that it would be right to say that once the property, shares and
money had been transferred into the sole name of the donee, the donor or anyone else could
object to the donee dealing with that property as he pleased without reference to the donor,
and if that be so, since the other conditions have already been fulfilled, it follows that in my
judgment these shares and money were the subject-matter of a valid donatio mortis causa,
that the son is entitled to them and that they do not form part of the testatrix's estate.

CASE: In re KORVINE'S TRUST. LEVASHOFF v. BLOCK.

CITATION: [1921] 1 Ch. 343

FACTS: On February 27, 1919 K., a domiciled Russian then resident in London, having
passed a sum of 1000l. to the joint account at a bank of himself and B., instructed B. in the
presence of three other persons, in case of K.'s death, to pay his doctor's bills, funeral
expenses, and debts, and to pass over the remnant of the 1000l. to the plaintiff L., a Russian
lady then living in Switzerland. K. further instructed B. at the same interview to pass to the
plaintiff certain Russian bonds, money, gold articles, and jewellery contained in a separate
box in the custody of W. In 1917 before going on a perilous voyage the contents of this box
had been left by K. in a sealed case with a friend with the view of providing for the plaintiff
in the case of his death. On February 28, 1919, K. went into a nursing home for a serious
operation and died on April 9, 1919, intestate. A memorandum of this message of K. was
composed at the Russian Consulate in London and signed on June 18, 1919, by B. and two of
the others present when it was given. K. had a wife and sons in Russia. B. lodged the balance
of the 1000. amounting to 818l. 19s. 2d. with the Russian Consul in London, and it was
subsequently paid into Court under an order and the official solicitor was appointed to
represent the estate of K.

ISSUES:

1) whether the transaction of February 27, 1919, constituted a good donatio mortis
causa?
2) The next question is whether the law of this country is the law properly applicable in
this case?

JUDGEMENT: The court held that the gift of the money, bonds, and jewellery constituted a
good donatio mortis causa by English law. That the law to be applied to it was that applicable
to gifts inter vivos and not that applicable to testamentary dispositions, notwithstanding that
the subject matter of the donatio was liable to the donor's debts upon a deficiency of assets,
and also subject to legacy and estate duty. The first gift by the Admiral in 1917 of the
securities and valuables before going on a perilous voyage to the Canary Islands was made in
contemplation of possible death. Further it was explained that the Admiral returned in safety,
but the same articles were again disposed of on February 27, 1919, and the gift was perfected
from the date of its creation by the death which followed. English law is applicable as it was
an assignment of movables and the lex situs applies. The law of domicil does not apply to
such a gift. The deceased Admiral was a domiciled Russian applicant's interest were a
succession arising under anything in the nature of a testamentary disposition or under an
intestacy the law to be applied would be the law of the domicil. On the other hand, it is not
disputed that the rule as to gifts inter vivos is correctly stated at p. 519 of Dicey and that an
assignment giving a good title to movables according to the law of the country where the
movables are situate at the time of the assignment is valid. Which of these two rules applies
to chattels the subject of a donatio mortis causa? Mr. Methold admits that the donee cannot
be said to take under any testamentary disposition but submits that neither can a donatio
mortis causa properly be regarded as a gift inter vivos. He places it somewhere between the
two and argues that in as much as the title of the donee is not in fact perfected unless the
donor dies, there is in it so great an element of succession on death as to bring it within the
rule regulating testamentary dispositions rather than that applied to gifts inter vivos. No doubt
the gift is consummated by the death of the donor, but it is not a legacy or a testamentary act.
Therefore, it is a gift, though an incomplete gift, inter vivos - a gift subject to revocation by
the act of the donor himself or by his recovery from his illness. If he dies without revoking
the gift the donee's title is derived from the act of the donor in his lifetime and relates back to
the date of that act. On these grounds, and notwithstanding that the subject matter of the
donatio is liable to the donor's debts upon a deficiency of assets and is also subject to legacy
and estate duty, it was held that the law to be applied is that applicable to gifts inter-vivos and
not that applicable to testamentary dispositions.

CASE: MORSON V. SECOND NAT'L BANK

CITATION: 306 Mass. 588

FACTS: About September 20, 1937, while Turner and Mildred Turner Copperman were
travelling together in Italy, Turner handed to Mildred Turner Copperman a sealed envelope
previously marked by him "Property of Mildred Turner Copperman." As he did so he said,
"These are yours." The certificate in his name, dated October 6, 1933, was in the envelope.
He also said that he would have to sign the back of the certificate. Two days later a notary
and two witnesses came to the hotel where the parties were staying. Mildred Turner
Copperman produced the certificate, and "Turner signed his name on the back and then he
filled in the name of Miss Copperman and her address" and delivered the certificate to
Mildred Turner Copperman, who "accepted it." Turner's intention at that time was "to make
an absolute gift to Mildred Copperman to take effect at once. The husband died and the wife
alleged that the certificate was hers based upon the husband's gift. The estate initiated an
action for injunctive relief against the corporation, bank, and the wife to enjoin the transfer of
the stock and for recovery of the certificate. The trial court entered judgment for the estate,
finding that there was no completed gift of stock and the validity of the transfer is to be
judged by the law of Italy, and that certain formalities required by that law for the making of
gifts in general were not observed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a completed gift of an ordinary tangible chattel is to be

determined by the law of the situs of the chattel or lex domicile?

JUDGEMENT: The court found that the transfer was improperly judged by the laws of Italy.
The court held that shares of stock were subject to the jurisdiction of the state of
incorporation and the husband's action were sufficient in Massachusetts to effect legal
transfer of the shares. The court further expressed that with respect to the share and bonds in
present case the shares are part of the structure of the corporation, all of which was erected
and stands by virtue of the law of the State of incorporation. The law of that State determines
the nature and attributes of the shares. If by the law of that State the shares devolve upon one
who obtains ownership of the certificate it may be that the law of the State of a purported
transfer of the certificate will indirectly determine share ownership. shares created in a State
which has adopted the uniform stock transfer act with its provision that title to a share can be
transferred only by delivery of the certificate "may be transferred by delivery of the
certificate as provided by the Act even though such delivery takes place in another state
where such Act is not in force. Therefore, his rule is precisely applicable to the present case
and trial court decree was reversed.

CASE: COMMISSIONER OF GIFT TAX VS. K.M. ZIAUDDIN

CITATION: (1998)145CTR(Mad)70

FACTS: The assessee is an individual and was not ordinarily a resident during the previous
year ended on March 31, 1975, relevant to the assessment year 1975-76. The assessee made
the following gifts to his three daughters. One lakh each to two daughters and fifty thousand
to one daughter. The above gifts were made by way of drafts purchased in Malaysian dollars
at Kuala Lumpur in the name of the donees. According to the assessee, the gifts took place at
Kuala Lumpur and the gifts were accepted on behalf of his daughters in Kuala Lumpur itself
and the assessee purchased the drafts thereafter. The assessee, therefore, contended that the
gifts were movable properties situated in foreign country and the assessee being not
ordinarily a resident, is entitled to exemption under section 5(1) (ii) of the Gift-tax Act
(hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act"). The Gift-tax Officer, however, did not accept the
contentions urged on behalf of the assessee and held that the assessee had not proved the
acceptance of the gifts at Kuala Lumpur. He, therefore, held that the gifts took place in India
and levied the gift-tax.

ISSUE:

1) Whether Tribunal justified in holding that demand drafts purchased in foreign

currency in Kuala Lumpur and sent to his three daughters were gifts exempt under
Section 5 (1) (ii) – bank being debtor is in foreign country?
2) Whether transfer of movables by gift inter-vivos, and that the validity of such transfer
of property should be governed by the lex situs?

JUDGEMENT: Held that relationship between banker and customer is one of debtor and
creditor. As the debt situated in foreign country in foreign bank at time of acceptance of gifts
debt situated outside India. The donor being individual though citizen of India is not
ordinarily resident. Therefore, gift has not taken place in India. The court held that
considering the relationship between the banker and the customer and the location of the debt
at the time of acceptance of the gifts, the assessee is entitled to the exemption as provided
under section 5(1)(ii) of the Act.

RULES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH REGARD TO GIFT OF

MOVABLES

There are various principles under the conflict of laws to determine the substantive law
(municipal law) that applies to a case to determine the rights of the parties. There also various
rules followed by the English courts. A person's capacity to assign a movable, or any interest
therein, is governed by the law of his domicil (lex domicilii) at the time of the assignment.
This rule must be read subject to the effect of rules followed by English courts. In principle,
capacity for the assignment of a movable, by gift or sale, should be governed by the lex
domicilli of the assignor. Thus, if X, a minor domiciled in Scotland, makes a gift of goods in
England, his capacity to make, and therefore the validity of, the gift depends (it would seem)
upon the law of Scotland. “But on this matter, it is impossible to speak with certainty.
Capacity to alienate movables probably stands in the same position as capacity to contract,
and there is considerable doubt as to the limits within which contractual capacity is governed
by the lex domicilii. We may, at any rate (it is submitted), assume that, where in fact a good
title to a movable is acquired under the lex situs, it will be treated as valid in England, even
though the person (e.g., a minor) conferring a title under the lex situs was incapable of giving
a good title under his lex domicilii.” the assignment of a movable, wherever situate, in
accordance with the law of the owner's domicil, is valid. 1 The cases which illustrate these
authoritative dicta have mainly, if not exclusively, reference to general assignments of
movables. No reported case can (it is believed) be cited as absolutely supporting this rule in
reference to individual assignments, e.g., by gift or sale; but the validity of such assignments,
when made in accordance with the owner's lex domiclii, is so uniformly taken for granted by
judges and by writers of eminence, such as Story, that we may assume that a sale or gift by a
person domiciled in England will, at any rate if made in England, be held (if it be in
accordance with English law) to be valid as regards goods, wherever situate. 2 And it may
possibly be the case that such sale or gift of goods situate in England, by a person domiciled
in a foreign country, which is made in accordance with, and is valid by, the law of his

1
A. V. Dicey. Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws (2)
2
Ibid
domicil, will be held valid in England. “Nis a trader domiciled in Maryland, and carrying on
business both in Maryland and in England. He is owner of movable property in England. N,
under a deed of arrangement executed in Maryland, assigns all his property to A, as trustee,
for the benefit of his creditors. The deed is valid according to the law of Maryland (N's lex
domicilii), but is not registered in accordance with the Deeds of Arrangement and therefore,
if governed by the law of England (lex situs), is void. After the deed has been executed, X, a
creditor who has obtained judgment in England against N, causes N's movable property in
England to be taken in execution. The title of A to the property has been held valid as against
the title of X.3 But the property in this case passed under a general assignment. How far,
therefore, the principle of Rule 145 applies to cases of individual assignments still admits of
doubt. X, domiciled and being in England, makes a gift by deed to A of goods at Paris. The
gift is valid here without reference to French law. 4 If X were to bring the goods to England,
no third person having acquired a title to them under French law, the goods would be held to
be the property of A”.5

The same result ought (it would seem) to follow if X, when domiciled in England, but being
in France, makes a gift by deed to A of goods at Paris. “In such a case, however, our Courts
would possibly hold that the form required by the lex loci was imperative, and that therefore,
if the gift does not, by the law of France, pass the property in the goods, there has been no
transfer of property at all. X, again, domiciled and being in a foreign country, where property
in goods can be conveyed by a verbal gift, gives A, by word of mouth, furniture of X's in
London. The property (perhaps) passes to A. It must, however, remain doubtful whether, at
any rate, the two last examples do not fall within the exception to our Rule.”

THE NECESSITY OF DELIVERY IN GIFTS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND

CONFLICT ISSUES

The English case of “Cochrane v. Moore, 6 a donor, apparently domiciled and resident in
England, purported, by words of gift spoken in England, to give to the defendant a quarter
share in a horse at all relevant times stabled in Paris. Later, the plaintiff advanced money on
the security of the horse and, when the horse was sold, he claimed that he was entitled to the
whole proceeds of the sale. The issue whether any title had passed by the gift was decided
solely by reference to English law, under which delivery was held to be necessary. However,
3
dulaney v. Merry 4 Son, [1901] 1 Q. B. 536.
4
Code Civil, Art. 931 of French law
5
Castrigue v. Imrie (1870), L. R. 4 H. L. 414;
6
(1890) L. R. 25 Q. B. D. 5
as French law was not pleaded or referred to, the case is hardly strong authority against the
application of the law of the situs.” This case after a period of judicial doubt, established the
legal tenet that delivery is essential to a valid gift of personal property. The constant
reiteration of this doctrine in English and American cases has given it an almost impregnable
position in the law. However, the many and diverse ways in which gratuitous transfers of
property are affected make this rule difficult to apply. A mere intention to make a gift in the
future is of course unenforceable. But suppose there is an expression of an intent to make a
present gift and the donor retains possession of the chattel. Thus, in In re Lewis' Estate 7 Mrs.
Lewis, who was about to go to a hospital, said to her son, Matthew, you will find my bank
books in my trunk, and they are yours, and I won't come back. That was the only evidence of
the gift. The court held that there was no valid gift, saying that there must be a delivery to the
donee. This is the general rule. But the court goes on to say, "In cases of this kind, where it is
claimed that donations have been made and no delivery of any kind is shown, the evidence
should be carefully scrutinized, and should be definite, clear and convincing. 8 This statement,
if applied literally, suggests a radical change in the law of gifts. Delivery would cease to be a
sine qua non of a valid gift. The original conception of delivery was modelled after the
formality of seisin. There had to be a manual tradition of the thing intends to be given. This
test was a crude but effective way of determining whether one had freely divested himself of
certain rights and invested another with these same rights. It was the most conclusive test of a
gift. The donee had the chattel. But the term delivery soon lost its early connotation, and in its
later usages has tended to confuse the courts.9 In most jurisdictions a constructive or symbolic
delivery is sufficient. A New York court held that the delivery by the donor to the donee of
an instrument stating, "I give this day to my wife a present of (500) five hundred shares," was
a valid constructive delivery of the shares. The same result was reached where a donor sent
the donee a letter informing him of the gift of a boat held in storage. 10 A written order
delivered by a decedent to a donee for money and a watch contained in the money belt of the
decdent was held sufficient to prove a gift of those chattels. 11 The handing over of an ear of
corn was held to be a symbolic delivery of a field of corn, some hogs and a negro slave. 12
Another court has held valid the gift of a set of plate where one plate was given as symbolic

7
Surrog. Ct. Bronx Co. 1924) 123 Misc- 115, 205 N. Y. Supp. 365,
8
Matter of Housnzan (1918) 182. App. Div.37
9
Richardson v. E,mmett (1901) 61 App. Div. 205
10
Hawkins v. Union Trust Co. (1919) 187 App. Div. 47
11
In re Stalden's Estate (1922) 194 N. Y. Supp. 349
12
Lavender v. The Addm'r of Pritchard (1804) 3 N. C. 293.
delivery.13 One case almost dispensed with the necessity for any delivery by implying a
delivery where there was neither actual nor symbolic delivery. 14 In that case, a grandfather,
whose grandchild lived in the house with him, stated that he had given his heifer to his
grandchild. The heifer remained on the premises of the donor; nevertheless, the gift was held
to be valid.

GIFT CAUSA MORTIS AND CONFLICT ISSUES

A number of significant legal consequences depend upon whether an attempted gratuitous

transfer of property is labelled inter vivos or mortis-causa. Real estate cannot be transferred
mortis causa but may be the subject of a gift inter vivos. Property given mortis causa is as
fully subject to the claims of creditors of the donor's estate if his assets are insufficient, as a
legacy is to abatement whereas a gift inter vivos is ordinarily not liable to such claims. Where
the transaction has occurred during an illness of the donor, and he subsequently recovers, if
he can prove that the gift was mortis causa, his recovery works an automatic revocation of the
gift; if the gift was inter vivos, it is absolute and irredeemable. It is presumed that a gift made
during an illness or peril to the life of the donor is mortis causa, but this is rebuttable by proof
of the intention of the donor to part unconditionally with absolute control and dominion over
the propert. In “Emery v. Clough,15 which involved a gift causa mortis. A bill was brought for
discovery of assets. The defendant and the intestate were domiciled in New Hampshire but
were temporarily in Vermont where the intestate became ill. As a gift causa mortis, he
delivered a bond and a sum of money to defendant with instructions to deliver it to third
persons after his death, and the delivery was accordingly made. This procedure would have
been valid by the law of Vermont but not by the law of New Hampshire, which required a
petition to the probate court with the testimony of two disinterested witnesses to the
transaction within sixty days after the death of the donor in order to effectuate the transfer.
But in reality, a gift causa mortis is neither a transfer inter-vivos nor a testamentary
disposition, although it is of the nature of both. The court drew an analogy to contract
because a gift causa mortis requires consent. But such a transaction is not contractual, since a
contract is the result of bargaining, and there was neither knowledge nor consent upon the
part of the donees until after the death of the donor. Further, if this were a contract, it is
possible that the governing law would be the place of performance by the delivery to the
donees-in New Hampshire. Nor does the rule that the goods were governed by the domicil of
13
Danby v. Titcker (1883) 31 W. R. 578 (criti
14
Whatley v. Mitchell (1919) 24 Ga. App. 174, 100 S. E. 229.
15
63 N.H. 552, 4 Atl. 796 (i886).
the owner apply. While the court does not clearly state its position, it is apparent that the only
operative law which would satisfactorily explain the decision is that the law of the situs of the
property, at the time of the creation of an interest therein, governed in the forum. Since the
chattel was in Vermont with the owner, his acts there operated according to the law of the
situs to pass a defeasible title to a third party, and the delivery to the defendant for
transmission to the donee created a relationship analogous to a trust. The law of the situs of
the chattel should operate as to the creation of an interest therein and any interest in a chattel,
even though defeasible, which is valid by the law of the situs should be recognized in the
state of the forum even though the latter is also the state of the domicil.”

CONCLUSION

Gift of movables in conflict of laws has a very little authority. The major issues and
challenges present in the gift is that whether it is gift inter-vivos or gift causa mortis. In both
the situations the delivery to donee is essential to complete gift. In the context of conflict of
laws, the gift of movables is primarily governed by lex domicile. With regard to donatio
mortis causa a gift in contemplation of death. Where such a gift has been characterised as a
transfer of property, then its validity and effect are governed by the law of the situs. It should
however, be noted that Farwell J in Re Craven’s Estate16 characterised such a gift as a
testamentary disposition and applied the law of the testatrix’s domicile, English law, by
which law an effective parting with dominion was necessary to make the gift valid.” He did
not refer to the law of the situs to determine what was sufficient to pass the dominion.

16
(1890) 25 QBD 57