How did the approach of Emperor Frederick I to

the problems of government in Germany differ to

his measures in Italy?
When analysing how the approaches of Frederick I (Barbarossa) to problems of
government in Germany and Italy differed in certain aspects it must be kept in
mind that these approaches were not independent of each other. It must be borne
in mind that Frederick ruled three separate kingdoms which together comprised
the Western empire.1 Policy relating to all three, therefore, was heavily connected
and often overlapped.2
That being said there is a clear distinction between the methods used by
Barbarossa to achieve his ends in Germany and those used in regard to Italy.3 In
Germany he used diplomatic skill to enlarge and sustain his authority over the
kingdom.4 This involved the playing off of certain forces against each other and,
later in his reign, developing and enforcing the feudal nature of his rule.5 In Italy,
however, Barbarossa’s methods were somewhat more robust.6 To use a
clausewitzian phrase, he used war as a means of policy in order to force his will
upon his opponents.7
Frederick I’s approaches to these kingdoms had to be different in order to
comprehensively deal with the problems of government unique to each. It is the
goal of this essay to briefly outline these problems and thence to analyse how
Frederick approached them. This will be done, firstly, in relation to Germany and,
secondly, in relation to Italy.
When Frederick I, nephew of the previous king Conrad III, was elected to the
throne in 1152 he became the ruler of a kingdom (Germany) still reeling from the
investiture contest.8 The power of the German monarchy had decreased to an
enormous extent9 due to the conflict with the reforming Papacy and the

1
Not only that but Frederick ruled for 38 years meaning he had time to exert great influence and
build up the kind of empire he desired. See Horst Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages c.
1050-1200, (Cambridge 1986, reprinted 1989, translated by Timothy Reuter), 135. However this
also means he had time to change his views and policies with regard to both Germany and Italy.
2
Often to free his own hands to pursue, or to gain support for, Italian expeditions Frederick would
entrust power in, or be conciliatory towards, the German princes. By far the clearest example of
this occurred early on in Frederick’s reign when he made ‘wide concessions to Henry the Lion in
the north and in Bavaria.’ These concessions were granted so as to allow Frederick his first
expedition to Italy. See Peter Munz, Frederick Barbarossa: A study in Medieval Politics, (London
1969), 54-55.
3
For the first ten years of his reign or thereabouts, Fuhrmann believes, Frederick divided his time
equally between his German and Italian kingdoms. Fuhrmann, High Middle Ages, 149.
4
For an example of this - concerning Saxon rivalries – see Munz, Barbarossa, 55.
5
Geoffrey Barraclough, The Origins of Modern Germany, (Oxford 1946; second edn., reprinted
1972), 176.
6
He engaged in six Italian expeditions in total. Fuhrmann, High Middle Ages, 142.
7
The most obvious example of this being his dealings with Milan, see Barraclough, Origins, 182.
8
For a comprehensive look at the origins of this cataclysm between Empire and Papacy see I.S.
Robinson, Henry IV of Germany, 1056-1106 (Cambridge, 1999). For an overview of what the
Investiture Contest meant for Germany see Fuhrmann, High Middle Ages, 98-101.
9
R.H.C. Davis, A History of Medieval Europe, (London 1957; tenth edn. 1968), 315.
internecine feuds between the Welf family and their enemies.10 Frederick himself
owed his election to his descent from both the Welf and their rivals the Staufen.11
The result of all this conflict was, along with a general decline in German
influence and prestige12, a loss of power for the monarchy13 and a not
inconsiderable political centrifrugalisation, or disintegration, across
Germany.14Thus the immediate tasks before the young king were great.
Barbarossa began by taking on the role of arbiter of disputes and conciliator of
old enmities. This was to be seen primarily in his dealings with his uncle Welf VI
and his cousin Henry the Lion, duke of Saxony and Bavaria.15 The former was
granted ‘important Italian imperial offices and estates’16 while the latter felt the
benefit of Barbarossa’s mediation in his conflict with the Margrave of
Brandenburg, Albert the Bear.17
As mentioned at the outset Frederick used the playing off of powerful German
nobles against each other as a means of keeping himself at the apex of the German
power structure. Though Henry the Lion was entrusted with a monumental
amount of power18 Frederick made sure to hold him in check to some extent by
appointing Wichmann, archbishop of Naumburg-Zeitz, to the archbishopric of
Magdeburg when that position became vacant in 1152. Wichmann was related to
some of the most powerful Saxon families and so was bound to rival Henry in
Saxony.19
Use of the Imperial Church to enhance his own power was, in fact, a significant
aspect of Frederick’s approach to ameliorating the problems associated with loss
of power he had inherited on becoming king.20 At the beginning of his reign he
essentially removed three bishops and one archbishop which he replaced with
men more conducive to his own plans.21 Such interference with the clergy without
aggravating the papacy was the product of the Treaty of Constance signed with
Pope Eugenius III in 1153.22 This kind of power over the Imperial Church was
10
Barraclough places much emphasis on the need to recover lost power as imperative for
Frederick’s prospects. Barraclough, Origins, 167.
11
Davis, Medieval Europe, 318.
12
Barraclough, Origins, 163
13
The kings preceding Frederick had to make many concessions to their nobility; exchanging
regalian rights for loyalty. Z.N. Brooke, A History Of Europe, From 911 To 1198, (Cambridge
1938), 506.
14
Barraclough, Origins, 162-4.
15
Henry was given the title of duke of Bavaria by Frederick in the first place. See Alfred
Haverkamp, Medieval Germany 1056-1273, (Oxford 1988, translated by Helga Braun and Richard
Mortimer), 222.
16
Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, 222.
17
This was in relation to an argument over the inheritance of two families that had died out.
Fuhrmann, High Middle Ages, 139-40.
18
His influence and prestige was known and respected as far afield as the Byzantine court.
Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, 231.
19
Munz, Barbarossa, 56.
20
Frederick met this challenge by paying little attention to, or stretching the meaning of to a
massive extent, the 1122 Concordat of Worms. Fuhrmann, High Middle Ages, 140-1.
21
The bishops in question were Henry of Minden, Burckard of Eichstatt and Bernard of
Hildesheim. The Archbishop of Mainz was also replaced; by Henry’s chancellor Arnold von
Seelenhofen. Munz, Barbarossa, 68.
22
Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, 224. For a more in-depth look at what the treaty of Constance
contained see Fuhrmann, High Middle Ages, 141-2.
highly significant.23 As the single biggest source of knights and soldiers for
Frederick’s army the German episcopate was ‘the very backbone of his military
machine.’24
The centrepiece of Frederick’s approach to the problem of German political
disintegration25 was the establishment of a sophisticated feudal system with the
king at its head.26 As the lower nobility27 were already operating under a feudal, or
semi-feudal, system28 Frederick tried to apply the same system to the high-
nobility. His objective was to salvage some of the power and authority of the
German monarchy. To do so Frederick needed to create a strong high-nobility –
what would be called tenants-in-chief, or principes imperii - just below himself in
the hierarchy.29 This would involve the concession of regalia to this new class.30 If
such a class could be successfully brought into existence, and consequently the
lower nobility halted in their upward progress31, it would leave the German king
securely at the apex of the political hierarchy.32
Elements of the aforementioned approach can be seen as early as 1156 with the
splitting of Bavaria in two, creating the new duchy of Austria.33 This was
Frederick’s solution to the conflict between Henry the Lion and the Babenberger,
Henry Jasomirgott, in Bavaria. The latter received the new duchy of Austria with
a number of sovereign rights including the right to inheritance in both male and
female lines.34 The document outlining these rights came to be called the
privilegium minus and was the founding charter of the rights granted to the
principes imperii.35 It must be noted that rather than a transference of rights36 from
23
Arguably the early period of Barbarossa’s reign was a return to the status quo ante the
Investiture Contest as regards the Emperor’s power over the Imperial Church. For a brief
summation of the ‘Imperial Church system’ apparatus before Henry IV see Geoffrey Barraclough,
Mediaeval Germany 911-1250, Volume 1: Introduction, (Oxford, 1938; Fourth edn. 1967), 63-70.
24
Munz, Barbarossa, 69. Munz uses the wonderful phrase ‘solid episcopal phalanx’ to describe
the Imperial Church and its military value to Frederick at this time.
25
A symptom of the disintegration was that the rights once claimed by the emperor alone were
now being, to a certain extent, usurped by the local nobility. Davis, Medieval Europe, 320.
26
Barraclough, Origins, 177. And Munz, Barbarossa, 324 and 355. Barraclough implies this was
always an implicit goal of Barbarossa’s plans while Munz believes it was only after the failure of
his main scheme, what he calls the ‘Great Design’, that Barbarossa took this feudalism-centred
approach.
27
The family to which Frederick belonged – the Staufen – had risen from this social stratum. Their
rise could not have been possible were it not for the turmoil brought about by the Investiture
Contest. Davis, Medieval Europe, 321.
28
This was largely a result of the Investiture Contest, See Munz, Barbarossa, 318.
29
Barraclough, Origins, 190.
30
A ‘new estate of imperial princes’. Fuhrmann, High Middle Ages, 170.
31
The fluid social hierarchy which resulted from the Investiture Contest contained an enormous
number of newly-made families rising through their support for the Welf, or for their enemies.
This time also saw the influx of MInisteriales, originally unfree servants of the king, into the upper
echelons of the German nobility. Munz, Barbarossa, 318-19.
32
A corollary to this would be making the German Kingship hereditary, not elective, thus making
the king independent of the principes imperii. Munz, Barbarossa, 355-6.
33
Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, 223.
34
Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, 223.
35
Davis, Medieval Europe, 318-19.
36
Most of the rights delegated to the dukes of this new province had already been lost by the
German crown in the years before Frederick’s reign. The privilegium minus only consolidated, or
codified this situation. Davis, Medieval Europe, 321.
king to duke the privilegium minus was an ‘authorisation to subject the local
aristocracy…to superior authority.’37
Frederick also backed Henry the Lion in many of his feuds with the Saxon
nobility38; thereby continuing his policy of strengthening the principes imperii
against the lower nobles.39 He would eventually take part in depriving Henry of
the duchies of Bavaria and Saxony at Gelnhausen in 1180.40 This action is in
accordance with the feudal plan also in that it put an end to the power of the only
duke in Germany able to challenge the king. Saxony was then divided in two,
creating Westphalia. Bavaria was also divided, this time with the removal of the
territory of Styria. Each duchy was given to one of Frederick’s new class of
prince.41
The extent to which the Investiture Contest changed the political landscape of
Italy dwarfed what it had meant for Germany.42 In Italy Imperial authority had
disintegrated entirely.43 When Barbarossa was crowned Emperor by Pope Adrian
IV in Rome in 1155 - the circumstances of which set the tone for his approach to
Italy44 - the old Italian realm of the Empire had fragmented entirely to be replaced
by a number of city-states, or communes.45 This had been a gradual process
whereby the bishops and archbishops; once bastions of Imperial authority, were
replaced by a governmental body called the ‘Consulate.’46 To call this situation a
problem of government would be an understatement; imperial authority over Italy
was basically non-existent. The emperor’s goal was to restore imperial authority
not only to strengthen the Empire but to reap the financial rewards47 of dominating

37
Barraclough, Origins, 176 (in footnote).
38
Brooke, A History Of Europe, 502.
39
Brooke, A History Of Europe, 505.
40
Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, 232. Haverkamp and Brooke (Brooke, A History Of Europe,
502) believe the deposition was Frederick’s revenge for Henry’s refusal to aid his Italian
expedition in 1176 but Munz, Barbarossa, 346-7, argues convincingly that the real reason was that
Henry ‘constituted a tangible threat to the feudalisation of the monarchy.’
41
Bernard of Anhalt got Saxony (also called Angaria) while the archbishop of Cologne received
Westphalia. Otto of Wittesbach, helpful and faithful to Frederick all his life was installed in
Bavaria. Styria was given to its former margrave, Ottocar. Brooke, A History Of Europe, 502.
Each of these princes was thus raised in status to principes imperii and their help in militarily
defeating Henry the Lion was virtually guaranteed. Munz, Barbarossa, 353-4.
42
For an outline of the power exercised by Ottonian rulers in Italy see Giovanni Tabacco, The
struggle for power in medieval Italy: Structures of political rule, (Cambridge 1989), 165.
43
To the extent that Tabacco, medieval Italy, 220, considers Barbarossa’s Italian campaigns to
have been but passing excursions as far as the Italian communes were concerned. Barbarossa was
only able to exert any influence ‘episodically.’
44
Both emperor and pope had to make their way into the city clandestinely due to an ongoing
conflict between the pope and the Roman people. When the people found out about the secret
coronation in St. Peter’s they attacked some imperial soldiers. Frederick’s army replied harshly;
massacring a large group of these people before taking control of the city. Munz, Barbarossa, 85-
7.
45
Davis, Medieval Europe, 327.
46
Tabacco, medieval Italy, 183-185.
47
The exponential growth of commune wealth is difficult to explain but a valiant attempt to do so
can be found in J.K. Hyde, Society and politics in medieval Italy: the evolution of the civil life,
(London 1973), 66-72.
the communes.48 His approach to this goal involved crushing the communes
through military measures if necessary.49
Frederick’s aims for Italy did not remain the same for his entire spell in office
but, up to the Peace of Anagni in 117650, his objectives can be gauged from the
decrees he made at Roncaglia in 1158.51 Here he claimed, among other rights, all
regalia held by previous emperors52 and ‘jurisdiction over all matters affecting
property, life and liberty.’53 Encompassed by these rights, naturally, was fodrum54,
and a refusal to grant this by certain areas of Lombardy on his first expedition in
1154 precipitated the first show of Imperial appetite for cruelty in the form of
looting.55 This first trip into Italy also marked the first show of military strength
against Milan and her allies. Milan was put to the ban of the empire as a result of
the claims and grievances of her rivals.56 The area around Milan was pillaged and
the city of Tortona, ally of Milan, was brutally besieged and conquered before its
castle was dismantled at the behest of Pavia, a rival of Milan’s.57
The incident just described exemplifies Barbarossa’s approach to the politics of
Lombardy.58 The communes at this time were perpetually at war with one another.
Barbarossa made use of these alliances to enhance his own authority over the
whole region.59 The heavy-handed methods of the imperial army were once again
in evidence in Frederick’s second Italian expedition in late 1158. Milanese ally
Brescia was ‘devastated’60 before Milan itself, which had not been attacked on the
first expedition, was besieged and forced to surrender61 in the name of imperial
authority. At this point it seemed Frederick’s approach had paid dividends.

48
Barraclough, Origins, 172-73.
49
As in the case of Milan. Barraclough, Origins, 182. Nevertheless evidence of town-building by
Barbarossa in Germany implies the emperor was not completely rural-minded and hellbent on
crushing all things urban. See Fuhrmann, High Middle Ages, 152.
50
Munz, Barbarossa, 313-14.
51
Barbarossa was helped in this enterprise by jurists from Bologna, experts in Roman law.
Fuhrmann, High Middle Ages, 147.
52
Davis believes Frederick had designs on becoming a ruler like a true Roman Emperor of old.
Davis, Medieval Europe, 322-23.
53
Munz, Barbarossa, 119-20.
54
‘A contribution for the upkeep of the imperial armies on their way to Rome.’ Munz, Barbarossa,
72. The issue of fodrum and the refusing of it was the reason Frederick laid waste to Spoleto on his
first expedition. Munz, Barbarossa, 88-9.
55
Frederick did not officially condone such behaviour but tolerated it as one of the only ways to
feed the army. Munz, Barbarossa, 72-3. The Napoleonic maxim that an army marches on its belly
was well understood by medieval kings.
56
Munz, Barbarossa, 73.
57
Munz, Barbarossa, 74-6.
58
Tabacco believes Frederick was trying to bring about a feudal system in Italy and thus had to
destroy the power of the cities. Tabacco, medieval Italy, 213-15. Barraclough, however, thinks
Frederick’s solution to the problem of government in Italy was to recognise the communes but
force them to accept imperial authority and imperial rights, such as taxation rights and fodrum. By
doing this he could also exploit their wealth. Barraclough, Origins, 180.
59
Hyde notes specifically the cordial relationship between the Genoese and the empire. Hyde,
Society, 69.
60
Munz, Barbarossa, 160.
61
Munz, Barbarossa, 161-2.
Enforcing the Roncaglia decrees62 he installed magistrates working for the Empire
(podesta) as the leaders of the communes.63
The majority of the communes accepted the podesta at first. The exception was
Milan and her allies.64 In 1159 the Milanese attack on the fortress of Trezzo was
the catalyst for another Imperial invasion of Lombardy65. This time Milan was
besieged successfully and dismantled.66
Unfortunately for the emperor this success was short-lived. The brutality of
Barbarossa67 coupled with the corruption and cruelty of his podesta68 had caused a
rallying of opposition to the empire.69 Firstly in 1164 a league of Verona was
formed to oppose the emperor.70 In 1167 this was followed up by the formation of
the Lombard League.71 The unified opposition was substantial enough72 – if it held
together – to permanently thwart Barbarossa’s plans for government in Italy. The
culture of the time reflected this new hatred of the empire. The rhetorician
Boncampagno, in the historical tract De Obsidione Ancone, urged the Italian
communes to come together and oppose Barbarossa’s tyranny.73
The implications of Barbarossa’s conflict with his Italian enemies for imperial
government in Italy only became clear with the peace that followed the emperor’s
defeat at Legnano in 1176.74 The immediate peace of Venice75 was indecisive76
and permanent peace was not agreed upon until 1184.77 Although the emperor
retained some authority over the Lombard cities – most notably taxation rights;

62
Aiding the emperor to find a basis in law for his decrees were the civil lawyers of Italy who
were immersed in the study of Roman law. This small section of the population were perhaps the
only group not to desert the emperor during the 1060’s and 1070’s. Hyde, Society, 86.
63
Munz, Barbarossa, 171-2.
64
Barraclough, Origins, 181.
65
Munz, Barbarossa, 177.
66
Munz, Barbarossa, 181-3. This occurred in 1162 following the siege and destruction of the city
of Crema by Barbarossa’s army. The dismantling aspect was carried out under pressure from
Pavia. Surprisingly Milan’s destruction didn’t permanently harm the city’s vibrant economy in the
long run. A quick recovery was made. Hyde, Society, 74.
67
John of Salisbury labelled him a ‘German tyrant’. Fuhrmann, High Middle Ages, 156.
68
A new civic magistrate appointed by the emperor, more often than not a ‘foreigner…from the
emperor’s own entourage or from some other city.’ Davis, Medieval Europe, 329.
69
Munz, Barbarossa, 274-6. The imperial representative in Piacenza, Arnold of Dorstadt, was a
particularly nasty character by all accounts.
70
Barraclough, Origins, 182.
71
The aim of the league was to win back from the emperor the liberties the communes had once
enjoyed without interference from outside. Davis, Medieval Europe, 331.
72
Munz, Barbarossa, 281-2.The opposition now also contained the Papacy. Adrian IV had
reversed his mild alliance with Frederick to ally with the Norman kingdom in Sicily through the
Treaty of Benevento in 1156. From then on empire and papacy became more and more estranged.
73
Hyde, Society, 89.
74
This defeat, argues Munz, was not as clear-cut as is sometimes assumed. Panic on the imperial
side rather than Lombard skill in battle is what brought it about. Munz, Barbarossa, 311.
75
In 1177. Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, 229.
76
Largely this was because of the impasse on the subject of the Matildine lands. For the context
origin of the argument over these lands see Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, 128-32, and Munz,
Barbarossa, 326.
77
In that year a marriage alliance between the aunt of the Norman ruler of Sicily and Frederick’s
son Henry brought any tensions between the Empire and the loose Papal-Lombard-Sicilian
coalition to a close. Munz, Barbarossa, 367.
the cities promised Barbarossa substantial payments78 - his original objectives had
essentially failed.79
In the final years of his reign Frederick changed his approach to government in
Italy.80 His methods became less sanguinary and he entirely shifted his focus from
Lombardy to central Italy.81 Here he achieved easily what he had desired for
Lombardy. Direct bureaucratic control was assumed in Tuscany.82 The aid of
Christian of Mainz, and strangely Milan83, meant military dominance of central
Italy by the empire.84 By 1187 a number of reforms of government setting up
‘uniform administrative districts’ under imperial control had been implemented in
Spoleto, Ancona, Romagna, Tuscany and the Matildine lands.85 When Frederick
set off for the third crusade in May 118986 he could boast of having strengthened
the overall control of the empire in Italy in spite of the failures associated with his
earlier, more militaristic approach to firmly subduing Lombardy.87
In conclusion; the emperor Frederick I dealt differently with the problems of
government in each of his kingdoms.88 In Germany Frederick’s approach involved
a high level of subtle diplomacy.89 Inheriting a state still in crisis following the
days of conflict between papacy and empire Frederick built a solid foundation90
for a feudal state with the king firmly at its head.91 When approaching the rivalries
between the German nobles he exhibited great political dexterity.92 Ultimately he
created a new elite of nobles, the principes imperii, to exert authority over the
multitudes of noble families which had sprung up before the era of his reign.93

78
Barraclough, Origins, 183.
79
The Lombard cities retained almost in total the rights they had enjoyed during the absence of
imperial rule that preceded Barbarossa’s reign. Brooke, A History Of Europe, 508.
80
This was nothing less than a ‘complete reversal of his policy’ according to Brooke, A History Of
Europe, 508.
81
Barraclough, Origins, 184.
82
Brooke, A History Of Europe, 509.
83
Davis, Medieval Europe, 338. Following the peace of Venice Milan resumed its inter-urban
rivalry with its neighbours. Despite its destruction at Frederick’s hands it had virtually no scruples
in allying with Frederick to advance its own interests.
84
Barraclough, Origins, 184.
85
Barraclough, Origins, 185-6.
86
Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, 234.
87
Barraclough, Origins, 186.
88
Of course Barbarossa was also king of Burgundy which was a very important part of his plans.
Barraclough is of the opinion that Barbarossa was a truly ‘imperial’ ruler in that he didn’t neglect
any of his three kingdoms (Barraclough, Origins, 174-5). Beatrice of Burgundy was the emperor’s
wife. The diet of Besancon in 1157 was the centrepiece of imperial policy in Burgundy.
Barbarossa’s dealings with the powerful Burgundian family the Zahringers constituted an
important part of overall imperial policy. Despite the importance attributed to this kingdom by
Barbarossa himself Burgundy is not mentioned in this essay title and so is not alluded to in the
essay.
89
He did, however, fail to make the kingship hereditary. Davis, Medieval Europe, 339.
90
The ‘prestige of the empire’ was considered to be ‘high’ during the reign of Barbarossa in
contrast to the reigns of other medieval western emperors. Fuhrmann, High Middle Ages, 30.
91
See note 18.
92
See notes 23, 24, 27 and 28.
93
See notes 19, 20 and 21.
 In Italy, however, Frederick tried a more forceful approach94 to the problem of
the collapse of imperial authority there.95 In Lombardy his measures were often
harsh and cruel.96 Nevertheless, after 1177, Frederick began to display the political
nous he had shown in Germany.97 He ended up by bringing central Italy under
direct imperial authority.98 At the time of his death the gains made by Frederick
Barbarossa in reinventing and restoring imperial authority in both Germany and
Italy were impressive indeed.
(1,981 words, not including title.)

94
See, for example, notes 44 and 45.
95
See notes 29 and 30.
96
Two figures worthy of mention in regard to Barbarossa’s exploits in Italy are his chancellor,
Rainald of Dassel, and his loyal ally Otto of Wittelsbach. The former should certainly take some
responsibility for the cruel measures exacted on Lombardy while the latter also could be a
fearsome character. For a brief look at how prominent Rainald was for Frederick’s plans see
Munz, Barbarossa, 92-5. An example of Otto’s heavy-handedness is to be found in Munz,
Barbarossa, 211, also Fuhrmann, High Middle Ages, 145. Davis calls Frederick’s measures
following the destruction of Milan ‘a policy of annihilation.’ Davis, Medieval Europe, 330.
97
See, for example, note 27.
98
See notes 61, 62, 64 and 65.
 Bibliography

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(Oxford, 1938; Fourth edn. 1967)

Barraclough, Geoffrey, The Origins of Modern Germany, (Oxford 1946; second

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Brooke, Z.N., A History Of Europe, From 911 To 1198, (Cambridge 1938)

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Robinson, I.S., Henry IV of Germany, 1056-1106 (Cambridge, 1999)

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