VILLAROMAN, Janine Monica D.

2019-400309
Pundaodaya v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 179313

Doctrine:

The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as

referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence,
that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends
to return and remain (animus manendi).”  Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons,
one intends to return.

Facts:

Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya (Pundaodaya) is married to Judith Pundaodaya,

who ran against Noble for the position of municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental in the 2007 elections. In 2007, Noble filed his Certificate of Candidacy,
indicating therein that he has been a resident of Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza,
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental for 15 years.

Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification against Noble, alleging that the

latter lacks the residency qualification prescribed by existing laws for elective local
officials; that he never resided nor had any physical presence at a fixed place in
Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; and that he does not
appear to have the intention of residing therein permanently. Pundaodaya claimed
that Noble is in fact a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he also
maintains a business called OBERT Construction Supply.

In his Answer, Noble averred that he is a registered voter and resident of Barangay
Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that in 1992, he married Bernadith Go,
the daughter of then Mayor Narciso Go of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that he
has been engaged in electoral activities since his marriage; and that he voted in the
said municipality in the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections.

Issue:
Do “residence” and “domicile” refer to “dwelling”? Did Noble effectively change
his domicile?
Supreme Court Ruling:

No. In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held that the term “residence” is
to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or
“habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi).” In Domino v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained
that domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for
business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.

If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate an

actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose. Without clear and positive proof of the
concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of origin continues.

To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be

coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily
presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed
and permanent place of abode. In this case, Noble’s marriage to Bernadith Go
does not establish his actual physical presence in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.
Neither does it prove an intention to make it his permanent place of residence.
VILLAROMAN, Janine Monica D.

2019-400309

Villafuerte v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 206698

Doctrine:

In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78,
it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material
matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive
rights of a candidate — the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the
certificate of candidacy. The false representation under Section 78 must consist of
a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible.

Facts:

Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of
the Province of Camarines Sur in the May 13, 2013 local and national elections.
On October 25, 2012, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Verified Petition to
deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy (COC) of respondent,
alleging that respondent intentionally and materially misrepresented a false and
deceptive name/nickname that would mislead the voters when he declared under
oath in his COC that “L–RAY JR.–MIGZ” was his nickname or stagename and
that the name he intended to appear on the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, L–
RAY JR.–MIGZ NP; that respondent deliberately omitted his first name
“MIGUEL” and inserted, instead “LRAY JR.,” which is the nickname of his
father, the incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur, “LRay Villafuerte, Jr.”

COMELEC’s First Division denied the petition for lack of merit and found no
compelling reason why the COC of respondent should be denied due course to or
cancelled on the sole basis of an alleged irregularity in his name/nickname.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent committed a material misrepresentation under Section

78 of the Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancellation of his COC.
Supreme Court Ruling:

No. Section 78 states that the false representation in the contents of the COC
required under Section 74 must refer to material matters in order to justify the
cancellation of the COC. In case there is a material misrepresentation in the
certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC is authorized to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to
Section 78. In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under
Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain[s]
to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the
substantive rights of a candidate — the right to run for the elective post for which
he filed the certificate of candidacy. A false representation under Section 78 must
consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” In other words, it must be made with an
intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondent’s nickname “LRAY JR. MIGZ” written in
his COC is a material misrepresentation is devoid of merit. Respondent’s nickname
written in the COC cannot be considered a material fact which pertains to his
eligibility and thus qualification to run for public office.
VILLAROMAN, Janine Monica D.

2019-400309

Peñera v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 181613

Doctrine:

A person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. A candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done
during the campaign period, not before.

Facts:

Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta.
Monica during the May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the
Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region, a Petition for
Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and
Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging
in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement
of the campaign period.

Issue:

Whether or not Penera is guilty of premature campaigning

Supreme Court Ruling:

No. In Lanot v. COMELEC, it held that a person who files a certificate of

candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Lanot was
decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period. Congress elevated the Lanot
doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of the third
paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. Congress not only reiterated but
also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed
by a candidate “only” upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means
that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so
committed.
VILLAROMAN, Janine Monica D.

2019-400309

Lanot v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 164858

Doctrine:

The disqualification of the elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated because
of the disqualification. Votes cast in favor of a candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes, against whom a petition for disqualification was filed before the
election, are presumed to have been cast in the belief that he was qualified. For this
reason, the second placer cannot be declared elected.

Facts:

On 19 March 2004, Henry P. Lanot, Vener Obispo, Roberto Peralta, Reynaldo dela
Paz, Edilberto Yamat, and Ram Alan Cruz, filed a petition for
disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against
Eusebio before the COMELEC. Lanot, Obispo, and Eusebio were candidates for
Pasig City Mayor, while Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz were candidates for
Pasig City Councilor in the 10 May 2004 elections. Petitioners alleged that Eusebio
engaged in various forms on various occasions premature campaigning.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Lanot can be proclaimed and allowed to sit as mayor-
elect in case of disqualification of Eusebio

Supreme Court Ruling:

No. Even if the court assumes Eusebio’s disqualification as fact, it cannot grant the
prayers of the petitioners.

The disqualification of the elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated because
of the disqualification. Votes cast in favor of a candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes, against whom a petition for disqualification was filed before the
election, are presumed to have been cast in the belief that he was qualified. For this
reason, the second placer cannot be declared elected.

The exception to this rule rests on two assumptions. First, the one who obtained the
highest number of votes is disqualified. Second, the voters are so fully aware in
fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification to bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety but nonetheless the voters still cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate. Lanot and Benavides failed to prove that the exception applies
in the present case. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that Eusebio is
disqualified, the rule on succession provides that the duly elected Vice-Mayor of
Pasig City shall succeed in Eusebio’s place.
VILLAROMAN, Janine Monica D.

2019-400309

Kabataan Partylist v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 221318

Doctrine:

No registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty

(120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

Facts:

On February 15, 2013, President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367,
which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 3469 and Senate Bill No. 1030, passed
by the House of Representatives and the Senate. RA 10367 mandates the
COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new
voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters
through the adoption of biometric technology.

On July 1, 2013, the COMELEC commenced the mandatory biometric system of

registration. On April 1, 2014, the COMELEC issued a Resolution No. 9863 which
amended certain portions of Resolution No. 9853, by stating that ERBs shall
deactivate the VRRs of those who "failed to submit for validation despite notice on
or before October 31, 2015," and that the "deactivation for cases falling under this
ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015 Board hearing."

A month later, or in May 2014, the COMELEC launched the NoBio-NoBoto public

information campaign which ran concurrently with the period of continuing
registration.

On November 25, 2015, herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application
for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation
requirement.

Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on
October 31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189.

Supreme Court Ruling:

No. Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:

System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x No registration shall,

however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the
prohibitive period beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted.
The subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to conduct
voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period which may not
be reduced, but may be extended depending on the administrative necessities and
other exigencies.
VILLAROMAN, Janine Monica D.

2019-400309

Domino v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 134015

Doctrine:

The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus
Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of
the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was
made in the certificate of candidacy that will include, among others, the residence
of the candidate.

Facts:

In 1998, Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of

Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani
indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency
where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately
preceding the election.

Private respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, They alleged that Domino, contrary to his
declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered
voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. For his defense,
DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement
and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997.

On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring

Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone
district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise
ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.

Issue:

Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final,
conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on
Elections.

Supreme Court Ruling:

No. The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the
Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate
of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of
the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was
made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence
of the candidate. The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list
of voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and
its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the
right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive
upon the COMELEC.
VILLAROMAN, Janine Monica D.

2019-400309

Yra v. Abano

G.R. No. 30187

Doctrine:

No person shall be eligible for any elective municipal office unless, within the time
fixed by law, he shall file a duly sworn certificate of candidacy. Said certificate
shall declare that he is a resident of the municipality, in which his candidacy is
offered; that he is a duly qualified elector therein, and that he is eligible to the
office.

Facts:

Maximo Abano is a native of the municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the

proper age, he transferred to Manila to complete his education. While temporarily
residing in Manila, Abano registered as a voter there. Shortly after qualifying as a
member of the bar and after the death of his father, Abano returned to Meycauayan
to live. From May 10, 1927, until the present, Abano has considered himself a
resident of Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections were approaching, he made an
application for cancellation of registration in Manila, but this application was
rejected by the city officials for the reason that it was not deposited in the mails on
or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless, Abano presented himself as a candidate for
municipal president of Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and was elected by
popular vote to that office.

Marcos Yra, the vice-president elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan, challenges the right
of the respondent, Maximo Abano to the position to which elected on the ground
that the respondent is ineligible.

Issue:

Whether or not the non-eligibility of the respondent for the reason that he was not a
“qualified voter in his municipality” is sufficient to nullify his election

Supreme Court Ruling:

No. One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his
candidacy is that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has
held that the term "qualified" when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean
that a person must be a registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person
does not need to register as an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the
qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications
prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector
in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be
voted for.
VILLAROMAN, Janine Monica D.

2019-400309

Mercado v. Manzano

G.R. No. 135083

Doctrine:

The phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No.
7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.

Facts:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were

candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The proclamation of private respondent was
suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain
Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of

Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective position.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and cannot run for public
office

Supreme Court Ruling:

No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance,
on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. Hence, the
phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
Section 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is

not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country, private respondent has,
as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen. On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken
part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
VILLAROMAN, Janine Monica D.

2019-400309

Gonzalez v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 192856

Doctrine:

Under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives.

Facts:

Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private respondent Reno G. Lim both filed
certificates of candidacy for the position of Representative of the 3rd congressional
district of the Province of Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections. On March 30,
2010, a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy was filed by Stephen Bichara on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish
national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father and a Filipino mother, and
that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in
accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625.

On May 8, 2010, the COMELEC’s Second Division issued the assailed resolution
which declared Respondent Fernando Vallejo Gonzalez disqualified to be a
candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives, 3rd District,
Province of Albay.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a Representative which was
already officially proclaimed as winner

Supreme Court Ruling:

No. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
over election, returns, and qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins. The court does not have jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility of the
private respondent who was already a member of the house at the time of the filing
of the petition for certiorari.

Under Article VI, Section 17 of the1987 Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the House of Representatives. Here, subsequent events showed that Gonzalez had
not only been duly proclaimed, he had also taken his oath of office and assumed
office as Member of the House of Representatives. The HRET therefore has
jurisdiction.
VILLAROMAN, Janine Monica D.

2019-400309

Bautista v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 133840

Doctrine:

The instant case involves a ground for disqualification which clearly affects the
voters' will and causes confusion that frustrates the same. This is precisely what
election laws are trying to protect. They give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will
of the voter. Thus, extreme caution should be observed before any ballot is
invalidated. Further, in the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of
their validity.

Facts:

Petitioner Cipriano "Efren" Bautista and private respondent were duly registered
candidates for the position of Mayor of Navotas, Metro Manila in the elections of
May 11, 1998. Aside from said candidates, a certain Edwin "Efren" Bautista,
hereinafter referred to as Edwin Bautista, also filed a certificate of candidacy for
the same position of mayor. His certificate of candidacy was filed at midnight on
March 27, 1997, the last day for such filing.

Petitioner filed a petition praying that Edwin Bautista be declared a nuisance

candidate. The COMELEC saw merit in the petition and declared Edwin Bautista a
nuisance candidate and consequently ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy for the position of mayor. Accordingly, the name of Edwin Bautista was
not included in the list of candidates for the position of mayor for Navotas. Copies
of said list were distributed by the Office of the Election Officer of Navotas to the
boards of election inspectors. On May 13, 1998, the COMELEC denied Edwin
Bautista's motion praying for the reconsideration of the resolution declaring him a
nuisance candidate.

When the canvass of the election returns was commenced, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Navotas refused to canvass as part of the valid votes of petitioner the
separate tallies of ballots on which were written "EFREN BAUTISTA", "EFREN",
"E. BAUTISTA", and "BAUTISTA". Said ballots were tallied by the BEI
separately either on some portion of the election return not intended for votes for
mayoralty candidates or in separate sheets of paper. In view of this refusal,
objections to the inclusion of the election returns were raised during the canvass.

Issue:

Whether or not COMELEC erred in invalidating the votes of Bautista

Ruling:

Yes. It must be emphasized that the instant case involves a ground for
disqualification which clearly affects the voters' will and causes confusion that
frustrates the same. This is precisely what election laws are trying to protect. They
give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. Thus, extreme caution
should be observed before any ballot is invalidated. Further, in the appreciation of
ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of their validity. The votes separately tallied
are not really stray votes. Then COMELEC Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo himself,
now a respected member of the Court, in his May 14, 1998 Memorandum, allowed
the segregation of the votes for "Bautista", "Efren", and "Efren Bautista", and "E.
Bautista" into a separate improvised tally, for the purpose of later counting the
votes. In fine, the COMELEC itself validated the separate tallies since they were
meant to be used in the canvassing later on to the actual number of votes cast.
These separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite
the apparent confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real
intention of the voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar.
Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of newspaper releases and
other forms of notification, the voters were informed of the COMELEC's decision
to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate. Respondent COMELEC is
directed to order the inclusion, as part of the valid votes of petitioner, the following
votes that were separately tallied by the boards of election inspectors: "EFREN
BAUTISTA", "EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA" and "BAUTISTA".