See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/325400973

Breaking Down the Language of Online Racism: A

Comparison of the Psychological Dimensions of
Communication in Racist, Anti‐Racist, and Non‐Activist
Groups

Article  in  Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy · October 2017

DOI: 10.1111/asap.12159

CITATION READS
1 206

2 authors:

Nicholas Faulkner Ana-Maria Bliuc

Monash University (Australia) University of Dundee
31 PUBLICATIONS   265 CITATIONS    82 PUBLICATIONS   2,202 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Online communities of recovery from addiction View project

EPA-BWA partnership activity View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Ana-Maria Bliuc on 30 April 2020.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, Vol. 0, No. 0, 2018, pp. 1--16

Breaking Down the Language of Online Racism: A

Comparison of the Psychological Dimensions of
Communication in Racist, Anti-Racist, and
Non-Activist Groups
Nicholas Faulkner
Monash University

Ana-Maria Bliuc *
Western Sydney University

The Internet represents a powerful tool for racist groups to build a sense of group
consciousness and promote their cause. In the current study, we examined the
language used by racist (n = 87), anti-racist (n = 50), and nonactivist (n = 1379)
groups when describing their self-defining beliefs online. We used computerized
linguistic analysis software to measure psychological indicators and antecedents
of group consciousness and to examine the persuasive techniques used in online
group communication. Racist and anti-racist groups were similar on some lin-
guistic indicators of group consciousness (e.g., use of words reflecting perceived
injustice), but differed on others (e.g., use of words reflecting group identification).
Linguistic indicators of antecedents of group consciousness (moral foundations
and focus on religion) differed across groups, with racist groups focused more
on purity, respect for authority, and religion, and less on fairness than anti-racist
groups. Racist groups also used less cognitively complex language than nonac-
tivist groups (but similar levels to anti-racist groups). Our results contribute to
understanding how racist groups promote their self-defining beliefs online, and
identify several key factors that should be considered when designing policies to
reduce racist groups’ growth and impact.

∗
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ana-Maria Bliuc, Social Sciences
and Psychology, Western Sydney University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia. [e-mail: a.bliuc@
westernsydney.edu.au].
We are grateful to the Australian Research Council, Australian Human Rights Commision, and
the Victorian Health Promotion Foundation for supporting this research through funding for the ARC
LP 120200115 “Cyber-racism and community resilience.”
1
DOI: 10.1111/asap.12159 
C 2018 The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
2 Faulkner and Bliuc

Introduction

Racist groups have a long history of using the latest communication media to
spread bigotry and prejudice. In the past, they used written materials, radio broad-
casts, and public television networks (Anti-Defamation League, 2001). Unlike the
attitudes and ideologies they promote, their approach to new technologies have
been distinctively progressive as they have been long known as early adopters of
Internet technology (Gerstenfeld, Grant, & Chiang, 2003; Hamm, 1993). Racist
groups utilize a diverse array of virtual places, including social networking sites,
chat rooms, discussion boards, and their own websites to express and spread
their views and ideologies, sell promotion merchandise, and recruit new members
(Douglas, McGarty, Bliuc, & Lala, 2005). The Internet is an effective tool for
racist groups as it allows them to reach larger audiences faster, and communicate
anonymously and at a lower cost than they ever could before the advent of the
Internet (Daniels, 2013; Hale, 2012; see also McNamee, Peterson, & Pena 2010).
As a result, they have been able to use the Internet to their advantage at alarming
rates and with concerning consequences (Hale, 2012).
The Internet helps racist groups achieve collective goals such as sharing racist
messages to broad audiences (Caiani & Parenti, 2010; Daniels, 2009; Gerstenfeld,
Grant, & Chiang, 2003), boosting group commitment (in both numbers and internal
cohesion, by enabling them to attract new members and strengthen the commitment
of existing members, Adams & Roscigno, 2005; Chau & Xu, 2006; Weaver, 2012),
and increasing their global influence (by building a sense of transnational collective
identity, Adams & Roscigno, 2005; Burris, Smith, & Strahm, 2000; Gerstenfeld,
Grant, & Chiang, 2003). These affordances enable racist groups to have more
influence in society, by connecting to like-minded racist groups across national
boundaries (Burris, Smith, & Strahm, 2000), facilitating communication between
spatially disconnected racist individuals (Simi & Futrell, 2006), and by provid-
ing isolated racists with virtual communities of support (as for example, in the
case of notorious White supremacist Anders Breivik in Norway). In other words,
the Internet seems to represent an ideal platform where, as part of the broader
White supremacist movement, racist groups can enact their collective identities in
the pursuit of their shared goals (Jakubowicz et al., 2017).
The opportunities of racist groups to achieve their collective goals via online
environments also represent opportunities for researchers to harvest the data from
these environments and use it to gain insights into the psychological processes
that motivate these groups. As such, in our study of racist groups, we treat them
as activist groups that embrace collective solutions to perceived group problems
(Duncan, 1990) and aim to affect social change (even if the change in this case
is not about progress, but rather about returning to former structures with norms
promoting intergroup inequality and White dominance, Bliuc, McGarty, Hartley, &
Muntele, 2012). Thus, racist groups are likely to have a developed politicized group
Breaking Down the Language of Online Racism 3

identity (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) and corresponding ‘‘group consciousness’’

(Duncan, 1999, 2012) underpinned by psychological processes that are shared with
activist groups in general.
In contemporary models of activism (see Duncan, 2012; van Zomeren et al.,
2008), collective action stems from an integrated cluster of variables referred to as
group consciousness (Duncan, 2012; see also the application of the model in Bliuc
et al., 2015). Group consciousness, as a core driver of collective action, includes
variables such as identification with the group, perceptions of injustice (as anger),
and a sense of group efficacy (perceptions that the group can achieve its collective
goals through its actions). According to these theoretical models, racist groups
should develop group consciousness in similar ways and of similar levels to other
activist groups. Based on theories that consider individual aspects and sociopsy-
chological elements as integrated drivers of collective behavior as well as research
based on these theories, group consciousness is shaped by individual variables
such as moral values and personal orientations (Bliuc et al., 2015; Duncan, 2012;
Thomas et al., 2016, 2018).
While it is plausible that racist groups have strongly developed group con-
sciousness in similar ways to other action-oriented groups, including anti-racist
groups, they are likely to be highly distinct in terms of those psychological dimen-
sions that constitute the antecedents of group consciousness—such as their focus
on religious and moral values (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al.,
2011). Drawing on research on differences between the moral values of political
conservatives and liberals (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2007; Haidt &
Joseph, 2004), racist groups are likely to base their ideologies on moral values such
as ‘‘Ingroup’’ (loyalty to ingroup, patriotism, and self-sacrifice), ‘‘Authority’’ (re-
spect for authority, leadership, and protection), and ‘‘Purity’’(sanctity and bodily
and spiritual purity), rather than ‘‘Harm/Care’’ (caring, nurturing, and protecting
vulnerable individuals from harm), and ‘‘Fairness’’(reciprocity and justice). Sim-
ilarly, racist groups may also base their ideologies more on conservative values
drawn from religion than other action-oriented groups (Adams & Rosigno, 2005).
There is increasing evidence suggesting that racist groups are becoming more
sophisticated in manipulating language in order to make their messages more per-
suasive (Daniels, 2009; 2013; Douglas, McGarty, Bliuc, & Lala, 2005; Faulkner
& Bliuc, 2016). The field has collected a substantial amount of evidence regarding
various discursive strategies used by racist groups online (e.g., Atton, 2006; Billig,
2001; Douglas, McGarty, Bliuc, & Lala, 2005; Erjavec & Kovacic, 2012; Faulkner
& Bliuc, 2016; Tynes, Reynolds, & Greenfield 2004); however, researchers have
paid far less attention to the actual language used by racist groups when they
are communicating online. We know from research on persuasion that language
represents a powerful tool that can be used to get people to both do and believe
various things, (Guerin, 2003a). As such, before convincing people to act (e.g.,
joining racist groups or supporting them in other ways), racist discourse may first
4 Faulkner and Bliuc

attempt to influence people to believe that a particular version of the world is

true. An effective way to achieve this is by using clear and concise language and
by framing ambiguous socially constructed knowledge as fact (Guerin, 2003b).
These strategies (based on clarity and simple communication) have been shown,
not only to be highly effective in facilitating persuasion, but also more enduring
than some other discursive strategies. For example, research on the effectiveness
of discursive strategies used in storytelling on White supremacist websites on ado-
lescents shows that strategies based on arguments that are low in narrative content,
but high in explicit messages have enduring effects, which in addition gradually
increase over time (Lee & Leets, 2002). Following from these arguments, it seems
likely that to achieve increased persuasive effectiveness in their online commu-
nication, when framing their arguments for an audience of potential supporters,
racist groups would tend to use language that is clear and concise, thus low in
cognitive complexity.
Currently, there is no research examining the linguistic characteristics of the
language used by racist groups online. This gap in research exists despite evidence
showing that such analyses of language could provide insight, not only into how
group consciousness is expressed in these groups, but also about how language
may be strategically used to increase its power of persuasion. For example, com-
puterized text analysis approaches can reveal emotions (e.g., Bantum & Owen,
2009; Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997; Pennebaker & Francis, 1996; White
et al., 2015), moral values (e.g., Clifford & Jerit, 2013; Graham, Haidt & Nosek,
2009; Vergani & Bliuc, 2018), focus on group belonging and social identities
(e.g., Bliuc, 2016; 2017; Cohn, Mehl, Pennebaker, 2004), and cognitive complex-
ity (e.g., Pennebaker, Chung, Frazee, Lavergne, & Beaver, 2014; Pennebaker &
King, 1999; Slatcher, Chung, Pennebaker, & Stone, 2007). The present study seeks
to address this by conducting a computerized (comparative) linguistic analysis of
the language used by racist groups in their online self-defining group statements.

Present Study

To examine the psychological dimensions underpinning racist online commu-

nication, and in particular, manifestations of group consciousness of racist groups
(including both its indicators and antecedents) and communication strategies that
are likely shaped by group consciousness, we conduct a computerized linguistic
analysis of online self-defining statements of racist, anti-racist, and nonactivist
groups using the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count software (LIWC, Pennebaker
et al., 2015a). We compare the language used in self-defining statements of racist
groups with language from anti-racist groups and nonactivist groups.
Our objective is threefold. First, we seek to investigate whether racist groups
manifest their group consciousness in a similar manner to other activist groups.
Second, to better understand online manifestations of collective racism, we seek
Breaking Down the Language of Online Racism 5

to identify whether particular linguistic characteristics distinguish racist groups

from other activist groups. As such, we focus on possible antecedents of racist
groups’ consciousness, including moral values and religiosity (Bliuc et al., 2015;
Duncan, 2012). Third, by examining these aspects of online communication by
racist groups, we also aim to uncover specific strategies that racist groups may
use to advance their collective goals (i.e., framing their messages in simple and
unambiguous terms). We focus on exploring language as a collective product of
these groups with the goal of identifying the psychological aspects underpinning
their communication as a manifestation of the collective identity of these groups
(Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 2009).
We focus on self-defining group statements because they are designed to ex-
press key attributes and ideological messages that are deemed representative for
the group, thus likely to be developed either collaboratively or by representative
(or prototypical) members of the group. That is, they provide opportunities for
‘‘entrepreneurs of identity’’ such as the leaders of racist groups, or more broadly
activist groups, to present a specific vision of what it means to be a member of
that group (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011). Thus, in a sense, analyzing the lan-
guage contained in such statements could represent a particularly useful approach
to investigate specific intragroup dynamics operating within broader groups of
supporters of racism. Also, these are highly strategic documents as online self-
defining group statements (usually found in group’s mission statements) are in
many cases the first point of contact for the group with sympathizers and potential
recruits. At the same time, these statements may also be closely monitored by
authorities, so they need to be framed in such a way that is both powerful and
subtle. This would suggest that these statements are shaped by the specific goals of
the group, and likely require a considerable amount of time and effort to be ‘‘cali-
brated’’ for their target audience. However, rather than analyzing these statements
to identify discourses and explicit goals (as done in previous studies), we adopt
the different approach of analyzing language use to identify the psychological
dimensions that primarily indicate the collective consciousness of these groups.
In the present study, we test the following hypotheses:

H1. Group consciousness—as measured by linguistic indicators of social iden-

tification (usage of first and third person pronouns), perceptions of injus-
tice (usage of anger words), and group efficacy (usage of words focused on
achievement)—should be of similar levels in racist and anti-racist groups
(given that both of these groups are likely to be interested in promoting
collective action), but lower in nonactivist groups.
H2. The antecedents of group consciousness, as reflected in linguistic indicators
of moral values and religiosity, should be different in racist and nonracist
groups. We expect conservative values (such as Purity, Ingroup Loyalty, and
Respect for Authority) and a focus on religion to be higher in racist groups
6 Faulkner and Bliuc

compared to anti-racist groups (Adams & Rosigno, 2005; Graham, Haidt, &
Nosek, 2009).
H3. Finally, to explore how communication strategies are used by racist groups
to increase the effectiveness of their messages, we examine the cognitive
processes underpinning the communication of racist groups in comparison to
anti-racist and nonactivist groups. We expect that racist groups would use less
cognitively complex language (Lee & Leets, 2002), than both anti-racist and
nonactivist groups.

Method

Text Samples

We collected a sample of self-defining group statements from racist organi-

zations (n = 87), anti-racist organizations (n = 50), and nonactivist groups (n =
1379). Each statement described the group’s beliefs, values, or goals. To identify
racist groups, we used the online lists provided by the Southern Poverty Law
Center (SPLC, 2016) (SPLC is a civil rights law firm that maintains a list of
active U.S.-based hate groups), Franklin’s (2010) directory of hate groups, and
Google searches relating to racist hate groups. Many groups listed in the SPLC
(2016) and Franklin (2010) directories did not maintain websites that contained
self-defining statements and were thus not included in our sample. To identify
anti-racist groups, we used several lists of anti-racist organization—including lists
from Wikipedia (2014), and Multicultural Australia (n.d.)—supplemented with
Google searches related to anti-racist groups. Like the racist groups, many anti-
racist groups did not maintain websites that contained self-defining statements. To
identify nonactivist groups, we used an online repository of business and commu-
nity organizations’ mission statements and visions (“Mission Statements,” n.d.).
Whenever a group maintained more than one web page containing self-defining
statements we included only the longest page (as measured by word count) in
our analyses. We report below all measures (as indicated by linguistic categories
in LIWC), data exclusions, and analyses performed (the data and syntax for our
analyses are available at https://osf.io/vzwef/).

Measures

All texts were analyzed using LIWC 2015 software (Pennebaker, Booth,
Boyd, & Francis, 2015a). LIWC searches each text for over 2,000 words or word
stems that have previously been categorized into a variety of different linguistic
categories. LIWC calculates the percentages of all words in a given text that
belong to each category. Its categories have been validated (e.g., Bantum & Owen,
2009; Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015b; Tausczik & Pennebaker,
Breaking Down the Language of Online Racism 7

2010) and are widely used in research on social and personality psychology
(for a review, see Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). We only included linguistic
measures that were relevant to our hypotheses. As such, we included categories
related to social identification, anger, achievement, moral foundations, religion,
and cognitive complexity.

Social identification. Consistent with existing research (Bliuc, Best, Iqbal, &
Upton, 2017; Davis & Brock, 1975; Gunsch, Brownlow, Haynes, & Mabe, 2000;
Sillars, Shellen, McIntosh, & Pomegarnate, 1997; Cohn, Mehl, & Pennebaker,
2004), we used first person plural (e.g., we, us, our) and third person plural (e.g.,
they, their, they’d) words as indicators of a focus on groups and social identities.

Perceived injustice. Following Bliuc et al. (2015), we used anger as capturing

perceived injustice, which is one of the indicators of group consciousness. The
LIWC 2015 anger category includes words such as annoyed, hate, and angry.

Group efficacy. We used LIWC’s achievement category as a proxy indicator

of a focus on group efficacy. This category includes words such as win, success,
and better.

Focus on Religion. LIWC’s religion category was used to measure the extent
to which texts used religious concepts. The category includes words such as altar
and church.

Moral Values. We used the Moral Foundations Dictionary (Graham, Haidt,

& Nosek, 2009; http://www.moralfoundations.org/othermaterials) to measure the
extent to which each text used harm (e.g., suffer, hurt, care), fairness (e.g., fair,
justice, discriminat*), ingroup loyalty (e.g., together, communal, enem*), authority
(e.g., obey, respect, unfaithful), and purity (e.g., clean, disgust*, gross) words. The
Moral Foundations Dictionary uses distinct dictionaries to measures whether each
moral value is being discussed as a virtue (e.g., care) or a vice (e.g., harm). We were
interested in the overall usage of each moral value. As such, similar to existing
research (Clifford & Jerit, 2013), we created aggregate scores that summed the
vice and virtue scores for each moral value.

Cognitive complexity. We used LIWC 2015’s ‘Analytic’ variable to mea-

sure the extent to which texts were written in a cognitively complex manner
(Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015b; Pennebaker et al., 2014). This
variable ranges from 0 to 100, with higher numbers indicating more “formal,
logical, and hierarchical thinking” (Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 2015a,
p. 22).
8 Faulkner and Bliuc

Results

We tested for differences in language usage across racist, anti-racist, and

nonactivist texts using Welch’s ANOVAs and Games-Howell post-hoc tests. We
used Welch’s tests, rather than standard F tests, because they are robust to violations
of the equal variance assumption (Delacre, Lakens, Mora, & Leys, 2018).

Social Identification

Results revealed significant differences across racist, anti-racist, and non-

activist texts in the extent to which they used first person plural (we), Welch’s
F(2, 92.30) = 8.49, p < .001, η2 = .010, and third person plural (they) words,
Welch’s F(2, 106.40) = 7.58, p = .001, η2 = .003. As shown in Table 1, racist
groups used significantly more first person plural words than anti-racist and non-
activist groups. Similarly, racist groups used significantly more third person plural
words than anti-racist groups.

Perceived Injustice

There were significant differences across groups in the extent to which they
expressed anger (as an indicator of perceived injustice), Welch’s F(2, 84.56) =
70.80, p < .001, η2 = .250. Anger words were used more frequently in both
the anti-racist and racist groups compared to the nonactivist groups. Racists and
anti-racist groups did not differ significantly in the extent to which they expressed
anger.

Table 1. Means (and standard deviations) of Linguistic Variables across Racist, Anti-Racist, and
Control Groups
Racist groups Nonactivist groups Anti-racist groups
First person plural (we) 3.5 a (2.28) 2.45 b (2.39) 2.46 b (2.05)
Third person plural (they) 0.99 a (0.78) 0.93 a (1.26) 0.58 b (0.63)
Anger 1.01 a (0.80) 0.09 b (0.43) 1.43 a (1.69)
Achievement 2.11 a (1.20) 3.75 b (2.58) 3.13 b (1.78)
Religion 2.12 a (2.54) 0.23 b (1.16) 0.57 b (1.08)
Harm 0.95 a (0.80) 0.99 a (1.92) 1.09 a (1.12)
Fairness 0.4 a (0.48) 0.13 b (0.59) 1.58 c (1.59)
Ingroup 1.79 a (1.39) 1.19 b (1.64) 2.33 a (1.48)
Authority 1.29 a (0.99) 0.54 b (1.00) 0.83 c (0.68)
Purity 0.28 a (0.38) 0.23 a (0.71) 0.07 b (0.17)
Cognitive complexity 84.76 a (13.03) 90.34 b (9.73) 89.5 a, b (10.79)

Notes. n = 1516. Means that have no subscript in common are significantly different from each other
(Games Howell, p < .05). Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.
Breaking Down the Language of Online Racism 9

Group Efficacy

Results revealed significant differences across groups in usage of achieve-

ment words, Welch’s F(2, 104.73) = 62.36, p < .001, η2 = .024. Achievement
words were used less by racist groups than by anti-racist and nonactivist groups.
Anti-racist and nonactivist groups did not significantly differ in their usage of
achievement words.

Focus on religion

Groups differed significantly in the extent to which they used religion in

their self-defining statements, Welch’s F(2,88.43) = 25.52, p < .001, η2 = .106.
Words relating to religion were used significantly more frequently by racist groups
than anti-racist and nonactivist groups. Anti-racist and nonactivist groups did not
significantly differ in their usage of religious words.

Moral Values

Significant differences across groups were found in usage of the fairness,

Welch’s F(2, 89.05) = 32.96, p < .001, η2 = .145, ingroup loyalty, Welch’s F(2,
92.78) = 20.08, p < .001, η2 = .021, authority, Welch’s F(2, 95.01) = 26.23, p <
.001, η2 = .032, and purity moral values, Welch’s F(2, 145.55) = 16.79, p < .001,
η2 = .002. Harm was the only moral value that did not significantly differ across
groups, Welch’s F(2, 110.00) = 0.33, p = .718, η2 = .000. Anti-racist groups used
fairness more than any other group. In contrast, racist groups used authority more
than any other group. Purity was used more by racist and nonactivist groups than
by anti-racist groups. The ingroup loyalty value was used more frequently by both
racist and anti-racist groups compared to nonactivist groups.

Cognitive Complexity

Results revealed significant differences across groups in usage of cognitively

complex language, Welch’s F(2, 88.40) = 7.75, p = .001, η2 = .017. Racist groups
used significantly less cognitively complex language than nonactivist groups.

Discussion

Although much research on cyber-racism has focused on the discursive strate-

gies used by racist groups, less attention has been paid to the actual language used
when racist groups are presenting themselves online when describing their founda-
tional beliefs. Analyzing such language represents an opportunity to complement
10 Faulkner and Bliuc

current evidence which is mostly derived from qualitative analyses of the discur-
sive strategies used by racist groups. In addition, by conducting a computerized
linguistic analysis of language use in racist, anti-racist and nonactivist groups,
we are able to compare and identify psychological foundations of online collec-
tive racism. This approach has some other distinct advantages: it allows for the
analysis of large samples of textual data, it is objective, transparent, and easily
replicable, and it has high external validity (von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas,
2009; Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). In this way, it represents a promising additional
method for research on online racism that both complements and, in some respects,
goes beyond the discourse analysis techniques that have been commonly used in
existing research.
The key aim of our research was to examine the underpinning psychologi-
cal processes of online activism enacted by racist groups. More specifically, we
expected that racist groups share some similarities with anti-racist activist groups
(regarding those collective dimensions that represent drivers for activism), but they
are also significantly different from them in other respects. Because racist groups
can be seen as activist groups (promoting collective goals in similar ways to other
activist groups, albeit goals that are about fostering inequality and exclusion), we
predicted that the levels of group consciousness in racist groups—as captured by
group identification, anger, and group efficacy—should be similar in its levels to
anti-racist groups (but higher than in nonactivist groups). However, we predicted
that the antecedents of the group consciousness should be significantly different in
racist and anti-racist groups. That is, we expected to find differences in the moral
values underpinning racist and anti-racist groups and the focus on religion.
Our results broadly support these predictions, with some exceptions. We
found that linguistic indicators of group identification are higher in racist groups
compared to both anti-racist and nonactivist groups. We expected that group iden-
tification in racist groups would be higher than group identification in nonactivist
groups, but it would be of similar levels in racist and anti-racist groups. Regarding
another dimension of group consciousness—perceived injustice (as captured by
anger)—as predicted, we found that both racist and anti-racist groups have similar
levels that are higher than in nonactivist groups. This finding suggests that racist
groups’ collective consciousness is shaped by anger in similar ways to anti-racist
groups. However, we found significant differences in levels of group identification
and perceived group efficacy in racist groups compared to anti-racist groups. That
is, group identification in racist groups seems to represent a stronger driver of
activism than in anti-racist groups. Also, group efficacy as captured by the use of
achievement words is significantly lower in racist groups compared to anti-racist
groups. These are interesting findings for a number of reasons. First, because
group identification is often a predictor of increased commitment to engage in
collective action on behalf of the group (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele,
2007; 2015; Bliuc, Best, Iqbal, & Uption, 2017; Duncan, 2012; van Zomeren
Breaking Down the Language of Online Racism 11

et al., 2008), the finding that indicators of identification are higher in racist groups
suggests that racist groups might be more committed to online activism compared
to anti-racist groups. Second, these findings indicate that racist groups seem to
display a strong focus on their collective identity when describing online what
they stand for. Past research has found that the use of first- and third-person plural
pronouns often signifies the existence of strong group ties and a strong focus on
collective identity (Agnew, Van lange, Rusbult, & Langston, 1998; Cohn, Mehl, &
Pennebaker, 2004). Thus, this finding provides additional support for the claim that
racist groups use their website’s self-descriptive statements to build and enhance
a sense of belonging to a collective identity (Adams & Rosigno, 2005; Burris,
Smith, & Strahm, 2000) that is contrasted to opposing identities of the outgroup
(through the use of ‘‘us vs. them’’ type of language). Thirdly, as a complementary
interpretation of these findings, the particular pattern of pronoun use by racist
groups (i.e., lower usage of first-person singular pronouns and higher usage of
first-person plural pronouns) could suggest attempts to present themselves as hi-
erarchically superior and convey a tone of authority when self-presenting online
(Kacewicz, Pennebaker, Davis, Jeon, & Graesser, 2014; Pennebaker et al., 2015).
Contrary to our predictions, group efficacy was lower in racist groups than in
anti-racist groups. The implications of this finding are quite intriguing, because
a lower sense of group efficacy in racist groups could mean that racist groups are
aware that their collective goals (e.g., returning to a state where inequality and
segregated societies on the basis of race are the norm) are not realistically
achievable even through sustained group effort. In this light, their increased
group identification seems almost paradoxical, suggesting strong commitment to
a cause that is already lost.
In line with our predictions, our results show a stronger focus on religion in
racist groups compared to anti-racist groups. This finding complements existing
research using qualitative techniques, such as thematic analyses of interview data,
which has indicated that racist groups use religion to strengthen White racist
identities and present White racial superiority as divinely sanctioned (Adams &
Rosigno, 2005; Barkun, 1997; Dobratz, 2001; McNamee, Peterson, & Pena, 2010).
Regarding the moral values that represent the antecedents of group consciousness,
our findings suggest a more nuanced picture than we anticipated. That is, the
predominant moral foundations in racist groups are authority and purity, while in
anti-racist groups the strongest moral foundation is fairness. However, contrary to
our predictions (but not totally surprising, given the activist nature of both type
of groups), loyalty to ingroup is equally significant in both racist and anti-racist
groups.
Finally, our investigation of cognitive complexity as an indication of commu-
nication strategies used by racist groups revealed that racist groups tend to use less
cognitively complex language than nonactivist groups. The cognitive complexity
of anti-racist groups’ text was not significantly different from nonactivist or racist
12 Faulkner and Bliuc

group language. This finding implies that racist groups tend to present their beliefs
in clear, relatively simple, “Black and White” ways, rather than making sophisti-
cated distinctions between different ideas and integrating perspectives to identify
key similarities (Pennebaker & King, 1999; Pennebaker et al. 2014; Tausczik &
Pennebaker, 2010). This may not only reflect a more general preference for lower
complexity (e.g. Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Sidanius, 1978; Tam, Au, & Leung,
2008), but it is also an effective strategy to persuade audiences to believe particular
arguments (Guerin, 2003b), and one that was shown to produce enduring effects
(Lee & Leets, 2002). This finding may be indicative of a persuasion strategy being
used by activist groups in general to attract new members. Indeed, research has
indicated that simple messages tend to be more persuasive than complex messages
when the group or individual presenting the message has a lower status, as most
racist groups do (Hafer, Reynolds, & Obertynski, 1996; also see Lowrey, 1998).
The use of simpler language in activist self-defining statements may serve to in-
crease their persuasiveness, and may therefore be favored by these groups when
presenting their beliefs online. An alternative (but not contradictory) explanation
of this finding is that the use of low complexity messages can indicate increased
certainty in relation to the worldview underpinning the messages communicated.
Despite several advantages of the computerized text analysis utilized in this
study, the method is not without limitations. One limitation is that simple word
counts inevitably cannot capture the complexities of language; LIWC cannot detect
sarcasm, irony nor differentiate between different uses of the same word. Despite
this limitation, past research has consistently shown that LIWC categories reflect
meaningful psychological states and personal concerns in many different contexts
(Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).

Conclusion

Overall, the present research demonstrates that in some respects, racist groups
function in similar ways to (contrasting) activist groups, that is, anti-racist groups.
Both these categories of groups develop group consciousness that is indicated
by similar psychological dimensions. However, while the basic drivers of online
activism such as perceptions of injustice (expressed as anger) and communication
strategies such as using direct and clear language may be common to activist
groups in general, the foundations that shape the collective goals of the group
are fundamentally different. That is, based on our analysis, racist groups express
a stronger sense of collective identity (higher group identification), but express
less group efficacy than anti-racist groups. Moreover, online racism is uniquely
characterized by conservative moral values such as purity and respect for authority
as well as a stronger focus on religion.
The differences between the psychological processes underpinning racist and
anti-racist groups’ online activism suggest useful considerations for designing
Breaking Down the Language of Online Racism 13

policies and interventions to reduce racist groups’ growth and impact. Our results
imply, for example, that interventions targeted at racist group members may be
more effective when they: (i) recognize the value of moral foundations associated
with purity and respect for authority; (ii) appeal to religion and religious values;
and (iii) are presented in simple, noncognitively complex manner.
Racist groups undermine contemporary diverse societies by creating inter-
group division and mistrust, thus escalating intergroup tensions. Recently, in
many Western democracies, we have seen an increase in populism manifested
in unprecedented levels of public support for far-right groups with a racist agenda
(Inglehart, & Norris, 2016). To be able to counteract the societal influence of these
groups, we need to first fully understand the (possibly implicit) communication
strategies and psychological mechanisms that may explain their strength and ap-
peal. Our research represents an initial step in that direction - it sets a platform for
further investigation of how racists groups use online communication techniques
to exploit public’s current fears and insecurities.

References

Adams, J., & Roscigno, V. J. (2005). White supremacists, oppositional culture and the world wide
web. Social Forces, 84, 759–778. https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2006.0001
Agnew, C. R., Van Lange, P. A., Rusbult, C. E., & Langston, C. A. (1998). Cognitive interdependence:
Commitment and the mental representation of close relationships. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 74, 939–954. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.4.939
Anti-Defamation League (2001). Poisoning the web: Hatred online: Internet bigotry, extremism and
violence. Retrieved from http://archive.adl.org/poisoning_web/net_hate_tool.html
Atton, C. (2006). Far-right media on the Internet: Culture, discourse and power. New Media and
Society, 8, 573–587. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444806065653
Bantum, E. O., & Owen, J. E. (2009). Evaluating the validity of computerized content analysis programs
for identification of emotional expression in cancer narratives. Psychological Assessment, 21,
79–88. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014643
Barkun, M. (1997). Religion and the racist right: The origins of the christian identity movement.
Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/101.1.152
Bliuc, A. M., Best, D., Beckwith, M., & Iqbal, M. (2016). Online support communities in ad-
diction recovery. In S. Buckinham & D. Best (Eds.), Addiction, behavioral change and
social identity: The path to resilience and recovery (p.137). New York, NY: Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.1080/16066359.2017.1347258
Bliuc, A. M., Best, D., Iqbal, M., & Upton, K. (2017). Building addiction recovery capital through
online participation in a recovery community. Social Science & Medicine, 193, 110–117.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.09.050
Bliuc, A. M., McGarty, C., Badea, C., & Boza, M. (2018). Enacting collective support for the Eu-
ropean integration: Participation in pro-integration action and preference for specific transna-
tional acculturation strategies. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 28, 15–28.
https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2337
Bliuc, A. M., McGarty, C., Hartley, L., & Muntele Hendres, D. (2012). Manipulating national identity:
The strategic use of rhetoric by supporters and opponents of the ‘Cronulla riots’ in Australia.
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 35, 2174–2194. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2011.600768
Bliuc, A. M., McGarty, C., Reynolds, K., & Muntele, D. (2007). Opinion-based group membership
as a predictor of commitment to political action. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37,
19–32. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.334
14 Faulkner and Bliuc

Bliuc, A. M., McGarty, C., Thomas, E. F., Lala, G., Berndsen, M., & Misajon, R. (2015). Public
division about climate change rooted in conflicting socio-political identities. Nature Climate
Change, 5, 226–229. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2507
Billig, M. (2001). Humour and hatred: The racist jokes of the Ku Klux Klan. Discourse and Society
12, 267–289. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926501012003001
Burris, V., Smith E., & Strahm A. (2000). White supremacist networks on the internet. Sociological
Focus, 33, 215–235. https://doi.org/10.1080/00380237.2000.10571166
Caiani, M., & Parenti, L. (2010). The dark side of the web: Italian right-wing extrem-
ist groups and the Internet. Southern European Society and Politics, 14, 273–294.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13608740903342491
Chau, M., & Xu, J. (2006). Mining communities and their relationships in blogs: A study
of online hate groups. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 65, 57–70.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2006.08.009
Clifford, S., & Jerit, J. (2013). How words do the work of politics: Moral foundations the-
ory and the debate over stem cell research. The Journal of Politics, 75, 659–671.
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381613000492
Cohn, M. A., Mehl, M. R., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2004). Linguistic markers of psycho-
logical change surrounding September 11, 2001. Psychological Science, 15, 687–693.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00741.x
Daniels, J. (2009). Cloaked websites: Propaganda, cyber-racism and epistemology in the digital era.
New Media & Society, 11, 659–683. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444809105345
Daniels, J. (2013). Race and racism in Internet studies: A review and critique. New Media & Society,
15, 695–719. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444812462849
Davis, D., & Brock, T. C. (1975). Use of first person pronouns as a function of increased objective
self-awareness and performance feedback. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 11,
381–388. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(75)90017-7
Delacre, M., Lakens, D., Mora, Y., & Leys, C. (2018, January 31). Why psychologists should always
report the W-test instead of the F-test ANOVA. https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.82
Dobratz, B. A. (2001). The role of religion in the collective identity of the white racialist move-
ment. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40, 287–301. https://doi.org/10.1111/0021-
8294.00056
Douglas, K. M., McGarty, C. A., Bliuc, A.-M., & Lala, G. (2005). Understanding cyberhate: Social
competition and social creativity in online white supremacist groups. Social Science Computer
Review, 23, 68–76. https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439304271538
Duncan, L. E. (2012). The psychology of collective action. In K. Deaux & M. Sny-
der (Eds.), Oxford library of psychology. The Oxford handbook of personality
and social psychology (pp. 781–803). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195398991.013.0031
Erjavec, K. & Kovacic, M. P. (2012). ‘You don’t understand, this is a new war!’ Analysis of
hate speech in news websites’ comments. Mass Communication and Society, 15, 899–920.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2011.619679
Faulkner, N., & Bliuc, A.-M. (2016). ‘It’s okay to be racist’: Moral disengagement in online
discussions of racist incidents in Australia. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39, 2545–2563.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1171370
Franklin, R. A. (2010). The hate directory. Retrieved from http://www.hatedirectory.com
Gerstenfeld, P. B., Grant, D. R., & Chiang, C. P. (2003). Hate online: A content analy-
sis of extremist internet sites. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 3, 29–44.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-2415.2003.00013.x
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different
sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96, 1029–1046.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015141
Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Map-
ping the moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 366–385.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021847
Breaking Down the Language of Online Racism 15

Guerin, B. (2003a). Combating prejudice and racism: New interventions from a functional anal-
ysis of racist language. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 13, 29–45.
https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.699
Guerin, B. (2003b). Language use as social strategy: A review and an analytic framework for the
social sciences. Review of General Psychology, 7, 251–298. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-
2680.7.3.251
Gunsch, M. A., Brownlow, S., Haynes, S. E., & Mabe, Z. (2000). Differential linguistic content
of various forms of political advertising. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 44,
27–42. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15506878jobem4401_3
Hafer, C. L., Reynolds, K. L., & Obertynski, M. A. (1996). Message comprehensibility and persuasion:
Effects of complex language in counter-attitudinal appeals to laypeople. Social Cognition, 14,
317–337. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.1996.14.4.317
Hale, W. C. (2012). Extremism on the World Wide Web: A research review. Criminal Justice Studies,
25, 343–356. https://doi.org/10.1080/1478601x.2012.704723
Haidt, J. (2007). The new synthesis in moral psychology. Science, 316, 998–1002.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1137651
Hamm, M. S. (1993). American skinheads: The criminology and control of hate crime. Westport, CT:
Praeger.
Haslam, S. A., Reicher, S. D., & Platow, M. J. (2011). The new psychology of leadership: Identity,
influence and power. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Hodson, G., & Busseri, M. A. (2012). Bright minds and dark attitudes: Lower cognitive ability pre-
dicts greater prejudice through right-wing ideology and low intergroup contact. Psychological
Science, 23, 187–195. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611421206
Kacewicz, E., Pennebaker, J. W., Davis, M., Jeon, M., & Graesser, A. C. (2014). Pronoun use reflects
standings in social hierarchies. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 33, 125–143.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927x13502654
Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-
nots and cultural backlash. HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP16-026.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659
Lee, E., & Leets, L. (2002). Persuasive storytelling by hate groups online: Ex-
amining its effects on adolescents. American Behavioral Scientist, 45, 927–957.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764202045006003
Lowrey, T. M. (1998). The effects of syntactic complexity on advertising persuasiveness. Journal of
Consumer Psychology, 7, 187–206. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327663jcp0702_04
McNamee G., Peterson, B. L., & Pena, J. (2010). A call to educate, participate, invoke and indict:
Understanding the communication of online hate groups. Communication Monographs, 77,
257–280. https://doi.org/10.1080/03637751003758227
Mission Statements. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.missionstatements.com
Multicultural Australia (n.d.). List of anti-racist groups. Retrieved from http://www.multicultural
australia.edu.au/doc/antiracist_1.pdf
Pennebaker, J. W., Booth, R. J., Boyd, R. L., & Francis, M.E. (2015a). Linguistic inquiry and word
Count: LIWC2015. Austin, TX: Pennebaker Conglomerates.
Pennebaker, J. W., Boyd, R. L., Jordan, K., & Blackburn, K. (2015b). The development and psycho-
metric properties of LIWC2015. Austin, TX: University of Texas at Austin.
Pennebaker, J. W., Chung, C. K., Frazee, J., Lavergne, G. M., & Beaver, D. I. (2014). When small
words foretell academic success: The case of college admissions essays. PloS one, 9, e115844.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0115844
Pennebaker, J. W., & Francis, M. E. (1996). Cognitive, emotional, and language processes in disclosure.
Cognition and Emotion, 10, 601–626. https://doi.org/10.1080/026999396380079
Pennebaker, J. W., & King, L. A. (1999). Linguistic styles: Language use as an individual difference.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 1296–1312. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-
3514.77.6.1296
Pennebaker, J. W., Mayne, T. J., & Francis, M. E. (1997). Linguistic predictors of adaptive bereavement.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 863–871. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-
3514.72.4.863
 16 Faulkner and Bliuc

Sidanius, J. (1978). Intolerance of ambiguity and socio-politico ideology: A multidimensional analysis.

European Journal of Social Psychology, 8, 215–235. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420080207
Sillars, A., Shellen, W., McIntosh, A., & Pomegranate, M. (1997). Relational characteristics of lan-
guage: Elaboration and differentiation in marital conversations. Western Journal of Communi-
cation, 61, 403–422. https://doi.org/10.1080/10570319709374587
Simi, P., & Futrell, R. (2006). Cyberculture and the endurance of white power activism. Journal of
Political and Military Sociology, 34, 115–142.
Slatcher, R. B., Chung, C. K., Pennebaker, J. W., & Stone, L.D. (2007). Winning words: Individual
differences in linguistic style among U.S. presidential and vice presidential candidates. Journal
of Research in Personality, 41, 63–75. https://doi.org/10.1037/e529412014-119
SPLC. (2016). Intelligence files. Retrieved from http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-
files
Tam, K.P., Au, A., & Leung, A.K.Y. (2008). Attributionally more complex people show
less punitiveness and racism. Journal of Research in Personality, 42, 1074–1081.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2007.11.002
Tausczik, Y. R., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2010). The psychological meaning of words: LIWC and
computerized text analysis methods. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 29, 24–54.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927x09351676
Tynes, B. M., Reynolds, L., & Greenfield, P.M. (2004). Adolescence, race and ethnicity on the internet:
A comparison of discourse in monitored vs. unmonitored chat rooms. Applied Developmental
Psychology, 25, 667–684. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appdev.2004.09.003
Van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an integrative social identity model of
collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives.
Psychological bulletin, 134(4), http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.134.4.504
von Hippel, W., Sekaquaptewa, D., & Vargas, P.T. (2009). Linguistic markers of implicit attitudes. In
R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Brinol (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from new implicit measures.
New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Weaver, S. (2012). A rhetorical discourse analysis of online anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic jokes. Ethnic
and Racial Studies, 36, 483–499. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2013.734386
White, F. A., Abu-Rayya, H. M., Bliuc, A. M., & Faulkner, N. (2015). Emotion expression and inter-
group bias reduction between Muslims and Christians: Long-term Internet contact. Computers
in Human Behavior, 53, 435–442. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2015.04.074
Wikipedia (2014). Category:Anti-racist organizations in the United States. Retrieved from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Anti-racist_organizations_in_the_United_States

View publication stats