016 Social Justice Society v. Lim

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 187836. November 25, 2014.]
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY, SAMSON

S. ALCANTARA, and VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO ,
petitioners, vs. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as mayor of
the City of Manila, respondent.
[G.R. No. 187916. November 25, 2014.]
JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, MA.

LOURDES M. ISIP-GARCIA, RAFAEL P. BORROMEO JOCELYN
DAWIS-ASUNCION, minors MARIAN REGINA B. TARAN,
MACAILA RICCI B. TARAN, RICHARD KENNETH B. TARAN,
represented and joined by their parents RICHARD AND
MARITES TARAN, minors CZARINA ALYSANDRA C. RAMOS,
CEZARAH ADRIANNA C. RAMOS, and CRISTEN AIDAN C.
RAMOS represented and joined by their mother DONNA C.
RAMOS, minors JAZMIN SYLLITA T. VILA AND ANTONIO T.
CRUZ IV, represented and joined by their mother MAUREEN
C. TOLENTINO, petitioners, vs. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE
MAYOR FRANCISCO DOMAGOSO, COUNCILORS ARLENE W.
KOA, MOISES T. LIM, JESUS FAJARDO, LOUISITO N. CHUA,
VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, JOHN MARVIN C. NIETO,
ROLANDO M. VALERIANO, RAYMUNDO R. YUPANGCO,
EDWARD VP MACEDA, RODERICK D. VALBUENA, JOSEFINA
M. SISCAR, SALVADOR PHILLIP H. LACUNA, LUCIANO M.
VELOSO, CARLO V. LOPEZ, ERNESTO F. RIVERA, 1 DANILO
VICTOR H. LACUNA, JR., ERNESTO G. ISIP, HONEY H.
LACUNA-PANGAN, ERNESTO M. DIONISO, JR. and ERICK IAN
O. NIEVA, respondents.
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC., PETRON CORPORATION AND

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, intervenors.
DECISION
PEREZ, J : p
Challenged in these consolidated petitions 2 is the validity of Ordinance

No. 8187 3 entitled "AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 8119,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS 'THE MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND
ZONING ORDINANCE OF 2006,' BY CREATING A MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-
2) AND HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-3), AND PROVIDING FOR ITS
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ENFORCEMENT" enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
(Sangguniang Panlungsod) on 14 May 2009.
The creation of a medium industrial zone (1-2) and heavy industrial zone
(1-3) effectively lifted the prohibition against owners and operators of
businesses, including herein intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc. (Chevron),
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell), and Petron Corporation (Petron),
collectively referred to as the oil companies, from operating in the designated
commercial zone — an industrial zone prior to the enactment of Ordinance No.
8 0 2 7 4 entitled "AN ORDINANCE RECLASSIFYING THE LAND USE OF THAT
PORTION OF LAND BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER IN THE NORTH, PNR
RAILROAD TRACK IN THE EAST, BEATA ST. IN THE SOUTH, PALUMPONG ST. IN
THE SOUTHWEST AND ESTERO DE PANDACAN IN THE WEST, PNR RAILROAD IN
THE NORTHWEST AREA, ESTERO DE PANDACAN IN THE NORTHEAST, PASIG
RIVER IN THE SOUTHEAST AND DR. M. L. CARREON IN THE SOUTHWEST, THE
AREA OF PUNTA, STA. ANA BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER, MARCELINO
OBRERO ST., MAYO 28 ST. AND THE F. MANALO STREET FROM INDUSTRIAL II TO
COMMERCIAL I," and Ordinance No. 8119 5 entitled "AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING
THE MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND ZONING REGULATIONS OF
2006 AND PROVIDING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION, ENFORCEMENT AND
AMENDMENT THERETO."
The Parties
Petitioners allege the parties' respective capacity to sue and be sued, viz.:
Petitioners Residence Suing capacity aside from
in Manila being residents of Manila/
other personal
circumstances
G.R. No. 187836

SJS Officer Samson S. Alcantara Not mentioned Manila taxpayer;
One of the petitioners in SJS
(Alcantara) in the petition;
v.
holding office Atienza (G.R. No. 156052);*
in Ermita, Pesident of ABAKADA GURO
PARTY LIST with members
Manila
who
are residents of the City of
Manila
SJS Officer Vladimir Alarique T. One of the petitioners in SJS
Pandacan
Cabigao v.
(Cabigao) Atienza (G.R. No 156052)
* The allegation is inaccurate. SJS Officer Alcantara is actually one of the counsels for petitioner SJS in G.R. No.
156052. The petitioners in that case are the SJS itself, Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon (Tumbokon).
G.R. No. 187916

Former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr.
San Andres Former Mayor of Manila;
(Mayor
Atienza) Secretary of Department of
Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR)
Bienvinido M. Abante Sta. Ana Citizen and taxpayer;
member of the House of
Representatives
Incumbent City Councilor of
Ma. Lourdes M. Isip-Garcia San Miguel
the
City of Manila
Rafael P. Borromeo Paco
the
City of Manila
Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion Sta. Mesa
the
City of Manila
Minors Marian Regina B. Taran, Citizens, real estate owners
Paco
Macalia and
Ricci B. Taran, Richard Kenneth B.
taxpayers
Taran,
represented and joined by their
parents
Richard and Marites Taran
Citizens, real estate owners
Minors Czarina Alysandra C. Ramos, Tondo
and
Cezarah Adrianna C. Ramos, and
taxpayers
Cristen
Aidan C. Ramos represented and
joined by
their mother Donna c. Ramos
Minors Jasmin Syllita T. Vila and Citizens, real estate owners
Sta. Ana
Antonio T. and
Cruz IV, represented and joined by
taxpayers
their
mother Maureen C. Tolentino
Respondents Sued in their capacity as
G.R. Nos. 187836 and 187916

Former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) Incumbent Mayor of Manila at
the time of the filing of the
present petitions
G.R. No. 187916

Vice-Mayor Francisco Domagoso (Vice-Mayor Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer
Domagoso) of the City Council of Manila
Arlene Woo Koa Principal author of City

Ordinance No. 8187
Personal and official capacities
Moises T. Lim, Jesus Fajardo, Louisito N. Chua,
as
Victoriano A. Melendez, John Marvin Nieto, Rolando
councilors who voted and
M.
Valeriano, Raymondo R. Yupangco, Edward VP approved City Ordinance No.
Maceda, 8187
Roderick D. Valbuena, Josefina M. Siscar, Phillip H.
Lacuna, Luciano M. Veloso, Carlo V. Lopez, Ernesto
F.
Rivera, 6 Danilo Victor H. Lacuna, Jr., Ernesto G.
Isip,
Honey H. Lacuna-Pangan, Ernesto M. Dionisio, Jr.,
Erick
Ian O. Nieva
The following intervenors, all of which are corporations organized under

Philippine laws, intervened: 7
Intervenors Nature of Business
importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum

Chevron Philippines,
products in the
Inc. (CHEVRON) Philippines since 1922
manufacturing, refining, importing, distributing and
Pilipinas Shell
marketing of
Petroleum Corporation petroleum products in the Philippines
(SHELL)
manufacturing, refining, importing, distributing and
Petron Corporation
marketing of
(PETRON) petroleum products in the Philippines
They claim that their rights with respect to the oil depots in Pandacan would
be directly affected by the outcome of these cases.
The Antecedents
These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor
Atienza, Jr. 8 (hereinafter referred to as G.R. No. 156052), where the Court
found: (1) that the ordinance subject thereof — Ordinance No. 8027 — was
enacted "to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of the inhabitants of
Manila;" 9 (2) that it had passed the tests of a valid ordinance; and (3) that it is
not superseded by Ordinance No. 8119. 10 Declaring that it is constitutional and
valid, 11 the Court accordingly ordered its immediate enforcement with a
specific directive on the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan oil terminals.
12
Highlighting that the Court has so ruled that the Pandacan oil depots
should leave, herein petitioners now seek the nullification of Ordinance No.
8187, which contains provisions contrary to those embodied in Ordinance No.
8027. Allegations of violation of the right to health and the right to a healthful
and balanced environment are also included.
For a better perspective of the facts of these cases, we again trace the
history of the Pandacan oil terminals, as well as the intervening events prior to
the reclassification of the land use from Industrial II to Commercial I under
Ordinance No. 8027 until the creation of Medium Industrial Zone and Heavy
Industrial Zone pursuant to Ordinance No. 8187.
History of the Pandacan

Oil Terminals
We quote the following from the Resolution of the Court in G.R. No.
156052:
Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated
along the banks of the Pasig [R]iver. At the turn of the twentieth
century, Pandacan was unofficially designated as the industrial center
of Manila. The area, then largely uninhabited, was ideal for various
emerging industries as the nearby river facilitated the transportation of
goods and products. In the 1920s, it was classified as an industrial
zone. Among its early industrial settlers were the oil companies. . . .
On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the shores

of the Philippine Islands. . . . [I]n their zealous attempt to fend off the
Japanese Imperial Army, the United States Army took control of the
Pandacan Terminals and hastily made plans to destroy the storage
facilities to deprive the advancing Japanese Army of a valuable logistics
weapon. The U.S. Army burned unused petroleum, causing a
frightening conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin recounted the events
as follows:
After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December
1941, all army fuel storage dumps were set on fire. The flames
spread, enveloping the City in smoke, setting even the rivers
ablaze, endangering bridges and all riverside buildings. . . . For
one week longer, the "open city" blazed — a cloud of smoke by
day, a pillar of fire by night.
The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and
rendered its network of depots and service stations inoperative.
After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan

changed as Manila rebuilt itself. The three major oil companies
resumed the operation of their depots. But the district was no longer a
sparsely populated industrial zone; it had evolved into a bustling,
hodgepodge community. Today, Pandacan has become a densely
populated area inhabited by about 84,000 people, majority of whom
are urban poor who call it home. Aside from numerous industrial
installations, there are also small businesses, churches, restaurants,
schools, daycare centers and residences situated there. Malacañang
Palace, the official residence of the President of the Philippines and the
seat of governmental power, is just two kilometers away. There is a
private school near the Petron depot. Along the walls of the Shell
facility are shanties of informal settlers. More than 15,000 students are
enrolled in elementary and high schools situated near these facilities. A
university with a student population of about 25,000 is located directly
across the depot on the banks of the Pasig [R]iver.
The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies'

distribution terminals and depot facilities. The refineries of Chevron
and Shell in Tabangao and Bauan, both in Batangas, respectively, are
connected to the Pandacan Terminals through a 114-kilometer
underground pipeline system. Petron's refinery in Limay, Bataan, on
the other hand, also services the depot. The terminals store fuel and
other petroleum products and supply 95% of the fuel requirements of
Metro Manila, 50% of Luzon's consumption and 35% nationwide. Fuel
can also be transported through barges along the Pasig [R]iver or tank
trucks via the South Luzon Expressway. 13 (Citations omitted)
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)

dated 12 October 2001 between the oil companies
and the Department of Energy (DOE)
On 12 October 2001, the oil companies and the DOE entered into a MOA
14 "in light of recent international developments involving acts of terrorism on
civilian and government landmarks," 15 "potential new security risks relating to
the Pandacan oil terminals and the impact on the surrounding community
which may be affected," 16 and "to address the perceived risks posed by the
proximity of communities, businesses and offices to the Pandacan oil terminals,
consistent with the principle of sustainable development." 17 The stakeholders
acknowledged that "there is a need for a comprehensive study to address the
economic, social, environmental and security concerns with the end in view of
formulating a Master Plan to address and minimize the potential risks and
hazards posed by the proximity of communities, businesses and offices to the
Pandacan oil terminals without adversely affecting the security and reliability of
supply and distribution of petroleum products to Metro Manila and the rest of
Luzon, and the interests of consumers and users of such petroleum products in
those areas." 18
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027
against the continued stay of the oil depots
The MOA, however, was short-lived.
On 20 November 2001, during the incumbency of former Mayor Jose L.
Atienza, Jr. (Mayor Atienza) — now one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 187916 —
the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8027 19 reclassifying the
use of the land in Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II
to Commercial I.
The owners and operators of the businesses thus affected by the

reclassification were given six months from the date of effectivity of the
Ordinance within which to stop the operation of their businesses.
Nevertheless, the oil companies were granted an extension of until 30

April 2003 within which to comply with the Ordinance pursuant to the following:
(1) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 20 dated 26 June 2002 between

the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE), on the one hand, and
the oil companies, on the other, where the parties agreed that "the scaling
down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option"
21 and committed to adopt specific measures 22 consistent with the said
objective;
(2) Resolution No. 97 dated 25 July 2002 23 of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, which ratified the 26 June 2002 MOU but limited the extension of
the period within which to comply to six months from 25 July 2002; and

(3) Resolution No. 13 dated 30 January 2003 24 of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, which extended the validity of Resolution No. 97 to 30 April 2003,
authorized then Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil
companies, and called for a reassessment of the ordinance.
Social Justice Society v. Atienza (G.R. No. 156052):
The filing of an action for mandamus
before the Supreme Court
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
In the interim, an original action for mandamus entitled Social Justice
Society v. Atienza, Jr. docketed as G.R. No. 156052 25 was filed on 4 December
2002 by Tumbokon and herein petitioners SJS and Cabigao against then Mayor
Atienza. The petitioners sought to compel former Mayor Atienza to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and cause the immediate removal of the terminals of the
oil companies. 26
Issuance by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction
and preliminary mandatory injunction,
and status quo order in favor of the oil companies
Unknown to the Court, during the pendency of G.R. No. 156052, and
before the expiration of the validity of Resolution No. 13, the oil companies filed
the following actions before the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (1) an action for
the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of preliminary
prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction — by Chevron; (2) a
petition for prohibition and mandamus also for the annulment of the Ordinance
with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction — by Shell; and (3) a petition assailing the validity of the
Ordinance with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) — by Petron. 27
Writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction were issued in favor of Chevron and Shell on 19 May 2003. Petron,
on the other hand, obtained a status quo order on 4 August 2004. 28
The Enactment of Ordinance No. 8119
defining the Manila land use plan
and zoning regulations
On 16 June 2006, then Mayor Atienza approved Ordinance No. 8119
entitled "An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and
Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement
and Amendment thereto." 29
Pertinent provisions relative to these cases are the following:

(a) Article IV, Sec. 7 30 enumerating the existing zones or districts in the
City of Manila;
(b) Article V, Sec. 23 31 designating the Pandacan oil depot area as a
"Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone" (O-PUD); and
(c) the repealing clause, which reads:
SEC. 84. Repealing Clause. — All ordinances, rules, regulations in
conflict with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed;
PROVIDED, That the rights that are vested upon the effectivity of this
Ordinance shall not be impaired. 32
7 March 2007 Decision in G.R. No. 156052;

The mayor has the mandatory legal duty
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order
the removal of the Pandacan terminals
On 7 March 2007, the Court granted the petition for mandamus, and
directed then respondent Mayor Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No.
8027. 33
Confined to the resolution of the following issues raised by the petitioners,

to wit:
1. whether respondent [Mayor Atienza] has the mandatory legal duty
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the
Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can
amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027. 34
the Court declared:

. . . [T]he Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the
duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the
chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or
annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty
to do so. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by
respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions
passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondent's duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. . . .
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the
MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which
ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it
full force and effect only until April 30, 2003 . Thus, at present, there
is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance
No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along
with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11,
2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York
City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents
of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely
occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
No reason exists why such a protective measure should be
delayed. 35 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;

Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional
The oil companies and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
DOE, filed their motions for leave to intervene and for reconsideration of the 7
March 2007 Decision. During the oral arguments, the parties submitted to the
power of the Court to rule on the constitutionality and validity of the assailed
Ordinance despite the pendency of the cases in the RTC. 36
On 13 February 2008, the Court granted the motions for leave to
intervene of the oil companies and the Republic of the Philippines but denied
their respective motions for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, . . .
We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. In coordination with the appropriate
agencies and other parties involved, respondent Mayor is hereby
ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan
Terminals out of its present site. 37
13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;

Ordinance No. 8027 was not impliedly repealed
by Ordinance No. 8119
The Court also ruled that Ordinance No. 8027 was not impliedly repealed
by Ordinance No. 8119. On this score, the Court ratiocinated:
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an
irreconcilable conflict between the two ordinances. There is no conflict
between the two ordinances. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the
Pandacan area from Industrial II to Commercial I. Ordinance No. 8119,
Section 23, designated it as a "Planned Unit Development/Overlay
Zone (O-PUD)." In its Annex "C" which defined the zone boundaries, the
Pandacan area was shown to be within the "High Density
Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)." . . . [B]oth ordinances actually
have a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from
industrial to commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential
commercial (Ordinance No. 8119)
xxx xxx xxx
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically

with a certain area described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area)
whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law as it
covers the entire city of Manila.
xxx xxx xxx

. . . The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be taken
to indicate the legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on
the subject matter, including Ordinance No. 8027, a special enactment,
since the aforequoted minutes (an official record of the discussions in
the Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear intent to preserve the
provisions of Ordinance No. 8027. 38
Filing of a draft Resolution amending

Ordinance No. 8027 effectively allowing
the oil depots to stay in the Pandacan area;
Manifestation and Motion to forestall
the passing of the new Ordinance
filed in G.R. No. 156052
On 5 March 2009, respondent then Councilor Arlene W. Koa, filed with the
Sangguniang Panlungsod a draft resolution entitled "An Ordinance Amending
Ordinance No. 8119 Otherwise Known as 'The Manila Comprehensive Land Use
Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006' by Creating a Medium Industrial Zone (1-2)
and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) and Providing for its Enforcement." 39 Initially
numbered as Draft Ordinance No. 7177, this was later renumbered as
Ordinance No. 8187, the assailed Ordinance in these instant petitions.
Considering that the provisions thereof run contrary to Ordinance No.
8027, the petitioners in G.R. No. 156052 filed a "Manifestation and Motion to: a)
Stop the City Council of Manila from further hearing the amending ordinance to
Ordinance No. 8027; [and] b) Transfer the monitoring of the enforcement of the
Resolution of the Honorable Court on this case dated 13 February 2008 from
Branch 39, Manila Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court." 40
28 April 2009 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;
Second Motion for Reconsideration
denied with finality; succeeding motions
likewise denied or otherwise noted
without action
On 28 April 2009, pending the resolution of the Manifestation and Motion,
the Court denied with finality the second motion for reconsideration dated 27
February 2008 of the oil companies. 41 It further ruled that no further pleadings
shall be entertained in the case. 42
Succeeding motions were thus denied and/or noted without action. And,
after the "Very Urgent Motion to Stop the Mayor of the City of Manila from
Signing Draft Ordinance No. 7177 and to Cite Him for Contempt if He Would Do
So" filed on 19 May 2009 was denied on 2 June 2009 for being moot, 43 all
pleadings pertaining to the earlier motion against the drafting of an ordinance
to amend Ordinance No. 8027 were noted without action. 44
The Enactment of Ordinance No. 8187

allowing the continued stay of the oil depots
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim
(Mayor Lim), who succeeded Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
enacted Ordinance No. 8187. 45
The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified
Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119, and all other
Ordinances or provisions inconsistent therewith 46 thereby allowing, once
again, the operation of "Pollutive/Non-Hazardous and Pollutive/Hazardous
manufacturing and processing establishments" and "Highly Pollutive/Non-
Hazardous[,] Pollutive/Hazardous[,] Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous[,]
Non-Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and
Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous manufacturing and processing establishments"
within the newly created Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial
Zone (1-3) in the Pandacan area.
Thus, where the Industrial Zone under Ordinance No. 8119 was limited
to Light Industrial Zone (I-1), Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a
Medium Industrial Zone (I-2) and a Heavy Industrial Zone (I-3), where
petroleum refineries and oil depots are now among those expressly allowed.
Hence these petitions.
The Petitions
G.R. No. 187836
To support their petition for prohibition against the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8187, the petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS) officers allege
that:
1. The enactment of the assailed Ordinance is not a valid exercise of
police power because the measures provided therein do not promote the
general welfare of the people within the contemplation of the following
provisions of law:
a) Article III, Section 18 (kk) 47 of Republic Act No. 409 otherwise

known as the "Revised Charter of the City of Manila," which
provides that the Municipal Board shall have the legislative
power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper;
b) Section 16 48 of Republic Act No. 7160 known as the Local

Government Code, which defines the scope of the general
welfare clause;
2. The conditions at the time the Court declared Ordinance No. 8027
constitutional in G.R. No. 156052 exist to this date;
3. Despite the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 156052, and

notwithstanding that the conditions and circumstances warranting the validity
of the Ordinance remain the same, the Manila City Council passed a contrary
Ordinance, thereby refusing to recognize that "judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system of the
Philippines;" 49 and

4. Ordinance No. 8187 is violative of Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the
Constitution of the Philippines on the duty of the State "to protect and promote
the right to health of the people" 50 and "protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology." 51
Petitioners pray that Ordinance No. 8187 of the City of Manila be declared
null and void, and that respondent, and all persons acting under him, be
prohibited from enforcing the same.
G.R. No. 187916
The petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction against the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8187 of former Secretary of Department of Environment and
Natural Resources and then Mayor Atienza, together with other residents and
taxpayers of the City of Manila, also alleges violation of the right to health of
the people and the right to a healthful and balanced environment under
Sections 15 and 16 of the Constitution.
Petitioners likewise claim that the Ordinance is in violation of the following
health and environment-related municipal laws, and international conventions
and treaties to which the Philippines is a state party:
1. Municipal Laws —
(a) Sections 4, 52 12, 53 19 54 and 30 55 of Republic Act No. 8749
otherwise known as the Philippine Clean Air Act;
(b) Environment Code (Presidential Decree No. 1152);

(c) Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); and
(d) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
2. International Conventions and Treaties to which the Philippines is a

state party —
a. Section 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
states that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person;"
b. Articles 6, 56 24 57 and 27 58 of the Convention on the Rights

of the Child, summarized by the petitioners in the following manner:
1. the human right to safe and healthy environment[;]

2. human right to the highest attainable standard of
health[;]
3. the human right to ecologically sustainable

development[;]
4. the human right to an adequate standard of living,

including access to safe food and water[;]
5. the human right of the child to live in an environment

appropriate for physical and mental development[; and]
6. the human right to full and equal participation for all
persons in environmental decision-making and development
planning, and in shaping decisions and policies affecting one's
community, at the local, national and international levels. 59
Petitioners likewise posit that the title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to
amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119 when it actually intends to repeal
Ordinance No. 8027. According to them, Ordinance No. 8027 was never
mentioned in the title and the body of the new ordinance in violation of Section
26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that every bill passed by
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
Also pointed out by the petitioners is a specific procedure outlined in

Ordinance No. 8119 that should be observed when amending the zoning
ordinance. This is provided for under Section 81 thereof, which reads:
SEC. 81. Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance. — The proposed
amendments to the Zoning Ordinance as reviewed and evaluated by
the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) shall be submitted to
the City Council for approval of the majority of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod members. The amendments shall be acceptable and
eventually approved: PROVIDED, That there is sufficient evidence and
justification for such proposal; PROVIDED FURTHER, That such proposal
is consistent with the development goals, planning objectives, and
strategies of the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan. Said
amendments shall take effect immediately upon approval or after thirty
(30) days from application.
Petitioners thus pray that:

1. upon filing of [the] petition, [the] case be referred to the Court
[E]n Banc, and setting (sic) the case for oral argument;
2. upon the filing of [the] petition, a temporary restraining order
be issued enjoining the respondents from publishing and posting
Manila City Ordinance No. 8187 and/or posting of Manila City Ordinance
No. 8187 and/or taking any steps to implementing (sic) and/or enforce
the same and after due hearing, the temporary restraining order be
converted to a permanent injunction;
3. . . . Manila City Ordinance 8187 [be declared] as null and void

for being repugnant to the Constitution and existing municipal laws and
international covenants;
4. . . . the respondents [be ordered] to refrain from enforcing
and/or implementing Manila City Ordinance No. 8187;
5. . . . respondent City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim [be enjoined] from

issuing any permits (business or otherwise) to all industries whose
allowable uses are anchored under the provisions of Manila Ordinance
No. 8187; and
6. . . . respondent Mayor of Manila Alfredo S. Lim [be ordered] to

comply with the Order of the Honorable Court in G.R. 156052 dated
February 13, 2008. 60
The Respondents' Position

on the Consolidated Petitions
Respondent former Mayor Lim
In his Memorandum, 61 former Mayor Lim, through the City Legal Officer,
attacks the petitioners' lack of legal standing to sue. He likewise points out that
the petitioners failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Maintaining that Ordinance No. 8187 is valid and constitutional, he

expounds on the following arguments:
On the procedural issues, he contends that: (1) it is the function of the

Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact zoning ordinances, for which reason, it may
proceed to amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119 without prior referral to the
Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals (MZBAA) as prescribed under
Section 80 (Procedure for Re-Zoning) and the City Planning and Development
Office (CPDO) pursuant to Section 81 (Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance) of
Ordinance No. 8119, especially when the action actually originated from the
Sangguniang Panlungsod itself; (2) the Sangguniang Panlungsod may, in the
later ordinance, expressly repeal all or part of the zoning ordinance sought to
be modified; and (3) the provision repealing Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119
is not violative of Section 26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which requires
that every bill must embrace only one subject and that such shall be expressed
in the title.
On the substantive issues, he posits that the petitions are based on
unfounded fears; that the assailed ordinance is a valid exercise of police power;
that it is consistent with the general welfare clause and public policy, and is not
unreasonable; that it does not run contrary to the Constitution, municipal laws,
and international conventions; and that the petitioners failed to overcome the
presumption of validity of the assailed ordinance.
Respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso

and the City Councilors who voted
in favor of the assailed ordinance
On 14 September 2012, after the Court gave the respondents several
chances to submit their Memorandum, 62 they, through the Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, prayed that the Court dispense with the filing
thereof.
In their Comment, 63 however, respondents offered a position essentially
similar to those proffered by former Mayor Lim.
The Intervenors' Position

on the Consolidated Petitions
On the other hand, the oil companies sought the outright dismissal of the
petitions based on alleged procedural infirmities, among others, incomplete
requisites of judicial review, violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts,
improper remedy, submission of a defective verification and certification
against forum shopping, and forum shopping.
As to the substantive issues, they maintain, among others, that the
assailed ordinance is constitutional and valid; that the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents;
that it is a valid exercise of legislative power; that it does not violate health and
environment-related provisions of the Constitution, laws, and international
conventions and treaties to which the Philippines is a party; that the oil depots
are not likely targets of terrorists; that the scaling down of the operations in
Pandacan pursuant to the MOU has been followed; and that the people are safe
in view of the safety measures installed in the Pandacan terminals.
Incidentally, in its Manifestation dated 30 November 2010, 64 Petron
informed the Court that it will "cease [the] operation of its petroleum product
storage facilities" 65 in the Pandacan oil terminal not later than January 2016 on
account of the following:
2.01. Environmental issues, many of which are unfounded,
continually crop up and tarnish the Company's image.
2.02. The location of its Pandacan terminal is continually
threatened, and made uncertain preventing long-term planning, by the
changing local government composition. Indeed, the relevant zoning
ordinances have been amended three (3) times, and their validity
subjected to litigation. 66
Intervening Events
On 28 August 2012, while the Court was awaiting the submission of the
Memorandum of respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso and the councilors who
voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which
composition had already substantially changed, enacted Ordinance No. 8283 67
entitled "AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 2 OF ORDINANCE NO. 8187 BY
RECLASSIFYING THE AREA WHERE PETROLEUM REFINERIES AND OIL DEPOTS
ARE LOCATED FROM HEAVY INDUSTRIAL (1-3) TO HIGH INTENSITY
COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE (C3/MXD).
The new ordinance essentially amended the assailed ordinance to

exclude the area where petroleum refineries and oil depots are located from
the Industrial Zone.
Ordinance No. 8283 thus permits the operation of the industries operating
within the Industrial Zone. However, the oil companies, whose oil depots are
located in the High Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD), are given
until the end of January 2016 within which to relocate their terminals.
Former Mayor Lim, who was then the incumbent mayor, did not support
the amendment. Maintaining that the removal of the oil depots was prejudicial
to public welfare, and, on account of the pending cases in the Supreme Court,
he vetoed Ordinance No. 8283 on 11 September 2012. 68
On 28 November 2012, former Mayor Lim filed a Manifestation informing
this Court that the Sangguniang Panlungsod voted to override the veto, and
that he, in turn, returned it again with his veto. He likewise directed the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to append his written reasons for his veto of the
Ordinance, so that the same will be forwarded to the President for his
consideration in the event that his veto is overridden again. 69
On 11 December 2012, Shell also filed a similar Manifestation. 70
Meanwhile, three days after former Mayor Lim vetoed the new ordinance,
Atty. Luch R. Gempis, Jr. (Atty. Gempis), Secretary of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, writing on behalf of respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso and the
City Councilors of Manila who voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance, finally
complied with this Court's Resolution dated 17 July 2012 reiterating its earlier
directives 71 to submit the said respondents' Memorandum.
In his Compliance/Explanation with Urgent Manifestation 72 dated 13
September 2012, Atty. Gempis explained that it was not his intention to show
disrespect to this Court or to delay or prejudice the disposition of the cases.
According to him, he signed the Comment prepared by respondents Vice-

Mayor and the City Councilors only to attest that the pleading was personally
signed by the respondents. He clarified that he was not designated as the legal
counsel of the respondents as, in fact, he was of the impression that, pursuant
to Section 481 (b) (3) of the Local Government Code, 73 it is the City Legal
Officer who is authorized to represent the local government unit or any official
thereof in a litigation. It was for the same reason that he thought that the filing
of a Memorandum may already be dispensed with when the City Legal Officer
filed its own on 8 February 2010. He further explained that the Ordinance
subject of these cases was passed during the 7th Council (2007-2010); that the
composition of the 8th Council (2010-2013) had already changed after the
2010 elections; and that steps were already taken to amend the ordinance
again. Hence, he was in a dilemma as to the position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod at the time he received the Court's Resolution of 31 May 2011.
Atty. Gempis, thus, prayed that the Court dispense with the filing of the
required memorandum in view of the passing of Ordinance No. 8283.
Issue
The petitioners' arguments are primarily anchored on the ruling of the
Court in G.R. No. 156052 declaring Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional and valid
after finding that the presence of the oil terminals in Pandacan is a threat to the
life and security of the people of Manila. From thence, the petitioners
enumerated constitutional provisions, municipal laws and international treaties
and conventions on health and environment protection allegedly violated by
the enactment of the assailed Ordinance to support their position.
The resolution of the present controversy is, thus, confined to the
determination of whether or not the enactment of the assailed Ordinance
allowing the continued stay of the oil companies in the depots is, indeed, invalid
and unconstitutional.
Our Ruling
We see no reason why Ordinance No. 8187 should not be stricken down
insofar as the presence of the oil depots in Pandacan is concerned.
I
We first rule on the procedural issues raised by the respondents and the
oil companies.
At the outset, let it be emphasized that the Court, in G.R. No. 156052, has
already pronounced that the matter of whether or not the oil depots should
remain in the Pandacan area is of transcendental importance to the residents of
Manila. 74
We may, thus, brush aside procedural infirmities, if any, as we had in the

past, and take cognizance of the cases 75 if only to determine if the acts
complained of are no longer within the bounds of the Constitution and the laws
in place. 76
Put otherwise, there can be no valid objection to this Court's discretion to
waive one or some procedural requirements if only to remove any impediment
to address and resolve the serious constitutional question 77 raised in these
petitions of transcendental importance, the same having far-reaching
implications insofar as the safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila,
and even its neighboring communities, are concerned.
Proper Remedy
Respondents and intervenors argue that the petitions should be outrightly
dismissed for failure on the part of the petitioners to properly apply related
provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate remedy available to them.
To begin with, questioned is the applicability of Rule 65 78 of the Rules of

Court to assail the validity and constitutionality of the Ordinance.
. . . there is no appeal, or any plain,

speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. . .
Rule 65 specifically requires that the remedy may be availed of only when
"there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." 79
Shell argues that the petitioners should have sought recourse before the
first and second level courts under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, 80 which govern "the enforcement or violations of environmental and
other related laws, rules and regulations." 81 Petron additionally submits that
the most adequate remedy available to petitioners is to have the assailed
ordinance repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In the alternative, a local
referendum may be had. And, assuming that there were laws violated, the
petitioners may file an action for each alleged violation of law against the
particular individuals that transgressed the law.
It would appear, however, that the remedies identified by the intervenors

prove to be inadequate to resolve the present controversies in their entirety
owing to the intricacies of the circumstances herein prevailing.
The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied

in Sec. 2, Part I, Rule I thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern the
procedure in civil, criminal and special civil actions before the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, and the Regional Trial Courts involving enforcement or
violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations such
as but not limited to the following:
(k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste
Act;
xxx xxx xxx
(r) R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;

xxx xxx xxx
(y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, . . .; and other existing laws

that relate to the conservation, development, preservation,
protection and utilization of the environment and natural
resources. 82 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are
allegations of violations of environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve
as collateral attacks that would support the other position of the petitioners —
the protection of the right to life, security and safety.
Moreover, it bears emphasis that the promulgation of the said Rules was
specifically intended to meet the following objectives:
SEC. 3. Objectives. — The objectives of these Rules are:
(a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology;
(b) To provide a simplified, speedy and inexpensive procedure for the

enforcement of environmental rights and duties recognized
under the Constitution, existing laws, rules and regulations, and
international agreements;
(c) To introduce and adopt innovations and best practices ensuring the
effective enforcement of remedies and redress for violation of
environmental laws; and
(d) To enable the courts to monitor and exact compliance with orders
and judgments in environmental cases. 83
Surely, the instant petitions are not within the contemplation of these
Rules.
Relative to the position of Petron, it failed to consider that these petitions

are already a sequel to G.R. No. 156052, and that there are some issues herein
raised that the remedies available at the level of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
could not address. Neither could the filing of an individual action for each law
violated be harmonized with the essence of a "plain, speedy, and adequate"
remedy.
From another perspective, Shell finds fault with the petitioners' direct
recourse to this Court when, pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court exercises only appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance. 84 Thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. (Emphasis supplied)
To further support its position, it cites the case of Liga ng mga Barangay
National v. City Mayor of Manila , 85 where the petitioners sought the
nullification of the mayor's executive order and the council's ordinance
concerning certain functions of the petitioners that are vested in them by law.
There, the Court held:
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for
certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and
executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction. 86 Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides: . . .
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not
have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if
only questions of law are involved. 87
Assuming that a petition for declaratory relief is the proper remedy, and
that the petitions should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court, we have,
time and again, resolved to treat such a petition as one for prohibition,
provided that the case has far-reaching implications and transcendental issues
that need to be resolved, 88 as in these present petitions.
On a related issue, we initially found convincing the argument that the

petitions should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court, it having
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court over a special civil action for prohibition,
and original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
However, as we have repeatedly said, the petitions at bar are of
transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. 89 In the case of Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 90 the Court ratiocinated:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly
treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance
of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside
the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the
petition at bar. . . . This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible
tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
. . . persons aggrieved thereby. . .

As to who may file a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus,
Petron posits that petitioners are not among the "persons aggrieved"
contemplated under Sections 1 to 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Chevron argues that petitioners, whether as "citizens," "taxpayers," or

"legislators," lack the legal standing to assail the validity and constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 8187. It further claims that petitioners failed to show that they
have suffered any injury and/or threatened injury as a result of the act
complained of. 91
Shell also points out that the petitions cannot be considered taxpayers'
suit, for then, there should be a claim that public funds were illegally disbursed
and that petitioners have sufficient interest concerning the prevention of illegal
expenditure of public money. 92 In G.R. No. 187916, Shell maintains that the
petitioners failed to show their personal interest in the case and/or to establish
that they may represent the general sentiments of the constituents of the City
of Manila so as to be treated as a class suit. Even the minors, it argues, are not
numerous and representative enough for the petition to be treated as a class
suit. As to the city councilors who joined the petitioners in assailing the validity
of Ordinance No. 8187, Shell posits that they cannot invoke the ruling in Prof.
David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo , 93 where the Court held that legislators may
question the constitutionality of a statute, if and when it infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators, because of the absence of the allegation that the
assailed ordinance indeed infringes upon their prerogatives.
Former Mayor Lim submitted a similar position supported by a number of
cases on the concept of locus standi, 94 the direct injury test, 95 an outline of
the stringent requirements of legal standing when suing as a citizen, 96 as a
taxpayer, 97 as a legislator and in cases where class suits are filed in behalf of
all citizens. 98
Their arguments are misplaced.
In G.R. No. 156052, we ruled that the petitioners in that case have a legal
right to seek the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 because the subject of the
petition concerns a public right, and they, as residents of Manila, have a direct
interest in the implementation of the ordinances of the city. Thus:
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right
to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a
political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its
offices in Manila. It claims to have many members who are residents of
Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly
residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases
that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its
object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the
execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and
they need not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of
Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the
city's ordinances. 99 . . . (Citations omitted)
No different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit the enforcement

of the assailed ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter that
concerns a public right. Necessarily, the people who are interested in the
nullification of such an ordinance are themselves the real parties in interest, for
which reason, they are no longer required to show any specific interest therein.
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that SJS, now represented by SJS Officer
Alcantara, has been recognized by the Court in G.R. No. 156052 to have legal
standing to sue in connection with the same subject matter herein considered.
The rest of the petitioners are residents of Manila. Hence, all of them have a
direct interest in the prohibition proceedings against the enforcement of the
assailed ordinance.
In the case of Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through

Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS, INC.) v. Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM), 100 involving a petition for
certiorari and prohibition to permanently enjoin PSALM from selling the Angat
Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-
Water), the Court ruled:
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. . . . This
Court, however, has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised
are of paramount importance to the public. Thus, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere
fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
There can be no doubt that the matter of ensuring adequate
water supply for domestic use is one of paramount importance to the
public. That the continued availability of potable water in Metro Manila
might be compromised if PSALM proceeds with the privatization of the
hydroelectric power plant in the Angat Dam Complex confers upon
petitioners such personal stake in the resolution of legal issues in a
petition to stop its implementation. 101 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)
In like manner, the preservation of the life, security and safety of the
people is indisputably a right of utmost importance to the public. Certainly, the
petitioners, as residents of Manila, have the required personal interest to seek
relief from this Court to protect such right.
. . . in excess of its or his jurisdiction,

or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. . .
Petron takes issue with the alleged failure of the petitioners to establish
the facts with certainty that would show that the acts of the respondents fall
within the parameters of the grave abuse of discretion clause settled by
jurisprudence, to wit:
. . . "[G]rave abuse of discretion" means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law. 102
It is pointless to discuss the matter at length in these instant cases of

transcendental importance in view of the Court's pronouncement, in Magallona
v. Ermita. 103 There it held that the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper
remedies to test the constitutionality of statutes, notwithstanding the following
defects:
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary
grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the
writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot
issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the
exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the
part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of
petitioners.
Respondents' submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings.

When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review,
however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and
prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality
of statutes, and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.
Issues of constitutional import . . . carry such relevance in the
life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself
constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the
issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural
rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is
one such law. 104 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Requisites of judicial review
For a valid exercise of the power of judicial review, the following
requisites shall concur: (1) the existence of a legal controversy; (2) legal
standing to sue of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) a plea that
judicial review be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. 105
Only the first two requisites are put in issue in these cases.
On the matter of the existence of a legal controversy, we reject the

contention that the petitions consist of bare allegations based on speculations,
surmises, conjectures and hypothetical grounds.
The Court declared Ordinance No. 8027 valid and constitutional and
ordered its implementation. With the passing of the new ordinance containing
the contrary provisions, it cannot be any clearer that here lies an actual case or
controversy for judicial review. The allegation on this, alone, is sufficient for the
purpose.
The second requisite has already been exhaustively discussed.
Proof of identification required in the notarization

of the verification and certification against forum
shopping in G.R. No. 187916
At the bottom of the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping
of the petition in G.R. No. 187916 is the statement of the notary public to the
effect that the affiant, in his presence and after presenting "an integrally
competent proof of identification with signature and photograph," 106 signed
the document under oath.
Citing Sec. 163 of the Local Government Code, 107 which provides that an
individual acknowledging any document before a notary public shall present his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC), Chevron posits that the petitioner's failure to
present his CTC rendered the petition fatally defective warranting the outright
dismissal of the petition.
We disagree.
The verification and certification against forum shopping are governed

specifically by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
Section 4 provides that a pleading, when required to be verified, shall be

treated as an unsigned pleading if it lacks a proper verification while Section 5
requires that the certification to be executed by the plaintiff or principal party
be under oath.
These sections, in turn, should be read together with Sections 6 and 12,
Rule 2 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Section 6 108 of the latter Rules, specifically, likewise provides that any
competent evidence of identity specified under Section 12 thereof may now be
presented before the notary public, to wit:
SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. — The phrase
"competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of an
individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an
official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the
individual, such as but not limited to passport, driver's
license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National
Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal
ID, voter's ID, Barangay certification, Government Service
and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security
System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card,
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW
ID, seaman's book, alien certificate of
registration/immigrant certificate of registration,
government office ID, certification from the National
Council for the Welfare of Disable Persons (NCWDP),
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
certification; or
(b) . . . . 109
Forum shopping
Shell contends that the petitioners in G.R. No. 187836 violated the rule
against forum shopping allegedly because all the elements thereof are present
in relation to G.R. No. 156052, to wit:
1. "identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same

interests in both actions" —
According to Shell, the interest of petitioner SJS in G.R. No. 156052 and
the officers of SJS in G.R. No. 187836 are clearly the same. Moreover, both
actions implead the incumbent mayor of the City of Manila as respondent. Both
then respondent Mayor Atienza in G.R. No. 156052 and respondent former
Mayor Lim in G.R. No. 187836 are sued in their capacity as Manila mayor.
2. "identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same fact(s)" —
Shell contends that, in both actions, petitioners assert the same rights to
health and to a balanced and healthful ecology relative to the fate of the
Pandacan terminal, and seek essentially the same reliefs, that is, the removal
of the oil depots from the present site.
3. "the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other" —
Relative to the filing of the Manifestation and Motion to: a) Stop the City
Council of Manila from further hearing the amending ordinance to Ordinance
No. 8027 . . . (Manifestation and Motion) and Very Urgent Motion to Stop the
Mayor of the City of Manila from Signing Draft Ordinance No. 7177 [now
Ordinance No. 8187] and to Cite Him for Contempt if He Would Do So (Urgent
Motion) both in G.R. No. 156052, Shell points out the possibility that the Court
would have rendered conflicting rulings "on cases involving the same facts,
parties, issues and reliefs prayed for." 110
We are not persuaded.

In Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos, 111 the Court expounded on the
nature of forum shopping. Thus:
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse
judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and
possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution
of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. The established rule is that for forum shopping to exist,
both actions must involve the same transactions, same essential facts
and circumstances and must raise identical causes of actions, subject
matter, and issues. . . . 112 (Citations omitted)
It bears to stress that the present petitions were initially filed, not to
secure a judgment adverse to the first decision, but, precisely, to enforce the
earlier ruling to relocate the oil depots from the Pandacan area.
As to the matter of the denial of the petitioners' Manifestation and Urgent

Motion in G.R. No. 156052, which were both incidental to the enforcement of
the decision favorable to them brought about by the intervening events after
the judgment had become final and executory, and which involve the same
Ordinance assailed in these petitions, we so hold that the filing of the instant
petitions is not barred by res judicata.
In the same case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos involving the re-filing
of a complaint, which had been earlier dismissed without qualification that the
dismissal was with prejudice, and which had not been decided on the merits,
the Court declared that such re-filing did not amount to forum shopping. It
ratiocinated:
It is not controverted that the allegations of the respective
complaints in both Civil Case No. 95-1387 and Civil Case No. 96-0225
are similarly worded, and are identical in all relevant details, including
typographical errors, except for the additional allegations in support of
respondents' prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction in Civil
Case No. 95-1387. It is similarly not disputed that both actions involve
the same transactions; same essential facts and circumstances; and
raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and issues.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-1387 was without

prejudice. Indeed, the Order dated 20 November 1995, dismissing Civil
Case No. 95-1387 was an unqualified dismissal. More significantly, its
dismissal was not based on grounds under paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of
Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which dismissal shall bar the
refiling of the same action or claim as crystallized in Section 5 of Rule
16 thereof, thus:
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. — Subject to the right of appeal,
an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f),
(h), and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same
action or claim.
From the foregoing, it is clear that dismissals under paragraphs
(f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court constitute
res judicata, to wit:
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or
by the statute of limitations;
xxx xxx xxx

(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's
pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is
unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds.
Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds
that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent
jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively
settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same
parties and for the same cause. Res judicata exists when the following
elements are present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the
court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits ; and
(d) and there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, subject matter, and cause of action. 113 (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
Here, it should be noted that this Court denied the said Manifestation and
Urgent Motion, and refused to act on the succeeding pleadings, for being moot.
114 Clearly, the merits of the motion were not considered by the Court. The
following disquisition of the Court in Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos is further
enlightening:
The judgment of dismissal in Civil Case No. 95-1387 does not
constitute res judicata to sufficiently bar the refiling thereof in Civil
Case No. 96-0225. As earlier underscored, the dismissal was one
without prejudice. Verily, it was not a judgment on the merits. It bears
reiterating that a judgment on the merits is one rendered after
a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a
judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely
technical point. The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates
the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to
litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed
action had not been commenced. 115 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)

Considering that there is definitely no forum shopping in the instant
cases, we need not discuss in detail the elements of forum shopping.
II
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested with the power to "reclassify land within the
jurisdiction of the city" 116 subject to the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is
also settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed by another
ordinance." 117 These have been properly applied in G.R. No. 156052, where
the Court upheld the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the
land subject of the Ordinance, 118 and declared that the mayor has the duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027, provided that it has not been repealed by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or otherwise annulled by the courts. 119 In the same
case, the Court also used the principle that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is in
the best position to determine the needs of its constituents 120 — that the
removal of the oil depots from the Pandacan area is necessary "to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack
on the Pandacan Terminals." 121
Do all these principles equally apply to the cases at bar involving the
same subject matter to justify the contrary provisions of the assailed
Ordinance?
We answer in the negative.
We summarize the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter

subject of these petitions. In 2001, the Sanggunian found the relocation of the
Pandacan oil depots necessary. Hence, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027.
In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian had already changed,
Ordinance No. 8187 was passed in favor of the retention of the oil depots. In
2012, again when some of the previous members were no longer re-elected,
but with the Vice-Mayor still holding the same seat, and pending the resolution
of these petitions, Ordinance No. 8283 was enacted to give the oil depots until
the end of January 2016 within which to transfer to another site. Former Mayor
Lim stood his ground and vetoed the last ordinance.
In its Comment, the 7th Council (2007-2010) alleged that the assailed
Ordinance was enacted to alleviate the economic condition of its constituents.
122
Expressing the same position, former Mayor Lim even went to the extent
of detailing the steps 123 he took prior to the signing of the Ordinance, if only to
show his honest intention to make the right decision.
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the conditions with
respect to the operations of the oil depots existing prior to the enactment of
Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ to this day, as would later be
discussed, the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter has thrice
changed, largely depending on the new composition of the council and/or
political affiliations. The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the
"general welfare" of the city does not after all gear towards the protection of
the people in its true sense and meaning, but is, one way or another,
dependent on the personal preference of the members who sit in the council as
to which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors,
has changed its view on the matter, favoring the city's economic-related
benefits, through the continued stay of the oil terminals, over the protection of
the very lives and safety of its constituents, it is imperative for this Court to
make a final determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which
specific right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present
controversy, history reveals that there is truly no such thing as "the will of
Manila" insofar as the general welfare of the people is concerned.
If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara 124 by Justice Laurel, we say

when the judiciary mediates we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the Manila Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to the Court by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them.
III
The measures taken by the intervenors to lend support to their position

that Manila is now safe despite the presence of the oil terminals remain
ineffective. These have not completely removed the threat to the lives of the
inhabitants of Manila.
In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.

8027 was declared as a guarantee for the protection of the constitutional right
to life of the residents of Manila. There, the Court said that the enactment of
the said ordinance was a valid exercise of police power with the concurrence of
the two requisites: a lawful subject — "to safeguard the rights to life, security
and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila;" 125 and a lawful method — the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the land use from industrial to
commercial, which effectively ends the continued stay of the oil depots in
Pandacan. 126
In the present petitions, the respondents and the oil companies plead that
the Pandacan Terminal has never been one of the targets of terrorist attacks;
127 that the petitions were based on unfounded fears and mere conjectures;128
and that the possibility that it would be picked by the terrorists is nil given the
security measures installed thereat. 129
The intervenors went on to identify the measures taken to ensure the

safety of the people even with the presence of the Pandacan Terminals. Thus:
1. Chevron claims that it, together with Shell and Petron, continues to
enhance the safety and security features of the terminals. They likewise adopt
fire and product spill prevention measures in accordance with the local
standards set by the Bureau of Fire Protection, among others, and with the
international standards of the American Petroleum Industry ("API") and the
National Fire Prevention and Safety Association ("NFPSA"); that since 1914, the
oil depots had not experienced "any incident beyond the ordinary risks
and expectations" 130 of the residents of Manila; and that it received a
passing grade on the safety measures they installed in the facilities from the
representatives of the City of Manila who conducted an ocular inspection on 22
May 2009; and
2. Referring to the old MOU entered into between the City of Manila and
the DOE, on the one hand, and the oil companies, on the other, where the
parties thereto conceded and acknowledged that the scale-down option for the
Pandacan Terminal operations is the best alternative to the relocation of the
terminals, Shell enumerates the steps taken to scale down its operations.
As to the number of main fuel tanks, the entire Pandacan Terminal has
already decommissioned twenty-eight out of sixty-four tanks. Speaking for Shell
alone, its LPG Spheres, which it claims is the only product that may cause
explosion, was part of those decommissioned, thereby allegedly removing the
danger of explosion. Safety buffer zones and linear/green parks were likewise
created to separate the terminal from the nearest residential area. Shell's
portion of the oil depot is likewise allegedly equipped with the latest technology
to ensure air-quality control and water-quality control, and to prevent and cope
with possible oil spills with a crisis management plan in place in the event that
an oil spill occurs. Finally, Shell claims that the recommendations of EQE
International in its Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study, which it says is
one of the leading independent risk assessment providers in the world and
largest risk management consultancy, were sufficiently complied with; and that,
on its own initiative, it adopted additional measures for the purpose, for which
reason, "the individual risk level resulting from any incident occurring from
the Pandacan Terminal, per the QRA study, is twenty (20) times lower
compared to the individual risk level of an average working or domestic
environment." 131
We are not persuaded.
The issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of
terrorist attacks has already been passed upon in G.R. No. 156052. Based on
the assessment of the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila and the then position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, 132 the Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism is
imminent. It remains so convinced.
Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the
very nature of the depots where millions of liters of highly flammable and
highly volatile products, regardless of whether or not the composition may
cause explosions, has no place in a densely populated area. Surely, any
untoward incident in the oil depots, be it related to terrorism of whatever origin
or otherwise, would definitely cause not only destruction to properties within
and among the neighboring communities but certainly mass deaths and
injuries.
With regard to the scaling down of the operations in the Pandacan

Terminals, which the oil companies continue to insist to have been validated
and recognized by the MOU, the Court, in G.R. No. 156052, has already put this
issue to rest. It specifically declared that even assuming that the terms of the
MOU and Ordinance No. 8027 were inconsistent, the resolutions ratifying the
MOU gave it full force and effect only until 30 April 2003. 133
The steps taken by the oil companies, therefore, remain insufficient to

convince the Court that the dangers posed by the presence of the terminals in a
thickly populated area have already been completely removed.
For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point
or another, no matter how remote it is as perceived by one or some, we cannot
allow the right to life to be dependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics
and theories of probability have no place in situations where the very life of not
just an individual but of residents of big neighborhoods is at stake.
IV
It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere subdual of risk of
catastrophe, that we saw in and made us favor Ordinance No. 8027. That
reason, unaffected by Ordinance No. 8187, compels the affirmance of our
Decision in G.R. No. 156052.
In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative

to the continued stay of the oil depots, we follow the same line of reasoning
used in G.R. No. 156052, to wit:
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting
sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general
welfare" of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to
take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in
the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing,

Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila which
recommended the approval of the ordinance:
(1) the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly

flammable and highly volatile products which include
petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel,
diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;
(2) the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;

(3) it is situated in a densely populated place and near
Malacañang Palace; and
(4) in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire
could spread to the neighboring communities.

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a
particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist
target. As long as it (sic) there is such a target in their midst, the
residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to
remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. According to
respondent:
Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11

incident which showed that what was perceived to be impossible
to happen, to the most powerful country in the world at that, is
actually possible. The destruction of property and the loss of
thousands of lives on that fateful day became the impetus for a
public need. In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of
terrorism continued [such] that it became imperative for
governments to take measures to combat their effects.
xxx xxx xxx

Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no
impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is
unfair to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who have
categorically expressed their desire for the relocation of the terminals.
Their power to chart and control their own destiny and preserve their
lives and safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors' warnings of
doomsday scenarios and threats of economic disorder if the ordinance
is enforced. 134
The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The
Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been
lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade this Court that
the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk
by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation
to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
There is, therefore, no need to resolve the rest of the issues.
Neither is it necessary to discuss at length the test of police power

against the assailed ordinance. Suffice it to state that the objective adopted by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod to promote the constituents' general welfare in
terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to life, security
and safety of the people.
In G.R. No. 156052, the Court explained:
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to
property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced
to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to
property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.
When the state or LGU's exercise of police power clashes with a few
individuals' right to property, the former should prevail. 135
We thus conclude with the very final words in G.R. No. 156052:
On Wednesday, January 23, 2008, a defective tanker containing
2,000 liters of gasoline and 14,000 liters of diesel exploded in the
middle of the street a short distance from the exit gate of the Pandacan
Terminals, causing death, extensive damage and a frightening
conflagration in the vicinity of the incident. Need we say anything
about what will happen if it is the estimated 162 to 211 million liters [or
whatever is left of the 26 tanks] of petroleum products in the terminal
complex will blow up? 136
As in the prequel case, we note that as early as October 2001, the oil
companies signed a MOA with the DOE obliging themselves to:
. . . undertake a comprehensive and comparative study . . .
[which] shall include the preparation of a Master Plan, whose aim is to
determine the scope and timing of the feasible location of the
Pandacan oil terminals and all associated facilities and infrastructure
including government support essential for the relocation such as the
necessary transportation infrastructure, land and right of way
acquisition, resettlement of displaced residents and environmental and
social acceptability which shall be based on mutual benefit of the
Parties and the public.
such that:
Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their
operations in the Pandacan Terminals, they cannot feign unreadiness
considering that they had years to prepare for this eventuality. 137
On the matter of the details of the relocation, the Court gave the oil
companies the following time frames for compliance:
To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation of
assets and personnel, the intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc., Petron
Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation shall, within a
non-extendible period of ninety (90) days, submit to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 39, the comprehensive plan and relocation
schedule which have allegedly been prepared. The presiding judge of
Manila RTC, Branch 39 will monitor the strict enforcement of this
resolution. 138
The periods were given in the Decision in G.R. No. 156052 which became
final on 23 April 2009. Five years have passed, since then. The years of non-
compliance may be excused by the swing of local legislative leads. We now stay
the sway and begin a final count.
A comprehensive and well-coordinated plan within a specific time-frame

shall, therefore, be observed in the relocation of the Pandacan Terminals. The
oil companies shall be given a fresh non-extendible period of forty-five (45)
days from notice within which to submit to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39,
Manila an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule. The relocation,
in turn, shall be completed not later than six months from the date of their
submission.
Finally, let it be underscored that after the last Manifestation filed by Shell
informing this Court that respondent former Mayor Lim vetoed Ordinance No.
8283 for the second time, and was anticipating its referral to the President for
the latter's consideration, nothing was heard from any of the parties until the
present petitions as to the status of the approval or disapproval of the said
ordinance. As it is, the fate of the Pandacan Terminals remains dependent on
this final disposition of these cases.
VI
On the matter of the failure of Atty. Gempis to immediately comply with

the directives of this Court to file the Memorandum for the Vice-Mayor and the
city councilors who voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance, the records do not
bear proof that he received a copy of any of the resolutions pertaining to the
filing of the Memorandum.
A narration of the events from his end would show, however, that he was
aware of the directive issued in 2009 when he stated that "when the City Legal
Officer filed its Memorandum dated 8 February 2010, [he] thought the filing of
a Memorandum for the other respondent city officials could be dispensed with."
139 There was also a categorical admission that he received the later Resolution
of 31 May 2011 but that he could not prepare a Memorandum defending the
position of respondents vice-mayor and the city councilors who voted in favor of
Ordinance No. 8187 in view of the ongoing drafting of Ordinance No. 8283,
which would change the position of the Sanggunian, if subsequently approved.
The reasons he submitted are not impressed with merit.
That he was not officially designated as the counsel for the vice-mayor
and the city councilors is beside the point. As an officer of the court, he cannot
feign ignorance of the fact that "a resolution of this Court is not a mere request
but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely." 140 As
early as 2009, he should have immediately responded and filed a Manifestation
and therein set forth his reasons why he cannot represent the vice-mayor and
the city councilors. And, even assuming that the 31 May 2011 Resolution was
the first directive he personally received, he had no valid excuse for
disregarding the same. Worse, the Court had to issue a show cause order
before he finally heeded.
Atty. Gempis should "strive harder to live up to his duties of observing
and maintaining the respect due to the courts, respect for law and for legal
processes and of upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal profession in
order to perform his responsibilities as a lawyer effectively." 141
In Sibulo v. Ilagan, 142 which involves a lawyer's repeated failure to

comply with the directives of the Court, the penalty recommended by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines was reduced from suspension to reprimand
and a warning. The Court ratiocinated:
Considering, however, that respondent was absolved of the
administrative charge against him and is being taken to task for his
intransigence and lack of respect, the Court finds that the penalty of
suspension would not be warranted under the circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx

To the Court's mind, a reprimand and a warning are sufficient
sanctions for respondent's disrespectful actuations directed against the
Court and the IBP. The imposition of these sanctions in the present
case would be more consistent with the avowed purpose of disciplinary
case, which is "not so much to punish the individual attorney as to
protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the
public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court." 143
We consider the participation of Atty. Gempis in this case and opt to be

lenient even as we reiterate the objective of protecting the dispensation of
justice. We deem it sufficient to remind Atty. Gempis to be more mindful of his
duty as a lawyer towards the Court.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Ordinance No. 8187 is hereby

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL a n d INVALID with respect to the continued
stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is hereby ordered toCEASE

a n d DESIST from enforcing Ordinance No. 8187. In coordination with the
appropriate government agencies and the parties herein involved, he is further
ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of the
Pandacan area.
As likewise required in G.R. No. 156052, the intervenors Chevron

Philippines, Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and Petron Corporation
shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days, submit to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Manila an updated comprehensive plan and
relocation schedule, which relocation shall be completed not later than six (6)
months from the date the required documents are submitted. The presiding
judge of Branch 39 shall monitor the strict enforcement of this Decision.
For failure to observe the respect due to the Court, Atty. Luch R. Gempis,
Jr., Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, i s REMINDED of his duties
towards the Court and WARNED that a repetition of an act similar to that here
committed shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,

Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., I join J. Leonen in his concurring & dissenting opinion.
Carpio, J., took no part, one of the counsel is my former law firm.
Brion, * J., is one leave.

Leonen, J., see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Jardeleza, J., took no part, intervenor part of former employer group.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN, J., concurring and dissenting:
The Pandacan oil depots must go, not because Ordinance No. 8187 is
unconstitutional, but because of Ordinance No. 8283. Due to its proposed
doctrine, I regret that I am unable to bring myself to agree with the well-written
ponencia of an esteemed colleague.
The petitions should be dismissed for being moot and academic in view of
the manifestations 1 filed by respondents when the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila enacted City Ordinance No. 8283 entitled "An Ordinance Amending
Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8187 by Reclassifying the Area where Petroleum
Refineries and Oil Depots are Located from Heavy Industrial (I-3) to High
Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD)." 2
Considering that the petitions are now moot and academic, this court
should have exercised judicial restraint and refrained from making any
determination with regard to the validity of Ordinance No. 8187.
Even assuming that the petition is not yet moot, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
187836 and 187916 should be dismissed on procedural and substantive
grounds.
Prefatory
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila has the power to amend or repeal

its zoning ordinances. A determination by this court in an earlier petition for
mandamus denying challenges to the validity of an earlier ordinance on
constitutional grounds does not necessarily render such ordinance as
irrepealable. That earlier ordinance may still be repealed should the local
government decide to change its policy. In fact, the local government has
changed its policy by enacting Ordinance No. 8283, which amends Section 2 of
Ordinance No. 8187.
Ordinance No. 8187 is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. This

presumption cannot be discharged with petitioners' broad factual allegations
properly challenged by respondents. This special civil action is not the proper
forum to determine questions of fact.
The spectre of terrorism and the dangers of ecological destruction are

easy to foist. But our fears should not be given such privilege so as to numb us
to the possibility that the facts may not be as petitioners present them. The
reality is that the ordinance now in question is the product of the political will of
the citizens of Manila exercised through their duly elected representatives.
The Constitution entrusts us with the power of judicial review. We do not

have the power to veto an ordinance.
There are other remedies available to petitioners more adequate for their
purposes. The fields of environment and health law have progressed to allow
the proper causes of action to be laid in the proper forum. Proper evidence
needs to be received before we conclude with finality at the level of this court
that businesses of private respondents actually destroy the environment and
that they do so with impunity. The precautionary principle certainly does not
sanction a suspension of judicial rules with respect to evidence, reason, and
legal interpretation.
The case
The Pandacan terminal is located by the banks of the Pasig River. 3 It was
constructed in 1914 and serves as the main artery for the storage and
distribution of fuel to Metro Manila and the rest of Luzon. 4 It is linked to a
permanent underground pipeline 5 that connects it to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation's (Shell) refinery in Tabangao and Chevron's finished products
import terminal in San Pascual, both in the province of Batangas. 6
Apart from the use of a pipeline, the location of the Pandacan terminal
enables the delivery of fuel through barges. This is the mode of transportation
utilized by Petron since its refinery is located in Limay, Bataan. When the
terminal is located elsewhere, delivery of fuel may have to contend with traffic
and other challenges. 7
The Pandacan terminal is the focal point of this country's fuel supply
system. It provides 95% of the fuel supply in Metro Manila, 70% of the country's
shipping needs, 90% of the country's demand for lubricants, and 75% of the
country's need for aviation fuel. 8
The importance of the Pandacan terminal is also felt in the business

sector because it provides livelihood to more than 3,000 retail stations in
Regions I to IV and the National Capital Region. 9
During the 1970s, the Philippines experienced fuel shortages. The

shortage peaked in 1974, reaching a point where the country was almost
paralyzed. Long queues at fuel stations were seen and, most of the time, the
fuel stations ran out of fuel. 10
Fortunately, the national government anticipated the fuel shortage.

Republic Act No. 617 3 11 was passed in 1971, creating the Oil Industry
Commission. The Oil Industry Commission was mandated to perform the
following:
SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy and Purposes. —. . . .
(a) To assure that the country shall have a proper adequate and
continuous supply of crude oil and refined petroleum products under
the most economic and competitive terms possible considering all
available sources of supply;
(b) To assure that the petroleum industry, as a business vital to
the national interest, operates under conditions of orderly and
economic competition;
(c) To assure the public of reasonable prices for petroleum
products considering the international price levels of crude oil and
petroleum products and after allowing for proper and reasonable cost
of importing, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, storing,
distributing, marketing, and selling crude oil and petroleum products in
the Philippines, and for a fair and reasonable return; and to prevent
collusive practices in the industry, particularly as to prices[.]
In 1977, the Oil Industry Commission was replaced by the Department of

Energy. 12 This department was created to make certain that there is an
adequate supply of energy for the country. 13 Additional functions were granted
to the Department of Energy upon the passage of Republic Act No. 8479. 14
On October 12, 2001, the Department of Energy entered into a
memorandum of agreement with Chevron, Shell, and Petron to address the
safety concerns brought about by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in
the United States. The parties agreed to conduct a study regarding the
feasibility of relocating the Pandacan terminal. 15
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted

Ordinance No. 8027. 16 Ordinance No. 8027, which took effect on December 28,
2001, 17 reclassified the area where the Pandacan terminal is located from
Industrial II to Commercial I. 18
Foreseeing that the effect of Ordinance No. 8027 could lead to a fuel
shortage, then Manila Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (petitioner in G.R. No. 187916),
Chevron, Shell, Petron, and then Department of Energy Secretary Vincent S.
Perez, Jr., conducted dialogues. 19 On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila, the
Department of Energy, Chevron, Shell, and Petron executed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) where the parties agreed to scale down the operations in
the Pandacan terminal by decommissioning storage tanks and constructing
buffer zones around the Pandacan terminal. 20
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila ratified the MOU in Resolution No.

97, Series of 2002. The MOU would be valid from July 25, 2002 until December
31, 2002. Business permits valid until December 31, 2002 were issued to Shell,
Chevron, and Petron. Resolution No. 13, Series of 2003, extended the MOU's
validity until April 30, 2003. Again, business permits were issued with the same
validity period as the MOU. 21
Meanwhile, Social Justice Society (SJS) filed a petition for mandamus

before this court on December 4, 2002. They prayed for the issuance of the writ
o f mandamus to compel Mayor Jose L. Atienza (Mayor Atienza) to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027. This was docketed as G.R. No. 156052. 22
Toward the end of the MOU's validity in April 2003, Mayor Atienza refused
to issue new business permits to Shell, Chevron, and Petron. This prompted
Chevron to file a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for
injunction, annulment of Manila City Ordinance No. 8027, specific performance
and damages, with application for a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. This case was filed on April
25, 2003 and docketed as Civil Case No. 03-106377. 23
On the same day, Shell filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with
application for a temporary restraining order and writs of preliminary injunction
and preliminary mandatory injunction. It assailed the validity of Ordinance No.
8027 and prayed for the enforcement of the MOU. This case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 03-106380. 24
The cases filed by Chevron and Shell were consolidated and raffled to
Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court granted
applications for the writs of preliminary mandatory injunction and preliminary
prohibitory injunction. 25
Petron later filed a petition assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8027
and alleging violations of the Department of Energy law, deregulation law, the
memorandum of agreement dated October 12, 2001, and the MOU dated June
28, 2002. 26
On June 16, 2006, then Manila Mayor Atienza approved Ordinance No.
8119, also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Regulations of 2006. 27 Ordinance No. 8119 reclassified the Pandacan terminal
area from Industrial II to High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone. 28
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8119 triggered the filing of another

complaint by Shell and Chevron before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They
filed a complaint for injunction and nullification of Ordinance No. 8119 with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, praying that Ordinance No. 8119
be declared unconstitutional. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 06-115334. 29
Petron filed a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 06-115334 but was
denied. Hence, Petron filed its own complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 07-
116700. A temporary restraining order was issued in favor of Petron, enjoining
the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8119. 30
On March 7, 2007, this court, through the First Division, granted the
petition filed by SJS and directed that the mayor of the City of Manila
immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. 31 Shell, Chevron, and Petron filed
motions for leave to intervene and motions for reconsideration in intervention.
They argued that there were legal impediments to the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8027 because of the cases they filed before the lower courts. On
February 13, 2008, the First Division, through Chief Justice Corona, granted the
motions to intervene, but denied the motions for reconsideration. The First
Division also ordered the dismissal of Civil Case Nos. 03-106377 and 03-
106380. 32
Shell, Chevron, and Petron filed another motion for reconsideration on
February 28, 2008. 33 This was denied with finality on April 28, 2009 in an En
Banc resolution 34 on the ground that it was a second motion for
reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court. 35
On May 28, 2009, then Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed
Ordinance No. 8187, "An Ordinance Amending City Ordinance No. 8119
Otherwise Known as 'The Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance of 2006' By Creating a Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy
Industrial Zone (1-3) and Providing for its Enforcement." 36
In essence, Ordinance No. 8187, a zoning ordinance, allows the continued
stay of the oil depots in the Pandacan area. Ordinance No. 8187 also repeals
the relevant portions of Ordinance No. 8027.
Petitioner SJS went directly to this court and filed a petition 37 for
prohibition on June 1, 2009. This was docketed as G.R. No. 187836. Petitioners
Mayor Atienza and the other parties followed suit on June 5, 2009 and filed a
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari with application for an
injunction and temporary restraining order. 38 This was docketed as G.R. No.
187916. These petitions were consolidated by this court.
The issues in this case are the following:

(a) Procedural issue: Whether petitioners in G.R. No. 187836
and G.R. No. 187916 have standing to file this case
(b) Substantive issue: Whether Ordinance No. 8187, otherwise
known as "An Ordinance Amending Ordinance No. 8119, Otherwise
Known as 'The Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance of 2006' By Creating a Medium Industrial Zone (I-2) and
Heavy Industrial Zone (I-3), and Providing for Its Enforcement," is valid
and constitutional
This dissent will focus on the substantive issue first.
I
The presumption of constitutionality
All laws, including ordinances, enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.

39 The reason behind this presumption has been discussed by this court as
follows:
This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on
the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to
encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said
that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch
accords to its coordinate branch — the legislature. 40
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila 41

explains the reasons behind the presumption of validity of ordinances:
As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The
presumption is all in favor of validity. . . . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The
local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given
notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people.
. . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when
there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation. 42
In order to overcome this presumption of constitutionality, petitioners

must be able to prove beyond any doubt how the challenged statute violates
the Constitution. 43 Hypothetical arguments will not suffice.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila and other local government units

have the statutory power to enact zoning ordinances. Thus, Republic Act No.
7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 grants the following powers to the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila:
SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. —
(a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section
16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Generate and maximize the use of resources and revenues
for the development plans, program objectives and priorities of the city
as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, with particular attention
to agro-industrial development and city-wide growth and progress, and
relative thereto, shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(vii) Adopt a comprehensive land use plan for the city:
Provided, That in the case of component cities, the formulation,
adoption or modification of said plan shall be in coordination with
the approved provincial comprehensive land use plan;
(viii) Reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city,

subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code;
(ix) Enact integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with

the approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing
laws, rules and regulations; establish fire limits or zones,
particularly in populous centers; and regulate the construction,
repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones
in accordance with the provisions of the Fire Code[.] (Emphasis
supplied)
The Revised Charter of the City of Manila or Republic Act No. 409 also
provides: 44
ARTICLE III. — The Municipal Board
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have

the following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx

(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper
for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances which shall not exceed to two hundred pesos fine or six
months' imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single
offense.
With regard to the seeming overlap between Republic Act No. 7160 and
Republic Act No. 409, this court, in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 45 held
that:
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or
incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and
the nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris
and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting
said powers must be construed against the City Council.
xxx xxx xxx
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later
expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail and override
the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are
repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter,
which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later
prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative will. If there is an
inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the
same subject matter, which cannot be removed by any fair and
reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the
legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier.
xxx xxx xxx
In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general

and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly." Thus, submitting to
petitioners' interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers
the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating
such must be considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with
the latter's provisions granting the City Council mere regulatory
powers. 46
For purposes of this case, there appears to be no repugnance between

Republic Act No. 7160 and Republic Act No. 409. Both provide for the statutory
basis for the conclusion that the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila was well
within its powers when it enacted Ordinance No. 8187. This ordinance was also
enacted in accordance with the process for enacting zoning guidelines.
The Local Government Code does not provide for a special procedure with
regard to the passage of a zoning ordinance. However, Republic Act No. 7924
47 provides that:
SEC. 3. Scope of MMDA Services. — Metro-wide services under
the jurisdiction of the MMDA are those services which have metro-wide
impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge
expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be
provided by the individual local government units (LGUs) comprising
Metropolitan Manila. These services shall include:
xxx xxx xxx
e. Urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter
services which include the formulation, adoption and
implementation of policies, standards, rules and
regulations, programs and projects to rationalize and
optimize urban land use and provide direction to urban
growth and expansion, the rehabilitation and development
of slum and blighted areas, the development of shelter and
housing facilities and the provision of necessary social
services thereof.
Rule V, Section 15 of the implementing rules and regulations of Republic

Act No. 7924 48 provides:
Sec. 15 Linkage with HUDCC, HLURB, NHA, LGUs and Other
National Government Agencies Concerned on Urban Renewal,
Zoning and Land Use Planning and Shelter Services. — Within
the context of the National Housing and Urban Development
Framework, and pursuant to the national standards, guidelines and
regulations formulated by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
[HLURB] on land use planning and zoning, the Authority shall prepare a
metropolitan physical framework plan and regulations which shall
complement and translate the socio-economic development plan for
Metro Manila into physical or spatial terms, and provide the basis for
the preparation, review, integration and implementation of local land
use plans and zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities in the
area.
Said framework plan and regulations shall contain, among

others, planning and zoning policies and procedures that shall be
observed by local government units in the preparation of their plans
and ordinances pursuant to Sections 447 and 458 of RA 7160, as well
as the identification of sites and projects that are considered to be of
national or metropolitan significance.
Cities and municipalities shall prepare their respective land use
plans and zoning ordinances and submit the same for review and
integration by the Authority and indorsement to HLURB in accordance
with Executive Order No. 72 and other pertinent laws .
In the preparation of a Metropolitan Manila physical framework
plan and regulations, the Authority shall coordinate with the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council, HLURB, the National
Housing Authority, Intramuros Administration, and all other agencies of
the national government which are concerned with land use and
zoning, urban renewal and shelter services. (Emphasis supplied)
OP Executive Order No. 72 49 then provides:
SECTION 1. Plan formulation or Updating. — (a) Cities and
municipalities shall continue to formulate or update their
respective comprehensive land use plans, in conformity with the
land use planning and zoning standards and guidelines
prescribed by the HLRB pursuant to national policies.
xxx xxx xxx

The comprehensive land use plan prepared by the
CDC/MDC shall be submitted to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, for enactment into a
zoning ordinance. Such ordinance shall be enacted and approved
in accordance with Articles 107 and 108 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the LGC.
xxx xxx xxx
c. Cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila shall
continue to formulate or update their respective comprehensive
land use plans, in accordance with the land use planning and
zoning standards and guidelines prescribed by the HLRB
pursuant to EO 392, s. of 1990, and other pertinent national
policies.
None of the petitioners question whether Ordinance No. 8187 followed

these requirements.
Instead, petitioner Mayor Atienza argues that the passage of Ordinance
No. 8187 was in violation of the procedure stated in Ordinance No. 8119,
specifically:
Sec. 81. Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance. — The proposed
amendments to the Zoning Ordinance as reviewed and evaluated by
the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) shall be submitted to
the City Council for approval of the majority of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod members. The amendments shall be acceptable and
eventually approved; PROVIDED, That there is sufficient evidence and
justification for such proposal; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That such
proposal is consistent with the development goals, planning objectives
and strategies of the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan. Said
amendments shall take effect immediately upon approval or after thirty
(30) days from application. 50
Respondent Mayor Lim points out that Section 81 of Ordinance No. 8119
is better understood if taken together with Section 80, which states:
Sec. 80. Procedure for Re-Zoning. — Any association or group of
persons who wishes to prepare a re-zoning of a certain area, may file a
petition with the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals
(MZBAA) for initial evaluation.
The MZBAA shall then endorse the proposal together with its
preliminary findings to the City Planning & Development Office (CPDO)
for further evaluation. Whenever necessary, site inspection of the
vicinity subject to rezoning shall be made, the CPDO shall then
recommend for approval the re-zoning of the subject area to the City
Council. 51
Respondent Mayor Lim points out that the procedure provided under
Sections 80 and 81 of Ordinance No. 8119 is not a condition precedent for the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8187. He reasons that it would be absurd for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila to submit its re-zoning plans to the Manila
Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals or MZBAA for review, after which the
review would be subject to the approval by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila. 52
We agree with respondent Mayor Lim. Furthermore, none of the

petitioners presented clear basis to conclude that Ordinance No. 8187 violated
any of the provisos in Section 81.
No clear basis and

compelling reasons
This court must be presented with clear basis and compelling reasons so
as to overcome the presumption of statutory validity and constitutionality. We
explained in Smart Communications, Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas 53
that:
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there
must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the
Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing
unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to
invalidate [a law] based on . . . baseless supposition is an affront to the
wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it." This presumption of constitutionality can
be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an
infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is
reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the
discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be
struck down. 54
In Hon. Fernando v. St. Scholastica's College, 55 we reiterated the test to

determine the validity of an ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of
decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable. 56 (Citation omitted)
The reason for the first requirement — that an ordinance should not
contravene the Constitution or any statute — was explained in City of Manila v.
Hon. Laguio 57 as follows:
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they
are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. The Ordinance
must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws.
That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the
supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment
must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative
legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national
legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter. 58 (Citations omitted)
In relation to the constitutional requirement of due process, we further

clarified that:
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the
rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the
imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the
Court — the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test
mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under
intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is
considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence
of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and
on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest. 59 (Citation omitted)
We then recalled the rational relationship test in this manner:

As with the State, local governments may be considered as
having properly exercised their police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject
and lawful method. 60 (Citation omitted)
In White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 61 this court clarified that

heightened or immediate scrutiny is used "for evaluating classifications based
on gender and legitimacy." 62 This standard is still sparingly used in substantive
due process cases.
Unfortunately, the ponencia does not use these standards but instead
anchors its conclusion on the existence of the prior case of Social Justice
Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. or G.R. No. 156052. Thus:
It bears to stress that the present petitions were initially filed, not
to secure a judgment adverse to the first decision, but, precisely, to
enforce the earlier ruling to relocate the oil depots from the Pandacan
area.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the
conditions with respect to the operations of the oil depots existing prior
to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ to
this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on
the new composition of the council and/or political affiliations. The
foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the "general welfare"
of the city does not after all gear towards the protection of the people
in its true sense and meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent
on the personal preference of the members who sit in the council as to
which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city
councilors, has changed its view on the matter, favoring the city's
economic-related benefits, through the continued stay of the oil
terminals, over the protection of the very lives and safety of its
constituents, it is imperative for this Court to make a final
determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which specific
right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present
controversy, history reveals that there is truly no such thing as "the will
of Manila" insofar as the general welfare of the people is concerned. 63
On the contrary, the pleadings show that the factual milieu may have
changed. Furthermore, Ordinance No. 8027 cannot be an irrepealable
ordinance. Its repeal cannot be a basis for illegality or unconstitutionality.
II
Unresolved questions of fact
defeat a challenge to the legal or constitutional
validity of an ordinance
Petitioners make the following factual assertions:
First: Oil depots are inherently risky and pose a threat to the security of
its surrounding community. 64
Second: There is the confirmed presence of Jemaah Islamiyah in the

country. 65 If the Philippines is not a target of terrorist attacks, then why did
Congress pass Republic Act No. 9372, also known as the Human Security Act of
2007? 66
Third: Ordinance No. 8187 allows the entry of pollutive and hazardous
industries in Manila. This violates Article II, Sections 15 and 16 of the 1987
Constitution. It also violates Presidential Decree No. 1151, also known as the
Philippine Environmental Policy. 67
Fourth: The enactment of Ordinance No. 8187 was in bad faith because it
was passed and signed into law a month after the denial with finality of the
motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 156052. 68
SJS attached a committee report 69 to its memorandum, to convince this
court why its petition for prohibition should be granted. However, that
committee report pertains to Ordinance No. 8027. It is irrelevant. The
circumstances that led to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 are different
from more contemporary considerations that led respondents to the
promulgation of Ordinance No. 8187. Contrary to the stance of petitioners, we
cannot presume that the world always remains at status quo, that it is static,
and it does not change.
In the ponencia:
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the
conditions with respect to the operations of the oil depots existing prior
to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ to
this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on
the new composition of the council and/or political affiliations. The
foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the "general welfare"
of the city does not after all gear towards the protection of the people
in its true sense and meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent
on the personal preference of the members who sit in the council as to
which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to favor. 70
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Intervenor Chevron points out that out of the 52 storage tanks in the
Pandacan terminal, 26 tanks have been decommissioned. 71 Buffer zones and
green parks now exist in order to protect both the terminal and the nearby
residential area. 72
Intervenor Shell manifests that its area in the Pandacan terminal will
eventually become a mere distribution point. At present, it is in the process of
transferring its fuel to the Shell terminals in Batangas, Bataan, La Union, and
Muntinlupa. 73 As for its supply of aviation fuel, it will be delivered directly to
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. 74 Petron's transfer and Shell's reduction
of their operations in Pandacan will reduce the terminal's environmental
footprint by more than 50%. 75
Even the ponencia recognizes that the conditions have changed when it
stated that:
1. Chevron claims that it, together with Shell and Petron,
continue to enhance the safety and security features of the terminals.
They likewise adopt fire and product spill prevention measures in
accordance with the local standards set by the Bureau of Fire
Protection, among others, and with the international standards of the
American Petroleum Industry ("API") and the National Fire Prevention
and Safety Association ("NFPSA"); that since 1914, the oil depots have
not experienced "any incident beyond the ordinary risks and
expectations" of the residents of Manila; and that it received a
passing grade on the safety measures they installed in the facilities
from the representatives of the City of Manila who conducted an ocular
inspection on 22 May 2009; and
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . Shell's portion of the oil depot is likewise allegedly equipped
with the latest technology to ensure air-quality control and water-
quality control, and to prevent and cope with possible oil spills with a
crisis management plan in place in the event that an oil spill occurs.
Finally, Shell claims that the recommendations of EQE International in
its Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study, which it says is one of
the leading independent risk assessment providers in the world and
largest risk management consultancy, were sufficiently complied with;
and that, on its own initiative, adopted additional measures for the
purpose, for which reason, "the individual risk level resulting from any
incident occurring from the Pandacan Terminal, per the QRA study, is
twenty (20) times lower compared to the individual risk level of an
average working or domestic environment."
xxx xxx xxx
The steps taken by the oil companies, therefore, remain

insufficient to convince the Court that the dangers posed by the
presence of the terminals in a thickly populated area have already
been completely removed. 76 (Emphasis in the original)
With regard to highly flammable substances, Shell manifested that

liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is no longer stored in the Pandacan terminal.
Among the fuel products, only LPG can cause an explosion. Diesel, fuel oil, and
lubricating engine oil will not explode even if a lit match or anything with fire is
thrown at any of these fuel products because these products do not easily
vaporize and require more energy to burn. For gasoline, kerosene, and jet fuel,
Shell also utilizes special containers to prevent explosions. All of these products
are stored below their flashpoint temperature. 77
With respect to terrorist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah being in

this country, intervenor Petron rebuts by stating that it is extremely difficult to
ascertain the objectives of terrorists. 78 Further, a survey of terrorist attacks
from 2003 to 2009 reveals that the following areas have been the targets:
48 buses and trains
31 marketplaces
28 churches and mosques
13 police stations
20 restaurants and cafes
18 hotels 79
An oil terminal in Yemen was the target of a terrorist attack, but it was
foiled and the small fire in a gas tank, caused by shrapnel from an explosion,
was easily extinguished. 80 Based on this data, Petron makes the assumption
that oil refineries and oil depots may have the same degree of risk as any other
business establishment when it comes to terrorist attacks. 81
Shell alleged that safety measures are in place in the Pandacan terminal.
The terminal employs around 300 security personnel, working round the clock
in three shifts. Checkpoints and security outposts are located at the entrance
and exits of the terminal. The area is equipped with closed circuit television
cameras, capable of zooming and panning to get a bird's eye view of all
activities inside the terminal and its surrounding areas. 82
In addition, the Pandacan terminal is in close proximity to Malacañang

Palace. It is included in the "no-fly zone". Any aircraft flying near the area can
be "neutralized" by Malacañang Palace's anti-aircraft gun batteries. 83
With regard to the argument that Ordinance No. 8187 allows the entry of
pollutive and hazardous industries in the City of Manila, Shell points out that
Ordinance No. 8187 simply followed the classifications provided in the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board Model Zoning Ordinance. 84 It does not
necessarily mean that they are actually pollutive or hazardous. Thus,
intervenor Shell states:
It bears noting that while petroleum refineries and oil depots are
classified as "highly pollutive/extremely hazardous" industries, they are
nonetheless allowable classifications even under the Model Zoning
Ordinance. To reiterate, contrary to petitioners' simplistic and
misleading argument, such classification does not mean that highly
essential industries which are classified as "highly pollutive/extremely
hazardous" have a license to cause pollution. It only recognizes that
these industries have the possibility to cause pollution if no
environmental safeguards and/or standards are in place. 85
Under Ordinance 8187, medium industrial zones would allow the

operation of "pollutive/hazardous industries" while heavy industrial zones would
allow the operation of "highly pollutive/non-hazardous industries"; "highly
pollutive/hazardous industries"; "highly pollutive/extremely hazardous
industries"; "pollutive/extremely hazardous industries"; and "non-
pollutive/extremely hazardous industries." 86 However, these are mere
classifications that should not, in any way, lead to the conclusion that the
industries classified under any of these categories are automatically polluters.
The arguments raised by petitioners are hypothetical. No convincing
evidence was presented to show why oil depots are inherently risky or why oil
depots are targets of terrorist attacks. The examples of fire incidents in other
fuel facilities located in Puerto Rico and India 87 are insufficient to give us a
scientific basis for concluding that the risks of simply having an oil depot are
unmanageably high. The examples do not relate to the number of oil depots
that have operated continuously without any safety problems.
To decide a controversy on the basis of hypothetical facts would have the

effect of barring litigation between real parties with real causes of action. 88
III
The earlier case of
Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, J r.,
G.R. No. 156052
Although dealing with a different ordinance with a different treatment of
the Pandacan oil depots, the earlier doctrinal pronouncements in Social
Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. 89 or G.R. No. 156052
support this dissent.
This earlier case was a petition for mandamus filed directly before this
court. It sought to compel the mayor of the City of Manila to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027.
With the petition being an original one, it is wrong to conclude that this
court made definitive factual findings that are binding in this case when it
granted the writ of mandamus against respondent Mayor Lim. The petition was
granted on the ground that since the validity of the memorandum of
understanding executed between Chevron, Shell, Petron, and the City of Manila
had expired, there was no more hindrance to the enforcement of Ordinance No.
8027. 90
After the decision had been promulgated, motions for leave to intervene
and motions for reconsideration were filed. In a resolution, this court granted
the motions for leave to intervene but denied the motions for reconsideration.
91
In denying the motion for reconsideration, this court ruled that Ordinance
No. 8027 was not unconstitutional based on the challenge raised by Chevron,
Shell, and Petron. 92 This court did not make the pronouncement that the
ordinance cannot be repealed. This court certainly did not even make definitive
findings of fact that would have prevented the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila to change its policy. In this case, it appears that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila reconsidered its interpretation of the factual
basis of the earlier ordinance, examined the viability of its policy in
relation to the interests of its constituents, and passed Ordinance No.
8187. It is also clear that there were changes in the elected
representatives of the City of Manila.
Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. has the authority to
hold that Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted in the exercise of police power. 93 It
did not discriminate against the Pandacan terminal and the oil depots found
therein. 94 Neither did the ordinance contravene Republic Act No. 7638 95 and
Republic Act No. 8479. 96 Further, Ordinance No. 8027 does not prohibit the oil
businesses from conducting their business in Manila, but they are no longer
allowed to have an oil depot in the Pandacan terminal. 97
This court denied the second motion for reconsideration for being a
prohibited pleading.
No res judicata
Certainly, Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. is not res
judicata insofar as the present original petition is concerned.
The procedural vehicle is no longer mandamus in this case. Petitioner SJS
filed a petition for prohibition. Petitioner Mayor Atienza now files a petition for
prohibition, mandamus and certiorari. The earlier case sought to enforce an
ordinance. SJS, in this case, seeks to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance
because:
[T]he same is illegal and unconstitutional, thus, without force and
effect. Further, it is a circumvention of this Honorable Court's decision
on [sic] GR 156052 which mandates the enforcement of Ordinance No.
8027 by the mayor of the City of Manila which effectively removes the
Pandacan oil depot. 98
Clearly, the decision in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza,
Jr. dealt with Ordinance No. 8027. This petition now deals with Ordinance No.
8187. The subject matter and the issues are totally different.
No allegation and clear basis
for a finding that a law was violated in
enacting the ordinance
The petition filed by petitioner SJS in this case and its memorandum are
extraordinary in that these are bereft of any substantial argument that clearly
shows that Ordinance No. 8187 violates any law. The closest mention of any
law is Section 458 of the Local Government Code of 1991 that grants the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila the power to enact ordinances for the
general welfare.
Petitioner SJS recommends that we rule that:
"General welfare" means the enjoyment of health and the
common blessings of life, and this could only be achieved if there
would be [a] guarantee against risk in health and the common
blessings of life of the people. 99 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Explaining its argument that general welfare can only be present if there
is absolutely no risk to health, petitioner SJS continues to cite Villanueva v.
Castañeda, 100 where this court held that a talipapa (small public market) can
endanger public health and public safety. 101 Thus, in the sole view of
petitioner SJS:
If this Honorable Court could consider a talipapa to be hazardous
to public health and safety, there is more reason for this Honorable
Court to consider the Pandacan oil depot to be hazardous to the
community surrounding it. The comparison may not be apple to apple
and orange to orange but the logic and common sense behind this
comparison is to point out the far greater danger that an oil depot may
bring compared to that of a talipapa. The detrimental impact of the
mere presence of the oil depot in the Pandacan community outweighs
the beneficial impact that it gives, if it has any. 102
Such arguments are superficially seducing but dangerous because these

ask that legal decisions be the outcome of homespun fear rather than based on
more critical analysis.
The fallacy of the argument of petitioner SJS is obvious.
To begin with, not all talipapa are hazardous to public health and safety.
In the case cited by petitioner SJS, the talipapa was "in the vicinity of the public
market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a strip of land
measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors
stalls." 103 The vendors wanted to assert their right to remain in the area due to
a previous authorization by the municipal government. The municipal
government denied this right, insisting on the demolition of their structures
because they were illegal constructions on public property. In deciding to
uphold the municipal government, this court noted that the occupants
proliferated under filthy conditions that added to the basis of the municipal
government to assert its powers over the public space. 104 That case certainly
did not denigrate all talipapa. Its reiteration of the findings of the municipal
government certainly only applied to that specific set of vendor stalls.
Not all talipapa are the same. Not all are hazardous to public health and
safety. It depends on the condition of the talipapa. These conditions can be
found only upon the presentation of evidence in the proper judicial forum. Only
after the presentation of evidence can the degree of risk and hazard be
assessed in relation to the standards contained in law and corresponding
regulations. Only after all these can courts rule whether to remove or demolish
a talipapa.
The same considerations apply to oil depots. In this case, upon
reassessing the facts and weighing the risks in relation to the necessity of the
Pandacan oil depot, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila found it proper to
reverse its policy through a validly issued ordinance. Except for superficial
arguments based on fallacies masquerading as common sense, petitioners here
do not present us with facts that can be taken judicial notice of. Rather,
petitioners present to us the same city council report that was submitted for
the passage of Ordinance No. 8027, and not the report that served as basis for
Ordinance No. 8187, which is the subject of this case.
The failure to discharge the burden of clearly showing the illegality of the
ordinance is enough to dismiss the petition. However, the static view of the
world presented by petitioners merits further attention.
The challenges and controversies surrounding the passage of the various
ordinances relating to the Pandacan oil depot certainly also impel the
corporations and the local government officials to install measures to further
assure its public. We cannot accept the implied assumption of the petitioners
that nothing in relation to the Pandacan oil depot has changed since this court's
decision and resolution in the earlier case of Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v.
Hon. Atienza, Jr. 105
For instance, the ponencia in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon.
Atienza, Jr. (2008 resolution) pointed out that:
The ordinance [Ordinance No. 8027] was intended to safeguard
the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and
not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly,
as a representation of western interests which means that it is a
terrorist target. As long as there is such a target in their midst, the
residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to
remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. According to
respondent:
Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11
incident which showed that what was perceived to be impossible
to happen, to the most powerful country in the world at that, is
actually possible. The destruction of property and the loss of
thousand of lives on that fateful day became the impetus for a
public need. In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of
terrorism continued [such] that it became imperative for
governments to take measures to combat their effects. 106
In this petition, SJS repeats the same argument with the same certainty
that the Pandacan terminal is a target of terrorist attacks because it represents
Western interest in the Philippines. In its memorandum, SJS randomly listed
acts of terrorism in the Philippines and in Asia. In its own enumeration, bombs
attributed to terrorists exploded: in cars near the official residence of
ambassadors, on a packed parking deck beneath a stock exchange building,
inside a luggage, outside a bar, in a bus terminal, in an embassy, in hotels, and
inside a light rail transit coach. 107
In the Philippines, terrorists have targeted government buildings, public

utility buses, fastfood outlet, beach resort, markets, and churches. 108 At the
international level, terrorists have chosen trains, churches, mosques and other
places where the faithful gather, police stations, hotels, embassies, and
markets. 109 Not once has an oil depot been attacked.
"Western interests," if such concept can be accepted despite its obvious
ambiguity and potential to encompass much of modern life, are simply too
omnipresent. To accept SJS' theory would mean that it would be illegal and
unconstitutional not to close down or isolate cars, residences of ambassadors,
parking buildings, lounges, bars, restaurants, bus terminals, embassy buildings,
hotels, and light rail transit coaches.
The panic does not end there. SJS expands even further to almost
everything. Thus:
All of us should not forget the so-called Rizal Day bombings
where innocent ordinary people were targeted by J[emaah] I[slamiyah]
on Light Rail Transit coaches which had claimed many lives. The Light
Rail Transit did not represent Western interest and had no symbolic
value as far as Western target is concerned and yet it was struck by
those heartless terrorists. 110
Risks are inherent in all human activity. The questions properly addressed
to policy makers are whether the risks are properly proven and understood, the
measures that are proposed are sufficient to mitigate the risks in relation to the
beneficial effects or objective of the activity, and whether the measures can be
implemented given the institutions in place and the resources available.
Governance cannot proceed from imagined fears. Therefore, insofar as judicial
review is concerned, it is not our duty to second-guess political branches or
local government units. They are in a better position to understand risks,
decide on measures, and pursue these measures' implementation.
Doctrine in Social Justice Society
(SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.
This much was recognized in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon.
Atienza, Jr. 111
Statutes and ordinances are presumed valid unless and until the
courts declare the contrary in clear and unequivocal terms. The mere
fact that the ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will
not entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined. The presumption
is all in favor of validity. The reason for this is obvious:
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be
lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all
the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and
necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential
to the well being of the people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation.
xxx xxx xxx
[Courts] accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the judiciary[,] in the determination
of actual cases and controversies[,] must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.
The oil companies argue that this presumption must be set aside
when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the
ordinance itself. We see no reason to set aside the presumption. The
ordinance, on its face, does not at all appear to be unconstitutional. It
reclassified the subject area from industrial to commercial. Prima facie,
this power is within the power of municipal corporations:
The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into
industrial, commercial and residential zones is recognized in almost all
jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police power itself and
is exercised for the protection and benefit of their inhabitants.
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to
divide its territory into residential and industrial zones, and to
prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are
to be established exclusively in the latter zone.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of Manila has the
authority, derived from the police power, of forbidding the appellant to
continue the manufacture of toyo in the zone where it is now situated,
which has been declared residential. . . .
Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly appears
that it is unconstitutional. There is no such showing here. Therefore,
the injunctive writs issued in the Manila RTC's May 19, 2003 order had
no leg to stand on. 112 (Citations omitted)
IV
No ordinance is irrepealable
Petitioners assail Ordinance No. 8187 because the ordinance effectively
allows the oil depots to remain in the Pandacan terminal, allegedly contrary to
this court's decision in G.R. No. 156052. It, thus, concludes that the ordinance is
illegal or unconstitutional.
Petitioners are mistaken.

Ordinance No. 8187 repealed Ordinance No. 8027. G.R. No. 156052 had
Ordinance No. 8027 as its subject matter. There is no circumvention of the
decision in G.R. No. 156052 simply because Ordinance No. 8027 no longer
exists upon its valid repeal by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila. Both
ordinances were the result of the determination of policy by the City of Manila.
Certainly, there is nothing in our decision in G.R. No. 156052 that categorically
prevents the repeal of Ordinance No. 8027.
As this court has categorically stated, "there is no such thing as an
irrepealable law." 113 As explained in Duarte v. Dade: 114
It is fundamental that what legislators have the power to enact
they have the power to repeal. In speaking of the powers of legislative
bodies, it is said in Lewis' Southerland on Statutory Construction,
section 244: "A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over
all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old,
unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution
or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors
by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every
legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its
predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same
session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in
its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a
future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in
advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes." 115 (Emphasis supplied)
In The City of Davao, et al. v. Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Davao City,
et al., 116 this court stated that:
It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive
limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition against the
passage of irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding
legislatures of the fundamental best senses carte blanche in crafting
laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their allowance promotes an
unhealthy stasis in the legislative front and dissuades dynamic
democratic impetus that may be responsive to the times. As Senior
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once observed, "[t]o be sure, there
are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions.
Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear change."
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles
for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future
legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with
equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers.
Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative
body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments
or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience. 117
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Even the issuance of a writ of mandamus to implement Ordinance No.

,
8027 cannot mean that it becomes irrepealable. This was a live and existing
ordinance when this court dealt with it in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v.
Hon. Atienza, Jr. Today, it has been validly repealed. This court made it clear in
G.R. No. 156052 (2007) that the city mayor has the duty to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 "as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by
the courts." 118
V
Violation of the doctrine of respect
for the hierarchy of courts
Respondents argue that the petitions should be dismissed because direct

recourse to this court is improper. The allegations in the petitions involve
factual issues that require the presentation of evidence. Also, Rule 65, Section
4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. — . . . .
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to
the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer
or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
Chevron argues that since the act complained of was done in the City of
Manila, then the petition should have been filed before the Regional Trial Courts
of Manila. 119 As a consequence, the petitions in G.R. No. 187836 and G.R. No.
187916 should be dismissed.
In accordance with Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, this

court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. The same jurisdiction is granted to the Court of
Appeals 120 and Regional Trial Courts 121 under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. 122
Thus, there is concurrence of jurisdiction among this court, the Court of
Appeals, and the Regional Trial Court with regard to petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
However, the concurrence of jurisdiction does not mean that parties are
free to choose which court to seek redress from. This court is the court of last
resort, and observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is necessary to
prevent "(1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the court,
which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and
(2) further overcrowding of the court's docket." 123
In Anillo v. COSLAP, 124 this court explained that:

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to
this Court is highly improper for it violates the established policy of
strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. While we have
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals to issue
writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an
unrestrained freedom of choice as to which court the application for the
writ will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals and should also
serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs. This Court is a court of last resort and must
so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by
the Constitution and immemorial tradition. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs
is allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
xxx xxx xxx
The doctrines of judicial hierarchy and res judicata are not
meaningless procedural rules because they are grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's
substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed
except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly
administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement
of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates
arbitrariness, caprice, despotism or whimsicality in the settlement of
disputes. 125
Exceptions to the doctrine

of hierarchy of courts
Nevertheless, this court has, from time to time, relaxed its rules and
allowed the direct filing of petitions before it. The exceptions to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts include:
(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of
public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3)
when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when
analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and
justified the immediate and direct handling of the case. 126
None of these exceptions were sufficiently shown to be present in this

case so as to convince this court that it should relax its rules of procedure.
VI
Petitioners have no legal standing
In its memorandum, SJS alleges that it is suing not as taxpayers, but in

pursuance of a public right. Since its members are Filipino citizens, it has the
standing to pursue the public right without need to allege any specific interest
in the public right. SJS also claims that Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao resides in
Pandacan and lives 300 meters away from the Petron oil depot and, as such,
has a substantial interest. 127
In G.R. No. 187916, some of the petitioners are minors claiming to

represent their own generation and future generations. However, unlike Oposa
v. Factor an, 128 the minors in this case do not appear to be representative
enough of the interests of their generation as to consider their petition to be a
class suit.
On the contrary, Shell, Chevron, and Petron point out that petitioners
neither alleged any particular injury suffered nor did they allege any imminent
injury brought about by Ordinance No. 8187.
In cases involving issues of constitutionality, the party raising the issue of

constitutionality must have locus standi. Locus standi has been defined as "a
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 129 The basic
question in determining if one has locus standing is "whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 130
The requirement that one must have locus standi comes from Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which states that:
Article VIII. Judicial Department
Section 1 . . . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The requirement that a party must have standing in court is not a mere
procedural rule that this court can brush aside on the mere invocation of
"transcendental importance," "taxpayers' suit," and "filing as Filipino citizens."
Then Associate Justice Reynato Puno, in his dissenting opinion in Kilosbayan v.
Guingona, 131 explained the importance of locus standi:
The requirement of standing to sue inheres from the definition of
judicial power. It is not merely a technical rule of procedure which we
are at liberty to disregard. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. (Italics in the original)
xxx xxx xxx
Stated otherwise, courts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases
dumped into their laps nor are they free to open their doors to all
parties or entities claiming a grievance. The rationale for this
constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle. It is
intended "to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and,
perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the
determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of
government."
xxx xxx xxx
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of
persons who desire to litigate constitutional issues is economic in
character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of
courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is severely
limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of
suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and
ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be
sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary today. 132
"Rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" means that the
party who seeks relief from this court must suffer, or is in imminent danger of
suffering, an injury. In Tolentino v. COMELEC, 133 this court held that "direct
injury" may be determined using the following guidelines:
Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1)
he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury
is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. 134
In a previous case, 135 this court held that SJS had no standing to file a
petition for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on the
following grounds:
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they
have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation. A taxpayer's action may be properly brought only
when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.
In the present case, there is no allegation, whether express or implied,
that taxpayers' money is being illegally disbursed.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory
Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters
would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents
below, if the question at issue was not resolved. There was no
allegation that SJS had suffered or would be deprived of votes due to
the acts imputed to the said respondents. Neither did it allege that any
of its members would be denied the right of suffrage or the privilege to
be voted for a public office they are seeking.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members
who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and
beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence.
Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise
too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement
of standing. 136 (Citations omitted)
This should have guided SJS in determining whether it had the standing to
file the petition for prohibition before this court. Unfortunately, SJS did not heed
this court's advice.
Transcendental importance
Petitioners try to justify its direct recourse to this court by arguing that
the issues raised in their petitions are of "transcendental importance." 137
To determine if an issue is of transcendental importance, this court is
guided by the parameters set forth in Francisco v. House of Representatives:
138
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance,

the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme
Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of
the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by
the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;
and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in raising the questions being raised. 139
A mere allegation of transcendental importance will not suffice to

convince this court to take cognizance of a case. Petitioner SJS, in its
memorandum, point out that since this court had taken cognizance of G.R. No.
156052, there is no more need to present other arguments to convince this
court that the matter at hand is of transcendental importance. 140
Petitioners are mistaken. Whether an issue is of transcendental

importance is a matter determined by this court on a case-to-case basis. An
allegation of transcendental importance must be supported by the proper
allegations.
Petitioners, however, merely stated:
This Honorable Court, again in the prequel case of Social Justice
Society, et al. v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13 February 2008, made the
following statements —
The importance of settling this controversy as fully and as
expeditiously as possible was emphasized, considering its impact
on public interest. Thus, we will also dispose of this issue here.
The parties were after all given ample opportunity to present and
argue their respective positions. By so doing, we will do away
with the delays concomitant with litigation and completely
adjudicate an issue which will most likely reach us anyway as the
final arbiter of all legal disputes.
The foregoing was an undeniable recognition by this Honorable
Court of the importance of this case as it mentioned "its impact on
public interest" that justified its taking cognizance of the original
petition because the issue would most likely reach it anyway "as the
final arbiter of all legal disputes." Thus, petitioners need not stretch its
argumentation to convince this Honorable Court about the
transcendental importance of this case. 141
For this court to brush aside the rules of procedure in view of the
"transcendental importance" of a case, petitioners must be able to show that
"the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights
outweigh the necessity for prudence." 142 This they failed to do.
VII
There are other remedies available
Respondents and intervenors point out that more appropriate remedies
are available to petitioners. As petitioners' allegations relate to the
environment, they could have filed civil, criminal, or special civil actions before
the lower courts, and prayed for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan, or
environment protection orders, as provided by the rules of procedure for
environmental cases. Chevron raised the argument that since petitioners allege
that the Pandacan terminal is hazardous and pollutive, then the proper remedy
is not to enjoin the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187 but to enjoin the
hazardous and pollutive activities inside the terminal. 143
I agree with respondents.

Petitioners could have availed themselves of the remedy of a writ of
kalikasan if they could properly and clearly show grave danger to the
environment.
Petitioners may argue that their petitions were filed ahead of the
promulgation of the rules of procedure for environmental cases. However,
procedural rules are generally given retroactive effect since there are no
vested rights in rules of procedure. 144
Rule 7, Section 1 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC 145 provides:
SEC. 1. Nature of the writ. — The writ is a remedy available to a
natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's
organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest
group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on
behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity,
involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The application for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan is commenced by

filing a verified petition, stating the personal circumstances of petitioner and
respondent, the environmental laws violated, the acts or omissions complained
of, and the environmental damage "as to prejudice the life, health or property
of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces." 146 The petition must be
supported by relevant evidence such as affidavits or documents. A petition for
the issuance of a writ of kalikasan may include a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary environmental protection order (TEPO). 147
If petitioners had evidence, they could also file an action for abatement of
nuisance, considering that in their memorandum, they characterized the oil
depot as a nuisance per accidens. Their memorandum states:
No self-respecting government would allow its people to be
exposed to health and safety risk by allowing a nuisance per accidens,
just like the Pandacan oil depot, to sit side by side with a densely
populated community. 148 (Emphasis from the original removed)
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as:

ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Another option available to petitioners was to file a complaint under the

provisions of the Clean Air Act. 149 Thus, the law provides:
SEC. 40. Administrative Action. — Without prejudice to the right
of any affected person to file an administrative action, the Department
shall, on its own instance or upon verified complaint by any person,
institute administrative proceedings against any person who violates:
a. Standards or limitation provided under this Act; or
b. Any order, rule or regulation issued by the Department with respect

to such standard or limitation.
SEC. 41. Citizen Suits. — For purposes of enforcing the provisions
of this Act or its implementing rules and regulations, any citizen may
file an appropriate civil, criminal or administrative action in the proper
courts against:
a. Any person who violates or fails to comply with the provisions of this
Act or its implementing rules and regulations; or
b. The Department or other implementing agencies with respect to
orders, rules and regulations issued inconsistent with this Act;
and/or
c. Any public officer who willfully or grossly neglects the performance
of an act specifically enjoined as a duty by this Act or its
implementing rules and regulations; or abuses his authority in
the performance of his duty; or, in any manner, improperly
performs his duties under this Act or its implementing rules and
regulations: Provided, however, That no suit can be filed until
after thirty-day (30) notice has been given to the public officer
and the alleged violator concerned and no appropriate action has
been taken thereon.
The court shall exempt such action from the payment of filing
fees, except fees for actions not capable of pecuniary estimations, and
shall, likewise, upon prima facie showing of the non-enforcement or
violation complained of, exempt the plaintiff from the filing of an
injunction bond for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Within thirty (30) days, the court shall make a determination if
the compliant herein is malicious and/or baseless and shall accordingly
dismiss the action and award attorney's fees and damages.
SEC. 42. Independence of Action. — The filing of an
administrative suit against such person/entity does not preclude the
right of any other person to file any criminal or civil action. Such civil
action shall proceed independently.
If petitioners had evidence to support their allegation that Ordinance No.

8187 by its simple existence actually causes pollution and hazard to
communities in Manila, they could avail themselves of remedies under Republic
Act No. 6969, 150 whose pertinent portions state:
SEC. 13. Prohibited Acts. — The following acts and omissions
shall be considered unlawful:
a. Knowingly use a chemical substance or mixture which is imported,

manufactured, processed or distributed in violation of this Act or
implementing rules and regulations or orders;
b. Failure or refusal to submit reports, notices or other information,

access to records as required by this Act, or permit inspection of
establishment where chemicals are manufactured, processed,
stored or otherwise held;
c. Failure or refusal to comply with the pre-manufacture and pre-
importation requirements; and
d. Cause, aid or facilitate, directly or indirectly, in the storage,
importation, or bringing into Philippine territory, including its
maritime economic zones, even in transit, either by means of
land, air or sea transportation or otherwise keeping in storage
any amount of hazardous and nuclear wastes in any part of the
Philippines.
SEC. 14. Criminal Offenses and Penalties. —
a. (i) The penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and one day to six
(6) years and one day and a fine ranging from Six hundred pesos
(P600.00) to Four thousand pesos (P4,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person who shall violate section 13(a) to (c) of this Act
and shall not be covered by the Probation Law. If the offender is
a foreigner, he or she shall be deported and barred from any
subsequent entry into the Philippines after serving his or her
sentence;
(ii) In case any violation of this Act is committed by a partnership,
corporation, association or any juridical person, the partner,
president, director or manager who shall consent to or shall
knowingly tolerate such violation shall be directly liable and
responsible for the act of the employees and shall be criminally
liable as a co-principal;
(iii) In case the offender is a government official or employee, he or
she shall, in addition to the above penalties, be deemed
automatically dismissed from office and permanently disqualified
from holding any elective or appointive position.
b. (i) The penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one day to
twenty (20) years, shall be imposed upon any person who shall
violate section 13 (d) of this Act. If the offender is a foreigner, he
or she shall be deported and barred from any subsequent entry
into the Philippines after serving his or her sentence;
(ii) In the case of corporations or other associations, the above penalty
shall be imposed upon the managing partner, president or chief
executive in addition to an exemplary damage of at least Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). If it is a foreign firm, the
director and all officers of such foreign firm shall be barred from
entry into the Philippines, in addition to the cancellation of its
license to do business in the Philippines;
(iii) In case the offender is a government official or employee, he or
she shall in addition to the above penalties be deemed
automatically dismissed from office and permanently disqualified
from holding any elective or appointive position.
c. Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, entry, transport,
manufacture, processing, sale or distribution of chemical
substances or mixtures into or within the Philippines shall carry
with it the confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the Government
of the proceeds of the unlawful act and instruments, tools or
other improvements including vehicles, sea vessels, and aircrafts
used in or with which the offense was committed. Chemical
substances so confiscated and forfeited by the Government at its
option shall be turned over to the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources for safekeeping and proper disposal.

d. The person or firm responsible or connected with the bringing or
importation into the country of hazardous or nuclear wastes shall
be under obligation to transport or send back said prohibited
wastes;
Any and all means of transportation, including all facilities and
appurtenances that may have been used in transporting to or in the
storage in the Philippines of any significant amount of hazardous or
nuclear wastes shall at the option of the government be forfeited in its
favor.
There is also a non-judicial remedy available to petitioners: that of local

initiative and local referendum.
Section 120 and Section 126 of Republic Act No. 7160 define local
initiative and local referendum as:
SECTION 120. Local Initiative Defined. — Local initiative is the
legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit
may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 126. Local Referendum Defined. — Local referendum is
the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local
government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance
enacted by the sanggunian.
The local referendum shall be held under the control and
direction of the COMELEC within sixty (60) days in case of provinces
and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30)
days in case of barangays.
The COMELEC shall certify and proclaim the results of the said
referendum.
Petron alleges that a petition for referendum regarding Ordinance No.

8187 was initiated on June 23, 2009. 151 The petition was entitled "Petisyon ng
mga mamamayan ng Maynila sa Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Maynila na
kaagad pawalang bisa ang City Ordinance No[.] 8187 na may pamagat na 'An
Ordinance Amending Ordinance No. 8119, otherwise known as 'The Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006', by creating a
Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) and Providing for
its Enforcement.'" 152
Two of the signatories in the petition for referendum, Vladimir Cabigao

and Rafael Borromeo, are petitioners in this case. 153
Petitioners definitely had other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies. On

this ground alone, the petition should have been dismissed.
VIII
Enactment of Ordinance No. 8283
renders this case moot and academic

Intervenor Shell filed a manifestation with motion to dismiss dated
September 2, 2013, informing this court that Ordinance No. 8283 was
published in The Manila Times 154 and took effect on September 30, 2012. 155
Shell prays that the petitions be dismissed for being moot and academic. 156 In
the same manifestation, Shell stated that it filed a petition for declaratory relief
docketed as Case No. 131034 questioning Ordinance No. 8283 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. 157
Respondent Luch R. Gempis, Jr., Secretary of the Sangguniang

Panlungsod of Manila, filed a compliance/explanation with urgent manifestation
dated September 13, 2012, informing this court that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8283 on August 28, 2012. 158 The
relevant portions of Ordinance No. 8283 provides:
ORDINANCE NO. 8283
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 2 OF ORDINANCE NO.
8187 BY RECLASSIFYING THE AREA WHERE PETROLEUM REFINERIES
AND OIL DEPOTS ARE LOCATED FROM HEAVY INDUSTRIAL (I-3) TO
HIGH INTENSITY COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE (C3/MXD)
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, in session
assembled, THAT:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8187 shall be amended
to read as follows:
"SEC. 2 The land use where the existing industries are
located, the operation of which are permitted under Section 1
hereof, are hereby classified as Industrial Zone except the area
where petroleum refineries and oil depots are located, which
shall be classified as High Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone
(C3/MXD)." (Emphasis from the original removed)
SEC. 2. Owners or operators of petroleum refineries and oil
depots, the operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1
hereof, are hereby given a period until the end of January 2016 within
which to relocate the operation of their businesses. 159
Mayor Lim vetoed Ordinance No. 8283. 160 However, the members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila overrode Mayor Lim's veto by more than
two-thirds (2/3) vote during a regular session on September 13, 2012. 161
Mayor Lim filed a manifestation 162 dated November 26, 2012, informing this
court that he vetoed Ordinance No. 8283 for a second time, pursuant to Section
17 of Republic Act No. 409. 163
Whether Mayor Lim's second veto was overridden does not appear on
record. However, considering this court's pronouncement in City of Manila v.
Hon. Laguio, Jr. , 164 the applicable law in this case is Republic Act No. 7160 and
not Republic Act No. 409. Section 55 (c) of Republic Act No. 7160 provides:
SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. — . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution
only once . The sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief
executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making
the ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief
executive concerned. (Emphasis supplied).
Following Section 55 (c) of Republic Act No. 7160, Mayor Lim's second
veto can be presumed to be of no effect. For this reason, the enactment,
publication, and enforcement of Ordinance No. 8283 render the petitions moot
and academic. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 165 this court defined "moot and
academic" in the following manner:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 166
In the same case, this court discussed the moot and academic principle
as:
The 'moot and academic' principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. 167
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP 168 discussed another exception to the

moot and academic principle: the "voluntary cessation of the activity
complained of by the defendant or doer." 169 This exception was illustrated as
follows:
Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the
challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of
power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case
moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for
injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation. 170
None of the parties have been able to show that the exceptions to the
moot and academic principle are present. A review of the records reveals that
after Shell and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila filed their
manifestations, petitioners SJS and Mayor Atienza did not file any opposition to
the motions to dismiss.
In any case, to rule upon the validity of Ordinance No. 8187 would be of
no use since the ordinance has been amended and, thus, conditions may have
changed.
This court is mindful that the power of judicial review should be exercised
with caution. Judicial pronouncements on the validity and constitutionality of
laws must be narrowly tailored to actual facts and issues in order to prevent
judicial overreach 171 and ensure that the remedy sought is appropriate to the
cause of action. 172 Actual facts that have been duly proven provide the limits
to the scope of judicial review that this court may exercise in a particular case.
173 In view of these principles, this court must refrain from ruling upon the
validity of Ordinance No. 8187.
Final note
Mayor Atienza argues that Ordinance No. 8187 violates the precautionary
principle in international environmental law. 174 Intervenor Shell refutes this by
arguing that the precautionary principle only applies "when scientific
investigation has found a plausible risk." 175
The precautionary principle applies when it can be shown that there is
plausible risk, and its causes cannot be determined with scientific certainty. It is
not available simply on the basis of imagined fears or imagined causes.
Otherwise, it will be absurd. Rather than a reactive approach to fear, the
precautionary principle is evolving as a proactive approach in protecting the
environment. 176 Furthermore, being only a principle, it does not trump the
requirements for proper invocation of remedies or act to repeal existing laws.
Petitioners' fears with regard to the prolonged stay of the oil companies in
the Pandacan terminal should be assuaged by the execution of the MOU in
2002 among the Department of Energy, City of Manila, Caltex (Philippines),
Inc., Petron Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. 177 Although
it appears that the validity of the MOU expired on April 30, 2003, 178 the oil
companies continued to fulfill their responsibilities under the MOU. Several
tanks have been decommissioned and dismantled, 179 including Shell's LPG
spheres. 180 Petron filed a manifestation, 181 informing this court that within
five years, or not later than January 2016, it will cease the operations of its
petroleum storage facilities in Pandacan due to environmental concerns and the
frequent changes in the zoning ordinances. 182 Buffer zones were constructed
to protect both the terminal and the nearby residential area. 183 The oil
companies intend to continuously scale down its operations in the Pandacan
terminal, lessening operations by around 80% in five years. 184
Further, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No.

8283 on August 28, 2012, 185 which reclassifies the Pandacan terminal from a
heavy industrial zone to a high intensity commercial/mixed use zone. 186
According to news reports, 187 Mayor Joseph Estrada is enforcing Ordinance No.
8283 and has informed the oil companies that they should relocate by January
2016.
Petitioners' aggressive vigilance to protect the community's security and

its environment is laudable. However, the resources that they deployed would
have been best used in the political forum. This court's jurisdiction is limited by
the rule of law. The policy decision to remove or gradually phase out the
Pandacan oil depot is left to the representatives of the people of the City of
Manila. We cannot replace their political decision with our own no matter how
convinced we are of our own policy positions.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to dismiss the petitions in G.R. No. 187836 and

G.R. No. 187916 for being moot and academic.
Footnotes
* On leave.
1. In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the motion to drop
respondent Ernesto Rivera as a party-respondent on the ground that he
actually voted against the enactment of the assailed ordinance. Rollo in G.R.
No. 187916, Vol. I, (no proper pagination, should be pp. 148-149).
2. Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. 1, pp. 3-20. Petition (for Prohibition) filed on 1 June
2009; Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. 1, pp. 11-115. Urgent Petition for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari (with Application for an Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order) filed on 5 June 2009. Id. at 116. Resolution
dated 9 June 2009 consolidating G.R. No. 187916 with G.R. No. 187836.
3. Approved by former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim on 28 May 2009. Rollo in G.R. No.
187916, Vol. 1, pp. 70-75. Annex "A" of the Urgent Petition for Prohibition,
Mandamus and Certiorari.
4. Approved by former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. on 28 November 2001. Id. at 76-
77. Annex "B" of the Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Certiorari.
5. Approved by former Mayor Jose L. Atienza on 16 June 2006. Id. at 78-115. Annex
"C" of the Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.
6. In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the motion to drop
respondent Ernesto Rivera as a party-respondent on the ground that he
actually voted against the enactment of the assailed ordinance. Rollo in G.R.
No. 187916, Vol. I, (no proper pagination, should be pp. 148-149).
7. Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. III, pp. 917-1065, Motion for Leave to Intervene
filed by Petron on 1 December 2009; pp. 1234-1409, Urgent Motion for Leave
to Intervene and to Admit Attached Comment-in-Intervention filed by Shell on
15 December 2009; rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. II, pp. 367-373, Motion for
Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Consolidated Comment in
Intervention filed by Chevron on 25 November 2009.
8. 546 Phil. 485 (2007). Decision and Resolution 568 Phil. 658 (2008).
9. Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 658, 703 (2008).
10. Id. at 684.

11. Id. at 699.
12. Id. at 723.
13. Id. at 673-676.
14. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. II, pp. 428-432. Annex "1" of the Urgent Petition
for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.
The MOA reads:
xxx xxx xxx

1. Immediately upon the execution of this Agreement, CALTEX, PETRON and SHELL
shall jointly undertake a comprehensive and comparative study of the
various alternatives to minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by the
proximity of communities, businesses and offices to the Pandacan oil
terminals and to respond to such risks and hazards to the satisfaction of the
relevant stakeholders. The study shall include the preparation of a Master
Plan, whose aim is to determine the scope and timing of the feasible
relocation of the Pandacan oil terminals and all associated facilities and
infrastructure including government support essential for the relocation such
as the necessary transportation infrastructure, land and right of way
acquisition, resettlement of displaced residents and environmental and social
acceptability which shall be based on mutual benefit of the Parties and the
public.
The study and Master Plan shall also take into full consideration (i) the integrity,
reliability and security of supply and distribution of petroleum products to
Metro Manila and the rest of Luzon as well as the interest of consumers and
users of such petroleum products; (ii) the impact of relocation on the other
depots/terminals similarly situated in other parts of the country; (iii) the
security, safety and welfare of the inhabitants around the current site and
those of the proposed sites; and (iv) the incremental investment, operating
and other related costs for the proposed relocation.
The study and Masterplan shall be completed within twelve (12) months from the
date of execution of this Agreement.
2. The DOE shall participate in the presentation of the study and Master Plan by,
among others, providing the policy framework and recommending the
necessary infrastructure, fiscal and non-fiscal, investment incentives and
other support measures as enumerated in paragraph 1 above including the
promotion of appropriate legislative proposals, coordination with other
government agencies, identification of the necessary governmental
resources and the provision of other measures that would facilitate the
attainment of objectives of this Agreement.
3. Subject to paragraphs 1 & 2 hereof, the Master Plan shall be implemented in

phases to be completed within a period of no more than five (5) years from
the date of execution of this Agreement; provided, that the commencement
of the first phase shall occur within 2003.
4. The relocation of the Pandacan liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), facilities of
CALTEX, PETRON and SHELL shall form part of the first phase of relocation.
xxx xxx xxx
15. Id. at 429.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 76.
The Ordinance reads:

ORDINANCE NO. 8027
AN ORDINANCE RECLASSIFYING THE LAND USE OF THAT PORTION OF LAND
BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER IN THE NORTH, . . . FROM INDUSTRIAL II TO
COMMERCIAL I
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, THAT:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring
health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and
Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of
land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east,
Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de
Pandacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de
Pandacan in the northeast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon
in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River,
Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby
reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of
which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a
period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within
which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby
in consequence, disallowed.
20. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. II, pp. 434-440. Annex "2" of the Consolidated
Comment in Intervention.
21. Id. at 435.
22. Id. at 435-436.

The oil companies undertook to do the following:
Section 1. — Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES
shall, upon signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale down the
Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, the immediate
removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with
the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety
buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. . . .
Section 2. — Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL
COMPANIES shall establish joint operations and management, including the
operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with
international and domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic
considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL
COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and
integrated areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering the commercial
and operational terms and conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered
into by the OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3. — The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer
zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL
COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the sole
responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and DOE, on the other hand, tasked themselves to:
Section 1. — The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its
appropriate action with the view of implementing the spirit and intent
thereof.
Section 2. — The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and
intent of this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in
compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from
the joint operations and the scale down program.
Section 3. — The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES'
compliance with the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4. — The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the
safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future
occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other
unauthorized parties.
23. Id. at 580-581. Annex "6" of the Consolidated Comment in Intervention.
24. Id. at 582.

25. Supra note 8.
26. Id. at 490.
27. Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9 at 671.
28. Id.
29. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 78-115. Annex "C" of the Urgent Petition for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.
30. Id. at 79-80.
SEC. 7. Division into Zones or Districts — To effectively carry out the provisions of
this Ordinance, the City of Manila is hereby divided into the following zones
or districts as shown in the Official Zoning Maps.
A. General Residential Zone:
1. High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)
B. Commercial Zones:
2. Medium Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C-2/MXD)
3. High Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C-3/MXD)
C. Industrial Zone:
4. Light Industrial Zone (I-1)
D. Institutional Zones:
5. General Institutional Zone (INS-G)
6. University Cluster Zone (INS-U)

E. Public Open Space Zones:
7. General Public Open Space Zone (POS-GEN)
7.a Parks and Plazas (POS-PP)
7.b Playground and Sports Field/Recreation Zone (POS-PSR)
8. Cemetery Zone (POS-CEM)

F. Others
9. Utility Zone (UTL)
10. Water Zone (WTR)
11. Overlay Zones:
11.1 Histo-Cultural Heritage Overlay Zone (O-HCH)
11.2 Planned Unit Development Overlay Zone (O-PUD)

11.3 Buffer Overlay Zone (O-BUF) (Emphasis supplied)
31. Id. at 92.
SEC. 23. Use Regulations in Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD). —
O-PUD Zones are identified specific sites in the City of Manila wherein the
project site is comprehensively planned as an entity via unitary site plan
which permits flexibility in planning/design, building siting, complementarily
of building types and land uses, usable open spaces and the preservation of
significant natural land features, pursuant to regulations specified for each
particular PUD. Enumerated below are identified PUD:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Pandacan Oil Depot Area
xxx xxx xxx
Enumerated below are the allowable uses:
1. all uses allowed in all zones where it is located

2. the [Land Use Intensity Control (LUIC)] under which zones are located shall, in
all instances be complied with
3. the validity of the prescribed LUIC shall only be [superseded] by the
development controls and regulations specified for each PUD as provided for
each PUD as provided for by the masterplan of respective PUDs. (Emphasis
supplied)
32. Id. at 114.
33. Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr. supra note 8 at 494.
34. Id. at 490-491.
35. Id. at 493-494.
37. Id. at 723.

38. Id. at 1792-1793.
39. Rollo in G.R. No. 156052, pp. 1793. Manifestation and Motion filed on 18 March
2009.
40. Id. at 1792-1803.

41. Id. at 1813-1816. Resolution dated 28 April 2009.
42. Id. at 1816.
43. Id. (no proper pagination, should be pp. 1844-1845). Resolution dated 2 June
2009.
44. Id. (no proper pagination, should be p. 1846). Resolution dated 9 June 2009
with respect to the City Legal Office's Motion to Excuse from Filing Comment
(on Petitioners' Manifestation and Motion and on Petitioners' Very Urgent
Motion to Cite the Members of the City Council in Direct Contempt of Court),
and the Comment. Id. (no proper pagination, should be pp. 1880-1881).
Resolution dated 23 June 2009 with respect to the Reply to the Comment
filed by the counsel for the petitioners.
45. Rollo, in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 70-74.

The Ordinance reads:
ORDINANCE NO. 8187
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 8119, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE
MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND ZONING ORDINANCE OF
2006", BY CREATING A MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) AND HEAVY
INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-3), AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ENFORCEMENT.
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, in session, assembled, THAT:

SECTION 1. Ordinance No. 8119, otherwise known as the "Manila Comprehensive
Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006" is hereby amended by
creating a Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) to
read as follows:
1. Use Regulations in Medium Industrial Zone (1-2)
The Medium Industrial Zone (I-2) shall be for Pollutive/Non-Hazardous and
Pollutive/Hazardous manufacturing and processing establishments.
Enumerated below are the allowable uses:
a. Pollutive/Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture and canning of ham

2. Poultry processing and canning
3. Large-scale manufacture of ice cream
4. Corn Mill/Rice Mill
5. Chocolate and Cocoa Factory
6. Candy Factory

7. Chewing Gum Factory
8. Peanuts and other nuts factory
9. Other chocolate and confectionary products

10. Manufacture of flavoring extracts
11. Manufacture of food products n.e.c (vinegar, vetsin)
12. Manufacture of fish meal
13. Oyster shell grading
14. Manufacture of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations
15. Manufacture of stationary, art goods, cut stone and marble products
16. Manufacture of abrasive products
17. Manufacture of miscellaneous non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.
18. Manufacture of cutlery, except table flatware
19. Manufacture of hand tools
20. Manufacture of general hardware
21. Manufacture of miscellaneous cutlery hand tools and general hardware n.e.c.
22. Manufacture of household metal furniture

23. Manufacture of office, store and restaurant metal furniture
24. Manufacture of metal blinds, screens and shades
25. Manufacture of miscellaneous furniture and fixture primarily of metal n.e.c.
26. Manufacture of fabricated structural iron and steel
27. Manufacture of architectural and ornamental metal works
28. Manufacture of boiler, tanks and other structural sheet metal works
29. Manufacture of other structural products n.e.c.
30. Manufacture of metal cans, boxes and containers
31. Manufacture of stamped coated and engraved metal products
32. Manufacture of fabricated wire and cable
33. Manufacture of heating, cooking and lighting equipment except electrical
34. Metal sheet works generally of manual operation
35. Manufacture of other fabricated metal products except machinery and

equipment n.e.c.
36. Manufacture or assembly of agricultural machinery and equipment
37. Native plow and harrow factory

38. Repair of agricultural machinery
39. Manufacture or assembly of service industry machines
40. Manufacture or assembly of elevators or escalators
41. Manufacture or assembly of sewing machines
42. Manufacture or assembly of cooking ranges

43. Manufacture or assembly of water pumps
44. Refrigeration industry
45. Manufacture or assembly of other machinery and equipment except electrical
n.e.c.
46. Manufacture and repair of electrical apparatus

47. Manufacture and repair of electrical cables and wires
48. Manufacture of cables and wires
49. Manufacture of other electrical industrial machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
50. Manufacture or assembly of electric equipment such as radio, television, tape,
tape recorders and stereo
51. Manufacture or assembly of radio and television transmitting, signaling and
detection equipment
52. Manufacture or assembly of telephone and telegraphic equipment
53. Manufacture of other electronic equipment and apparatus n.e.c.

54. Manufacture of industrial and commercial electrical appliances
55. Manufacture of household cooking, heating and laundry appliances
56. Manufacture of other electrical appliances n.e.c.
57. Manufacture of electrical lamp fixtures
b. Pollutive/Hazardous (sic) Industries
1. Flour Mill
2. Cassava Flour Mill
3. Manufacturing of coffee
4. Manufacturing of unprepared animal feeds, other grain milling n.e.c.
5. Production prepared feed for animals
6. Cigar and cigarette Factory
7. Curing and redrying tobacco leaves
8. Miscellaneous processing tobacco leaves n.e.c.

9. Weaving hemp textile
10. Jute spinning and weaving
11. Miscellaneous spinning and weaving mills n.e.c.
12. Hosiery mill
13. Underwear and outwear knitting mills
14. Fabric knitting mills
15. Miscellaneous knitting mills n.e.c.
16. Manufacture of mats and mattings
17. Manufacture of carpets and rugs

18. Manufacture of cordage, rope and twine
19. Manufacture of related products from abaca, sisal, henequen, hemp, cotton,
paper, etc.
20. Manufacture of linoleum and other surface coverings

21. Manufacture of machines for leather and leather products
22. Manufacture of construction machinery
23. Manufacture of machines for clay, stove and glass industries
24. Manufacture, assembly, repair, rebuilding of miscellaneous special industrial
machinery and equipment n.e.c.
25. Manufacture of dry cells, storage battery and other batteries
26. Boat building and repairing
27. Ship repairing industry, dock yards, dry dock, shipways
28. Miscellaneous shipbuilding and repairing n.e.c.
29. Manufacture of locomotive and parts
30. Manufacture of railroads and street cars

31. Manufacture of assembly of automobiles, cars, buses, trucks and trailers
32. Manufacture of wood furniture including upholstered
33. Manufacture of rattan furniture including upholstered
34. Manufacture of box beds and mattresses
2. Use Regulations in Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3)
The Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) shall be for highly Pollutive/Non-Hazardous;
Pollutive/Hazardous; Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; Non-
Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous
manufacturing and processing establishments. Enumerated below are the
allowable uses:
a. Highly Pollutive/Non-Hazardous Industries

1. Meat processing, curing, preserving except processing of ham, bacon, sausage
and chicharon
2. Milk processing plants (manufacturing filled, reconstituted or recombined milk,
condensed or evaporated)
3. Butter and cheese processing plants
4. Natural fluid milk processing (pasteurizing, homogenizing, vitaminizing bottling

of natural animal milk and cream related products)
5. Other dairy products n.e.c.
6. Canning and preserving of fruits and fruit juices
7. Canning and preserving of vegetables and vegetable juices
8. Canning and preserving of vegetable sauces

9. Miscellaneous canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables, n.e.c.
10. Fish canning
11. Patis factory
12. Bagoong factory
13. Processing, preserving and canning of fish and other seafoods, n.e.c.
14. Manufacture of dessicated coconut

15. Manufacture of starch and its by-products
16. Manufacture of wines from juices of local fruits
17. Manufacture of malt and malt liquors
18. Manufacture of soft drinks carbonated water
19. Manufacture of instant beverages and syrups
20. Other non-alcoholic beverages, n.e.c.
21. Other slaughtering, preparing and preserving meat products, n.e.c.

b. Highly Pollutive/Hazardous Industries
1. Vegetable oil mills, including coconut oil
2. Manufacturing of refined cooking oil and margarine
3. Manufacture of fish, marine and other animal oils
4. Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats, n.e.c.
5. Sugar cane milling (centrifugal refined)
6. Sugar refining
7. Muscovado Sugar Mill
8. Distilled, rectified and blended liquors, n.e.c.
9. Cotton textile mill
10. Ramie textile mill
11. Rayon and other man-made fiber textile mill
12. Bleaching and drying mills
13. Manufacture of narrow fabrics
14. Tanneries and leather finishing plants
15. Pulp mills

16. Paper and paperboard mills
17. Manufacture of fiberboard
18. Manufacture of inorganic salts and compounds
19. Manufacture of soap and cleaning preparations
20. Manufacture of hydraulic cement
21. Manufacture of lime and lime kilns

22. Manufacture of plaster
23. Products of blast furnace, steel works and rolling mills
24. Product of iron and steel foundries
25. Manufacture of smelted and refined non-ferrous metals
26. Manufacture of rolled, drawn or astruded non-ferrous metals
27. Manufacture of non-ferrous foundry products
c. Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries

1. Manufacture of industrial alcohols
2. Other basic industrial chemicals
3. Manufacture of fertilizers
4. Manufacture of pesticides
5. Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials and man-made fibers except
glass
6. Petroleum refineries and oil depots
7. Manufacture of reclaimed, blended and compound petroleum products
8. Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal
d. Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture of paints
2. Manufacture of varnishes, shellac and stains

3. Manufacture of paint removers
4. Manufacture of other paint products
5. Manufacture of matches
6. Manufacture of tires and inner tubes
7. Manufacture of processed natural rubber not in rubber plantations
8. Manufacture of miscellaneous rubber products, n.e.c.
e. Non-Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture of compressed and liquefied gases
SEC. 2. The land use where the existing industries are located, the operation of
which are permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby classified as
Industrial Zone.
The City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) shall prepare an amended
Zoning Map and Zoning Boundaries which shall be submitted to the City
Council for review.
SEC. 3. The Zoning Fees shall be P10/sq.m. of total floor area for MEDIUM
INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) and P10/sq.m. of total floor area for HEAVY
INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-3).
SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. — Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of Ordinance No.
8119 and all other Ordinances or provisions therein inconsistent with the
provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed, amended, rescinded or
modified accordingly.
SEC. 5. Effectivity Clause. — This Ordinance shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after its publication in accordance with law.
xxx xxx xxx.
46. Id. at 74.
Sec. 4 of Ordinance No. 8187 reads:
SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. — Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of Ordinance No.
8119 and all other Ordinances or provisions therein inconsistent with the
provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed, amended, rescinded or
otherwise modified accordingly.
47. Section 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following
legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx

(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation
and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the
morality, peace good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter; and to
fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed to two
hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine and
imprisonment, for a single offense.
48. SECTION 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
49. Article 8, Civil Code.
50. Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
51. Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
52. SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. — Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the
following rights of citizens are hereby sought to be recognized and the State
shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:
[a] The right to breathe clean air;
[b] The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principles of
sustainable development;
[c] The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and
monitoring of environmental policies and programs and in the decision-
making process;
[d] The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning
development policies, plans and programs projects or activities that may
have adverse impact on the environment and public health;
[e] The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any
activity, undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any
significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate
release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;
[f] The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or
her rights effectively under this Act;
[g] The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities
in violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compel the
rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of
penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and
[h] The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages
resulting from the adverse environmental and public health impact of a
project or activity.
53. SEC. 12. Ambient Air Quality Guideline Values and Standards. — The
Department, in coordination with other concerned agencies, shall review and
or revise and publish annually a list of hazardous air pollutants with
corresponding ambient guideline values and/or standard necessary to
protect health and safety, and general welfare. The initial list and values of
the hazardous air pollutants shall be as follows:
a) For National Ambient Air Quality Guideline for Criteria Pollutants:
Short Long
Term a Term b
Averaging Averaging
Pollutants µg/Ncm ppm Time µg/Ncm ppm Time
Suspended
Particulate 230d 24 hours 90 - 1 yeare
Matterc - TSP
-PM-10 150f 24 hours 60 - 1 yeare
Sulfur Dioxidec 180 0.07 24 hours 80 0.03 1 year
Nitrogen Dioxide 150 0.08 24 hours - - -
Photochemical
Oxidants 140 0.07 1 hour - - -
As Ozone 60 0.03 8 hours - - -
Carbon Monoxide 35mg/Ncm 30 1 hour - - -
10mg/Ncm 9 8 hours
Leadg 1.5 - 3 monthsg 1.0 - 1 year
a Maximum limits represented by ninety-eight percentile (98%) values

not to be exceed more than once a year.
b Arithmetic mean
c SO2 and Suspended Particulate matter are sampled once every six
days when using the manual methods. A minimum of twelve sampling
days per quarter of forty-eight sampling days each year is required
for these methods. Daily sampling may be done in the future once
continuous analyzers are procured and become available.
d Limits for Total Suspended Particulate Matter with mass median
diameter less than 25-50 um.
e Annual Geometric Mean
f Provisional limits for Suspended Particulate Matter with mass median
diameter less than 10 microns and below until sufficient monitoring
data are gathered to base a proper guideline.
g Evaluation of this guideline is carried out for 24-hour averaging time
and averaged over three moving calendar months. The monitored
average value for any three months shall not exceed the guideline
value.
b) For National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Source Specific Air Pollutants
from Industrial Sources/Operations:

Averaging Method of Analysis/
Pollutants1 Concentration2 time (min.) Measurement3
µ/Ncm ppm
Ammonia 200 0.28 30 Nesselerization/
Indo Phenol
Carbon
Disulfide 30 0.01 30 Tischer Method
Chlorine and
Chlorine 100 0.03 5 Methyl Orange
Compounds
expressed as
Cl2
Formaldehyde 50 0.04 30 Chromotropic acid
Method or MBTH
Colorimetric Method
Hydrogen 200100 0.13 30 Volhard Titration with
Chloride Iodine Solution
Hydrogen 100 0.07 30 Methylene Blue
Sulfide
Lead 20 30 AASc
Nitrogen 375,260 0.20,0.14 30,60 Greiss-Saltzman
Dioxide
Phenol 100 0.03 30 4-Aminoantiphyrine
Sulfur 470, 340 0.18, 30,60 Colorimetric-
Dioxide 0.13 Pararosaniline
Suspended
Particulate
Matter-TSP 300 - 60 Gravimetric
1 Pertinent ambient standards for Antimony, Arsenic, Cadmium,
Asbestos, Nitric Acid and Sulfuric Acid Mists in the 1978 NPCC Rules
and Regulations may be considered as guides in determining
compliance.
2 Ninety-eight percentile (98%) values of 30-minute sampling measured
at 25°C and one atmosphere pressure.
3 Other equivalent methods approved by the Department may be used.
The basis in setting up the ambient air quality guideline values and standards
shall reflect, among others, the latest scientific knowledge including
information on:
a) Variable, including atmospheric conditions, which of themselves or in
combination with other factors may alter the effects on public health or
welfare of such air pollutant;
b) The other types of air pollutants which may interact with such pollutant to
produce an adverse effect on public health or welfare; and
c) The kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public health or welfare which
may be expected from presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, in
varying quantities.
The Department shall base such ambient air quality standards on World Health
Organization (WHO) standards, but shall not be limited to nor be less
stringent than such standards.
54. SEC. 19. Pollution from Stationary Sources. — The Department shall, within two
(2) years from the effectivity of this Act, and every two (2) years thereafter,
review, or as the need therefore arises, revise and publish emission
standards, to further improve the emission standards for stationary sources
of air pollution. Such emission standards shall be based on mass rate of
emission for all stationary source of air pollution based on internationally
accepted standards, but not be limited to, nor be less stringent than such
standards and with the standards set forth in this section. The standards,
whichever is applicable, shall be the limit on the acceptable level of
pollutants emitted from a stationary source for the protection of the public's
health and welfare.
With respect to any trade, industry, process and fuel-burning equipment or
industrial plant emitting air pollutants, the concentration at the point of
emission shall not exceed the following limits:
Maximum
Standard Applicable to Permissible Method of
Pollutants Source Limits Analysisa
(mg/Ncm)
Antimony and
1.
Its
any source 10 as Sb AASb
compounds
2. Arsenic and its Any source 10 as As AASb
compounds
Cadmium and
3.
its
Any source 10 as Cd AASb
compounds
Carbon
4. Any industrial 500 as CO Orsat analysis
Monoxide
Source
5. Copper and its Any industrial 100 as Cu AASb
Compounds source
Hydrofluoric
6. Any source Titration with
Acids
and Fluoride other than the 50 as HF Ammonium
compounds manufacture of Thiocyanate
Aluminum from
Alumina
Hydrogen
7. i) Geothermal cd Cadmium Sulfide
Sulfide
Power Plants Method
ii) Geothermal
Exploration and e
well-
testing
iii) Any source 7 as H2S Cadmium Sulfide
other
than (i) and (ii) Method
8. Lead Any trade, industry 10 as Pb AASb
or
process
9. Mercury Any Source 5 as AASb/Cold-
elemental Hg Vapor Technique
or Hg Analyzer
10.Nickel and its
compounds,
Any source 20 as Ni AASb
except
Nickel Carbonyl
f
2,000 as acid
11.NOx i) Manufacture of and NOx and Phenol-disulfonic
Nitric Acid calculated as acid Method
NO2
ii) Fuel burning
Phenol-disulfonic
steam
generators acid Method
Existing Source 1,500 as NO2
New Source
• Coal-Fired 1,000 as NO2
• Oil-Fired 500 as NO2
iii) Any source
Phenol-disulfonic
other
than (i) and (ii) acid Method
Existing Source 1000 as NO2
New Source 500 as NO2
12. Phosphorus Any source 200 as P2O5 Spectrophotometry
Pentoxideg
13.Zinc and its Any source 100 as Zn AASb
Compounds
a Other equivalent methods approved by the Department may be used.
b Atomic Absorption Specttrophotometry
c All new geothermal power plants starting construction by 01 January
1995 shall control HsS emissions to not more than 150 g/GMW-Hr
d All existing geothermal power plants shall control HsS emissions to not
more than 200 g/GMW-Hr within 5 years from the date of effectivity of
these revised regulations.
e Best practicable control technology for air emissions and liquid
discharges. Compliance with air and water quality standards is
required.
f Emission limit of Nickel Carbonyl shall not exceed 0.5 mg/Ncm.
g Provisional Guideline
Provided, That the maximum limits in mg/ncm particulates in said sources shall
be:
1. Fuel Burning Equipment
a) Urban or Industrial Area 150 mg/Ncm
b) Other Area 200 mg/Ncm
2. Cement Plants (Kilns, etc.) 150 mg/Ncm
3. Smelting Furnaces 150 mg/Ncm
4. Other Stationary Sourcesa 200 mg/Ncm
Other Stationary Sources means a trade, process, industrial plant, or
a
fuel
burning equipment other than thermal power plants, industrial
boilers,
cement plants, incinerators and smelting furnaces.
Provided, further, That the maximum limits for sulfur oxides in said sources shall
be:
(1) Existing Sources
Manufacture of Sulfuric Acid
(i) 2.0gm.Ncm as SO3
and
Sulf(on)ation Process
(ii) Fuel burning Equipment 1.5gm.Ncm as SO2
(iii) Other Stationary Sourcesa 1.0gm.Ncm as SO3
(2) New Sources
Manufacture of Sulfuric Acid
(i) 1.5 gm.Ncm as SO3
and
Sulf(on)ation Process
(ii) Fuel Burning Equipment 0.7 gm.Ncm as SO2
(iii) Other Stationary Sourcesa 0.2 gm.Ncm as SO3
Other Stationary Sources refer to existing and new
a
stationary sources
other than those caused by the manufacture of sulfuric acid
and
sulfonation process, fuel burning equipment and
incineration.
For stationary sources of pollution not specifically included in the immediately

preceding paragraph, the following emission standards shall not be exceeded
in the exhaust gas:
I. Daily and Half Hourly Average Values
Daily Average Half Hourly
Values Average Values
Total dust 10 mg/m3 30 mg/m3
Gaseous and vaporous organic substances, 10 mg/m3 20 mg/m3
expressed as total organic carbon
Hydrogen chloride (HCl) 10 mg/m3 60 mg/m3
Hydrogen fluoride (HF) 1 mg/m3 4 mg/m3
Sulfur dioxide (SO2) 50 mg/m3 200 mg/m 3
Nitrogen monoxide (NO) and Nitrogen
dioxide (NO2), expressed as nitrogen 200 mg/m 3 400 mg/m 3
dioxide for incineration plants with a
capacity exceeding 3 tonnes per hour
Nitrogen monoxide (NO) and nitrogen
dioxide (NO2), expressed as nitrogen 300 mg/m 3
dioxide for incineration plants with a
capacity of 3 tonnes per hour or less
Ammonia 10 mg/m3 20 mg/m3
All the Average Values Over the Sample Period of a Minimum of 4 and Maximum
II.
of 8 Hours.
Cadmium and its compounds, expressed as
total 0.05
cadmium (Cd)
Thallium and its compounds, expressed as
mg/m3
thallium (Tl)
Mercury and its Compounds, expressed as
0.05 mg/m 3
mercury (Hg)
Antimony and its compounds, expressed as
antimony (Sb)
Arsenic and its compounds, expressed as arsenic
total 0.5
(As)
mg/m3
Lead and its compounds, expressed as lead (Pb)
Chromium and its compounds, expressed as
chromium (Cr)
Cobalt and its compounds, expressed as cobalt
(Co)
Copper and its compounds, expressed as copper
(Cu)
Manganese and its compounds, expressed as
manganese (Mn)
Nickel and its compounds, expressed as nickel
(Ni)
Vanadium and its compounds, expressed as
vanadium (V)
Tin and its compounds, expressed as tin (Sn)
These average values cover also gaseous and the vapor forms of the relevant
heavy metal emission as well as their compounds: Provided, That the
emission of dioxins and furans into the air shall be reduced by the most
progressive techniques: Provided, further, That all average of dioxin and
furans measured over the sample period of a minimum of 5 hours and
maximum of 8 hours must not exceed the limit value of 0.1 nanogram/m3.
Pursuant to Sec. 8 of this Act, the Department shall prepare a detailed action plan
setting the emission standards or standards of performance for any
stationary source the procedure for testing emissions for each type of
pollutant, and the procedure for enforcement of said standards.
Existing industries, which are proven to exceed emission rates established by the
Department in consultation with stakeholders, after a thorough, credible and
transparent measurement process shall be allowed a grace period of
eighteen (18) months for the establishment of an environmental
management system and the installation of an appropriate air pollution
control device: Provided, That an extension of not more than twelve (12)
months may be allowed by the Department on meritorious grounds.

55. SEC. 30. Ozone-Depleting Substances. — Consistent with the terms and
conditions of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer and other international agreements and protocols to which the
Philippines is a signatory, the Department shall phase out ozone-depleting
substances.
Within sixty (60) days after the enactment of this Act, the Department shall
publish a list of substances which are known to cause harmful effects on the
stratospheric ozone layer.
56. Article 6
1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and
development of the child.
57. Article 24
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and
rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is
deprived of his or her right of access to such health care services.
2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particular,
shall take appropriate measures:
(a) To diminish infant and child mortality;
(b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care to all
children with emphasis on the development of primary health care;
(c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of primary
health care, through, inter alia, the application of readily available
technology and through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean
drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of
environmental pollution;
(d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers;
(e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and children, are
informed, have access to education and are supported in the use of basic
knowledge of child health and nutrition, the advantages of breastfeeding,
hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention of accidents;
(f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family planning
education and services.
3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to
abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.
4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage international co-operation
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the right
recognized in the present article. In this regard, particular account shall be
taken of the needs of developing countries.
58. Article 27
1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate
for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.
2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility
to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of
living necessary for the child's development.
3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means,
shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for
the child to implement this right and shall in case of need provide material
assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition,
clothing and housing.
4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of
maintenance for the child from the parents or other persons having financial
responsibility for the child, both within the State Party and from abroad. In
particular, where the person having financial responsibility for the child lives
in a State different from that of the child, States Parties shall promote the
accession to international agreements or the conclusion of such agreements,
as well as the making of other appropriate arrangements.
59. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916 Vol. I, p. 44. Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus
and Certiorari.
60. Id. at 58-59.
61. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1846-1926.
62. Resolutions dated 20 October 2009, rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I (no proper
pagination, should be pp. 319-320; 15 June 2010, rollo in G.R. No. 187916,
Vol. IV, pp. 1979-1980; 31 August 2010, rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp.
2002-2003; 31 May 2011, rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. V, pp. 2347-2348;
and 17 July 2012, rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. VI, pp. 2746-2747.
63. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 282-300.
64. Id., Vol. IV, pp. 2128-2132.
65. Id. at 2129.
66. Id.
67. Id., Vol. V, pp. 2661-2662.
The new Ordinance reads:
ORDINANCE NO. 8283
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 2 OF ORDINANCE NO. 8187 BY
RECLASSIFYING THE AREA WHERE PETROLEUM REFINERIES AND OIL DEPOTS
ARE LOCATED FROM HEAVY INDUSTRIAL (1-3) TO HIGH INTENSITY
COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE (C3/MXD)
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, in session, assembled, THAT:
SEC. 1. Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8187 shall be amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. The land use where the existing industries are located, the operation of
which are permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby classified as
Industrial Zone except the area where petroleum refineries and oil
depots are located, which shall be classified as High Intensity
Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD)."
SEC. 2. Owners or operators of petroleum refineries and oil depots, the operation
of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a
period until the end of January 2016 within which to relocate the operation of
their businesses.
SEC. 3. The City Planning and Development Office shall prepare an amended
zoning map and zoning boundaries which shall be submitted to the City
Council for review.
SEC. 4. All ordinances or provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions of
this Ordinance are hereby repealed, amended, rescinded or modified
accordingly.
SEC. 5. This Ordinance shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in
accordance with law.
This Ordinance was finally enacted by the City Council of Manila on August 28,
2012.
PRESIDED BY:
FRANCISCO "Isko Moreno" DOMAGOSO
Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer
City Council, Manila
68. Id. at 2662.
The bottom portion of Ordinance No. 8283 reads:
BY HIS HONOR, THE MAYOR ON 11 Sept. 2012,
I veto this Ordinance for Being prejudicial to public welfare and in view of the
pending cases in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 187836 and G.R. No. 187916)
69. Id. at 2516-2518.
70. Id. at 2526-2534.
71. Resolutions dated 20 October 2009, rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I (no proper
pagination, should be 319-320); 15 June 2010, rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol.
IV, pp. 1979-1980; 31 August 2010, rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp.
2002-2003; 31 May 2011, rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. V, pp. 2347-2348;
and 17 July 2012, rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. VI, pp. 2746-2747.
72. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2495-2503.
73. SECTION 481. Qualifications, Term Powers and Duties. — . . .

xxx xxx xxx
(b) The legal officer, the chief legal counsel of the local government unit, shall
take charge of the office for legal services and shall:
xxx xxx xxx

(3) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the legal officer shall:
(i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings
wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official
capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a
component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal
officer may be employed to represent the adverse party;
In that case, the Court held:
. . . [The DOE] seeks to intervene in order to represent the interests of the
members of the public who stand to suffer if the Pandacan Terminals'
operations are discontinued. . . . Suffice it to say at this point that, for the
purpose of hearing all sides and considering the transcendental
importance of this case, we will also allow DOE's intervention. (Emphasis
supplied)
75. Santiago v. COMELEC , 336 Phil. 848, 880 (1997) citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 134 further citing
the landmark Emergency Powers Cases (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368
(1949).
76. Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation , 274 Phil. 323, 335 (1991)
citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Hon.
Tan, 246 Phil. 380, 385 (1988).
77. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 798 (1989).
78. Sections 1 to 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

xxx xxx xxx
Section 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court,
to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the respondent.
79. Id.
80. Resolution dated 13 April 2010 in A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC.
81. Sec. 2, Part I, Rule I, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
82. Id.
83. Sec. 3, Part I, Rule I, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
84. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2202-2203. Memorandum of Shell citing
Ortega v. Quezon City Government, 506 Phil. 373 (2005).
85. 465 Phil. 529 (2004).
86. Id. at 541 citing Philnabank Employees Association v. Estanislao, G.R. No.
104209, 16 November 1993, 227 SCRA 804, 811.
87. Id. at 542 citing Tano v. Hon. Gov. Socrates, 343 Phil. 670, 698 (1997);
Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 107921, 1 July 1993, 224
SCRA 236, 243.
88. Aquino v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617 SCRA 623, 638 citing
Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp. , 400 Phil. 307 (2000) and
Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461 (1998).
89. Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp. , 400 Phil. 307 (2000); Sen.
Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 464 Phil. 375, 384 (2004).
90. Sen. Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp. , 464 Phil. 375, 385 (2004).
91. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2100. Memorandum of Chevron.
Chevron relied on the ruling in Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Hon.
Romulo, 489 Phil. 710, 718 (2005) where the Court held:
For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
92. Id. at 2222. Memorandum of Shell citing Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R.
No. 159357, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 283 and Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 320
Phil. 171 (1995).
93. 522 Phil. 705 (2006).
94. Id. at 1859 citing Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830
(2003).
95. Id. citing Tolentino v. COMELEC , 465 Phil. 385 (2004).
96. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1858-1859 citing Francisco v. House of
Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003).
97. Id.; Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA
283.
98. Id.; Id. at 1863 citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224
SCRA 792.
99. Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr., supra note 8 at 492-493.
100. G.R. No. 192088, 9 October 2012, 682 SCRA 602.

101. Id. at 633-634.
102. Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. V, pp. 2144-2145. Memorandum of Petron citing
Aduan v. Chong, G.R. No. 172796, 13 July 2009, 592 SCRA 508; see also
Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 (1997); Duero v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil.
12 (2002); D.M. Consunji v. Esguerra, 328 Phil. 1168 (1996); and Planters
Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 271 Phil. 592 (1991) citing Carson v. Judge
Pantanosas, Jr., 259 Phil. 628 (1989).
103. G.R. No. 187167, 16 August 2011, 655 SCRA 476.
104. Id. at 487-488.
105. IBP v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 632 (2000) citing Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 and 113888, 19
August 1994, 235 SCRA 506 citing Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department
of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, 4 December 1990, 192 SCRA 51;
Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 184 Phil. 369 (1980); and People v.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
106. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 62. Urgent Petition for Prohibition,
Mandamus and Certiorari.
107. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2097.
Sec. 163. Presentation of Community Tax Certificate on Certain
Occasions. — (a) When an individual subject to the community tax
acknowledges any document before a notary public, takes the oath of
office upon election or appointment to any position in the government
service; receives any license, certificate, or permit from any public authority;
pays any tax or fee; receives any money from any public fund; transacts
other official business; or receives any salary or wage from any person or
corporation, it shall be the duty of any person, officer or corporation with
whom such transaction is made or business done or from whom any salary or
wage is received to require such individual to exhibit the community tax
certificate. . . . . (Emphasis and underscoring in the Memorandum of
Chevron)

108. Sec. 6. Jurat. — "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document.
109. As amended by Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
110. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2216.
111. 550 Phil. 98 (2007).
112. Id. at 107.
113. Id. at 108-110.
114. Rollo in G.R. No. 156052 (no proper pagination, should be p. 1844). Resolution
dated 2 June 2009.
115. Supra note 110 at 110-111.
116. Section 458 (a) (2) (viii), Local Government Code.
117. Tuzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90107, 21 August 1992, 212 SCRA 739,
747.
118. Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. applying Section 458 (a) (2) (viii) of
the Local Government Code.
119. Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr., supra note 8 at 493 citing supra
note 116.
121. Id. at 702.

122. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 296. Comment of respondents Vice-Mayor
Domagoso and the City Councilors who voted in favor of the assailed
Ordinance.
123. Id., Vol. IV, pp. 1852-1857. Memorandum of former Mayor Lim.
Former Mayor Lim narrated that when he received the draft Ordinance for his
approval, he did not readily act upon it but took the time to seriously study
the pros and cons of enacting the Ordinance; that he issued Executive Order
No. 18 creating an ad hoc panel to conduct a study thereon; that the
Assistant City Treasurer of Manila submitted to him a list of properties that
would be affected by the proposed ordinance and the real property taxes
they paid from 2007 to 2009; that he conducted a stakeholders' consultative
meeting composed of some Cabinet Secretaries and other officials, including
the Joint Foreign Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines; that Engr. Rodolfo
H. Catu (Engr. Catu), Officer in Charge of the City Planning and Development
Office, together with the ad hoc panel earlier created, conducted an ocular
inspection of the Pandacan Terminal, and submitted a favorable
recommendation; that he also sought guidance from His Eminence,
Gaudencio Cardinal Rosales; that he received a profile of the safety and
security features installed at the Pandacan oil depots from Shell; that he
likewise personally conducted an ocular inspection where he was assured by
then President Arroyo and her cabinet secretaries, who happened to visit the
site on the same day, that they interpose no objection to the proposed
ordinance; and that the European Chamber of Commerce expressed support
to the ordinance. It was only then that he made a decision to approve the
Ordinance.
124. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
125. Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9.
126. Id. at 704-707.
127. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2103-2104. Memorandum of Chevron;
rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. V, pp. 2220-2225. Memorandum of Petron.
128. Id. at 1883. Memorandum of former Mayor Lim.
129. Id. at 2285-2310. Memorandum of Shell.
130. Id. at 2112. Memorandum of Chevron. Emphasis supplied.
131. Id. at 2280. Memorandum of Shell.
132. Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9 at 702-703.
133. Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr., supra note 8 at 494.
134. Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9 at 702-720.
135. Id. at 720.
136. Id. at 722-723.
137. Id. at 721.
138. Id. at 723.
139. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. V, p. 2496. Compliance/Explanation with Urgent
Manifestation of Atty. Gempis, Jr.
140. Gone v. Atty. Macario Ga, A.C. No. 7771, 6 April 2011, 647 SCRA 243, 250.
141. Sibulo v. Ilagan, 486 Phil. 197, 204 (2004) citing Canons 1, 7, and 11, Code of
Professional Responsibility.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 204-205 citing Dr. Gamilla v. Atty. Mariño, Jr., 447 Phil. 419 (2003).
LEONEN, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 2757-2765 (respondent's manifestation) and 2813-
2820 (respondent-intervenor Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation's
manifestation). The compliance/explanation with urgent manifestation dated
September 13, 2012 of respondent was filed by Luch R. Gempis, Jr.,
Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila. The manifestation with
motion to dismiss dated September 2, 2013 of respondent-intervenor
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation likewise informed this court of the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8283.
2. Id. at 2760.
3. Id. at 2031.
4. Id. at 2029-2030.
5. Id. at 2032. The pipeline was inaugurated in 1969.
6. Id. at 2031.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2030 and 2526. The data supplied by Chevron and Shell in their
memoranda does not indicate the specific years when the data was
collected.
9. Id. at 2030.
10. Id. at 2032.
11. An Act Declaring a National Policy on the Petroleum Industry, Regulating the
Activities and Relations of Persons and Entities engaged therein, Establishing
an Oil Industry Commission to Effectuate the Same, and Defining its
Functions, Powers and Objectives, and for Other Purposes (1971). Rep. Act
No. 6173 was subsequently amended by Pres. Decrees numbered 56, 102,
389-A, 429-A, 456 and 1128.
12. Pres. Decree No. 1206 (1977), otherwise known as Creating the Department of
Energy.
13. Pres. Decree No. 1206 (1977), sec. 1.
14. An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry, and for Other Purposes
(1998).
15. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2035.

16. Ordinance Reclassifying the Land Use of that Portions of Land Bounded by the
Pasig River in the North, PNR railroad track in the East, Beata St. in the
South, Palumpong St. in the Southwest, and Estero de Pandacan in the West,
PNR railroad in the Northwest Area, Estero de Pandacan in the Northeast,
Pasig River in the Southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the Southwest; The area
of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28
St. and the F. Manalo Street from Industrial II to Commercial I (2001).
17. Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 658, 668 (2008)
[Per J. Corona, First Division].
18. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 2034-2035.
19. Id. at 2036.
20. Id. at 2037.
21. Id. at 2038.
22. Id. at 2040.
23. Id. at 2040-2041.
24. Id. at 2041.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2042.
28. Id. at 2043.

29. Id.
30. Id. at 2043-2044.
33. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2046.
34. Id.
35. Rule 52, sec. 2 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. — No second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained.
36. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2047.
37. Id. at 3-10.
38. Rollo (G.R. No. 187916), pp. 11-67.
39. Tano v. Hon. Gov. Socrates, 343 Phil. 670, 700 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En
Banc], citing La Union Electric Cooperative v. Yaranon, 259 Phil. 457, 466
(1989) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division] and Francisco v. Permskul, 255 Phil.
311, 322 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
40. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 342 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
41. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, et al. v. City of Manila,
127 Phil. 306 (1967) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
42. Id. at 314-315, citing U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102, 111 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm,
En Banc].
43. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 343 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
44. Rep. Act No. 409 (1949), otherwise known as An Act to Revise the Charter of
the City of Manila, and for Other Purposes.

45. 495 Phil. 289 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]. This case involved an ordinance,
classified by the city council as a zoning ordinance, which prohibited the
establishment or operation of certain businesses in the Ermita-Malate area.
46. Id. at 332-334.
47. An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining its
Powers and Functions, Providing Funds therefor and for Other Purposes
(1995).
48. The Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7924 became effective on
June 8, 1996.
49. Providing for the Preparation and Implementation of the Comprehensive Land
Use Plans of Local Government Units Pursuant to the Local Government Code
of 1991 and Other Pertinent Laws (1993).
50. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1810.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1810-1812.
53. G.R. No. 204429, February 18, 2014
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2014/february2014/204429.pdf> [Per J. Carpio, En Banc],
citing LAMP v. Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, April
24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
54. Id. at p. 13.
55. G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013, 693 SCRA 141 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
56. Id. at 157, citing White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444 (2009)
[Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
57. 495 Phil. 289 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
58. Id. at 308.
59. Hon. Ma. Lourdes C. Fernando, in her capacity as City Mayor of Marikina City, et
al. v. St. Scholastica's College and St. Scholastica's Academy-Marikina, Inc.,
G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013, 693 SCRA 141, 157 [Per J. Mendoza, En
Banc].
60. Id. at 158, citing Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., 546 Phil.
485, 493 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
61. 596 Phil. 444 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

62. Id. at 462.
63. Ponencia, pp. 50 and 53-54.
64. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1761.
65. Id. at 1768.
66. Id. at 1770.

67. Id. at 1773-1774.
68. Id. at 1772.
69. Id. at 1767.
70. Ponencia, p. 53.
71. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2039.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2368.
74. Id. at 2369.
75. Id.
76. Ponencia pp. 55-56.

77. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 2487-2488.
78. Id. at 2222.
79. Id. at 2223.
80. Id. at 2224-2225.
81. Id. at 2222.
82. Id. at 2370.
83. Id. at 2371.
84. Id. at 2462.
85. Id. at 2462-2463.
86. Id. at 2115-2122.
87. Id. at 1760-1761.
88. J. Leonen, dissenting opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8,
2014 <http//sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2014/april2014/204819.pdf> [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
89. 546 Phil. 485 (2007) [Per J. Corona, En Banc]; 568 Phil. 658 (2008) [Per J.
Corona, First Division]. The 2008 Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon.
Atienza, Jr. case is a resolution on the interventions of Chevron Philippines,
Inc., Petron Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
92. Id. at 720.
93. Id. at 702-705.
94. Id. at 708-709.
95. An Act Creating the Department of Energy Rationalizing the Organization and
Functions of Government Agencies Related to Energy, and for Other
Purposes (1992).
96. Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 658, 709-715
(2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
97. Id. at 706.

98. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1758.
99. Id. at 1765.
100. 238 Phil. 136 (1987) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
101. Id. at 146.
102. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1767.
103. Villanueva v. Castañeda, 238 Phil. 136, 139 (1987) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
104. Id. at 146.
105. Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., 546 Phil. 485 (2007) and
568 Phil. 658 [Per J. Corona, First Division].
107. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 1768-1770.
108. Id. at 2224.
109. Id. at 2223.
110. Id. at 1770.
111. 568 Phil. 658 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
112. Id. at 683-684. See Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil. 306, 325 (1967) [Per J. Fernando, En
Banc]; US v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102, 110 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc];
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 157 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En
Banc].
113. Atitiw, et al. v. Zamora, et al., 508 Phil. 321, 341 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En
Banc].
114. 32 Phil. 36 (1915) [Per J. Trent, En Banc].
115. Id. at 49.
116. 504 Phil. 543 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
117. Id. at 558.
119. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2053.

120. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1981), sec. 9.
121. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1981), sec. 21.

122. An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.
123. Emmanuel A. De Castro v. Emerson S. Carlos, G.R. No. 194994, April 16,
2013, 696 SCRA 400, 407 [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].
124. 560 Phil. 499 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
125. Id. at 505-506 and 509.
126. Ernesto Dy v. Hon. Gina M. Bibat-Palamos, G.R. No. 196200, September 11,
2013, 705 SCRA 613, 622 [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division], citing Republic of
the Philippines v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 174385, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA
306 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
127. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 1761-1762.
128. G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792 [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
129. J. Leonen, concurring opinion in Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25,
2013, 699 SCRA 352, 491 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc], citing David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 755 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En
Banc].
130. J. Leonen, concurring opinion in Garcia v. Drilon , G.R. No. 179267, June 25,
2013, 699 SCRA 352, 491 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc], citing Galicto v.
Aquino III, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 150, 170 [Per J.
Brion, En Banc].
131. J. Puno, dissenting opinion in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5,
1994, 232 SCRA 110 [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
132. Id. at 166, 169, and 170-171.
133. 465 Phil. 385 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
134. Id. at 402.
135. Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA
283 [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
136. Id. at 296-297.
137. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1764.
138. 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
139. Id. at 899.
140. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1764.

141. Id. at 1764.
142. J. Leonen, concurring opinion in Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25,
2013, 699 SCRA 352, 493 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
143. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 2065-2066.
144. De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, 561 Phil. 512 (2007) [Per J. Austria-
Martinez, Third Division].
145. Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (2010).

146. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 7, sec. 2.
147. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 7, sec. 2 (f).
148. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1775.
149. Rep. Act No. 8749 (1999), otherwise known as An Act Providing for a
Comprehensive Air Pollution Control Policy and for Other Purposes.
150. An Act to Control Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes,
Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (1990).
151. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2142.
152. Id. at 2143.

153. Id.
154. Id. at 2815.
155. Id. at 2814.
156. Id. at 2816.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2760.
159. Id. at 2766-2767.
160. Id. at 2760.
161. Id. at 2761.
162. Id. at 2781-2783.
163. Id. at 2782.
164. 495 Phil. 289 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]. This court held that:
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of
the legislative will must necessarily prevail and override the earlier law, the
Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or
later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two
laws on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that
which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative
will.
xxx xxx xxx
In addition, Section 534 (f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws,
acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly." (pp. 333-334)
165. 522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
166. Id. at 753.
167. Id. at 754.
168. 589 Phil. 387 (2008) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
169. Id. at 490.
170. Id. at 490.
171. J. Leonen, concurring opinion in Araullo v. Aquino G.R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/209287.pdf> [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
172. J. Leonen, dissenting and concurring opinion in Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of
Justice , G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014,
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2014/february2014/203335.pdf> [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
173. J. Leonen, dissenting opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa G.R. No. 204819, April 8,
2014, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2014/april2014/204819.pdf> [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
174. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2466.
175. Id. at 2467.
176. R. B. Deloso, The Precautionary Principle: Relevance in International Law and
Climate Change, 80 PHIL. L. J. 644 (2006).
177. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 331-334.
178. As per the decision in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.,
546 Phil. 485, 490 and 494 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
179. Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2474.
180. Id. at 2475.
181. Id. at 2315-2317.
182. Id. at 2316.
183. Id. at 2039.
184. Id. at 2517.
185. Id. at 2760.
186. Id. at 2766-2767.
187. Philippine Information Agency, April 3, 2014
<http://news.pia.gov.ph/article/view/231396509958/estrada-orders-big-3-to-
remove-oil-depots-in-pandacan> (visited November 11, 2014); A. R. Remo
and E. Sauler, "Mayor Estrada to 'Big 3' oil firms: Submit relocation plans,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2014,
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/591385/mayor-estrada-to-big-3-oil-firms-
submit-relocation-plans> (visited November 11, 2014); B. Cupin, "Erap to oil
firms: Shut down Pandacan depot by 2016," Rappler, April 3, 2014 (last
updated April 4, 2014) <http://www.rappler.com/nation/54618-erap-estrada-
close-pandacan-oil-depot> (visited November 11, 2014).

016 Social Justice Society v. Lim

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016 Social Justice Society v. Lim

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 187836. November 25, 2014.]

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY, SAMSON

[G.R. No. 187916. November 25, 2014.]

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, MA.

CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC., PETRON CORPORATION AND

Challenged in these consolidated petitions 2 is the validity of Ordinance

G.R. No. 187836

G.R. No. 187916

Respondents Sued in their capacity as

G.R. Nos. 187836 and 187916

G.R. No. 187916

Arlene Woo Koa Principal author of City

The following intervenors, all of which are corporations organized under

importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum

History of the Pandacan

On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the shores

After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan

The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies'

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)

The owners and operators of the businesses thus aﬀected by the

Nevertheless, the oil companies were granted an extension of until 30

(1) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 20 dated 26 June 2002 between

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Pertinent provisions relative to these cases are the following:

7 March 2007 Decision in G.R. No. 156052;

Conﬁned to the resolution of the following issues raised by the petitioners,

the Court declared:

13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;

13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;

Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals speciﬁcally

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Filing of a draft Resolution amending

The Enactment of Ordinance No. 8187

a) Article III, Section 18 (kk) 47 of Republic Act No. 409 otherwise

b) Section 16 48 of Republic Act No. 7160 known as the Local

3. Despite the ﬁnality of the Decision in G.R. No. 156052, and

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(b) Environment Code (Presidential Decree No. 1152);

(d) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

2. International Conventions and Treaties to which the Philippines is a

b. Articles 6, 56 24 57 and 27 58 of the Convention on the Rights

1. the human right to safe and healthy environment[;]

3. the human right to ecologically sustainable

4. the human right to an adequate standard of living,

5. the human right of the child to live in an environment

Also pointed out by the petitioners is a speciﬁc procedure outlined in

Petitioners thus pray that:

3. . . . Manila City Ordinance 8187 [be declared] as null and void

5. . . . respondent City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim [be enjoined] from

6. . . . respondent Mayor of Manila Alfredo S. Lim [be ordered] to

The Respondents' Position

Maintaining that Ordinance No. 8187 is valid and constitutional, he

On the procedural issues, he contends that: (1) it is the function of the

Respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso

The Intervenors' Position

The new ordinance essentially amended the assailed ordinance to

According to him, he signed the Comment prepared by respondents Vice-

We may, thus, brush aside procedural inﬁrmities, if any, as we had in the

To begin with, questioned is the applicability of Rule 65 78 of the Rules of

. . . there is no appeal, or any plain,

It would appear, however, that the remedies identiﬁed by the intervenors

The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied

xxx xxx xxx