Beltrami's Kantian View of Non-Euclidean Geometry*

by Ricardo J. Gomcz, Los Angeles

The main purposc of this Brief study is to show that Beltrami's first allegcdly true
Interpretation of Lobachevsky's geometry can bc conceivcd äs pursuing a Kantian
program and äs a confirmation of both Kant's view about thc possibility of non-
Euclidcan geometrics and of the intuitive necessity of Euclidean geometry.1

Beltrami Starts his most important work on non-Euclidean geometry by pointing out
that one of his purposes is "to look for a real substratum" to such Lobachevksy's
doctrine.2 There are two main problems that we have to solve: First, what does
Beltrami mean by a real substratum of a geometrical theory and, second, why did he
believe that it was necessary to give a real substratum to Lobachevsky's geometry.
In order to answer the first question we must briefly summarize Beltrami's Interpre-
tation of Lobachevsky's geometry. According to Beltrami, the fundamental criterion of
proof of elementary geometry is the superimposability of congruent figures, and, the
most essential element of figures and constructions is the straight line. While there is no
exception to the principle of the superimposition in all surfaces of constant curvature,
such is not the case with the postulate of the determination of an straight line by two
different points in so far äs exceptions have been found for the sphere when those two
points are dismetrically opposite. Calling geodesic line on a surface any line "having the
property of being determined without ambiguity by two of its points,"3 Beltrami
claims, on the one hand, that there is no such exception for the surfaces of negative

* I want to express my gratitude to an anonymous referee whose valuable suggesrions allowed me

to polish the final version of this paper.
1
As a matter of fact, there are not direci references to Kant's work in Beltrami's mathematical
papers. It is our main conjecture that according to Beltrami's treatment of non-Euclidean
geometry it can be concluded that he was endorsing a sort of Kantian view of such geometry in
so far äs his approach was in accord with both Kant's view about the possibility of non-
Euclidean geometry and the intuitive necessity of Euclidean geometry.
2
Eugenio Beltrami, Saggio dl Interpretazione della Geometria Non-Euclidea, in Opere Afatemati-
ehe, 4 vols. (Milano: Ulrico Hoepli, 1902), vol. l, pp. 374-405, p. 375.
3
Ibid., p. 376.

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/25/15 5:46 AM
 Beltrami' s Kantian View 103

curvature and, on the other hand, that (by showing that) "it will become evident a
priori that the theory of the non-Euclidean plane geometry subsists inconditionally for
all surfaces of negative constant curvature."4
In fact, Beltrami is pushing forward the research already accomplished by
Lobachevsky. The latter had pointed out that the postulate of the straight line does not
unambiguously determine an straight line on every surface and equivalently such
postulate is not sufficient for showing that on all surfaces the sum of the three angles of
a rectilinear triangle is always equal to two right angles.5
Lobachevsky claimed that new suppositions were necessary to make such unambigu-
ous determination of the straight line (for example, it is necessary to assume the
existence of a sigle parallel through a given point of a plane to another given line in that
plane). Beltrami analogously attempts to show that in a surface of constant negative
curvature (the extra-assumption being made) the postulate of the straight line deter-
mines it unambiguously and that if that is the case, then the geometry on such surface is
the one already developed by Lobachevsky.
In this surface (Beltrami's pseudosphere) the metric is given by
ds2 = R2 (a2 - v2) du2 + 2 uvdudv + (a2 - u2) dv2
(a2 - u2 - v2)

(where Λ is a parameter, u and v are the coordinate of the starting point of the linear
element ds and R is the radii of the surface at that point). d? represents the square of a
line element of the surface whose constant negative curvature equals to —l /R2.
The surface can be generated by the rotation about the u-axis of the curve - tractrix -
whose equation is

and in which ufor all of its points the position of the tangent between such points and
the u-axis is constant and equal to r."6
Then Beltrami shows that through any (real) point it is possible to draw two (real)
geodesic parallels to a (real) geodesic not going through that point, and that those two
geodesics form with one another an angle different both from 0° and 180°. Thus
Beltrami proves that the main initial results of Lobachevsky's new theory of parallels
are valid on the pseudo-sphere.7

4
Ibid., p. 377.
5
See, for example, N. Lobachevsky, Pangeometry, in D.E. Smith, edit., A Source Book in
Matkematia, 2 vols. (New York: Dover Publ. Inc., 1959), vol. 2, pp. 360-388, especially
' pp. 360-1.
* E. Beltrami, Sulla Superficie di Rotazione ehe serve dt Tipo alle Superficie Pseudosferiche, Opere
Matematicke, vol. 2, pp. 394—409, p. 395. Beltrami adds that "in order to get the equation of the
surface generated by the rotation of the curve about the u-axis, it is sufficient to write in [the
equation of the tractrix] VvM·"!? instead of v calling z the coordinate relative to an axis Oz
perpendicular to Ou and Ov." (Ibid.)
7
See, N. Lobachevsky, Pangeometry, pp. 362-3.

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/25/15 5:46 AM
1Q4

Beltrami also provcs that thc mou remarkablc propmics of Lobachcvsky's geometry
bccomc truc on the surfacc of thc pscudo-sphcrc. For examplc, he provcs ihat on the
pteudo-sphere, for any trianglc ABC, A + B 4- C < 2R, by proving that thc arca of any
gcodcsic trianglc $ R1 ( - A - B - C). As thc arca has to be positive, it follows that
- (A + B + C) > 0 and t äs a conscqucncc, A + B + C < .
Corucqucnily, Bcltrami feit himsclf cntitled to concludc that "the non-Euclidcan
plane gcometry is not othcr than thc gcomctry of thc surfacc of consunt negative
magnitudc.* 1 But this surfacc of consunt negative curvature was an Euclidean geo-
metrical cntity, morc precisely, it was construaible in the Standard Euclidean space of
our human reprcscntation. This is why Beltrami claimcd that by showing that the non-
Euclidcan geometry is true when we Interpret it in a pseudo-sphcre, he was providing a
real substratum of such gcometry, that is, an Interpretation constructible in the
Standard spacc of our reprcsentation.
Now we want to show that he feit himself commited to provide such Interpretation
because, at bottom, he was endorsing a Kantian view of geometry (although he never
mentioned Kant explicitly), according to which mathematical concepts are accepted äs
such only if they can be constructed in the pure Intuition of the Euclidean space, that is
only if their corresponding objects can be exhibited (äs Euclidean objects).'

II

Kant never denied the mere possibility of other spaces (and correspondingly of other
geometries). In other words, he never claimed the logical necessity of Euclidean
geometry. Thus already in 1747 he accepted that there might be objects (not related to
our world) which can be interrelated according to other dynamical laws. So, the
possibility of other spaces (conceived, a la Leibniz, äs Systems of ordering relations)
depends explicitly upon the possibility of other worlds governed by other physical
laws. These spaces might be non-Euclidean and with more than three-dimensions.
Thus, it is not logically necessary even that our space be three-dimensional; it is a
consequence of a factual necessity the one brought about in the fact that forces operate
proportionally to the inverse of the square distance. But this law is in itself contingent.
God could ascribe other laws and, äs a result of it, other worlds associated with other
spaces could emerge. Then, it is not even intuitively necessary that the space of
representarion be Euclidean; the matter is condngent.
Correspondingly, different geometries are possible, each dealing with a different
kind of space. Moreover, Kant seems to accept that if we were born in any of those
other possible worlds we would be able to represent their non-Euclidean geometries in

' E. Beltrami, Teoria Fondamentale DegH Spazii di Curvatura Constante, Opere Afatematicke,
vol. l, pp.40^-429, p.425.
' See, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, transl. by N. Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1965), B 741 ff.

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/25/15 5:46 AM
 Beltrami's Kantian View 105

non-Euclidean terms. In fact, Kant has also envisaged an encompassing general

geometry covering all the different types of space (but not dealing with an encompass-
ing space). "A science of all these possible spatial forms would undoubtedly be the
highest geometry that a finite mind could conceive,"10 although he was not claiming
that such geometry already existed.
Already in the Dissertatio (1770), although Kant has not explicitly denied the
possibility of other geometries, he explicitly endorsed the privileged character of
Euclidean space and held that other spaces should be intuitively represented in
Euclidean terms; correspondingly any other geometry could be represented only by
using Euclidean objects.
The following is Kant's crucial text emphasizing the privileged character of the
Euclidean space:
"A person who strove to fashion with his mind any other relations than those dictated by this
concept [of the space of sensibility which is, according to other texts, being mied by the Euclidean
axioms] would be wasting his effort, because he would have been compelled to use this very
concept to support his own fiction."11

On the one hand, we read this quoted text äs not explicitly rejecting the possibility of
other geometries. At most, it states that we could not represent other spaces if we did
not have at hand the Euclidean space which is so epistemologically primary. Kant thus
seems to accept the possibility of constructing in the Euclidean space of our Intuition
the Euclidean objects corresponding to the notions of point, straight line and surface
satisfying the non-Euclidean axioms. In fact, he seems to be going further. He seems to
be requiring that a person must do that in order to be able to deal mathematically with
those objects; he seems to be anticipatlng the critical requirement of the constructibility
in the Euclidean space of our representation of any concept for accepting such concept
äs genuinely mathematical.
On the other hand, we claim that Beltrami's Interpretation of Lobachevsky's
geometry satisfies such Kantian requirement. Beltrami then seems to conceive such
Interpretation äs showing that the non-Euclidean concepts are mathematically real.
Thus, by providing an Euclidean Interpretation of Lobachevsky*s plane geometry he
used, äs Kant recommended, the very concept of Euclidean space to support
Lobachevsky's geometry. Moreover, Beltrami when stating that his main purpose was
to provide a real substratum to the non-Euclidean geometry, proceeds äs if he were
committing himself to satisfy Kant's demand that
"The mere universal form of Intuition, called space, must be the substratum of all intuitions
determinable to particular objecis."12
10
Kant, Thoughts in the True Estimation of Living Forces, in Kant's Inaugural Dissertation and
Early Writings on Space (Chicago-London: Open Court Publ. Co., 1929), p. 12 (Ak I, p. 13).
11
Kant, On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World. A Dissertation, in
Selected Pre-Critical Writings and Conespondence with Beck, transl. and introduced by
G.Kerferd and D. Walford (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1968), p. 72 (Ak II, p. 405).
12
Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Indianapolis: The Library of Liberal Arts,
Bobbs and Merrill, 1950), #38, pp.68-9 (Ak IV, 321-2).

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/25/15 5:46 AM
106 Ricardo J, Gomcz

Bcltram»'* work thows thai he procecded äs if he would havc undcrstood Kant's usc
of thc word 'must* in thc above tcxt äs compclling a mathcmatician to $how (äs Beltrami
faithfully attcmptcd to) that thc Euclidcan space ii thc suburatum of all intuitions, by
cxhibiting thc particular Euclidcan objccts corrcsponding to Lobachcvsky's conccpts.
This Kantian charactcr of Bcltrami's work is strcsscd by his rcluctancc to acccpt non-
Euclidcan stcrcomctry a$ bcing rcaJIy groundcd, in so far äs thcrc sccms to bc no
Interpretation of it in terms of Euclidcan objccts:
"Only in regard to thc plane gcometry, the conccpts have thus a truc and proper Interpretation,
bccausc thcy are comtructible in a real surfacc, whereas thosc of thc three-dimcnsional geometry
are not susceptible but of an anaiytic represcntation, because thc space in which thcir represenu-
tion comcs to bc concrctizcd is different from thc one to which we givc that namc* (Italic; by
Bcltrami).1»

Even the vocabulary used is Kantian (c.g. constructibility of concepts). Most

important is the requisite of constructibility in a real surface (rcpresentable in the
Euclidean space of our inruirion) äs a criterion of a proper Interpretation (an actual
mathematical Interpretation). This seems to be consistent with Lobachevsky's own
understanding of what he was doing by proposing a new geometry violating some of
thc fundamental proposals of the Euclidean geometry. To such geometry "[he] had
given the name of imaginary geometry" (Italics by Lobachevsky).M Beltrami's emphasis
on the expression 'real* when talking of 'real substratum/ can be understood, on the
one band, äs being consistent with Kant's command to show that the concepts of any
new geometry are constructible in the empirically real space of our representation and,
on the other band, äs supplementing Lobachevsky's work by showing the parts of that
alJegedly imaginary geomctry that now can be claimed äs mathematically real.15
Only after Beltrami's work Kant would have accepted Lobachevsky's geometry.
Such work would have shown to Kant the Euclidean constructibility of non-Euclidean
concepts and also would have confirmed the logical possibility of other geometries
without violating the intuitive necessity of the Euclidean space.1*

0
E. Beltrami, Teoria Fundamentale Degli Spazii di Curvatura Constante, Opere Afatematicbe>
vol. l, p.427.
14
N. Lobachevsky, Pangeometry, p. 362.
15
Beltrami acknowledges that he has not actually proved "the impossibility of obtaining a
construction of the non-Euclidean stereometry without living the domain of the ordinär)'
geometry... [although he believes that] it seems to be very improbable." (Saggio di Interpreta-
zione della Geometria Non-Euclidea, Opere Matematiche, vol. l, p. 398.)
l
* By the way, Beltrami's work has also confirmed Kant's view of the synthetic character of the
geometrical axioms. By showing that there is a tue inte retation of certain axioms one of which
is the negation of Euclid's fifth postulate of parallelism, it is shown that the axioms of parallels is
not anaiytic because, äs A.Pap rightly claimed, "if it were, its negation would be seif-
inconsistent and hence inconsistent with any axiom." (A. Pap, An Introduction to the Philo-
sophy of Science, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, p. 115.) As Beltrami has shown,
that is not the case, because it seems to be possible to give an Interpretation that makes true all
the axioms. In fact, äs Hubert showed there are problems with Beltrami's Interpretation.

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/25/15 5:46 AM
 Beltrami's Kantian View 107

Kant had distinguished between logical necessity and intuitive necessity. He always
clalmed that the Euclidean geometry was not logically necessary. From the Dissertation
onwards he restricted his former claim by compelling the Euclidean geometry to be
intuitively necessary (the-only one that we can represent in our pure human Intuition).
This together with Kant's critical requirement of the constructibility of the geometrical
concepts led to the necessity of representing non-Euclidean concepts through Euclid-
ean objects.
We may wonder whether under Beltrami's Interpretation there would be problems
with Kant's theory of the applicability of mathematics to the empirical world. Does
such Interpretation run against what Kant called the safe applicability of mathematics to
the world? It follows from Kant's explicit assertions about the issue that such safe
applicability is grounded on the unique character of the Euclidean space äs the form of
our sensible Intuition. In fact, this is not violated by the mere existence of the non-
Euclidean geometry in so far äs it should be represented, according to Beltrami, in the
Euclidean space of our Intuition. However, we might wonder whether Kant would
have accepted the possibility of describing the same factual Situation in two different
languages, the one using an Euclidean terminology, the other a Lobachevskian ter-
minology for expressing the same fact (being represented in both cases in Euclid's
space). We can talk of the same fact because in both cases we impose the same spatial
manifold upon the sensible data. It is hard to imagine why Kant would have rejected
such possibility because we should continue to project the same and unique Euclidean
space, functioning äs the form of our sensibility, upon the same sensible data though we
would be expressing the resulting empirical fact in different languages. So, it seems
plausible to believe that Kant would have accepted Beltrami's claim that "Loba-
chevsky's theory coincides, except in names, with the geometry of the three dimen-
sional space of constant negative curvature" (my italics).17 The safe applicability of
geometry to the empirical world requires, according to Kant, the uniqueness of the
space of our representation. But such uniqueness is not violated by the mere existence
of a non-Euclidean geometry in so far äs the latter can be represented, äs Beltrami
showed, in Euclidean space.
Many people have already argued that the mere emergence of non-Euclidean
geometries refutes neither Kant's view about their possibility nor his conception of
geometry äs a System of synthetic a priori propositions. We have actually shown that
the construction of true interpretations of such geometry refutes neither Kant's
conception of geometry nor his view about the possibility of other geometries. On the
contrary, we have made explicit the remarkable fact that the first allegedly true
Interpretation of such geometry was consistent with the Kantian program of construct-
ing in the Euclidean space of our human representation all the geometrical concepts.

Furthermore, it was Beltrami's purpose neither to show the consistency of Lobachevsky's

System nor to directly advocate Kant's thesis of the synthetic character of the geometrical
axioms, but that is a consequence of his worL
17
E. Beltrami, Teoria Fondamentale Degli Spazü di Curvatura Constante, Opere Matematiche,
vol. l, p.425.

Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/25/15 5:46 AM