DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT TITLE – A CASE STUDY ON RUDUL SAH V. STATE OF BIHAR

SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- II

NAME OF THE FACULTY: NAGESWARA RAO SIR

NAME OF THE STUDENT: SANSKAR JAIN

ROLL NO. 2018080

SEM 4

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher who gave me the golden
opportunity to do this wonderful project on the topic which also helped me in doing a lot of research
and I came to know about so many new things I am thankful to them. Secondly, I would also like to
thank my friends who helped me a lot in finalizing this project within the limited time frame.

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 INDEX

1. SYNOPSIS

2. FACTS OF THE CASE

3. JUDGMENT

4. INTRODUCTION 0F FALSE IMPRESONMENT

5. WHO IS LIABLE FOR FALSE IMPRISONMENT

6. INGREDIENTS OF TORT OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT

7. REMEDIES

8. CASE REFERRED

9. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE

10. CONCLUSION

11. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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 SYNOPSIS

PROJECT TITLE: A CASE STUDY OF RUDUL SAH V. STATE OF BIHAR

INTRODUCTION

Rudul Shah’s case is a landmark case in the field of state liability. It is considered to be particularly
important because it led to the emergence of compensatory jurisprudence for violations of fundamental
rights under the Constitution. In this case, it is noteworthy that the Indian Constitution does not clearly
provide for the award of compensation and that the judgment is based on the court ’s interpretation of
the scope of its right to remedy. This is the first case since the establishment of the Supreme Court,
which paid someone monetary compensation for violating the basic rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. Victims have the right to claim damages in the civil law of torts, which is complementary
to monetary compensation and not excluded. It emphasizes the inefficiency of the individual responsible
for the life and freedom of the citizens he has promised to serve, and this inefficiency not only damages
the individual but also the foundation of the democratic government. This case highlights the fate of a
person. Rudul Sah was punished for something he did not do, but because the system he relied on caused
him to fail in the worst possible way.

The government will begin to act in a way that they are aware of the violation of Rudul Sah ’s rights and
take fair and prompt action. They do not abide by the law but abide by the principles of the law. They
take a rational and sympathetic approach, rather than a purely systematic approach. They did not hesitate
to call out the government on what they, quite rightly, thought was a grave miscarriage of justice. They
did call out the government of Bihar on their callous and insensitive response to the plight of the
petitioner during his trial. They also criticized the way the government threw the Jailor under the bus
and took no responsibility for their own actions.

Also, there was a suggestion of a system of checks and balances that could prevent the repetition of such
incidents. This was specifically for the state of Bihar because it had been in turmoil over the mess that
was its penitentiary system at that time. However, it would serve all states well to adopt and further
build on the Courts proposal to prevent the repetition of such terrible incidents.

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RESEARCH QUESTIONS;

Whether a writ petition is an appropriate remedy for claiming compensation/ancillary reliefs, awarding
compensation.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY;

To understand the dilemma surrounding an appropriate remedy for claiming compensation/ancillary

reliefs, awarding compensation

To understand the application of Article 32 in these circumstances.

The scope of this study is restricted to application of the Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY;

The research is adopting doctrinal study for this project involves the analytical and descriptive study of
primary sources of data especially Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

SOURCES OF RESEARCH:

PRIMARY SOURCES: The Constitution of India, 1949

SECONDARY SOURCE: Books, Articles, Online resources.

LITERATURE REVIEW

1. RUDUL SAH V. STATE OF BIHAR

Rudul Sah’s case was a public interest litigation (PIL) case filed in the Supreme Court under Article
32 of the Indian Constitution (whereby one can directly approach the Supreme Court when
fundamental rights have been infringed upon). The petition sought the release of Rudul Sah from
illegal detention, and also ancillary relief such as rehabilitation and compensation.

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CASE ANALYSIS OF RUDAL SAH V. STATE OF V. STATE OF BIHAR

FACTS OF THE CASE

Rudul Sah was arrested in 1953 on charges of murdering his wife. He was acquitted by an Additional
Sessions Judge, in 1968, who directed his release from jail, pending further orders. Rudul Sah
languished in jail for 14 years after his acquittal, until his plight was highlighted in the media in 1982
and led to the filing of the PIL on his behalf.

By the time the PIL came up for hearing in Court, Rudul Sah had been released. However, he sought
ancillary relief including payment for his rehabilitation, future medical expenses incurred, and
compensation for his illegal incarceration from the State. The Court directed the State to show cause for
the petitioner’s detention in relation to his ancillary claims, and received a much delayed response in
defence of the incarceration from a state jailor. The Court viewed the State response as a callous
afterthought with no true basis in fact and thus held that the petitioner’s detention was wholly
unjustified.  Next, the Court examined whether, under its remedial powers it could adjudicate the
petitioner’s claims for ancillary relief.  The Court reasoned that Article 21’s guarantee of the right to life
and personal liberty would be stripped of its significant content if the Court was limited to passing
orders releasing individuals illegally detained.  The Court held that the “right to compensation is some
palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in

the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield.”
Accordingly, the Court ordered the State to pay 30,000 rupees to the petitioner as an interim measure, in
addition to the 5,000 already paid, noting that the judgment did not preclude the petitioner from bringing
future lawsuits against the State and its officials for appropriate damages relating to his unlawful
detention.

JUDGMENT

1. This Writ Petition discloses a sordid and disturbing state of affairs. Though the petitioner was
acquitted by the Court of Sessions, Muzaffarpur, Bihar, on June 3, 1968 he was released from
the jail on October 16, 1982, that is to say, more than 14 years after he was acquitted. By this
Habeas Corpus petition, the petitioner asks for his release on the ground that his detention in
the jail is unlawful. He also asked for certain ancillary reliefs like rehabilitation,

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 reimbursements of expenses which he may incur for medical treatment and compensation for
the illegal incarceration.

2. This petition came up before us on November 22, 1982 when we were informed by Shri
Goburdhan, counsel for the State of Bihar, that the petitioner was already released from the
jail. The relief sought by the petitioner for his release thus became infructuous but despite
that, we directed that a Notice to show cause be issued to the State of Bihar regarding prayers
2, 3 and 4 of the petition. By prayer No. 2 the petitioner asks for medical treatment at
Government expense, by prayer No. 3 he asks for an ex gratia payment for his rehabilitation,
while by prayer No. 4 he asks for compensation for his illegal detention in the jail for over 14
years.

3. We expected a prompt response to the Show Cause Notice from the Bihar Government at least
at this late stage, but they offered no explanation for over four months. The Writ Petition was
listed before us on March 31, 1983 when Shri Goburdhan restated that the petitioner had been
already released from the jail. We passed a specific order on that date to the effect that the
release of the petitioner cannot be the end of the matter and we called upon the Government of
Bihar to submit a written explanation supported by an affidavit as to why the petitioner was
kept in the jail for over 14 years after his acquittal. On April 16, 1983, Shri Alakh Deo Singh,
Jailor, Muzaffarpur Central Jail, filed an affidavit in pursuance of that order. Shorn of its
formal recitals, the affidavit reads thus :

a) That the petitioner was received on 25.3.67 from Hazaribagh Central Jail and was being
produced regularly before the Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur and on 30.8.68 the
learned Judge passed the following order The accused is acquitted but he should be detained
in prison till further order of the State Government and I.G. (Prisons), Bihar. (A true copy of
the same is attached as Annexure I).

b) That accused Rudul Sah was of unsound mind at the time of passing the above order. This
information was sent to the Law Department in letter No. 1838 dated 10.5.74 of the
Superintendent, Central Jail, Muzaffarpur through District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur.

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c) That the Civil Surgeon, Muzaffarpur, reported on 18.2.77 that accused Rudul Sah was normal
and this information was communicated to the Law Department on 21.2.77.

d) That the petitioner, Rudul Sah was treated well in accordance with the rules in the Jail
Manual, Bihar, during the period of his detention.

e) That the petitioner was released on 16.10.82 in compliance with the letter No. 11637 dated
14.10.82 of the Law Department.

4. The Writ Petition came up before us on April 26, 1983 when we adjourned it to the first week
of August 1983 since it was not clear either from the affidavit filed by the Jailor or from the
order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur, which is annexed to the affidavit
as Annexure I, as to what was the basis on which it was stated in the affidavit that the
petitioner was of unsound mind or the reason why the learned Additional Sessions Judge
directed the detention of the petitioner in jail, until further orders of the State Government and
the Inspector General of Prisons.

5. The writ petition has come up for hearing once again before us today. If past experience is any
guide, no useful purpose is likely to be served by adjourning the petition in the hope that the
State authorities will place before us satisfactory material to explain the continued detention
of the petitioner in jail after his aquittal. We apprehend that the present state of affairs, in
which we are left to guess whether the petitioner was not released from the prison for the
benign reason that he was insane, is not likely to improve in the near future.

6. The Jailor's affidavit leaves much to be desired. It narrates with an air of candidness what is
notorious, for example, that the petitioner was not released from the jail upon his acquittal and
that he was reported to be insane. But it discloses no data on the basis of which he was
adjudged insane, the specific measures taken to cure him of that affliction and, what is most
important, whether it took 14 years to set right his mental imbalance. No medical opinion is
produced in support of the diagnosis that he neither was insane nor indeed is any jail record
produced to show what kind of medical treatment was prescribed for and administered to him
and for how long. The letter (No. 1838) dated May 10, 1974 which, according to paragraph 3
of the affidavit, was sent to the 1aw Department by the Superintendent of the Central Jail,

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 Muzaffarpur, is not produced before us. There is nothing to show that the petitioner was found
insane on the very date of his acquittal. And, if he was insane on the date of acquittal, he
could not have been tried at all for the simple reason that an insane person cannot enter upon
his defence. Under the CrPC, insane persons have certain statutory rights in regard to the
procedure governing their trial. According to paragraph 4 of the affidavit, the Civil Surgeon,
Muzaffarpur, reported on February 18, 1977 that the petitioner was normal and that this
information was communicated to the Law Department on February 21, 1977. Why was the
petitioner not released for over 5 1/2 years thereafter? It was on October 14, 1982 that the
Law Department of the Government of Bihar directed that the petitioner should be released.
Why was the Law Department so insensitive to justice? We are inclined to believe that the
story of the petitioner's insanity is an afterthought and is exaggerated out of proportion. If
indeed he was insane, at least a skeletal medical record could have been produced to show that
he was being treated for insanity. In these circumstances, we are driven to the conclusion that,
if at all the petitioner was found insane at any point of time, the insanity must have
supervened as a consequence of his unlawful detention in jail. A sense of helplessness and
frustration can create despondency and persistent despondency can lead to a kind of mental
imbalance.

7. The concerned Department of the Government of Bihar could have afforded to show a little
more courtesy to this Court and to display a greater awareness of its responsibilities by asking
one of its senior officers to file an affidavit in order to explain the callousness which pervades
this case. Instead, the Jailor has been made a scapegoat to own up vicariously the dereliction
of duty on the part of the higher officers who ought to have known better. This is not an
isolated case of its kind and we feel concerned that there is darkness all around in the prison
administration of the State of Bihar. The Bhagalpur blindings should have opened the eyes of
the Prison Administration of the State. But that bizarre episode has taught no lesson and has
failed to evoke any response in the Augean Stables. Perhaps, a Hercules heas to be found who
will clean them by diverting two rivers through them, not the holy Ganga though. We hope
(and pray) that the higher officials of the State will find time to devote their personal attention
to the breakdown of Prison Administration in the State and rectify the grave injustice which is
being perpetrated on helpless persons. The High Court of Patna should itself examine this

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 matter and call for statistical data from the Home Department of the Government of Bihar on
the question of unlawful detentions in the State Jails. A. tabular statement from each jail
should be called for, disclosing how many convicts have been in jail for more than 10 years,
12 years, and 14 years and for over 16 years. The High Court will then be in a position to
release prisoners who are in unlawful detention in the jails and to ask the State Government to
take steps for their rehabilitation by payment of adequate compensation wherever necessary.

8. That takes us to the question as to how the grave injustice which has been perpetrated upon
the petitioner can be rectified, in so far as it lies within our power to do in the exercise of our
writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. That article confers power on the
Supreme Court to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate,
for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III. The right to move the Supreme
Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III is
"guaranteed", that is to say, the right to move the Supreme Court under Article 32 for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution is itself a
fundamental right.

9. It is true that Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute for the enforcement of rights and
obligations which can be enforced efficaciously through the ordinary processes of Courts,
Civil and Criminal. A money claim has therefore to be agitated in and adjudicated upon in a
suit instituted in a court of lowest grade competent to try it. But the important question for our
consideration is whether in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32, this Court can pass
an order for the payment of money if such an order is in the nature of compensation
consequential upon the deprivation of a fundamental right. The instant cave is illustrative of
such cases. The petitioner was detained illegally in the prison for over fourteen years after his
acquittal in a full-dressed trial. He filed a Habeas Corpus petition in this Court for his release
from illegal detention. He obtained that relief, our finding being that his detention in the
prison after his acquittal was wholly unjustified. He contends that he is entitled to be
compensated for his illegal detention and that we ought to pass appropriate order for the
payment of compensation in this Habeas Corpus petition itself.

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10. We cannot resist this argument. We see no effective answer to it save the stale and sterile
objection that the petitioner may, if so advised, file a suit to recover damages from the State
Government. Happily, the State's Counsel has not raised that objection. The petitioner could
have been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit if his claim to compensation was
factually controversial, in the sense that a civil court may or may not have upheld his claim.
But we have no doubt that if the petitioner files a suit to recover damages for his illegal
detention, a decree for damages would have to be passed in that suit, though it is not possible
to predicate, in the absence of evidence, the precise amount which would be decreed in his
favour. In these circumstances, the refusal of this Court to pass an order of compensation in
favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lip-service to his fundamental right to liberty
which the State Government has so grossly violated. Article 21 which guarantees the right to
life and liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this Court were
limited to passing orders to release from illegal detention. One of the telling ways in which the
violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of
Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in the payment of monetary compensation.
Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be
corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is
some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public
interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield. If
civilisation is not to perish in this country as it has perished in some others too well-known to
suffer mention, it is necessary to educate ourselves into accepting that, respect for the rights of
individuals is the true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State must repair the damage done
by its officers to the petitioner's rights. It may have recourse against those officers.

11. Taking into consideration the great harm done to the petitioner by the Government of Bihar,
we are of the opinion that, as an interim measure, the State must pay to the petitioner a further
sum of Rs. 30,000 (Rupees thirty-thousand) in addition to the sum of Rs. 5,000 (Rupees five
thousand) already paid by it. The amount shall be paid within two weeks from today. The
Government of Bihar agrees to make the payment though, we must clarify, our order is not
based on their consent.

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 12. This order will not preclude the petitioner from bringing a suit to recover appropriate damages
from the state and its erring officials. The order of compensation passed by us is, as we said
above, in the nature of a palliative. We cannot leave the petitioner penniless until the end of
his suit, the many appeals and the execution proceedings. A full-dressed debate on the nice
points of fact and law which takes place leisurely in compensation suits will have to await the
filing of such a suit by the poor Rudul Sah. The Leviathan will have liberty to raise those
points in that suit. Until then, we hope, there will be no more Rudul Sahs in Bihar or
elsewhere.

INTRODUCTION OF FALSE IMPRESONMENT

This project has required consultation to an assorted range of books and websites that are a part of the
secondary sources. Some research papers and journals too have been referred to. The various sites
referred to include the official sites of Supreme Court of India and Manupatra for research on cases of
Indian origin, while the other cases can be traced back to various books referred to thereby.

EXPLANATION:-

1. Introduction: This section briefly high lights the basics of what is false imprisonment and who
can be held liable for the tort of false imprisonment.
2. False imprisonment as a Tort: This part has been included to explain the concept of false
imprisonment as a tort with the help of various case laws, both Indian and Foreign.
3. Ingredients of false imprisonment: This section focuses on explaining the elements of false
imprisonment as a tort, i.e., of what constitutes the tort of false imprisonment.
4. Remedies: This division seeks to list out the available remedies for the tort of false imprisonment
and of when and how they can be availed.
5. Conclusion : This component endeavors to summarize the project as a whole and to give the
concluding remarks and opinion about the topic, i.e., “False Imprisonment and its Remedies”

WHO IS LIABLE FOR FALSE IMPRISONMENT

A person may be liable for false imprisonment not only when he directly arrests or detains the plaintiff,
but also when he was “active in promoting or causing” the arrest or detention. Apart from this liability
can be fastened vicariously, or through instrumentality of some officer. Also, if a person gets another

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arrested by police on a false complaint, he is liable for damages of false imprisonment . In cases where
the plaintiff was arrested on a charge of theft on bona fide but wrong information given by a shop
detective and here the police officers gave evidence that they had exercised their own judgement in
arresting the plaintiff, the shop-owner would not be held liable.

The plaintiff is arrested without a warrant and produced before a Magistrate who remands him in
custody; his remedies for detention before and after the remand are different. For detention prior to the
remand he can sue for trespass for false imprisonment whereas after it he can sue for malicious
prosecution. When a wrong person is arrested and imprisoned under a decree to which he is not a party,
the person setting the court in motion is not liable for false imprisonment.

In case of false imprisonment the burden to prove justification lies on the defendant who made or caused
the arrest.

INGREDIENTS OF TORT OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT

To ask at the outset if a convicted prisoner enjoys in law „residual liberty‟, as if the extent of any
citizen’s right to liberty were a species of rights in rem or a matter of status, is to ask the wrong
question. The action for false imprisonment is maintainable in personam. The various constituents of
false imprisonment include:

1. PERIOD OF CONFINEMENT: Whatever may be the period of confinement, the tort of false
imprisonment arises. But time period is of essence while determining the amount of compensation to be
awarded to the injured party. An otherwise lawful detention may become unlawful if the detention is
prolonged for an unreasonable period of time.

2. THE INTENTION FACTOR: There are very few torts that consider the intension (“mens rea”) of the
defendant, and false imprisonment is one of these i.e., a person is not liable for false imprisonment
unless his or her act is done for the purpose of imposing a confinement. To reveal the element of intent,
the defendant must only intend to accomplish the act that causes the confinement, and need not contend
that the confinement was unlawful; as the defendant’s actual motives are immaterial. Even negligent
acts of confinement amount to false imprisonment.

3. KNOWLEDGE OF THE PLAINTIFF: There is no requirement that the plaintiff alleging false
imprisonment was aware of the restraint on his freedom at the time of his confinement, e.g., the Meering

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Case discussed earlier. If the person is confined in a room, with one of the entries known to the plaintiff
closed, and the room has more than one entry exit door, but the plaintiff has no knowledge about the
same, the defendant will still be held liable. Thus, the person confined does not have to be aware of the
confinement or be harmed by it as it is actionable per se - Meering v Grahame White Aviation Co

4. PLACE OF CONFINEMENT: To constitute the wrong, there may be no actual imprisonment in the
ordinary sense- i.e. incarceration. Any confinement in the ordinary sense whether be it prison or any
place used temporarily for the purpose of confinement constitutes false imprisonment. An unlawful
arrest too amounts to false imprisonment.

REMEDIES

1. Action for Damages Damages in false imprisonment is those which flow from the detention. A person
injured is entitled to compensatory damages. The damages for false arrest are to be measured only to the
time of arraignment or indictment. There is no legal rule for the assessment of the damages and this is
entirely left on the court to measure damages. Elements of the injury to the person which are included in
the purview of recovery of damages include injury to the person and physical suffering, mental suffering
and humiliation, loss of time earnings and interruption of businesses, reasonable and necessary expenses
incurred, injury to the reputation and generally the deprivation of any right caused by the loss of liberty
such as the plaintiffs loss of the family company during the period of arrest.

2. Nominal and Compensatory Damages: The general rule in personal tort action is that the plaintiff is
entitled to recover such a sum that shall be fair and just, in the absence of circumstances justifying an
award for exemplary damages. The mere unlawful detention constitutes the basis for the recovery of at
least nominal damages, but an award of only nominal damages may be insufficient and flawed where the
facts proved indicate a right to greater damages. It has been held now that the person can now be
imprisoned without knowing it. In such cases the plaintiff might obtain only nominal damages. Mental
suffering including fright, shame and mortification from the indignity and disgrace, consequent upon an
illegal detention, is usually considered an injury for which compensation may be made in an action for
false arrest or false imprisonment. The fact that no physical injury was inflicted on one complaining of
false imprisonment has been said to be no grounds for denying the recovery of reasonable compensation
for mental suffering.

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3. Punitive, Exemplary and Aggravated Damages If an imprisonment is affected recklessly,
oppressively, insultingly and maliciously with a design to oppress and injure, the court may award
exemplary or punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded in cases where the defendants conduct is
recklessly indifferent to the rights of others or in intentional or wanton violation of those rights, and
such damages are awarded to give a deterrent. In some circumstances exemplary damages may be
provided as when there is abuse of power by the state. Aggravated damages may be awarded in a proper
case as when the imprisonment in itself of a nominal character is offensive or hurt fell to the plaintiffs
feelings. Courts have often held that malice will warrant an award for exemplary or punitive damages in
an action for false imprisonment or false arrest. Punitive or exemplary damages will not be allowed
where the false imprisonment was brought about in good faith, without malice in fact or in law and
where there is no element of wantonness or oppression.

4. Writ of Habeas Corpus This writ is considered to be a golden remedy by the English Law. The
Supreme Court of India and High Court of states issue this writ under article 32 and 226 respectively.
Subject to the rules framed by the High Courts, an application for habeas corpus can be made by the
person in confinement or by any person on his behalf. The writ of habeas corpus is effective means of
immediate release from unlawful detention, whether in prison or private custody. Where an unlawful
detention is continuing the plaintiff may seek this writ. This writ is also used in criminal cases of false
imprisonment.

5. Self Help: A person who is unlawfully detained may use self-help to escape including reasonable
force so as to defend him from unlawful arrest. The force used must be proportionate in the
circumstances. This is risky course since the power to arrest is likely to depend upon not only in the
commission of offence but in the alternative, in a reasonable suspicion thereof. Hence an innocent
person who forcibly resists may be liable for battery if the arrester had reasonable grounds for his
suspicion.

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CASE REFERRED

In India the first case to be brought into light and decided upon by the Supreme Court with respect to
false imprisonment was the A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras. Union of India that highlighted the
seminal significance regarding the interpretation of fundamental rights and their interplay.

The petitioner was detained under the Preventive Detention Act (Act IV of 1950) and he applied under
Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus and for his release from detention, on the ground
that the said Act contravened the provisions of Arts. 13, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and was
consequently ultra vires and that his detention was therefore illegal, and it was held that the Prevention
Detention Act, 1950, with the exception of Sec. 14 thereof did not contravene any of the Articles of the
Constitution and, the invalidity of Sec. 14 did not affect the validity of the Act as a whole, and the
detention of the petitioner was not illegal. In the Hussainara Khatoon(I) v. State of Bihar case, it was
held that speedy trial is an integral part of fundamental right of life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21
of the constitution. Further it laid down norms for speedy disposal of cases, after analyzing the fact that
a large number of men and women had been held behind bars awaiting trial, for longer than periods that
they would have to serve if their offence was proved, thereby depriving them of their freedoms.

In Mathew Areeparmtil and other v. State of Bihar and other the court ordered that the cases which
involve tribal accused concerning imprisonment of more than 7 yrs. should be released on execution of a
personal bond. In the case where trial has started accused should be released on bail on execution of a
personal bond. In case where no proceedings at all have taken place in regard to the accused within three
yrs., from the date of the lodging of FIR, the accused should be released forthwith under S.169 Cr. P.C.
if there are cases in which neither charge-sheet have been submitted nor investigation has been
completed during the last three years, the accused should be released forthwith subject to reinvestigation
to the said cases on the fresh facts and they should not be arrested without the permission of the
magistrate

In D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal the petitioners raised important issues concerning the police
powers and if monetary compensation should be awarded for established infringement of Fundamental
Rights, as under Article 21 and 22 of our constitution. The court held that Custodial violence, including
torture and death in the lock ups, strikes a blow at the Rule of Law, which demands that the powers of
the executive should not only be derived from law but also that the same should be limited by law. To

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check the abuse of police power, transparency of action and accountability were the two safeguards laid
down by the court. The D.K. Basu’s case contained 11 path-breaking directives where the court spelt
out, in mandatory terms, the rights of an arrestee or a detainee and the manner in which the arresting or
detaining authority is expected to behave, including the written record of arrest, informing of arrestee‟s
family of his arrest, medical examination on request, among the others.

The case also high-lightened the power of arrest and whether monetary compensation should be awarded
for established infringement of fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 21 & 22. The Court laid down
requirements of power of arrest in para 36 of the judgment and declared monetary or pecuniary
compensation is an appropriate and indeed an effective and sometime perhaps the only suitable remedy
for redressal of the established infringement of the fundamental right to life of a citizen by the public
servants and the State is victoriously liable for their acts.

Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration looked into the Article 32 of the constitution and determined the
power and responsibility of the court to intervene and protect prisoners from the torture they are put
through by the jail authorities (“hands off doctrine”). The case also drew attention on the right against
solitary confinement, along with the principle that said required a Prison Manual to be made available to
the prisoners, in addition to keeping of grievance boxes in prisons and remedial action on grievances by
the Session‟s judge. The Supreme Court also recognized the right of the prisoners to be visited by their
friends and relatives, and favoured their visits but subject to search and discipline and other security
criteria.

In Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others, the Supreme Court
ruled that the right to life and liberty includes the right to live with human dignity and therefore a
detainee would be entitled to have interviews with family members, friends and lawyers, and as under
article 14 and 21, the regulations must be reasonable and non-arbitrary, without severe restrictions. The
cased focused on death of a suspect in police custody, and use of third degree measures by police in
investigation.

In Sebasitian M. Hongray, two persons were taken into custody by the Army authority in Manipur, but
were not produced in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus and it was held that those persons must have
met an unnatural death while in army custody. The Supreme Court directed the Union of India to pay
exemplary damages for the action of the army authorities in murdering the two persons.

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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE: 

Rudul Sah’s case is a landmark judgment in the jurisprudence of state liability. It is considered
particularly important as it led to the emergence of compensatory jurisprudence for the violation of
fundamental rights under the Constitution. It is noteworthy in this context that there is no express
provision for awarding compensation in the text of the Indian Constitution, and that this judgment was
on the basis of the Court’s interpretation of the extent of its remedial powers. This was the first case
since the inception of the Supreme Court that awarded monetary compensation to a person for the
violation of his fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The grant of such monetary
compensation was in addition, and not to the exclusion, to the right of the aggrieved person to bring an
action for damages in civil law or in tort. Following this case, the Supreme Court awarded compensation
in several cases. In the subsequent early cases in which this remedy was considered, the Court held that
compensation would be awarded only in ‘appropriate cases’ which seemed to primarily involve life and
liberty rights and were mostly cases relating to  illegal detention and unlawful deaths. Nonetheless, in
later cases(link is external), it became clear that the scope had become significantly wider. Since
economic and social rights are often considered by the Supreme Court under the ambit of Article 21 of
the Constitution (the right to life which is a fundamental right), compensation as a constitutional remedy
may be available for violations of these rights.  For example, in the case Paschim Banga Khet Samity v
State of West Bengal where the Supreme Court upheld that the right to life included the right to health,
compensation was granted by way of redress with explicit reference to the Rudul Sah case.

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ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Rudal Sah’s case is a landmark case in the field of state liability. It is considered to be particularly
important because it led to the emergence of compensatory jurisprudence for violations of fundamental
rights under the Constitution. In this case, it is noteworthy that the Indian Constitution does not clearly
provide for the award of compensation and that the judgment is based on the court’s interpretation of the
scope of its right to remedy. This is the first case since the establishment of the Supreme Court, which
paid someone monetary compensation for violating the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Victims have the right to claim damages in the civil law of torts, which is complementary to monetary
compensation and not excluded. It emphasizes the inefficiency of the individual responsible for the life
and freedom of the citizens he has promised to serve, and this inefficiency not only damages the
individual but also the foundation of the democratic government. This case highlights the fate of a
person. Rudal Sah was punished for something he did not do, but because the system he relied on caused
him to fail in the worst possible way.

The government will begin to act in a way that they are aware of the violation of Rudal sah’s rights and
take fair and prompt action. They do not abide by the law but abide by the principles of the law. They
take a rational and sympathetic approach, rather than a purely systematic approach. They did not hesitate
to call out the government on what they, quite rightly, thought was a grave miscarriage of justice. They
did call out the government of Bihar on their callous and insensitive response to the plight of the
petitioner during his trial. They also criticized the way the government threw the Jailor under the bus
and took no responsibility for their own actions.

Also, there was a suggestion of a system of checks and balances that could prevent the repetition of such
incidents. This was specifically for the state of Bihar because it had been in turmoil over the mess that
was its penitentiary system at that time. However, it would serve all states well to adopt and further
build on the Courts proposal to prevent the repetition of such terrible incidents.

Also, I think the compensation provided is quite low. The amount Rs. 30,000 in addition to the already
paid Rs. 5000 is nothing but a mockery of justice. This amount is not enough to make up for the loss of
14 years and the resulting physical injury and mental pain caused to the victim. But, according to the
court this is just a palliative measure. The court should have taken some proper measures while looking
into such incidents as mere compensation cannot resolve the damages faced by the petitioner and all this

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because of their conduct which caused this huge miscarriage of justice. Also, the court should have
ordered a proper inquiry in this case so that proper justice could have been delivered. As there is a
saying “Justice should not only be done, but it should be seen to be done”.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Manupatra.com

2. http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi

3. http://www.legalservicesindia.com/articles/dct.htm

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