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This paper was presented at the 25th Annual OTC in Houston, Texas, U. S.A., 3-6 May 1993,
This papar waa aelectad for presentation by the OTC Program Committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contants of tha papar,
aa presented, have not baan reviewed by the Offshore Technology Con farance and are aub)ect 10 cmrraction by tha author(a). The material. aa DraSentad. does not nacessarilv reflect
any position of the Offshora Technology Con farance or ita officers; Permission to copy Is restr;ctad to an abstract Of not more than 300 words. Iilustfationa may not ba copied, The ~bstract
should contain conspicuous acknowledgment of whare and by whom the papar is presanted,
415
2 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DRIILING BLOWOUTS, 1971-1991 OTC 7248
with any of the natural gas influxes that are summarized in figure 3.
triggered these drilling blowouts,
pollution and environmental damage were One or more contributing factors were
minimal. identified for 70 of the 87 blowouts.
Unintentional swabbing, or the lifting of
SHALLOW GAS well fluids while pulling the drill string
from the wellbore, was identified as a
Although development wells accounted for contributing factor in 21 (24.1 percent) of
62.6 percent of the oil and gas drilling the blowouts. Other important contributing
during this period (table 1), 46 (55.4 factors included the fracturing of sub-
percent) of the 83 nonaulfur well blowouts surface formations allowing gas to escape
occurred during exploratory drilling to shallow sediments or to the seafloor (21
(figure 1). The greater incidence of blowouts or 24.1 percent), equipment
blowouts during exploratory drilling may be failures (16 blowouts or 18.4 percent), gaa
attributable to the relative absence of migration during or after the cementing of
geologic information and drilling data. well casing (16 blowouts or 18.4 percent),
Because’ most exploratory wells are not casing leaks or ruptures (5 blowouts or 5.7
commercially producible, the occurrence of percent), drilling into or inducing
drilling blowouts in the GOM may not be communication with other wells (5 blowouts
strongly linked to well producibility. or 5.7 percent), and stuck pipe (3 blowouts
This judgment is further supported by or 3.4 percent). No attempt was made to
information on the well depths at the time quantify the. extent to which human error
the blowouts occurred (table 2 and figure contributed to each of the blowouts.
2). Fifty-eight (66.7 percent) of the
blowouts occurred before the wells had been BLOWOUT DURATION
drilled to a depth of 5,000 feet and were
not triggered by hydrocarbon influxes from Most of the blowouts were of short duration
commercially productive intervals. These (figure 4); 18 (20.7 percent) ceased
wells flowed shallow gas that was over flowing in less than an hour, a cumulative
pressured, undetected, or improperly of 50 (57.5 percent) in less than a day,
controlled. and a cumulative of 73 (83.9 percent) in
less than a week. Figure 5 helps to
Although the rate of blowout occurrence explain the short durations. Most (62 or
during development drilling was lower, a 71.3 percent) of the wells stopped flowing
slightly greater proportion of the events when sediments in the uncased portion of
involved shallow gas. Despite the the well bridged or sealed the well. If
availability of more detailed geologic data the uncased portion of the well includes an
during the development drilling phase, 25 unconsolidated section of sufficient
of the 37 (67.6 percent) development length, this bridging action often occurs
drilling blowouts flowed gas from shallow shortly after the well starts flowing. Of
zones. This blowout rate is further the 62 flowing wells that bridged, 55 did
evidence of the important role of shallow so in less than a week.
gas in drilling blowouts.
Of the wells that did not bridge, all but
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS two were controlled by pumping mud or
cement or by actuating mechanical well-
An influx of gas into the wellbore was a control equipment. The two exceptions
precursor to each of the blowouts. involved trapped gas that dissipated upon
Blowouts resulted when an event or, more release. Although relief wells were
typically, a series of events led to an initiated during several of the blowouts,
uncontrolled release of gas from the well. all of the flowing wells were controlled by
Occurrences or circumstances that other means prior to completion of the
contributed to such losses of well control relief wells.
416
OTC 7248 ELMER P. DANENBERGER 3
BLOWOUT RATES AND EFFECTS wells drilled and the number of blowouts by
water depth. For”water depths of 200 feet
During the 21-year study period, oil and or less, an average of 334 wells were
gas drilling blowouts occurred at a rate of drilled per blowout. For wells in water
one per every 256 wells drilled (figure 6). depths of greater than 200 feet, the
The rate for exploratory wells was one per blowout frequency increased to one for
173 wells drilled; for development wells, every 176 wells drilled. One possible
the rate was one per 359 wells drilled. explanation for the difference in blowout
Four blowouts occurred while drilling 197 rates is the increased presence of shallow
sulfur wells. The high blowout rate for gas, sourced in the thick, overlying
sulfur wells is attributable to shallow gas organic-rich Recent sediments (Ray, 1992),
drilling problems at a major sulfur in the Pleistocene trend of the GOM, much
discovery in the GOM. Casualties from of which is in water depths of more than
blowouts resulted from one well per 1,948 200 feet. Figure 9 is a map of shallow
wells drilled. One of every 3,573 wells gas blowouts by production trend. The map
resulted in fatalities from blowouts (857 and data provided in table 3 indicate a
wells per fatality). higher risk of shallow gas blowouts for
Pleistocene trend wells. Other possible
Six of the 11 casualty events occurred explanations for the higher blowout rate
during development drilling. Fourteen of include the lower fracture gradients for
the 25 drilling blowout fatalities and 40 wells in deeper water and the increased use
of the 65 injuries resulted from these 6 of floating drilling rigs and seafloor
incidents. One of these incidents, a 1980 blowout prevention equipment.
shallow gas blowout, resulted in 6 fatal-
ities and 29 injuries. The high blowout rate for wells in 501 to
1,000 feet of water (table 1) is largely
Figure 7 depicts the number of blowouts and attributable to four blowouts at a single
wells started from 1971 through 1991. facility. Without these incidents, the
These data do not indicate a significant occurrence rate would have been comparable
improvement in the blowout record over the to that for the 201- to 500-foot depth
study period. However, there is evidence range. Interestingly, the blowout record
of a lessening in the consequences of for wells drilled in depths greater than
blowouts. No fatalities or serious 1,000 feet has been comparable to that for
injuries resulted from drilling blowouts shallow (<200 feet) water depths. Blowout
during the last 7 years of the study trends by water depth will receive further
period. A total of 6,450 wells were scrutiny as more deep-water wells are
drilled (well footage of more than 65 drilled.
million feet) during this 7-year period.
RIG TYPE AND DIVERTER SYSTEMS
Significant volumes of liquid hydrocarbons ?
were not associated with any of the Of the 53 blowouts involving wells drilled
drilling blowouts. Records on file with mobile units (figure 10), 30 were
indicate two spills associated with being drilled with jackups. Although this
drilling blowouts before 1971: the Santa exceeds the number of blowouts for wells
Barbara blowout in 1969, which released an drilled with other types of mobile units,
estimated 80,000 barrels of oil into the jackup rigs conduct most of the exploratory
Santa Barbara Channel, and a 1965 gas drilling in the GOM. Veritas (1990)
blowout in the GOM, which released 1,700 reports 1,691 jackup unit-years in the GOM
barrels of condensate. during the period 1970-1989. This number
represents 66.1 percent of all mobile
WATER DEPTH drilling activity (2,558 unit-years) during
this timeframe. Assuming that jackup use
Table 1 and figure 8 present the number of was at least as dominant during the entire
417
4 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DRILLING BLOWOUTS, 1971-1991 OTC 7248
1971-1991 study period, jackups would have Information on the problems Jthat
the lowest blowout frequency per unit-year. contributed to the diverter failures is
summarized in figure 13. Table 4 presents
The consequences of blowouts from jackups information on diverter use and failures by
and other bottom-founded rigs have been rig type. As would be expected, the main
more severe than those for floating use of diverters has been on bottom-founded
drilling units. Only 1 of the 18 blowouts rigs. Table 4 also indicates a superior
that occurred during drilling operations performance record for diverter systems on
from floating rigs (semisubmersibles and platforms.
drillship) resulted in casualties and
major property damage. In contrast, 10 of The failure rate for diverters would have
the 69 blowouts attributed to drilling from been lower if each diverter use that
bottom-founded structures (platforms, allowed sufficient time for the safe
jackups, and submersibles) resulted in evacuation of personnel was deemed to be a
casualties, and 15 rigs incurred major success. Seven more diverter uses (four on
property damage. Although more complex platforms, two on jackups, and one on a
well-control operations may increase the semisubmersible) would qualify as
risk of gas blowouts in deeper waters, successful under these less demanding
floating rigs and their employees appear to criteria.
be less endangered.
CONCLUSIONS
The stability of bottom-founded rigs can be
affected by disturbances to the seafloor. Drilling data do not indicate a significant
Such drilling structures can collapse if a reduction in blowout frequency over the
shallow gas influx fractures the uncased period 1971-1991. The failure to reduce
portion of the hole and forms a crater drilling blowout occurrence rates is
around the wellbore. To prevent such largely attributable to difficulties in
occurrences, many operators prefer not to drilling through shallow gas sands. Given
shut in shallow gas influxes but to allow the serious limitations in methods for
the gas to flow to the surface where it is controlling shallow gas influxes, more
directed downwind through diverter lines. emphasis on improved gas detection and
Such diverter systems are intended to avoidance capabilities may be needed.
provide time for the evacuation of rig
personnel, to deplete the shallow gas sand, Although recent data suggest some
or to allow the well to bridge. Because improvement in the performance of diverter
capabilities for controlling diverted gas systems, such systems have not proven to be
flows are extremely limited, all of the gas a sufficiently reliable means of handling
diversion events during the study period shallow gas influxes. The risks in
were counted as blowouts. allowing gas to flow to the surface and be
●
diverted must be carefully weighed against
As indicated in figure 11, the failure rate the risks of shutting in the well.
for diverter systems has been high. Although electing not to divert a shallow
Diverters were used during 41 of the gas influx may increase the risk of gas
drilling blowouts. Nineteen of the 41 channeling back to the seafloor and forming
diverter uses were considered failures a crater, this risk may be low if the
because the desired venting of gas could operator has confidence in the integrity of
not be sustained until the wells bridged or the wellbore or unimportant if the well is
were satisfactorily controlled. Figure 12 being drilled from a floating rig. In any
presents annual data on diverter use and case, thorough consideration of gas
performance and indicates an improvement in handling procedures is required before
diverter performance in recent years. drilling operations are initiated.
During 1989-1991, seven of the eight
diverter uses were successful. Swabbing, a perennial drilling problem,
418
OTC 7248 ELMER P . DANENBERGER 5
REFERENCES
419
6 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DRILLING BLOWOUTS, 1971-1991 OTC 7248
WELLS
WATER TOTAL TOTAL WELLS PER
DEPTH EXP . DEV . SULFUR WELLS BLOWOUTS BLOWOUT
420
ELMER P. DANENBERC3ER 7
1991
GEOLOGIC AGE OF WELLS DRILLED SHALLOW GAS WELLS PER AVERAGE DEPTH
PRODUCTION BLOWOUTS BLOWOUT (FT) TO TOP
OF PRODUCTION
Platform 24 8
Jackup 11 8
Semisubmersible 4 3
Submersible 1 0
Drillship 1 0
421
Deep
dawlopment 63% development 45%
FormatIon Fracturea
1-6 hours
Equipment Failures
Cementing
6-24 hour
Caaing Failure 18%
aya
Stuck Pipe
, , I
o 5 10 15 20 25
26%
Number of Blowouts
Figure 4 - Percentage of blowouts by their duration,
Figure 3- Factors contributing to blowouts, 1971-1991
Mud/Cemertt/Mechanical Exploratory well blowout
d Gas Dkipated (excludes sulfur wells)
2%
All blowouts
(excludes sulfur wells)
A
N
0
Blowouts Well Starts
12 1,400
1,200
10
201-500 ft
1,000 44% <200 ft
8
45%
800
8
600
4
400
2 200
9% 2%
0 ~~ $’ ~~
1971 1976 1961 1988 1991
~“
Figure 8- Percentage of blowouts by watsr depth, 1971-1991
Figure 7- Number of well starts and drilling blowouts, 1971-1991
10 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DRILLING BLOWOUTS, 1971-1991 OTC 7248
. \ I
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424
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Urm Dmnagui
Valve Fall od
Lln. Plugged
Flow Ignlt.d
Broach.d Casing
o 2 4 6 a
Number of Incidents
Flgur. 13- Contrlbuthrg factors Irr dlv.rtor failur.s