TEEKAY SHIPPING PHILS., INC.

, and/or TEEKAY SHIPPING CANADA, Petitioners,

vs.
RAMIER C. CONCHA Respondent

FACTS:

In November 2000, Ramier C. Concha was hired as an Able Seaman. He was

deployed to Canada. During his assignment, a foreign particle accidentally entered his left
eye. When his eye became reddish and his vision became blurred, the designated medical
officer on board administered first aid treatment. Since there was no sign of improvement,
respondent requested for medical check-up in a hospital.

He was admitted at Karanatha Hospital in Australia and was diagnosed with Left
Eye Acute Iritis. On December 6, 2000, he was repatriated to the Philippines. Upon arrival,
he was referred to the Metropolitan Hospital. He underwent medical treatment until
February 2001. Since he was not assessed whether he was fit to work, he filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal with money claims with the Arbitration Branch of NLRC on May 28,
2001. The complaint was dismissed.

On December 13, 2004, he filed another complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. He sought to recover disability benefits, damages and
attorney’s fees. He likewise prayed for the payment of wages pertaining to the unexpired
portion of his contract.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for being time-barred. Raising Article
291 of the Labor Code, they maintained that all money claims premised on, or arising from
one’s employment should be brought within 3 years from the time the cause of action
accrued.

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.

NLRC set aside the order of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC reinstated the case and
ordered the Labor Arbiter of origin to conduct further proceedings.

CA promulgated a decision dismissing their petition. The motion for reconsideration

filed by petitioners on July 25, 2008 was denied in a Resolution dated November 20, 2008.

ISSUE:

Whether the Concha’s claims have not yet prescribed.

RULING:

Actions based on injury to rights prescribe in 4 years under Article 1146 of the Civil
Code. An action for damages involving a plaintiff separated from his employment for
unjustifiable causes is one for "injury to the rights of the plaintiff, and must be brought
within 4 years.” Private respondent had gone to the Labor Arbiter on a charge,
fundamentally, of illegal dismissal, of which his money claims form but an incidental part.
Essentially, his complaint is one for "injury to rights" arising from his forced
disembarkation.

Thus, Article 1146 is the applicable provision. It provides:

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:

(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

(2) Upon a quasi-delict;

One’s employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right," and the

wrongful interference is an actionable wrong. When one is arbitrarily and unjustly
deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of
one’s dismissal from employment constitutes is an action predicated "upon an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff," as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must
be brought within 4 years.

As in other causes of action, the prescriptive period for money claims is subject to
interruption, and in view of the absence of an equivalent Labor Code provision for
determining when said period may be interrupted, Article 1155 of the Civil Code is
applicable. It states that:

Article 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the
Court, when there is written extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

Here, after his disembarkation from the vessel on December 6, 2000, private
respondent filed on May 28, 2001 a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC. His complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter on the same date. In
accordance with Section 16, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, private respondent can
re-file a case in the Arbitration Branch of origin. Since the filing of his first complaint on
May 28, 2001 tolled the running of the period of prescription, both the NLRC and the CA
were correct in ruling that the filing of respondent’s second complaint with money claims
on December 13, 2004 was clearly filed on time.
 ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILS., INC., ENTERPRISE SHIPPING AGENCY SRL
AND/OR EVANGELINE RACHO, Petitioners, v. ERNESTO S. QUIOGUE, JR., Respondent.

FACTS:
Quiogue was hired by Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., for and on behalf of
its principal Enterprise Shipping Agency SRL, to work as Able-Bodied Seaman on board the
vessel MT Filicudi M with a basic salary of US$363.00. The employment contract was
governed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC) and the International Transport Workers Federation Total Crew Cost
Collective Bargaining Agreement (ITF TCC CBA), providing for higher benefits in the event
of disability or death of a worker.
On November 11, 2010, while Quiogue was on duty transferring the fire wire, his co-
worker accidentally dropped it on his left foot. He was immediately given first aid and
thereafter sent to a hospital in Spain. The x-ray examination on his injured foot showed
that one of his metatarsal bones was fractured. On November 19, 2010, as his injury
prevented him from performing his duties on board, he was repatriated and immediately
referred to the Metropolitan Medical Center where he was diagnosed to have sustained
"non-displaced Fracture of the Cuneiform Bone, Left Foot." Quiogue underwent treatment
and therapy with the company-designated physician from November 2010 to April 2011.
On April 13, 2011, he was certified as "fit to work" by the company-designated physician
however he continued to feel pain and discomfort. Consequently, he sought a second
opinion which concluded that the extent of his injury rendered him permanently and
totally incapable to perform his work as a seafarer.
Quiogue sought compensation based on total permanent disability from petitioners,
but the latter refused, insisting that he was not entitled to total permanent disability
benefits because he was declared as fit to work by the company-designated physician.
Quiogue then filed a complaint before the NLRC.

Labor Arbiters ruling:

The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in Quiogue's favor because his left foot injury affected
his dexterity and flexibility in walking and enduring weights which is a liability to his
employment as a seafarer. This became a liability to Quiogue's employment as he could no
longer endure the manual and laborious work required of him as a seafarer.
NLRC’s ruling:

The NLRC affirmed the decision of LA in toto and denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. According to the NLRC, a seafarer was not precluded from engaging the
services of the physician of his own choice as it was clear from Section 20 B (3)7  of the
POEA-SEC. In situations where the certification of the company-designated physician
would clash with the findings of the doctors of the seafarer, it would be the findings
favorable to the complainant that must be adopted. Moreover, from the time that Quiogue
had been injured until the time that he was allegedly certified to be fit to work by the
company-designated physician on April 13, 2011, more or less 5 months had already
transpired.

CA’s ruling:
The CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC that Quiogue was entitled to permanent and
total disability benefits but deleted the award of attorney's fees. It held
that notwithstanding the company-designated physician's assessment private respondent
is already fit to work, his disability is considered permanent and total because he was only
certified fit to work after the lapse of more than 120 days from the time he was repatriated.
Petitioners reiterated their arguments and prayer that the petition be given due course and
that the assailed decision and resolution of the CA be reversed and set aside.

ISSUE:
Whether Quiogue is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.
RULING:
Yes. It is a well-settled rule that if the medical treatment or evaluation exceeds 240 days,
the seafarer is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. The doctrine recognizes
that, in awarding disability benefits to the seaman, disability should not be understood
more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity.

In summary, if there is a claim for total and permanent disability benefits by a seafarer, the
following rules (rules) shall govern:
A. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the
seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer
reported to him;
B. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period
of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes
permanent and total;
C. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period
of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical
treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and
treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that
the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period;
and
 D. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the
extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and
total, regardless of any justification.
Here, the records show that despite the medication and therapy with the company-
designated physician, Quiogue still experienced recurring pains in his injured left foot. The
company-designated physician, however, even with the recurring pains, declared him as fit
to work. Thus, Quiogue sought the opinion of his own physician, Dr. Escutin, who after the
necessary tests and examination declared him unfit for sea duty in whatever capacity as a
seaman.

The right of a seafarer to consult a physician of his choice can only be sensible when his
findings are duly evaluated by the labor tribunals in awarding disability claims. The
credibility of the findings of Quiogue's private doctor was properly evaluated by the NLRC
when it found that the findings of Dr. Escutin who gave Grade 1 disability rating was more
appropriate and applicable to the injury suffered by Quiogue. With these medical findings
and the fact that Quiogue failed to be re-deployed by petitioners despite the fit to work
assessment, Dr. Escutin's assessment should be upheld.

As correctly noted by Quiogue, his entitlement to permanent total disability compensation,

as determined by the LA, the NLRC and the CA, was due to his inability to work/return to
his seafaring occupation after 120 days until the present time. Significantly, as aptly found
by the NLRC, he remained unemployed even after the time he filed the complaint to recover
permanent total disability compensation. In the aforecited case of Carcedo, it was stated
that should the company-designated physician fail to give his proper medical assessment
and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed
totally and permanently disabled.

Jebsens Maritime, Inc. and/or Star Clippers, Ltd. Vs. Edgardo M. Mirasol R. No.
213874. June 19, 2019

FACTS:

In November 2012, a complaint was filed by Edgardo Malate Mirasol against Jebsens
Maritime, Inc., Star Clippers Ltd., and/or Maria Theresa Lunzaga for total and permanent
disability benefits, moral and exemplary damages, four months basic wages, and attorney's
fees.

Complainant also filed an Addendum Supplement dated 27 December 2012,

wherein it was alleged that respondents are legally mandated to provide sickness
allowance equivalent to 120 days salaries; and that their refusal to pay sickness allowance
is a manifest sign of bad faith which makes them liable for damages.
 The respondents on the other hand argued that complainant is not entitled to
disability compensation under the POEA Standard Employment Contract.

The LA ruled that petitioners are liable to pay respondent permanent and total
disability benefits and sickness allowance for 120 days, as well as attorney's fees reasoning
that that respondent acquired epidydimitis and testicular cancer while he was on-board
the vessel because he was declared fit to work during his pre-employment medical
examination. The LA also found that respondent was subjected to enormous stress and
constantly exposed to dusts, chemical irritants, and/or natural elements such as harsh sea
weather.

The NLRC partially granted the appeal and ruled that respondent's testicular cancer
is not work-related because respondent complained of pain in his right testicle on his 10th
day onboard the vessel and that cancer cannot happen in just 10 days. Nonetheless, the
NLRC ruled that given the fact that it was undisputed that respondent lost one testicle,
which is considered an illness under Urinary and Generative Organs with a disability grade
of 11, respondent is entitled to US$7,465.00. Having failed to show proof of payment of
sickness allowance to respondent, the NLRC affirmed the LA's award of sickness allowance
to respondent.

The CA decided in favor of Mirasol ruling that he is entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits because the company-designated physicians failed to arrive at a timely
and definite assessment of respondent's fitness to work or permanent disability. Further,
the CA affirmed the award of sickness allowance and attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits and

attorney’s fees.

RULING:

The Petition is denied. Respondent is entitled to permanent and total disability

benefits and attorney’s fees.
Permanent total disability means the inability to do substantially all material acts
necessary to the prosecution of a gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain
and without material injury or danger to life.

For disability to be compensable, two (2) elements must concur: (1) the injury or
illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed
during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract.

In Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr. (Elburg), 764 SCRA 431 (2015),
the Court summarized the rules when a seafarer claims total and permanent disability
benefits, as follows: 1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical
assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time
the seafarer reported to him; 2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his
assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the
seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total; 3. If the company-designated physician
fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g.,
seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the
period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the
burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to
extend the period; and 4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his
assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer’s disability becomes
permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

Following Elburg, the company-designated physicians’ failure to issue a final and

definite assessment within the 120-day period makes respondent entitled to permanent
and total disability benefits. It was no longer necessary for respondent to present evidence
that his illness is work-related and compensable because the law operates to declare
respondent entitled to total and permanent disability benefits after the company-
designated physicians’ failure to issue a final and definite assessment within the 120-day
period.

EDMUND C. MAWANAY, PETITIONER, v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC.,

RIZZO-BOTTIGLIERI - DE CARLINI ARMATORISPA AND/OR CAPT. DANILO
SALASAN,* RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
Mawanay was hired by respondent Rizzo-Bottiglieri-De Carlini Armatorispa through
its local manning agency Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTCI) on July 10, 2013. He
was employed as an ordinary seaman on board the ocean-going vessel Giovanni Battista
Bottiglieri for a period of eight (8) months which commenced on July 24, 2013.

On August 30, 2013, while removing rust at the ship's deck, the petitioner
experienced severe headache and dizziness. The next day, while performing his usual tasks,
he collapsed after experiencing shortness of breath and suffocation. The petitioner was
then given first aid and allowed to rest. The next day, the petitioner again lost
consciousness. It was then decided that the petitioner was to be brought to a medical
facility at the next port of destination.

On October 1, 2013, the vessel reached the port of Fujairah, United Arab Emirates.
The petitioner was then brought to the Fujairah Port Clinic and underwent laboratory
scans and a CT scan of his brain, and was diagnosed to be suffering from "chronic
headache/sinusitis; increase intra-cranial pressure." The petitioner was confined for three
days and thereafter declared unfit for sea duty.
 On October 6, 2013, the petitioner was medically repatriated to the Philippines.
Upon his arrival, the petitioner immediately reported to PTCI, which then referred him to
the company's accredited physician for post-employment medical examination.

Due to his recurring headache, the petitioner was advised to consult with an ENT
specialist, and was found to have vertiginous migraine. He was prescribed medications to
manage his pain, and was told to return for another check-up on October 18, 2013. As the
petitioner's headache persisted, he was told to undergo an MRI, which yielded normal
results. Petitioner however claimed that he remained to experience headache. He was then
referred to and seen by the company-designated neurologist on January 17, 2014 which
found the petitioner to be suffering from cluster headache and prescribed medications.

On January 21, 2014, the company-designated physician issued a medical report and
concluded that his interim disability assessment is Grade 10. Two medical reports by the
company-designated physician followed. In the first which was issued on February 19,
2014, the physician indicated the possibility that the petitioner is feigning illness. It also
stated that the petitioner may be cleared during his next check-up, but emphasized that
migraine is a chronic disease that can be triggered by external stimuli. The final medical
report on the other hand, issued on March 5, 2014, stated that the petitioner is no longer
suffering from headache and is cleared of his condition.

On August 26, 2014, the petitioner filed a complaint for permanent and total
disability benefits before the NLRC. The petitioner said that since the company-designated
physician stopped treatment after five sessions he consulted another doctor, Dr. May
Donato-Tan.

On August 18, 2014, on the basis of the results of laboratory tests and examinations,
Dr. Donato-Tan issued a medical certificate declaring the petitioner permanently and
totally disabled to perform his work as a seaman.

LA DECISION:

LA rendered his Decision dismissing the petitioner's claim for permanent and total
disability benefits. The LA held that there is no reason to deviate from the findings of the
company-designated physician that the petitioner is fit to work, especially as the latter's
diagnosis is a result of a series of medical examinations, tests, and treatments.

NLRC DECISION:

NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the LA and found the petitioner to be
entitled to permanent and total disability benefit: Respondents, in solidum shall pay in peso
equivalent at time of payment US$93,154.00 as disability benefits; and 10% thereof as
attorney's fees. All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
NLRC pointed out the glaring inconsistency in the findings of the company-designated
physician. The NLRC noted that while the company-designated physician declared that the
petitioner is free from illness, at the same time, he recognized that migraine is chronic and
can easily be triggered by external stimuli.

NLRC also ruled that the petitioner is entitled to permanent and total disability as he
suffers from recurrent headache and dizziness for more than 120 days or exactly for a
period of 10 months from his repatriation.

CA RULING:

CA granted the petition. NLRC decision were ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the complaint for permanent and total disability compensation filed is
DISMISSED. CA held that the parties are bound by the provisions of the POEA SEC in that
the company-designated physician's findings and assessment is controlling on the matter
of disability or fitness to work of a seafarer.

CA adjudged the petitioner ineligible to permanent and total disability claims. The
CA emphasized that the mere lapse of the 120-day period does not automatically entitle the
petitioner to his claim particularly because he requires further medical attention and the
maximum 240-day period from the time of the petitioner's repatriation has not yet lapsed
at the time the company-designated physician issued a final assessment.

CA also declared that the NLRC erred in relying fully with the company-designated
physician's assessment, as it is settled that the latter's findings are not binding on the labor
tribunals and the courts.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioner is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.

2. Whether CA erred in giving sole credence to the findings of the petitioner.

RULING:

1. The mere lapse of 120 days with the petitioner remaining incapacitated to resume
his duties and earn a gainful occupation does not automatically entitle him to
permanent total disability benefits. The Court clarified that the 120-day rule applies
only in cases where the complaint for maritime disability compensation was filed
prior to October 6, 2008. Consequently, the succeeding claims, as in the case at bar
where the complaint was filed by the petitioner on August 26, 2014, are covered by
the 240-day rule.

The determination of the rights of a seafarer for disability compensation, when

covered by the 240-day rule, requires a balance in application by Philippine law, the
parties' contractual obligations under the POEA SEC and/or Collective Bargaining
Agreement, and the pertinent medical findings of the seafarer's condition by his own
physician and the company-designated physician.
 The interplay of these rules has been explained by the Court following procedure for
compliance under the 240-day rule: The seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must
report to the company-designated physician within 3 days from arrival for diagnosis and
treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman
is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage
during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is
acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition
is defined under the POEA [SEC] and by applicable Philippine laws.

If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because
the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period
may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to
declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The
seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified
by his medical condition.

2. Section 20-13(3) of the POEA SEC, the seafarer in case of disagreement, may then
consult with his own doctor. In the event of variance in the opinions of the
company-designated physician and the seafarer's doctor of choice, the matter may
be referred to a third doctor chosen by both parties whose diagnosis shall be final
and binding.

Here, Court finds that in here, the findings issued by the company-designated physician
prevails for two reasons: first, on account of the petitioner's breach of his contractual
obligations under the POEA SEC; and second, on the basis of the intrinsic merit and
reliability of the medical report issued. The company-designated physician complied with
the law when he issued a temporary disability rating within the 120-day period and a final
assessment of the petitioner's medical status prior to the expiration of the 240-day period;
also, that the petitioner, aggrieved of the findings issued by the company-designated
physician, availed of his rights under the POEA SEC and consulted with his own physician
who issued a contrary finding; and finally, that despite the conflicting opinions of the two
doctors, the matter was not referred to a third doctor as mandated by Section 20-B(3) of
the POEA SEC.

The conflicting opinions of the two physicians as to the type of illness the petitioner
is suffering highlights even more the importance of seeking the opinion of a third doctor. As
between the two opinions nonetheless, even setting the mandatory procedure aside, the
Court still finds the assessment and the disability rating by the company-designated
physician to be more worthy of belief and credence. It was the company-designated
physician who initially attended to the petitioner after repatriation, the one who referred
him to the proper medical specialists, and consistently monitored his progress until he was
eventually declared lit to work on March 5, 2014.

While it can be said that the POEA SEC was drafted in order to promote the interest
of Filipino workers abroad, the same does not mean that its interpretation and
implementation would have to always benefit labor. The goal of every court in every
litigation is to render justice. And in this sense, it is not justice to favor labor on this score
alone. Neither does this excuse the workers from compliance with their obligations under
the contract.