A.C. No.
4346           April 3, 2002 all the complainants belong, by surreptitiously selling some rights
ERLINDA ABRAGAN, MILA GINA JAVIER, REYNALDO MERCADO,
PATERNO TORRES, BENIGNA ANTIBO, ELEISER SALVADOR,
EDNA SAPON, JULIANA CUENCA, ESPERANZA BUENAFE,
VICENTE BARNAGA, MARTHA SAPON, JOSEFINA OPEÑA, PUREZA
WABE, RONULFO LOPEZ, DOMINADOR HERNANDEZ, FELIPA
EMBATE, ROQUE CATIIL, JERRY SAPON, CONCEPCION
MATANOG, and PABLO SALOMON, complainants,  apportionment, assignment and sale of parcels of land subject to
vs.
ATTY. MAXIMO G. RODRIGUEZ, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers violate their oath of office when they represent conflicting
interests. They taint not only their own professional practice, but the
entire legal profession itself.
1âwphi1.nêt
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Petition praying for the disbarment of Atty. Maximo
1 
G. Rodriguez because of alleged illegal and unethical acts. The Petition
relevantly reads as follows:
"2. That sometime in 1986, the petitioners hired the services of
the respondent and the latter, represented the former in the case
entitled PABLO SALOMON et al vs. RICARDO DACALUZ et al.,
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 3 docketed as Civil Case No. 11204, for Forcible Entry
with Petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages,
[and] a Certified True and Correct Copy of the COMPLAINT by
Clerk of Court III Gerardo B. Ucat of the said Court, is herewith
attached to the original of this PETITION, while photocopies of
the same are also attached to the duplicate copies of this same
Petition and marked as Annex 'A' hereof;
"3. That after the Case No. 11204 was finally won, and a Writ of
Execution was issued by the Honorable Municipal Trial Court in
Cities of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3, the same respondent
lawyer represented the petitioners herein;
"4. That when respondent counsel disturbed the association
(Cagayan de Oro Landless Residents Association, Inc.), to which
to other persons without the consent of the petitioners herein,
they decided to sever their client-lawyer relationship;
"5. That in fact, the National Bureau of Investigation of Cagayan
de Oro City, is presently undertaking an investigation on the
illegal activities of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez pertaining to his
express involvement in the illegal and unauthorized
the Case No. 11204, where he represented the poor landless
claimants of Cagayan de Oro City, which include your petitioners
in this case;
"6. That petitioners herein later filed an indirect contempt charge
under Civil Case No. 11204 against Sheriff Fernando Loncion et
al., on August 2, 1991 engaging the services of Atty. LORETO O.
SALVA, SR., an alleged former student of law of Atty. Maximo
Rodriguez, [and a] certified true and correct copy of the complaint
thereat consisting of four (4) pages is herewith attached and
photocopies of which are also attached to the duplicates hereof,
and correspondingly marked as their Annex 'B';
"7. That respondent lawyer, Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, (in the
Indirect Contempt Case under the same Civil Case No. 11204,)
REPRESENTED and actively took up the defense of FERNANDO
LONCION et al. much to the dismay, damage and prejudice of
the herein petitioners, [and] a copy of Atty. Rodriguez's Answer,
which is also certified true and correct by Clerk of Court III
Gerardo Ucat of Branch 3 of MTCC – Cagayan de Oro City,
consisting of three (3) pages, is attached to the original of this
Petition, while photocopies of the same are attached to the other
copies hereof and accordingly marked as Annex 'C';
"8. That the records will bear the petitioners out that their counsel,
Atty. SALVA SR. later on withdrew the case of Indirect Contempt
upon the suggestion of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez; and instead, filed
the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution;
"9. That on January 12, 1993, the herein respondent, without
consulting the herein Petitioners who are all poor and ignorant of
court procedures and the law, filed in behalf of the plaintiffs
(which include the herein Petitioners) in Civil Case No. 11204, a
Motion to Withdraw Plaintiffs' Exhibits, [and] a certified true and
correct copy of said Motion by Mr. Gerardo Ucat of MTCC Branch
3, Cagayan de Oro City is herewith attached to the original of this
Petition, while photocopies of the same are also attached to the
rest of the copies of this same Petition, and are correspondingly
marked as their Annex 'D'.
"10. That the illegal and unethical actions of Atty. Maximo
Rodriguez are most obnoxious, condemnable, and highly
immoral, to say the least, more so if we consider his social
standing and ascendancy in the community of Cagayan de Oro
City;
"11. That the records of Civil Case No. 11204 which are
voluminous will bear the petitioners' allegations against the herein
respondent, who, after representing them initially, then
transferring allegiance and services to the adverse parties
(Lonchion, Palacio and NHA Manager), came back to represent
the herein petitioners without any regard [for] the rules of law and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, which is highly contemptible
and a clear violation of his oath as a lawyer and an officer of the
courts of law;
"12. That these acts are only those that records will bear,
because outside of the court records, respondent, without regard
[for] delicadeza, fair play and the rule of law, has assigned,
apportioned and sold parcels of land[,] subject matter in Civil
Case No. 11204 which legally have been pronounced and
decided to be in the possession of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
11204, who are partly the petitioners herein. Thus, they cannot
yet enjoy the fruits of the tedious and protracted legal battle
because of respondent's illegal acts, which have instilled fear
among the plaintiffs and the petitioners herein;
"13. That respondent lawyer even represented ERLINDA
ABRAGAN, one of the herein petitioners, in a later proceedings in
Civil Case No. 11204 wherein the apportionment of parcels of
land was erroneously, unprocedurally and illegally submitted to a
commissioner, and that ERLINDA ABRAGAN, after winning in the
said Civil Case was later on dispossessed of her rights by
respondent counsel's maneuver, after the decision (in Civil Case
No. 11208) became final executory;
"14. That to make matters worse, respondent Atty. Rodriguez
eventually fenced an area consisting of about 10, 200 square
meters within Lot No. 1982[,] the subject matter in Civil Case No.
11204 without the consent of the herein petitioners. He even
openly and publicly proclaimed his possession and ownership
thereof, which fact is again and also under NBI investigation;
"15. That all the foregoing acts of respondent lawyer plus his
continuing and ongoing illegal and unethical maneuvers have
deprived the herein petitioners of their vested rights to possess
and eventually own the land they have for decades possessed,
and declared as such by final judgment in Civil Case No. 11204."
In his Comment, respondent flatly denied the accusations of petitioners.
2 
He explained that the withdrawal of the exhibits, having been approved
by the trial court, was not "illegal, obnoxious, undesirable and highly
immoral." He added that he took over the 8,000 square meters of land
only after it had been given to him as attorney's fees. In his words:
"14. Respondent ADMITS that he fenced an area of about 8,000
sq. [m]. after the association had awarded the same as attorney's
fees in Civil Case Number 11204, the dismissal of the appeal by
the NHA, the successful handling of three (3) cases in the
SUPREME COURT, the pending case of QUIETING OF TITLE
filed by the NHA, and for the pending reconveyance case, Civil
Case No. 93-573, supra. These area of 8,000 sq. [m]., was
awarded as attorney's fees, which [were] supposed to be ten
percent of the 22 hectares, Lot No. 1982, the subject matter of
Civil Case No. 11204, but the association and its members were
able to take actual possession by judgment of the courts only o[f]
the twelve (12) hectares. [This] area consisting of 8,000 sq. [m].,
and consisting of two (2) lots [was] fenced by the respondent to
prevent squatters from entering the area. The rights of
possession and ownership o[f] this area by the respondent
depends upon the outcome of Civil Case No. 93-573, supra, for
reconveyance of title by the association and its members versus
the NHA, et. al. If it is true that this is under investigation by the
NBI, then why, not wait and submit the investigation of the NHA,
instead of filing this unwarranted, false and fabricated charge
based on preposterous and ridiculous charges without any proof
whatsoever, except the vile [language] of an irresponsible
lawyer."3
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Reply in which they reiterated their
4 
allegations against respondent and added that the latter likewise violated
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and/or decision.
5
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
In her Report and Recommendation dated January 23, 2001,
Investigating IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for
violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Her report reads in part as follows:
"From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent
represented conflicting interest considering that the complainants
were the same plaintiffs in both cases and were duly specified in
the pleadings particularly in the caption of the cases. Under the
said predicament even if complainants were excluded as
members of the Association represented by the respondent; the
latter should have first secured complainants' written consent
before representing defendants in the Indirect Contempt case
particularly Macario Palacio, president of the Association, or
inhibited himself.
"It is very unfortunate that in his desire to render service to his
client, respondent overlooked the fact that he already violated
Rule 15.03 of [C]anon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
'Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.'
"We have no alternative but to abide by the rules." 6
IBP Board of Governors' Resolution
Upholding the above-quoted Report, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended via its May 26, 2001
Resolution that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) months for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors, but hold that the penalty should be six-month suspension as
recommended by the investigating commissioner.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
At the outset, we agree with Commissioner Navarro's conclusion that
apart from their allegations in their various pleadings, petitioners did not
proffer any proof tending to show that respondent had sold to other
persons several rights over the land in question; and that he had induced
the former counsel for petitioners, Atty. Salva Jr., to withdraw the indirect
contempt case that they had filed. Neither did the IBP find anything
wrong as regards the 8,000 square meters awarded to respondent as
payment for his legal services. Petitioners' bare assertions, without any
proof to back them up, would not justify the imposition of a penalty on
respondent.
Having said that, we find, however, that respondent falls short of the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers. They are
expected to uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times. The
trust and confidence clients repose in them require a high standard and
appreciation of the latter's duty to the former, the legal profession, the
courts and the public. Indeed, the bar must maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealings. To this end,
lawyers should refrain from doing anything that might tend to lessen the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their
profession.7
In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after full disclosure of the facts."
The Court explained in Buted v. Hernando: 8
"[A] lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose.
"The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and
not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also the
 subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others
in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with
respect to which confidence has been reposed." (Italics in the
9 
original)
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. x x x."

In the case at bar, petitioners were the same complainants in the indirect
contempt case and in the Complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No.
11204. Respondent should have evaluated the situation first before
10 
agreeing to be counsel for the defendants in the indirect contempt
proceedings. Attorneys owe undivided allegiance to their clients, and
should at all times weigh their actions, especially in their dealings with the
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. We find however that
suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law, as recommended
by Commissioner Navarro, is sufficient to discipline respondent.
A survey of cases involving conflicting interests on the part of counsel
reveals that the Court has imposed on erring attorneys either a 12 

latter and the public at large. They must conduct themselves beyond reprimand, or a suspension from the practice of law from five (5)
reproach at all times. months to as high as two (2) years.
13  14

The Court will not tolerate any departure from the "straight and narrow"
path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession. 1âwphi1.nêt
In Hilado v. David, which we quote below, the Court advised lawyers to
11 
be like Caesar's wife – to be pure and to appear to be so.
WHEREFORE, Maximo G. Rodriguez is found guilty of violating Rule
15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1.nêt

"This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as
practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well as to protect the attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste.
As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily SO ORDERED.
one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in Melo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep Vitug, J.,abroad on official business.
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice."

Because of his divided allegiance, respondent has eroded, rather than

enhanced, the public perception of the legal profession. His divided
loyalty constitutes malpractice for which he may be suspended, following
Lawyer's Oath
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of Attorneys by Supreme Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution
Court, grounds therefor. – Any member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.

March 5, 2018

A.C. No. 11871

POTENCIANO R. MALVAR, Complainant 
vs.
ATTY. FREDDIE B. FEIR, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Disbarment filed by petitioner Potenciano R. Malvar

against Atty. Freddie B. Feir for violation of Canori 19, Rule 19.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath. 1

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On February 13, 2015, petitioner Potenciano R. Malvar filed a complaint

for disbarment against respondent Atty. Freddie B. Feir alleging that on
December 17, 2014 and January 22, 2015, he received threatening
letters from Feir stating that should he fail to pay the sum of
Pl8,000,000.00 to his client, Rogelio M. Amurao, a criminal complaint for
Falsification of Public Documents and Estafa, a civil complaint for
Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title, and an administrative
complaint for the revocation of his license as a physician would be filed
against him.  According to Mal var, Feir's demands were tantamount to
2
blackmail or extortion due to the fact that F eir tried to obtain something
of value by means of threats of filing complaints.  Said acts are in
3
violation of the Lawyer's Oath which provides that: "I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the. doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same."  In support of his complaint, Mal var submitted the
4
following affidavits executed by: (1) his staff stating that said staff
witnessed Amurao deliver to the office a Deed of Absolute Sale signed by
Amurao, Noemi Amurao, Teodorico Toribio, and Fatima Toribio;  and (2)
5
Amurao himself stating that he is one of the sellers indicated in the Deed
of Absolute Sale, that the signature appearing thereon is his, and that he
personally witnessed Noemi Amurao, Teodorico Toribio, and Fatima
Toribio sign said document. 6
For his part, Feir countered that the said letters merely demanded Malvar
to explain how certain parcels of land Malvar was purchasing from his
client, Amurao, were already registered in Malvar's name when Amurao
had never executed a Deed of Absolute Sale transferring the same. Feir
narrated that sometime in 2008, Amurao was tasked by his co-owners,
spouses Teodorico Toribio and Fatima Toribio, to sell their properties
consisting of three. (3) parcels of land located in Antipolo City for
₱21,200,000.00. The buyer of said properties was Malvar, who initially
paid the sum of ₱3,200,000.00 with a promise to pay the remainder of
the purchase price after verification of the authenticity of the owner's title
to the properties. For this purpose, Malvar borrowed the original copies of
said titles from Amurao. Malvar, however, failed to return the same
despite several demands. To his surprise, Amurao later on learned that
the subject properties were already transferred in Malvar's name despite
the fact that he never executed the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale nor
received the balance of the purchase price. Upon further verification,
Amurao discovered that there exists a Deed of Absolute Sale covering
the sale of the subject properties in favor of Malvar exhibiting not only the
signatures of Amurao and Teodorico but also the signature of Fatima,
who had long been dead.  But when asked, Malvar could not proffer any
7 adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's
explanation as to the existence of the suspicious Deed of Absolute Sale
or the fact that the subject properties were already in his name. It is for
this reason that Amurao consulted Feir on his legal remedies as regards
his recovery of the subject properties and/or collection of the remaining
balance of the purchase price. Clearly, therefore, Malvar's complaint
seeking his disbarment appears only to harass and intimidate Feir. The
threat to sue Malvar based on the facts presented to Feir as a lawyer was
not groundless as Amurao stands to lose his property while· Malvar
enriches himself at Amurao's expense.  Interestingly, moreover, it was
8
pointed out that the purported Affidavit executed by Amurao must be a
forgery in view of the fact that he never executed any such document and
that his supposed Senior Citizen Identification Number indicated in the
Acknowledgment thereof was left blank. 9
After a careful review and evaluation of the case, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against Feir for lack of merit on February 23,
2016. On November 5, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
10
Resolution  adopting and approving the recommended dismissal of the
11
complaint, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner dismissing the complaint.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath
or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory
grounds enumerated in Section 27,  Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
12 13
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a
lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law."
Moreover, Rule 19.01 thereof states that "a lawyer shall employ only fair
and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file
any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the
adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the
client.
14
In the instant case, Malvar claims that Feir sent him the demand letters in
order to interpose threats that should he fail to pay the sum of
₱18,000,000.00, Feir will file criminal, civil, and administrative complaints
which were, in truth, unfounded for being based neither on valid nor
relevant facts and law. Such demands, according to Malvar, are
tantamount to blackmail or extortion.
pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the
principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may
be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps necessary
to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a
specified period.17

The Court, however, does not find merit in Malvar's contention. Blackmail
is defined as "the extortion of money from a person by threats of
accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints, x x x obtaining
of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an
accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate
to his prejudice." In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is
equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money
either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the
exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by
operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers
to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim. 15
In the absence, therefore, of any evidence preponderant to prove that
Feir committed acts constituting grounds for disbarment, such as the
violation of Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath, Malvar’s claims must necessarily
fail.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the
Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Freddie Feir for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Malvar is the buyer of the DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
properties subject herein and that Amurao, Feir’s client, is one of the Associate Justice
owners of the same. It is also undisputed that said subject properties are
already registered under Malvar’s name. But according to Amurao, he
has yet to receive the remaining balance of its purchase price. To the
Court, this fact alone is enough reason for Amurao to seek the legal
advice of Feir and for Feir to send the demand letters to Malvar. As the
IBP held, these demand letters were based on a legitimate cause or
issue, which is the alleged failure of Malvar to pay the full amount of the
consideration in the sale transaction as well as the alleged falsified Deed
of Sale used to transfer ownership over the lots subject of the instant
case.  Whether the Deed of Sale used in transferring the properties in the
16

name of Malvar was, indeed, forged and falsified is another matter for as
far as the instant complaint for disbarment is concerned, Feir was simply
acting in compliance with his lawyer's oath to protect and preserve the
rights of his client.

It bears stressing, moreover, that the monetary consideration Feir was

demanding from Malvar in the amount of ₱18,000,000.00 cannot be
considered as the subject of blackmail or extortion. Feir’s demand for
said amount is not an exaction of money for the exercise of an influence
but is actually a legitimate claim for the remaining balance subject of a
legitimate sale transaction. Contrary to Malvar’s claims, there is nothing
in the demand letters to show that the same was maliciously made with
intent to extort money from him since it was based on a valid and
justifiable cause. Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard
practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer

A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018
ROMEO A. ZARCILLA AND MARITA
BUMANGLAG, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA,
JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated February 9, 2006
filed by complainants Romeo A. Zarcilla (Zarcilla) and Marita
Bumanglag (Bumanglag) against respondent Atty. Jose C.
Quesada, Jr. (Atty. Quesada) for gross misconduct.
The facts are as follows:
On August 5, 2002, complainant Zarcilla executed an Affidavit-
Complaint2against respondent Atty. Quesada and complainant
Marita Bumanglag, among others, for falsification of public
documents docketed as I.S. No. 02-128-SF. Zarcilla alleged that
Bumanglag conspired with certain spouses Maximo Quezada
and Gloria Quezada (Spouses Quezada) and Atty. Quesada to
falsify a Deed of Sale3 dated April 12, 2002 by making it appear
that his parents, Perfecto G. Zarcilla and Tarcela A. Zarcilla,
sold a parcel of land under TCT No. T-18490 in favor of the
Spouses Quezada despite knowledge that his parents were
already deceased since March 4, 2001 and January 9, 1988,
respectively, as per Death Certificates4 issued by the Office of
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Santo Tomas, La Union. Said
signing of deed of sale was allegedly witnessed by a certain
Norma Zafe and Bumanglag, and notarized by Atty. Quesada.
Other than the alleged falsified deed of sale, Zarcilla also
claimed that on March 20, 2002, the Spouses Quezada filed a
petition for the administrative reconstitution of the original copy
of TCT No. 18490 where they presented the Joint Affidavit of his
then already deceased parents, the spouses Perfecto Zarcilla
and Tarcela A. Zarcilla as the petitioners.5 Said Joint-Affidavit of
the Spouses Quezada was again notarized by Atty. Quesada.
However, on October 9, 2002, Bumanglag executed a Counter-
affidavit6 in the same case where she claimed to be the real
owner of the property after Perfecto Zarcilla sold the same to
her mother. Bumanglag also stated therein that she facilitated
the sale transaction to the Spouses Quezada which, in effect,
exonerated her co-respondents, including Atty. Quesada, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
xxxx
6. That after the death of my mother I needed money to pay for
the expenses she incurred when she was sick and need
medication and all the (sic) to pay for the expenses of her
burial. I offered to sell the property to Spouses MAX QUEZADA
and GLORIA QUEZADA. I showed them the Deed of Sale
between PERFECTO ZARCILLA and my mother. I also showed
them the paper that my mother signed giving me the land;
7. That the Spouses Quezada told me that they will buy the
land provided I will be the one to transfer the said land to their
name. They gave me an advance payment so that I could
transfer the land to them. I made it appear that PERFECTO
ZARCILLA sold the property to the said spouses because
the title of the land was still in the name of Perfecto
Zarcilla. I did not have [any] criminal intent when I did it
because the land no longer belong to Perfecto Zarcilla. I
did all the subsequent acts like Petition for Reconstitution in the
name of Perfecto Zarcilla because then, the title was still in his
name. However, there was no damage to the heirs of PERFECTO
ZARCILLA because the land had long been sold to my mother
and the sons and daughters no longer had no legal claim to the
said land;
8. That SPOUSES MAXIMO QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA
did not falsify any document because I was the one who
facilitated the transaction knowing that the land I was
selling really belonged to me. Not one of my brothers and
(sic) sisters never (sic) complained when I sold the land.
I just delivered the document to the Spouses MAXIMO
QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA including the title in their
name. I was paid the balance after the Certificate of Title in
their name was finally delivered.7
All other respondents in the said falsification case, except for
Atty. Quesada, also filed their respective counter-affidavits
where they reiterated Bumanglag's admission.8
In a Resolution9 dated April 14, 2003, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of La Union held Bumanglag only to
undergo trial. All other respondents, including Atty. Quesada
who did not even file his counter-affidavit, were exonerated for
insufficiency of evidence.
Both Zarcilla and Bumanglag filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, but both were denied. Consequently,
Bumanglag was indicted for four counts of falsification of public
documents before the Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas, La
Union, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3594, 3595, 3597, and
3598.
However, Zarcilla later on withdrew said cases when he learned
that Bumanglag was not aware of the contents of her counter-
affidavit when she signed the same. He also found out that
Bumanglag was deceived by her co accused, including Atty.
Quesada. Thus, upon the motion of Zarcilla, in an Order10 dated
July 27, 2005, the court dismissed all falsification cases against
Bumanglag.
In a Resolution11 dated June 26, 2006, the Court resolved to
require Atty. Quesada to file a comment on the complaint
against him.
On August 28, 2006, Atty. Quesada file a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Comment12 due to voluminous workload. On
September 18, 2006, Atty. Quesada filed a second motion for
extension to file comment. In a Resolution13dated November 20,
2006, the Court granted Atty. Quesada's motions for extension
with a warning that the second motion for extension shall be
the last and that no further extension will be given.
On September 26, 2007, due to Atty. Quesada's failure to file a
comment on the complaint against him within the extended
period which expired on October 17, 2006, the Court resolved
to require Atty. Quesada to (a) show cause why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt from such failure,
and (b) comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by
submitting the required comment.14
Due to Atty. Quesada's failure to comply with the Show Cause
Resolution dated September 26, 2007, the Court resolved to (a)
impose upon Atty. Quesada, a fine of P1,000.00, and (b)
require Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June
26, 2006 by filing the comment required therein.15
No payment of fine was made as of January 13, 2009 as
evidenced by a Certification16 which was issued by Araceli
Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer.
Again, failing to comply with the directives of the Court to pay
the fine imposed against him and to submit his comment, the
Court, in a Resolution17dated February 16, 2009, resolved to (a)
impose upon Atty. Quesada an additional fine of P1,000.00, or a
penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fines are not
paid within 10 days from notice, and (b) order Atty. Quesada to
comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 to submit his
comment on the complaint against him. Atty. Quesada was also
warned that should he fail to comply, he shall be ordered
arrested and detained by the National Bureau of Investigation
until he shall have made the compliance or until such time as
the Court may order.
Despite repeated notices and warnings from the Court, no
payment of fine was ever made as of September 3, 2010 as
evidenced by a Certification18 which was issued by Araceli
Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer. On
December 28, 2010, another Certification19 was issued anew
showing no record of payment of fine by Atty. Quesada.
Thus, in a Resolution20 dated March 9, 2011, the Court resolved
to (1) increase the fine imposed on Atty. Quesada to P3,000.00,
or imprisonment often (10) days if such fine is not paid within
the prescribed period; and (2) require Atty. Quesada to comply
with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the
required comment on the complaint.
No payment of fine was made as of July 12, 2011, as evidenced
by a Certification21 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga,
Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer.
It appearing that Atty. Quesada failed to comply with the
numerous Resolutions of the Court to pay the fine imposed
upon him and submit comment on the complaint against him, in
a Resolution22 dated August 24, 2011, the Court ordered the
arrest of Atty. Quesada, and directed the NBI to arrest and
detain him until he shall have compli[ed] with the Court's
Resolution dated March 9, 2011. Subsequently, the Court issued
a Warrant of Arrest.23
Apparently forced by his looming detention, after five (5) years,
Atty. Quesada filed his Comment24 dated October 10, 2011, in
compliance with Resolution dated June 26, 2006. He claimed
that he is a victim of political harassment, vengeance and
retribution, and that the instant case against him was filed
solely for the purpose of maligning his person. Attached to his
compliance was postal money order in the amount of P3,000.00
as payment for the fine imposed upon him.
In a Letter25 dated October 10, 2011, Atty. Ricardo S. Pangan,
Jr., Regional Director of the NBI, informed the Court that Atty.
Quesada voluntarily surrendered before the agents of the NBI
on October 11, 2011, and claimed that he had already complied
with the Resolution of the Court. Atty. Quesada submitted a
copy of his comment and payment of fine, thus, on the same
day, Atty. Quesada was immediately released from custody.
On February 1, 2012, the Court referred the instant case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.26
During the mandatory conference before the IBP-Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), only Bumanglag and her counsel
appeared. Atty. Quesada failed to appear thereto, thus, the
mandatory conference was reset to July 11, 2012. However, on
July 11, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the
mandatory conference was reset anew to July 25, 2012.
Meanwhile, Bumanglag informed the IBP-CBD that co-
complainant Romeo Zarcilla passed away in 2005.
On July 23, 2012, Atty. Quesada requested that the mandatory
conference be reset due to health reasons. He submitted his
Medical Certificate dated May 2, 2012 showing that he
underwent a head operation and that he is still on recovery
period.
On July 25, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus,
the parties were directed to appear on August 23, 2012 and
submit their respective verified position papers. However, on
August 23, 2012, only Bumanglag and her counsel appeared,
and Atty. Quesada failed to appear anew. Thus, considering that
the parties were duly notified of the hearing, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.
On May 30, 2014, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and
Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty. Quesada
be disbarred from the practice of law.
In a Resolution No. XXI-2015-097 dated January 31, 2015, the
IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the
report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
RULING
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into
the conduct of its officers.27 The issue to be determined is
whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the
court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative
proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a
complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the
charges against him despite numerous notices.
However, in administrative proceedings, the complainant has
the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations
in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. As in
this case, considering the serious consequence of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court
has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty.28
Thus, in the instant case, the allegations of falsification or
forgery against Atty. Quesada must be competently proved
because falsification or forgery cannot be presumed. As such,
the allegations should first be established and determined in
appropriate proceedings, like in criminal or civil cases, for it is
only by such proceedings that the last word on the falsity or
forgery can be uttered by a court of law with the legal
competence to do so. A disbarment proceeding is not the
occasion to determine the issue of falsification or forgery simply
because the sole issue to be addressed and determined therein
is whether or not the respondent attorney is still fit to continue
to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
Accordingly, We decline to rule herein whether or not the
respondent had committed the supposed falsification of the
subject affidavit in the absence of the prior determination
thereof in the appropriate proceeding.29
We, however, noted that Atty. Quesada Violated the notarial
law for his act of notarizing the: (1) Deed of Sale30 dated April
12, 2002 purportedly executed by and between the spouses
Maximo F. Quezada and Gloria D. Quezada, the buyers, and
complainant Zarcilla's parents, the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and
Perfecto Zarcilla; and the (2) Joint Affidavit31 dated March 20,
2002 purportedly executed by the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and
Perfecto Zarcilla for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-18490,
when in both occasions the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and
Perfecto Zarcilla could no longer execute said documents and
appear before Atty. Quesada since they have long been
deceased as evidenced by their death certificates. Tarcela
Zarcilla died on January 9, 1988, while Perfecto Zarcilla died on
March 4, 2001.32
Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
stresses the necessity of the affiant's personal appearance
before the notary public:
xxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.
Thus, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
person who signed the same is the very same person who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the
appearance of the person who actually executed the document
in question, the notary public would be unable to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed.
Here, Atty. Quesada's act of notarizing the deed of sale
appeared to have been done to perpetuate a fraud. This is more
evident when he certified in the acknowledgment thereof that
he knew the vendors and knew them to be the same persons
who executed the document. When he then solemnly declared
that such appeared before him and acknowledged to him that
the document was the vendor's free act and deed despite the
fact that the vendors cannot do so as they were already
deceased, Atty. Quesada deliberately made false
representations, and was not merely negligent.
Thus, by his actuations, Atty. Quesada violated not only the
notarial law but also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized the
deed of sale without all the affiant's personal appearance. His
failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only
damage to those directly affected by the notarized document
but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in
degrading the function of notarization. The responsibility to
faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in
an acknowledgment or jurat is more pronounced when the
notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the
Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge
with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.33
Time and again, We have held that notarization of a document
is not an empty act or routine. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document, thus, making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and
the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to
a private instrument.34
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this
form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this
requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed.35
Aside from Atty. Quesada's violation of his duty as a notary
public, what this Court find more deplorable was his defiant
stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive
disregard of the Court's directives to file his comment on the
complaint. Despite several Court resolutions, notices, directives
and imposition of fines for Atty. Quesada's compliance and
payment, he ignored the same for more than five years.
Consequently, this case has dragged on for an unnecessary
length of time. More than five (5) years have already elapsed
from the time the Court issued the first Resolution dated June
26, 2006 which required Atty. Quesada to file his comment until
his eventual submission of comment on October 10, 2011. It
took a warrant of arrest to finally move Atty. Quesada to file his
Comment and pay the fines imposed upon him. While the Court
has been tolerant of his obstinate refusal to comply with its
directives, he shamelessly ignored the same and wasted the
Court's time and resources.
And even with the submission of his comment, he did not offer
any apology and/or any justification for his long delay in
complying with the directives/orders of this Court. We surmised
that when Atty. Quesada finally complied with the Court's
directives, his compliance was neither prompted by good faith
or willingness to obey the Court nor was he remorseful of his
infractions but was actually only forced to do so considering his
impending arrest. There is, thus, no question that his failure or
obstinate refusal without justification or valid reason to comply
with the Court's directives constitutes disobedience or defiance
of the lawful orders of Court, amounting to gross misconduct
and insubordination or disrespect.36
Atty. Quesada's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is in itself alone is a sufficient cause for
suspension or disbarment. His cavalier attitude in repeatedly
ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. His conduct indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a
Court's Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request,
nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively." Atty. Quesada's obstinate refusal to comply with
the Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his
character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's
lawful orders which this Court will not tolerate."37
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies
Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be of the Republic of the Philippines.
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross SO ORDERED.
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or Carpio,*Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin,
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa,
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur. 
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing Sereno, C.J., on leave.
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the

dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect
for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer's obedience to court
orders and processes.38 Considering Atty. Quesada's
predisposition to disregard not only the laws of the land but also
the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor.
Worse, with his repeated disobedience to this Court's orders,
Atty. Quesada displayed no remorse as to his misconduct which,
thus, proved himself unworthy of membership in the Philippine
Bar. Clearly, Atty. Quesada is unfit to discharge the duties of an
officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of
disbarment.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We find

respondent ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA JR. GUILTY of gross
misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering
him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession.
He is, thus, ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and
his name stricken-off of the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately. We, likewise, REVOKE his incumbent notarial
commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him
from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal file of
respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all
A.C. No. 9119
EUGENIO E. CORTEZ, Complaint  complainant questioned him, Atty. Cortes became hysterical and
vs.
ATTY. HERNANDO P. CORTES, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
The instant controversy arose from a Complaint-Affidavit  filed by
1
complainant Eugenio E. Cortez  against respondent Atty. Hernando P.
2
Cortes (Atty. Cortes) for grave misconduct, and violation of the Lawyer's
Oath and the Code for Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Cortes as his
counsel in an illegal dismissal case against Philippine Explosives
Corporation (PEC). He further alleged that he and Atty. Cortes had a
handshake agreement on a 12% contingency fee as and by way of
attorney's fees.3
Atty. Cortes prosecuted his claims for illegal dismissal which was decided
in favor of complainant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commissions ordering PEC to pay complaint
the total amount of One million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱1,
100,000) m three staggered payments. PEC then issued City Bank
Check No. 1000003986 dated March 31, 2005 in the amount of Five
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱550,000), Check No. 1000003988 in
the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱275,000)
dated April 15, 2005, and Check No. 1000003989 also in the amount of
Two Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱275,000) dated April 30,
2005, all payable in the name of complainant. 4 opening of an account to deposit the checks. Atty. Cortes had to
Complainant narrated that after the maturity of the first check, he went to
China Bank, Southmall Las Pinas with Atty. Cortes and his wife to open
an account to deposit the said check. Atty. Cortes asked complainant to
wait outside the bank while he personally, for and in his behalf, facilitated
the opening of the account. After thirty minutes, he was asked to go
inside and sign a joint savings account with Atty. Cortes. 5
On April 7, 2005, complainant alleged that when he was about to
withdraw the amount of the initial check deposited, Atty. Cortes arrived
with his wife and ordered the bank teller to hold off the transaction. When
complainant asked why he did that, Atty. Cortes answered that 50% of
the total awarded claims belongs to him as attorney's fees. When
imposingly maintained that 50% of the total awarded claims belongs to
him.6
Complainant then tried to pacify Atty. Cortes and his wife and offered to
pay ₱200,000, and when Atty. Cortes rejected it, he offered the third
check amounting to ₱275,000, but Atty. Cortes still insisted on the 50% of
the total award. Complainant was then forced to endorse the second and
third checks to Atty. Cortes, after which he was able to withdraw the
proceeds of the first check. With the help of the lawyers in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), complainant was able to have the drawer of
the checks cancel one of the checks endorsed to Atty. Cortes before he
was able to encash the same.
Atty. Cortes, in his Answer, admitted that his services were engaged by
complainant to pursue the labor claims. He, however, denied that they
agreed on a 12% contingency fee by way of attorney's fees. 7
Atty. Cortes claimed that complainant is a relative of his, but considering
that the case was to be filed in Pampanga and he resided in Las Piñas,
he would only accept the case on a fifty-fifty sharing arrangement. 8
Atty. Cortes alleged that the checks were issued pursuant to the
preexecution agreement reached by the parties at the office of Labor
Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo. He and complainant agreed that the amount of
the first check be divided fifty-fifty, the whole of the second check would
be the complainant's, and the third check would be his. 9
Atty. Cortes further alleged that he had to assist complainant in the
convince the bank manager to accept the checks issued in the name of
Eugene E. Cortez despite the fact that complainant's ID's are all in the
name of Eugenio E. Cortez.  He claimed that anyone in his place would
10
have demanded for the holding off of the transaction because of the base
ingratitude, patent deception and treachery of complainant. 11
Atty. Cortes posited that the check forms part and parcel of the judgment
award to which he had a lien corresponding to his attorney's fees and
complainant should have at least invited him to witness the "harvest of
the fruits."
12
Atty. Cortes insisted that the alleged 12% agreement is false, being
merely a concoction of Gomplainant’s fertile and unstable mind. He also
pointed out that the fifty-fifty sharing arrangement is not unconscionably
high because the complainant was given the option to hire other lawyers,
but still he engaged his services. 13
After hearing and submission of position papers, the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, in a Report and Recommendation dated April 11, 2007,
recommended the six-month suspension of Atty. Cortes. It ruled that a
contingent fee arrangement should generally be in writing, and that
contingent fees depend upon an express contract without which the
lawyer can only recover on the basis of quantum meruit. It also pointed
out that the Labor Code establishes a limit as to the amount of attorney's
fees that a lawyer may collect or charge his client in labor cases.
The report and recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors in an August 17, 2007 Resolution:
R E S O L U T I O N NO. XVIII-2007-74
CBD Case No. 05-1482
Eugenio E. Cortez vs.
Atty. Hernando P. Cortes
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and for violation of A1iicle 11 (b) of the Labor Code, Atty. Hernando P.
Cortes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
and Ordered to Return to complainant whatever amount he received in
excess of the 10% allowable attorney's fees in labor case (sic).
TOMAS N. PRADO
National Secretary
A motion for reconsideration  was filed by Atty. Cortes, which was denied
15
by the IBP Board of Governors. 16
The issue, plainly, is whether or not the acts complained of constitute
misconduct on the part of Atty. Cortes, which would subject him to
disciplinary action.
We rule in the affirmative.
We have held that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this
jurisdiction. It is generally recognized as valid and binding, but must be
laid down in, an express contract.  The case of Rayos v. Atty.
17
Hernandez  discussed the same succinctly, thus:
18
A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is
generally recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in
an express contract. The amount of contingent fee agreed upon by the
parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal
services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher
compensation is allowed as contingent fee in consideration of the risk
that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. Contracts of this nature
are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and
the lawyer especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of
action, but no means with which to pay for legal services unless he can,
with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid
out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee
arrangement is the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek
redress for injuries sustained and have their rights
vindicated.  (Emphasis Ours)
19
In this case, We note that the parties did not have an express contract as
regards the payment of fees. Complainant alleges that the contingency
fee was fixed at 12% via a handshake agreement, while Atty. Cortes
counters that the agreement was 50%.
The IBP Commission on Discipline pointed out that since what
respondent handled was merely a labor case, his attorney's foes should
not exceed 10%, the rate allowed under Article 111  of the Labor Code.
20
14 Although we agree that the 50% contingency fee was excessive, We do
not agree that the 10% limitation as provided in Article 111 is
automatically applicable.
The case of Masmud v. NLRC (First Division), et al.,   discussed the
21
matter of application of Article 111 of the Labor Code on attorney's fees:
There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense,
attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a
lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the latter. On
the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be
awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the
losing party to the prevailing party, such that, in any of the cases
provided by law where such award can be made, e.g., those authorized
in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the amount is payable not to the lawyer
but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to
the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.
xxxx
Contrary to Evangelina’s proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code
deals with the extraordinary concept of attorneys fees.  It regulates
1âwphi1
the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages
sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used
as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his
client for the legal services he rendered.  (Emphasis Ours)
22
It would then appear that the contingency fees that Atty. Cortes required
is in the ordinary sense as it represents reasonable compensation for
legal services he rendered for complainant. Necessarily, the 10%
limitation of the Labor Code would not be applicable. Beyond the limit
fixed by Article 111, such as between the lawyer and the client, the
attorney's fees may exceed 10% on the basis of quantum meriut.  We, 23
however, are hard-pressed to accept the justification of the 50%
contingency fee that Atty. Cortes is insisting on for being exorbitant.
Generally, the amount of attorney's fees due is that stipulated in the
retainer Agreement which is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyers
compensation.  In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney's fees is
1âwphi1
fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the
attorneys services.  Courts may ascertain also if the attorney's fees are
24
found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances. In no
case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is
reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138  of the Rules of Court.
25
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer
shall charge only fair and reasonable fees." Rule 20.01 of the same
canon enumerates the following factors which should guide a lawyer in
determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance
of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of
the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to
the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or' certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established;
and
(j)The professional standing of the lawyer.
Here, as set out by Atty. Cortes himself, the complainant's case was
merely grounded on complainant's alleged absence without leave for the
second time and challenging the plant manager, the complainant's
immediate superior, to a fist fight. He also claimed that the travel from his
home in Las Piñas City to San Fernando, Pampanga was costly and was
an ordeal. We likewise note that Atty. Cortes admitted that complainant
was a close kin of his, and that complainant appealed to his services
because, since his separation from work, he had no visible means of
income and had so many mouths to feed. These circumstances cited by
Atty. Cortes to justify the fees; to Our mind, does not exculpate Atty.
Cortes, but in fact, makes Us question all the more, the reasonableness
26 of it.
We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed by Atty.
Cortes was, under the facts obtaining in this case, grossly excessive and
unconscionable. The issues involved could hardly be said to be novel
and Atty. Cortes in fact already knew that complainant was already hard
up. We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and
lawyers are not merchants.  Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not
27

capital that yields profits.  The returns it births are simple rewards for a
28

job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile

pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental
interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to
State regulation.29

Here, considering that complainant was amenable to a 12% contingency

fee, and which we likewise deem to be the reasonable worth of the
attorney's services rendered by Atty. Cortes under the circumstances,
Atty. Cortes is hereby adjudged to return to complainant the amount he
received in excess of 12% of the total award. If the Law has to remain an
honorable profession and has to attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its
ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by
their lives, accord continuing fidelity to such tenets and principles.30

We, however, find that the recommended suspension of six months is too
harsh and considering that Atty. Cortes is nearing ninety years old and
that there was no question that Atty. Cortes was able to get a favorable
outcome, a reduction of the suspension is proper. We then reduce and
sanction Atty. Cortes to a three-month suspension from the practice of
law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Hernando P.

Cortes is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for three (3) months, and is ordered to return to complainant
Eugenio E. Cortez the amount he received in excess of the 12%
allowable attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.
 January 8, 2018 LOURDES ALMARIO P. PEDIA, above named, to do the following acts
and things:
A.C. No. 10689
1. To act as our representative and agent in administering our property x
ROMEO A. ALMARIO, Complainant  x x located at District of Tondo, City of Manila consisting of SEVENTY
vs. EIGHT SQUARE METERS AND SIXTY FIVE DECIMETERS (78.65)
ATTY. DOMINICA LLERA-AGNO, Respondent Square meters, covered by TCT No. T-244909 of the [Register] of Deeds
of the City of Manila;
DECISION
xxxx
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto our said attorney-in-fact full
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint  filed by complainant
1 power and authority, whatsoever requisite to be done in or about the
Romeo A. Almario (complainant) before the Commission on Bar premises, as fully as we might or could lawfully do if personally present
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking to disbar and hereby ratifying and confirming all that our said attorney shall do or
Atty. Dominica L. Agno (respondent lawyer), for notarizing a Special cause to be done by virtue of these presents until revoked in writing by
Power of Attorney (SPA) without the personal appearance of one of the me.
affiants therein.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed this instrument on the 26th day
Factual Background of July 2006 at Muntinlupa City.

On July 5, 2006, a Complaint for Judicial Partition with Delivery of xxxx

Certificate of Title, docketed as Civil Case No. 06115416  (civil case),
2

was instituted before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila by the HEIRS OF THE LATE VICTORIA A. ALMARIO:
herein complainant against therein defendants Angelita A. Barrameda
and several other persons. It was therein alleged that complainant is the (Signed)
sole surviving registered owner of a parcel of land situated at No. 973 Del RONALD A. GATDULA
Pan Street, San Antonio, Tondo, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 244909, and that the defendants therein are co-owners (Signed)
of that parcel of land by virtue of intestate succession. FRANCISCA A. MALLARI

Relative to the said civil case, herein respondent lawyer, as counsel for xxxx
therein defendants, notarized and acknowledged a SPA  which reads:
3

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES) SS.
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: CITY OF MUNTINLUPA )

WE, x x x the HEIRS OF THE LATE VICTORIA ALMARIO, to wit: BEFORE ME, a notary public for the City of Muntinlupa, personally
RONALD A. GA TD ULA, of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of appeared the following persons on the 26[th] day of July 2006:
973 Del Pan St., Tondo, Manila and FRANCISCA A. MALLARI, of the
same address, do hereby appoint, name and constitute also MA. xxxx
Ronald A. Gatdula with CTC No. 16785315 issued at Manila on 1-19-
06 Francisca Mallari with CTC No. 16785314 issued at Manila on 1-19-
06 known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed
the foregoing Special Power of Attorney, consisting of three (3) pages
including this page where the acknowledgement is written, signed by the
parties and their instrumental witnesses and they acknowledged to me
that the same is their own true act and deed.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL.
(Signed)
DOMINICA L. AGNO
Notary Public
Until 31 Dec 2006
PTR No. 0007769
Muntinlupa City
06 January 2006
IBP Life Roll 00577
Doc. No. 193
Page No. 55
Book No. 11
Series of 2006
It is complainant's contention: (l) that the said SP A was falsified because
one of the affiants therein, Francisca A. Mallari (Mallari),  could not
4 2) The SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006 for reasons of
possibly have executed the same because she was in Japan at the time
the SP A was executed, as certified to  by the Bureau of Immigration (BI);
5 filing their Answer in the civil case, and that in any event, Mallari
(2) that this SP A was used in the said civil case to perpetrate fraud and
deception against complainant resulting in the filing of Criminal Case No.
452612-CR, for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Use
of Falsified Document) against Ma. Lourdes Almario Pedia, (Pedia), the
attorney-in-fact mentioned in the SPA; (3) that respondent lawyer
notarized the SP A although Mallari did not personally appear before her;
(4) that in the process of notarizing the SP A, respondent lawyer also
accepted a Community Tax Certificate (CTC), which is no longer
considered a competent evidence of identity pursuant to the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice; and (5) that, therefore, respondent lawyer violated
Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which state
- the said civil case executed a Compromise Agreement,  which
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
xxxx
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice.
In her Answer,  respondent lawyer prayed for the dismissal of the
6
complaint and offered the following arguments:
1) On July 12, 2006, Pedia sent the SPA to Mallari in Japan and it
was brought back to the Philippines on July 25, 2006 by Mallari's
son, Roman Mallari-Vestido;
expediency, because therein defendants were pressed for time in
undertook to have the SPA acknowledged before the Philippine
Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on August 28, 2006, (thereby giving it
retroactive effect). Respondent lawyer claimed that the
aforementioned circumstances showed that she acted in good
faith in notarizing the SPA;
3) Mallari was able to acknowledge the SP A with red
ribbon  before the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on
7
August 28, 2006;
4) Neither fraud nor deception was perpetrated as the parties in
8
was approved by the RTC; 9
 5) Contrary to complainant's claim, CTCs are still presently
accepted as proof of personal identification in cases where no
other proof of personal identification is available; and,
6) That, if at all, it was complainant himself who defrauded the
RTC when he stated in his verified complaint that Mallari is a
resident of No. 973 Del Pan St., San Antonio, Tondo, Manila,
even though he knew that Mallari was in Japan at the time of
filing of the civil case.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
In a Report and Recommendation,  the Investigating Commissioner
10
found respondent lawyer liable for violation of Section 12 of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice and recommended that she be suspended for
six months as notary public.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, it was evident that
respondent lawyer notarized the SPA despite knowing that Mallari, one of
the affiants therein, did not personally appear before her.
Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
On April 16, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a
Resolution  adopting the finding and approving the recommendation of
11
the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent lawyer filed a verified Motion for Reconsideration,  which
12
was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution  dated May 3,
13
2014.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
Respondent lawyer admits the infraction imputed against her, and simply
pleads that the penalty recommended by the IBP be reduced or lowered.
She argues that: (1) this is her first offense since she was first
commissioned as a notary public in 1973; (2) the case involved only one
document; (3) the notarization was done in good faith; (4) the civil case
wherein the questioned SP A was used ended in a Compromise
Agreement; and finally (5) she is already 71 years old and is truly sorry
for what she had done, and promises to be more circumspect in the
performance of her duties as a notary public.14
In his Comment  to the Petition, complainant insists that respondent
15
lawyer must be disciplined accordingly and that suspension is the
appropriate penalty for such infraction.
The sole issue that this Court must thus address is the appropriate
penalty to be meted out against respondent lawyer.
Our Ruling
The importance of the affiant's personal appearance when a document is
notarized is underscored by Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice which states:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - 'Acknowledgment' refers to an act in
which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally
complete instrument or document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by
the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or
document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the
instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or
document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a
particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that
capacity. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Section 2(b), Rule 1V of the same Rules provides that:
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions mandate the notary public to require the physical or
personal presence of the person/s who executed a document, before
notarizing the same. In other words, a document should not be notarized
unless the person/s who is/are executing it is/are personally or physically
present before the notary public. The personal and physical presence of
the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the notary public to verify
the genuineness of the signature/s of the affiant/s therein and the due
execution of the document.
Notaries public are absolutely prohibited or forbidden from notarizing a
fictitious or spurious document.  They are the law's vanguards and
1âwphi1
sentinels against illegal deeds. The confidence of the public in the
integrity of notarial acts would be undermined and impaired if notaries
public do not observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties spelled out in the notarial law.
This Court, in Ferguson v. Atty. Ramos,   held that "notarization is not an
16
empty, meaningless and routinary act[;i]t is imbued with public interest x
xx."
In cognate or similar cases,  this Court likewise held that a notary public
17
The Court opts to suspend respondent lawyer as a notary public for two
months, instead of six months as the IBP had recommended. We are
impelled by the following reasons for taking this course of action: first, the
apparent absence of bad faith in her notarizing the SP A in question;
second, the civil case wherein the flawed SP A was used ended up in a
judicial Compromise Agreement; and finally, this is her first administrative
case since she was commissioned as a Notary Public in 1973. In
addition, respondent lawyer invites our attention to the fact that she is
already in the twilight years of her life.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Dominica L. Agno is
hereby SUSPENDED as Notary Public for the aforesaid infraction for two
months and WARNED that the commission of a similar infraction will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to Atty. Agno's personal record. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts
in the country for their info1mation and guidance.

must not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the SO ORDERED.
very same persons who executed the same, and personally appeared
before him to attest to the truth of the contents thereof. The purpose of
this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness
of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the party's free and voluntary act and deed.

In the present case, the SPA in question was notarized by respondent

lawyer despite the absence of Mallari, one of the affiants therein. Mallari
could not have personally appeared before respondent lawyer in
Muntinlupa City, Philippines where the SPA was notarized on July 26,
2006 because Mallari was in Japan at that time, as certified to by the
Bureau of Immigration.

It goes without saying that it was respondent lawyer's bounden duty, as a

lawyer and notary public, to obey the laws of the land and to promote
respect for legal processes. Respondent lawyer may only forsake this
duty at the risk of forfeiting her membership in the Philippine Bar and the
revocation of her license as a notary public. Considering however, the
circumstances attendant upon this case, we resolve to reduce or lower
the recommended penalty on respondent lawyer.
A.C. No. 5161             April 14, 2004
ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant,  that time by TCT No. T- 1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a Complaint-Affidavit filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court,
1 
complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando S.
Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to,
and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant’s signature in a
purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation
in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby violating
his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.
The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita
Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam
T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein respondent;
Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left
several parcels of land, to wit:
a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
containing an area of 43,908 square meters more or less, and
covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing
an area of 16,073 square meters, more or less, and covered at
that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds
of Cavite;
c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing
an area of 22,131 square meters, more or less and covered at
According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his
relationship with her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive
them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of
an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the
following acts or omissions:
1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to
advise against, the perjury committed by his wife Felicisima and
his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986,
wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of
the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully
well that the same was false. He presented that document to the
Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot
No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later
sold to Antel Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already
made to, and received by, Felicisima and Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to
advise against, the forgery of complainant’s signature in a
purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995
involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time
working as an overseas contract worker. He even presented the
falsified document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer
the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-
in-law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable
them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was
received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial
Reconstitution of the Original Copy and Owner’s Duplicate Copy
of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainant’s sisters
Marcelina and Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the respondent
made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the
effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and
legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante
for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names. With the
reconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the
respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605
 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from the sale
to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was even
received pending the reconstitution proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false
misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he
requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full
payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of
reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew
that it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the
reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the
release of the money, he even used the stationery of the
Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.
In his Comment, the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint
2  administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses.
and asserts that he did not take advantage of his profession to deprive
any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his parents-in-law.
Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima
and Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely profit from the
sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603
because he had no part in the execution of the document. All the while he
believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to
dispose of the said lot. If ever complainant’s signature was affixed on that
document, it was done in good faith.
The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera,
et. al., in LRC Case No. 5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869.
The false testimony of Marcelina in that case that she and Felicisima
were the only children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could
not be faulted on him because such was a clear oversight. Moreover, the
sale of Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina
and his wife. His conformity through his signature was pro-forma because
the property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent
his alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order of
reconstitution would be released by the end of November 1996, suffice it
to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk of Court, Mr. Rosauro
Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually uncontested and
granted by courts.
Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him
in bombarding him with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case;
Civil Case No. TM-855 for "Annulment of Documents, Titles, and
Reconveyance plus Damages"; and a criminal case for Estafa and
Falsification of Public Documents.
In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will
allegedly made by her mother and allegedly implemented by their eldest
brother Eliseo in view of the following circumstances: (1) her mother met
a sudden death in 1967; and partition of the properties in total disregard
of their father was morally reprehensible, since the latter was still alive;
(2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were still minors including
respondent’s wife herself; (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his
siblings, in response to the previous letter of Felicisima, Marcelina, and
Miriam, denying the existence of a toka. She further states that the
respondent was not merely a passive onlooker but, as he admitted, the
On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or
decision.3
On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues
presented by both parties, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations
of the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and
Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus
she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of
law.4
In its Resolution No. XV-2003-333 of 21 June 2003, the Board of
5 
Governors of the IBP approved and adopted Commissioner San Juan’s
report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for
six years.
We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of
facts and conclusion of culpability. The respondent has sufficiently
demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the
exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long
years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer.
It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers
that pledge; thus:
LAWYER'S OATH
 I, ……………… , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution
and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent
to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to
dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and
keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyer’s oath, they become
guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair
and impartial dispensation of justice. This oath is firmly echoed and
6 
reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
...
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
… Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
...
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to
be misled by any artifice.
All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal
system. When the respondent took the oath as a member of the legal
profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this
covenant, respondent miserably failed.
The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they are the children
of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only between them Lot No. 1586
to the exclusion of their other siblings. There was concealment of the fact
7 
that there were other compulsory heirs to the estate of the deceased.
Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being
married to complainant’s sister, he knew of his wife’s siblings. In fact, he
declared that the complainant stayed with them while she was in the
Philippines. Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register
8 
of Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the
lot in question in the name of his wife and his sister-in-law Miriam.
It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted regarding the
9 
falsification of complainant’s signature in the Extrajudicial
Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which contains a
10 
purported waiver by the complainant of her right over the property.
Marcelina admitted that she signed complainant’s name in that
document. Such act of counterfeiting the complainant’s signature to
11 
make it appear that the complainant had participated in the execution of
that document is tantamount to falsification of a public document. 12
attorney and against committing falsification, he presented such
13 
document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in
favor of Marcelina and his wife. He himself, therefore, may also be held
14 
liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the
complainant and her other co-heirs. Notably, he also admitted in an
15 
affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the
transfer of Lot 1603. 16
Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts
which are contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the first and
foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land.
The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such
duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal
processes. For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a
17 
profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and
the dispensation of justice. As such, he should make himself more an
18 
exemplar for others to emulate. He should not, therefore, engage in
19 
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. He makes himself
20 
unfit to remain in the profession who commits any such unbecoming act
or conduct.21
Respondent’s argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his
sister- in-law Marcelina of the other siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the
reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a mere oversight does not
deserve credence in view of the following circumstances: First, the
petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners
when there were six siblings who were heirs of the unpartitioned
lot.22 Second, during the hearing of said case when the respondent asked
Marcelina whether she has brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the
latter said none. The transcript of that hearing reads:
ATTY. TORRES:
Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the
deceased Sps. Vicente Ting, Jr. and Julita Reynante?
WITNESS:
A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.
Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?
A None, sir. 23
The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false
testimony in court, and he never corrected the same despite full
24 
knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the case. Moreover, in
25 
knowingly offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be
punished as guilty of false testimony.26
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall "not
do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." This Rule was
27 
clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted
Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima
and when he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of
the title involving Lot 1605.
The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer
of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice. Like the
court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any
act on his part that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice
constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him. 28
It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution,
he offered in evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which was executed by
Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing of this administrative
case, Marcelina admitted that her statement in that affidavit that the title
was in her possession was false, as she was never in possession of the
title and would not, therefore, know that the same was lost.
29 
Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain
Mrs. Ong, the respondent requested the release of 50% of the remaining
balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through
Mrs. Ong that he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order
directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be released within
the month. Respondent’s information was misleading because he
30 
presented evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after he
sent the letter. Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on
31 
the part of the respondent.
Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless
bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
 Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which
Court; grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may be disbarred shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of SO ORDERED
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or
for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an

erring lawyer, we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary
proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence. While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is
32 

primarily addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction should neither

be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to
scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar. 33

Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases
of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not
hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers where the evidence calls for it. Verily, given the peculiar factual
34 

circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondent’s gross

misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life,
and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating
Commissioner.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando

S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath, as
well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal
profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and
his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
which shall forthwith record it in the personal files of the respondent; all
A.C. No. 5333               October 18, 2000
ROSA YAP PARAS, complainant,  complainant.
vs.
ATTY. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS, respondent.
DECISION
MELO, J:
This has reference to a case for disbarment initiated by complainant
Rosa Yap Paras against her husband, Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras. The
parties exchanged tirades and barbs in their copious pleadings, hurling
invectives, cutting remarks and insults at each other. Reduced to its
essentials, Rosa Paras charged her husband with dishonesty and
falsification of public documents, harassment and intimidation, and
immorality for siring a child with another woman. Respondent denied the
allegations, contending that his wife, in cahoots with her family, is out to
destroy and strip him of his share in their multi-million conjugal assets.
The parties come from wealthy families in Negros Oriental. They were
married on May 21, 1964 and have two grown-up children. They have
vast sugarlands and other businesses. Respondent was a Municipal
Judge for 14 years and served as Mayor in their town for 2 terms during
the administration of President Aquino. Complainant is a
businesswoman. Sometime in 1988, their marriage fell apart when due to
"marital strain that has developed through the years," respondent left his
wife and children to live with his mother and sister in Dumaguete City and
thence started his law practice. Complainant, in the meantime, filed a
case for the dissolution of their marriage, which case is still pending in
court.
The complaint charged:
DISHONESTY, FALSIFICATION and FRAUD
… respondent obtained loans from certain banks in the name of
complainant by counterfeiting complainant's signature, falsely making it
appear that complainant was the applicant for said loans. Thereafter, he
carted away and misappropriated the proceeds of the loans.
. . . to guarantee the above loans, respondent mortgaged some personal
properties belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of
GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AND CONCUBINAGE
Respondent is . . . engaged in the immoral and criminal act of
concubinage as he maintained an illicit relationship with one Ms. Jocelyn
A. Ching, siring an illegitimate child with her while married to
complainant.
UNETHICAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Respondent abused courts of justice and misused his legal skills to
frighten, harass and intimidate all those who take a position diametrically
adverse to his sinister plans by unethically filing complaints and other
pleadings against them. He utilized strategies to obstruct justice.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
(Respondent) utilized strategies to obstruct justice. In the criminal actions
initiated against him, respondent used his legal skills not to prove his
innocence but to derail all the proceedings.
(Complaint, Rollo, p. 2)
In his Answer, respondent interposed the following defenses:
(1) On the Charge of Falsification of Public Documents:
That during the sugarboom in the 1970's, his wife executed in his favor a
Special Power of Attorney to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan
authorizing him "to borrow money and apply for and secure any
agricultural or crop loan for sugar cane from the Bais Rural Bank, Bais
City . . ." (Rollo, Annex "3", p. 262)
(2) On the Charge of Forgery:
That the Report of the National Bureau of Investigation which found that
"the questioned signatures (referring to the alleged forged signatures of
complainant) and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS
were written by one and the same person…"(Annex "B" of the Complaint,
Rollo, p. 26) was doctored, and that his wife filed against him a string of
cases for falsification of public documents because he intends to
disinherit his children and bequeath his inchoate share in the conjugal
properties to his own mother.
(3) On the Charge of Grossly Immoral Conduct and Concubinage:
That this is a malicious accusation fabricated by his brother-in-law, Atty.
Francisco D. Yap to disqualify him from getting any share in the conjugal
assets. He cites the dismissal of the complaint for concubinage filed
against him by his wife before the City Prosecutor of Negros Oriental as
proof of his innocence.
Respondent, however, admits that he, his mother and sister, are
solicitous and hospitable to his alleged concubine, Ms. Jocelyn Ching
and her daughter, Cyndee Rose (named after his own deceased
daughter), by allowing them to stay in their house and giving them some
financial assistance, because they pity Ms. Ching, a secretary in his law
office, who was deserted by her boyfriend after getting her pregnant.
(4) On the Charge of Obstruction of Justice:
That "the legal remedies pursued by (him) in defense and offense are
legitimate courses of action done by an embattled lawyer."
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines investigated the complaint against respondent summarizing
the causes of action as follows:
(1) Falsification of complainant's signature and misuse of conjugal
assets; and
(2) Immorality and criminal acts of concubinage with one Ms. Ma. Jocelyn
A. Ching (for) siring an illegitimate child with her while married to
complainant, and, abandonment of his own family.
(Rollo, Report of the IBP, p. 34)
No actual hearing was conducted as the parties agreed to merely submit
their respective memoranda, depositions, and other pieces of evidence
attached to their pleadings.
Thereafter, the CBD found respondent guilty as charged and
recommended:
(1) Respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3)
months on the first charge; and
(2) Respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of law
on the second charge.
(ibid., p. 57)
The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent
for falsification and use of falsified documents (Criminal Case No. 11768)
and for concubinage (I.S. No. 93-578) will not bar the filing of an
administrative case for disbarment against him. In a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is required for conviction, while in an
administrative complaint, only a preponderance of evidence is necessary.
The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that "the questioned
signatures (referring to the signatures appearing in the loan agreements,
contracts of mortgage, etc.) and the standard sample signatures of
respondent were written by one and the same person." This affirms the
allegation of complainant Rosa Yap Paras that her husband forged her
signatures in those instruments. Respondent denies this but his denial
was unsubstantiated and is, therefore, self-serving.
In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the CBD relied heavily on the
uncontroverted sworn affidavit-statements of respondent's children and
three other eyewitnesses to respondent's illicit affair with Ms. Jocelyn
Ching. For a better appreciation of their statements, their affidavits are
hereby reproduced in full. Thusly,
"I, DAHLIA Y. PARAS, of legal age, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn
hereby depose and say:
1. I am a nurse by profession. I finished my BSN degree at the
College of Nursing, Silliman University.
2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras and my father Justo J. Paras.
My father has left the family home in Bindoy and now lives at his
mother's house at San Jose Ext., Dumaguete City.
3. My father has a "kabit" or concubine by the name of Ma.
Jocelyn Ching.  They have a child named Cyndee Rose, who
1âwphi1
was delivered at the Silliman University Hospital Medical Center
on July 19, 1990.
4. Jocelyn used to be the secretary of my father and Atty. Melchor
Arboleda when they practice law together in 1988 to 1989. Their
relationship started in 1989. When she became pregnant, my
father rented an apartment for her at the Amigo Subdivision,
Dumaguete City.
5. Following delivery of the baby, my father built a house for
Jocelyn in Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. My father
spend time there often with Jocelyn and their child.
6. I used to visit my father at San Jose Extension these past
years, and almost every time I was there, I would see Jocelyn,
sitting, watching TV, serving coffee in my father's law office, and
one time, she was washing my father's clothes.
7. I first saw their child Cyndee Rose in 1992, about early May, at
San Jose Extension. I was there to ask for my allowance. He was
there at the time, and when I looked at Cyndee Rose closely, I
became convinced that she was my father's daughter with
Jocelyn.
8. Incidentally, I had an elder sister also named Cindy Rose (now
deceased).
9. In September 1992 when I went to visit my father, I saw toys
and child's clothes in my father's room.
10. Whenever, I saw Jocelyn at San Jose Extension, I wanted to
talk to her or be alone with her, but she would deliberately avoid
me. I could see that she was hiding something from me." p. 109,
Records.
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
x x x           x x x          x x x
1. . . . sometime during the period of April-September, 1992, I
made several visits to my father at his mother's house in San
Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, where he had moved after he
left our home in Bindoy;
2. That these visits were made on different times and different
days of the week;
3. That most of my visits, I would meet a woman who was also
living at my father's place. This woman is now known to me to be
Ma. Jocelyn Ching;
4. That my basis for observing that Ms. Ching was living in my
father's house is that during my visits, whether during office hours
or after office hours, I would meet her at my father's place, not his
office; she was wearing house clothes and slippers, such as
skimpy clothes, shorts and T-shirt, not street or office clothes; she
was generally unkempt, not made up for work or going out; on
one occasion, I even saw her, washing my father's clothes as well
as a small child's clothing; and she conducted herself around the
house in the manner of someone who lived there;
5. That on one of my visits, I confirmed that Ms. Ching was living
with my father from Josie Vailoces, who was then a working
student living at my father's place;
6. Ms. Vailoces subsequently confirmed under oath the fact that
my father and Ms. Jocelyn Ching were living together as husband
and wife at my father's place in a deposition taken in connection
with Civil Case No. 10613, RTC-Dumaguete City, Branch 30, the
Honorable Enrique C. Garovillo, presiding. A copy of the
transcript of the deposition of Ms. Vailoces is already part of the
record of this case. For emphasis, photocopies of the pertinent
portion of the written deposition of Josie Vailoces is hereto
attached as Annexes "A"and "A-1." p. 111, Records
Respondent's son has this to say:
"I, RHOUEL Y. PARAS, 15 years old, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn
according to law, depose and say:
1. I am a high school student at the Holy Cross High School,
Dumaguete City.
 2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras, and my father Justo J. Paras, a
lawyer.
3. My father has left our home in Bindoy, and now lives at his
mother's house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City. He is
not giving us support any more.
4. However, from October 1991 to December 1992, I was getting
my allowance of P50.00 a week. I would go to their house at San
Jose Extension and personally ask him for it.
5. In October 1992, between 11:30 AM and 1:00 PM, I went to
San Jose Extension for my weekly allowance. I asked Josephus,
an adopted son of my father's sister, if my father was around.
Josephus said my father was in his room.
6. So I went direct to his room and because the door was not
locked, I entered the room without knocking. There I saw my
father lying in bed side by side with a woman. He was only
wearing a brief. The woman was wearing shorts and T-shirt.
7. They both appeared scared upon seeing me. My father
hurriedly gave me P100.00 and I left immediately because I felt
bad and embarrassed.
8. Before that incident, I used to see the woman at my father's
house in San Jose Extension. Every time I went to see my father,
she was also there.
9. I later came to know that she was Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and that
she was my father's "kabit" or concubine.
10. I am no longer getting my weekly allowance from my father."
p. 112, Records
Added to the foregoing sworn statements of respondent's children is the
damaging statement under oath of Virgilio Kabrisante who was
respondent's secretary when respondent was a mayor of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental which reads as follows:
"I, VIRGILIO V. KABRISANTE, of legal age, married, Filipino, a resident
of Malaga, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, after having been sworn in
accordance with law, do hereby depose and state that:
1. I personally know Justo J. Paras, having been his secretary
during his incumbency as Mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental. In
fact, through the latter's recommendation and intercession, I was
later on appointed as OIC Mayor of the same town from
December 1986 to January 1987.
2. When Justo J. Paras decided to practice law in Dumaguete
City, I became his personal aide and performed various chores
for the same. As his personal aide, I stayed in the same house
and room with the latter.
3. Sometime in January 1989, Justo J. Paras confided to me that
he felt attracted to my lady friend named Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching.
He then requested me to invite the latter to a dinner date at Chin
Loong Restaurant.
4. Conveying the invitation which was accepted by Ma. Jocelyn
Ching, the latter, Justo J. Paras and myself then had dinner at the
above-mentioned restaurant.
5. At the behest of Justo J. Paras, I invited Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching,
on several occasions, always to a picnic at a beach in Dauin,
Negros Oriental. Said invitations were always accepted by the
latter.
6. At each of the above-mentioned picnics, I observed that Justo
J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching had become more and more
intimate with each other.
7. Sometime in March 1989, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening
on a Friday, I accompanied Justo J. Paras to the area in front of
the Silliman University Medical Center, where he said he was
going to meet someone.
8. After waiting for a few minutes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching arrived and
immediately boarded at the back seat of the Sakbayan vehicle I
was driving for Justo J. Paras. The latter then requested me to
drive both of them (Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching) to
Honeybee Motel somewhere in Sibulan, Negros Oriental.
9. When we arrived there, Justo J. Paras asked me to wait for
them outside the room, while he and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching
entered the said room.
10. I waited outside the room for about two (2) hours after which
the two of them emerged from the room. We then proceeded to
Chin Loong to eat supper.
11. After eating supper, we dropped Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching off in
front of the Dumaguete City Cockpit.
12. This meeting was repeated two more times, at the same
place and always on a Friday.
13. On April 3, 1988, I went home to Bindoy and stopped working
for Justo Paras." pp. 56-57, Records.
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
x x x           x x x          x x x
1. Sometime in May 1989, I returned to Dumaguete City to look
for a job, having been jobless since I left Dumaguete City to go
home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
2. While looking for a job, I stayed at the house where my friend,
Bernard Dejillo was staying at Mangnao, Dumaguete City. My
friend Bernard Dejillo was occupying a room at the second floor
of the said house which he shared with me.
3. Sometime in the last week of May 1989, in the course of my
job hunting, I met Justo J. Paras. Having not seen each other for
some time, we talked for a while, discussing matters about the
barangay elections in Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
4. When our discussion was finished, Justo J. Paras asked me
where I was staying, to which I answered that I was staying at the
aforementioned house. He then requested me to find out if there
was an available room at the said house which he could rent with
Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. I told him that I would have to ask my
friend Bernard Dejillo about the matter.
5. When I arrived at the house that evening, I asked my friend
Bernard Dejillo about the matter, to which the latter signified his
approval. He told me that a room at the first floor of the same
house was available for rental to Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A.
Ching.
6. The next day, I immediately informed Justo J. Paras of Bernard
Dejillo's approval of his request.
7. Sometime in the first week of June 1989, Ma. Jocelyn Ching
moved in to the room she had rented at the first floor of the house
I was also staying at.
8. Almost every night thereafter, Justo J. Paras would come to
the house and stay overnight. When he came at night Justo J.
Paras and I would converse and while conversing, drink a bottle
of Tanduay Rum. Oftentimes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching would join in our
conversation.
9. After we finish drinking and talking, Justo J. Paras and Ma.
Jocelyn Ching would enter the room rented and sleep there, while
I would also go upstairs to my room.
10. The next morning I could always observe Justo J. Paras
came out of said room and depart from the house.
11. The coming of Justo J. Paras to the house I was staying
ceased after about one (1) month when they transferred to
another house.
12. I myself left the house and returned to Bindoy, Negros
Oriental some time in June 1989.
13. Sometime in January 1993, on a Saturday at about noontime,
I went to the house of Justo J. Paras to consult him about a
Kabataang Barangay matter involving my son. When I arrived at
his house, I noticed that the same was closed and there was no
one there.
14. Needing to consult him about the above-mentioned matter, I
proceeded to the resthouse of Justo J. Paras located at Maayong
Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental.
15. When I arrived at the said resthouse, Justo J. Paras was not
there but the person in charge of the said resthouse informed me
that Justo J. Paras was at his house at Barangay Maayong Tubig,
Dauin, Negros Oriental. The same person also gave me
directions so that I could locate the house of Justo J. Paras he
referred to earlier.
 16. With the help of the directions given by said person, I was
able to locate the house of Justo J. Paras.
17. At the doorway of the said house, I called out if anybody was
home while knocking on the door.
18. After a few seconds, Ma. Jocelyn Ching opened the door.
Upon seeing the latter, I asked her if Justo J. Paras was home.
She then let me in the house and told me to sit down and wait for
a while. She then proceeded to a room.
19. A few minutes later, Justo J. Paras came out of the same
room and sat down near me. I noticed that the latter had just
woke up from a nap.
20. We then started to talk about the matter involving my son and
sometime later, Ma. Jocelyn Ching served us coffee.
21. While we were talking and drinking coffee I saw a little girl,
about three (3) years old, walking around the sala, whom I later
came to know as Cyndee Rose, the daughter of Justo J. Paras
and Ma. Jocelyn Ching.
22. After our conversation was finished, Justo J. Paras told me to
see him at this office at San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, the
following Monday to discuss the matter some more.
23. I then bid them goodbye and went home to Bindoy, Negros
Oriental.
24. I am executing this affidavit as a supplement to my affidavit
dated 22 July 1993." pp. 58-60, Records
(ibid., pp. 44-52)
The CBD likewise gave credence to the sworn affidavits and the
deposition of two other witnesses, namely, Salvador de Jesus, a former
repairman of the Paras' household, and, Josie Vailoces, a working
student and former ward of the Paras' family, who both gave personal
accounts of the illicit relationship between respondent and Jocelyn Ching,
which led to the birth of Cyndee Rose. De Jesus swore that while doing
repair works in the Paras' household he observed Ms. Ching and Cyndee
Rose practically living in the Paras' house (p. 85, Rollo, Annex "H").
Vailoces, on the other hand, deposed that she was asked by respondent
Paras to deliver money to Ms. Ching for the payment of the hospital bill
after she gave birth to Cyndee Rose. Vailoces was also asked by
respondent to procure Cyndee Rose Paras' baptismal certificate after the
latter was baptized in the house of respondent; she further testified that in
said baptismal certificate, respondent appears as the father of Cyndee
Rose which explains why the latter is using the surname "Paras." (p. 87,
Annex "I", Rollo)
The findings and the recommendations of the CBD are substantiated by
the evidentiary record.
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT'S
SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and
respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis-à-vis the questioned signature
"Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents,
contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the following
results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J.
PARAS were written by one and the same person.
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA
YAP PARAS were not written by one and the same person.
(Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the
signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of the above findings
lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned or falsified
signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent
as said falsified signatures were the same as the sample signatures of
respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to negotiate for an
agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of
exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water.
For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from the banks, then why did
he have to falsify his wife's signatures in the bank loan documents? The
purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign
for and on behalf of the principal using his own name.

ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE

The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-

statements of his children and three other persons who used to work with
him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more than
satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The
baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was
named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the
child after his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his
allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete
City bolster the allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair
with Ms. Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition

precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People vs. Tunda, 181
SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda vs. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case
at hand, respondent has fallen below the moral bar when he forged his
wife's signature in the bank loan documents, and, sired a daughter with a
woman other than his wife. However, the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the Court and as a member of the bar (Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case
No. 4148, July 30, 1998). Disbarment should never be decreed where
any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the
end desired (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129 [1998]).

In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife's
signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for
ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and
abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served
simultaneously. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondent's
record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.
 October 3, 2017 2. The plaintiff is willing to sell [the] property in question to the defendant
in the amount of ₱350,000.00 within a period of three months beginning
A.C. No. 11483 February 1, 2005 up to April 30, 2005, the payment of which shall be paid
in one setting.4

LUZVIMINDA S. CERILLA, Complainant 
vs. The Compromise Agreement was approved by the MTC of Sibulan,
ATTY. SAMUEL SM. LEZAMA, Respondent Negros Oriental in an Order  dated January 31, 2005. Subsequently, a
5

Motion for Execution  dated June 2, 2005 was filed due to complainant's
6

RESOLUTION failure to comply with the terms and conditions set forth in the
compromise agreement, as complainant refused to execute a Deed of
Sale. The MTC issued a Writ of Execution  on June 10, 2005.
7

PERALTA, J.:
Complainant contended that respondent misrepresented in paragraph 2
On November 22, 2010, complainant Luzviminda S. Cerilla filed an
of the Compromise Agreement that she was willing to sell the subject
administrative complaint  for gross misconduct against respondent Atty.
1

property for ₱350,000.00. Complainant averred that she did not authorize
Samuel SM. Lezama with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
the respondent to sell the property and she is not willing to sell the
property in the amount of ₱350,000.00, considering that there are other
In her Complaint, complainant stated that she is one of the co-owners of co-owners of the property.
a parcel of land located at BarangayPoblacion, Municipality of Sibulan,
Negros Oriental, with an area of 730 square meters. The said property is
Complainant contended that by entering into the compromise agreement
covered by TCT No. 1-20416 and registered in the name of Fulquerio
to sell the subject property without any special power to do so,
Gringio. It was later sold by his sole heir, Pancracio A. Gringio, to the
respondent committed gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties to
heirs of Fabio  Solmayor, including the herein complainant. Being a co-
2

his client. She asserted that respondent's misconduct was the proximate
owner of the subject property, complainant engaged the services of
cause of the loss of the subject property in the ejectment case, which
respondent to file an unlawful detainer case against Carmelita S. Garlito
prejudiced her and the other co-owners, as respondent knew that the
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental. At that
ejectment case was filed by her for the benefit of all the co-owners of the
time, the complainant was working at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, and
property.
for this reason, she executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor
of the respondent to perform the following acts, to wit:
According to complainant, the subject property is located near the
Municipal Hall and town plaza of the Municipality of Sibulan, Negros
(1) To represent and act on my behalf in filing a case of ejectment
Oriental and the property's market value is not less than ₱l,500,000.00.
against Lita Garlito of Sibulan, Negros Oriental;
Since respondent sold the property for only ₱350,000.00, she
(complainant) and the other co-owners suffer actual loss.
(2) To appear on my behalf during the preliminary conference in Civil
Case No. 497-04 and to make stipulations of facts, admissions and other
Complainant contended that respondent's act of entering into the
matters for the early resolution of the same including amicable settlement
compromise agreement with the misrepresentation that she was willing to
of the case if necessary.
3

Complainant said that on the basis of the SPA, respondent entered into a
compromise agreement with the defendant in the unlawful detainer case
to sell the subject property of the complainant for ₱350,000.00 without
sell the property in the unlawful detainer case without her consent or
conformity, which caused her material damage, warrants respondent's
suspension or disbarment.
In his Answer,  respondent denied complainant's allegation that he
8

her consent or a special authority from her. Paragraph 2 of the

misrepresented that complainant was willing to sell the property in the
Compromise Agreement dated January 31, 2005 states:
amount of ₱350,000.00, since he was duly armed with an SPA to enter
into a compromise agreement, and the price of ₱350,000.00 was the
actual price paid by the complainant to the owner of the property.
Respondent contended that complainant has no cause of action against
him for the following reasons:
(a) The SPA dated December 27, 2004 was executed by the complainant
in favor of the respondent due to her inability to attend every hearing of
the unlawful detainer case;
(b) The SPA contains the sentence under number 2: "including amicable
settlement of the case if necessary";
(c) During the preliminary conference of the unlawful detainer case, the
respondent requested Presiding Judge Rafael Cresencio C. Tan, Jr. to
allow him to contact the complainant by mobile phone before any
compromise agreement could be executed. Respondent tried several
times to contact complainant to no avail during the recess. When the
case was called again, he requested a resetting, but the Presiding Judge
insisted on a compromise agreement to be submitted because
respondent was armed with the necessary SPA anyway, and the result
was the Compromise Agreement of January 31, 2005;
(d) Upon the signing of the Compromise Agreement, respondent was
able to contact complainant, who objected to the agreement because the
amount of ₱350,000.00 was small;
(e) After writing a letter of repudiation to the counsel of the defendant in
the unlawful detainer case, respondent filed a Manifestation dated
February 24, 2005 with the MTC of Sibulan, attaching therewith the letter
of repudiation, and he also filed a Motion to Set Aside Order and to Annul
Compromise Agreement (on the ground of mistake). However, the MTC
9
denied the said motion in an Order  dated May 30, 2005. Respondent
10
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied by the MTC;
(f) In 2006, the heirs of Favio Solmayor filed another unlawful detainer
case over the same property with the same MTC against the same
defendant, which was dismissed by the court on the ground of res
judicata;   and
11
(g) In 2008, complainant filed a civil case  for annulment of
12
judgment/quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages against
Carmelita S. Garlito, respondent Atty. Lezama and the MTC of Sibulan,
Negros Oriental, and the case is still pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 35, Negros Oriental. 13
Further, respondent stated that the payment for the property in the
amount of ₱350,000.00 is under the custody of the MTC of Sibulan,
although the money was deposited with the Philippine Veterans Bank by
defendant Carmelita S. Garlito, who opened an account in respondent's
name. Respondent stated that he has never touched the said deposit.
Respondent contended that the SP A given to him by the complainant
was sufficient authority to enter into the said compromise
agreement.  The amount of ₱350,000.00 was the price of the subject
1âwphi1
property, because the complainant paid the same amount for the
purchase of the property from the Gringio family.
According to the respondent, he entered into the compromise agreement
under the honest and sincere belief that it was the fairest and most
equitable arrangement. Under the present policy of the Court, parties
should endeavor to settle their differences (in civil cases, at least)
amicably. To penalize lawyers for their judgment calls in cases where
they are armed with authority to settle would wreck havoc on our system
of litigation, making them hesitant, apprehensive and wary that their
clients might file disciplinary cases against them for the slightest reasons.
While the filing of such complaint is part of the professional hazards of
lawyering, the same should only be anchored on the most serious
misconduct of lawyers, which respondent does not believe is present in
this case. Hence, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
On June 10, 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline held a
mandatory conference with the parties, who were required to submit their
respective Position Papers thereafter.
The Commissioner's Report
On June 28, 2013, Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.
submitted his Report,  finding respondent guilty of violating Canons 15
14
and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years.
The Investigating Commissioner stated that during the mandatory
conference, it was agreed upon that the SPA dated December 27, 2004
was the same SP A granted by complainant in favor of respondent. It was
also agreed upon that by virtue of the said SP A, respondent entered into
a compromise agreement with the defendant in the unlawful detainer
case. According to the complainant, while it is true that she executed an
SPA in favor of the respondent, there was no specific authority granted to
him to sell the subject property for ₱350,000.00, and that was the reason
why she refused to sign the Deed of Sale.
Moreover, respondent admitted during the mandatory conference that
complainant did not give him any instruction to sell the property, thus:
Comm. De La Rama: Prior to the execution of the compromise
agreement on January 31, 2005, were you under instruction by Ms.
Cerilla to sell the property?
Atty. Lezama: No, Your Honor.
Comm. De La Rama: You were not?
Atty. Lezama There was none.
Comm. De La Rama: So what prompted you to [have] that idea that Ms.
Cerilla is willing to sell this property in the amount of Php350,000.00?
Atty. Lezama : Because that is the same amount that she paid [for] the
property. It is an amicable settlement in meeting halfway.
Comm. De La Rama: But you at that time, prior to the signing of the
Compromise Agreement, you do not have any instruction from Ms. Cerilla
to sell the property?
Atty. Lezama No, Your Honor.
Comm. De La Rama : So it was your own volition?
Atty. Lezama : Yes, my own belief. 15
The Investigating Commissioner stated that respondent must have
overlooked the fact that the subject property was co-owned by
complainant's siblings. Respondent knew about the co-ownership
because of the existence of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,  but he
16
did not assert that his authority to compromise binds only the
complainant. Respondent merely made a flimsy excuse as shown in the
transcript of stenographic notes, to wit:
Comm. De La Rama: Are you aware, Atty. Lezama, that the property
does not belong exclusively to Ms. Cerilla?
Atty. Lezama I was of the impression that it was owned by complainant
that's why the ejectment complaint filed speaks only of Luzviminda Cerilla
but that was her claim because she said she paid for it. 17
The Investigating Commissioner stated that the transcript of stenographic
notes shows that respondent admitted that complainant did not grant him
the authority to sell the property in the amount of ₱350,000.00. Thus,
knowing that he did not possess such authority, respondent cannot
validly claim that his client, complainant herein, was willing to sell the
property in the amount of ₱350,000.00.
In order to save himself, respondent allegedly filed a Manifestation, but
he failed to submit a copy of the same before the Commission.
Further, the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
conference of the unlawful detainer case shows that it was the
respondent who stated that the plaintiff (complainant herein) was willing
to sell the property, and it was also the respondent who fixed the selling
price of the property at ₱350,000.00, thus:
Court : The plaintiff is willing to sell the property?
Atty. Lezama : Yes, if the defendant is willing to pay the amount of sale.
Court : How much?
Atty. Lezama : ₱l00,000.00, although the record is more than that, your
Honor.
Court : They will also want to buy the property. You will sell it for
₱l00,000.00?
Atty. Lezama : I don't think, your Honor. Maybe it's ₱300,000.00.
Court : ₱300,000.00. How much?
Atty. Lezama : ₱350,000.00.
x x x.
18
The MTC Judge also inquired about respondent's authority, and
respondent replied, thus:
Court Are you authorize[d] to make some suggestions to other matter,
dismissal or other settlement? Do you have an authority?
Atty. Lezama : Yes, your Honor, but I have some limitations. I think, your
Honor, we need one more setting because I cannot agree on the
proposal of the amount of the property your Honor. 19
The Investigating Commissioner stated that based on the foregoing,
respondent acted beyond the scope of his authority. Respondent knew
beforehand that no instruction was given by his client to sell the property,
yet he bound his client to sell the property without her knowledge. Thus,
he betrayed the trust of his client, complainant herein.
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating
Canons 15  and 17  of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
20 21
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years.
The Ruling of the IBP Board of Governors
On August 8, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XXI-2014-386,  which adopted and approved the Report and
22
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Finding that the
recommendation was fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and for violation of Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Board suspended respondent from the
practice of law for two (2) years.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in Resolution No. XXII-2016-179  dated February 25, 2016.
23
In a letter  dated August 18, 2016, Director for Bar Discipline Ramon S.
24
Esguerra notified the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
transmittal of the documents of the case to the Court for final action,
pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the finding and recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors.
Respondent entered into the Compromise Agreement  on the basis of
25
the SP A granted to him by complainant. The SPA authorized respondent
to represent complainant in filing the ejectment case and "[t]o appear on
[complainant's] behalf during the preliminary conference in said ejectment
case and to make stipulations of fact, admissions and other matters for
the early resolution of the case, including amicable settlement of the case
if necessary." Nowhere is it expressly stated in the SPA that respondent
is authorized to compromise on the sale of the property or to sell the
property of complainant.
The records show that respondent admitted that he entered into the
compromise agreement with the defendant in the unlawful detainer case
and stated that the plaintiff, who is the complainant herein, was willing to
sell the property to the defendant in the amount of ₱350,000.00 even if
the complainant did not instruct or authorize him to sell the property, and
he merely acted upon his own belief.  As the SPA granted to him by the
26
complainant did not contain the power to sell the property, respondent
clearly acted beyond the scope of his authority in entering into the
compromise agreement wherein the property was sold to the defendant
Carmelita S. Garlito.
Respondent, in his Answer and Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. XXI-2014-386, stated that his action was based on an honest belief
that he was serving both the interest of his client and the policy of the law
to settle cases amicably. However, his justification does not persuade,
because his alleged honest belief prejudiced his client, since the property
she was not willing to sell was sold at a price decided upon by
respondent on his own, which caused his client and her co-owners to file
further cases to recover their property that was sold due to
respondent's mistake. He overlooked the fact that he was not authorized
by his client to sell the property.
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 5 - A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments,
participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to
achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training
of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law
and jurisprudence.

The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have

been reiterated in Hernandez v. Atty. Padilla, thus:
27

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the

laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to
be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that
they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently
and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may
become susceptible to committing mistakes. 28

As found by the IBP Board of Governors, respondent also violated

Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Responsibility:

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

The Court sustains the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

that respondent be penalized with suspension from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama is found guilty of

violating Canons 5, 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of TWO
(2) YEARS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
to be appended to the personal file of respondent. Likewise, copies shall
be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED
 August 15, 2017
A.C. No. 11149
LAURENCE D. PUNLA and MARILYN SANTOS, Complainants,  letter (Annex "E") to respondent demanding that the ₱350,000.00 they
vs.
ATTY. ELEONOR MARA VILLA-ONA,, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The present administrative case stemmed from a Complaint-
Affidavit  filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on
1
Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) by complainants Laurence D. Punla and Marilyn
Santos against respondent Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, charging the
latter with violation of the lawyer's oath, for neglecting her clients'
interests.
Factual Background
The facts, as culled from the disbarment complaint, are summarized in
the Report and Recommendation  of Investigating Commissioner Ricardo
2
M. Espina viz.:
In a complaint-affidavit filed on 15 January 2013, complainants alleged
that they got to know respondent lawyer sometime in January 2012 when
they requested her to notarize a Deed of Sale; that subsequently, they
broached the idea to respondent that they intend (sic) to file two (2)
annulment cases and they wanted respondent to represent them; that
respondent committed to finish the two (2) annulment cases within six (6)
months from full payment; that the agreed lawyer's fee for the two
annulment cases is P350,000.00; that the ₱350,000.00 was paid in full by
complainants, as follows: ₱100,000.00 on 27 January 2012 as evidenced
by respondent's Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 55749 of even date (Annex
"A"); ₱150,000.00 on 28 January 2012 as evidenced by respondent's
Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 56509 of even date (Annex "B"); ₱50,000.00
on 14 March 2012 personally handed to respondent lawyer and
evidenced by respondent's handwritten acknowledgement receipt of
same date (Annex "C"); and, ₱50,000.00 on 15 March 2012 deposited to
respondent's Metrobank account no. 495-3-49509141-5 (Annex "D").
On the commitment of respondent that she will (sic) finish the cases in six
(6) months, complainants followed up their cases in September 2012 or
about 6 months from their last payment in March 2012. They were
ignored by respondent. On 25 September 2012, complainants sent a
paid her be refunded in full within five (5) days from receipt of the letter.
In a Certification dated 07 November 2012 (Annex "F"), the Philpost of
Dasmarinas, Cavite, attested that complainants' letter was received by
respondent on 01 October 2012. No refi.md was made by respondent. 3
In an Order  dated January 25, 2013, the IBP directed respondent to file
4
her Answer within 15 days. No answer was filed. A Mandatory
Conference/Hearing was set on December 4, 2013  but respondent did
5
not appear, so it was reset to January 22, 2014.  However, respondent
6
again failed to attend the mandatory conference/hearing as
scheduled. Hence, in an Order  dated January 22, 2014, the mandatory
7
conference was terminated and both parties were directed to submit their
verified position papers.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
The Investigating Commissioner was of the opinion that respondent is
guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
8
There is clear violation of Canons 17 and 18, Canons of Professional
Responsibility. These canons, quoted hereunder, [state]:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
Of particular concern is Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to always keep the
client informed of the developments in his case and to respond whenever
the client requests for information. Respondent has miserably failed to
comply with this Canon. 9
In addition, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found that respondent
has been charged with several infractions. Thus:
 Moreover, verification conducted by this Office shows that this is not the The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XXI-2015-156  dated 12

first time that respondent lawyer has been administratively charged February 20, 2015, resolved to adopt the findings of the Investigating
before this Office. As shown in the table below, respondent is involved in Commissioner as well as the recommended penalty of disbarment.
the following active cases:
The issue in this case is whether respondent should be disbarred.
NTS CASE NO. STATUS PENALTY
Our Ruling
ases:
. A.C. No. 6369 Pending with Supreme Suspension The Court resolves to adopt the findings of fact of the IBP but must,
A.C. No. 6371 Court however, modify the penalty imposed in view of respondent's previous
A.C. No. 6458 disbarment.
A.C. No. 6459
A.C. No. 6460 Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court provides the penalties of
A.C. No. 6462 disbarment and suspension as follows:
A.C. No. 6457
A.C. No. 6463 Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
g A.C. No. 6464 therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
A.C. No. 6469 office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
. CBD Case No. 10- Pending with Supreme Suspension reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
2733 Court violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
CBD Case No. 12- For report and   court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
3444 recommendation case without authority so to do x x x.
rez CBD Case No. 12- For report and   Here, there is no question as to respondent's guilt.  It is clear from the
3534 recommendation
1âwphi1

Clearly, respondent lawyer has been a serial violator of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility as shown in the thirteen (13) pending cases
filed against her. Add to that the present case and that places the total
pending administrative cases against respondent at fourteen (14). That
these 14 cases were filed on different dates and by various individuals is
substantial proof that respondent has the propensity to violate her
lawyer's oath- and has not changed in her professional dealing with the
public.
10
records that respondent violated her lawyer's oath and code of conduct
when she withheld from complainants the amount of ₱350,000.00 given
to her, despite her failure to render the necessary legal services, and
after complainants demanded its return.
It cannot be stressed enough that once a lawyer takes up the cause of a
client, that lawyer is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence and
zeal, especially when he/she accepts it for a fee. The lawyer owes fidelity
to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed upon him/her.  Moreover, a lawyer's failure to return upon
13

Consequently, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be disbarred and ordered to pay complainants the amount of
₱350,000.00 with legal interest until fully paid.
11
demand the monies he/she holds for his/her client gives rise to the
presumption that he/she has appropriated the said monies for his/her
own use, to the prejudice and in violation of the trust reposed in him/her
by his/her client.
14

Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors What is more, this Court cannot overlook the reality that several cases
had been filed against respondent, as pointed out by the IBP.  In fact,
1âwphi1
one such case eventually led to the disbarment of respondent. In Suarez
v. Maravilla-Ona,   the Court meted out the ultimate penalty of
15
disbarment and held that the misconduct of respondent was aggravated
by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing her to file
an answer and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. This
constitutes blatant disrespect towards the IBP and amounts to conduct
unbecoming a lawyer.
In the same case, the Court took note of the past disbarment complaints
that had been filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona viz.:
x x x In A.C. No. 10107 entitled Beatrice C. Yatco, represented by her
AttorneyIn- Fact, Marivic Yatco v. Atty. Eleonor Maravilla-Ona, the
complainant filed a disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for
issuing several worthless checks as rental payments for the
complainant's property and for refusing to vacate the said property, thus
forcing the latter to file an ejectment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona.
The IBP required Atty. Maravilla-Ona to file her Answer, but she failed to
do so. Neither did she make an appearance during the scheduled
mandatory conference. In its Resolution dated February 13, 2013, the
IBP found Atty. Maravilla-Ona guilty of serious misconduct[,] and for
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code. The Court later adopted and
approved the IBP's findings in its Resolution of September 15, 2014, and
suspended Atty. Maravilla-Ona from the practice of law for a period of
one year.
In yet another disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona, docketed as
A.C. No. 10944[,] and entitled Norma M Gutierrez v. Atty. Eleonor
Maravilla-Ona, the complainant therein alleged that she engaged the
services of Atty. Maravilla-Ona and gave her the amount of ₱80,000.00
for the filing of a case in court. However, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to file
the case, prompting the complainant to withdraw from the engagement
and to demand the return of the amount she paid. Atty. Maravilla-Ona
returned ₱15,000.00[,] and executed a promissory note to pay the
remaining ₱65,000.00. However, despite several demands, Atty.
Maravilla-Ona failed to refund completely the complainant's money. Thus,
a complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for grave
misconduct, gross negligence and incompetence. But again, Atty.
Maravilla-Ona failed to file her Answer and [to] appear in the mandatory
conference before the IBP. The IBP found that Atty. Maravilla-Ona
violated Canon 16, Rule 16.03 of the Code [of Professional
Responsibility] and recommended her suspension for a period of five (5)
years, considering her previous infractions. The Court, however, reduced
Atty. Maravilla-Ona's penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely. She was also ordered to
return the complainant's money.
Clearly, Atty. Maravilla-Ona exhibits the habit of violating her oath as a
lawyer and the Code [of Professional Responsibility], as well as defying
the processes of the IBP. The Court cannot allow her blatant disregard of
the Code [of Professional Responsibility] and her sworn duty as a
member of the Bar to continue. She had been warned that a similar
violation [would] merit a more severe penalty, and yet, her reprehensible
conduct has, again, brought embarrassment and dishonor to the legal
profession.16
Back to the case at bar: While indeed respondent's condemnable acts
ought to merit the penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar her anew, for
in this jurisdiction we do not impose double disbarment.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ADOPTS the findings of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and FINDSrespondent ATIY. ELEONOR MARA
VILLA-ONA GUILTY of gross and continuing violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and accordingly FINED ₱40,000.00.
Respondent is also ORDERED to PAYcomplainants the amount of
₱350,000.00, with 12% interest from the date of demand until June 30,
2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.  This is
17
without prejudice to the complainants' filing of the appropriate criminal
case, if they so desire.
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Office of the Bar Confidant, which
shall append the same to the personal record of respondent; to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which shall circulate the same to all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED
 A.C. No. 10245, August 16, 2017
ELIBENA A. CABILES, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEANDRO S.
CEDO, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Complainant Elibena Cabiles (Elibena) filed this administrative
complaint1before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
seeking the disbarment of Atty. Leandro Cedo (respondent
lawyer) for neglecting the two cases she referred to him to
handle.
The Facts
According to Elibena, she engaged the services of respondent
lawyer to handle an illegal dismissal case,  i.e., NLRC NCR Case
No. 00-11-16153-08 entitled "Danilo Ligbos v. Platinum
Autowork and/or Even Cabiles and Rico Guido," where therein
respondents were Elibena's business partners. Respondent
lawyer was paid Php5,500.002 for drafting therein respondents'
position paper3 and Php2,000.004 for his every appearance in
the NLRC hearings.
During the hearing set on March 26, 2009, only Danilo Ligbos
(Danilo), the complainant therein, showed up and submitted his
Reply.5 On the other hand respondent lawyer did not file a Reply
for his clients,6 despite being paid his appearance fee earlier.7
In a Decision8 dated March 31, 2009, the Labor Arbiter ruled for
Danilo, and ordered the clients of respondent lawyer to pay
Danilo backwages, separation pay, and 13th month pay.
Worse still, on October 27, 2009, the NLRC likewise dismissed
the appeal of the clients of respondent lawyer for failure to post
the required cash or surety bond, an essential requisite in
perfecting an appeal.9
According to Elibena, respondent lawyer misled them by
claiming that it was Danilo who was absent during the said
hearing on March 26, 2009; and that moreover, because of the
failure to submit a Reply, they were prevented from presenting
the cash vouchers10 that would refute Danilo's claim that he was
a regular employee.
With regard to the non-perfection of the appeal before the
NLRC, Elibena claimed that respondent lawyer instructed them
(his clients) to pick up the said Memorandum only on the last
day to file the appeal, i.e., on May 28, 2009; that the
memorandum was ready for pick up only at around 2:30 p.m.
that day; that left to themselves, with no help or assistance
from respondent lawyer, they rushed to file their appeal with
the NLRC in Quezon City an hour later; that the NLRC Receiving
Section informed them that their appeal was incomplete, as it
lacked the mandatory cash/surety bond, a matter that
respondent lawyer himself did not care to attend to; and,
consequently, their appeal was dismissed for non-perfection.
Elibena moreover claimed that respondent lawyer failed to
indicate his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
compliance11 in the position paper and in the memorandum of
appeal that he prepared. Elibena pointed to a
certification12 issued on June 29, 2010 by the MCLE Office that
respondent lawyer had not at all complied with the first, second,
and third compliance periods13 of the (MCLE) requirement.
Elibena also averred that in May 2009, she hired respondent
lawyer to file a criminal case for unjust vexation against Emelita
Claudit; that as evidenced by a May 5, 2009 handwritten
receipt,14 she paid respondent lawyer his acceptance fees, the
expenses for the filing of the case, and the appearance fees
totalling Php45,000.00; and that in order to come up with the
necessary amount, she sold 'to respondent lawyer her 1994
Model Mitsubishi Lancer worth Php85,000.00, this sale being
covered by an unnotarized Deed of Sale15dated August 1, 2009.
Elibena claimed that, despite payment of his professional fees,
respondent lawyer did not exert any effort to seasonably file her
Complaint for unjust vexation before the City Prosecutor's
Office; that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City
dismissed her Complaint for unjust vexation on September 10,
2009 on the ground of prescription; and that although she
moved for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the case, her
motion for reconsideration was denied by the City Prosecutor's
Office in a resolution dated October 19, 2009.16
In his Answer,17 respondent lawyer argued that the March 26,
2009 hearing was set to provide the parties the opportunity
either to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement, or
give time for him (respondent lawyer) to decide whether to file
a responsive pleading, after which the case would be routinely
submitted for resolution, with or without the parties' further
appearances. As regards the cash vouchers, respondent lawyer
opined that their submission would only contradict their defense
of lack of employer-employee relationship. Respondent lawyer
likewise claimed that Elibena was only feigning ignorance of the
cost of the appeal bond, and that in any event, Elibena herself
could have paid the appeal bond. With regard to Elibena's
allegation that she was virtually forced to sell her car to
respondent lawyer to complete payment of the latter's
professional fee, respondent lawyer claimed that he had fully
paid for the car.18
Respondent lawyer did not refute Ebilena's claim that he failed
to indicate his MCLE compliance in the position paper and in the
memorandum of appeal.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a May 18, 2011 Report and Recommendation,19 the
Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer guilty of
having violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for two years. Aside from respondent
lawyer's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements, the
Investigating Commissioner also found him grossly negligent in
representing his clients, particularly (1) in failing to appear on
the March 26, 2009 hearing in the NLRC, and file the necessary
responsive pleading; (2) in failing to advise and assist his
clients who had no knowledge of, or were not familiar with, the
NLRC rules of procedure, in filing their appeal and; 3) in failing
to file seasonably the unjust vexation complaint before the city
prosecutor's office, in consequence of which it was overtaken by
prescription.
In its March 20, 2013 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report
and Recommendation, but modified the recommended
administrative sanction by reducing the suspension to one year.
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the IBP's finding that respondent lawyer violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility. We also agree with the
recommended penalty.
Violation of Canon 5
Firstly, Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for
IBP members as an additional requirement to enable them to
practice law. This is ''to ensure that throughout their career,
they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the
ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the
practice of law."20 Non-compliance with the MCLE requirement
subjects the lawyer to be listed as a delinquent IBP
member.21 In Arnado v. Adaza,22 we administratively sanctioned
therein respondent lawyer for his non-compliance with four
MCLE Compliance Periods. We stressed therein that in
accordance with Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations,23 even if therein respondent attended an MCLE
Program covered by the Fourth Compliance Period, his
attendance therein would only cover his deficiency for the First
Compliance Period, and he was still considered delinquent and
had to make up for the other compliance periods. Consequently,
we declared respondent lawyer therein a delinquent member of
the IBP and suspended him from law practice for six months or
until he had fully complied with all the MCLE requirements for
all his non-compliant periods.
In the present case, respondent lawyer failed to indicate in the
pleadings filed in the said labor case the number and date of
issue of his MCLE Certificate of Compliance for the Third
Compliance Period, i.e., from April 15, 2007 to April 14, 2010,
considering that NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 had been
pending in 2009. In fact, upon checking with the MCLE Office,
Elibena discovered that respondent lawyer had failed to comply
with the three MCLE compliance periods. For this reason, there
is no doubt that respondent lawyer violated Canon 5, which
reads:
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH
STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL
TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING
INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
Violation of Canons 17 and 18 and Rule 18.03
The circumstances of this case indicated that respondent lawyer
was guilty of gross negligence for failing to exert his utmost
best in prosecuting and in defending the interest of his client.
Hence, he is guilty of the following:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
Furthermore, respondent lawyer's act of receiving an
acceptance fee for legal services, only to subsequently fail to
render such service at the appropriate time, was a clear
violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.24
Respondent lawyer did not diligently and fully attend to the
cases that he accepted, although he had been fully
compensated for them. First off, respondent lawyer never
successfully refuted Elibena's claim that he was paid in advance
his Php2,000.00 appearance fee on March 21, 2009 for the
scheduled hearing of the labor case on March 26, 2009, during
which he was absent. Furthermore, although respondent lawyer
had already received the sum of Php45,000.00 to file an unjust
vexation case, he failed to promptly file the appropriate
complaint therefor with the City Prosecutor's Office, in
consequence of which the crime prescribed, resulting in the
dismissal of the case.
We have held that:
Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of competence
and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted
to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also
consists of properly representing the client before any court or
tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences,
preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the
handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their
termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod
him or her to do so.
Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects
him to disciplinary action. While such negligence or carelessness
is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently
held that the lawyer's mere failure to perform the obligations
due his client isper se a violation.25
"[A] lawyer 'is expected to exert his best efforts and [utmost]
ability to [protect and defend] his client's cause, for the
unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the
ends of justice."'26 However, in the two cases for which he was
duly compensated, respondent lawyer was grossly remiss in his
duties as counsel. He exhibited lack of professionalism, even
indifference, in the defense and protection of Elibena's rights
which resulted in her losing the two cases.
With regard to the labor case tor which he opted not to file a
Reply and refused to present the cash vouchers which,
according to Elibena, ought to have been submitted to the
NLRC, we hold that even granting that he had the discretion
being the handling lawyer to present what he believed were
available legal defenses for his client, and conceding, too, that it
was within his power to employ an allowable legal strategy,
what was deplorable was his way of handling the appeal before
the NLRC. Aside from handing over or delivering the requisite
pleading to his clients almost at the end of the day, at the last
day to file the appeal before the NLRC, he never even bothered
to advise Elibena and the rest of his clients about the
requirement of the appeal bond. He should not expect Elibena
and her companions to be conversant with the indispensable
procedural requirements to perfect the appeal before the NLRC.
If the averments in his Answer are any indication, respondent
lawyer seemed to have relied heavily on the NLRC's much
vaunted 'leniency' in gaining the successful prosecution of the
appeal of his clients in the labor case; no less censurable is his
propensity for passing the blame onto his clients for not doing
what he himself ought to have done. And, in the criminal case,
he should have known the basic rules relative to the
prescription of crimes that operate to extinguish criminal
liability. All these contretemps could have been avoided had
respondent lawyer displayed the requisite zeal and diligence.
high standard of legal proficiency with his refusal to comply with
the MCLE as well as his lack of showing of his fealty to Elibena's
interest in view of his lackadaisical or indifferent approach in
handling the cases entrusted to him, we find it apt and
commensurate to the facts of the case to adopt the
recommendation of the IBP to suspend him from the practice of
law for one year.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leandro S. Cedo is hereby
found GUILTY of violating Canons 5, 17, 18, and Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year effective upon receipt of this Decision, and warned
that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Cedo's personal
record as attorney-at-law. Further, let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate said
copies to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED

As mentioned earlier, the failure to comply with the MCLE

requirements warranted a six-month suspension in
the Adaza  case. Respondent lawyer must likewise be called to
account for violating Canons 17, 18, and Rule 18.03. In one
case involving violation of Canons 17 and 18 where a lawyer
failed to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, the
lawyer was penalized with a six-month suspension.27 In another
case,28 involving transgression of the same Canons, the guilty
lawyer was meted out the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six months and admonished and
sternly warned that a commission of the same or similar acts
would be dealt with more severely.

"[T]he appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the

exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts."29 Given herein respondent lawyer's failure to maintain a
 A.C. No. 10580, July 12, 2017
SPOUSES GERALDY AND LILIBETH
VICTORY, Complainants, v. ATTY. MARIAN JO S.
MERCADO, Respondent.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This is a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Marian Jo S.
Mercado for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
Sometime in 2009, Spouses Geraldy and Lilibeth Victory
(Spouses Victory) were enticed by respondent to enter into a
financial transaction with her with a promise of good monetary
returns. As respondent is a lawyer and a person of reputation,
Spouses Victory entrusted their money to respondent to invest,
manage, and administer into some financial transactions that
would earn good profit for the parties.1
Respondent called and asked Geraldy Victory (Geraldy) whether
he wanted to invest his money. The respondent promised that
for an investment of PhP 400,000, she will give Geraldy PhP
600,000 in 30 days; and for PhP 500,000, she will give Geraldy
PhP 625,000.2
The investment transactions went well for the first 10 months.
Spouses Victory received the agreed return of profit. Some of
such financial transactions were covered by Memoranda of
Agreement.3
La!er on, respondent became evasive in returning to Spouses
Victory the money that the latter were supposed to receive as
part of the agreement. Respondent failed to settle and account
the money entrusted to her by Spouses Victory.4
Spouses Victory alleged that the outstanding obligation of
respondent is PhP 5 Million plus interest or a total of PhP 8.3
Million.5
Spouses Victory filed a criminal complaint for estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna.6
After the filing of said criminal case, respondent met with
Spouses Victory. Respondent proposed to reduce her obligation
from PhP 8.3 Million to PhP 7.5 Million in staggered payments,
to which Spouses Victory agreed. Respondent then issued three
postdated checks in the amount of PhP 300,000 each. However,
said checks bounced.7
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) found that respondent indeed lured Spouses
Victory in entering into a series of financial transactions with a
promise of return of profit. Respondent, however, failed to
deliver such promise. On such premise, the IBP-CBD
recommended respondent's suspension, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On the basis of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended
that respondent Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado be SUSPENDED for
SIX (6) MONTHS from the practice of law.8
Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XX-2013-199, which reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED,  with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A ", and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering Respondent's violation of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for evading the settlement of her
financial obligations to the complainants and for not bothering
to appear in the investigation of this case, Atty. Marian Jo S.
Mercado is hereby  DISBARRED.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,10 which was
denied in Resolution No. XXI-2014-158, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,
there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. However, considering that Respondent is
currently settling her financial obligations to Complainants and
very apologetic and granting her good faith in her investment
transaction with Complainants, Resolution No. XX-2013-199
dated March 20, 2013 is hereby  AFFIRMED, with
modification, and accordingly the penalty earlier imposed on
Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado is hereby reduced
to  SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one (1)
year.11(Emphasis supplied)
Issue
Should the respondent be held administratively liable based on
the allegations in the pleadings of all parties on record?
Our Ruling
Emphatically, a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing.
A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
his clients.12 Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 7 provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 -A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Exercising its disciplinary authority over the members of the
bar, this Court has imposed the penalty of suspension or
disbarment for any gross misconduct that a lawyer committed,
whether it is in his professional or in his private capacity. Good
character is an essential qualification for the admission to and
continued practice of law. Thus, any wrongdoing, whether
professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the
profession justifies disciplinary action.13
In this case, it is without dispute that respondent has an
outstanding obligation with Spouses Victory, as the latter's
investments which they coursed through the respondent fell
through. To make matters worse, respondent issued several
checks to settle her obligation; unfortunately, said checks
bounced.
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to act with the highest
degree of integrity and fair dealing. She is expected to maintain
not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people's faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. She must, at all
times, faithfully perform her duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to her clients, which include prompt payment of
financial obligations.14
It must be considered that the deliberate failure to pay just
debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments
for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system.15
We cannot exempt respondent from liability just because she
encountered financial difficulties in the course of her investment
deals. Respondent even admitted that she continued to do
business despite such financial hardships; as such, her
monetary obligations with different investors. accumulated at
an alarming rate. In an attempt to settle her obligations,
respondent issued checks, which all bounced.
To Our mind, the actuations of respondent fell short of the
exacting standards expected of every member of the bar.
In this case, while respondent admitted her responsibility and
signified her intention of complying with the same, We cannot
close our eyes to the fact that respondent committed
infractions. To uphold the integrity of the legal profession, We
deem it proper to uphold the findings as well as the sanction
imposed by the IBP Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve

to SUSPEND Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado from the practice of
law for one (1) year to commence immediately from the
receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of

the Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant
is directed to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's
record as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED

A.C. No. 11256, March 07, 2017
FLORDELIZA A. MADRIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARLOS P.
RIVERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A lawyer who causes the simulation of court documents not only
violates the court and its processes, but also betrays the trust
and confidence reposed in him by his client and must be
disbarred to maintain the integrity of the Law Profession.
Antecedents
In November 2002, complainant Flordeliza A. Madria consulted
the respondent in his law office in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan to
inquire about the process of annulling her marriage with her
husband, Juan C. Madria. After giving the details of her
marriage and other facts relevant to the annulment, the
respondent told her that she had a strong case, and guaranteed
that he could obtain for her the decree of annulment. He told
her, too, that his legal services would cost P25,000.00, and that
she should return on November 19, 2002 inasmuch as he would
still prepare the complaint for the annulment. At the time of the
consultation, she was accompanied by her daughter, Vanessa
Madria, and her nephew, Jayson Argonza.1
The complainant returned to the respondent's office on
November 19, 2002. On that occasion, he showed her the
petition for annulment, and asked her to sign it. She paid to
him an initial amount of P4,000.00.2 He acknowledged the
payment through a handwritten receipt.3
The complainant again went to the respondent's office on
December 16, 2002 to deliver another partial payment, and to
follow up on the case. The respondent advised her to just wait
for the resolution of her complaint, and assured her that she did
not need to appear in court. He explained that all the court
notices and processes would be sent to his office, and that he
would regularly apprise her of the developments.4 On December
28, 2002, she returned to his office to complete her payment,
and he also issued his receipt for the payment.5
The complainant's daughter Vanessa thereafter made several
followups on behalf of her mother. In the latter part of April
2003, the respondent informed the complainant that her
petition had been granted.6 Thus, Vanessa went to the
respondent's office and received a copy of the trial court's
decision dated April 16, 2003 signed by Judge Lyliha Abella
Aquino of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, in
Tuguegarao City.7
According to the complainant, the respondent advised her to
allow five months to lapse after the release of the decision
before she could safely claim the status of "single." After the
lapse of such time, she declared in her Voter's Registration
Record (VRR) that she was single.8
The complainant, again through Vanessa, received from the
respondent a copy of the certificate of finality dated September
26, 2003 signed by one Jacinto C. Danao of the RTC (Branch
4).9
Believing that the documents were authentic, the complainant
used the purported decision and certificate of finality in applying
for the renewal of her passport.10 However, she became the
object of an investigation by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) because her former partner, Andrew
Dowson Grainge, had filed a complaint charging that she had
fabricated the decision for the annulment of her marriage. Only
then did she learn that the decision and the certificate of finality
given by the respondent did not exist in the court records, as
borne out by the letter signed by Atty. Aura Clarissa B. Tabag-
Querubin, Clerk of Court of the RTC Branch IV, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
MS. RACHEL M. ROXAS
Officer-in-Charge
Regional Consular Office
Tuguegarao City
Madam:
This is in reply to your letter dated June 23, 2011 inquiring on
whether Civil Case No. 6149 for the Annulment of Marriage
between Flordeliza Argonza Madria and Juan C. Madria was filed
and decided by this Court.
As per records of this Court, the above-entitled case was filed
on April 25, 2003 but was dismissed as per Order of this Court
dated April 6, 2004.
The signature of the [sic] Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino as
appearing in the alleged decision attached to your letter is a
blatant forgery.
For your information and guidance.                  RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-242
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
AURA CLARISSA B. TABAG-QUERUBIN
Clerk of Court V11 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As a result, the complainant faced criminal charges for violation
of the Philippine Passport Act in the RTC in Tuguegarao
City.12 She claims that she had relied in good faith on the
representations of the respondent; and that he had taken
advantage of his position in convincing her to part with her
money and to rely on the falsified court documents.13
In his answer,14 the respondent denies the allegations of the
complainant. He averred that he had informed her that he
would still be carefully reviewing the grounds to support her
petition; that she had insisted that he should prepare the draft
of her petition that she could show to her foreigner fiance; that
she had also prevailed upon him to simulate the court decision
to the effect that her marriage had been annulled, and to
fabricate the certificate of finality; that she had assured him
that such simulated documents would be kept strictly
confidential; that he had informed her that the petition had
been filed in April 2003, but she had paid no attention to such
information; that she had not appeared in any of the scheduled
hearings despite notice; and that he had not heard from her
since then, and that she had not even returned to his office.
Findings and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP)
After conducting her investigation, IBP Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala submitted her Report and
Recommendation15 wherein she concluded that the respondent
had violated his Lawyer's Oath; and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years.
The IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, modified the recommendation
of suspension from the practice of law for two years to
disbarment through its Resolution No. XXI-2015-242, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
                CDB Case No. 14-4315
                Flordeliza A. Madria vs. Atty. Carlos P. Rivera
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
AND APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", considering violation of his lawyers' oath as a lawyer
and a member of the Bar by preparing a simulated Court
decision granting the petition for annulment of marriage of
complainant and a certificate of finality of the annulment
petition. Hence, Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.
The respondent acknowledged authorship of the petition for
annulment of marriage, and of the simulation of the decision
and certificate of finality. His explanation of having done so only
upon the complainant's persistent prodding did not exculpate
him from responsibility. For one, the explanation is
unacceptable, if not altogether empty. Simulating or
participating in the simulation of a court decision and a
certificate of finality of the same decision is an outright criminal
falsification or forgery. One need not be a lawyer to know so,
but it was worse in the respondent's case because he was a
lawyer. Thus, his acts were legally intolerable. Specifically, his
deliberate falsification of the court decision and the certificate of
finality of the decision reflected a high degree of moral
turpitude on his part, and made a mockery of the administration
of justice in this country. He thereby became unworthy of
continuing as a member of the Bar.
The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit of
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, and Rule 15.07, Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
xxxx
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS
WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.
The respondent would shift the blame to his client. That a lay
person like the complainant could have swayed a lawyer like the
respondent into committing the simulations was patently
improbable. Yet, even if he had committed the simulations upon
the client's prodding, he would be no less responsible. Being a
lawyer, he was aware of and was bound by the ethical canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly those
quoted earlier, which would have been enough to deter him
from committing the falsification, as well as to make him
unhesitatingly frustrate her prodding in deference to his sworn
obligation as a lawyer to always act with honesty and to obey
the laws of the land. Surely, too, he could not have soon
forgotten his express undertaking under his Lawyer's Oath to
"do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission."17Indeed, the
ethics of the Legal Profession rightly enjoined every lawyer like
him to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play
and nobility in the course of his practice of law.18 As we have
observed in one case:19
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of
the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always
live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his
client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity
and good faith.
Also, Canon 1520 and Rule 18.0421 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility required the respondent be true to
the complainant as his client. By choosing to ignore his fiduciary
responsibility for the sake of getting her money, he committed a
further violation of his Lawyer's Oath by which he swore not to
"delay any man's cause for money or malice," and to "conduct
[him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
[his] clients." He compounded this violation by taking
advantage of his legal knowledge to promote his own selfish
motives, thereby disregarding his responsibility under Canon
17.22
Under Section 27,23 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer
may be disbarred on any of the following grounds, namely: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4)
grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8)
corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case
without authority so to do.
Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit,
malpractice or misconduct in office, any of which was already a
ground sufficient for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court.24 The moral standards of the Legal
Profession expected the respondent to act with the highest
degree of professionalism, decency, and nobility in the course of
their practice of law.25 That he turned his back on such
standards exhibited his baseness, lack of moral character, renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the
dishonesty, lack of probity and general unworthiness to Court.30
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

continue as an officer of the Court.26 WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. CARLOS P.

We note that the respondent was previously sanctioned for
unprofessional conduct. In Cruz-Villanueva v. Rivera,27 he was
suspended from the practice of law because he had notarized
documents without a notarial commission. This circumstance
shows his predisposition to beguile other persons into believing
in the documents that he had falsified or simulated. It is time to
put a stop to such proclivity. He should be quickly removed
through disbarment.
It is true that the power to disbar is always exercised with great
caution and only for the most imperative reasons or in cases of
clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the
bar.28 But we do not hesitate when the misconduct is gross, like
in the respondent's case. We wield the power now because the
respondent, by his gross misconduct as herein described,
absolutely forfeited the privilege to remain in the Law
Profession. As we reminded in Embido v. Pe,29 in which we
disbarred the respondent lawyer for falsifying a court
decision:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RIVERA guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION OF
THE LAWYER'S OATH; and, ACCORDINGLY,
ORDERS his DISBARMENT. Let his name be STRICKENfrom
the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the OFFICE OF
THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b)
the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES; (c)
the OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT for appending to the
respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar; and (d)
the OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE for possible criminal prosecution of the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.

No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice
of the legal profession is always a privilege that the Court
extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw
or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect
the Lawyer's Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his
professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and
omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional
dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected
with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the
office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to
practice law confers upon him. Verily, no lawyer is immune from
the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation
are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed
either in a professional or private capacity. The test is whether
the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct
 February 1, 2017
A.C. No. 5819
HEIRS OF SIXTO L. TAN, SR., represented by RECTO A.
TAN, Complainants  docket fees through an Order dated 20 May 2002,  which respondent
vs.
ATTY. NESTOR B. BELTRAN, Respondent
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint against respondent, Atty.
Nestor B. Beltran. His derelictions allegedly consisted of his belated filing
of an appeal in a criminal case and failure to relay a court directive for the
payment of docket fees in a civil case to his clients - complainants Heirs
of Sixto L. Tan, Sr. represented by Recto A. Tan. The latter also accused
him of unduly receiving ₱200,000 as payment for legal services.
FACTS OF THE CASE
After agreeing to pay attorney's fees of ₱200,000, complainants engaged
the services of respondent counsel for the filing of cases to recover their
commercial properties valued at approximately ₱30 million.
On July 2001, complainants filed a criminal action for falsification of
public documents and use of falsified documents against Spouses
Melanio and Nancy Fernando and Sixto Tan, Jr. Docketed as LS. No.
2001-037,  this case was dismissed by the provincial prosecutor of Albay.
1
Respondent was notified of the order of dismissal on 18 October
2001.  On 6 November 2001, he filed an appeal via a Petition for Review
2
before the Secretary of the Department of Justice (SOJ). It was, however,
filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period to perfect an
appeal.  Consequently, in his Resolution promulgated on 5 March
3
2002, the SOJ dismissed the belated Petition for Review. Respondent no
4
longer filed a motion for reconsideration to remedy the ruling.
On 11 September 2001, complainants instituted a related civil suit to
annul the sale of their commercial properties before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Naga City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2001-0329.  After
5
being given ₱7,000 by his clients, respondent tasked his secretary to pay
the docket fees computed at ₱1,722.
Unfortunately, the Clerk of Court erred in the assessment of the docket
fees. To correct the error, the RTC required the payment of additional
6
received on 29 May 2002.  However, two weeks earlier, on 13 May 2002,
7
he had moved to withdraw as counsel with the conformity of his
clients.  No separate copy of the Order dated 20 May 2002 was sent to
8
any of the complainants. 9
The balance of the docket fees remained unpaid. Subsequently, the RTC
dismissed the civil case, citing the nonpayment of docket fees as one of
its bases. 10
Aggrieved by their defeat, complainants wrote this Court a letter-
complaint  asking that disciplinary actions be meted out to respondent.
11
They likewise contended that he had unduly received ₱200,000 as
attorney's fees, despite his failure to render effective legal services for
them.
Respondent claimed  that he could no longer move for the
12
reconsideration of the SOJ's dismissal of his belated Petition for Review
as he had only learned of the dismissal after the period to file a motion for
reconsideration had lapsed. He argued that while he prepared the
Petition for Review, his clients themselves, through Nilo Tan and Recto
Tan, signed and filed the same. Thus, he imputed to complainants the
belated filing of the appeal.
As for the dismissal of the civil action for nonpayment of docket fees,
respondent disclaimed any fault on his part, since he had already
withdrawn as counsel in that case.
1âwphi1
Anent his receipt of ₱200,000 as attorney's fees, respondent denied
collecting that amount. He only admitted that he had received ₱30,000 to
cover expenses for "the preparation of the complaints, docket fee,
affidavits, and other papers needed for the filing of the said cases."  He
13
did not deny his receipt of ₱7,000 for fees and other sundry expenses, of
which ₱l,722 had already been paid to the Clerk of Court for docket fees.
In any event, Atty. Beltran argued that ₱200,000 as attorney's fees was
inadequate, considering that the property under dispute was worth ₱30
million.
FINDINGS OF THE IBP recommended that respondent be ordered to restitute these sums to
complainants.
In a Resolution dated 12 March 2003,  this Court referred the
14

administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for In its Resolution dated 1 February 2007,  the Board of Governors of the
18

investigation, report, and recommendation. IBP resolved to fully dismiss the administrative case against respondent
without any explanation. Neither party has filed a motion for
The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, in a Report dated 24 July reconsideration or petition for review thereafter.19

2006,  found respondent guilty of neglect in handling the criminal case

15

and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three ISSUES OF THE CASE
months. The gist of the report reads: 16

l. Whether respondent neglected legal matters entrusted to him when he

The Respondent admits that the Petition for Review in this case was not
filed. This key detail leads the Commissioner to conclude that the
Respondent was negligent in failing to seasonably file the Petition
for Review in LS. No. 2001-037.
The Respondent's bare defense is that he allegedly left the filing of this
petition to the Complainants, who filed it out of time. Even assuming this
is true, the Respondent cannot disclaim negligence, being the lawyer and
knowing that the case related to the Complainants' claims on properties
the Respondent himself states are worth about PHP30 million. xxx.
Some of the Respondent's pleadings instead focus to the Motion for
Reconsideration regarding the late Petition for Review's dismissal, which
the Respondent explains by stating that the Complainants informed him
of this when the period to file a Motion for Reconsideration had already
belatedly filed an appeal before the SOJ, resulting in the dismissal of LS.
No. 2001-03 7
II. Whether respondent is guilty of violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and other ethical standards for failing to inform
complainants of the RTC Order to pay the balance of the docket fees in
Civil Case No. 2001-0329
III. Whether respondent unduly received ₱200,000 as attorney's fees
RULING OF THE COURT
We set aside the unsubstantiated recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors. Its resolutions are only recommendatory and always subject
to this Court’s review. 20

lapsed. Even assuming this is true, it is irrelevant since it is clear that the
Petition for Review itself was not seasonably filed. x x x. (Emphasis in the
Respondent filed a belated appeal
original)
before the SOJ.
With respect to dismissal of the civil case, the Investigating
In Reontoy v. Ibadlit,  we ruled that failure of the counsel to appeal within
21

Commissioner cleared respondent of any liability. The former gave

the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice. The Court
credence to the fact that by the time respondent received the directive of
elucidated that per Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
the RTC requiring the payment of the balance of the docket fees, the
Responsibility, "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
latter had already filed his withdrawal from the case.
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
Finally, as regards the factual claim of complainants that they paid
In the case at bar, respondent similarly admits that he failed to timely file
respondent attorney's fees amounting to ₱200,000, the Investigating
the Petition for Review before the SOJ. As a result of his delayed action,
Commissioner determined that their allegation was unfounded, as none
his clients lost the criminal case. Straightforwardly, this Court sanctions
of them produced receipts evidencing payment. At most, what the
him for belatedly filing an appeal.
Investigating Commissioner found was that respondent only admitted to
receiving ₱30,000 for expenses, aside from ₱5,278.  The former
17
The excuse forwarded by respondent - that he delegated the filing of the
Petition for Review to complainants - will not exculpate him from
administrative liability. As correctly explained by the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP, respondent cannot disclaim negligence, since
he was the lawyer tasked to pursue the legal remedies available to his
clients.
Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and
legal procedure. A client who deals with counsel has the right to expect
not just a good amount of professional learning and competence, but also
a wholehearted fealty to the client's cause.  Thus, we find that passing
22
the blame to persons not trained in remedial law is not just wrong; it is
reflective of the want of care on the part of lawyers handling the legal
matters entrusted to them by their clients. 23
After surveying related jurisprudence,  the Investigating Commissioner
24
recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
three months given his infraction of filing a belated appeal before the
SOJ. Yet, without explanation, the Board of Goven1ors resolved to ignore
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Accordingly, this Court will not adopt an unsubstantiated resolution of the
Board of Governors, especially when jurisprudence shows that we have
penalized lawyers for filing belated motions and pleadings. In the
resolution of this Court in Reontoy,  we suspended the counsel therein
25
from the practice of law for two months, given that his belated filing of an
appeal caused his client to lose the case. In Fernandez v. Novero,
Jr.,  we likewise suspended the respondent counsel for a month after he
26
filed a motion for reconsideration outside the reglementary period.
In Barbuco v. Beltran,  this Court imposed a six-month suspension on the
27
lawyer, who had belatedly filed a pleading, among other derelictions. We
stressed in that case that the failure to file a brief within the reglementary
period certainly constituted inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay
of 43 days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
Respondent failed to inform
complainants of the RTC Order
requiring the payment of full docket
fees.
Respondent argues that he was no longer bound to inform complainants
of the RTC Order requiring the payment of full docket fees, given that he
had already moved to withdraw as counsel with the conformity of the
latter. We find that argument unjustified.
Mercado v. Commission on Higher Education  is instructive on the effect
28
of the withdrawal of counsel with the conformity of the client:
As a rule, the withdrawal of a counsel from a case made with the written
conformity of the client takes effect once the same is filed with the court.
The leading case of Arambulo v. Court of Appeals laid out the rule that, in
general, such kind of a withdrawal does not require any further action or
approval from the court in order to be effective. In contrast, the norm with
respect to withdrawals of counsels without the written conformity of the
client is that they only take effect after their approval by the court.
The rule that the withdrawal of a counsel with the written conformity of
the client is immediately effective once filed in court, however,
is not absolute. When the counsel's impending withdrawal with the
written conformity of the client would leave the latter with no legal
representation in the case, it is an accepted practice for courts to order
the deferment of the effectivity of such withdrawal until such time that it
becomes certain that service of court processes and other papers to the
party-client would not thereby be compromised - either by the due
substitution of the withdrawing counsel in the case or by the express
assurance of the party-client that he now undertakes to himself receive
serviceable processes and other papers. Adoption by courts of such a
practice in that particular context, while neither mandatory nor sanctioned
by a specific provision of the Rules of Court, is nevertheless justified as
part of their inherent power to see to it that the potency of judicial
processes and judgment are preserved. (Emphasis in the original)
On 29 May 2002, when respondent herein received the RTC Order dated
20 May 2002, complainants still had no new counsel on record.
Therefore, Atty. Beltran should have acted with prudence by informing his
previous clients that he had received the directive of the court requiring
the payment of docket fees. After all, lawyers are officers of the court.
Like the court itself, respondent is an instrument for advancing the ends
of justice and his cooperation with the court is due whenever justice may
be imperiled if cooperation is withheld.
29
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.  In this case, we
30
consider the fact that not only did respondent file a belated appeal before
the SOJ, but he also failed to act with prudence by failing to inform
complainants of the RTC Order dated 20 May 2002.
However, we cannot put the blame solely on Atty. Beltran for the
nonpayment of the docket fees in the civil case. Although not discussed
by the Investigating Commissioner, the records reveal that even if
complainants' new counsel learned about the ruling on 30 May 2002, the
former still failed to pay the additional docket fees.
31
Taking into consideration the attendant circumstances herein vis-à-vis
the aforementioned administrative cases decided by this Court, we deem
it proper to impose on Atty. Beltran a two-month suspension from the
practice of law for belatedly filing an appeal before the SOJ. We also
admonish him to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance
of his duty to administer justice.
Complainants failed to prove that
respondent received ₱200,000 as
attorney's fees.
As a final point, the Court must clarify that the resolution of this case
should not include a directive for the return of the ₱35,278 as the
Investigating Commissioner recommended.
The Investigating Commissioner did not explain the recommendation for
the restitution of that sum. Moreover, complainants do not contest that
respondent received this sum for fees and other sundry expenses.
Neither do the records show that they demanded the return of this
amount from respondent. In consideration of these facts, the proper
corrective action is to order the accounting of the full sum of ₱35,278.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nestor B.
Beltran is SUSPENDED FOR TWO MONTHS from the practice of law
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely. He is ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and
diligence in the performance of his duties. He is also ORDERED TO
ACCOUNT for the ₱35,278 he received from his clients, with the
obligation to return the entire amount, or so much thereof remaining, to
complainants.

In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the
32
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other.33
Complainants have the burden to discharge that required quantum of
proof.  Here, as accurately assessed by the Investigating Commissioner,
34
the records do not bear any receipt proving Atty. Beltran's collection of
₱200,000 as attorney's fees.
This Decision shall take effect immediately upon receipt by Atty. Nestor
B. Beltran of a copy of this Decision. He shall inform this Court and the
Office of the Bar Confidant in writing of the date he received a copy of
this Decision. Copies of this Decision shall be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record, and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Office of the Court Administrator is
directed to circulate copies of this Decision to all courts concerned.
SO ORDERED

Complainants venture to argue that these sums were paid to respondent

without receipts. However, that bare argument has no other supporting
evidence - object, documentary, or testimonial. Even during the hearing
of this case before the IBP, when confronted with particular questions
regarding the sums paid to respondent, complainants could not answer
when and where they gave installment payments to Atty. Beltran. 35

General allegations will not meet the evidentiary standard of

preponderance of evidence.  Hence, we adopt the factual finding of the
36

Investigating Commissioner that complainants failed to prove their claim

of payment to respondent of ₱200,000 as attorney's fees.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 6980, August 30, 2017
CESAR O. STA. ANA, CRISTINA M. STA. ANA AND ESTHER
STA. ANA-SILVERIO, Complainants, v. ATTY. ANTONIO
JOSE F. CORTES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO,***J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainants against
Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes (respondent) against whom they
imputed deceit and falsification of public documents in the sale
of two parcels of property located at Bo. Lantic, Carmona,
Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
T-1069335 and T-1069336; and in the donation of66 pieces of
property by Atty. Cesar Casal (Atty. Casal) and his wife, Pilar P.
Casal (Pilar).
Factual Antecedents
In a sworn letter dated August 4, 2005, complainants alleged
that respondent was left ith the care and maintenance of
several properties either owned or under the administration of
Atty. Casal since the latter's death; that respondent abused his
authority, as such administrator, and engineered the sale or
transfer of the said properties, specifically the two parcels of
land covered by TCT Nos. T-1069335 and T-1069336, which
were owned originally by their (complainants') ancestors; that
on May 19, 2004, respondent, in connivance with Cesar Inis
(Inis) and A Casal's alleged adopted daughter, Gloria Casal
Cledera (Gloria), and her husband, Hugh Cledera (the spouses
Cledera), sold the abovementioned parcels of land to the
Property Company of Friends, Inc. (PCFI).1
Complainants further averred that as the said properties were
originally in the names of Inis, Ruben Loyola (Loyola), Angela
Lacdan (Lacdan) and Cesar Veloso Casal (Veloso), these
persons, in conspiracy with respondent, caused to be executed
a Special Power of Attorney2 (SPA) dated May 4, 2004, under
which Loyola, Lacdan and Veloso purportedly authorized their
co-owner Inis to sell the said properties; that this SPA was,
however, forged or falsified, because Loyola was already dead
on August 15, 1994, whereas Lacdan died on August 31, 2001,
and at the time of the execution of the SPA in Catmona, Cavite,
Veloso was in fact in Tacloban City; and that indeed, as a
consequence of respondent's wrongdoing, criminal cases for
Estata through Falsification of Public Document were filed
against respondent and the spouses Cledera.3
Complainants moreover claimed that respondent notarized 12
falsified Deeds of Donation, dated September 17 and 18, 2003,
and supposedly executed in Carmona, Cavite, under which it
was made to appear that Atty. Casal purportedly donated 66
pieces of property to Gloria; that they (complainants) caused to
be verified/examined Atty. Casal's "superimposed" signatures
on these deeds of donation by the Questioned Documents
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and that
in its Disposition Forms, the NBI concluded that "the signatures
appearing on the said questioned documents are mere xerox
copies which do not truly and clearly reflect the minute details
of the writing strokes and other aspects relative to the
preparation of the questioned signatures."4
In his answer, respondent asserted that all the criminal
complaints against him had been dismissed, and the criminal
information/s instituted therefor had been withdrawn by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), hence, he had been exonerated of
all the charges against him. Respondent adverted to the
Resolution of Regional State Prosecutor Ernesto C. Mendoza,
which in part declared -
x x x the signatures of Cesar E. Casal appearing on the said
questioned documents are mere xerox copies which do not truly
and clearly reflect the minute details of the writing strokes and
other aspects relative to the preparation of the questioned
signatures.
Nowhere in this report was there a categorical statement that
the document was falsified or the signatures were forged. x x x5
In a Resolution6 dated November 27, 2006, the Court resolved
to refer this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
The Investigating Commissioner summarized the charges
against respondent as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) First, [r]espondent was involved in the preparation of the
Loyola SPA, which was used to sell the [s)ubject [p]roperties
to PCFI, despite the fact that two (2) of the alleged signatories
therein were already dead at the time the Loyola SPA was
executed;
(b) Second, [r]espondent prepared and notarized 12 Deeds of
Donation, which [appear] to be spurious because the
signatures of Atty. Casal thereon were only superimposed;
(c) Third, [r]espondent notarized the 12 Deeds of Donation in
Quezon City, within his territorial jurisdiction as a notary
public x x x despite the fact that Atty. Casal signed the same
in x x x Cavite, or outside his jurisdiction as a notary public;
(d) Fourth, [r]espondent caused the preparation of the Casal SPA,
which appears to be spurious because the signature of Atty.
Casal thereon was only superimposed; and
(e) Fifth, [r]espondent knowingly used the spurious Casal SPA
and executed a Deed of Sale in favor of PCFI involving other
properties.7
After due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner
submitted a Report8dated May 14, 2010, finding respondent not
only guilty of dishonesty and deceitful conduct, but also guilty
of having violated hls oath as a notary public.
In finding respondent guilty of using a falsified document, the
Investigating Commissioner noted that although there was no
direct evidence that it was respondent himself who prepared or
drafted the SPA, there was evidence nonetheless that
respondent did actively participate, or take part, in the offer and
sale of the properties to the PCFI; and that since the execution
of the forged or falsified SPA is a crucial or critical component of
the eventual consummation of the sale to PCFI, respondent
could not be heard to say that he had no knowledge of the use
of a falsified document.9
As regards the 12 Deeds of Donation allegedly executed by
Atty. Casal, the Investigating Commissioner lent more credence
to the unbiased or impartial report of the NBI's finding that the
signatures of Atty. Casal were per se mere xerox copies; and
that moreover, respondent had violated Section 24010 of the
Revised Administrative Code, when he caused to be
acknowledged the Deeds of Donation in his law office in Quezon
City, despite the fact that these were supposedly signed and
executed by Atty. Casal in Cavite. The Investigating
Commissioner opined that respondent "ought to have known
that since he was outside his territorial jurisdiction as a notary
public, he could not have performed the acts of a notary public
at the time of the signing of the 12 Deeds of Donation, including
the taking of oath of the parties."11
The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. ATTY. ANTONIO JOSE F. CORTES be suspended from the
practice of law for a period ranging from six (6) months to two
(2) years with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or
similar acts or conduct shall be dealt with more severely; and
2. ATTY. ANTONIO JOSE F. CORTES be barred from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years,
and in the event that he is presently commissioned as notary
public, that his commission be immediately revoked and
suspended for such period.12
In its Resolution13 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner but modified the recommended
penalty to a one-year suspension from the practice of law, with
revocation of respondent's notarial license, plus a two-year
disqualification from reappointment as notary public. The
pertinent portion of the Resolution reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part ofthis Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering Respondent's violation of the Notarial Law, Atty.
Antonio Jose F. Cortes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year and his Notarial Commission
immediately REVOKED presently commissioned. Further, he is
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Publicfor two (2)
years.
No motions for reconsideration having been filed by any of the
parties, the case is before us for fmal resolution.
Our Ruling
Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As
vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain
not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [It is only in living up to the
very high standards and tenets of the legal profession that] the
people's faith and confidence in the judicial system can be
ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined - whether in their
professional or in their private capacity - for any conduct that is
wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.14
In the instant case, respondent acted with deceit when he used
the falsified documents to effect the transfer of properties
owned or administered by the late Atty. Casal. In a letter15 sent
by Atty. Florante O. Villegas, counsel for the PCFI, to the
spouses Cledera, the former explicitly stated that respondent
did have a hand in the negotiation leading to the sale of the
properties covered by TCT Nos. T-1069335 and T-1069336. In
clarifying that it only entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale
because of the "offer and representation that spouses Cesar and
Pilar Casal are the true owners of the subject parcels of
land,"16 the PCFI, through its legal counsel, declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We understand that you, together with Atty. Antonio Jose F.
Cortes, offered to sell the said parcels ofland to our client, and
that on September 17, 2003, an agreement of Purchase and
Sale was executed between Spouses Cesar E. Casal and Pilar P.
Casal (represented by Atty. Cortes as their attorney-in-
fact) and our client.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Mr. Guillermo C. Choa, President of the PCFI,
narrated in his affidavit18 the events leading to another sale
likewise involving properties coowned by Atty. Casal through
the use of the spurious SPA, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
3) That sometime in August 2003, Sps. Hugh Cledera and Gloria
Casal Cledera and Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes offered to
me for sale several parcels of land owned by Cesar E.
Casal(father of Gloria Casal Cledera) including Lot 5, Psu 10120
and Lot 6, Psu 101205 containing an area of 39,670 square
meters and 47,638 square meters, more or less, located at Bo.
Lantic, Carmona, Cavite which was then registered in the name
of Eduardo Gan, et al. under TCT No. T-79153 of the Register of
Deeds fur the Province of Cavite.
4) That Sps. Hugh Cledera and Gloria Casal Cledera
together with Atty. Cortes also presented to me the
following documents, to wit:
a) TCT No. T-79153 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Cavite.
b) Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 15, 1990 executed by
heirs of Eduardo B. Gan, et al. in favor of Cesar E. Casal,
Cesar Inis, Ruben Loyola and Angela Lacdan.
c) Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 19, 1990 executed by
Cesar Veloso Casal, et. al. in favor ofSps. Cesar and Pilar
Casal.
xxxx
6) That in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, it was agreed
that the seller shall register the several Deeds of Sale and
deliver the titles over said properties to Pro-friends (PCFI). In
the above-mentioned Agreement of Purchase and Sale,
Sps. Casal were represented by their duly authorized
attorney-in-fact, Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes, of legal age,
Filipino, with address at 2/F ELCO Bldg., 202 E. Rodriguez, Sr.,
Blvd., Quezon City. Present during negotiations for the
terms and conditions to be contained in the Agreement of
Purchase and Sale aside from myself and Atty.Cortes were
Sps. Hugh and Gloria Cledera, the son-in-law and daughter,
respectively of Sps. Casal; x x x19 (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, it cannot be denied that it was respondent who
engineered the execution of the 12 Deeds of Donation involving
66 pieces of Atty. Casal's property. Respondent was personally
present dwing the alleged signing of the Deeds of Donation in
Cavite, which deeds he brought afterwards to his law office in
Quezon City, and notarized the same. Indeed, in his Affidavit,
respondent stated: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
11. When I presented the documents for signature of the
donorsspouses, Cesar E. Casal and Pilar P. Casal, the late Cesar
E. Casal stamped the rubber facsimile of his genuine signature
in all the spaces provided in all copies of the Deeds of Donation.
At the same time and place, I also saw his wife Pilar P. Casal
affixed [sic] her own signature in the Deeds of Donation. Also
present dming the signing occasion was the donee herself, Dr.
Gloria P. Casal, as well as, [sic] her husband, Dr. Hugh Cledera
who affixed their signatures in all the copies of the Deeds of
Donation in my presence.
12. Thereafter, I gathered and brought all the signed
copies of the Deeds of Donation to my office in Quezon
City, and notarized them. Record shows that I notarized
them and entered the documents in my Notarial Registry on
September 17 and 18, 2003.20 (Emphasis supplied)
By using the falsified SPA and by knowingly notarizing
documents outside of his notarial commission's jurisdiction,
respondent was evidently bereft of basic integrity which is an
indispensable sine qua non of his ongoing membership, in good
standing, in the legal profession, and as a duly-commissioned
notary public.
In actively participating in the offer and sale of property to
PCFI, respondent was guilty of deceit and dishonesty by
leveraging on the use of a spurious Special Power of Attorney
There can be no debate either as to the fact that respondent
made use of a forged or falsified SPA in his dealings with PCFI.
As the lawyer who assisted in the sale of the properties through
the use of the falsified SPA in question, he ought to know that
the use of such falsified or forged SPA gives rise to grievous
legal consequences which must inevitably enmesh him
professionally. As a member of the Bar in apparent good legal
standing, he effectively held himself out as a trustworthy agent
for the principals he was purportedly representing in the
transaction/s in question.
Respondent's act of notarizing a forged Deed of Donation
outside of his jurisdiction is a violation of his duties as a notary
public, as well as a blatant falsification of public document
This Court agrees with the fmdings of the IBP Board of
Governors which upheld the impartial report of the NBI and its
findings that the signatures on the Deeds of Donation were
mere photocopies attached to the said Deeds.21Given the fact
that respondent admitted to having been with the late Atty.
Casal at the time of the execution of the Deed, it would not be
far-fetched to say that the use of the said mere photocopies
was with his knowledge and consent. What is more, his act of
bringing the Deeds of Donation that were executed in Carmona,
Cavite, to his law office in Quezon City, and notarizing them
there, not only violated Section 240 of the Revised
Administrative Code but "also [partook] of malpractice of law
and falsification."22
Section 240 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. - The jurisdiction of a notary
public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province. The
jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-
extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority
to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his
jurisdiction.23(Emphasis supplied)
Needless to say, respondent cannot escape from the clutches of
this provision.
The dismissal of the criminal complaints against respondent did
not change the sui generis character of disbarment proceedings
Respondent's contention that the DOJ had resolved to withdraw
the criminal complaints filed against him and his co-accused,
the spouses Cledera,24 does not persuade. The dismissal or
withdrawal of the criminal complaints/ information/sat the
instance of the DOJ, is of no moment. As a member of the Bar,
respondent should know that administrative cases against
lawyers are sui generis, or a class of their own. "Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance."25 Disbarment cases are aimed at purging the
legal profession of individuals who obdurately scorn and despise
the exalted standards of the noble profession of law. It is within
this Court's power, as a check and balance to its own system, to
ensure undeviating integrity by members of the Bar both on the
professional and the personal level. It is only by maintaining
this integrity and this loyalty to the law, to the Courts of Justice
and to their client and the public at large, that lawyers are
enabled to maintain the trust reposed upon them and to deliver
justice inside and outside the courtroom.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
and his Notarial Commission immediately REVOKED, if he is
presently commissioned. Furthermore, he
is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for two
(2) years, reckoned from the date of finality of this Resolution.

Furnish a copy of this Resolution to the Office of the Bar

Confidant, which shall append the same to the personal record
of respondent; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which shall circulate the same
to all courts in the country for their infonnation and guidance.
SO ORDERED
A.C. No. 10553, July 05, 2017 - FILIPINAS O. CELEDONIO,
Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME F. ESTRABILLO, Respondent.:
A.C. No. 10553, July 05, 2017 - FILIPINAS O. CELEDONIO,
Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME F. ESTRABILLO, Respondent.

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 10553, July 05, 2017

FILIPINAS O. CELEDONIO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME F.

ESTRABILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

For Our resolution is complainant Filipinas O. Celedonio's

disbarment complaint1 against respondent Atty. Jaime F.
Estrabillo, charging the latter with the violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and 1.02, Canon 9, Rule 1.09, Canon 10, Rule 10.01,
Canon 15, Rules 15.03 and 15.04, Canon 17, and Canon 19,
Rule 19.01 and 19.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
The Facts
The instant disbarment case stemmed from a criminal case of
Estafa filed by Alfrito D. Mah (Mah) against complainant's
husband in 2006, the latter being accused of embezzling a
substantial amount from Mah's company. In the said case,
respondent was Mah's legal counsel.2
Complainant averred that she tried talking to Mr. Mah's wife,
being one of the sponsors in their wedding, to drop the criminal
case against her husband, but Mrs. Mah responded that the
matter is already in the hands of their lawyer. Thus,
complainant and her husband met several times with the
respondent to negotiate the withdrawal of the criminal case.
Respondent assured the complainant and her husband that he
will talk to his client for the possibility of settling the case and
delaying the prosecution thereof in the meantime.3
In the process of negotiating, respondent advised the
complainant and her husband to execute a deed of sale over
their house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 502969-R, which will be used as a collateral for the
settlement of the case. Respondent explained to them that the
said deed of sale will merely be a security while complainant
and her husband are paying the embezzled money in
installments and he assured the spouses that the said deed of
sale will not be registered nor annotated in the title. The
criminal case against complainant's husband was then
dismissed.4
Being the only one who shoulders the family expenses,
complainant, at some point, decided to sell the subject house
and lot.5 However, on December 8, 2008, complainant received
summons from the court regarding a complaint for specific
performance with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI) and temporary restraining order
(TRO) filed by Spouses Mah, subject of which was TCT No.
502969-R.6 Apparently, the deed of sale that complainant and
her husband executed as a security for the settlement of the
criminal case was dated May 5, 2008 and notarized by the
respondent. The said complaint averred that herein complainant
and her husband have an obligation to deliver the subject
property to Spouses Mah. Complainant found out that the
respondent requested the Register of Deeds (RD) of Pampanga
to register and annotate the said deed of sale on the title on
November 27, 2008.7
This prompted the complainant to confront the respondent as
this was contrary to what they have agreed upon. The
respondent merely advised complainant to again negotiate with
his client and assured her that he would back her up. However,
complainant's efforts to negotiate were again proven futile.8
In the meantime, complainant has a deadline for the filing of a
responsive pleading in the said civil case. Also, the hearing for
the application for issuance of a TRO was already scheduled.
When the complainant went back to the respondent for this
matter, the respondent offered to and indeed prepared a Motion
for Extension of Time and Urgent Motion to Postpone for the
complainant dated December 22, 2008 and January 8, 2009,
respectively. Complainant alleged that it was respondent's
secretary upon respondent's instruction, who drafted the said
motions and that she was required to pay the corresponding
fees therefor. In view of the said motion for postponement,
complainant did not appear in the January 9, 2009 hearing.9
It turned out, however, that the said hearing still proceeded.
The respondent even appeared therein and manifested that he
filed a notice of lis pendens and adverse claim with the RD of
Pampanga. Complainant also found out that respondent filed a
Motion to Declare Defendants in Default in the said case dated
February 4, 2009, which was granted by the court on February
27, 2009. On March 31, 2009, a decision was rendered in the
said case in favor of respondent's clients. The decision became
final and executory and, thereafter, a writ of execution was
issued.10
Realizing that respondent employed deceit and was double-
dealing with her and her husband to their prejudice,
complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, praying
for the respondent's disbarment.
In his Answer to the instant administrative complaint,
respondent denied complainant's accusations. Despite admitting
that he told the complainant that he would help her out in
negotiating with his client, he averred that he never
compromised his relationship with the latter as counsel.
Respondent explained that he suggested a deed of second
mortgage be made on the subject property, as the same was
still mortgaged with the bank, for the purpose of settling the
criminal case with his client. He admitted preparing such deed
of second mortgage but the same was not signed by his client
as the latter preferred a deed of sale with a promissory note.
The complainant and her husband then executed the preferred
deed of sale. Consequently, Mr. Mah executed an affidavit of
desistance relative to the estafa case against complainant's
husband.11
As to the civil case, respondent averred that upon learning that
the complainant was selling the subject property, he filed an
adverse claim on the said property to protect his client's
rights.12
Respondent, further, denied that he was serving conflicting
interests when he instructed his secretary to draft the motions
for extension of time and postponement for the complainant. He
averred that he informed his clients about it and denied
demanding payment therefor from the complainant.13
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
Aside from respondent's act of instructing his secretary to
prepare and file motions for the complainant in the civil case
filed by his client, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found no proof as to the
other allegations in the complaint imputing deceit and other
violations of the CPR against respondent.14 On May 22, 2012,
the IBP-CBD recommended thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent Atty. Jaime E. Estrabillo be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.15
Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-
187, which reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
for Respondent's violation of Rule 15.03 and Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, it being not intentional,
Atty. Jaime E. Estrabillo is hereby REPRIMANDED.16
Both the complainant and the respondent filed their. respective
motions for reconsideration (MR) of the above-quoted
resolution.17
Acting on the said MRs, the IBP Board  of Governors issued
Resolution No. XXI-2014-116 on March 21, 2014, which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration of
Complainant and Respondent, there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission and they being a mere
reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out
and taken into consideration. Further, the Board RESOLVED
to AFFIRM with modification, Resolution No. XX-2013-187
dated March 20, 2013 and accordingly ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner SUSPENDINGAtty. Jaime E.
Estrabillo from the practice of law to [sic] six (6) months.18
This Court is now called to issue its verdict on the matter.
Issue
Should the respondent be administratively disciplined based on
the allegations in the complaint?
Our Ruling

We answer in the affirmative.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
Respondent admitted that he instructed his secretary to draft
and file motions for the complainant in the civil case filed by his
client against the latter. Such act is a clear violation of the
above-stated rules. The respondent, however, explained that it
was merely a humanitarian act on his part in helping the
complainant on the matter, to give the latter an opportunity to
settle their accountability to his client.19 Respondent insisted
that there was no intention on his part to violate the trust
reposed upon him by his client. In fact, according to the
respondent, it was his client's interest that he had in mind when
he prepared the motions as this would extend the chance of
getting a settlement with the complainant, which is the end
favored by his client.
Such explanation cannot, in any way, absolve him from liability.
The rules are clear. The relationship between a lawyer and
his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of
trust and confidence.20 The legal profession dictates that it is
not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to 'accord the
highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of
the client's interest.21 Thus, part of the lawyer's duty in this
regard is to avoid representing conflicting
interests.22 Jurisprudence is to the effect that a lawyer's act
which invites suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in
the performance of his duty already evinces inconsistency of
interests.23 In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty
to contend for that which duty to another client requires them
to oppose.24
There is, thus, no denying that respondent's preparation and
filing of motions on behalf of the complainant, the adverse party
in the case filed by him for his client, conflicts his client's
interest. Indeed, a motion for extension to file an answer would
not be favorable to his client's cause as the same would merely
delay the judgment sought by his client in filing the case.
Moreso, the motion for postponement of the TRO hearing would
definitely run counter with the interest of his client as such
remedy was precisely sought, supposedly with urgency, to
protect his client's right over the subject property before
complainant could proceed with the sale of the same.
Moreover, Rule 15.03 above-cited expressly requires a written
consent of all parties concerned after full disclosure of the facts
if ever, for whatever reason, a lawyer will be involved in
conflicting interests. Corollary to this, Rule 15.04 of the CPR
substantially states that if a lawyer would act as a mediator, or
a negotiator for that matter, a written consent of all concerned
is also required. Notably, there is no record of any written
consent from any of the parties involved in this case.
Considering the foregoing, We sustain the findings of the IBP
that respondent violated Rule 15.03 and Canon 17 of the CPR.
In addition, this Court cannot shun the fact that due to
respondent's acts, complainant lost her day in court.
Admittedly, the complainant cannot impute fault entirely to the
respondent for losing the opportunity to present her defense in
the civil case, as no prudent man will leave the fate of his or her
case entirely to his or her lawyer, much less to his or her
opponent's lawyer. However, We also cannot blame the
complainant for relying upon the motions prepared by the
respondent for her, thinking that in view of the said motions,
she was given more time file an answer and more importantly,
that there was no more hearing on the scheduled date for her
to attend. As it turned out, respondent even appeared on the
date of the hearing that was supposedly sought to be
postponed. This is a clear case of an unfair act on the part of
the respondent. Respondent may not have an obligation to
apprise the complainant of the hearing as the latter is not his
client, but his knowledge of the motion for postponement,
drafted by his secretary upon his instruction, calls for his fair
judgment as a defender of justice and officer of the court, to
inform the complainant that the hearing was not postponed.

This exactly demonstrates why dealing with conflicting interests

in the legal profession is prohibited it is not only because the
relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public
policy and good taste.25

As to the other matters raised in the complaint such as the

allegations that the respondent deceived the complainant to
execute the subject deed of sale, among others, We are one
with the IBP-CBD that such imputations were not supported by
sufficient evidence to warrant consideration.

Anent the penalty, considering that this is respondent's first

infraction, and that there is no clear showing that his
malpractice was deliberately done in bad faith or with deceit,
We hold that respondent's suspension from the practice of law
for six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP-CBD and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, is warranted.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to SUSPEND Atty. Jaime F.

Estrabillo from the practice 'of raw for six (6) months to
commence immediately from the receipt of this Decision, with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense A.C. No. 6933, July 05, 2017 - GREGORIO V. CAPINPIN, JR.,
will warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision Complainant, v. ATTY. ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., Respondent.:
be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and A.C. No. 6933, July 05, 2017 - GREGORIO V. CAPINPIN, JR.,
guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append Complainant, v. ATTY. ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., Respondent.
a copy of this Decision to respondent's record as member of the
Bar. THIRD DIVISION

SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 6933, July 05, 2017

GREGORIO V. CAPINPIN, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY.

ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed by
complainant Gregorio Capinpin, Jr., praying for the suspension
from the practice of law or disbarment of respondent Atty.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for violating the Canons of Professional
Ethics in connection with the foreclosure of complainant's
properties.
Factual Antecedents
On February 14, 1997, complainant executed a real estate
mortgage (REM)2on his two lots in favor of Family Lending
Corporation (FLC) as security for a loan amounting to PhP 5
Million with interest at two percent (2%) per month.
On April 29, 2002, due to complainant's default in payment,
FLC, through its President Dr. Eli Malaya (Dr. Malaya), initiated
foreclosure proceedings against the mortgaged properties.3
Complainant availed of legal remedies to stop the said
foreclosure proceedings, to wit: (1) he filed a case for damages
and injunction and also moved for the suspension of the sheriffs
sale, wherein such motion for suspension was granted but the
injunctive relief was denied after hearings. Complainant's
motion for reconsideration (MR) therein was also denied; (2) he
then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) with the Court of Appeals (CA), wherein no
TRO was granted due to some deficiencies in the petition; (3)
he also filed an annulment of REM with prayer for a WPI and/or
TRO before the trial court, wherein this time a WPI was issued
to stop the auction sale.4 This prompted FLC to file a petition
for certiorari  before the CA, questioning the trial court's
issuance of the injunctive writ. The CA nullified the said writ,
mainly on the ground of forum shopping, which was affirmed by
this Court on review.5 For these cases, FLC engaged
respondent's legal services.
The complaint alleges that during the above-cited proceedings,
respondent, without the knowledge of his client FLC,
approached complainant to negotiate the deferment of the
auction sale and the possible settlement of the loan obligation
at a reduced amount without resorting to the auction sale.
Respondent allegedly represented himself as being capable of
influencing the sheriff to defer the auction sale, as well as his
client FLC through Dr. Malaya to accept the amount of PhP 7
Million to fully settle the loan obligation. For this, the complaint
alleges that on April 13, 2005, respondent demanded payment
of professional fees amounting to Php 1 Million from
complainant.6 In fact, complainant already gave the following
amounts to respondent as payment of such professional fees:
(1) PhP 50,000 check dated April 13, 2005; (2) PhP 25,000
check dated April 18, 2005; (3) PhP 75,000 check dated April
22, 2005; (4) PhP 20,000 check dated May 16, 2005; (5) PhP
200,000 on June 30, 2005; and (6) PhP 30,000 on August 17,
2005.7 Despite such payments, the auction sale
proceeded.8 Hence, the instant complaint.
For his part, respondent denies that he was the one who
approached complainant for negotiation, the truth being that it
was complainant who asked for his help to be given more time
to raise funds to pay the loan obligation.9Respondent further
avers that he communicated the said request to his
client.10 Aside from the checks dated April 13, 18, 22 and May
16, 2005, which respondent claims to be advance payments of
his attorney's fees, respondent avers that he did not receive
any other amount from the complainant.11 All these, according
to the respondent, were known to his client.12 In fact, in a Letter
dated April 22, 2005 signed by the complainant and addressed
to FLC through Dr. Malaya, complainant expressly stated that
he will negotiate for the payment of respondent's fees as FLC's
counsel.13
On July 16, 2007, this Court referred the instant administrative
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation or decision.14
Report and Recommendation
of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In his Report and Recommendation15 dated June 4, 2010, the
Investigating Commissioner gave credence to complainant's
allegations that respondent, without the knowledge of his client,
negotiated with the complainant for the settlement of the loan
obligation, and that the respondent demanded and received
professional fees in negotiating the said settlement.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, respondent's act
of negotiating with the complainant on the deferment of the
auction sale and the settlement of the loan for a substantially
reduced amount was highly improper as respondent's primary
duty, being FLC's counsel, was to protect the interest of FLC by
seeing to it that the foreclosure proceedings be done
successfully to obtain the best amount possible to cover the
loan obligation.16 The Investigating Commissioner explained
that if a lawyer can collect professional fees or advanced
payment thereof from the adverse party, it results to a conflict
of interest.17 From the foregoing, the respondent was found to
have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which states that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.18
The report further stated that the amounts collected by the
respondent should be considered as money received from his
client; as such, he has the duty to account for and disclose the
same to his client in accordance with Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of
the said Code.19 The Investigating Commissioner found nothing
on record that showed that respondent made such accounting
for or disclosure to his client.20
Hence, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that
respondent was liable for malpractice and recommended that he
be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing discussion, this
Commissioner finds the respondent liable for malpractice and,
accordingly, recommends that respondent be meted a penalty
of ONE (1) YEAR suspension from the practice of law with a
warning that a repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with
more severity.21
Resolutions of the Board of Governors
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
On September 28, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-
84,22 which states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules and considering that
Respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03, and Canon 16, Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. is hereby  SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.23(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's MR24 was denied in the IBP Board of Governor's
Resolution No. XXI-2014-28025 dated May 3, 2014 as follows:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,
there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a
mere reiteration of the matters which had already been
threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No.
XX-2013-84 dated September 28, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.26
Necessarily, We now give Our final action on this case.
Issue
Should Atty. Cesa, Jr. be administratively disciplined based on
the allegations in the complaint and evidence on record?
The Court's Ruling
We are in full accord with the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner that respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03
and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the CPR.
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS
WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
Based on the records, We find substantial evidence to hold the
respondent liable for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the said
Code. It must be stressed that FLC engaged respondent's legal
services to represent it in opposing complainant's actions to
forestall the foreclosure proceedings. As can be gleaned from
respondent's position paper, however, it is admitted that
respondent extended help to the complainant in negotiating
with FLC for the reduction of the loan payment and cessation of
the foreclosure proceedings.27The case of Hornilla v. Salunat28 is
instructive on the concept of conflict of interest, viz.:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test
is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty
to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for
the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. x x x. Another
test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance
of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double[-]dealing in
the performance thereof.29
Evidently, respondent was working on conflicting interests –
that of his client, which was to be able to foreclose and obtain
the best amount they could get to cover the loan obligation, and
that of the complainant's, which was to forestall the foreclosure
and settle the loan obligation for a lesser amount.
Indeed, the relationship between the lawyer and his client
should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and
confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be so.
Part of the lawyer's duty to his client is to avoid representing
conflicting interests.30 It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.31
Respondent's allegation that such negotiation was within the
knowledge of his client will not exonerate him from the clear
violation of Rule 15.03 of the CPR. Respondent presented a
number of documents to support his allegation that all the
communications between him and the complainant were relayed
to his client but We find no record of any written consent from
any of the parties, especially from his client, allowing him to
negotiate as such.
Respondent's admission that he received advance payments of
professional fees from the complainant made matters worse for
him. As correctly found by the Investigating Commissioner, it
was highly improper for respondent to accept professional fees
from the opposing party as this creates clouds of doubt
regarding respondent's legal practice. As aptly stated by the
Investigating Commissioner, if a lawyer receives payment of
professional fees from the adverse party, it gives an impression
that he is being paid for services rendered or to be rendered in
favor of such adverse party's interest, which, needless to say,
conflicts that of his client's.
Simply put, respondent's professional fees must come from his
client. This holds true even if eventually such fees will be
reimbursed by the adverse party depending on the agreement
of the parties. Respondent cannot justify his act of accepting
professional fees from the complainant by alleging that such
was in accordance with the arrangement between his client and
the complainant as there is no clear proof of such arrangement.
The April 22, 2005 Letter32 signed by the complainant and
addressed to FLC through Dr. Malaya, invoked by the
respondent, does not, in any way, prove that there was an
agreement between complainant and FLC. Moreover, the fact
that respondent was already receiving several amounts from
the complainant even before the date of the said Letter,
supposedly stating an agreement between the complainant and
FLC as regards the settlement of the loan obligation and the
payment of his professional fees, is also suspicious. Such
circumstance reveals that even before the complainant and FLC
have come to such purported agreement, he was already
receiving professional fees from the complainant. Respondent's
allegations to the effect that negotiations had already been
going on between the parties through him via phone calls even
before that Letter do not hold water. To be sure, it would have
been easy for the respondent, as a lawyer, to present
documentary proof of such negotiation and/or arrangements
but respondent failed to do so.
At any rate, even assuming that there was indeed an
arrangement between FLC and complainant that respondent's
professional fees shall be paid by the complainant, which will be
later on deducted from whatever the latter will pay FLC for the
settlement of his loan obligation, respondent's act of accepting
such payments from the complainant and appropriating the
same for his professional fees is still reprehensible. The said
payments from the complainant are still considered FLC's
money; as such, respondent should have accounted the same
for his client. As correctly found by the Investigating
Commissioner, there is nothing on record, aside from
respondent's bare and self-serving allegations, that would show
that respondent made such accounting or disclosure to his
client. Such acts are in violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the
CPR above-cited.
This Court cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold, at
all times, the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The
ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with
the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play, and nobility in
the course of their practice of law. Clearly, in this case,
respondent failed to uphold such ethical standard in his practice
of law.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, We hold that respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year as recommended by the Investigating
Commissioner.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court AFFIRMS the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governor's Resolution No. XX-2013-84
dated September 28, 2013 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-280
dated May 3, 2014 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. from the practice of law for one (1) year
effective immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of
respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED

In addition, this Court is baffled by the idea that complainant

opted to pay respondent's professional fees first before his loan
obligation was even taken care of, and that FLC would actually
agree to this.