The Journal of
The International Association of
Transdisciplinary Psychology
Waxing bin Laden
Jeremy Fernando
Perhaps one might be allowed to open with
a potentially outrageous observation; that of
the relation between the renewed interest in
Brazilian waxing and the increase in fear of
terrorism. At first glance it would seem
absolutely absurd to even speak of waxing
and terrorism in the same breath: how an
age-old religious practice that suddenly
become popular again for aesthetic
reasons, has any relation with one of the
greatest fears of modern states seems
practically to belong in the realm of science
fiction.
However one must never dismiss a
possibility just because it isn’t immediately
obvious: as we have leant from Donald
Rumsfeld—perhaps yet another strange
source—the relationship between ‘knowns’
and ‘unknowns’ is many-fold. At the now
infamous US Department of Defense news
briefing on 12 February, 2002, then
Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld quipped,
but the truth is, there are
things we know, and we
know we know them -- the
known knowns. There are
things we know that we don't
know -- the known
unknowns. And there are
unknown unknowns; the
Volume 2, Issue 1, May 2010
things we do not yet know
that we do not know.”a
Perhaps unbeknownst to him, Rumsfeld had
stumbled upon a key problem of knowing
and knowledge, that of the relationship
between the object of inquiry, and
awareness of the existence of that object.
In the first scenario—the “known knowns”—
the subject is both aware of the object and
has a cognitive understanding of it. In the
case of the “known unknowns,” the subject
is aware of her/ his lack of cognitive
understanding of the object. It is more
interesting in the case of the “unknown
unknowns”: here the subject is unaware of
the fact that (s)he lacks a cognitive
understanding; this would be the case of an
absolute lack of knowledge. The problem
with Rumsfeld is that he didn’t go far
enough: he missed out the fourth variation,
that of the ‘unknown knowns’. In this case,
the subject is unaware of the fact that (s)he
has a cognitive understanding of something.
Hence one is never able to determine
whether (s)he knows or does not know of
something; this would be the case of the
indeterminability of knowledge. However,
just because (s)he is unaware of something
does not mean that it has no effects on her:
even though (s)he might be completely blind
to it, doesn’t mean that it cannot affect her.
Mayhaps here, we can consider this
possibility: terror resides in the unknown.
Or more precisely we fear what we know we
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?tr
anscriptid=3793
do not know. Hence it is not so much an
absolute unknown that is the problem: if we
do not know that we do know not, it is
completely outside our scope of cognition.
It is when we have an inkling that there is
something that lies outside our
understanding that we are faced with this
fear. In other words, terror grips up
precisely because of the ‘known
unknown’—we know that there is something
out there, but we also know that we have no
way of knowing when it will happen, or what
will happen.
In order to deal with this, we have to
create an explanation for whatever
happens: whether this explanation is real or
simulated, correct or not, is irrelevant. As
long as we believe it to be so, it fills this lack
of meaning that causes the anxiety and
fear. This is most clearly seen by the need
to prescribe a perpetrator to an act of
‘terrorism’ the moment it happens. We saw
this happen in the Oklahoma City bombings
in 1995: moments after it occurred, many
‘witnesses’ were reported to having seen
‘men of Arab descent’ leaving the scene.
Even after the perpetrators were discovered
to be White Americans—Timothy McVeigh
and Terry Nichols—many refuse to believe
that they were not part of a larger organized
‘grand plan’. Within minutes of the two
planes flying into the World Trade Centre in
New York on the morning of September 11,
there was widespread speculation of who
was involved. In fact the moment different
extremist groups started to call-in to claim
responsibility for the act, there was a
strange calming down: at least one knew
onto who and where to direct one’s energy.
One could posit that the confusion and
terror at this time was transposed to anger;
whether it was accurate or not is practically
irrelevant. It is this same need for a ‘master
plan’ that we see at any exhibition regarding
terrorism: somewhere in the room, usually
2
near the centre, one will find an
organizational chart. b For it is far more
comforting to believe that someone is in
charge, rather than the fact that an event
could be an occurrence without a
necessary, logical explanation. After all, the
madman is locked away in the asylum in
order to preserve the notion that the rest of
society is rational, within and under the
confines of logic, and reason.
And it is for this very reason that
after every act of terrorism, we hear a
barrage of jokes or conspiracy theories:
both function in exactly the same manner,
which is to provide an explanation for what
has happened. It does not matter how
absurd the explanation is as long as there is
one. The probability of one man being
entirely responsible for everything is not
high, nor even really plausible. Here
though, one can consider the register that
the operating logic for this explanation is
exactly the same as in all monotheistic
religions; after all, one requires a great
amount of faith to believe that reason
dictates all the events that occur. In this
way, the event is no longer left as an
accident, an unknown, and is brought back
under logic, reason, back into our comfort
zone.
This was clearly demonstrated in the
state of Singapore on 28 February 2008.
There should have been a state of
pandemonium: one of the most dangerous
men in South-East Asia—alleged high-
ranking deputy in Jemaah Islamiah—Mas
b An instance of this would be exhibition titled The Changing
Face of Terrorism at the National Library in Singapore (9
November to 17 December 2004), where an organization
chart took centre-stage. This was in spite of the fact that the
exhibition also noted that modern day terrorism is organic,
and organizations —Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah
amongst them—are no longer run like according to the
logics of traditional hierarchies.
Selamat Kasturi had escaped from the
Whitley Detention Centre. However, what
we encountered was ambivalence and even
mirth: there were numerous jokes
surrounding the escape ranging from his
name (Mas Selamat Kan-diri)c to how Prison
Break should just be renamed Toilet Break.
What these jokes reveal—regardless of
their actual content—is a desperate attempt
to find a reason for his escape. They
function in exactly the same way as
conspiracy theories; bringing us a perverse
comfort of knowing that there is someone in
charge—some reason behind—all things
that happen.
What we truly fear is not so much
what lies beneath (how can we ever know
this), but the veil that lies in between us and
the event itself: it is when we can see the
veil that we truly worry about what is in the
abyss. For the veil not only conceals
something—which is not so much the
problem for if something is completely out of
sight, there is also the chance that it will
eventually be out of mind—but more
pertinently, is a constant reminder of this
very concealment.
It is the tale of Ra that never lets us
forget that the power of secrets does not
necessarily lie in its content. When Ra was
poisoned by Isis, she offered the antidote in
exchange for the secret of his name; for
anyone that held this secret would also
share in the immense power of Ra. He
agreed and the secret was passed to her,
the secret of his real name: Amen-Ra.
c This is a play on words in the Malay language. Mas
Selamat Kan-diri literally translates to ‘Mas saves himself’,
which sounds very similar to his actual name. Another
popular joke in Malay at the time was, ‘where can you find
Mas Selamat’; the answer to it was “in the neighbouring
state of Johor Bahru, as there is a sign at the causeway that
reads ‘Selamat datang ke Johor’ (which translates to
‘welcome to Johor’ but could also mean ‘Selamat came to
Johor’).
3
However, when we consider the fact that
the secret to his name is merely an
affirmation of his name—I am Ra—this
suggests that the content of the secret was
always already known; after all, it was
common—if not universal—knowledge that
his name is Ra. Hence the secret to his
name was in fact an ‘unknown known’—
everyone knew the secret; they just did not
realize that this was the secret.d
This is precisely why hoaxes are
punished severely. It is not so much that
they are a waste of resources (those same
resources will be spent chasing a ‘real’ lead
that turned out to be fruitless), but that they
display all too clearly our inability at
distinguishing a real event from a hoax. In
fact, a hoax is a perfect instance of terror: it
has the same effects (fear) without any
possibility of ending. If there was an actual
bomb, it could either be defused or it would
explode: in either case, the event will end.
With a bomb hoax, the fear is always
already there; all we are waiting for—
endlessly—is the bomb to explode. This is,
as Jean-François Lyotard and Jean-Loup
Thébaud constantly remind us, “a blow [that
is] not struck on the adversary but it is
hoped that the blow will be borne by the
third party, the witness, public opinion.”e
The aim has always been to concretize the
link between the signifier and a single
signified. A perfect example of this is how
d The irony of the joke “Selamat dating ke Johor” was not
lost on everyone on the morning of 8 May 2009, when it was
announced that Mas Selamat had indeed been apprehended
in Johor; at that point the nature of secrets was momentarily
revealed: it is not what one knows that is important, but that
one must know that one knows. And even though Mas
Selamat has been recaptured by the Malaysian police, and he
has laid out the route that he took to escape, the reason for it
remains unknown; hence it remains a mystery to all.
eJean-François Lyotard & Jean-Loup Thébaud. (1999). Just
Gaming. pp.70.
the signifier ‘September 11th’ now has only
one signified—that of the events of the
morning of 11 September 2001 in New York
City. The fact that the date does not need a
year to it suggests that every other year in
history has been subsumed by this one;
there is no more space for negotiation.
What has been taken hostage is this very
space itself. As Lyotard and Thébaud
continue,
whereas in a two-sided
battle, my opponent thinks
that what I think and do is
unjust, and I think that what
he does and thinks is unjust.
Well, his freedom is complete
and so is mine. With a
hostage, I am applying … not
even “pressure.” It is much
more than that. It is the
social bond taken as a fact of
nature. f
What has been taken away is choice: one
no longer has any choice but to constitute
‘September 11th’ as a ‘terror attack on the
United States’; your only other option is to
refuse this interpretation. This is hardly a
space for negotiation, for thought: all you
can say is ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
This is also precisely why there is no
space for irony when it comes to the ‘war on
terror’: we see this most clearly in all
airports, where signs read—in one way or
another—that ‘jokes about hijacking, or
terrorism, are not tolerated’. In fact a joke
about terror is treated as if you have made a
real threat. This inability to divorce jokes
from a real threat was most painfully
witnessed on 22 July, 2005, when Jean
Charles de Menezes was shot seven times
f ibid. pp.70-71.
4
in the back of the head by the police in
London on the premise that he was
potentially a suicide bomber. g The reason
given was that he was displaying signs
consistent with a suicide bomber: he was
‘acting suspiciously’ (whatever that means),
he ran when the police called out to him,
etc. What this event displayed was not only
the complete inability to distinguish the
signs of a suicide bomber from the actual
suicide bomber, but that there is absolutely
no difference between them. In fact, by
displaying the signs of a suicide bomber
whilst not actually being one, de Menezes
exposed the perverse core of the Law: that
it is a sign system and nothing more; and it
is this that he was executed for.h
However if we admit that hoaxes are
a perfect state of terror, we would also have
to admit that there is no way of actually
combating it: the ‘war on terror’ is always
already lost: it is irrelevant how many
‘terrorists’ are captured or killed as the fear
is already in place. In fact if all ‘terrorists’
are killed—which is the fantasy of state
security—we are in real trouble; at this
point, the spectre of terrorism will forever
haunt us. Here we witness the wisdom of
gNews of this tragic event is widely available online. It can
be found amongst other places at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5173032.stm
h The fact that one can only be found guilty ‘beyond
reasonable doubt’ shows that doubt is the spectre that
haunts every judgement, that is part of every judgement.
This is due to the fact that each judgement is the singular
application of a universal law: this means that each
application is in exception to the universal. Hence there is
no reason the application of the law, and the idea of the law,
have anything to do with each other. However for the Law
to maintain itself as a universal governing idea, the paradox
where each application is potentially in exception to its
universality has to be maintained as its secret. Just because
everyone knows it doesn’t mean it can be openly mentioned:
it is this unsolvable paradox—this aporia— that hoaxes
expose; it is this transgression that Jean Charles de Menezes
had to pay for.
an old Cantonese saying which roughly
translates to, “it is better to have a known
enemy than to be oblivious and see
everyone as a friend”; the Anglo equivalent
would probably be the proverb, “keep one’s
friends close; keep one’s enemies even
closer.” Hence what has to be done is the
construction of a reason for the hoax itself:
this will allow it to be put back into its place:
if there is a cause for the hoax, then there
must also be a solution for it. In other word,
in order to appease our own fears, we must
always be able to see what is going on.
This is not to say that there are no
consequences for this simulated clarity. It is
Jean Baudrillard that continues to warn us
of the dangers of an absolute transparency,
where all things “lose their specificity and
partake of a process of confusion and
contagion—a viral loss of determinacy …” i
In this way, “every individual category is
subject to contamination, substitution is
possible between any sphere and any other:
there is a total confusion of types.”j
Each category is generalized
to the greatest possible
extent, so that it eventually
loses all specificity and is
reabsorbed by all the other
categories. When everything
is political, nothing is political
any more, the world itself is
meaningless. When
everything is sexual, nothing
is sexual any more, and sex
loses its determinants.
When everything is aesthetic,
nothing is beautiful or ugly
anymore, and art itself
iJean Baudrillard. (1999). The Transparency of Evil: Essays on
Extreme Phenomena. pp.7.
j ibid. pp.8.
5
disappears. This paradoxical
state of affairs, which is
simultaneously the complete
actualization of an idea, the
perfect realization of the
whole tendency of modernity,
and the negation of that idea
and that tendency, their
annihilation by virtue of their
very success …k
And not only is meaninglessness the
problem. By extension, everything can be
flattened, and hence, everything becomes
calculable, and is no longer singular; there
is no longer an irreducible difference in
humans, in us: we are all completely and
utterly exchangeable.
In order for it to be made clear—
transparent— it must be brought under an
over-arching logic: an Idea. Under that
Idea, everything else merely takes its place
under the network—every term (and
person) has meaning only insofar as it
relates to the larger Idea. We have all seen
the horrors of this logic play out most clearly
in Khmer Rouge Cambodia: under the over-
arching idea of “Year Zero,” one of the most
brutal instances of genocide was
unleashed. Of course it takes more than a
concept to kill people—an idea itself did not
result in the death of millions. However, it
was this Idea that formed the framework,
the structure, such that everything that lies
outside the boundaries, the premise, is
excluded, forbidden, banished. The
significance of the Idea is even clearer in
the fact that in Khmer Rouge Cambodia,
one did not even need to be guilty of
anything to be executed: as long as one
was labeled an enemy, one was
automatically excluded, imprisoned, tortured
and murdered. This suggests that as long
k ibid. pp.9-10.
as one could not be reduced to a sub-set of
the Idea, as long as one could not remain
exchangeable within the confines of the
Idea, one was beyond the pale. Instead of
George W Bush, it might as well have been
Pol Pot who uttered the threat, “You are
either with us, or against us.”l
The irony of course lies in the fact
that by making Osama bin Laden the
master-signifier for all terrorism, he is now
not only meaningless, but also can be—in
the words of the perfect seductress—
‘anything you want me to be’. For it is not
like we will allow him to remain
meaningless: our fear of the unknown will
drive us to fill the signifier with a meaning,
any meaning. And in this way, the spectre
of bin Laden will continue to haunt us. By
attempting to ‘wax’ bin Laden, by removing
the veil from him, all we have done is to
show ourselves not so much that there is
nothing to see, but more pertinently that
there is nothing that we can see. In effect,
we have made bin Laden a ‘known
unknown’—all that we now know, is that we
have absolutely no notion of what is going
on.
It is at this point that we reach an
aporetic situation: clearly if an event
remains absolutely unknown, it brings us
great discomfort, fear, terror even;
conversely attempting to know it too much is
l Bush’s exact words in his Address to a Joint Session of
Congress and the American People (20 September, 2001) were:
“either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”
http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920
-8.html
However, in some way, it is almost irrelevant these days
whether “you are either with us, or against us” is a
paraphrase, and not Bush’s exact words: we are in the realm
of the sign; as long as it is attributed to you, you might as
well be the one that said it—in fact, you are already the one
who said it.
6
also problematic. Here one finds the echo
of Samuel Beckett, we are left in a situation
where one has to both go on, but cannot at
the same time. The question that emerges
from this is one that is best captured by a
colloquial saying, “so how much then is
enough?”
In order to briefly examine this, it
might be helpful to take a small detour, into
the realm of freedom and happiness and its
relation with choice. For ostensibly, the
greater the amount of choice the subject
has, the freer, and happier (s)he should be.
If that were true, then one should be
satisfied with an event without explanation,
as one can then provide one’s own
explanation; however the fact that the
unknown event causes such discomfort—
and conversely the search for the ‘person in
charge’ seems to bring us comfort—would
suggest that the reverse is true. A detour
into three major political systems might
shed some light on this.
In a Fascist state, the subject is
denied all freedom; all power lies in the
hand of the one absolute leader—in this
sense, (s)he plays the role of the (Absolute)
Other, in which everything depends. The
subject is merely a part of the whole body
(in the form of the state): this is the
corporatization of the state and its subjects.
Hence, all action of the subject is a result of
the Leader: this is why Adolf Eichmann’s
defense in Jerusalem, when he claimed that
he was innocent as he was merely following
the orders of the Fuhrer is perversely
correct. Ironically, this absolute
enslavement also ensures the absolute
freedom of the subject; for there is nothing
that the subject can responsible for. (S)he
is merely a cog in the entire body, and as
such, the subject is not responsible for
anything, even her/ him self. So even if the
subject is punished by the law for something
in a Fascist state, it is not that (s)he is guilty brutal or disagreeable they may be—is
for doing—or not doing—something, for one effectively passed by the subject(s) on
can only be guilty if one is responsible for it, themselves.
but the fact that the Leader deems her/ him
so. The fact that the private and the public This ironic—perverse even—lack of
spheres are collapsed ensures the true freedom in democracy is due to the attempt
freedom of the self; one is accountable only of the subject at bridging the gap between
to the self and not to any external force. her/ him self and the other; by attempting to
know the other too well. By having a direct
In a Totalitarian state—the Soviet hand in choosing one’s own leaders, one is
Union under Stalin for instance—the other in effect having a stake in the leadership,
takes the form of the Party. In this manner, whilst being governed by that same
once again there is no freedom for the leadership. Hence there is no longer a gap,
subject as everything is determined by the a space, to complain about that same
Party; all responsibility comes under, and is leadership; after all, you were the one who
of, the Party. Hence the subject can always chose it. For a moment we turn to Slavoj
blame the Party for anything, even bad Žižek and his meditation on happiness, and
weather. Once again, a perverse form of perhaps it might shed a light on the
freedom for the subject can be found in this importance of a gap between the self and
situation. the other, between knowing and the
unknown.
In a democracy, the subject has to
assume complete responsibility for both her/ When exactly can people be
his actions and also that of the state. The said to be happy? In a
freedom of the subject is closely related to country like Czechoslovakia
the choice(s) that is presented to the in the late 1970s and 1980s,
subject; and in fact, the point of ultimate in a way, people were, in a
freedom, expression of one’s will and way, actually happy: three
choice, comes at the moment of election. fundamental conditions of
At each election, the subject has three happiness were fulfilled.
options: elect a particular candidate or Their material needs were
party, spoil the vote, or refuse to vote. But basically satisfied—not too
whichever option the subject chooses, (s)he satisfied, since the excess of
has already agreed to accept the outcome consumption can in itself
of the election. This, for instance, makes all generate unhappiness. It is
claims to Bush’s illegal election moot the good to experience a brief
moment the results were officially shortage of some goods on
announced; one can challenge them up to the market from time to time
the point which they are announced, but no (no coffee for a couple of
longer after. More crucially, the subject has days, then no beef, then no
to take responsibility for the outcome. In TV sets): these brief periods
effect, whether or not you elected that of shortage functioned as
particular person/ party, you are responsible exceptions that reminded
for her/ his/ their actions. By extension, this people that they should be
means that whatever legislation is passed glad that these goods were
by those elected to office—no matter how generally available—if

7
 everything is available all the It is the desire to close this gap that leads to
time, people take this the nightmare situation: for the logic of
availability as an evident fact freedom only works until the point in which
of life, and no longer one gets to choose. The freedom of choice
appreciate their luck. So life is perfect only when it is not a real choice;
went on in a regular and when the guidelines have already been laid
predictable way, without any out and the consequences are not real. The
great efforts or shocks; one nightmare begins when one begins to
was allowed to withdraw into believe that one can really choose: in this
one’s private niche. A manner, the outcome is never known (by
second extremely important definition) and it is at this point that the Real
feature: there was the other springs forth and stares into the face of the
(the Party) to blame for subject. The desire for false choices is
everything that went wrong, shown by the success of advertising:
so that one did no feel really choose between the hundreds of different
responsible—if there was a shaving creams; it matters not at all, for
temporary shortage of some every one of them is the same (but your
goods, even if stormy desire to choose has been satisfied; more
weather caused great importantly, the gap still remains). In that
damage, it was “their” fault. case, the question that arises is why the
And last, but not least, there Real does not over-take us at each election
was an other Place (the (since that is a choice)? This is simply
consumerist West) about because elections (and politics) have long
which one was allowed to ago entered the realm of simulated choice.
dream; and one could even This was best captured when the slogan
visit it sometimes—this place “Join the Revolution” appeared on television
was at just the right distance: screens in Singapore in mid-2005. This
not too far away, not too was probably the first ‘revolutionary-like’
close, This fragile balance comment ever seen on TV in the last 20
was disturbed—by what? By years, until it was revealed that it was an
desire precisely. Desire was advertisement for instant noodles (Koka).
the force that compelled the But perhaps this an apt reflection of politics;
people to move on—and end that it is nothing more than a sign system of
up in a system in which the exchange. One might as well have been
great majority are definitely voting for Obama or McCain, Ahmadinejad
less happy. m or Mousavi, Nissin or Maggi.n

To claim that everything is a sign

system—or an illusion—does not mean that
they affect us any less. As anyone who has
m Slavoj Ziek. (2003). The Puppet and the Dwarf: the Perverse gone to the theatre, or cinema, knows, even
Core of Christianity. pp.42.

Much of the thinking behind the paragraphs on Fascism,

Totalitarianism and democracy were developed in a n It was in a conversation with Serene Chua, on 27
conversation with Slavoj i ek at the European Graduate September, 2005, in Singapore that the Koka advertisement
School, Saas Fee, August 2004. was brought to my attention.

8
though we know that it is fiction does not Perhaps here, it might again be
mean that we do not laugh, cry, feel anger, helpful to once again turn to the modern day
outrage. So whether we are conscious of thinker of the revolution, Slavoj Žižek: after
our ‘suspension of disbelief’ or not, is all, no one truly believes the possibility of
irrelevant; in either case, the illusory nature revolutions anymore, and this is shown by
of the phenomenon has effects on us, all the constant nostalgia shown for the events
the same. of May 1968. However, Žižek continually
argues, in one form or another, that
Perhaps here we should respond to
the echo of Beckett and treat this illusion in a proper revolutionary
with irony; in this regard, it is not that we breakthrough, the utopian
should disregard the illusionary nature of future is neither simply fully
terror, but more pertinently, we should enter realized, present, nor simply
the illusion itself, and treat the illusion evoked as a distant promise
absolutely seriously. After all, any dispositif that justifies present
is hinged on the resistance of the subject— violence. It is rather as if, in a
why should terror be any different? If the unique suspension of
subject does not mind being disciplined— temporality, in the short
put under the logic of the dispositif—then circuit between the present
what power has it over the subject any and the future, we are—as if
longer? Hoaxes maintain their power due to by Grace—for a brief time
the subject maintaining a distance from the allowed to act as if the
hoax itself: it is this inability to fully believe utopian future were (not yet
in the hoax that allows it to continue fully here, but) already at
haunting the subject. In the case of a bomb hand, just there to be
hoax, the fact that terror continues to haunt grabbed. Revolution is not
the subjects long after the area is declared experienced as a present
safe only shows that the subjects both hardship we have to endure
believe, and do not believe, the threat at the for the happiness and
same time. If they completely believed in it, freedom of the future
the fact that the authorities do not find a generations but as the
bomb should defuse all the fears; present hardship over which
conversely if they completely do not believe this future happiness and
in it, then it would not have any effect in the freedom already cast their
first place. It is this partial belief—this shadow-in it, we already are
inability to decide whether to believe or free while fighting for
not—that results in the constant terror. To freedom, we already are
compound issues, this partial belief also happy while fighting for
means that the fact that no bomb is found is happiness, no matter how
tantamount to there always already being a difficult the circumstances.
bomb somewhere ready to go off; or more Revolution is not a Merleau-
radically still, that the bomb has already Pontyan wager, an act
gone off, and we are merely waiting for its suspended in the futur
effects. anterieur, to be legitimized or
delegitimized by the long
term outcome of the present

9
 acts; it is as it were its own
ontological proof, an
immediate index of its own
truth.o
It is this “as if” that remains crucial to us: we
must act ‘as if’ we are able to do so. In the
case of terror, we must take on the
Beckettian wager in its full profundity; we
must treat plunge into the illusion ‘as if’ we
are able to do so.
Here one can take a lesson from the
state of Singapore. Overtly section 377A of
the constitution criminalizes sodomy; in
effect—if not in principle—homosexuality is
a criminal act. However Singapore is also
one of the gay capitals of Asia. There is
practically a gay district in the middle of
town, just outside of the Central Business
District; this is no underground scene, and
everybody knows where all the gay bars,
and clubs, are. At first it would seem
paradoxical for that to be so. However,
when one takes into account the running
logic of the state—ultra-capitalism—this
begins to make complete sense. Since
surplus value is the aim of capitalism, surely
it does not matter if the result of a
relationship is surplus in the form of another
human life (reproduction), or in the form of
revenue (the pink dollar). Once value is
abstracted, the irreducible differences
between the two can be flattened. This is
not to say that anyone actually believes they
are the same thing; however, clearly one
can act as if they are.
In the after-math of September 11,
there was widespread panic around the
world regarding one’s response to the
o This was in reference to the utopian ideal of the Leninist
revolution and can be found in Slavoj Ziek.“A Plea for
Leninist Intolerance” in Critical Inquiry. Winter 2000.
www.uchicago.edu/research/jnl-crit-
inq/v28/v28n2.Ziek.html
10
possibility of a terrorist attack. Even though
most believed there was in reality no way to
stop a committed suicide bomber—what
defense does one have if the bomber was
already willing to give up her/ his life—
states had to do something in order to seem
like they were doing something. Most
states over-reacted—the United States of
America would be a prime example. The
irony of course is that by putting their
citizens—and anyone that was unfortunate
enough to have to pass through their
immigration system—under such checks,
and scrutiny, they might as well have been
terrorizing everyone; by attempting to make
everything, and everyone, transparent, they
have already taken away the “space of
negotiation,” and all secrets. The
introduction of the ‘alert levels’ only served
to exacerbate the terror; this means that the
spectre of the threat is ubiquitous and
unending, for even ‘alert level green’ only
means that the ‘level red’ was merely
waiting to happen.
On the other hand, Singapore had
an enlightened response to the ‘terror
threat’. In a walk-way between one of the
subway stations with the highest tourist
traffic—Orchard MRT—and a popular
shopping mall—Wisma Atria—a solitary
security guard was posted there. And (s)he
did absolutely nothing. The common
reading, and criticism, from the public was
that this was merely a show: after all what
good could he do. And this was how most
people completely missed the point. A
security guard does absolutely no good
when it comes to a suicide attack; neither
does any elaborate security system
(otherwise Presidential assassinations could
never happen). What this solitary guard
does is to guard the very idea of security
itself: to guard as if it was possible to guard.
And more than just that, whilst (s)he was
guarding the idea, everyone’s life went on
as normal—in this way, there effects of the
alleged terror threats were dissipated.
This is the acknowledgement of the
very nature of terror itself. What the
security guard does is to ensure that the
“space of negotiation” is guarded. When
(s)he is seen, the public is free to make
what they will of her/ him: even if one
constitutes that (s)he is perceived to be
nothing more than an object, one is still free
to interpret the object in whatever manner
one desires. Here one might invoke the
spectre of the gatekeeper from Franz
Kafka’s fable “Before the Law” in The Trial.
It is only the gatekeeper that prevents the
man from the country being absolutely
bound to the Law; the Law that he cannot
see, cannot hear, and cannot know about.
The fact is that the man from the country is
free to go anytime he chooses; it is the
gatekeeper that is bound to that spot, bound
to keeping the door open for the man, the
same man who is also free to step through
the door. The role of the gatekeeper is to
inform the man of the consequences,
nothing more. However without the
gatekeeper, the man would be completely
enslaved to the Law (which has somehow
drawn him to the door-way), as it would
become his Absolute Other, ruling him as a
pure idea, without any possibility for him to
even approach. Hence the gatekeeper is
the medium through which the man has an
opportunity to even begin conceiving of this
Law. In exactly the same way, the security
guard that sits at the entrance to the walk-
way is the medium between the idea of the
threat of terror and the people; by allowing
us to think of her/ his role, we are saved
from being plunged completely into terror
itself, we are kept from the absolute
unknown.
This is the same lesson that can be
learned from Wes Craven’s A Nightmare on
11
Elm Street series. Freddie Krueger’s reign
of terror over Elm Street is premised on the
fact that he can enter one’s dreams, kill you
in there, and you would wake up dead.
Hence the most dangerous thing that one
could do on Elm Street was to mention his
name; once he entered your consciousness,
there was always a danger of him entering
your dreamscape. In other words, Freddie
Krueger adopted the space of the absolute
other, the unmentionable; and of course the
more one isn’t supposed to mention
something, the more news of him spread
like wild-fire. After all, one cannot know not
to know something. Since Krueger only
appeared in one’s dreams the popular
option in Elm Street was to attempt to stay
awake constantly; this of course proved
impossible. The solution to the problem
was to take Freddie on his own terms; enter
the dreamscape and kill him there. In other
words, the people at Elm Street finally
gained freedom by re-appropriating the
imaginary for themselves; regaining the
space between dreams and reality.
This strategy is precisely the same
as the one that some people are adopting in
their resistance against state-tyranny on
smokers. By introducing pictures of various
diseases that are allegedly brought about by
smoking, states attempt to scare people into
quitting. However this is simply a futile
gesture as everyone already knows that
smoking is bad for one’s health. The
reaction of some of the more creative
resisters is to attempt to collect a full-set of
these pictures. One can reclaim one’s
imaginary space through a process of
creative (mis)reading; by reading the
stickers as objects in themselves—rather
than as a signifier for a disease—they are
turned into objects of desire.
This suggests that in order to
reclaim our imaginary from terror, we have
to learn to creatively mis-read all the
signifiers. What we need is a sense of
disinterestedness; where the signifier
should only be read singularly. This is
where we must take a lesson from
Aristotle’s judge in the Nichomachean
Ethics; judging singularly, making each
judgement in a situation, such that each
judgement is in exception to everything but
itself. And since each judgement is made in
a particular situation, a situation that never
repeats, each judgement is in effect in
exception to everything, even itself. Hence
the judge is always already judging her/ him
self as a judge in the moment of judging.
So in some moments, ‘alert level red’ should
be taken with utmost seriousness (run for
the bunkers), whilst in others, it should
indicate what clothes to wear that day. In
this manner, we save for ourselves our
space of negotiation with the signifier.
By seeing, but refusing to see too
clearly, or more than that, by refusing to let
any sign be shown too clearly to us. In that
manner, we preserve our imaginary,
precisely by allowing the signs to keep
some secrets from us.
Jeremy Fernando is the Jean Baudrillard
Fellow at the European Graduate School.
He works in the intersections of literature,
philosophy, and media; and is the author of
Reflections on (T)error, Reading Blindly,
and a book, The Suicide Bomber; and her
gift of death. Exploring different media has
led him to film, and installation art, and his
work has been exhibited in Vienna, Hong
Kong, Seoul, and Singapore. He is the
editor of the thematic magazine One
Imperative, and is also a Research Fellow
at the Centre for Liberal Arts and Social
Sciences, Nanyang Technological
University.
12
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