The Art of Deception 1

THE ART OF DECEPTION

Carl Grove

Deception, deceit, manipulation, coercion, disinformation, lies...

whatever you call it, it's a basic characteristic of human nature:
the use (or systematic misuse) of our communication skills for the
purpose of engineering some individual or group advantage. How
does it work, and -- perhaps more importantly -- why does it work?
Considering how pervasive it is, we should all really be on our guard
against it. And yet most of us, most of the time, fall prey again and
again, to the most absurdly obvious ploys. In attempting to answer
these questions, we will learn a great deal about ourselves and our
culture. Maybe we won't like what we learn.

We can begin by defining everyday, amateur kinds of deception

of the kind employed informally by mischief-makers, manipulators,
unfaithful spouses, and virtually everybody. Often the tendency to lie
to cover up one's guilt, or even one's stupidity, is so ingrained, and so
automatic, that we remain all but unconscious of the process.
Children do this as a matter of course as soon as they start to speak:
"I didn't do it!" "It wasn't me!" When they are holding the paint
pot and a dripping brush, denying that it was them who decorated
the new car seems pretty silly, so they soon learn to make their lies
more plausible. But most adults stay one step ahead. Isn't it odd,
therefore, that grown-ups will fall for deceptions that are scarcely
more sophisticated than those perpetrated by their offspring? If you
doubt this, consider a well-publicised case from a few years ago. A
prominent and much-respected pastor was found to have employed
the donations of his congregation to pay for the services of large
numbers of call-girls. So they threw him out, right? Actually, no --
when confronted, the pastor confessed his guilt, condemned himself
as the most despicable sinner, and begged the church members to
forgive him. There were lots of tears, hugging, and loads of
forgiveness. In fact, the congregation asked him not to go. You can
probably guess what happened after that....

That minister certainly knew his flock; he was giving them

what they really wanted, not spiritual truths but excitement,
sentimentality, and raw emotion. In return, they got the pastor they
deserved.
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In contrast, we can consider what we might call professional

deception, and here we can list all too many categories. There is the
accepted type of deception associated with entertainment -- we know
that the actors in our films aren't really superheroes or tragic
victims, but we accept the false image because it pleases us to do so.
We enjoy watching the conjurors doing the impossible; we know it's
just trickery, but we enjoy it. But -- it is all too easy to fall for the
tricks of the malevolent who know how to exploit the same
psychological processes for their own ends. Con men, the leaders of
weird sects, advertising agencies, politicians and their spin-doctors,
and propaganda specialists, all know how to appeal to the basic
weaknesses of their targets -- their greed, vanity, need for emotional
stimulus, desire for attention, sexual perversions, and so on. Even
motivation of a more acceptable kind can be exploited: the desire for
knowledge, success, and social identity, for example. If you give
people what they want, or promise it as a reward for the actions you
want them to take, you can't fail.

Let's consider a well-known case, that of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Forget the theories about "other marksmen" and just consider the
basic question: was Oswald a "lone nut" or was he acting under
control? If so, who was controlling him? What seemed, at the time,
an easy question, has become a complex, convoluted, hall of mirrors.
Oswald was no nut; he was a sensitive, intelligent and articulate
young man. If, as he himself claimed, he became disillusioned with
the American way of life and attracted to Marxism at an early age,
we have the first major question: why did he apply to join the US
Marines? Secondly, is it a coincidence that he was posted to the
Atsugi military base in Japan, where he and other marines were, it is
said, used as subjects in the CIA's Project MKultra mind control
program? Thirdly, is it also a coincidence that Oswald then decided
to defect to the USSR? Fourthly, isn't it also odd that Oswald
married a Russian lady, then claimed to be disillusioned with life in
the USSR (in a diary which proved to have been written long after
the alleged events, and which contradicts other evidence regarding
his privileged life in Russia)? Fifthly, a KGB defector, Yuri Nosenko,
whose reliability turned out to be virtually zero, made the amazing
claim that the KGB had never interrogated Oswald, never taken him
up on his offer to tell them about his knowledge of US radar
technology or the U2 spyplane, and raised no objection to his
changing his mind and returning to the US. Is all this extremely poor
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disinformation, or amazingly clever and sophisticated? On the

surface, it looks as if the CIA, finding in Oswald the ideal
"Manchurian Candidate" that they had long sought, had
programmed him to believe that he wanted to defect and maybe also
filled him with disinformation that they wanted him to reveal under
narco-hypnotic examination. But maybe the Soviet hypnotists were
too smart, discovered the truth, then reprogrammed him to denounce
Communism and return to the States. It has also been claimed that a
minor operation that Oswald underwent before his return was
actually the implant of a mind control device. But it isn't likely that
the Soviets would be so idiotic as to program him to kill Kennedy,
and when he did, they panicked and sent Nosenko, inadequately
prepared, for damage limitation.

So who actually pulled the strings? Rogue elements in the CIA

or some other agency? Organised crime? Why did the FBI fail to
keep Oswald under observation after all the suspicions surrounding
him? As is somewhat typical of a situation where almost all the
"facts" may actually be disinformation, we are left with a host of
unanswered questions.

Disinformation is perhaps the most advanced and sophisticated

form of deception. What, exactly, is it?

Disinformation is the name used for communications

employing a variety of media with the aim of provoking a desired
response on the part of their recipients. It is not simply “lies plus a
small amount of truth,” as some have suggested. A disinformation
package may comprise entirely truthful content, but presented in a
way designed to provoke scepticism on the part of its recipient. It
must, to be effective, take into account the mindset, belief system,
and dominant prejudices of its intended victim(s). Disinformation is
an art rather than a science; skilled exponents share some of the
personality characteristics of sociopaths; their detachment from
social relationships enables them to be somewhat more objective
about other people’s personality weaknesses, and makes them better
able to exploit them.

Disinformation would be less effective if people were able to

observe their own defects of thinking and emotion and take measures
to control if not overcome them. Unfortunately, all human cultures
seem to accept that language can be used to distort and manipulate
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as much as communicate. Children, observing their parents, are not

slow to emulate their verbal deceptiveness. Truthful people are
regarded as oddities -- why else would the story of George
Washington and the cherry tree (very possibly the invention of
Mason Locke Weems, Washington's first biographer) merit such
concern? But, as we pointed out above, childish deception is pretty
crude. It takes time to develop a more sophisticated approach to
deception -- time, and a certain type of culture, plus a natural talent.
Above all, to be a success in this rather esoteric field requires an
appreciation of subtlety. Disinformation without subtlety is just
lying, and liars are found out, sooner or later. The best
disinformation works through emphasis, context, exploitation of
human weaknesses, and the manipulation of expectation.

In fact, successful disinformation often survives every normal

test of "truthfulness."

The term "disinformation" is Russian in origin, and many

regard the Soviets as unequalled in this dubious endeavor; but they
built always upon some very favorable circumstances. In a
totalitarian society, where all media are subject to complete control,
and where the opportunities for intelligence services in other states to
discover even basic facts about that society are severely limited, the
disinformers have a truly unfair advantage. The challenges faced by
the purveyors of deception in open societies, in which potential
targets have access to other sources of information, are far greater.
Admittedly, the long-term disinformation program run by the
Soviets from the 1930s on was hugely successful in its aims of
convincing the West that the USSR was no longer concerned with
world domination, and that its military capabilities were far inferior
to America's. It was not until the CIA developed the U2 high altitude
surveillance aircraft in the late 1950s that an accurate picture of the
Soviet Union became available.

This is all rather complicated, so let's consider a simpler issue:

how a disinformation specialist might approach the task of
influencing an enemy during wartime. One technique, which was
often employed by the London Controlling Section during WWII,
involved planting fake stories in the diplomatic circle. At official
functions and parties held at the embassies of neutral states, Allied
diplomats were given short scripts to incorporate casually into the
general run of conversation. It was assumed, usually correctly, that
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some of those present were either sympathetic to, or in the pay of, the
Axis powers. The LCS wanted the message to sound entirely natural
and spontaneous. "I can't understand why we're not trying to take
back such-and-such a city. Churchill is more interested in opening up
the Eastern Front." This, of course, when preparations are under
way for retaking the city as soon as possible. The idea is to offer
what seems to be an unguarded moment, when significant admissions
are made. This technique is widely used, particularly when the
targets are regarded as not of the sharpest calibre. When an Air
Force officer blurts out that a UFO landed at his base last night, it is
wisest to take this with a big pinch of salt! I suspect that many of the
famous "disclosures" made in recent years fall into this category.

While the fake unguarded disclosure is often surprisingly

effective, its limitations are obvious. Too much detail in the script,
and it would be immediately suspect. So if you want to get across
more information, you need to use the medium of writing. The choice
of how to present written material is critical. Do you present it as the
disclosure of a disgruntled whistle-blower, or as an official document
presented through regular channels; as a short paper or a long book;
as an article "planted" in a provincial newspaper? Is the author
correctly named or fake? To whom is it ostensibly addressed?

Let's look at some specific examples of known and probable

examples of written disinformation to see how these considerations
pan out in practice.

The Priory of Sion

During the 1950s, a series of strange documents, the "secret

dossiers," were deposited anonymously in the French national
archives. They purported to describe the history of a secret society,
the Priory of Sion, said to have been founded in 1090 to promote the
return to power of the usurped Merovingian dynasty. The Priory
also formed the Knights Templar as its active and visible organ of
action. During key periods in Western history, the Grand Masters of
the order provided a hidden continuity underlying many puzzling
and mysterious events. During the 20th Century, the Priory
supported Charles de Gaulle, and continued to play a significant
"behind the scenes" role in European politics.

In addition, the Priory -- if that was, indeed, its real name --

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released various books, some technical, some popular, giving details

of one specific affair that took place in the small town of Rennes le
Chateau in southern France. A local priest, Berenger Sauniere, came
across some mysterious enciphered documents whilst restoring his
church. In following up the clues contained in these and in various
local monuments and buildings, Sauniere was led to Paris and
meetings with famous intellectuals and occultists, as well as other
shadowy figures.

Henry Lincoln, a BBC writer and presenter, came across one of

these books and became intrigued enough to follow the story up and
produce three major TV documentaries. Eventually, Lincoln and his
two fellow researchers, Michael Baigent and Richard Leigh,
wrote a best-selling book entitled The Holy Blood and the Holy Grail,
which developed the thesis that Jesus married Mary Magdalene and
that their offspring produced the Merovingian dynasty... In short,
not content with verifying much of the controversial information in
the secret dossiers, Baigent, Leigh and Lincoln succeeded in
identifying them with a dangerously provocative idea of their own.

Disentangling this nightmare mixture of fact, possible

disinformation, and speculation is a job few have attempted. Most
have adopted the rather naive course of rejecting everything -- the
existence of the Priory, its alleged history, and the Holy Blood theory.
I think this is a mistake. Early on I became aware that much of the
material presented by the Priory implied considerable knowledge of
esoteric groups in the Middle East and that, like many other bodies
such as the Freemasons, the Priory represented an attempt to
implant Eastern spiritual tradition in the West. But were the current
leaders of the secret society, especially its Grand Master, Pierre
Plantard, genuine representatives of the original order? Or merely
people reviving a defunct organisation? Another theory, that bears
little close examination, is that two or three Surrealist philosophers
decided to create the whole ediface as a kind of artistic creation! This
idea itself originates with disinformation on the part of Priory
sources.

One way of assessing the information is that of employing the

ordinary scholastic methods to compare it with pre-existing sources
of data. This approach was taken by Baigent et al., and it
demonstrated that the Priory had provided information consistent
with verifiable historical facts. Moreover, in some instances, as I
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myself determined, the Priory's allegations proved to be congruent

with extremely obscure and little-known facts, even when they
appeared to run counter to the text-book versions of events. For
example, the Priory's claim to have adopted the rose and cross motif
in 1188 led to a lot of criticism, because historians claim that its first
appearance was in connection with the Rosicrucian Manifestos in
1614. In fact, the first use of this symbol was by Abdul-Quadir Jilani
in Baghdad, a few years prior to its alleged adoption by the Priory of
Sion; and it was also used as a badge by Martin Luther, so the dating
is consistent. Elsewhere I have suggested that maybe the Priory -- if
it existed -- maybe promoted the "Rosicrucians" to distract attention
from a possible security lapse.

So the purveyors of information about the putative Priory had

access to certain secret or privileged information. In particular, the
Priory, and its associated organisation, the Knights Templar, seems
to have contacted some of the esoteric orders of the Middle East --
the Quadiris, the Masons, the Assassins, and possibly the Sarmounis.

On the other hand, the Priory certainly also employed tech-

niques of disinformation in its dealings with 20th Century
researchers. Baigent et al's follow-up to The Holy Blood and the Holy
Grail, entitled The Messianic Legacy, details the authors' perplexity
when confronted with a sustained onslaught of deception, confusion,
and outright absurdity. No doubt the Priory felt that their original
aim, of getting some good publicity for their organisation from the
British researchers, had been overshadowed by the furore created by
their theories about the alleged dynasty of Jesus, and were getting
their own back. Ultimately, critics of the Holy Blood conception felt
that the ludicrous story of the "surrealist experiment" somehow
supported their dismissal of the whole idea. Logic was stood on its
head, distorted, and kicked aside. Emotion took over, as it always
does, and the disinformation scored an easy victory.

What is the truth about the whole affair? The organisation did
exist, I am certain. It numbered a lot more than three or four
surrealist jokers. It demonstrated a measure of real influence over
the French media. It released, directly or indirectly, a lot of
significant information about esoteric movements in Europe. But
beyond this, we can say no more. The reaction of researchers to this
tantalising and puzzling phenomenon tells us a lot about human
nature and the subjective nature of scholastic study. Baigent et al.
The Art of Deception 8

did some superb research into the Priory but were ultimately more
interested in promoting their own theories than in finding the truth.
And it is this quirk of the human intellect, along with others, that
makes possible the success of disinformation. Always, people want
support for their own belief systems, and if disinformation appears
to support these, it will gain their acceptance. Belief systems can be
useful, to be sure, but if they lead to obsession, allegiance to crazy
cults, and vulnerability to coercion, they can create huge problems.

D Day

Numerous accounts have been written about the Allied

invasion of Europe and I am not going to attempt a detailed
summary. The military side has been fully documented, and we have
learned a lot in recent years about the covert operations that
underpinned its success. It is a remarkable fact that while the Nazis
were expecting an Allied landing in France, the actual site chosen for
the invasion, the Normandy coast, based upon strategic and tactical
factors known to the Reich, was concealed by some clever deception
techniques. Disinformation was employed to convince the German
High Command that the Pas de Calais and Norway were the Allied
forces' preferred targets.

The organisation which handled this work was the London

Controlling Section or LCS, referred to above. It was formed in
October, 1941, under the leadership of Col. Oliver Stanley. In 1942,
Col. John Bevan, a stockbroker with intelligence connections, took
control. Key members of the LCS were Major Ronald Wingate; the
writer Dennis Wheatley; Derrick Morley, a financier; and Harold
Peteval, the manager of a soap factory. Personal contacts and the old
boy network seems to have constituted the main selection criteria.
The LCS was designed to co-ordinate deception on a global scale, but
its main concern was the Allied landing plans, codenamed Overlord.

The organisational skills of the LCS were truly remarkable. It

oversaw a huge variety of deception operations: the creation of an
entire notional military force, headed by General Patton, and the
provision of supporting evidence such as radio traffic typical of a
large army, false reports sent back to the Germans by double agents
controlled by the XX Committee, and the planting of disinformation
on the diplomatic circuit, as mentioned previously. No detail was
missed, no opportunity lost to misdirect the German command. Full
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advantage was taken of the decrypyts of Enigma messages provided

by the codebreakers, which generated valuable feedback about the
Axis response to each element of the disinformation program. And,
as we all know, the operation was ultimately successful. We can take
the D-Day deceptions as an ideal model for a disinformation package.
What basic principles and rules can we generalise from it, and how
can we apply these principles in cases where the situation is more
ambiguous -- or less ideal?

1. DISINFORMATION

should relate to the victim's beliefs, preconceptions, prejudices,

and fears.

should be worked for. Information that is obtained too easily is

always suspect.

is best obtained by inference rather then being stated explicitly.

should appear to come mostly from sources which have previously

provided reliable information. Sources can and should vary in
apparent reliabilty.

should be concrete and detailed rather than abstract and general.

Small details add to an impression of reality.

should include "chickenfeed," verifiable but trivial information.

2. FEEDBACK

Feedback revealing the victim's response to the disinformation

is essential. This can come from agents, military intelligence, or
signals decrypts. In situations where there is little or no feedback, the
operation can fail without its controllers being aware of this. Often,
as in peacetime intelligence work, one is forced to deduce the effects
of one's disinformation from the target's own attempts at
disinformation!

3. THE BACKGROUND

If possible, the background should be one of confusion. The

emotional pitch should be high; normal communications should be
The Art of Deception 10

disrupted, and the victim given inadequate time for reflection.

"Noise" and "interference" should be increased to overload the
victim's thinking. The disinformation should appear to offer a way
out of the confusion. Often, a message can be overloaded with true,
detailed, accurate but irrelevant information, and the key element of
the disinformation hidden amongst this, awaiting the victim's
triumphant "discovery."

4. CORRECT INFORMATION

The truth, as Churchill observed, should always be surr-

ounded by a "bodyguard of lies." However, it is not just a matter of
keeping the truth 100% secure -- this is rarely possible. Rather, the
disinformation should be so configured as to make the truth appear
absurd, unlikely, or unreliable.

5. CLARITY AND CONSISTENCY OF AIM

In the furore surrounding the alleged defector Yuri Nosenko,

mentioned above, we see the problems caused by a disinformation
operation triggered at short notice in response to a sudden crisis --
the assassination of President Kennedy. The Soviets were keen to
distance themselves from Lee Harvey Oswald. Nosenko, who had
previously volunteered to work for the CIA, was offered as a defector
who had been involved in Oswald's case. But his claims that the
KGB had never taken an active interest in a defector with a military
background and specialised knowledge of radar seemed wholly
implausible from the start, and as debriefing continued, more and
more lies and inconsistencies and strange "memory lapses" led most
of the CIA handlers to regard Nosenko as a plant. By a strange irony,
the US intelligence community was severely damaged by the
Nosenko affair (although surely even the KGB could not have
designed their operation to achieve such a result on purpose!) The
FBI wanted to whitewash Nosenko, because the information he
provided gave support to one of their Soviet sources and would also
have got them off the hook for their failure to keep Oswald under
surveillance. The leadership of the CIA rejected the findings of their
own operatives and actually removed most of their Russian affairs
specialists in order to bring in people who supported Nosenko.
Nosenko, in fact, was later made a CIA consultant!

6. KEEP THE TARGET'S ATTENTION WHERE YOU WANT IT

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Like a conjuror, the disinformation expert aims to keep control

of his victim's attention. He can do this in any way he likes, but he
shouldn't be too crude. Stressing the key disinformation elements can
be overdone. Totally ignoring other factors can give useful clues to
the good intelligence analyst. A balance has to be found where the
false information seems more plausible than the true. It is vital that
the message is correctly targeted. Assumptions have to be made
about the experience and skills of the enemy analysts. Crude and
frankly implausible disinformation, such as the infamous MJ-12
documents, is clearly aimed at the naive.

7. IT HELPS...

if the victim is subject to excessive vanity.

if the target organisation is beset by personality clashes, internal

power struggles, empire-building, etc. (Fortunately for the Allies,
the Nazi culture embodied all these defects and more.)

8. EMPLOY NEW AND UNFAMILIAR TECHNIQUES

The LCS employed a variety of ingenious technical tricks, such

as life size models of air bases and tanks, and also novel ways of
planting disinformation such as Operation Mincemeat, which
employed the corpse of an ostensibly high ranking officer carrying
"secret documents" deployed at sea. Today developments in mind
control, psychotronics, psyops, and special effects technology has
given disinformers a huge range of choices in this regard. The use of
narcohypnotic methods makes it possible for the agents of
disinformation to be totally convinced of its truth, making the job of
assessing their reliability doubly difficult.

So we now have a good idea of what is involved in producing

disinformation. But how do we cope with being on the receiving end?
If we know, or suspect, that we are the targets of a disinformation
operation, what can we do, and how should we respond?

There seem to be two general approaches. One is the response

of the analytically trained, intellectual type. It is exemplified by the
initial reception given to Nosenko by his CIA handlers. Questioned
again and again on points of detail, policy, personal career,
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responsibilities, colleagues in the KGB, and his motives in defecting,

every contradiction and uncertainty examined in depth, the Russian
was the subject of one of the most intense examinations ever
conducted by the CIA. The outcome was a 900 page report which
documented the most thorough possible analysis of the evidence,
coming to the unequivocal conclusion that Nosenko was not a
genuine defector, and that he had been sent to distance Lee Harvey
Oswald from the Soviet Intelligence community.

The alternative response is to rely upon one's gut feelings and

personal intuitions, both about (in this case) the individual at the
focus of the operation and about the information he is offering.
There are advantages and disadvantages in both approaches, but
neither can offer any real certainty.

The problem with the intellectual method is that the dis-

information package is put together at least partly on the assumption
that its recipients will be using reason and logic to draw the desired
conclusions from it. Thus, in a sense, the use of logic may actually be
counter-productive. Moreover, one can only draw firm logical con-
clusions from a closed system of data. In an open-ended system -- i.e.
in the real world -- where possibilities are unlimited, one can only
deal in plausible but uncertain inferences. Most significantly, it all
depends upon one's assumptions about the source of the
disinformation. Much of the time, one is dealing in absurdly complex
and subtle interactions. "We know that they know that we know
such-and-such, but do they know that we know that they think we
don't know about so-and-so?" In the Nosenko case, for example, a
key question might be: "The KGB must realise that we would never
believe that they had no dealings at all with Oswald, so they must
know that this claim of Nosenko's will render him unreliable in our
eyes. Might that be intended to cause us to reject other things that he
claims that are, in fact, true? Or might they be telling us, look, we
know this is ludicrous, but this is what the Kremlin have ordered us
to do?"

Then, when you feel that you know what the enemy intends
that you do in response to his disinformation, what should you do? If
you fail to respond as he wants, that will tell him that you have seen
through him. Would it not be better to act in such a way as to leave
the question open, or to suggest that you have swallowed the bait and
await a chance to take advantage of this?
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The more intuitive approach may avoid these intellectual halls

of mirrors, but in the real world there are organisational and social
factors that limit what the individual can do, no matter how good his
insights. Rule by committee tends to negate or frustrate the efforts of
the gifted maverick, especially in countries where the consensus view
is respected. By the 1960s, there was no room in US Intelligence for a
character like the British counterintelligence expert Maxwell Knight,
the model for "M" in the James Bond books, who could reputedly
spot a Soviet agent by a species of ESP. Nor would more conventional
skills, such as the reading of non-verbal cues, overcome the obstacles
posed by mindcon techniques: how can you detect signs of deception
in a defector if that person genuinely believes in the information he is
providing? (In this regard, it is interesting to note that while most
people who came in contact with Lee Harvey Oswald saw him as a
polite and intelligent individual, albeit with unconventional political
views, some sensed something disturbing in his character.)

While few of us are likely to be the targets of a fully-fledged

disinformation program, there are plenty of examples of organised
deceptions aimed at general groupings in the community. Sects and
cults try to recruit people with a religious orientation and with
psychological or social problems likely to make them vulnerable to
the message they are offering. Con-men want to get their message to
the well-off segments of the population. Advertising agencies do
market research to determine to whom their clients can offload their
products. So we all need some guidelines on dealing with, as it were,
the less sophisticated types of disinformation.

Here are a few general considerations.

1. The disinformation is always intended to take advantage of our

personal and group belief systems. A good start is to observe this
process in our everyday experience: to notice that we tend to be
pleased or even excited when someone or something appears to give
support to our beliefs. This is true in all areas of life -- in religion,
science, philosophy, art, sport, politics, military strategy, sexual
orientation, the law, our occupations... you name it! First we need to
be aware of the pervasive nature of beliefs. Often, as in the case of
cultural and social belief systems, they seem so natural, so right, that
we just take them for granted. Sometimes it requires the shock of
having such beliefs attacked head on before we realise how powerful
The Art of Deception 14

they are. It goes without saying that we tend to accept information

which supports them and reject information that contradicts them,
making our reactions easy to predict and hence to manipulate. So if
your first reaction to a possibly deceptive message is to feel good and
to think "this guy really knows what he's talking about," -- beware!
If, on the other hand, you feel sceptical, and think "what nonsense! I
can't accept any of this," then there are two distinct possibilities: (A)
the message is telling the truth; or (B) it is disinformation addressed
to somebody else.

2. Closely associated with belief systems is emotion. Anything that

seems to support our beliefs generates pleasant emotions; we are
always delighted when we find someone who shares -- or perhaps
more importantly, appears to share -- our most cherished beliefs,
whether these are explicitly experienced as beliefs or not. But if Lady
Gaga is your favorite singer, this is actually equivalent to a belief that
she is the best in her field; likewise the football team you support, the
scientific theory that you endorse, the political party that you joined,
the thriller writer whose books you like. Conversely, someone who
seems to attack any of your special idols will seem almost to be
attacking you. The anger and aggression that can often arise in this
situation is, unless you have previously learned to observe yourself,
altogether astonishing. After all, does it really matter whether you
believe this or that, what team you support, what type of music you
like? No, of course it doesn't! But this ridiculous quirk of human
nature gives the masters of deception a tool for entering your mind,
pressing whatever buttons they want, and getting you to comply in
their plans.

But emotion can enter the equation in other ways. A liking for
emotional stimulus can exist independently of the question of
someone's belief system. And if you enjoy experiencing extreme
emotions, it doesn't matter whether they originate in perceived
support or opposition. The excitement engendered by debate,
conflict, and change can give you your fix. Jacques Vallee (in
Revelations) pointed out that if a mysterious stranger gives you secret
information about some topic of great interest to you (he is talking
about UFOs, but it could be anything, even national security) which
then turns out to be 100% wrong, you should dismiss and ignore any
future messages from this individual. But in fact, if you derive
pleasure from the feeling of being involved in exciting events, and
being specially favored by the mysterious personage, you will
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actually maintain and even increase your interest in his statements!

In the case of UFOs, this process can be extended almost indefinitely.
Large numbers of disinformation messages, in the guise of Top Secret
reports released by whistle-blowers, beginning with the MJ-12
documents and then continued in even more detail in numerous
"Serpo" releases, have engaged the attention of huge numbers of
people who mostly should have the intelligence to see through the
nonsense they contain.

The aim of such programs may be to convince researchers of

the reality of extraterrestrials, or to overload their attention with
"noise" and hence draw attention away from other possibilities, or
even to provide training exercises for learner disinformers. Again,
we can learn a lot about ourselves by observing our own reactions to
this kind of material.

3. A third major factor is that of the social groupings that, through

the accidents of your upbringing and your shared experiences, often
give you a sense of identity. Tribalism is not confined to third world
countries -- it underlies a lot of thinking amongst people who would
consider themselves too sophisticated for this sort of thing. But what
else can you call something that leads you to oppose some people and
support others just because some belong to your religion, your school,
your political party, your scientific associates, your street gang, your
football supporters' club... and the others don't?

It is obvious that cults and sects exploit this sense of social

belonging, or, more often, someone's lack of social stimulus. Equally,
they often rely upon the charisma of the cult leader. But, looked at
from the outside, the wild-eyed, gibberish-spouting maniacs who
entrance so many otherwise sensible people hardly seem to merit the
term. If you feel that you are being sucked into some organisation of
this kind, just remember that Adolf Hitler had bucketloads of
charisma and millions of adoring followers. And millions can't be
wrong, can they?. . . .

These three factors operate in everybody, all of the time.

Maybe we can't switch them off, but we can learn to observe them
within ourselves, and to distance ourselves from them at times. And
we can certainly learn to spot people and groups trying to take
advantage of them. Admittedly, if someone has reached a mature age
and still hasn't realised that all this is going on, he (or she) is not
The Art of Deception 16

likely to be able to do anything other than to swallow the bait, again

and again, for the rest of his life. (What is more puzzling, and rather
amusing, is to observe cynical and worldly-wise youths, who claim to
be "cool" and detached from the norms of society, but actually spend
their time and money acquiring every tatty product of the system
they profess to despise!)

Once we have observed that our emotions are being triggered,

we can try to understand why. If the emotions are pleasant, do we
feel an urge to follow some course of action? If so, is this the result of
some suggestion made by the source of the message? If the emotions
are unpleasant, are we being urged to do something that will make us
feel better? Sadly, we are so accustomed to being the victims of
deception that it seems almost normal, and it takes a real effort to see
just what is happening. And in a sense, because we ourselves have
lived in a culture where verbal gymnastics, twisting of meanings,
evasion of the truth, and downright deception are the norm, it is our
fault, as much as anyone else's, that we have failed to challenge them
or to avoid contributing our own lies and half-truths to the mixture.

The extension of everyday deception into a more extreme form

is a natural progression. The "It wasn't me" of the child becomes
"I'd love to help, but I'm struggling myself at the moment," becomes
"There is a KGB agent working in the State Department." In a way,
the human race is involved in a silent conspiracy to avoid the truth
whenever possible, because it's so handy to be able to draw upon our
deceptive skills at times. . . But when the manipulations and
distortions drive out the truth almost completely -- and we can all
think of plenty of examples in the "religious" field, for example --
then the distorted, deviant form becomes the consensus, and people
try to assess all information in this domain with reference to this! In
a situation like this, it's no wonder that disinformation flourishes. We
all expect our governments to lie to us, because they have done so on
numerous previous occasions; we expect our politicians to lie and to
avoid giving straight answers; we expect salesmen and advertisers to
exaggerate the merits of their products; we expect religious leaders
to claim supremacy for their churches. No wonder it's so difficult to
separate truth and falsehood; truth is such a rare commodity that we
hardly know how to recognise it!

So the realisation that something in a message has triggered an

emotional response in us is invaluable. A message that doesn't evoke
The Art of Deception 17

emotion is probably fairly neutral. A message that does may well have
a hidden agenda. Not always -- some people are just plain insensitive
and don't realise how upsetting, or the reverse, their comments may
be. But often, even in everyday life, people may be trying, possibly
unconsciously, to manipulate us. We need to be on guard against this.
But what actually happens? Most of us end up judging the "truth-
fuless" of messages by the amount of emotion they provoke in us!
How otherwise can we account for the success of advertisers and
wild-eyed preachers? Why else do the producers of films and TV
programs load them with as much excitement, joy, sadness, anxiety,
and, of course, adrenaline-producing "action" as they possibly can?
Emotion "sells" products, entertainment, music, patriotism, false
religion, and everything else. But part of the conspiracy is that
nothing is called by its right name: you mustn't say "emotion," you
must talk about "profound feelings," "spiritual uplift," "deep
insights" and so on.

So the first thing you need to do is to detach from this habit

and to refuse to let yourself wallow in a crude emotional response,
whether that emotion is positive or negative.

The second thing is to determine what the message is trying to

get you to believe. This may seem obvious, but only the crudest of
deceptions states it explicitly: "Believe this and you will be saved,"
"Believe these shares are genuine and buy them," "Believe me, I
love you," and so on. The more sophisticated the disinformation, the
more subtle is the massage. You will more often come across:

1. Hints leading you in the desired direction

2. A set of alternatives which invites you to pick one, in which

your choice is determined by emphasis, apparent plausib-
ility, appeal to your belief system, etc.

3. A choice between a limited number of alternatives, where the

true alternatives are ignored or passed over quickly

4. A choice where one alternative is stressed in an overtly

biassed or unappealing way, leading you to prefer the
other alternative

It is interesting to observe how many intellectual types, who

The Art of Deception 18

would reject crude emotional appeals, fall for some of these ploys.
Historians, for example, typically fail even to notice the use of disin-
formation techniques and are often astonishiongly naive in their
judgment. Modern historians, especially those dealing with WWII,
are often forced to take account of deception, because it played a
vital role in that conflict; but specialists in earlier periods don't
credit people in those days with the capacity to employ it. A serious
mistake.

When the disinformation consists of only one or two messages

it is not difficult to come to some kind of reasonable decision about it,
but when a more concerted long-term program is being run things
get more complicated: (a) you can quickly become overwhelmed by
the sheer quantity of information; (b) your allies may be in conflict
with you because of their different interpretations of the messages;
and (c) if a wide variety of media are being employed, you can no
longer be certain which messages are part of the package, and which
are actually from different sources. Bernard Newman's brilliant
book The Flying Saucer describes a clever disinformation campaign
to convince people of the reality of an extraterrestrial invasion, and
deserves careful study. It shows clearly how public thinking can be
manipulated by what appears to be a spontaneous debate; and how
the genuine responses of people to the debate can be recruited by the
deceivers. Eventually, a stage is reached where nobody can tell for
sure what is disinformation and what isn't. By keeping the main
issue at centre stage, much of the disinformers' work is being done,
even by people who are entirely ignorant of what is really going on.

Say that the deceivers are trying to promote concept A. The

campaign may begin with an article, maybe in a newspaper or
magazine, which may declare that such-and-such an issue is very
puzzling, and then go on to review possibilities B, C, D, E, and so on.
The way the article develops makes these possibilities seem very
confusing and inadequate. Then idea A is introduced, right at the
end, in a rather offhand way, but in such a manner that it makes a lot
of sense compared with the other options.

Now the newspaper prints some readers' letters in reply to the

original article. Most of these are genuine but one or two may be
planted, and a lot of these are supporting A.

The next stage will depend upon this initial response. Most of
The Art of Deception 19

the participants in the debate will be ordinary people giving their

honest opinions, and all the deceivers need to do is dripfeed the
media with a few key inputs to keep things heading in the right
direction. Someone may write a rather superior piece, claiming that
only the mentally-challenged would consider A a sensible notion, and
putting forward unlikely and absurd arguments in favor of B, C and
the rest. Someone else, with impeccable credentials and obvious good
sense, will declare that they previously disregarded A, but they now
see what a good idea it is, and back up their position with some
powerful and original arguments. These contributions will in turn
bring in more, and the case for A will gain momentum...

Most people, unaware of the behind-the-scenes activity, will

take the controversy at face value, take sides, and most will, without
realising it, have been brainwashed into a belief system revolving
around concept A. Yes, it will seem much better than B, C, D, and E;
but nobody will be searching for possibilities X, Y and Z. And this is
just what the disinformers want.

In later years, historians may go back and write lengthy but

naive accounts of the "Great A Controversy." No matter how
thorough their researches, and how long their books, no matter if
every single article and letter is studied in detail, unless they make an
effort to look beyond the obvious they will never have a clue what
has really happened. One can suspect but can never prove that disin-
formation was involved; one can connect names and organisations,
but the best one can do is to collect circumstantial evidence, and that
too long after the event to make any difference.

As an exercise, it is worth thinking about some controversial

issues that especially interest you, and in each instance ask yourself:
"Was my opinion on this matter really arrived at by independent
thought, or was I influenced by taking notice of other people's views,
whether for or against; or by emotional responses within myself that
I don't fully understand; or by social or family pressures?"
Discovering that you were influenced by such factors doesn't
necessarily mean that an organised disinformation program was
underway, but it can illustrate how easily somebody who
understands the opinion-forming process might organise the
information that you receive so as to get you to respond the way they
want.
The Art of Deception 20

So far, we have dealt almost exclusively with the spoken or

written word. But disinformation can employ all kinds of media, and
with film and television, the deceivers have the option of using purely
visual techniques. For an interesting example, let's consider the TV
documentary produced by Fox, Did We Land on the Moon? I was at
first impressed by some of the photographic evidence cited in the
program, and by the failure of the NASA spokesman to respond
sensibly to it. I was particularly impressed by two photos, ostensibly
taken from the same location, one of which showed the Lunar
Module (LEM) and the other which didn't. At that time I didn't have
a computer and I was limited to analysing stills I had copied from the
TV screen. And these certainly seemed to confirm that the
surrounding area was identical in the two pictures. Not just the hilly
background, but at least 20 identifiable rocks lying close to the LEM,
appeared in both shots. But when I eventually got hold of the two
photos (numbers A515-82-11057 and A515-82-11082 in the Apollo
Image Gallery), the rock fields no longer matched! It seems that
when Fox faded from the first picture to the second they actually
copied the rock images to it... not exactly honest. Moreover, by
printing smaller copies of the NASA images, I determined that the
hills in the background (the lunar Hadley Delta) exhibited a strong
stereo effect, indicating that the pictures were not taken from the
same location. Clearly, images offer the deceivers new ways of
manipulation through fakery, editing, and false emphasis. Computer
graphics provide immensely powerful tools for image distortion, far
more effective than negative retouching or cut-and-paste techniques.
Today, seeing is certainly not believing.

And sadly, the modern development of radiation mind control

technology and similar horrors, means that soon it won't be possible
to determine what is a real personal experience and what isn't.

However, disinformation is an art, not a science, and it is

defined more by the skill and knowledge of the individual deceiver
than by rigid rules and technically advanced machinery. What sort
of person is good at disinformation?

1. Someone who can be objective about other people. That is,

somebody who understands human nature and the quirks of
psychology (discussed above) that make us vulnerable to suggestion,
influence, conditioning, brainwashing -- call it what you will. This
knowledge may or may not be intellectual, but it must include a
The Art of Deception 21

measure of intuition. Great disinformers do not think their plans out

logically; the ideas come to them holistically, although they will need
logical thinking to develop the ideas in a practical way, and verbal
skills to express the concepts to their allies.

2. Somebody who has the skills of a good story-teller or novelist;

i.e. someone with the ability to take a comprehensive view of a
complex situation. Indeed, many good thriller writers were recruited
by Intelligence services in wartime, or even turned to writing after
having worked in disinformation programs: Dennis Wheatley, Ian
Fleming, Bernard Newman, and John Dickson Carr for example.
(Besides creating James Bond, Fleming is unofficially credited with
the idea of luring Rudolf Hess to Britain to make contact with
prominent aristocrats allegedly interested in making peace with
Germany.)

3. Somebody who understands subtlety. Subtlety is a factor that

can play a decisive role in a manipulative campaign, because the
more subtle something is, the harder it is to detect. Coming, as most
of us do, from a culture in which drama, excitement, and emotional
extremes dominate the media, we find that messages which lack this
kind of stimulus often fail to make any impact on us. Sometimes we
don't even notice them at all. In this way they can influence us
subliminally, like the short slogans that can be presented very briefly
in the course of an innocent piece of film.

Appreciation of subtlety is usually associated with an

understanding of the psychology and cultural background of the
target of disinformation. Here are some examples of the kinds of
factor that lend themselves to exploitation.

During WWII, the British psychological warfare experts

wanted to destabilise the German forces. In particular, they wanted
to organise anti-Nazi resistance groups. They knew that the extreme
patriotism of the German people would have led the soldiers to
oppose any attempts by Allied forces to take the lead in such an
initiative, so they decided to set up notional anti-Nazi groups which
appeared to be home-grown. Various attempts along these lines were
made without conspicuous success, but the most effective proved to
be an extremely traditionalistic, rather old-fashioned organisation,
which mixed anti-Hitler propaganda with vitriolic attacks on the
British. Winston Churchill, in particular, was condemned as a
The Art of Deception 22

disgusting drunkard, an utterly despicable character. Why did this

deception impress the German soldiers? The answer turned out to be
that while the average conscript strongly suspected that the other
alleged groups were, indeed, manufactured by the British, they were
taken in by this one because they found it impossible to believe that
anyone in England would dare openly criticise their own leader in such
an offensive way, even for purposes of deception! This was something
that the English, with a long tradition of violent and often obscene
attacks upon Kings and political figures, probably never anticipated.
It demonstrates how cultural belief systems can make one vulnerable
in unexpected ways.

American forces in the Pacific made similar discoveries about

the peculiar cultural system of the Japanese. They anticipated that it
would be difficult to get information from captured troops because of
the fanatical patriotism which appeared to underlie their incredible
acts of bravery in warfare, illustrated in such instances as the
Kamikaze suicide pilots. In the event, prisoners of war virtually all
chose to collaborate with their US interrogators, even volunteering
all kinds of detailed military data! Two factors seemed to have been
involved: firstly, the shame that surrender and capture created in the
troops, which led them to feel irreversibly separated from their land
and comrades. And secondly, having detached from one powerful
authoritarian system, they were anxious to find another to join --
hence their extremely co-operative behavior. The Americans were not
slow to exploit their new understanding.

On a more personal level, a knowledge of the interests,

opinions, and prejudices of one's target can make possible all kinds
of subtle tactics. If you want the victim to reject a certain idea you
can link it with somebody you know they dislike; preferably by
means of true and verifiable facts. This requires a lot of background
knowledge, of course. Or if you want the victim to do what you want
you can link your demand with some interest or obsession that makes
them open to influence. Professor R. V. Jones, head of British
Scientific Intelligence, urgently required assistance from a senior
official, one with a reputation for unco-operativeness. He made
enquiries and found that the man had a consuming interest in model
railways. Jones did his homework, and when he was shown into the
official's office and found him operating a large train set, was able to
convince him, through intelligent questions and comments, that he,
too, was a fan of this hobby. Towards the end of the meeting he
The Art of Deception 23

casually asked for the help he needed, and was granted it without a
moment's delay.

4. Somebody with a naturally creative ability, who can grasp the

relationships between large numbers of complicated factors and
come up with just the message that will gain the desired result with a
minimum of effort. Some of the best disinformation achieves almost
the level of genius.

Summary

Deception is a basic characteristic of humanity. Children

learn to lie at an early age, and gradually make their untruths
more plausible as they grow up. As most of us come from
cultures that pay lip-service to the need for honesty, the young
adult finds it necessary to distort and manipulate the truth in
such a way that outright lies are not involved. This ability to
employ verbal forms that have the effect of lies without
actually being lies forms the basis of much advanced
disinformation.

Disinformation has been used for thousands of years both for

personal advantage and as a tool in group conflict. Armies
have won battles by pretending to retreat (as at the Battle of
Hastings), by using "false flag" tactics, and by exploiting the
vanity of opponents. Secret societies and other special-interest
organisations have employed deceptive and confusing
messages to evade the attention of repressive governments.

Disinformation works by exploiting certain weaknesses in

human psychology. These are: the tendency to interpret
information with reference to belief systems; the desire for
group identity; and the excessive and irrational introduction
of emotion. At an early stage of human evolution these
tendencies aided survival, and so they have persisted beyond
the point when they became counter-productive. Because so
much of our personal and social life is built upon these mech-
anisms, it is difficult to distance ourselves from them, and this
makes us vulnerable to exploitation by people who do
understand them.

What can we do if we suspect that we are the targets of

The Art of Deception 24

disinformation? First of all, don't worry -- this is our natural

condition. The politicians on our television, the "born again"
preachers, the advertisements in our newspapers, even our
friends and families, all have their own agenda, and that
agenda is almost always based upon attempts to exploit our
weak points. We are all used to it, even if we don't always see
it in these terms. Indeed, we often feel rather uneasy if we get
messages that don't contain coercive elements! Secondly, try
to observe our reactions to the materials on offer and deduce
what they are trying to get us to do. Thirdly, if it is a possible
option -- do nothing. If there is one thing disinformers hate, it
is being ignored. Without feedback on your reactions, they are
deprived of a vital resource. Fourthly, if you feel you must do
something, at least do something unexpected, that might
throw doubts into the minds of the deceivers.

Postscript: Right -- or Wrong?

The following little story encapsulates the special difficulties

that disinformation is characterised by.

You arrive at the airport in a beautiful island in the South

Pacific for your dream vacation. On the way to your hotel, the taxi-
driver (a European) remarks, "The people here are lovely, don't get
me wrong, but they don't have a lot of time for the truth. Don't
believe a word they say!"

You take this with a pinch of salt, and forget about it. After a
quiet night sleeping off a long flight, you go down to reception and
ask the way to the beach. The receptionist smiles and says, "It's
down that road."

"Great. Is it far?"

"No, just five minutes away."

So you set off with your beach gear and sun lotion, but after
walking for what seems like an eternity you realise something is
wrong. Did that girl misdirect you? Why? You remember the taxi-
driver. Maybe he knew something.

Not only is there no sign of the sea, but the road has now
The Art of Deception 25

reached a fork. One branches off the the left, the other to the right.
Which is the right one?

A local wanders by and you ask him.

"It's easy, just take the road going to the right."

"Is it far?"

"A fair distance. It'll take you 20 minutes or so."

You remember the taxi-driver again. You don't want to be

taken in a second time. "Are you sure?" you ask. "I've heard that
some of the folks here like to kid people a bit."

The man is not pleased. "You have been misinformed, sir!" he

snaps. "I always tell the truth. We are honest on this island." And he
strides off.

Which way do you go?

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Baigent, M., Leigh, R., & Lincoln, H. The Holy Blood and the Holy
Grail. London, 1982. It is an interesting commentary upon our
rather superficial culture that the authors' theory went all but
ignored for two decades. It was not until a best-selling thriller
based upon it, and a blockbuster movie based on the book, hit
the spotlight that public interest exploded. Then came the equally
superficial debunking...

Baigent, M., Leigh, R. & Lincoln, H. The Messianic Legacy. London,

1986. The long-awaited sequel proved disappointing. Part of it
did detail further contacts with the Priory, much of which was
disinformation and confusion; but most dealt with more theory-
building.

Carrion, J. Follow the magic thread: The principles of deception.

Internet article, 2009. (Follow The Magic Thread The Principles
of Deception)

Epstein, E. J. Legend: The Secret Life of Lee Harvey Oswald. London,

The Art of Deception 26

1978. A "legend" is the name for a notional biography created for

an agent. A key study, written before the revelations about project
MKULTRA and its operations at Atsugi Base in Japan, where
Oswald was one of the CIA's subjects in narco-hypnotic experim-
ents.

Golitsyn, A. New Lies For Old (undated). A detailed history of Soviet

strategies of disinformation emphasises the role of straight-
forward lies in misleading the West about the USSR. The major
aim was to convince us that Communism was weakening and was
soon to be replaced by a more conventional system (ironically this
is what eventually happened!); a second line was to downplay the
military strength of the Russians and hence to discourage the US
from spending more on nuclear missiles. Clearly, when the truth
was totally secure, and the Soviets had penetrated large areas of
Western Intelligence, they did not have to be more creative than
this.

Keel, J. The Mothman Prophecies, 1975. See Ch. 4 for Keel's analysis
of the role of belief systems in UFO research.

Kick, R. (Ed.) You are Being Lied To. NY, 2001. A useful collection of
articles on disinformation in Western (mostly US) society.

Kick, R. 50 Things You're not Supposed to Know, 2003. An amusing

selection of facts suppressed by vested interests published by The
Disinformation Company.

Masterman, J. C. The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939-1945.

London, 1972. The definitive account of the work of the British
XX Committee which oversaw the information sent back to the
Nazis by agents who had agreed to help the Allies (as alternative
to the less popular option, execution). The Committee faced all of
the problems encountered by the purveyors of disinformation, in
particular, what to send as chickenfeed (true but trivial facts
intended to convince the Germans that their spies were doing
their job.)

Masters, A. The Man Who Was M. London, 1984. A Biography of the

counter-intelligence agent Maxwell Knight. Knight's abilities
were undoubted, and he was unpopular because even when the
USSR was allied to the UK during WWII, he continued to insist
The Art of Deception 27

that Communism was still an enemy. He was a friend of Dennis

Wheatley, the writer and disinformation specialist, and at one
stage both were receiving tuition under the infamous occultist
Aleister Crowley. During this period, Knight's girl friend awoke
one night to observe her partner looking out of the window. Then
she realised he was still asleep beside her. This incident led to the
break-up of their relationship.

Newman, B. The Flying Saucer. London, 1948. An account of a plot

to unify the world using a faked extraterrestrial invasion. The
author had highly-placed contacts in the intelligence world and
it is possible that he had some inside knowledge regarding the
flying saucer phenomenon.

Packard, V. The Hidden Persuaders. NY, 1957. The first major expose
of the advertising industry. It is clear that advertising agencies are
well aware of the three major weaknesses of human thought and
know how to exploit them.

Ranelagh, J. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. London,
1986. A monumental history of the controversial organisation,
dealing both with Project MKULTRA, the mind control program,
and the devastating effects of the Kennedy assassination and the
defection of KGB operative Yuri Nosenko.

Sweeney, H. M. Twenty-five rules of disinformation. A somewhat

misleading title; the article is really about dishonest arguments
in open debate, rather a different though related phenomenon.
http--www.whale.to-m-disin.html

Carl Grove, September 13th, 2011

 C. Grove 2011
The Art of Deception 28