CASES

IN
NATURAL RESOURCES

SUBMITTED TO: Atty. Ismael Manaligod

SUBMITTED BY:

 Sophia E. Matote
 Jonna Maye S. Canindo
 Maureen Margareth D. Eslava
 Sony Berth Daluping
 Eric Gonayon
CSU Ll.B- II
G.R. No. 79538.  October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.

THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL

RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:

On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it
was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species
within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the
municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.

However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development (Bureau),
Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in
Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and
nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum
order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena.

Subsequently, petitioner’s timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent a letter addressed
to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive,
citing in support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and alleging that it was not
given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations, but no
favorable action was taken on his letter;

Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly covered by petitioner’s
TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation under a new TLA
which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by
Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license. The latter entities were
controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17,
1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto
Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking:  (1) the reinstatement of its
timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos
administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development
and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and 
regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs
found in the concession area. However, petitioner's request was denied.  Petitioner moved for
reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request that the timber license agreement issued
to private respondent be declared null and void.  The MNR however denied this motion.
Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. 
The Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,
denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for
certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of the Bureau orders
cancelling his timber license agreement and the granting of TLA to private respondent, which
were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.

HELD:

NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of
time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches. Laches is
defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either
abandoned it of declined to assert it.  The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a
plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be
destructive of the right itself.  Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant, not those who sleep
upon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions
in 1983 and 1984.  Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not
deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the
time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. 
Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a
more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and
against public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts
will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the interests
of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public
policy issue of forest conservation.  For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion
possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve
and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of
utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted.  And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein.  They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require.  Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of
the due process of law clause.
BENGUET CORPORATION, G.R. No. 163101
Petitioner,

- versus -

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES-MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD

and J.G. REALTY AND MINING CORPORATION,
Respondents.

FACTS:

Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to Purchase (RAWOP) ,
wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims with a total area of
288.8656 hectares. The parties also executed a Supplemental Agreement. The mining claims
were covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) Application No. APSA-V-0009
jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claim-owner and Benguet as operator.

After some time, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N. Tachuling, issued a letter
informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims. However, J.G. Realty,
through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a letter to the President of Benguet informing
the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP. The latter alleged that petitioner violated some
of the provisions of the RAWOP, specifically on non-payment of royalties and non-fulfillment of
obligations stipulated therein.

J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP. POA issued a
Decision, cancelling the RAWOP and its Supplemental Agreement. BENGUET was subsequently
excluded from the joint MPSA Application over the mineral claims. Subsequent MR was denied.
Said decision was upheld by DENR-MAB.

Hence this instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner the filing of the petition with the Supreme Court is proper.

HELD:
 NO. the instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an improper
Remedy.

The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the “Philippine Mining
Act of 1995” states, “A petition for review by certiorari and question of law may be filed by the
aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or
decision of the [MAB].”

The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final
orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review. A quasi-
judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government, other than a court or
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-
making. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial
bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No.
1-91––“among these agencies are”––indicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or
conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not
expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.

The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from
administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.

Thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA.

Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has
become final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be denied.
G.R. No. 148267. August 8, 2002

ARMANDO C. CARPIO, petitioner, vs. SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS:

This case originated from a petition filed by respondent [Sulu Resources Development
Corporation] for Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No. MPSA-IV-131, covering
certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner [Armando C. Carpio] filed an opposition/adverse
claim thereto, alleging, inter alia, that his landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be
covered by respondent’s claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right to explore and extract the
quarry resources on his properties.

After due proceedings were held, the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau
of the DENR rendered a Resolution upholding petitioner’s opposition/adverse claim.
Respondent appealed the foregoing Resolution to the Mines Adjudication Board. Meanwhile,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the ground of respondent’s failure to comply with
the requirements of the New Mining Act’s Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Mines
Adjudication Board rendered the assailed Order dismissing petitioner’s opposition/adverse claim.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order which was denied by the Board. An
appeal was filed with the CA but same was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the Mines Adjudication Board
should be made directly to the Supreme Court as contended by the respondent and the Court of
Appeals, or such appeals be first made to the Court of Appeals as contended by herein petitioner.

HELD:

The petition is meritorious.

Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative actions; and the CA is prepared
to handle such issues because, unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule on questions of fact. i In
Metro Construction, we observed that not only did the CA have appellate jurisdiction over CIAC
decisions and orders, but the review of such decisions included questions of fact and law. ii At the
very least when factual findings of the MAB are challenged or alleged to have been made in
grave abuse of discretion as in the present case, the CA may review them, consistent with the
constitutional dutyiii of the judiciary.
To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB Decision
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
mandates that “[n]o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent.” On the other hand,
Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by this Court
on a “petition for review by certiorari.” This provision is obviously an expansion of the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court has not consented. Indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this Court would unnecessarily
burden it.iv
Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transfers to the
CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial body’s decisions, such transfer relates
only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the substantive and vested rights of the parties. The
aggrieved party’s right to appeal is preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which
the appeal is to be made or decided. v The parties still have a remedy and a competent tribunal to
grant this remedy.
Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.vi Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final
orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review. vii A quasi-
judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government, other than a court or
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-
making.viii MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial
bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No.
1-91 -- “among these agencies are” -- indicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive
and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not expressly
listed, should be deemed included therein.ix
Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129x as amended by RA No.
7902,xi factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial bodies; and the
CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has more elbow room to resolve them.
By including questions of factxii among the issues that may be raised in an appeal from quasi-
judicial agencies to the CA, Section 3 of Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3
of Rule 43 explicitly expanded the list of such issues.
According to Section 3 of Rule 43, “[a]n appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of
Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.” Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies even only on questions of law may be brought to the CA.
Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from
administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.xiii
Consistent with these rulings and legal bases, we therefore hold that Section 79 of RA 7942
is likewise to be understood as having been modified by Circular No. 1-91, BP Blg. 129 as
amended by RA 7902, Revised Administrative Circular 1-95, and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
In brief, appeals from decisions of the MAB shall be taken to the CA through petitions for
review in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
 Registration Commission were not sufficient to support an action for
cancellation of OCT No. 4216 and the derivative titles thereof.

the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the
community. Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its
huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed
however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and
contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative
of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the
deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.
G.R. No. 108619 July 31, 1997

EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch

52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Issue:
Whether the term lumber is included in the concept of timber in order to constitute an
offense as stated in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the
Philippines).

Facts:
The petitioners were apprehended on the Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan Puerto
Princesa for violating Section 68 of PD No. 705 or known as The Forestry Reform Code of the
Philippines. There were 1, 800 board feet of lumber loaded in two (2) passenger jeeps in
different sizes and dimension that were confiscated. On August 9, 1991, all the accused were
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Petioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information filed against them contenting
that, Section 68 of PD 705 does not include lumber because the wording of the law
categorically specify timber to be collected as to constitute the violation on the said law. He
further contends that, the law is vague because it does specify the authority or legal documents
required by existing forest law and regulation.
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not the courts to
determine the wisdom of the law or to set the policy as rest by the legislature. He further
asserts that the word timber should include lumber which is a product or derivative of a timber.
The position of the prosecution could result to the circumvention of the law, for one could
stealthily cut a timber and process it to become a lumber. On September 24, 1991, the lower
court construed the interpretation of the law against the State thus the motion was granted.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on the order underscoring the fact
that the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991
which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product
actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped
with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were
indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber
sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one point
to another. The motion was approved thus this case.

Ruling:
NO, The Court ruled that, the word lumber includes timber. The primary reason why the
law was enacted is to secure and maximize the use of the natural resources; the non inclusion
of lumber on the law may give rise for the circumvention of law. Section 68 of the said law
punishes these acts namely (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other
forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations. Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in
Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under
Executive Order No. 277. To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68
would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the
doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to
defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the
law.  After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumbers which, to
reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in
tautology.

G.R. No. 158182             June 12, 2008

SESINANDO MERIDA, petitioner,  vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Issue:

1. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though
it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer
2. Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705. –
Facts:

Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violation of Section 68 of PD 705
for "cutting, gathering, collecting and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over which private
complainant Oscar Tansiongco claims ownership. When confronted during the meeting about
the fell narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one
Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a
pacto de retro sale. It was later found out that he converted the narra trunk into lumber.

He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense
of denial. Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section
80 of PD 705. CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling, but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in
the government's favor. Also, it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his
extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR
permit.

Ruling:

Yes, The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure list the cases which must be initiated by a
complaint filed by specified individuals, non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of
jurisdiction from trying such cases. However, these cases concern only defamation and
other crimes against chastity and not to cases concerning Secti on 68 of
PD 705. Further, Secti on 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person from
filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

Moreover, here, it was not forest officers of employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but
Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez
cannot be faulted for not conducti ng an investi gati on to determine "if there is prima
facie evidence to support the complaint or report."  At any rate, Tansiongco was not
precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint ]before the
Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705.

2. Yes, Petitioner is guilty of the second paragraph of section 80, which is the cutting, gathering,
collecting, or removing of timber  from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authority. The court also said that the lumber or “processed log “is covered by the “forest
products” term in PD 705, as the law does not distinguish between a raw and processed timber.

A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 March 14, 1995

AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN petitioner,  vs. JUDGE RAFAEL B. OMIPON, respondent.

Issue:
Whether the respondent Judge erred in releasing the truck used to transport an illegal
lumber despite of prima facie evidence for violation of PD 705 as amended by EO 277.

Facts:
Augustus Momongan is the Regional Director of DENR in Tacloban City, while the
respondent Judge Omipon is the incumbent Judge of MCTC of Hinunangan Silago, Southern
Leyte. At around 10:00 of November 14, 1992 the police officer of Hinunangan Silago, Southern
Leyte apprehended a truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck was owned by Basilio
Cabig drived by Dionisio Golpe. After the apprehension and confiscation, a preliminary
investigation was done to determine whether there is a probable cause to engender the owner
of the truck and the driver guilty on the violation of PD 705. Despite of the presence of prima
facie evidence the respondent Judge ordered the release of the truck apprehended. Mr.Cabig
was charged against PD 705 but Mr. Golpe the driver was not included in the complaint.
The Regional Director Momongan filed an instant complaint against the judge alleging
that the release order was a violation of PD 705 Sections 68 and 68-A respectively, and
Administrative Order No. 59.Complainant claims that respondent Judge has no authority to
order the release of the truck despite the non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the complaint. The
truck should have been turned over to the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of San Juan, Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition as the same falls under the
administrative jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office.
 Respondent Judge explained that after conducting the preliminary investigation, he
found that Golpe, the owner of the truck, is principally engaged in the hauling of sand and
gravel and the delivery of hollow blocks, and the loading of the timber in the car is due to the
request of his friend Cabig. Respondent Judge observed that Golpe has a lesser participation in
the crime of illegal logging. More importantly, the fact that the complaint charged only Cabig,
respondent Judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, ordered the release of the truck
owned by Golpe.

Ruling:
No, The court found that the respondent order to release the truck owned and driven by
Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable. According to the RPC, “Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the
instrument or tools with which it was committed." However, this cannot be done if such
proceeds and instruments or tools "be the property of a third person not liable for offense." In
this case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut lumber, cannot be confiscated
and forfeited in the event accused therein be convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr.
Dionisio Golpe was not indicted. Hence, there was no justification for respondent Judge not to
release the truck.
Complainant is correct in pointing out that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized
representative has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered forest products
and all conveyances used in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws. The release of the truck did not render nugatory the
administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. Despite the order of release, the truck can be
seized again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to include the truck
owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has done as manifested before the lower court
or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents petitioners, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Issue
Whether children have the legal standing to file the case?

Facts
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children, through their parents,
claiming that they bring the case in the name of “their generation as well as those generations
yet unborn.” Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license
agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more
timber license agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and to protection by the State in its capacity as  parens patriae.
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop
issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law—and violative of
plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the
lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal
standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility”. Their right
to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the
succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future
generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to
the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.

G.R. No. 131270             March 17, 2000

PERFECTO PALLADA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Issue:
Whether a separate certificates of origin is used for lumber and timber.
Facts:

Sometime in the latter part of 1992, DENR received a reports that illegally cut lumber
were delivered in the warehouse of Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia Bukidnon.
DENR officers in collaboration of PNP raided the company’s warehouse and found a large
stockpile of lumber in varying sizes cut by a chainsaw. As proof that the company had acquired
the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of
Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give
credit to the receipt considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been
suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have
come from a licensed sawmill operator.

On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as
assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden
Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended. During the trial, the accused presented documents that the lumber are
legally obtained. This may include the certificate of origin. However, the court found out that
Pallada was guilty of the violation of PD 705 and the rest of the accused were acquitted due to
insufficiency of evidence. The case was appealed to the CA and rendered a decision affirming
the decision of the lower court, thus this case was elevated.

Ruling:

Yes, there should be a separate Certificate of origin. The trial court acted correctly in not
giving credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the lumber
held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin. For indeed, as BFD
Circular No. 10-83  states in pertinent parts:

In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and responsibility

for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof, the
attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this circular [is]
hereby adopted as accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers . . . .
5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber Origin
(CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as proceeding from illegal sources and
as such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and
BFD implementing guidelines.

The irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not
only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to
the same. The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the
CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned.

G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON ,
respondent.

Issue:
 Whether the information correctly and properly charged an offense and whether the trial
court had jurisdiction over the case.

Facts:
The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined
and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines. The information provided that Godofredo Arrozal and Luis
Flores, together with 20 other John Does whose identities are still unknown, the first-
named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging Corporation, conspired and
entered the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased
father, Macario Prudente, and proceeded to illegally cut, gather, and take, there from, without
the consent of the said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, 60 logs of
different species.
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information
on 2grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that
the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. Trial court thus
dismissed the information based on the respondent’s grounds.

Ruling:
The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut,
gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other
forest products cut ,gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any
private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority
under a license agreement, leas, license, or permit granted by the state. The failure of the
information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be
noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from
private woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente.
The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the
state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those
produced in private woodlands. Thus, ownership is not an essential element of the offense as
defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. As to the second issue raised, the regular courts still has
jurisdiction. Sec. 80 of PD 705covers 2 specific instances when a forest officer may commence a
prosecution for the violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
The first authorizes a forest officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest
without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the
offenses described in the decree. The second covers a situation when an offense described
in the decree is not committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee and the
commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint. In both cases, however, the forest
officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the appropriate
official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary informations
in court. Unfortunately, the instant case does not fall under any of the situations covered by Section
80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither
was the alleged commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in a
private land and the complaint was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal. As
such, the OSG was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the
Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the crime of
demeanour and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against person
charged with the commission of the crime. In short, Section 80 does not grant exclusive authority to
the forest officers, but only special authority to reinforce the exercise of such by those upon whom
vested by the general law.

G.R. No. 136142               October 24, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  vs. ALFONSO DATOR et.al , Accused- Appelant

Issue:
Whether the penalty imposed to Telan the accused is correct in violation of PD 705

Facts:

Pator Teala and his co accused Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol were charged with the
crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code. The accused while transporting pieces of lumber bound to Maasin Souther
Leyte, they were apprehended by the police officer and seized pieces of lumber. As a result
SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt covering the fifty-one (51) pieces of confiscated Dita and
Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of Isuzu cargo truck with Plate No. HAF 628. The confiscated
pieces of lumber and the cargo truck were turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property
Custodian of Maasin, Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially transferred custody of the same to
the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. The accused Telan alleged that the pieces of lumber were
cut from the track of land belonging to his mother in San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte which he
intended to use in the renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao of the same municipality. He
further contends that he secured verbal permission to Boy Leonor an officer-in -charge of the
DENR.

The lower courts found out that the accused is guilty in violation of PD 705 sentencing
the accused to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, which is two (2) degrees higher than PRISION MAYOR maximum, the
authorized penalty similar to Qualified Theft, and to pay the costs. Thus, this case was elevated
to the court.
Ruling:

No, In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita and
Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and therefore not premium
quality lumber. It may be noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by the appellant, a
mere janitor in a public hospital, from the land owned by his mother, not for commercial
purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of his house. It does not appear that appellant
Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any other pending criminal case involving
violation of any of the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended). In
view of the attendant circumstances of this case, and in the interest of justice, the basis for the
penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be the minimum amount under Article 309
paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods for simple theft.

Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended, is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant
to the said decree, the imposable penalty on the appellant shall be increased by two degrees,
that is, from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods to prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be
imposed on the appellant should be six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.

G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  vs. WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant

Issue:
Whether the appellant’s activities consist an offense
Facts:
Provincial Task Force got wind that a that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number
PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acti ng on said
informati on, members of the PTF went on patrol several ti mes within the  vicinity
of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City. On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with
SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about1:00 in
the morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal
Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass
by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.On June 23, 1994,
accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of
Section 68 of P.D. 705as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged that, on or about the 8th
day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler
Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest
Products Chain saw lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or
equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 atP25.00/bd. ft.,
necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities Accused-appellant
denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber
from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa and Elpidio
Sabal The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area
covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered
by the PLTP’s of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as
payment for his hauling services

Ruling:
Yes, Possession of the lumber without the necessary permit is a violation of the RFC.
When the police apprehended Que, he failed to present documentary evidence to prove that
he has the permit to possess and transport the lumber. All he had was the permit for the
coconut slabs. He even concealed the lumber so as to avoid it from being seen upon first
inspection of the load. Under the circumstances, there is no doubt that the accused was aware
that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber, but could not secure one and
therefore, concealed such by placing it in such a manner that it could not be seen by merely
looking at the cargo. There are 2 ways of violating Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code:
a. by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without licence
and
b. by possessing timber or other forest products without required legal documents.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of said acts. However, in
the second offense, mere possession without proper documentation consummates the crime.

G.R. No. 161798             October 20, 2004

PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner,  vs. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO, Presiding Judge,

respondent

Issue;

Whether petitioner has the right to retain the seized confiscated products by the virtue
of MOA regarding the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree
Plantation.

Facts:
 Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multi-billion peso pulp
and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds government-issued
Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and Integrated Forest Management
Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop
with the State almost 130,000 hectares of forest land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve.

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its officers,
rendered three Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001 and April 6, 2001
designating the petitioner as DENR depository and custodian for apprehended forest products
and conveyances within its concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the CENRO-Bislig and
petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) containing "Procedural Guidelines
in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation." The MOA provided, among others,
that field validation/verification of applications for Certificates of Private Tree Ownership
(CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the DENR, the local government unit concerned, and
petitioner. Pursuant to these Memoranda, petitioner’s security personnel were deputized as
DENR officers to apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used in the
commission of illegal logging and the forest products removed and possessed by the offenders.

In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner PICOP,

through its security personnel, had on numerous occasions apprehended within its concession
and tree plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances were kept in
PICOP’s impounding area.

A class suit was initiated among the members of UFAB asking for preliminary mandatory
Injunction. They further asked for the declaration of the memoranda null and void and sought
to restrain the DENR and those who are participants from enforcing the said memoranda. The
RTC ordered Elias R. Seraspio, Jr. to recall, withdraw and abrogate the enforcement of the
assailed Memorandum dated February 16, 2001 and to refrain and desist from implementation.
Petitioner was also ordered to release the confiscated falcata logs and vehicles to the owners
thereof, or to the CENRO-Bislig or the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur,
where the administrative and criminal proceedings were ongoing.

Ruling:

Petitioner had no right or interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and
conveyances. Petitioner’s compound was used only as a depository for the confiscated logs and
conveyances by virtue of the Memorandum. While it claimed that some of the confiscated
forest products may have come from its concession area, petitioner admitted that the
ownership of the confiscated products was still to be determined in the cases pending either at
the CENRO-Bislig or at the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur. Hence,
petitioner’s interest in the confiscated forest products was merely contingent and cannot be
material as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner contends that private respondents’ intrusion was in violation of petitioner’s PTLA No.
47 and IFMA No. 35. These license agreements gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage
and develop forest lands, and recognized petitioner as owner of the trees and other products in
the concession area. In filing this petition, petitioner is merely defending its subsisting
proprietary interest pursuant to these license agreements.

It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to protect in the confiscated forest
products and conveyances. It has no subsisting proprietary interest, as borne out by its licensing
agreements, which need to be protected by annulling the writ of injunction issued by the trial
court. Petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the apprehended logs and
conveyances by virtue of its being designated a depository of the DENR pursuant to the assailed
Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner merely holds the confiscated products and
conveyances in custody for the DENR while the administrative or criminal proceedings
regarding said products are pending.
GR NO. 152989. September 4, 2002

Roldan, Jr. petitioner v. Hon, Madrona et.al. respondents

Issue:

a. Whether a person who cuts trees for his own use within his property without the
necessary permit from the DENR and without transporting the same outside said property, be
criminally charged for violating PD 705?
b. Whether the owner of a private property is administratively liable under Section 14 of
DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport the logs out
of his property and used them for his own agricultural purposes.
Facts:

On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources for him to cut some trees for a proposed
road and poultry farm in his property. He also paid all the fees required by the various
government agencies. While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was allegedly
informed by some employees from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) that he could proceed with the cutting of trees even though his application was still
awaiting approval. Consequently, petitioner proceeded with the cutting of trees and bulldozing
of the roadway.  He used the cut logs as materials to build his chicken cages. About three weeks
later, representatives of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and personnel from the Intelligence
Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided petitioner’s place,
allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory of the cut trees was conducted there were
872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506 board feet) and three felled timber logs with a total
market value of P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.

Ruling:
a. Yes, Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear that the violators of
the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft. As to the assertion that his
penalty for cutting trees in his own land should not be equated with that for qualified theft,
suffice it to say that the judiciary is never concerned with the wisdom of the law. Whether or
not the legislature was correct in imposing on violators of PD 705 a penalty equal to that
imposable on those guilty of qualified theft is a question beyond the power of the Court to
resolve. It is a settled rule that the fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law regardless
of who may be affected, even if the law is harsh - dura lex sed lex
 Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the “Revised Guidelines in the Issuance
of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private Land Timber Permit,” provides:
SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-wood products
covered by these regulations which are transported without the prescribed
documents shall be considered illegal and, therefore, subject to confiscation in
favor of the government and shall be disposed in accordance with laws, rules
and regulations governing the matter.

b. No, The rule is clear. The aforementioned administrative order considers the mere act
of transporting any wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as an offense
which is subject to the penalties provided for by law.
G.R. No. 184098             November 25, 2008

AMADO TAOPA, petitioner,  vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Issue:

Whether the penalty imposed against the petitioner is correct in violation of PD 705

Facts:

On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of

Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver,
Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On
investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the
owners of the seized lumber Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment.
After trial on the merits, the RTC found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt. Only
Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted
but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.The dispositive portion of the CA decision read:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with respect to accused-

appellant Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on reasonable doubt,
and MODIFIEDwith respect to accused-appellants Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco by
reducing the penalty imposed on them to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum

Ruling:

NO, Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft. The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and
possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630. Following
Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day to
20 years plus an additional period of four years for the excess of P47,630.

The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence imposable on Taopa shall be the
penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be
anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
 The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the medium period
of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 16 years, five months and 11 days
to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may
be anywhere between 16 years, five months and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22 years, two
months and 21 days of reclusion perpetua.

G.R. No. 175289               August 31, 2011

CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN et.al , Petitioners,  . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Isuue:

Whether mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest
laws and regulations makes one automatically liable even criminal intent in violation of Section
68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended.

Facts:

In a Criminal Complaint filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan
de Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest Protection and Law
Enforcement Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay
Captain Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and
Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended
by Executive Order No. 277. The respondents were guilty of gathering and possessing sixty-
three (63) pieces flitches of varying sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of
Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued at P108,150.00, without
any authority and supporting documents as required under existing forest laws and regulation
to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Ruling:

Yes, As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such,
criminal intent is not an essential element. There is no dispute that petitioners were in
constructive possession of the timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin and
Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without any license
or permit issued by any competent authority. Given these and considering that the offense is
malum prohibitum, petitioners’ contention that the possession of the illegally cut timber was
not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.
CA-G.R. SP. No. 80927. February 4, 2005

LT. RODELLO B. LARAYA, PN, et.al., petitioners, vs. HON. PERFECTO E. PE, RTC of
Palawan,respondent.

Issue:

Whether the Respondent Judge acted in excess of his Jurisdiction or with Grave Abuse
Of Discretion when he allowed the Re-Opening Of Pre-Trial For Purposes Of Plea-Bargaining
without The consent of the Complainants and Contrary to Section 2, Rule 116 Of The Revised
Rules On Criminal Procedure, As Amended.

Facts:

It was on 12 September 2002, thirty eight (38) Chinese nationals on board their fishing
vessels were caught within the Malampaya Natural Gas Platform Project Exclusive Zone, in El
Nido, Palawan in the act of illegal fishing. Hundreds of kilos of Groupers (locally known, as
Lapu-Lapu), Wrasse (locally known, as Mameng) and Snappers (locally known, as Maya-Maya)
were found in the said fishing vessels found within the vessels, among others, were powders
and pillets, suspected to be noxious substances or component ingredients of explosives. A
bottle of home-made dynamite was also retrieved. A criminal complaint was filed against the
accused-private respondents for the violation of Republic Act No. 8550, otherwise known as the
Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, specifically, Section 87 (Poaching) and Section 88 (Fishing
through Explosives, Noxious or Poisonous Substances) of the said Act.

Subsequently, criminal informations for violation of Republic Act No. 8550 were filed
against all 38 Chinese nationals with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. All of the accused-
private respondents thereafter pleaded not guilty to the charges on 07 May 2003.

During the pre-trial of the criminal cases, counsel for the accused-private respondents
manifested their intention to enter into plea bargaining by entering a plea of guilty to a lesser
offense under paragraph 2 of Section 88 of Republic Act 8550. However, the then prosecuting
officer of the cases, Provincial Prosecutor Alen Ross B. Rodriguez did not accede
 After prosecution presented its first witness and initial cross-examination was
conducted by the counsel for the defense, or after only two hearing dates, however, Provincial
Prosecutor Alen Ross B. Rodriguez manifested his intention to inhibit from further prosecuting
the criminal cases. Continuation of the trial was, hence, rescheduled the following day.

On 16 July 2003, with the appearance of a new prosecutor, counsel for the defense
asked the court to re-open the pre-trial stage of the criminal cases and reiterated the accused-
private respondent’s earlier intention of availing plea bargaining. This time, the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office, represented by Prosecutor Olegario Cayetano, Jr., did not object. On the
contrary, Prosecutor Cayetano manifested that the government was amenable to re-open pre-
trial for the purpose of plea-bargaining. Consequently, the trial court ordered the re-opening of
the pre-trial.

During the re-opened pre-trial stage, all the accused-private respondents through their counsel
plead guilty to violation of Paragraph 2, Section 88 of Republic Act 8550. The public prosecutor
interposed no objection with the change of plea and informed the court that the prosecutor’s
conformity with the plea bargaining was in consonance with the directive of the Chief State
Prosecutor

Ruling:

NO, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides:

“SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial and
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
XXX                                                       XXX                                                 
XXX”

Hence, for the herein petitioners to lodge the instant action, they must first be “a
person aggrieved”, otherwise, they would be without legal standing to pursue this legal
recourse. That having been said, this Court rules that the herein petitioners are not persons
aggrieved by the assailed decision of the trial court in the subject criminal cases. It is
elementary in criminal law that a crime is an offense against the State, and is hence prosecuted
in the name of the People of the Philippines. For this reason, Section 5 of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “all criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
prosecutor.” Furthermore, Section 1 of P.D. 1275, provides the exclusive domain of the
prosecutory arm of the government as how best to deal with the prosecution of criminal cases.
Hence, any grievance in course thereof affecting the interest of the State must proceed only
from such an arm of the government.

A.M. No. MTJ- 03- 1487. December 1, 2003

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF GUINDULMAN, BOHOL, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MANUEL A. DE

CASTRO, Acting Presiding Judge, MCTC, Guindulman-Duero,
Bohol, respondent.

Issue:

Whether the respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law for not imposing
the proper penalty provided for in Sec. 90, R.A. No. 8550, otherwise known as The Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998.

Facts:

It was on May 17, 2002 when lawmen apprehended a boat captain and eight crew
members of the fishing boat B/B Junida-J who were fishing within the vicinity of the municipal
waters and fish sanctuary of Basdio, Guindulman, Bohol with a ring net (known locally as
“licom”).  Charges for violation of Sections 86, 90 and 96 of Republic Act No. 8550 were
immediately filed with the MCTC, Guindulman-Duero, Bohol, presided over in an acting capacity
by Judge Manuel A. de Castro.  In the morning of the very next day, a Saturday, two of the
accused, namely: Narciso J. Jusay, Jr. (boat owner) and Rolando T. Amistoso (boat captain) were
released from detention upon order of respondent.  It appears that respondent held a court
session on May 18, 2002, despite the fact that it was a Saturday, and proceeded to arraign both
accused who pleaded guilty. The respondent judge exaggerated the speedy disposition of the
case commanding the accused to pay five thousand pesos and further commanded to return
the alleged impounded boats to the accused. Surprised by such turn of events, the Sangguniang
Bayan passed a resolution for the further investigation on the action of respondent judge about
the crime charged against the accused and a copy thereof was received by the Office of the
Chief Justice, Supreme Court on June 25, 2002. 

Ruling:

Yes, the respondent Judge committed a grave ignorance of the law and violation of
circulars issued by the court when he tried a case in Saturday. The respondent judge
impudently misused his authority to impose the penalty under the law which it cannot be
countenanced.  If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law, there will not only
be confusion in the administration of justice but even also oppressive disregard of the basic
requirements of due process. The observance of the law, which he is bound to know is required
of every judge.  When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;
anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.  A judge should be
the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.  It is a pressing responsibility of
judges to keep abreast with the law and the changes therein for ignorance of the law, which
everyone is bound to know, excuses no one, not even judges.  Indeed, it has been said that --
when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. 

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1430.  September 8, 2003

SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ROMEO B. SENSON, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERIBERTO M.

PANGILINAN, MTCC, PUERTO PRINCESA CITY,
respondent.

Issue:
 Whether the decision of the respondent judge is correct in approving the Urgent motion
for custody of Fishing Net.

Facts:

On 14 March 2000, several persons were apprehended for violation of Section 86 of

Republic Act No. 8550, also known as “The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998” by members of
the Philippine National Police.  The items seized from those arrested included (a) 1 unit fish net,
(b) 36 units lights (300 watts), (c) 1 unit light (500 watts), (d) 1 unit buoy, (e) 7 containers, (f) 7
plastic container boxes, (g) 4 styropore boxes, and (h) 10 boxes of fish.  On the same day,
Criminal Case No.15019 against them was filed.  Three days later, Danilo Alayon and Norma
Villarosa, asserting to be the co-owners of the M/B King Fisher that was used in the illegal
fishing activity, filed an “Urgent Motion for Custody of Fishing Net,” alleging that the fish net
which costs “no less than P600,000.00” was left unattended at the beach exposed to the
elements and movements of the sea which could cause its early deterioration and ultimate
loss.  Respondent Judge, despite the vigorous objection of the public prosecutor, granted the
motion in part, to the following effect -

“To obviate their possible loss, destruction and/or deterioration, pending resolution of the
above-captioned case, the apprehending officers or whoever has the custody, are ordered to
cause the immediate turnover of the following items to movants who undertake to produce the
same whenever needed in court, as they can only be properly confiscated in favor of the
government upon conviction of the accused.

The respondent contended that Republic Act No. 8550, the law under which the accused
were charged with having transgressed, did not provide for the seizure of the fishing
paraphernalia pending trial and that the prosecution still could prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt even without the evidence being presented since it had sufficient
witnesses for the purpose.

Ruling:

No, the seizure of the fishing paraphernalia has been made as being an incident to a
lawful arrest.  Rule 127, Section 12, of the Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 12.  Search incident to lawful arrest.- A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.”

G.R. No. 132451 December 17, 1999

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, petitioner,  vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity
as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in
his capacity as the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX
PHILIPPINES INC., PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP.
and PETRON CORP., respondents.

Issue:

Whether the exclusion of Section 19 (setting the time of full deregulation of oil law) on
RA 8479 made by the congress makes the law unconstitutional.

Facts:

November 5, 1997, this Court in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of

Energy and Lagman, et al., v. Hon.Ruben Torres, et al., declared Republic Act No. 8180, entitled
"An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes", unconstitutional,
and its implementing Executive Order No. 392 void. R.A. 8180 was struck down as invalid
because three key provisions intended to promote free competition were shown to achieve the
opposite result. More specifically, this Court ruled that its provisions on tariff differential,
stocking of inventories, and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic
power, and interfere with the free interaction of the market forces.

As a result of the Tatad decision, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8479, a new
deregulation law without the offending provisions of the earlier law. Petitioner Enrique T.
Garcia, a member of Congress, has brought the petition seeking to declare Section 19 thereof,
which sets the time of full deregulation, unconstitutional. After failing in his attempts to have
Congress incorporate in the law the economic theory he espouses, petitioner asks the court, in
the name of upholding the Constitution, to undo a violation which he claims Congress has
committed.

Ruling:

No, It bears stressing that R.A. 8180 was declared invalid not because deregulation is
unconstitutional. The law was struck down because, as crafted, three key provisions plainly
encouraged the continued existence if not the proliferation of the constitutionally proscribed
evils of monopoly and restraint of trade. It is not the function of the Court to safeguard the
members of the congress on what law they will enact because this is the exact tenet on the
encroachment of power as stipulated on the principle of separation of power. The court as a
whole, respects the laws legislate by the congress. The validity of such laws, may only be
impugned if it violates the Constitution. In the case at bar, the Constitution perse was not
violated nor ridiculed.
G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE

HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC.
and CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF
BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents. 

Issue:

Whether the Local Government Code Code of 1991 repealed the Charter of Laguna Lake
Developmental Authority (RA NO. 4850) in the issuance of fish pen permits and other related
activity involving Laguna de Bay.

Facts:

This is a petition made by Laguna Lake Development Authority to declare an exclusive

power on the regulation of issuing a fish open permits over the businessmen engage in the
Laguna de bay. The power to issue a permit was then transferred to the office of the mayor on
the different municipalities of Laguna thus making the Laguna de bay crowded and unhealthy
for living of natural resources and danger to the livelihood among the folks of Laguna.

Ruling:

No, the court holds that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily
repeal the laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water
rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government Code of 1991
does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the
Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments.

It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority
constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a
general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which
is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in
this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not
repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the
intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to
include the cases embraced in the special law."  

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special
law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication.Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the
Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.

G.R. No. L-68474 February 11, 1986

NUCLEAR FREE PHILIPPINE COALITION, ET AL., petitioners,  vs. NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. 70632 February 11, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, ET

AL., respondents.

Issue:

Whether the judgement of PAEC on the nuclear power plant safe.

Facts:

a. G.R. No. 70632, petitioners question the competence of respondent PAEC

Commissioners to pass judgment on the safety of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 PNPP-1
in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77 without however seeking their ouster from office,
although "proven competence" is one of the qualifications prescribed by law for PAEC
Commissioners. Petitioners also assail the validity of the motion (application) filed by the
National Power Corporation (NPC) for the conversion of its construction permit into an
operating license for PNPP-1 on the principal ground that it contained no information regarding
the financial qualifications of NPC, its source of nuclear fuel, and insurance coverage for nuclear
damage.

b.. In G.R. No. 68474, acting on the motion filed therein dated June 8, 1985 to order
PAEC to reconsider its orders of May 31 and June 5, 1985, the urgent motion for mandatory
injunction and/or restraining order dated August 3, 1985, the second urgent motion for
mandatory injunction dated August 12, 1985, and the various pleadings and other documents
submitted by the parties relative thereto, and considering the paramount need of a reasonable
assurance that the operation of PNPP-1 will not pose an undue risk to the health and safety of
the people, which dictates that the conduct of the inquiry into the safety aspects of PNPP-1 be
characterized by sufficient latitude, the better to achieve the end in view, unfettered by
technical rules of evidence (Republic Act 5207, section 34), and in keeping with the
requirements of due process in administrative proceedings.

Ruling:

a. The Court therefore resolved to RESTRAIN respondent PAEC Commissioners from

further acting in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77.the said decision is due to the pamphlets
that PAEC had circulated. Having thus prejudged the safety of the PNPP-1 respondent PAEC
Commissioners would be acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
were they to sit in judgment upon the safety of the plant, absent the requisite objectivity that
must characterize such an important inquiry.

b. The respondent PAEC (once reconstituted) to re-open the hearing on PNPP-1 so as to

give petitioners sufficient time to complete their cross-examination of the expert witnesses on
quality assurance, to cross-examine the witnesses that petitioners have failed to cross-examine
on and after August 9, 1985, and to complete the presentation of their evidence, for which
purpose, respondent PAEC shall issue the necessary subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to
compel the attendance of relevant witnesses and/or the production of relevant documents. For
the said purposes, the PAEC may prescribe a time schedule which shall reasonably assure the
parties sufficient latitude to adequately present their case consistently with the requirements
of dispatch. lt is understood that the PAEC may give NPC the opportunity to correct or supply
deficiencies in this application or evidence in support thereof.
Azucena Salalima vs. Employees Compensation Comm. and Soc. Sec. System
G.R. No.-146360

Facts:

Petitioner’s husband Juancho Saldima was employed for twenty nine years as a route helper and
salesman for the Meycauayan Plant of Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines Inc. during the annual
company medical examination, Juancho was diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis. Later
found him to have cancer of the lungs and died after few months. Azucena, the wife of Juancho
is now claiming for the benefits of her husband from the company and the SSS. RTC dismissed
the case. CA affirmed and this petition was therefore filed.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to benefits provided by P.D. 626

Held:

SC answered in the affirmative. Because the facts of the case showed that the cause of Juancho’s
death was his mere work and that his medical history states that his stay at Coca cola is a
contributory to his sickness. SSS was ordered to pay the claimant and the RTC’s and CA’s
decisions were reversed and set aside.

Social Justice Society, et. al. vs. Honorable Jose Atienza, Jr.
G.R. No. 156052

Facts:

Chevron is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum

products in the Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the business of manufacturing,
refining and likewise importing and marketing of petroleum products. Petitioners sought to
compel Mayor Tienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which was enacted by Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila and became effective upon approval by Mayor Atienza. This ordinance
reclassifies the area described from industrial to commercial and directed the owners to cease
and desist from operating their business within 6 months. Among the business is the Pandacan
Terminal of the Oil companies. Oil companies intervened in the issue attacking the validity of
the ordinance.

Issue:

Whether the ordinance approved by respondent is valid or not

Held:
Valid. Because the tremendous event happened near the area which many were put into danger,
the Manila Municipal Office shall do its ministerial duty to protect all property and health of
those people who lived in the vicinity and nearby cities. The court ordered the transfer of
Pandacan Terminal within a non extendible period of 90 days. The life of the people shall be the
utmost priority of the government in terms of its security, though the business will lose billions
of money, the municipality cannot sacrifice its people.

Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. IAC and Nestor Sunga, Jr.

G.R. No. 65935

Facts:

A case filed by Nestor Sunga Jr., businessman and owner of the NBS Machineries and the NAP-
NAP Transit. He purchased a minibus Mazda from Motorcester with an agreement to pay the
balance in monthly basis. Later, Nestor failed to pay his obligations to the company which cause
the confiscation of the minibus by the officers of Filinvest Corp. The minibus was mortgaged to
Filinvest Corp. Sunga cleared his obligations to Filinvest which the court rendered decisions
granting Sunga moral, actual damages, litigation expenses and Attorney's fees. Filinvest filed
motion to review the decision of the court.

Issue:

Whether the award of damages to Sunga is valid

Held:

Yes. It is valid but it is unconscionable, therefore the SC reduced the amount granted to Sunga
since the facts show that the latter had not suffered much and that it is his obligation to pay the
minibus as it was stipulated between him and Filinvest Corp. Moral and actual damages were
granted but litigation expenses was eliminated for it has no price for litigation.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.

G.R. Nos. 120865-71

Facts:

A case filed by authority against all those who were given permit by Municipal mayors Pacis,
Papa and Jala-Jala to include them as releasers of permits and other respondents for violating the
provisions who has the jurisdiction to give permits. But the issue not only lies on the granting of
permits but the error on deciding that authority is not a quasi-judicial agency that R.A. 4850 was
amended by P.D. 813 and E.O. 927 s. of 1983 and the LGU has the power to issue permits.

Issue:

Whether LLDA has the power as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body

Held:

Yes. LLDA has express powers as regulatory and quasi-judicial body to cease and desist orders
and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culture
structures in Laguna De Bay. It is not co-equal to RTC but only to its extent of power provided
by law. All permits issued were declared null and void and all structures on the said area shall be
demolished because of the void permits granted to owners and operators.

Agapito Magbanwa, et. al. vs. IAC, et. al.

G.R. no. 66870-72

Facts:

A case where all plaintiffs who were tenants of the defendants complained the diversion of the
free flow of water from their farm lots which caused portions of their landholdings to dry up to
their great damage and prejudice and they were asked to vacate the areas for they could not plant
any longer for lack of water.

Issue:

Whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages

Held:

Yes. Because the closing of water flow to the petitioners’ farm lots caused damage and
prejudicial to them in their harvest. It has no showing in the facts that petitioners were negligent
but instead the respondents’ bad faith which caused prejudice to the former. Under the law, the
landowner has the obligation to keep tenant in the peaceful and continuous cultivation of his
landholding. A disturbance of possession such as the act complained of is violative of the law.
Therefore, the court granted moral and exemplary damages and Attorney’s fees to plaintiffs.

Ernesto Rodriguez, et. al. vs. IAC and Daytona Construction and Development Corporation
G.R. no. 74816

Facts:

Plaintiffs filed an action for abatement of a public nuisance with damages against defendant.
After four extensions of time to file an answer by defendant, Daytona moved to dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. Motions denied, defendant was declared in default
and authorized plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte. The facts of the case at bar shows that
there is other nearby residents who were prejudiced by the Daytona Corp. for the running of its
business. It affected their health and property. But in this case, the delay of the respondents to
answer id questionable and contrary to law.

Issues:
1. Whether petitioners have cause of action to file the case
2. Whether respondents are liable for damages

Held:

1. Yes. Because the business had greatly prejudiced their health and property. The permit given
to Daytona is valid but the conditions provided were not met.
2. Yes. Respondents are liable for damages except nominal damages based on the discretion of
the court instead moral and actual damages were awarded because sufficient evidence had
supported as such.

DENR vs. Gregorio Daraman, et. al.

G.R. No. 125797

Facts:

This is a case filed by the DENR represented by RED Israel Gaddi against Gregorio Daraman
and Narciso Lucenecio who were caught by one Pablo opinion to transport illegal pieces of
lumber using the vehicle of one Baby Lucenecio, the Holy Cross Funeral Services. Here, the
respondents alleged that one Asan, owner of furniture shop ask the two to bring also some pieces
of wood to his house located near the funeral’s location. Opinion, DENR employee, saw the
vehicle and inspected it, there he saw some lumber and issued an order of forfeiture. The court
granted bond and released the funeral car and lumber because it was found out that Daraman and
Lucenecio were not owners of the vehicle and lumber. Hence, this complaint was filed.

Issue:

Whether the respondents violated P.D. 705 section 68-A

Held:

Yes. The court cannot deny the fact that Section 68-A P.D. 705 is also applicable to those who
transport lumber without proper documents. Here, Daraman and Lucenecio had no permit to
transport lumber although they were only asked to bring the lumber to the house of one Asan.
The RTC has overstepped its jurisdiction of the case since DENR was given the power to
confiscate the property in favor of the state/government. The release of this property defeated the
purpose of section 68-A of P.D. 705. Therefore, SC granted the petition of DENR, RTC’s
decision was reversed and set aside.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Honorable Roman Cansino, Jr. et. al.
G.R. No. L-17923

Facts:

On October 3, 1960, Magdayo Ramirez, owner of 85 tubs of fish filed a complaint for replevin
against Commander Abraham Campo and manager of Royal Cold Storage. Upon the filing by
Ramirez of a P2, 000 bond, Judge Roman Cansino ordered the court sheriff to take possession of
the 85 tubs of fish for five days and release it to Ramirez. Commander Ocampo filed a petition to
return the fish for the same fish were caught in TONY LEX I boat. Here, the fish were caught
through the use of dynamite, which is a violation and crime under R.A. 428. Action for
prohibition and injunction were filed by Ocampo against the Judge and the sheriff.

Issues:

Whether respondent Judge erred in posting a bond in dissolving the warrant of seizure
Whether Ramirez violated R.A. 428

Held:

Yes. RTC Judge Cansino erred in dissolving the warrant of seizure because the petitioner is the
R.P and the same is exempt from the obligation to post such a bond.
Yes. Ramirez violated R.A. 428 because under this law, it is violative to use dynamite in fishing
which the Bureau of Fisheries strictly observes the implementation of the said law.

Sea Lion Fishing Corporation vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. no. 172678

Facts:

This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of CA in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration and petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. Here, 17 Chinese fishermen were
caught poaching off Mangsee Island in Palawan. The Barangay officials and team of Philippine
Marines found F/V Sea Lion with five boats with fishing nets spread over the water. The court
filed various cases against the Chinese fishermen to wit: Violation of section 977 of R.A.
85508[8]; Violation of section 909[9] of R.A. 8550 and violation of Section 27(a) and (f) 10 [10]
of R.A. 9141711(110 and section 8712(12) of R.A. 8550, F/V sea Lion filed an Urgent Motion
for Release of evidence alleging that it owns the vessel. The court released the vessel but later
the court found out that the evidence of ownership of Sea Lion was not supported by documents.
Therefore, government forfeited the vessel.

Issue:

Whether the forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion in favor of the government was proper

Held:

Yes. The government was correct when it forfeited F/V Sea Lion since its motion was only filed
after the judgment has been rendered and it failed to seek all remedies given the sufficient time
to do so. The lower court had jurisdiction over the case and the petitioner was not denied of due
process and gets it failed to comply with the other requirements provided in the law.
Legaspi VS. Civil Service Commission
G.R. no. 72119

Facts:

Civil Service Commission denied Valentin Legaspi’s (petitioner) request for information on the
civil service eligibilities of 2 people employed as sanitarians, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas, in the Health Department in Cebu. Petitioner claims that his right to information is
guaranteed by the Constitution prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information. The Solicitor General
challenges the petitioner’s standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any
legal right to be informed of the civil services eligibilities of the government employees
concerned. SolGen further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission
to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

Issue:

WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department employees.

Held:

Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the position of sanitarian,
and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for
said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi.

Aldovino vs Alunan
G.R no. 102232

Facts:

The petitioners herein were affected by reorganizing of Ministry of Tourism as provided in

Section 29 of Executive Order No. 120 which took effect on January 30, 1987. These EO
provides that incumbents whose positions are not included in the new position structure and
staffing pattern or who are not reappointed are deemed separated from the service. Pursuant to
this, the Department of Tourism issued various office orders and memoranda declaring all
positions thereat vacant. To that effect, it leads to the separation of many of its employees
including the petitioners. The court had previously decided similar cases of Mandani, Abrogar
and Arnaldo. The petitioners and intervenors claimed that they should not be deprived of their
life granted to their former co-employees plead for reinstatement without the loss of seniority
rights. Furthermore, they claimed for back salaries will be computed under the new staffing
pattern from dates of their invalid termination at rates not lower than their former salaries. The
court aims to determine whether the separation of herein petitioners and intervenors from service
was pursuant to office orders and memoranda declared void in Mandani case, thus reinstating
and paying them with their back wages.
Issues:

Whether or not the petitioners and intervenors must be reinstated and paid of their back wages.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that herein petitioners are reinstated immediately to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries computed under new staffing
pattern from the dates of their invalid dismissal at rates not lower than their former salaries but
not to exceed a period of 5 years with several provisions. Having found out that the Executive
Order is unconstitutional, thus dismissal of the employees is also unconstitutional. The courts
declared its total nullity. An unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, imposes no
duties and affords no protection. In legal contemplation, it is inoperative as if it had not been
passed.
G.R. No. L-20875 April 30, 1923

VICENTE ABAOAG, ET AL vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL.

Facts:

In the year 1884 a number of "Bagos" or Igorots or non-Christians, numbering at that time
about thirty, were invited by the gobernadorcillo and principalia of the then town of Alava, now
the municipality of Sison, of the Province of Pangasinan.

The "Bagos" entered upon said land, took possession of it and have continued to live upon the
same and have cultivated it since that date. On February 28, 1919, the “Bagos” filed an action,
claiming the land was registered to them under the Torrens system but was later dismissed on
the grounds of lack of evidence that they are entitled to the land.

Issue:

W/N the court is correct in dismissing the case on the grounds of lack of evidence.

Held:

No, the court is not correct in dismissing the case on the grounds of lack of evidence.

If we were to look into the Royal Decrees of Spain, as the attorney for the appellants has done,
we will find that Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines
into trespassers of the land which they occupy, or even into tenants at will.  In the Royal Cedula
of October 15, 1754, we find the following: "Where such possessors shall not be able to
produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession as a valid
title by prescription." We may add that every presumption of ownership under the public land
laws of the Philippine Islands is in favor of one actually occupying the land for many years, and
against the Government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions
of subsequently enacted registration land act.

In addition to the facts above stated, the record shows that at the time of the delivery of said
parcel of land to the petitioners, it was unoccupied and unimproved public land; that since their
entry upon the possession of the land in the year 1884, they and their ancestors have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same,
believing in good faith that they were the owners.

Wherefore, the court reversed its decision, thus the petitioners where permitted to present
whatever evidence they may have.
G.R. No. L-4231            April 1, 1908

CASTLE BROTHERS, WOLFE AND SONS vs. GUTIERREZ HERMANOS

Facts:

There was a verbal contract between Knight and Don Leopoldo Criado by which the defendants
agreed to sell the plaintiffs 500 bales of “good current Manila” hemp at P24 a picul. That, while
some mention of marks was made, Knight said he could not accept those marks unless they
turned out to be up to the quality of "good current Manila." However, Don Leopoldo Criado
testified that the phrase "good current" was never mentioned in the conversation and that he
stated to Mr. Knight that the defendants had 554 bales of the four marks mentioned, and that
of those he sold 500 bales.

Knight’s testimony was supported by the testimony of Higginbotham who was his assistant in
the office and who heard the conversation, and who states that there was a positive agreement
on the part of Don Leopoldo Criado to furnish 500 bales of "good current Manila." 

On the 500 bales, delivered, the plaintiffs accepted and paid for 210 bales and no question as to
these bales on made in the case. They refused to accept 299 bales on the ground that it was not
good current Manila hemp, called upon the defendants to furnish 299 bales of that quality and
notified them that, on failure to do so, they would buy the same in the market and charge the
increased cost of the defendants. The defendants refused to substitute other bales and the
plaintiffs bought 299 bales of good current Manila hemp at P28.50 a picul, P4.50 more per picul
than the price at which the defendants had agreed to furnish them that quality of hemp. The
loss to the plaintiffs was therefore P2,691 and to recover that sum this action was brought.

Thus the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.

Issue:

W/N the ruling of the court is correct basing from the evidence presented.

Held:
Yes, the ruling of the court is correct.

Aside from Knight and Higginbotham’s testimonies, the other evidence in which the court
based its ruling is the letter received by the plaintiff on September 13, 1906 from Portland
Cordage Company, of Oregon which states that they are asking the plaintiff to offer them 500
bales of good current Leyte hemp, but the plaintiffs cannot furnish 500 good current Leyte
hemp, instead they offered 500 bales of good current Manila hemp. On the same day, before
sending the letter, Knight saw Don Leopoldo Criado who told him that they could furnish 500
bales of good current Manila Bales, thus their verbal contract. Don Leopoldo Criado denies that
he had the conversation with Knight on that day, but the fact that the telegrams where sent
and received was undeniable.

G.R. No. L-24796           June 28, 1968

Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz

Facts:

Piadeco claims to be the owner of Some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the municipalities
of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and
Montalban, province of Rizal. Piadeco's evidence of ownership consists of Titulo de Propiedad
and a deed of absolute sale.

The controversy began when the Acting Director of Forestry Apolonio F. Rivera required
Piadeco to surrender the original certificate to him. Ground for this cancellation was that
Piadeco had violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting trees within the Angat and
Marikina Watershed Reservations, expressly excluded from the said certificate.

Piadeco filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
Director of Forestry, Forest Station Warden Marquez and Nawasa, essentially upon the
averment that their acts heretofore narrated were "all precipitate, arbitrary, whimsical and
capricious." The preliminary injunction was granted and then he moved to declare the forestry
officials in default for failure to answer its petition on time. The forestry officials asked the court
to dismiss the petition upon the averments that said court had no jurisdiction over their
persons or the subject matter of the petition, and that administrative remedies have not yet
been exhausted by Piadeco. On the same date, too, but in a separate motion, said forestry
official asked for a reconsideration of the lower court's order granting preliminary injunction,
bottomed upon their charge that the illegal cutting of trees by Piadeco inside the Angat and
Marikina Watershed Reservations — which are the main source of water supply of the City of
Manila and its surrounding towns and cities — poses a grave danger of causing them to dry up
to the prejudice and irreparable injury of the inhabitants thereof. The forestry officials were
declared in default.

Piadeco entered into an amicable settlement with Nawasa whereby Piadeco's case against
Nawasa was withdrawn, the right of way granted by Nawasa to Piadeco remaining revoked and
cancelled; and Nawasa's counterclaim against Piadeco was also withdrawn in consideration of
P1,651.59 paid by Piadeco to Nawasa, representing the former's liabilities to the latter. The
court approved of the amicable settlement.

Piadeco applied for the renewal of its Certificate of Private Woodland Registration but was
denied by Assistant Director of Forestry J. L. Utleg but Piadeco continued logging operations. It
was about this time that illegal logging was denounced by some members of Congress thereby
attracting national attention. The Secretary of National Defense directed the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces to implement the request. And, the Chief of Staff dispatched a task force of
the army into the Angat area, which impounded and seized all logs cut by Piadeco and other
loggers which were purportedly conducting illegal operations and they made a private quarters
on a portion of Piadeco’s land and prevented continuation of logging operations, from cutting
and gathering of timber and other forest products and enjoyment of said property. Hence,
Piadeco filed a complaint but was denied.

Issue:

W/N Piadeco's title is registrable with the Bureau of Forestry

Held:

No. Piadeco’s title is not registarable with the Breau of Forestry.

The pertinent statutory provision is Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, viz:

SEC. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. — Every private owner of land containing
timber, firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to the same with the
Director of Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement of the boundaries of their property,
shall be furnished by said Director to the Collector of Internal Revenue, and the same shall be
supplemented from time to time as occasion may require.

Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any such land
lies shall render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a view to its registration
in the Bureau of Forestry.

Ampliatory thereof is Section 7, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 of July 1, 1941, as amended
by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, which took effect on January 1, 1963. It reads:

7. Titles that may be registered. — Only the following titles covering lands containing timber,
firewood and other minor forest products may be registered under and pursuant to Section
1829 of the Revised Administrative Code;

(a) Administrative titles granted by the present Government, such as homestead patent, free
patent, and sales patent; and

(b) Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land Registration Act (Act 496, as
amended) or under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended).

The amendment of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2
consisted in theomission of one paragraph, paragraph (c), which particularized as one of the
titles registrable pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, "[t]itles granted
by the Spanish sovereignty in the islands and duly recognized as valid titles under the existing
laws."

In the case at bar however, Piadeco’s title was issued during the Spanish regime. And it is state
in Section 1829, does not describe with particularity titles that may be registered with the
Bureau of Forestry. Spanish titles are quite dissimilar to administrative and judicial titles under
the present system. Although evidences of ownership, these Spanish titles may be lost thru
prescription. They are, therefore, neither indefeasible nor imprescriptible. It should not have
been allowed registration in the first place. Obviously, registration thereof can never be
renewed.
G.R. No. L-21814 July 15, 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. MELECIO ABANZADO, ET AL

Facts:

The Director of Forestry filed a petition to review a judgment in a land registration proceeding,
no decree having been issued as yet, arose from its failure to accord him the opportunity to
present his evidence to show that the land in controversy is part of a communal forestand is
thus non-disposable.

More specifically, what was sought by appellant public official in his amended petition for
review was  the reconsideration of a previous decision, reached without his being heard,
adjudicating in favor of private respondents what was alleged to be a portion of the Bais
Communal Forest, a non-disposable public land. There was an opposition to such petition by
private respondents, who argued that no extrinsic fraud was alleged and that the Director of
Forestry was barred by estoppel or laches. The appealed order was based on the absence of
actual or extrinsic fraud, thus resulting in the denial of the petition for review.

Issue:

W / N the court the Director of Forestry / Lands be allowed to present his evidences in the case
at bar.

Held:

Yes, the Director of Forestry / Lands should be allowed to present his evidences in the case at
bar.

A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, the appeal was taken directly to this Court
on a question of law raising the constitutional issues of absence of a hearing in accordance with
due process as well as the deviation from the fundamental principle that forest resources as
part of the national patrimony should be inalienable. 

It should be quite apparent why no other decision except that of reversal of the appealed order
is warranted. For in addition to the lack of respect for the requirements of procedural due
process, there was on the part of the lower court a disregard of a basic state policy. The
Constitution then in force, as is similarly the case with the present Charter, was quite explicit on
the point of forest resources being inalienable. That is a paramount state objective.
In the matter Ozaeta Romulo (July 30 1979)

Facts:

Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the
continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is no custom
or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the
name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court:

1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and

2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying
that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who
had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered
consolidated.

Issue:

W/N the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who
already passed away in the name of the firm

Held:

No. The surviving partners are not allowed to retain the name of the deceased partner in the
name of the firm.
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations
between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional
ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the
possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the
deceased partners from their firm name.

G.R. No. L-3793            February 19, 1908

CIRILO MAPA vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

Facts:

The petitioner sought to have registered a tract of land of about 16 hectares in extent, situated
in the barrio of San Antonio, in the district of Mandurriao, in the municipality of Iloilo. The
petitioner presented evidence which appears that the land in question is lowland, and has been
uninterruptedly, for more than twenty years, in the possession of the petitioner and his
ancestors as owners and the same has been used during the said period, and up to the present,
as fish ponds, nipa lands, and salt deposits. The witnesses declare that the land is far from the
sea, the town of Molo being between the sea and the said land. Judgment was rendered in
favor of the petitioner and the Government has appealed.

Issue:

W/ N the said property is an agricultural land.

Held:
The question as to whether the lands there involved were or were not agricultural lands within
the meaning of the sections was neither discussed nor decided.

The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926 section 54, paragraph 6 which follows:

All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as
defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim
of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the
taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions
of this chapter.

The main phrase “agricultural lands” as defined by said act of Congress of July 1, is found not
only in section 54 above quoted but in other parts of Act No. 926, and it seems that the same
construction must be given to the phrase wherever it occurs in any part of that law. Moreover,
if it should be said that there is no definition in the act of Congress of the phrase "agricultural
land," we do not see how any effect could be given to the provisions of Act No. 916, to which
we have referred. If the phrase is not defined in the act of Congress, then the lands upon which
homesteads can be granted cannot be determined.

G.R. No. L-3714             January 26, 1909

ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET AL.

Facts:

Isabelo Montano presents a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription of a
piece of land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery. This petition was
opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands on the ground that the land
in question belonged to the Government of the United States, and the latter, that it was the
absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said fishery. The Court of
Land Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906, dismissed the said oppositions without
costs in favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial.

Issue:

W/N the property in question is an agricultural land.

Held:

The property is an agricultural land

The section quoted is section 54, paragraph 6, Act No. 926, in which the phrase used is
"agricultural public lands."

Throughout the opinion the phrase "public lands" is repeatedly and exclusively used. The entire
discussion was directed to the question as to whether the property there in question being
"public land," it could be considered as agricultural public land and the conclusion reached is
stated at page 182, as follows:

In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land," as used in Act No. 926, means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.

In that case the land in question was a long distance from the sea. In fact, the entire town of
Molo was between it and the water. It could in no sense be called tidal land. Therefore, the
opinion was devoted to a consideration of not what were "public lands" but whether this
particular tract was or was not agricultural public land. The question what the phrase "public
lands" meant neither considered nor decided in that opinion, for its resolution was not
necessary. In the concurring opinion, however, that question was discussed and it was stated
that the phrase "public lands" used in Act No. 926 must be interpreted according to the
American understanding of the words employed and the meaning of the terms as definitely
fixed by the decrees of the United States Supreme Court.
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS

Facts:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the
Philippines.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration

alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was
opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased whom
he married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the opposition. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat
to Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both
parties moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted.

ISSUE: 

W/N the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws.

HELD: 

Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial

notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the
validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

For failure to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of the marriage, the marriage
between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts.
G.R. No. 2869            March 25, 1907

MATEO CARIÑO vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

Facts:

Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error because
the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application. For more than 50 years before the Treaty
of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held the land as recognized owners by the
Igorots. Cariño inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land
adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the Spanish Crown. In
1901, Cariño obtained a possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law. The
North American colonial government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a public
road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration
court. 

Issue:

W/N the petitioner is granted ownership of the land.

Held:

Yes. The petitioner is entitled to ownership of said land.

The petitioner's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against
him or his father ever was made. And also under the Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall
not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession, as a valid title by prescription."  For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is
enough. For uncultivated, 30.

G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979

LEPANTO vs. DUMYUNG

Facts:

The director of lands filed a criminal case against the defendants on the ground of
misrepresentation and false data and information. The defendants in the three cases filed an
amended joint answer with counterclaim to the complaint in intervention. The defendants filed
a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had complied with all the legal
requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Lands
and that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents.

Issue:

W/N the defendants are entitled to ownership of the land.

Held:
Yes. The Defendants are entitled to ownership of the land in question.

Section 44 of the Land Act in its second paragraph states:

A member of the national cultural, minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether
disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding
paragraph of this section: PROVIDED, that at the time he files his free patent application, he is
not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public
Land Law.

It is for this reason — that is, to give these national cultural minorities who were driven from
their ancestral abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public domain.

G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS

Facts:

There was a land in General Santos City which was claimed by Isagani Du Timbol. The land
covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by Precila Soria, who
transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol who
filed his application as a transferee from Precila Soria.

Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I,
General Santos City to declare the free patent in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol null
and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the land in question to the mass of public
domain. The action is based on the ground that the land covered thereby is a forest or timber
land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act. And claimed that the said patent and
title were obtained fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du Timbol never occupied and
cultivated the land applied for. The case was dismissed.

Issue:

W/N Hon. Animas’ decision is correct.

Held:

No. The First decision was incorrect.

The complaint alleges that applicant Isagani Du Timbol’s actions constitutes as fraud.

A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is
procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name
although the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the
part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such
title void.
GR No.71169, December 22, 1988

Sangalang ET. Al v. IAC,

Facts:

Sangalang filed an action to enforce by specific performance restrictive easement upon

property, specifically the Bel- Air Village subdivision in Makati, Metro Manila, pursuant to
stipulations embodied in the deeds of sale covering the subdivision, and for damages. Bel - Air
itself had brought its own complaints, four in number, likewise for specific performance and
damages to enforce the same 'deed restrictions.' The court ruled in favor of the plantiffs. The
IAC reversed the decision of the court.

Issue:

W/N the IAC erred in the decision of the case at bar.

Held:

No. The IAC did not commit any error in the ruling of the case at bar.

The petitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise other than for the supposed
"non-impairment" guaranty of the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the
more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be
capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.
In that connection, we find no reversible error to have been committed by the Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. L-43203 July 29, 1977

JOSE C. CRISTOBAL vs. ALEJANDRO MELCHOR and FEDERICO ARCALA

Facts:

The plaintiff was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President's Private Office,
Malacañang, Manila.

Five of the employees who were separated not including the herein plaintiff filed a civil and
were reinstatement and the payment of their salaries. The plaintiff sent a letter to the Office of
the President requesting reinstatement to his former position and the payment of salary but
the request was denied repeatedly until he received a letter which declared the matter
“definitely closed”. The plaintiff then filed a complaint against the Executive Secretary,
Alejandro Melchor and Federico Arcala, cash disbursing officer, Office of the President of the
Philippines. The defendants argued that the plaintiff had no cause of action as he is deemed to
have abandoned his office for failure to institute the proper proceedings to assert his right
within one year from the date of separation pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court,
he having come to court only after the lapse of more than nine years, thereby in effect
acquiescing to his separation, and therefore he is not entitled to any salary from termination of
his employment. The complaint was dismissed.

Issue:

W/N the court erred in dismissing the case.

Held:

Yes. The court made an error in dismissing the case.

There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal amounting to

abandonment of his right to reinstatement in office. Although Cristobal failed to file his
complaint within one year from the date of separation but, it is claimed, he allowed almost nine
years passing before coming to court by reason of which he is deemed to have acquiesced to
his removal. The Court stated that in a general sense, laches is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. And it is the doctrine of laches which is invoked to defeat
Jose Cristobal's suit, there are exceptional circumstances attending which take this case out of
the rule enunciated above and lead us to grant relief to appellant. These are:

-There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal amounting to

abandonment of his right to reinstatement in office.

-It was an act of the government through its responsible officials more particularly then
Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc and his successors which contributed to the alleged delay in
the filing of Cristobal's present complaint for reinstatement.

-The dismissal of appellant Cristobal was contrary to law on the strength of this Court's
Decision.

Wherefore, the court ordered the reinstatement and payment of back wages of the plaintiff.

G.R. No. L-36142 March 31, 1973

JAVELLANA VS. TAN

Facts:

In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution.

Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet
secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said
constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the
President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there
being intimidation and fraud.

ISSUE: 

W/N the SC must give due course to the petition.

HELD: 
The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed
the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the
Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent
evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the
people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of
the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign
capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.

G.R. No. 81311 June 30, 1988

KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN VS. TAN

Facts:

EO 273 was issued by the President of the Philippines which amended the Revenue Code,
adopting the value-added tax (VAT) effective 1 January 1988. Four petitions assailed the validity
of the VAT Law for being beyond the President to enact; for being oppressive, discriminatory,
regressive, and violative of the due process and equal protection clauses, among others, of the
Constitution. The Integrated Customs Brokers Association particularly contend that it unduly
discriminate against customs brokers (Section 103 [r]) as the amended provision of the Tax
Code provides that “service performed in the exercise of profession or calling (except custom
brokers) subject to occupational tax under the Local Tax Code, and professional services
performed by registered general professional partnerships are exempt from VAT.

Issue:

Whether the E-VAT law discriminates against customs brokers.

Held:

The phrase “except custom brokers” is not meant to discriminate against custom brokers but to
avert a potential conflict between Sections 102 and 103 of the Tax Code, as amended. The
distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are subject to occupation
tax under the Local Tax Code is based upon material differences, in that the activities of
customs brokers partake more of a business, rather than a profession and were thus subjected
to the percentage tax under Section 174 of the Tax Code prior to its amendment by EO 273. EO
273 abolished the percentage tax and replaced it with the VAT. If the Association did not
protest the classification of customs brokers then, there is no reason why it should protest now.
G.R. No. L-23136 August 26, 1974

MATHAY et al vs. THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST COMPANY et al

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a class suit against the defendant bank on the ground of breach of contract
between the plaintiff and defendant bank and "falsely certified to the calling of a special
stockholders' meeting allegedly pursuant to due notice and call of Defendant Bank" without
notifying the plaintiffs and other stockholders. The defendants moved for the dismissal of the
action on the ground of the plaintiffs-appellants had no legal standing or capacity to institute
the alleged class suit; that the complaint did not state a sufficient and valid cause of action; and
that plaintiffs-appellants' complaint against the increase of the number of directors did not
likewise state a cause of action. Thus the court dismissed the case. The plaintiffs appealed.

Issue:

W/N the plaintiffs have sufficient cause of action.

Held:

No, there was no sufficient cause of action.

It having been shown that the complaint failed to state ultimate facts to constitute a cause of
action, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the other assignments of errors.
G.R. No. L-45987             May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAYAT

Facts:

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any
other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was
caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay
P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the
constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal
protection afforded by the constitution. He said this attempt to treat them with discrimination
or “mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled” will meet with their instant
challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.

ISSUE: W/N the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification.
The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics
that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be
arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) Must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or
parentage.” The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or less
capable race.” On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public
policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment
of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true
equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for
them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with
their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

G.R. No. L-14078            March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes) vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

Facts:

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants

(uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public
lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public
land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on
thisreservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the
provincial governor. 

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in
the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in
the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation
on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this
order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section
2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which
they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within
the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on
the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be
held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away
from the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty
of abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of
his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action:

(1) Attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and

(2) The only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following;

(3) The protection of the Manguianes;

(4) The protection of the public forests in which they roam;

(5) The necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines. 

“Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual
and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man
can do exactly as he pleases. 

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. 

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas

corpus can, therefore, not issue.

G.R. No. L-51773 May 16, 1980

LT. COL. RODRIGO S. DE GUZMAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT JUDGE MARCELINO M. ESCALONA, FLORENTINO RODRIGO, and
MARIANO DAYDAY.
Facts:

The defendants Florentino Rodrigo and Mariano Dayday were charged with "Illegal Possession
of Explosive locally known as 'dinamita'.” While in the seawaters of the Cebu, confederating
and mutually helping with one another, without authority of the law and without proper permit
from authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously possess, keep an
explosive, locally known as 'DINAMITA' in their banca purposely for use of illegal fishing and
three (3) bottles of explosives, two (2) paddles, two (2) fishnets locally known as "SIBOT" and
one (1) banca were recovered from their possession and control, which acts of the above-
named accused is a gross violation of PD No. 1058. Both were found guilty of said accusation.

However, the judge only submitted possession of explosives in connection with subversion is
covered by Presidential Decree No. 9, thus, the old law on illegal possession of explosives, Act
3023, has not been completely repealed; that having found that the possession by the two
accused of two bottles of home-made explosives was solely for fishing purposes and had no
connection with subversion, the illegal act should fall not under Presidential Decree No. 9 but
under Act 3023.

Petitioner Lt. Col. Rodrigo S. De Guzman, PC Provincial Commander Integrated National Police
Superintendent at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City, instituted these certiorari proceedings
alleging mainly that the offense charged was one for possession of explosives intended for
illegal fishing under Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058,
and not for violation of Act 3023 which had long been repealed by several laws and decrees;
that the penalty provided for by current legislation is one which falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; and that respondent Judge's Decision has no
legal basis.

Issue:

W/N the responded judge erred in rendering judgment even though the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Held:

Yes. Considering that the Municipal Circuit Court lacked competent jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the criminal complaint against the accused respondents.

Presidential Decree No. 1058 is an amendatory decree, which increased the penalties for
certain forms of illegal fishing and for other acts made punishable under Presidential Decree
No. 704 or the "Fisheries Decree of 1975". The pertinent portion of Section 33 of Presidential
Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058 reads:

Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in
illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. - It shall be unlawful for any person to catch,
take or gather or cause to be caught, taken gathered fish or fisheries/aquatic products in
Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use
of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof:
Provided, that possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as
herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided. ... (Emphasis supplied).

Section 38, subsection a (1) of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1058, correspondingly provides:

(1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years to twenty-five (25) years in
the case of mere possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing. ... (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Comment he filed for petitioner People
of the Philippines, respondent Judge's reference to Presidential Decree No. 9 is misplaced for,
indeed, there is no mention at all of, nor any reference to, Presidential Decree No. 9 in the
Complaint.
G.R. No. L-25434 July 25, 1975

HONORABLE ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., in his capacity as Acting Commissioner, Philippine

Fisheries Commission, and THE PHILIPPINE NAVY

vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARCA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Branch 1) and MORABE, DE GUZMAN & COMPANY

Facts:

On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats, Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively
called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish
caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two vessels.

It was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were
engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of
compromise dated September 13, 1965 by respondent company to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew
members of the vessels were settled. However, the ships were apprehended without warrant
for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations
promulgated there under.

Respondent filed with the Court against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan,
Jr., for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which
had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine
Navy. The court dismissed the complaint for failure of the petitioner to prosecute and failure of
the defendant to appear.

It was held that Hon. Roldan acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:

W/N is it lawful to apprehend fishing boats without warrant.

Held:

Yes. In the case at bar, it is lawful to apprehend the fishing boats without warrant.

The word boat in its ordinary sense, means any water craft, the fishing boats Tony Lex III and
Tony Lex VI are likewise vessels within the meaning of the term vessel. the accepted definition
of vessel includes "every description of water craft, large or small, used or capable of being
used as a means of transportation on water"

Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the customs
laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant,
because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search
warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to
require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected.

Since the crew of certain fishing vessels were caught, in flagrante, illegally fishing with dynamite
and without the requisite license, their apprehension without a warrant of arrest and the
seizure of the vessel, as well as its equipment and the dynamites found therein, as an incident
to a lawful arrest was held to be lawful.

G.R. No. L-9699             August 26, 1915

THE UNITED STATES vs. JUAN HERNANDEZ, ET AL.

Facts:

In 1947, Liberato Jimenez was appointed as a temporary legal investigator in the Philippine
Veterans Board (PVB). In 1949, he was promoted as the Chief of the Investigation Section but
still in a temporary capacity because he is not civil service eligible. In 1950, he took a
promotional civil service exam. In July 1951, Jimenez received a letter from PVB Chairman Gen.
Guillermo Francisco advising him that he is being replaced by a civil service eligible. In
September 1951, Jimenez received the results of the civil service exam he took in 1950; he
passed. He then appealed his separation from service.

ISSUE: 

W/N Jimenez should be reinstated.

HELD: 
No. In fact, he should have been separated from the service even before 1951. Under the law,
he was supposed to only hold such temporary appointment for three months while the
appointing power is still looking for a civil service eligible. His extended stay in the service is
only upon the grace of the appointing power. Further, there is no law which provides that a
temporary appointment may ripen to a permanent one. When he met the civil service
eligibility, Jimenez did not become entitled to a permanent position in the PVD. The power to
appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper authority, in this case the head of
the department. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified for any competitive
position in the Civil Service. Mere certification as a civil service eligible does not amount to an
appointment. The Civil Service Commission does not insure any appointment; it only certifies an
eligible to be possessed of the qualification as required for a position classified under its rules.
G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006

JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and B. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the
President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for
Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (“Marcopper”), a
corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.

Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit that discharged millions
of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

The DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac, Marinduque with violation
of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water
Code of the Philippines (“PD 1067”), Section 8 of PD No. 984 or the National Pollution
Control Decree of 1976 (“PD 984”), Section 108 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (“RA 7942”), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
(“RPC”) for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.

Petitioners moved to quash the Information on the following grounds:

 (1) the Information were “duplicitous” as the Department of Justice charged more
than one offense for a single act;
(2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of
Marcopper when the incident subject of the Information took place; and
(3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.

MTC issued a Consolidated Order”), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order
and quashing the Information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC
maintained the Information for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Boac, Marinduque,
assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for
violation of RA 7942. The RTC granted public respondent’s appeal but denied
petitioners’ petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed
the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges
reinstated. RTC affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Petitioners contended that since the acts
complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are “the
very same acts complained of” in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the
latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of
Article 365 of the RPC. The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for
duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property should stand.

HELD:

NO. The information filed by the petitioner should not be quashed.

There is no duplicity of charges in the present case.

There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more
than one offense. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the
Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the
accused in preparing his defense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each
petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus,
petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the
Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
G.R. No. 139548. December 22, 2000

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

ALBERTO G. BUMOLO et al., , respondents.

FACTS:

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining claims in Pao, Kasibu,

Nueva Vizcaya with the DENR from February 02,1982 to October 12, 1982. Private
respondents Alberto G. Bumolo and others registered their mining claims in the same
area from 28 July 1981 to 22 September 1988, which claims were subsequently
converted into Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA).

On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option Agreements over the mining. Under
the Agreements, petitioner was granted the exclusive and irrevocable right to explore
the mining claims for three (3) years with provision for extension.

On December 23, 1982 and March 26, 1987 petitioner filed Prospecting Permit
Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of Forest Development, DENR, on the alleged
ground that a portion of the area covered by the mining claims was within the Magat
River Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of June 26, 1969 and with DAR on account
of alleged coverage of the other portion within the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino Civil
Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11 September 1975.
On 15 July 1991 Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected petitioner’s Prospecting
Permit Application (PPA) on the ground that the Memorandum of July 08, 1991
endorsed by the Regional Technical Director for Mines revealed that the area covered
was outside government reservation; that the prospect claim was in conflict with existing
claims; and, that the area had been extensively explored in the early 1980's.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Regional Executive Director Samuel Paragas

recommended to the DENR Secretary that petitioner's request for reconsideration be
denied; that the existing rights of mining claim holders be respected; and, that the prior
legal rights of MPSA/Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement applicants over
subject area be recognized.

As regards petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared that it was issued a
clearance to prospect for six (6) months from December 11, 1995.

On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent Mines Adjudication Board
(MAB). Petitioner maintained that subject area was within the Magat River Forest
Reservation. On June 11, 1998 the rejection of the PPA was affirmed whereas the
mining claims of respondents Alberto G. Bumolo et al. that had been converted into a
MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, were given due
course.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Respondent MAB denied petitioner’s motion .

ISSUE:

Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of the PPA was outside
the Magat River Forest Reservation.

HELD:

Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of Regional Executive Director

Paragas in denying petitioner's PPA.
The disapproval of Marcopper’s PPA moreover, did not emanate from a single
recommendation of the RTD for Mines. Records would show that as early as May 31,
1989 x x x the Bumolo group of PD 463 claims which Marcopper has eventually
surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30 group of claims x x x x was confirmed by the
Forest Engineering Section of the region to be outside proclaimed watershed areas,
wilderness, national parks and existing government reforestation projects x x x x
In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA is outside
the Magat River Forest Reservation has been adequately established by the following
evidence: (a) confirmation as early as 31 May 1989 by the Forest Engineering Section
of Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991 Memorandum Report of Regional
Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting provided by the National Mapping and
Resources Information Authority per its 2 June 1995 indorsement of the maps to the
office of the Regional Executive Director. Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area
subject of its PPA within the Magat River Forest Reservation based merely on the
alleged "typographical error committed by somebody in the Engineering Section of the
DENR." Aside from the fact that the allegation does not have anything to support it, the
aforementioned documents which the Regional Executive Directors relied upon in
denying the PPA had already settled the issue.
Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the bases for the rejection of petitioner's
PPA. As plotted by the Lands Management Sector of DENR Region 2 contained in the
sketch plan of 11 November 1996 and as shown in the Land Use map of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya, the
area covered under the PPA is indeed outside any government reservation.

G.R. No. 98332   January 16, 1995

MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.

HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and Natural

Resources, and JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau,
respondents.

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, authorizing the DENR Secretary to
negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements
for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing
the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or
financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, the DENR Secretary issued DENR
Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989, entitled "Guidelines on Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement under Executive Order No. 279." Under the transitory provision of
said DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing mining
leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those
pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20)
hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1)
year from the effectivity of these guidelines.

The Secretary of the DENR then further issued DENR Administrative Order No. 82,
series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation."
The issuance and the impending implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order
Nos. 57 and 82 after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association
of the Philippines, Inc. to file the instant petition assailing their validity and
constitutionality before this Court.

Petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., mainly contends that the
administrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner
contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Article
III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57
unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other mining agreements and
automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year
from its effectivity date.  On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 82 declares that
failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements within two
(2) years from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the
abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.

Petitioner argued that Executive Order No. 279 does not contemplate automatic
conversion of mining lease agreements into mining production-sharing agreement as
provided under Article 9, Administrative Order No. 57 and/or the consequent
abandonment of mining claims for failure to submit LOIs and MPSAs under Section 3,
Administrative Order No. 82 because Section 1 of said Executive Order No. 279
empowers the DENR Secretary to negotiate and enter into voluntary agreements which
must set forth the minimum terms and conditions provided under Section 2 thereof. 
Moreover, petitioner contends that the power to regulate and enter into mining
agreements does not include the power to preterminate existing mining lease
agreements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR
Secretary are unconstitutional.

HELD:

NO. DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are not unconstitutional.

The questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of

the purposes of the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the
paramount interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare.  The validity and
constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be sustained, and their
force and effect upheld.

Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements
which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211.  It bears mention that under the text of Executive Order No. 211, there is
a reservation clause which provides that the privileges as well as the terms and
conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, shall be subject to any and all
modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Article XII, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution.  Hence, the strictures of the non-impairment of contract clause
under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution do not apply to the aforesaid mining
leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211.  They can be amended, modified or altered by a statute
passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution.

Moreover, nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which would
lead us to conclude that the questioned order authorizes the automatic conversion of
mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharing agreements.  The provision
in Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 that "all such leases or agreements shall be
converted into production sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of
these guidelines" could not possibly contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of
the Government that all existing mining leases and agreements are automatically
converted into production-sharing agreements.  On the contrary, the use of the term
"production-sharing agreement" in the same provision implies negotiation between the
Government and the applicants, if they are so minded.  Negotiation negates compulsion
or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner in the instant petition.  A mineral
production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a meeting of the minds of the parties
after negotiations arrived at in good faith and in accordance with the procedure laid
down in the subsequent Administrative Order No. 82.
OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Petitioner,

- versus -
 
PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION,   Respondent.
                                       
CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. JUDGE BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95, Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan, and PLATINUM GROUP METAL CORPORATION,                                
Respondents

PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION,

                                             Petitioner,

 - versus -
 
CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, acting for its own
interest and on behalf of OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
                                         Respondent.
PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
                                             Petitioner,
  
- versus -
 COURT OF APPEALS and POLLY C. DY,
                                         Respondents

FACTS:

In 1971 and 1980, Olympic was granted “Mining Lease Contracts” by the Secretary of
the DENR covering mining areas located in the municipalities of Narra and Espanola,
Palawan.

On July 18, 2003, Olympic entered into an Operating Agreement with Platinum, by
virtue of which Platinum was given the exclusive right to control, possess,
manage/operate, and conduct mining operations, and to market or dispose mining
products on the Toronto Nickel Mine in the Municipality of Narra. In return, Platinum
would pay Olympic a royalty fee of 2½% of the gross revenues.

Olympic and Platinum applied for, and were subsequently granted the necessary
government permits and environmental compliance certificates.

On April 24, 2006, Olympic sent a letter to Platinum, informing the latter of the
immediate termination of the Operating Agreement on account of Platinum’s gross
violations of its terms, and directing Platinum to immediately surrender possession of
the subject mining areas under the Operating Agreement.

Olympic instituted an action for the issuance of an injunctive writ before the RTC of
Puerto Princesa against Platinum. In its prayer, Olympic sought to enjoin Platinum from
conducting mining operations on the subject mining areas, and also to recover
possession thereof. The RTC dismissed Olympic’s complaint.

Olympic then filed two cases with the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) for
the revocation of the SSMPs of Platinum, on the ground of Olympic’s termination of the
Operating Agreement because of the alleged gross violations thereof by Platinum. This
was dismissed and POA for the cancellation of the Operating Agreement and the
revocation of the SSMPs of Platinum. This case was subsequently withdrawn by .
While these two administrative cases were pending, Olympic transferred its applications
for mineral agreements, including its rights under the Operating Agreement, to Citinickel
via a Deed of , without the knowledge or consent of Platinum. This assignment was
thereafter approved by the Regional Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
(MGB).

After the assignment, Citinickel filed Civil Case No. 06-0185 before the RTC of
Parañaque, on June 21, 2006, seeking to invalidate the Operating Agreement based on
Platinum’s alleged violation of its terms. This action was also dismissed by the trial
court, citing forum shopping and improper venue as among the grounds for dismissal.
Citinickel did not bother to appeal this dismissal, opting instead to find other remedies.

Citinickel thereafter filed three administrative cases: PMRB Case No. 002-06, DENR
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) Case No. 8253, and POA Case No. 2006-
02-B.

Civil Case No. 4199 involved a complaint for quieting of title, damages, breach of
contract, and specific performance filed by Platinum against Olympic before the RTC of
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Branch 95 on June 14, 2006.

Olympic sought the dismissal of Platinum’s Civil Case No. 4199 through a motion to
dismiss where Olympic alleged that the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the
issues raised in the case. Olympic contended that the case involved a mining dispute
requiring the technical expertise of the POA; accordingly, jurisdiction should be with the
PO

ISSUE:

Which body has the authority to hear and decide the dispute between Olympic/Citinickel
and Platinum, as parties to the operating agreement.

HELD:

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by
the allegations of the complaint. It is thus obvious that the complaint falls within the
ambit of the RTC’s original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other judicial or quasi-
judicial bodies.
Although Section 77 (d) of the Mining Act has transferred to the POA jurisdiction over
disputes pending before the Bureau of Mines and the DENR, Section 77 (b) did not
adopt the wording of Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281 so as to include
all other forms of contracts – public or private – involving mining rights; Section 77 (b) in
relation to Section 3 (ab) of the Mining Act did not include a general catch-all phrase to
cover other agreements involving mining rights similar to those in Section 7, paragraphs
(a) and (c) of PD No. 1281. Instead, the Mining Act, through the above-quoted Sections
3 (ab) and 26, has limited the jurisdiction of the POA, as successor of the adjudicatory
functions of the Bureau of Mines, to mineral agreements between the government and
the private contractor. Otherwise stated, while disputes between parties to any mining
contract (including operating agreements) may previously fall within the Bureau of
Mines’ jurisdiction under Section 7 (a) or (c) of PD No. 1281, it can no longer be so
placed now within the authority of the POA to settle under Section 77 (b) of the Mining
Law because its jurisdiction has been limited to the resolution of disputes involving
public mineral agreements.

The controlling factor in determining venue for cases is the primary objective for which
said cases are filed. Platinum’s primary objective in filing the complaint is to protect its
interest in the subject mining areas, although it joined its claims of breach of contract,
damages, and specific performance in the case. In any event, the Rules of Court allow
joinder of causes of action in the RTC, provided one of the causes of action (in this
case, the cause of action for quieting of title or interest in real property located in
Palawan) falls within the jurisdiction of said court and venue lies therein. In fine, there
is absolutely no reason to disturb the CA’s findings that venue was properly laid
in the Palawan court.
G.R. No. 163509

PICOP RESOURCES, INC.,petitioner,

- versus -

BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES CORPORATION and THE MINES

ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.

FACTS:

Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity) entered
into a Mines Operating Agreement (Agreement for brevity) with Banahaw Mining and
Development Corporation (Banahaw Mining for brevity) whereby the latter agreed to act
as Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and eventual commercial operation
of CMMCI’s eighteen (18) mining claims located in Agusan del Sur.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining
Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. So that Banahaw
Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of
precious minerals found within its mining claims. Upon its expiration, the temporary
permit was subsequently renewed thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last being on June
28, 1991.

Since a portion of Banahaw Mining’s mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP’s
logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of each other’s right
to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of
way to its mining claims. Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications
for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for brevity).

While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to
sell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private
respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The
transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner,
as well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI.

Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately

approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base
Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its
claims.

On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining’s
pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant
and to submit additional documents in support of the application. Area clearances from
the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife
Sanctuary were submitted, as required.

On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals’ amended MPSA applications

were published in accordance with the requirements of the Mining Act of 1995.

On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau
(MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private
respondent Base Metals’ application. After the submission of their respective position
paper, the Panel Arbitrator issued an Order disapproving private respondent Base
Metals’ MPSA on the reasons that adverse claim was filed on time, that the granting of
the MPSA application on area subject of an IFMA or PTLA which is covered by a
Presidential Warranty, the panel believes it cannot, unless the grantee consents thereto,
without the grantee’s consent, the area is considered closed to mining location (sec. 19)
(b) (No. 2), DAO No. 96-40) and that the mining location in forest or timberland is
allowed only if such forest or timberland is not leased by the government to a qualified
person or entity and if it is leased the consent of the lessor is necessary, in addition to
the area clearance to be issued by the agency concerned before it is subjected to
mining operation.
Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because it is off tangent to mining.
Both are extremes. They can not exist at the same time. The other must necessarily
stop before the other operate.

Private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with public respondent MAB,
the latter rendered the assailed decision setting aside the Panel Arbitrator’s order. The
Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB.

Hence this petition.

PICOP presents the following issues: (1) the 2,756 hectares subject of Base Metals’
MPSA are closed to mining operations except upon PICOP’s written consent pursuant
to existing laws, rules and regulations and by virtue of the Presidential Warranty; (2) its
Presidential Warranty is protected by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution; and
(3) it does not raise new issues in its petition.

PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining operations as these are
within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve established under Proclamation No.
369 of then Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis. The area is allegedly also part of permanent forest
established under Republic Act No. 3092 (RA 3092), and overlaps the wilderness area
where mining applications are expressly prohibited under RA 7586. Hence, the area is
closed to mining operations under Sec. 19(f) of RA 7942.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals’ MPSA is, by law, closed to mining
activities

Whether or not the Presidential Warranty is a contract protected by the non-impairment

clause of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

Anent the first issue, the Court ruled that the area covered by Base Metals’ MPSA
is, by law, not closed to mining activities.

There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals’ MPSA has
been proclaimed as watershed forest reserves.

Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao
Forest Reserve, such does not necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to
mining activities. Contrary to PICOP’s obvious misreading of our decision in Apex
Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineral agreements are not allowed
in the forest reserve established under Proclamation 369, the Court in that case actually
ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385, one can acquire mining rights
within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, by initially
applying for a permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and
subsequently for a permit to explore with the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences.

Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestty subject to

existing rights and reservations. Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations
in forest lands which include the public forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves,
and forest reservations

With regard to the second issue, the Court do not subscribe to PICOP’s argument that
the Presidential Warranty dated September 25, 1968 is a contract protected by the non-
impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution. An examination of the Presidential
Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the government’s
commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees
PICOP’s peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the
basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers
only the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not
extend to the utilization of other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within
the concession.

The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA

No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. It is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify
PICOP’s rights under its timber license. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the
non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,

versus

MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL

RESOURCES, ET AL, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in
the business of mining. On 31 March 2000, petitioner’s Application for Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), for the exploration, development and
commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and other mineral deposits in a 4,360.71-
hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was approved and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was
issued in its favor.

Private respondent is also a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines and engaged in the business of mining. Private respondent filed an
Application for Exploration Permit with MGB covering the same properties covered by
and during the subsistence of APSA-SF-000089 and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of
petitioner. In turn, petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition to the Application for
Exploration Permit of the private respondent. It was allegedly filed with the Panel of
Arbitrators on 30 August 2005 and was received by the latter on 5 September 2005.

Prior, however, to petitioner’s filing of its Verified Protest/Opposition to the private

respondent’s Application for Exploration Permit, petitioner’s MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was
cancelled, a Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

The MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent.

Panel of Arbitrators dismissed motu proprio the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner.
Petitioner elevated by appeal to the MAB which was also dismissed.

The case was elevated to the Court of appeals but judgment was rendered against the
petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No.
05-001 issued by MGB to private respondent.

HELD:

NO. The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No.
05-001 issued by MGB to private respondent

Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel of
Arbitrators, thus:

Sec. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. – x x x. Within thirty (30) working days, after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and
original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:

1. Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

2. Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;

3. Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and

claimholders/concessionaires; and

4. Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the
effectivity of this Act.

The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims, conflicts, and
oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineral rights, but not over
cancellation of mineral rights already granted and existing.

As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing exploration permit, Section 28 of DAO

NO. 96-40 explicitly provides:
 Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration Permit. – The
Director/concerned Regional Director may cancel the Exploration
Permit for failure of the Permittee to comply with any of the
requirements and for violation(s) of the terms and conditions under
which the Permit is issued. For renewed Exploration Permits, the
Secretary upon the recommendation of the Director shall cause the
cancellation of the same.

According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96-40, “Director” means the Director of the MGB
Central Office, while “Regional Director” means the Regional Director of any MGB
Regional Office. As the authority to issue an Exploration Permit is vested in the MGB,
then the same necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel
the same. Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke, or cancel EP No. 05-001 of
private respondent is already lodged with the MGB, and not with the Panel of
Arbitrators.

G.R. No. L-49109.  December 1, 1987

SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. MINISTER OF

NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF MINES JUANITO
C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner , Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc., is a mining corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines.  It alleges that it is the holder of fifty (50)
valid mining claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the
provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July 1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for
short).

On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders of
subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one (1) year from the
approval of the Decree.  Petitioner accordingly filed a mining lease application, but
"under protest", on 13 October 1978, with a reservation annotated on the back of its
application that it is not waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of
Presidential Decree No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this Court.

On 10 October 1978, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
alleging that it has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law to protect its rights (except by said petition).  Petitioner assails Presidential
Decree No. 1214 as unconstitutional in that it amounts to a deprivation of property
without due process of law.

Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already been declared as its own
private and exclusive property in final judgments. The respondents, on the other hand,
allege that petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition as it failed to fully
exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional. 

HELD:

Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional.

It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the
public domain, of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the
patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset.  It may be
underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover all mining claims
located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which their locators had
failed to obtain a patent.  And even then, such locators may still avail of the renewable
twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Dec. No. 463, the Mineral Development
Resources Decree of 1974.

Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution.

Petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. 135190.  April 3, 2002

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BALITE

PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated; and THE
HONORABLE ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING REGULATORY
BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao), respondents.

FACTS:
The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-
Surigao Forest Reserve known as the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.” Located at Mt.
Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del Norte, the land has
been embroiled in controversy since the mid-80’s due to the scramble over gold
deposits found within its bowels.

On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted

Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included
the hotly-contested Diwalwal area.

Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991 Republic Act No. 7076, or the
People’s Small-Scale Mining Act.  The law established a People’s Small-Scale Mining
Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial
Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretary’s direct supervision and
control. The statute also authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-scale
mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to
small-scale miners under certain conditions.

On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued Department

Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as
non-forest land open to small-scale mining. The issuance was made pursuant to the
powers vested in the DENR Secretary by Proclamation No. 369, which established the
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.

On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which
directs the DENR to study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state
utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall
include, but shall not be limited to, studying and weighing the feasibility of entering into
management agreements or operating agreements, or both, with the appropriate
government instrumentalities or private entities, or both, in carrying out the declared
policy of rationalizing the mining operations in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area; such
agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing between the state and the said
parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale miners, as well as the
payment of royalties to indigenous cultural communities, among others.  The
Undersecretary for Field Operations, as well as the Undersecretary for Legal and
Legislative Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director of the Mines and Geo-
sciences Bureau are hereby ordered to undertake such studies. x x x

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the
Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal
Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which represented all the OTP grantees.  It prayed
for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground
that the “direct state utilization” espoused therein would effectively impair its vested
rights under EP No. 133.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.  It ruled that the DENR Secretary did not
abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since the same was
merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options available to the government
for solving the Diwalwal conflict. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the assailed
memorandum order did not adopt the “direct state utilization scheme” in resolving the
Diwalwal dispute.

Held:

We agree with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the challenged MO 97-03 did not
conclusively adopt “direct state utilization” as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. 
The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was
merely a study of this option and nothing else.  Contrary to petitioner’s contention, it did
not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners
or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to
undertake studies to determine its feasibility. 

G.R. No. 69997.  September 30, 1987

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, GREGORIA BOLANOS, AUREA ARAOJO,
GERVACIO ARAOJO, MARIA BERNAL, FELIX DETECIO, JESUS ASUNCION,
MELANIO ASUNCION and BIENVENIDO ASUNCION, respondents.

FACTS:

On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted mining patents on mineral
claims located at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu, Albay to herein petitioners and other
private individuals.

Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned
their rights to their mining claims in favor of the petitioner.  The assignment of rights was
recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on December 2, 1959.

The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on July 20, 1962, were all recorded
in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962 and transcribed on
September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds of Albay. 
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued the respective original certificates
of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 in the names of John Canson, Jr.,
Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner.

Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, tree patents were granted by the respondent
Director of Lands and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued by the
Register of Deeds to private respondents.
All of the above patents covered portions of the lots covered by the patents belonging to
the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents against the
private respondents and prayed that all the free patent titles issued in their favor for
properties over which original certificates of title had already been issued in its favor be
declared null and void.

The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint

The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. 

ISSUE:
a) Whether or not the lands in question belong to the public domain;
b) Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the petitioner had no personality to institute the same

HELD:

No.

Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provides:

"All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.  Natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, applying the aforequoted provision to the case at bar, we conclude that the
issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the President of the Philippines in
1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract or utilize the minerals
which may be found on or under the surface of the land.  On the other hand, the
issuance of the free patents by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979 in favor of the
private respondents granted to them the ownership and the right to use the land for
agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right to extract or utilize,
the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.

There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's stand that it acquired the right to the
mineral lands prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, thus, making such
acquisition outside its purview and scope.

Anent the second issue, the petitioner has no personality to institute the action below for
annulment and cancellation of patents.  The mineral lands over which it has a right to
extract minerals remained part of the inalienable lands of the public domain and thus,
only the Solicitor General or the person acting in his stead can bring an action for
reversion. 

LOCAL GOVERNANCE CASES:

G.R. No. 110249.  August 21, 1997

ALFREDO TANO, ET AL, petitioners,

vs.

GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES ET AL respondents.

Facts:

On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted
Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: “AN ORDINANCE
BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING
EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF.

To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued
Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:

“In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74,
otherwise known as ‘AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR
INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR
PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR
WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYOR’S
PERMIT” and “City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT
OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM
JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to
check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster
being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any
port within the jurisdiction of  the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft
or seacraft.

On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of

Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: “A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE
CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF
LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY:
SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS (SUNO).  CROMILEPTES
ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND
SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA
(MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS
MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS
SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL
AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM
PALAWAN WATERS,

and,

ORDINANCE NO. 2, Series of 1993

Entitled, “Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and
shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1.  Family: Scaridae
(Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3. Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or
Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4.  Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5.
Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other species), 6.
Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba
or Green Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of
five (5) years in and coming from Palawan Waters.

Respondents implemented the said ordinances, thereby depriving all the fishermen of
the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of
livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine
merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade.

Petitioners filed this petition directly with the COURT alleging that the Ordinances
deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from
the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; that the Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation
nor condition under which the Mayor’s permit could be granted or denied; in other
words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit
and; that Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan “altogether prohibited the
catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral
dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through
lawful fishing method,” the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to
earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline
Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their
vocation and entering “into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to
carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion.”

And finally, to declare Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as null and
void,

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED ORDINANCES ARE

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

HELD:

It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units)
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no
finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.

After a scrunity of the challenged  Ordinances and the provisions  of the Constitution
petitioners claim to have been violated, we find petitioners’ contentions baseless and so
hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and
applicable laws.

Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power,
inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. 
It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by
appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances,
electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing
laws. Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod,
and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to “[p]rotect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment
such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing… and such other
activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of
ecological imbalance.”
G.R. No. L-40243.  March 11, 1992

CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A.

SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; GAVINO V. GUERRERO, in
his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; JOSE T. BUEBOS, in his capacity
as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ANGELES TABLIZO, in his capacity as Councilor
of Virac, Catanduanes; ELPIDIO T. ZAFE, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catan-
duanes; MARIANO ALBERTO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes;
JULIA A. GARCIA, in her capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; and PEDRO A.
GUERRERO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes, respondents.

FACTS:

Celestino Tatel, a businessman, is engaged in the import and export of abaca and other
products. He has a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena.

Residents of barrio Sta. Elena filed a complaint against petitioner. They alleged that the
disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse
of petitioner affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke,
obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine. A committee was appointed by the
municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter.  The committee noted the crowded
nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses,
so much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of petitioner occasioned by a
continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable
materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people within the
neighborhood.
Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April
22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance
within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council of Virac.

Petitioner instituted the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning of Article

694 of the Civil Code and whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of
Virac is unconstitutional and void.

HELD:

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the
exercise of its police power.  It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations
are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government
and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and
carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general
welfare clause under the Administrative Code.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a
substantive nature.  These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance
No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.
 LAND TENURE CASES:

G.R. No. 86889.  December 4, 1990

 LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT

OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

FACTS:

On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13
and 32 of R.A. No. 6657.

On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and
Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657  (Commercial Farms).

Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry
business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be
adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section
16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production
and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules
and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on
January 9, 1989.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657, the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 and the
Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 are unconstitutional.

HELD:

Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are null and void for being
unconstitutional.

Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes “private agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising” in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to
the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the
agrarian reform program of the State.  There is simply no reason to include livestock
and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. The transcripts of the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural,"
clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian
reform program of the Government.

The requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing “corporate farms” which
include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement “production-sharing
plans” (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon
to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their
net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being
confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process.
G.R. No. 78742.  July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D.

GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M.
ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO,
FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J.
CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA,
FELICISIMA C. APRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO,
CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 79310.  July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUÑA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA,

HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE,
INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners, vs. JOKER
ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL,
respondents.

G.R. No. 79744.  July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner, vs. HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR
TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCEÑA, and ROBERTO TAAY,
respondents.

G.R. No. 79777.  July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. PHILIP
ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

G.R. No. 79777

Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and
229, and R.A. No. 6657.

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned
by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four
tenants and owned by petitioner Agustin Hermano, Jr.  The tenants were declared full
owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds
inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated
E.O. No. 228.  The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of
the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. 
Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a
valid appropriation.

The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be
the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives
and so violated due process.  Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem
because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.

G.R. No. 79310

The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental.  Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization
composed of 1,400 planter-members.  This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation
of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.

The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. 
Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the
Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during
the transition period.  At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the
President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be
annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process,
and equal protection.

They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it
is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, "in
violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his
landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer Certificates of Land
Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused
payment of lease rentals to him.

On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small
landholding under Operation Land Transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of
the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents.  He claims that
on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing.  On February 17, 1987,
he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos.
228 and 229 were issued.  These orders rendered his motion moot and academic
because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.

The petitioner now argues that:

(1)   E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.

(2)   The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

(3)   The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987
Constitution.

G.R. No. 78742

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to
owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are
cultivating or intend to cultivate the same.  Their respective lands do not exceed the
statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected
or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-
farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules
and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their
right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.  They therefore ask the
Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
are constitutional.

HELD:

R.A. No. 6657, Section 18 of the CARP Law, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229 are constitutional.

The Court declared that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for
in Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.

E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of
the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after
proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just
compensation.  Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its
Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after
October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just
compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or
the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank.  Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership
is contemplated either.

Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily
transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
 The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII,
Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable.  R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such
limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial
provisions.  This section declares:

Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or
retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall
vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by
the landowner exceed five (5) hectares.  Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each
child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications:  (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing
the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential
Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder,
further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as
long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall
have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention.  It is
settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will
suffice if the matters embodied in the text.
i
Ibid., p. 20; Fabian v. Desierto, supra, p. 487.
ii
Id.
iii
See § 1, Art. VIII, Constitution.
iv
Fabian v. Desierto, supra, p. 489.
v
Ibid., p. 492; Metro Construction v. Chatham Properties, supra, pp. 22-23.
vi
Its precursors are Circular No. 1-91, which prescribed the rules governing appeals to the CA from the final
orders or decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies; and Administrative Circular No. 1-95,
which revised the earlier circular.
vii
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
viii
Metro Construction v. Chatham Properties, supra, p. 20.
ix
Ibid.
x
Prior to BP Blg. 129, the jurisdiction of the CA, under the Judiciary Act of 1948, was as follows:
“SEC. 29. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. - The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all cases, actions, and proceedings, not enumerated in section seventeen of this Act, properly brought to it,
except final judgments or decisions of Court of First Instance rendered after trial on the merits in the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction, which affirm in full the judgment or decision of a municipal or city court, in which cases the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals only on petition for review, to which the Court of
Appeals shall give due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the court has committed errors of
fact or of fact and law that would warrant reversal or modification of the judgment or decisions sought to be
reviewed. The decision of the Court of Appeals shall be final: Provided, however, That the Supreme Court in its
discretion may, in any case involving a question of law, upon petition of the party aggrieved by the decision and
under rules and conditions that it may prescribe, require by certiorari that the said case be certified to it for
review and determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal. (RA No. 5433)”
“SEC. 30. Original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. - The Court of Appeals shall have original jurisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and
process in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.”
xi
The jurisdiction of the CA was expanded by BP Blg. 129 and RA No. 7902 to read:
“SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
“(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto,
and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
“(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
“(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional
Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the
Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
“The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform
any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the
Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the
Chief Justice.”
xii
Metro Construction v. Chatham Properties, supra, p. 22.
xiii
St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, 295 SCRA 494, 510, September 16, 1998.