Espiritu v. Ciprano Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

February 15, 1974 | Esguerra, J. | Dura lex sed lex

PETITIONER: Primitivo Espiritu and Leonora A. De Espiritu RATIO:

RESPONDENTS: Ricardo Ciprano and The Court of First Instance, Rizal,
Branch XV
SUMMARY: Espiritu wanted to evict Ciprano as the latter was not able to pay
rentals following a series of rental fee increase. Herein, Ciprano seeks to defend
himself through RA 6126, which prohibits rental fee increases within a certain
period when there is no consent of the other party.
The Court found that RA 6126 is not applicable to the case as the rental fee
increase started in 1969, while the law clearly states that only the period of
March 31, 1970 up to one year shall be covered by the moratorium on rental fee
increases.
DOCTRINE: Dura lex sed lex – the proper interpretation of the law should
always be implemented
1. The cited law by the respondent took effect on June 17, 1970, while the
unpaid rental fee increase was effective as early as January 1969. As cited
in the law, only those periods of rentals starting from March 31, 1970 until
one year has passed shall be affected by the prohibition for a rental increase
without prior consent of the other party. Applying the legal principle
expressum facit cessare tacitum, the law should be understood in its
plain meaning and only up to its provided period.
Moreover, the respondent Ciprano also did not show any allegations that his
consent was necessary for Espiritu to affect the increase. The use of RA
6126 as a last resort cannot be construed in such a way that it promotes
justice only for the respondent. The proper interpretation of the law
should always be implemented, particularly when the law is clear and
unambiguous. Herein, justice is applied as per what the law says rather
than what would be beneficial only to the petitioner or respondent.

FACTS:
1. Espiritu initially wanted to evict Ciprano due to failure to pay rentals.
Ciprano’s defense had issues as he was not properly guided by a legal
counsel throughout the process. Eventually, Judge Vivencio Ruiz gave
Ciprano the opportunity to file a motion to dismiss.
2. Ciprano alleged that under RA 6126, entitled "An Act To Regulate Rentals
of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another's Dwelling Is Located For
One Year And Penalizing Violations Thereof”
3. Court of First Instance ordered that the Motion for Dismissal be sustained,
and preceeding motion for reconsideration by Espiritu was denied.

ISSUE/s:
1. WoN RA 6126 is applicable to the case – NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are hereby
nullified and set aside. The court a quo shall proceed with the prompt disposition of
Civil Case No. 338-M (12285) on the merits in accordance with Republic Act 6031
if applicable, otherwise under the prevailing procedure prescribed by the Rules of
Court.

Costs against respondent.