PEOPLE vs.
LAKANDULA (MARZO) accused basically invoked the defense of alibi
July 20, 1983 | Fernando, J. | Implications
PETITIONER: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: ERNESTO LAKANDULA y ZAPANTA
DOCTRINE:
1. one of the incidental and inherent powers of the
courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from
one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring
site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and
impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of
justice so demands
FACTS:
 This is a mandatory review of the death sentence
imposed by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig,
Rizal, upon the accused Ernesto Lakandula.
 The accused was charged, together with others,
with Robbery with Homicide in an information
dated January 19, 1968 field before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal.
 Only the accused Lakandula was apprehended
who later pleaded “not guilty” ensuing the full
trial. However, this trial was held only when the
case was transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court
of Pasig after several postponements in the CFI
Rizal.
 As stated above, the Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig rendered a decision sentencing the accused
to suffer the death penalty.
 Majority of the discussion delt with the
commission of the crime charged where the
 The accused also argued that the lower court
erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case since
the transfer from the CFI Rizal to the Circuit
Criminal Court, in accordance with Administrative
Order No. 202, issued by the Secretary of Justice
on May 26, 1969, was not made in the interest of
the administration of justice because the accused
and his witnesses were made to travel more than
22 kilometers from Pasig, Rizal instead of
commuting a short distance from the City Jail of
Caloocan where he had been detained.
 The counsel for the accused also argues that
Secretary of Justice had no authority to legally
issue Administrative Order No. 202 and even
assuming that he can, the Secretary of Justice
cannot authorize the transfer or reassignment of
cases arising from the municipalities other than
those mentioned in the administrative order; and
that Republic Act No. 5179, which created the
circuit criminal courts, does not authorize the
transfer of cases which are pending and have
been partly tried by the Courts of First Instance.
ISSUE: Was the transfer of the case from the Court of
First Instance in Rizal to the Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig proper and valid?
RULING: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.
RATIO:
 On the discussion of alibi as a defense: The
Supreme Court held that after reviewing the case
with great case, it found no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the trial court which held
that the defense of alibi by the accused was
negated by the categorical declaration by a
witness who saw the accused inside the premises
where the crime was committed.
o Side note: The Court also held that in order
to accept alibi as a meritorious defense, it
must be shown that it was physically
impossible for the accused to be at the
scene of the crime when it was committed
but in the present case, and in addition to
the testimony of the witness above, the
accused himself admitted that he was at the
scene of the crime (when he admitted that
he held the hands of the deceased in order
to help him up) which negates his defense.
o What’s more is that the accused’s wife also
made an offer to pay the adoptive parents
of the deceased with PHP 800 as settlement
which constitutes an implied admission of
guilt.
 In resolving the issue above, the Supreme Court
held that it found no justification to sustain the
accused-appellant’s claim that the case was
transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court by virtue
of Administrative Order No. 202 which reads as
follows:
o "In the interest of the administration of
justice and upon joint petition of the
Municipal Mayors of Parañaque, Las Piñas,
Muntinglupa, Montalban, San Mateo,
Marikina, Malabon, and Navotas, Rizal,
which is favorably indorsed by the Provincial
Governor, all cases arising from the
aforesaid municipalities are hereby
transferred effective immediately from the
branches of the Court of First Instance of
the province to which they are presently
assigned to the branches of said Court with
official station at Pasig, with the exception
of those cases the trial of which have
already been begun by the Judges to which
they are presently assigned.
o "All administrative orders of this
Department which are in conflict herewith
are hereby revoked."
 The Court held that, clearly, from the provisions
above, only cases arising from the municipalities
of Paranaque, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Montalban,
San Mateo, Marikina, Malabon, and Navotas were
directed to be transferred to the branches of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. No mention
whatsoever is made of cases arising from
the City of Caloocan; thus, the transfer of the
case to the Circuit Criminal Court could not
have been effected pursuant to the
administrative order.
 Be that as it may, the Court also held that since
the case was transferred, the Court can only
assume that, as the Solicitor General has stated,
the transfer of the case to the Circuit Criminal
Court was effected in accordance with the long
standing practice by judges of moving cases from
one branch to another branch of the same court,
if they have agreed that such a step would
 best promote the ends of justice, as in this
case, which had been pending for a long time in
the Court of First Instance without being heard
although the accused was detained.
 The Supreme Court also recounted its decision in
the case of People vs. Gutierrez where it held that
one of the incidental and inherent powers of the
courts is that of transferring the trial of cases
from one court to another of equal rank in a
neighboring site, whenever the imperative of
securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing
a miscarriage of justice so demands.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment
appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED.
However, for lack of the necessary votes, the accused-
appellant who has been a detention prisoner for more
than fifteen (15) years, is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. With costs.