Humboldt Universitä t zu Berlin

Institut fü r Philosophie
Winter Semester 2013/2014
Proseminar: Der Wü rdebegriff
Dozentin: Dr. Nora Kreft

Is Poverty a Violation of Human Dignity?

Name: Astrid (Dona) McDonald

Anschrift: Leipziger Str. 58, 10117 Berlin
Matrikel Nummer: 537097
Studiengang: KombiBA Philosophie, Regionalstudien Afrika Asien
Fachsemester: 5. Fachsemester
Datum: 26. January 2015

1
 Table of Contents

Introduction…………………………………………..……………………………………..3

Part One: What is Human Dignity?

According to Avishai Margalit…………………………………………………………...…4

An Excursion into Kantian Dignity……………………………………………………..….5
According to Jürgen Habermas……………………………………………………….......7

Part Two: Is Poverty a Violation of Human Dignity?

A Response in Terms of Margalit and Habermas……................................…….…….9

My Response:

The Society in which Humans Live.…………………………….…...……………………10

Moral Self-Legistlation is Over-Burdened……………………….…………………….…11
Intrinsic Value is Being Undermined………………………….….………………….……12
Radical-Freedom is Being Suppressed………………………….……………...……….12

Conclusion……..……………………………………………………………………….….13

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………..15

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 Humboldt Universität zu Berlin
Institut für Philosophie
Proseminar: Der Würdebegriff
Datum: 26.01.2015
Dozentin: Dr. Nora Kreft
Studentin: Dona (Astrid) McDonald
Fachsemester: 5.Fachsemester
Kombinationsbachelor Philosophie, Regionalstudien Afrika Asien

mcdonala@hu-berlin.de

Introduction
As stated on the Project “Human Dignity” homepage of the University of Heidelberg, ‘the
meaning, scope and justification of human dignity have become increasingly controversial.’ 1
In legal terms, dignity is too abstract to be precise and attempts to consolidate it with a set
of basic rights2 have been denounced for not recognising that rights are rooted in dignity.3
For a pluralistic and largely secular and cynical world, dignity is too reliant on religious
scriptures.4 In medical ethical matters, not only is “dignity” but also “human” a very
unspecific concept. This controversy stems from the ignorance about what human dignity
actually constitutes and has even cast shadows of doubt over dignity’s existence. Ruth
Macklin made waves in 2003 as she announced that ‘dignity seems to be nothing more than
respect for autonomy. … Dignity is a useless concept in medical ethics and can be eliminated
without any loss of content.’'5 Moral deliberation is challenged by political, traditional and
medically-progressive behaviour and the possibilities and problems these each present. The
ignorance towards human dignity is no short-coming, rather it is inherent to our time and
place in human history. This ignorance is my motivation for granting the following
arguments such importance.

In response to the question whether poverty is a violation of human dignity I will argue that
it is. I will found this claim on Avishai Margalit’s ‘The Decent Society’ and Jürgen Habermas’
essay ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights’. Combining
these two perspectives deflates the aforementioned controversy, offering a plausible and
pragmatic interpretation of this notion. Margalit’s and Habermas’ views emphasise the role

1
Interdisciplinary Forum for Biomedicine and Cultural Studies (IFBK), 2011
2
Dieter Birnbacher, 1995, Aufklärung und Kritik 2 (Sonderheft 1): 6
3
Peter Schaber, 2010, Instrumentalisierung und Würde: 105
4
Ron Kubsch, 2004, MBS Jahrbuch 4: 63-86
5
Ruth Macklin, 2003, BMJ 327 (7249): 1419-1420
3
that human dignity plays in society as in history. The infringements poverty commits on
human dignity will subsequently be made explicit. Finally, I will argue that poverty is merely
a symptom of the market-based financial system and that this system is the actual violation
of human dignity.

What is human dignity according to Avishai Margalit.

Margalit chooses not to defend human dignity per se. ‘A Negative Justification of Human
Dignity’ forgoes the process of justifying respect of all human beings in favour of justifying
the prevention of suffering. Margalit argues that humans can suffer both physically and
psychologically and that morality ultimately entails the eradication of all cruelty. Physical
and psychological cruelty can be summed up in humiliation and so morality implies the
eradication of humiliation.6 Humiliation is defined as ‘any sort of behaviour or condition that
constitutes a sound reason for a person to consider his or her self-respect injured.’ 7 Margalit
discerns between various reasons one is entitled to feel humiliated. He stipulates that ‘only
humans can produce humiliation, although they need not actually have any humiliating
intent’8 and that ‘conditions are humiliating, however, only if they are the result of actions or
omissions by human beings.’9 A society carries responsibility for the humans within it and
Margalit describes a society as “decent” ‘if its institutions do not act in ways that give the
people under their authority sound reasons to consider themselves humiliated.’ 10

Margalit does attempt to find a reason to respect all humans equally, starting with the
creationist-religious heritage of human dignity as a concept and discussing the notion of
“reflected glory”; the translation of being created in God’s image from theistic into human
terms. Unsatisfied with either of these suggestions- which neither justify respecting all
humans nor respecting exclusively humans- Margalit places conditions upon any trait which
should justify respect for humans. Any such trait must be equal amongst all humans;
immune to abuse; morally relevant; and in human (as opposed to divine) terms. 11 The
criteria placed upon the sought-after justification for respect however do not apply to the
6
Avishai Margalit, 1998, The Decent Society: 85
7
Ibid.: 9
8
Ibid.: 10
9
Ibid.: 9
10
Ibid.: 10–11
11
Ibid.: 62–63
4
negative justification as not being cruel and not being treated cruelly do not raise the issue
of equality. Furthermore, a disdain for humiliation cannot be abused; the moral relevance of
acting against cruelty is implicit and this justification appeals to no divinities and may also be
expanded to all living beasts.

On Kant’s Dignity
Margalit addresses Kant’s arguments for human dignity. He concedes that Kant’s reasons for
respecting humans are morally relevant and not divine but laments that those reasons
breach the conditions of being equally shared amongst all humans (such as being a moral
self-legislator) and immune to abuse (in the case of the capacity to be a moral agent or to
determine one’s own ends). Hence Kant’s justification for universal and egalitarian respect
of human dignity fails in Margalit’s view. Using the quality of rationality as an example,
Margalit completely debases the idea that humans should be respected for their intrinsic
value. He argues that rationality is a trait in which humans cease to be individuals and so, in
some circumstances, utilitarian arguments weighing up the use- and exchange-value of
persons must become acceptable.12 The idea is that in the worst case immorally predisposed
scenario, some person or persons must be attributed more respect than others. These
situations sadly exist, and Kant’s justification based on intrinsic value merely ignores the
need to address such situations. Margalit then dismisses radical freedom as a justification
for respecting humans because he is forced to conclude that ‘the ability of human beings
to… abandon their evil ways’ is unfit as a justification for respecting humans, due to the
possibility that this capacity may be abused and perverted. Just as any human might change
for the better, every human could also change for the much worse.13

Kant needs to be defended. In response to the unequal distribution of moral capacity, Peter
Singer offers the appropriate response: ‘You cannot evade responsibility by imitating beings,
who are incapable of making this choice.’14 The fact some beings are incapable of morally
self-legislating with the same degree of logical consideration expected from healthy adults, is
not a reason to ignore the moral responsibility that the wisest and most insightful of humans
are capable of recognising.

12
Ibid.: 68–69
13
Ibid.: 70–75
14
Peter Singer, 2011, Practical Ethics: 61
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On the matter of intrinsic worth, to retort Kant with a utilitarian argument one is to miss the
point. There is a fundamental disagreement between Kant’s transcendentalism and
utilitarian materialism. Kant’s idea of what is good is derived from logical considerations
under the assumption of the freedom of any person. His conclusion is morality in form of
the categorical imperative; a single command which demands rational consideration and
allows circumstantial adaptation. Utilitarianism however derives its idea of goodness from
experience, under the assumption of a human nature. Utilitarian ethics are a set of rules
and guidelines, which do not oblige a subject to intelligence, but to the standards and
sanctions of the circumstances at play. Kant is clearly not describing a moral system which is
practised in our market-based and utilitarian economy. Already in 1797 he questioned the
integrity of a society in which the needy are dependent on the help of the rich. This
afterthought expressing doubt over institutional morality is still relevant today:
The wherewithal for doing good, which depends upon the gifts of fortune, is for the most
part a result of the patronage of various men owing to the injustice of government, which
introduces an inequality of wealth that makes beneficence necessary. Under such
circumstances, does the assistance which the rich render the needy deserve at all the name
of beneficence, with which one so gladly plumes himself as merit? 15

I believe that Kant is not ignoring those worst case immorally predisposed scenarios with his
claim to intrinsic value, but preaching an attitude and a world, which rise above them.

Lastly, the criticism that radical freedom is no reason to respect other persons is, I feel
misplaced; it is a reason to respect one’s self. To deny one’s own autonomy is an insult to
one’s own dignity. Kant’s ‘autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of
every rational nature’.16 Furthermore:
He possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) whereby he exacts the respect of all other
rational beings in the world, can measure himself against each member of his species, and
can esteem himself on a footing of equality with them. The humanity in one’s person is the
object of the respect which he can require of every other human being, but which he also
must not forfeit. Consequently, he can and should value himself at once both small and
great, according to which he regards himself as a sensible being (according to his moral
predisposition). But since he must regard himself not merely as a person in general but also
as a man, i.e., as a person having duties which his own reason has imposed upon him, his
insignificance as a human animal cannot injure the consciousness of his dignity as a rational
man. And he should not disavow the moral self-esteem of such a being, i.e., he should
pursue his end (which in itself is a duty) neither cringingly nor servilely as though seeking

15
Immanuel Kant and James W. Ellington, 1994, The Elements of Ethics PtII: 119
16
Ibid.: 41
6
 favour, nor should he deny his dignity; but, rather, he should always pursue his end with an
awareness of the sublimity of his moral nature (and such awareness is already contained in
the concept of virtue). This self-esteem is a duty of man to himself. 17

Habermas’ Human Dignity

Habermas chooses to argue for a positive and cognitive identification of human dignity. His
argument is an empirical one, which ultimately agrees with Margalit’s argument. Habermas
argues that human dignity is the ‘moral “source” from which all of the basic human rights
derive their meaning.’18 Habermas defines human dignity as ‘the “portal” through which the
egalitarian and universalistic substance of morality is imported into law.’ According to
Habermas, the feeling of indignation, caused by political tyranny, religious discrimination,
inequality and exclusion (to name just a few), has given birth to a ‘generally acceptable
justification whose epistemic dimension is beyond state control.’ 19 The term “human
dignity” has been implemented as a tool of empowerment against the negative experience
of humiliation, to create positive laws which protect the equal claim of every person for
respect from their fellow human beings. The result is human rights.

Habermas emphasises the ‘catalytic role’ human dignity has played in the development of
human rights. Addressing the translation of subjective moral responsibilities into objective
legal claims, he explains how the synthesis of internalised rationally based morality in the
subjective conscience and the organised force of judicial legislation have changed (western)
society from one where individual moral subjects owed respect to other persons, into a
society where individual legal subjects may demand respect from other persons. Habermas
also discusses the transformation of dignity’s semantic content. Curiously, the honour
previously attributed to those in authority positions now adorns all persons in a political
framework, which has been fought for and developed by the citizens themselves, insofar as
democratic theory intends for citizens to partake in self-governance. 20
Habermas’ empirical argument agrees with Margalit’s analytical one: the violation of
humanity occurs in the act of humiliation. Michael Rosen concurs as he writes ‘To respect
someone’s dignity requires that one treats them “with dignity”—that is, they must not be

17
Ibid.: 97
18
Jürgen Habermas, 2010, Metaphilosophy 41 (4): 466
19
Ibid.: 469
20
Ibid.: 470–475
7
treated in ways that degrade, insult, or express contempt.’21 A similar view is offered by
Theodor Adorno: ‘One should be united with the suffering of human beings: the smallest
step to their joys is one towards the hardening of suffering.’ 22 The protection of human
dignity is a matter of preventing humiliation and it is a legitimate demand that all humans
are equally entitled to make. The idea of protecting human dignity can be equated with that
of non-humiliation, as can a violation of human dignity be seen as synonymous with
humiliation.

I contend, that Margalit’s ‘negative justification’ is compatible with Kant’s human dignity, yet
offers a more practical guideline in terms of societal legislation. Habermas offers further
insight from his empirical point of view:
‘The features of human dignity specified and actualised in this way [through the experience
of humiliation] can then lead both to a more complete exhaustion of existing civil rights and
to the discovery and construction of new ones. The background intuition of humiliation
forces its way first into the consciousness of suffering individuals and then into the legal
texts, where it finds conceptual articulation and elaboration.’ 23

The interesting point that Habermas makes, is that dignity neither can nor should be
positively identified a priori. Habermas believes that a precise listing of infringements upon
human rights are not foreseeable and therefore not legible until they have both occurred
and been considered from a universal, egalitarian and legally enforceable perspective.
James Ellington aptly notes in the introduction to his English translation of the Grounding of
the Metaphysics of Morals, that ‘Moral philosophy is intended for what can be realised in
action amid changing circumstances.’24 Morality and human dignity cannot be carved in
stone. Minimalistic laws in the form of human rights are necessary to invoke Kantian
morality, but the conditions under which humans live are not stagnant and unchanging. The
prevention of humiliation offers the greatest freedom whilst not evaluating the merit of
behaviours. It aims only to forbid cruelty.
Is poverty a violation of human dignity?
According to Margalit, poverty must be man-made- but not self-made- for it to be
humiliating. There are indeed rare instances of poverty which do not constitute humiliation,
but these are ‘bound to be limited to voluntary poverty and the poverty of the childless.’ If

21
Michael Rosen, 2012, Dignity, It's History and Meaning: 129
22
Theodor W. Adorno, 1994, Minima Moralia: 22
23
Jürgen Habermas, 2010, Metaphilosophy 41 (4): 468
24
Immanuel Kant and James W. Ellington, 1993, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: xi
8
poverty means living below the minimum, which a society (not a government) considers
necessary to live a life fit for humans, then poverty excludes persons from ‘economic
citizenship’ in that society. 25 The institutions responsible for a society may well be the cause,
by their actions or omissions, of this financial status. The consequences of this financial
status, are what forces poverty to indeed be a humiliating condition to live under. Margalit
views poverty as a violation of human dignity because it leaves humans exposed, vulnerable
and unable to help themselves; labels one a failure and seals this fate; poses an existential
threat; creates a class of humans who are compared to animals; denies the poor the glory of
aesthetic charm; withholds one from fulfilling their responsibility to provide for their family;
is often associated with filth; leads to depression; causes and encourages competition
between those who share the same fate; and detaches persons from the human
community.26 Furthermore, poverty robs the poor of reasons to respect themselves:
Seeing poverty as closing off possibilities of living that are worthwhile in the eyes of the poor
themselves makes them seem worthless to themselves as well, as if they are incapable of
living a life that is worthwhile even in their own eyes. 27

Margalit brushes over the roots of welfare as a response to market-economy 28 and touches
on the ‘business-cycles in capitalist economies’29 as a cause of poverty. The relationship
between the globalised market-economy and human dignity is something I will offer more
attention in the final section of this essay.

Habermas notes that the changes surrounding human dignity and human rights could and
would never have taken place without turmoil and conflict resulting from experiences of
humiliation. The experience of marginalisation- of financial segregation and life in poverty is
a humiliating experience which has recurred throughout history.
“Human Dignity” performs the function of a seismograph that registers what is constitutive
for a democratic legal order, namely, just those rights that the citizens of a political
community must grant themselves if they are to be able to respect one another as members
of a voluntary association of free and equal persons. 30

Reading between the lines, in those instances, where poverty has led to tumult and revolt, it
has evidently been an infringement on human dignity. In those instances, where human

25
Avishai Margalit, 1998, The Decent Society: 229
26
Ibid.: 227–228
27
Ibid.: 230–231
28
Ibid.: 222
29
Ibid.: 230
30
Jürgen Habermas, 2010 Metaphilosophy 41 (4): 469
9
dignity has been called upon, it reflects the dissatisfaction of a population with the political
priorities of the society to which they (are supposed to) belong. It is not lost on Habermas
that the relationship between aspiring self-legislating populations and the implementation of
human rights allegedly protecting human dignity is a partial, fragile and sometimes
downright dubious one. The “legal order” in our society is what I wish to concentrate on in
the final section of this essay.

My thoughts:
The idiosyncratic relationship between morality and humiliation was illustrated by Martin
Luther King in his famous Nobel Peace Prize Lecture: ‘It is better suffer in dignity than to
accept segregation in humiliation’.31 Luther King was telling us not that suffering is a
violation of dignity but the mistreatment of persons by others. Such mistreatment and its
acceptance violate humanity and gives us reason to be implored. Morality exists not in the
eradication of suffering, but in the standard set by self-respect. The following argument is
based on the idea that society is human by extension. Society consists of and carries the
responsibility for humans on a larger, anonymous scale. Poverty, as far as it is man-made
(but not self-made) must now be viewed in our social system: the market-based economy.

Margalit examines what he calls a ‘macroethical concept… the setup of society as a whole’ 32
in terms of the behaviour necessary for human relations abstracted through institutions to
be deemed “decent”. He does not go further to question the principles guiding society. The
economic historian Michael Perelman does. In his book “The Invisible Handcuffs of
Capitalism: How Market Tyranny Stifles the Economy by Stunting Workers” he gives us an
insight into macroeconomics –the setup of the global economic system as a whole.
‘This field is governed by, Perelman shows, a stubborn, obtuse tendency to ignore factors of
production and working conditions, instead theorising the economy as a level playing field of
rational actors engaging in free transactions. This produces economic theory and policy that
views the daily concerns of working people –job security, fulfilling work, safe and healthy
workplaces, liveable wages – as irrelevancies.’ 33

31
Luther King Jr., Martin, 1964, Nobel Prize Lecture
32
Avishai Margalit, 1998, The Decent Society: 2
33
Jeremy Milloy, Labour/Le Travail 71, 2013: 320
10
The market-based society claims to provide equal and universal human dignity by means of
economic freedom, when in fact dignity is more an interference in the profit calculations of
powerful financial interests. Governments granting primarily economic liberties fail to
secure the other basic human rights: inclusion and equality. 34 Freedom, respect and
meaningful participation in society occur as the luxuries of those who are privileged enough
to earn or own them- making them inequitable with inherent rights. Heiner Bielefeldt
pointedly remarks that Kant and his contemporaries could never have foreseen that the
notion of human dignity and the claim for equality would birth the demand for marriage
rights for homosexual couples.35 Similarly, the idea of remodelling our financial system as a
response to perpetual marginalisation is not impossible –it is just not yet accepted. In an
internet post by Jeremy Rifkin on the Prospect Magazine website, he claims:
A half a century from now, our grandchildren are likely to look back at the era of mass
employment in the market with the same sense of utter disbelief as we look upon slavery
and serfdom in former times. The very idea that a human being’s worth was measured
almost exclusively by his or her productive output of goods and services and material wealth
will seem primitive, even barbaric, and be regarded as a terrible loss of human value to our
progeny living in a highly automated world where much of life is lived on the Collaborative
Commons. 36

I return to my defence of Kant, as those three misconceived points build the foundation of
my argument: poverty is an inescapable result of our global market-based financial system
and it is this market-based financial system which constitutes a violation of human dignity.

Firstly, the role of moral self-legislation in present society is over-burdened. Kant’s idealistic
moral society is one, where subjects act, and these actions set an example which others
inevitably follow. The most rational subjects set the most moral standards which in turn
inspire moral behaviour amongst their fellows. Binding those standards to institutional law
automatically restricts the conscience of reason as a law upon itself. The morality of an
action cannot be evaluated by its legality or utility. I do not raise doubts that even a rational
community needs an organisational form of government, yet I consider it questionable
whether Kant would agree to the dogmatic obedience of laws when these conflict with
morality and a rational agent’s law of reason. The ‘constitutive legal order’ in our society
reflects that both persons and morality are viewed in monetary terms. The health of the

34
Jürgen Habermas, 2010, Metaphilosophy 41 (4): 468–469
35
Heiner Bielefeldt, 2011, Auslaufmodell Menschenwürde?: 108
36
Jonathan Derbyshire and Jeremy Rifkin, 2014
11
environment does not render the importance of effective climate change policies; education
funding is reduced whilst banks are rescued; the justice of the courts presents different
consequences often in accord with the price of one’s lawyer(s). No matter what aspect of
politics one views, it is rare to find examples where the interests served are not the interests
of the rich.

Secondly, intrinsic value is an attitude of appreciation and acceptance, not tainted by a

consequentialist ambition to maximise goods. Kant speaks of intrinsic value as opposed to
exchange value.37 Exchange value gives things a price. This price is fixed to a purpose (an
“end”). The purpose is determined by utility. Conversely, a person who does not fulfil a
purpose has no price and no value. Kant’s intrinsic value insinuates that there is immaterial
profit to be gained from all persons and that this gain cannot be guessed before the event
nor judged empirically. In the “Kingdom of Ends” agents do not pursue their happiness or
satisfaction; this condition is a by-product of the pursuit of other (morally acceptable) ends.
Kant furthermore explicitly states that happiness, although it might be the greatest and only
common goal of all of humanity, is not an end which may be pursued.38 If Kant is correct,
then utilitarian forms of state and economy geared towards the greatest happiness for the
greatest number must be abandoned in favour of forms of governments geared towards
morality- inclusive systems which nurture equally autonomous subjects. According to
Habermas, human rights depict precisely this shift from utilitarian to moral state philosophy.

Thirdly, radical Freedom is a transcendental quality, which is being suppressed by physical

suffering and material distraction. Margalit mentioned that poverty poses an ‘existential
threat’. This is true not only for those in poverty, but for all persons who do not occupy the
capitalist status- for all whose wealth does not perpetually inflate. Inflation pushes costs of
living for all persons ever higher. Granted, this is not immediately threatening for many
people, however statistics for wealth distribution show an obvious trend. The attitude of
competition to get or keep ahead are indoctrinated in our society. Competition is
antonymous with fraternity and as an attitude it is incompatible with one of respect. It
views other persons, not as “ends-in-themselves” but as potential threats to one’s own ends.
Furthermore, the supplies and demands of the modern market are themselves rather
37
Immanuel Kant and James W. Ellington, 1994, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 2 nd Section: 40
38
Ibid.: 8; 12; 26 - 28
12
questionable. It is not true that there is a shortage of resources to eradicate poverty.
Meanwhile demands are artificially manufactured and satisfied. The role that education and
advertising plays in shaping a consumer’s “free choice” is decisive. The bombardment of
advertising and the deceptive freedom secured by economic liberty, which constitute the
everyday experience for many in western societies, severely influence and restrict the
freedom of choice, allegedly used in the act of consumption.

In light of these three complaints I must conclude that moral self-legislation, intrinsic value
and radical-freedom are all deeply intertwined and corrupted by money and society’s
chosen utilities. Morality becomes irrelevant and impossible in extreme cases of poverty. It
is not fair to judge a thief immoral, when she must steal to feed her children. The price of
one’s purpose labels and values the very existence of people in our society. The effort of
persons working are valued and priced according to arbitrary evaluations. Teachers earn
less than actors; carers less than CEOs- what worth, value and gain does each represent for
our community and in what measure is this rewarded? Being able to escape the daily grind
or to enter into honest work is for many an exercise in folly and delusion- not in freedom- it
will not win them any dignity nor will such efforts alleviate their strain. Human rights are a
motion toward a Kantian society and away from hegemonic imperial forms of state.

Conclusion
Poverty is an inescapable result of our global market-based financial system and it is this
market-based financial system which constitutes the actual violation of human dignity. The
market-based economic system denies persons their intrinsic worth by putting a price on
their person and treating them as a means of production. Poverty resulting from the
market-based economic system stigmatises those affected with a social status and typically
accompanying social conditions. The principle of competition encouraged and propelled by
the market-based economic system furthermore values persons in terms of the money
spent, which injures their inherent worth and principles of equality. It also deceives many
people with money to sell their own freedom for the illusion of affluence. Citizenship in our
society not only comes in grades and classes, each available at a different price- it is simply
not available to many people, who may take nothing for granted and must exert themselves
just to “earn their keep”. Too many of these people are not even officially deemed to be

13
living in poverty. For these reasons, those living in poverty, official or not, are without
question the victims of this political state of affairs and their human dignity is being violated.
The negative interpretation of human dignity in terms of humiliation as supported by Avishai
Margalit and Jürgen Habermas is a useful tool in the legislation of human rights, intended to
strengthen democratic interests against commercial, religious, violent and other predators.
Yet Kant’s human dignity with which human rights have legally bestowed our species, is
something for each individual to realise for his or herself, despite impossible circumstances,
and to translate into action, by means of moral self-legislation, by recognising one’s own and
others’ intrinsic worth and utilising one’s own radical freedom.

14
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