F  D  P?

ORIGINAL
Blackwell
Oxford,
The
MUWO
©
0027-4909
2
962006
Muslim ARTICLE
Hartford
UK Publishing
WorldSeminary
Ltd

Failure of Democracy in
The Muslim
Failure of Democracy
World in Pakistan

Pakistan?
Irshad Ahmad Haqqani*
Lahore, Pakistan

I
n order to understand the plight of democracy in Pakistan, one needs
to remember the circumstances into which Pakistan came into being.
Its establishment as an independent country was the result of a political
movement of Muslims of the Subcontinent, no doubt, but those Muslims were
not politically organized. In fact, they had no political platform during the
initial period. Though they acquired one in 1906 in the form of the Muslim
League, this group was not terribly effective until 1934, when Jinnah joined it.
Most of those who assumed leadership in the Muslim League and rose to
power later in the newly independent country neither felt any real attachment
to the norms of democracy nor showed any genuine commitment to Islamic
teachings. The persistence of feudal culture throughout the country after
independence (even to today) also helped nondemocratic forces exert their
influence and poses a continuing and formidable challenge to the progress of
democracy in Pakistan.
In addition to this internal dimension, the country faces enormous security
pressures due to multifaceted problems with India. As State survival became
the country’s primary concern, the military assumed a greater than average
importance. Then, in the wake of weak political leadership, the military’s top
brass began to assert its centrality in matters of governance and political
management. One reason for the military’s frequent and prolonged stints in
power is that military rulers have managed to secure substantial external
backing for themselves.
Unfortunately, Pakistani politicians have not utilized the interludes between
periods of military rule to establish a civilian government. Instead, those who
prospered “at the pleasure” of military dictators allowed Parliament to simply
“rubber-stamp” the military’s initiatives. Rather than serving the cause of
democracy, Pakistani politicians have chosen instead to curry favor from the
military’s top brass and its backers in Washington. By indulging in corruption,
these politicians have not only smeared their own reputations but have also

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given rise to increasing public disenchantment with politics and the political
process.
The state of the judiciary is as dismal as that of other branches of the
Pakistani government. Apart from a few bold judgments, the higher courts
have played a pliant role to suit the whims and notions of those in power.
Military dictators and civilians too required that the courts comply with their
demands.
The country’s media, however, holds promise both for itself and for the
nation. In the face of restrictions and persecution, it has managed to survive
and uphold the cause of freedom of expression.
In spite of the many obstacles and failures in the democratic process, the
people of Pakistan have again and again shown confidence in democracy.
Given the opportunity, the public has risen against the military’s intervention
in politics and forced them back to their barracks. The people want to see
Pakistan emerge as a democratic, law-abiding country. Pakistanis have as
much potential to live in a peaceful democracy as people of any other nation,
and this road it must take. Developing democracy, however, requires time,
which it must be given without interruption.
Another phase of local elections recently concluded,1 giving rise to
both expectations and apprehensions. While the President, Prime Minister
and spokespersons of the ruling coalition declared that these elections
were an important milestone in the history of democracy in Pakistan,
the opposition expressed serious concerns about the exercise. Though
the rulers thought it prudent to hold these elections on a non-party basis,
political parties of all hues — ruling and opposition — participated with
full vigor.
With all the contradictory assertions and allegations, one faces the
inevitable question: Is Pakistan on the road to democracy? If so, then why
hasn’t it taken root in the country?
While there may be more than one answer and perspective, it is important
to keep in mind how Pakistan came into being. Did the conditions that are a
pre-requisite for the growth of democratic culture exist or not?

Muslims in the Subcontinent

After being in power in the Subcontinent for over 800 years, Muslims
found themselves on the wrong side of the political equation when British
colonial forces overthrew them and assumed direct power in the middle of
the nineteenth century. The new rulers subjugated their predecessors and
deliberately kept them backward in all areas. Although Hindus too were the
subjects of colonial rule, they had not been overthrown by their new masters
and so were not as averse to them, or their views and policies, as were the

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Muslims. Indignant at having been removed from power and proud of their
values, Muslims boycotted everything English. They were averse to modern
education and even against the learning of the English language. Hindus, on
the other hand, took to the modern approach more easily. Thus, Muslims
began lagging behind their Hindu fellows, who outnumbered them in all fields
of human activity.
Since the failure of the Mutiny of 1857, Muslims have also been suspected
of being “disloyal.” They lacked a political platform of their own from which
to express their views. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) had only relative success
convincing colonial rulers of the reasons for Muslim unrest and persuading
Muslims to desist from active politics and focus instead on acquiring modern
educations. He advised Muslims against joining the Indian National Congress
(formed in 1885), which was ostensibly a neutral platform for “interaction”
between the English and their subjects, but a clear bias toward the Hindu
population was evident from the day of its inception.2
Congress struggled to achieve self-rule and independence, but in a way
that not only left Muslims hopeless about their status and rights in a free and
united India but also made them suspicious about the party’s intentions due
to its position on issues vital to Muslims, such as separate electorates, the
partition of Bengal, and Muslim leaders’ efforts for Hindu-Muslim unity.
This led to the creation of the Muslim League in 1906 as a party that aimed
specifically to represent Muslims.

The Birth and Rise of the Muslim League

The Muslim League would not become a party representing the masses
and espousing modern political thought and trends for over a quarter century.
It was only when Jinnah joined in 1934 that it began to function as intended.
With a solid understanding of the existing situation in the Subcontinent and
grasping global trends of liberation and the right of self-determination of all
peoples, Jinnah both defined the distinct nature of the Muslim identity and
called for a separate homeland for them where they could live according to
their own values and way of life.
Pitted in a political battle, Congress and the Muslim League held positions
that were becoming increasingly irreconcilable. To resolve the impasse, Lord
Wavell, then Viceroy of India, convened a conference at Simla in June 1945 at
which it was decided that elections would be held to ascertain who represents
whom, and to what extent. Earlier, in the elections in 1937 held under the India
Act of 1935, the Muslim League had been unable to prove that it was the sole
representative of India’s Muslim population while Congress had succeeded in
forming its governments in six provinces under the eye of its central
leadership.

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Early Political Exigencies

Preparing for the 1945–46 elections, Jinnah welcomed “everybody who
was anybody” in politics into the Muslim League, but particularly people from
the Muslim-majority provinces. Needless to say, he had to compromise in one
way or another to enlist Muslim support for the party. The Jinnah-Sikandar
Pact is one example of his approach in this regard. On the other hand, local
influentials and vested interests in the Muslim-majority areas who wanted only
to secure their stake in any future setup were now eager to join the Muslim
League, since its ranks were swelling and fortunes rising under Jinnah’s
dynamic leadership. Many of those who joined the League at this stage did not
have any real connection with democratic values and norms. Unfortunately,
the undemocratic elements are still at the helm of affairs in the party.
The two parties that assumed power in August 1947 in the two newly
independent states of Pakistan and India were poles apart in terms of their
political growth, democratic culture, political acumen, and the character of
their leadership. Leadership of the Congress espoused democratic values, a
nationalist sentiment, and secularism, but many of those who assumed
leadership in the Muslim League neither felt any real attachment to the norms
of democracy nor showed any commitment to Islamic teachings.
While Nehru’s contribution in promoting a democratic culture after
Independence in India cannot be denied, the fact is that it was not just Nehru
but almost all congressional leaders and supporters who upheld the notion of
democracy. With or without Nehru, democracy was set to take root in India.
In sharp contrast, those who came to rule in Pakistan were not particularly
open to democracy; they believed in personal cults and group interests, not in
political institutions or systems. They could not really fathom the idea that
common people can be the final arbiters of their own destinies.

Non-democratic Practices and Consequences

It was because the democratic mind-set was so alien to Pakistanis that it
took nine years for the country to have a constitution of its own, whereas India
achieved this end in just one year. It was not a coincidence that the tradition
of time-bound elections took root in India from the very beginning, whereas
it took 23 years for Pakistan to hold its first country-wide election — which,
ironically, resulted in the bifurcation of the country into Pakistan and
Bangladesh. In large part, the secessionist strain in Bangladesh (then the East
Pakistan province) was encouraged by the non-democratic attitude of political
leaders from West Pakistan. These politicians refused to accept the majority
and its right to rule, and instead tried to impose their writ by force,
inadvertently paving the way for the separation of the entire region.

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These politicians had exhibited similar behavior earlier. In the 1951

elections in Punjab and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the sanctity
of the ballot box was sacrificed for the sake of political interests and coming
to power by any means. In the 1954 elections in East Pakistan, the Jagtu
(United) Front won an overwhelming majority, but its government was sacked
within a few months and governor rule imposed.
It is an unfortunate reality that those who came to rule the country from
the outset were not particularly fond of or trained in democratic traditions.
Jinnah only lived for about a year after the creation of Pakistan. His towering
persona had overshadowed the weaknesses of local politicians and the
fledgling system, but these were exposed with his passing.

Feudal Culture
The existence of a feudal-like system in Pakistan continues to present a
formidable obstacle to the progress of democracy in the country. In India,
feudalism and landlordism were brought to an end soon after Independence.
This ended the poor’s financial dependence on feudal lords. The lower classes
tasted new freedoms, which in turn supported the spread of democracy in the
country. The situation in Pakistan was quite the opposite. Much of the Muslim
League leadership, especially from the areas that subsequently became part of
Pakistan, was composed of wealthy and powerful landlords and feudal and
tribal leaders. Their interests lay in maintaining the status quo; they neither had
any particular affinity for democratic values nor did they care about improving
the lot of the masses. Since local feudals and chieftains control government
machinery, in rural areas in particular, law enforcement agencies take more
interest in enforcing the writ of the feudal than that of the law. The feudal class
not only still exists but has gained in strength and influence in Pakistani
politics. Many of those who occupy prominent positions in political parties,
ruling and opposition alike, belong to this class, and their interests lie in the
perpetuation of the present feudalistic system.
It is an unfortunate fact that feudal and tribal chiefs have frustrated
efforts toward improvement in the area of education. They even opposed
the development of infrastructure for fear that this would lead to people’s
emancipation and progress — the same people who had hitherto been their
hapless subjects. The incidence of violence and crime against women in rural
areas is a part of this larger picture. Though not limited to women, a
particularly ugly fact is that they are often humiliated as a means of subjugating
and suppressing the men in the feudal’s dominion.
Politics has become a game for the rich and this is a result of the power
and influence that feudals enjoy in the country. It is almost impossible for a

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middle-class individual to consider standing in elections. Thus has the feudal

system impeded the growth of democracy in Pakistan.

Military Intervention
With a weak democratic culture and group of politicians (in addition to
Indian hostility against Pakistan), the military’s top brass found an excuse to
meddle in national political affairs. The military has ruled the country for more
than half of Pakistan’s existence. Even when it is not ruling, military leaders
call the shots from behind the scenes and play a “guardian role” in the affairs
of the government.
Military interference in Pakistani politics began in the early 1950s when
Army Chief General Ayub Khan helped the President dislodge weak political
leaders one after another and ultimately assumed power himself by imposing
martial law in 1958. The seeds for this had been sown when Khan was
appointed Defense Minister “in uniform” in 1954.3
The military’s involvement in politics is a major reason why a democratic
political culture has not developed in Pakistan. Weak political leadership,
India’s hostility toward Pakistan and the lingering problem in Jammu and
Kashmir have necessitated that Pakistan maintain a large and powerful army.

External Support for Military Juntas

America’s patronage of Pakistan’s military rulers has also contributed to
the inability of democracy to take root in the country. In the face of Indian
hostility, Pakistan thought it could best meet security needs by forming an
alliance with America and participating in U.S.-led Western treaties (SEATO
and CENTO) in the 1950s. Despite all its talk of democracy, the U.S. thinks its
own interests are better served when the military has a very prominent role in
Pakistan’s national matters. This is because the U.S. finds it easy to deal with
an unelected dictator — a single person surrounded by sycophants — rather
than an elected political leadership that represents the whole nation. The
history of external powers’ interest and intervention in Pakistan’s internal
matters is long and sad. If we ignore it, we do so at our peril; the way to
overcome it is through the political process.
The U.S. patronized General Ayub Khan so that it would have an ally in
the region. It wanted to check the spread of communism, of which Soviet
Russia and China were the two main protagonists. Also, India was leaning
toward cooperation with the Soviets. The U.S. fully backed General Zia-ul-Haq
with respect to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s support to the
Afghan resistance. This is the U.S. strategy even today. Declaring its attack on
Afghanistan in October 2001 as a “war against terrorism,” the U.S. enlisted
General Pervez Musharraf’s support as a “close ally” in this war. Before this,

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the General did not enjoy favor from the U.S. The perception in Pakistan is
that as long as the U.S. needs the General, it will continue to support him
regardless of how that affects democracy in Pakistan.
While the U.S. has supported Pakistan’s military dictators, successive
civilian rulers were never in favor. For example, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in spite of
his secularist thinking, was not in America’s good graces because he started a
nuclear program. Then there were the crushing sanctions the U.S. imposed
against Pakistan throughout the period of civilian rule from the late 1980s to
the late 90s — a whole decade — when Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were
the elected leaders of the country.
Pakistan first faced martial law in 1958. Although military ruler Ayub Khan
employed all means to create an impression of mass support for his rule, he
failed to provide justification for being in office and had to relinquish power
in the face of the massive agitation and political antagonism against him. His
was a despotic rule; the constitution he devised was aimed to perpetuate
his own power. He introduced EBDO (Elective Bodies Disqualification
Ordinance), a presidential system and maneuvered to defeat Jinnah’s sister
(Fatima Jinnah) — and with this the will of the people in the presidential
elections of 1965. In spite of all this, he had to abdicate power in 1968. What
is worth noting is that the subsequent transfer of power did not take place
according to the constitution he had devised. It is unfortunate that his
departure did not result in democracy in Pakistan. He was succeeded by
another despot, General Yahya Khan, who presided over the tragic separation
of East Pakistan — reaping what Ayub Khan had sown there for himself.

Political Bickering
The chaotic reign of General Yahya Khan ended when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
assumed power. Although he was an elected Prime Minister, he held the
dubious distinction of being the Civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator. He
had been Foreign Minister with Ayub Khan, and had made the post a focus of
public attention. His charismatic leadership and role in foreign and defense
policies aside, Bhutto did not show any real interest in promoting a democratic
culture in Pakistan either. Although his role in the consensual 1973
Constitution has been greatly appreciated, he himself trampled its sanctity. He
not only persecuted his political opponents but refused to tolerate dissent,
even from within party ranks.
Thus, in spite of civilian rule from 1972 to 77, democracy failed to take
hold in Pakistan. The constitution was not respected in either spirit or letter.
Smaller provinces were restless and complained about the federal
government’s attitude. The situation came to a head in the province of
Balochistan — army action was mounted there. This might have quelled the

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opposition at the time, but further boosted anti-Center sentiment. Ultimately,

the provincial governments in Balochistan and NWFP were dissolved (The
Balochistan government was dissolved, while the NWFP government resigned
in protest).4
The performance of the opposition from the platform of the Pakistan
National Alliance (PNA) too became a cause for despondency and dejection.
The allegation against the leadership of the Alliance is that it deliberately tried
to sabotage talks with the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, that it invited
martial law (1977) and obtained ministerial positions separately after differences
developed among its own ranks. The formation of MRD led by the Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) could not provide a platform for political culture. Along
with those in its ranks who were playing the game of the establishment, the
MRD was criticized by those who had earlier formed the PNA against the PPP.
This mutual recrimination adversely affected the position of all political parties
in the eyes of the people.
Although apparently facing no political challenge but in search of legitimacy
for his rule and to continue as president, General Zia-ul-Haq held elections in
1985 on a non-party basis — like the recently concluded elections for local
bodies. While these elections paved the way for democracy, they also
strengthened the biraderi system and gave rise to parochial, ethnic and tribal
prejudices. The tenure of Prime Minister Junejo (1985–88) proved better in many
respects than the previous governments. Martial law came to an end — although
the 8th Amendment provided indemnity for measures taken by the martial law
regime, political parties were revived, and there were greater freedoms of
speech and dissent. But when the Premier began to assert himself, the President
(General Zia-ul-Haq, who was also the Chief of Army) dismissed him.
This relatively better period of civilian rule in Pakistan was followed by a
game of musical chairs between two other civilian leaders — Benazir Bhutto
and Nawaz Sharif. Between 1988 and 1999, both assumed power in two stints
each, interspersed with caretaker governments. Neither showed any interest
in promoting democracy in the country and instead indulged in personal
aggrandizement and cronyism. It is sad that both failed to show any real
commitment to democracy. This provided another excuse for the military to
call the shots from behind the scene for about a decade and then jump directly
into the foray and reassume power.5
The people of Pakistan feel a kind of disillusionment with democracy and
its suitability for governing and running the affairs of their state. A number of
questions such as, Should we imitate the Western model of democracy or have
a vision of our own? have been raised to create confusion. What Pakistan
needs is not to question the system but to start with a system and continue
with it. In modern times, no system has proved better than democracy.

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It is clear that democracy in Pakistan will be different from the Western

model. Here, the legislature will never have unlimited power to legislate on
any issue, as the legislatures in Western democracies have; they will be guided
by Islamic teachings. Here, sovereignty will be recognized as Allah’s and
people will enjoy power as His vicegerents. In Muslim democracies, the
legislature cannot declare halal what has been declared haram, and vice
versa. But in remaining matters — such as adult franchise; time-bound
elections; political freedoms; separate jurisdiction of the Parliament, Judiciary,
and the Executive branches of state; human rights; etc. — there is nothing
inherent in democracy that conflicts with the message of Islam. The demands
of Islamic teachings and tenets have been enshrined in every constitution
Pakistan has ever had. This is why it is regarded as a sacred document. It is a
covenant between the different segments and classes of society. A civilized
nation respects and obeys its constitution in all situations. This enables it to
face the ups and downs of circumstance and continue with its collective
national life. This ability, in turn, provides confidence and a sense of security
as well as highlighting its distinct identity among other nations. Pakistan needs
these things and therefore needs to take democracy seriously.
Sovereign nations achieve stability, strength and power not because of a
few individuals but because of strong institutions, stable systems, and well-
rooted traditions. This is a process of evolution. It may be that the political
process and democracy in Pakistan have failed again and again and that they
cannot bring stability to the country. However, the answer is not in giving up
on the democratic process, but in adhering to it more closely.
Democratic institutions and tradition take root only through a process of
evolution. The sapling of democracy may take root quickly in one place if
conditions allow, but it must be given time to grow, even if it appears to be
taking too long. From the very start, the situation in Pakistan has not been
favorable for the evolution of democracy. The country faced crises on both
internal and external fronts. Internally, it was weak and faced a host of issues;
externally it faced the hostility of its much larger neighbor. But this is no
excuse for military intervention in politics. Observant people agree that if the
army had resisted the urge to jump into the foray in 1958, there would have
been no subsequent periods of martial law because Pakistani political
institutions would have gained in strength and maturity, assumed their proper
role and averted the conditions under which the military intervened in national
affairs. Since democracy was effectively killed in its infancy, the later stages of
maturity and experience could not be reached.
This is how we should view the flaws and weaknesses of political
leadership even now. Maturity will come with the passage of time, as will
political stability and economic prosperity. Traditions need time to take root,

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but they will. Pakistan is not a special case in that cannot be trusted and will
therefore be barred from evolving. In a free environment, we can express our
values and reflect these in our institutions. But we must realize there is no
escaping some degree of trial and error.
As far as the people of the country are concerned, they have shown their
confidence in the democratic tradition time and again. When General Yahya
lifted the ban from political activities in January 1970, the whole country saw
a great enthusiasm and increased political activism — even though it had been
in the throes of chaos for five months in the preceding year. The year-long
political electoral campaign remained peaceful. Similarly, the electioneering of
1977 saw great tension and agitation, yet elections were peaceful, as was the
PNA-led campaign against alleged electoral rigging. It was similar in the 2002
elections. This shows that Pakistanis are a normal political people and can go
as far on the road to democracy as any other nation can. This road we must
take; we cannot do without it.

Role of the Judiciary

A major factor for the frequent interruptions in the democratic process is
the tendency of military governments to devise new constitutions and then
abrogation them. Those politicians who prosper under the military’s umbrella
do not consider the exercise of constitution-making more than a game and
play to serve vested interests while adjusting to the mood of the “high command.”
This is one reason why the constitution in Pakistan has not achieved the
sanctity that is its due, and which is accorded to it in civilized societies.
With this approach, those who happen to rule the country see no reason
for concern over the uncertain and unclear status of the Constitution of 1973
these days. To them, the country is functioning quite well despite all this fuss
and mess. Even if the constitution is abrogated or changed tomorrow, they
hold, there would be no catastrophe. Observant people cannot help showing
concern over such an attitude. A country’s constitution reflects its political
philosophy, its way of life, and its views on governance. It is, in fact, an
agreement between the different classes and segments of society, regions, and
administrative units. All segments of society look to it to arrive at decisions
with consensus.
In this regard, the role of the judiciary is very important. The judiciary,
needless to say, plays a vital role in the promotion and consolidation of
democracy in any country. But it has not been given the freedom that it needs
to play its due role in Pakistan.
If the judiciary is to play its due role in the promotion of democracy in the
country, then its credibility must be restored. The government’s power to
appoint judges should be eliminated; it should be the Supreme Judicial Council

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that reviews the cases of judges’ appointment and promotion and then refers
them to the Prime Minister and President for action. The judiciary’s autonomy
in economic matters is important so that it can dispense justice among the
people and the government, between the Center and the Provinces, and
among the Provinces themselves. Judges’ tenures should be secure so that they
can function without insecurity, fear or outside influence. There should be
restrictions preventing judges’ appointment to a profitable post after
retirement. The government should desist from any overture that gives the
impression, no matter how slight, that it seeks to influence or direct the
Pakistan’s courts.
Until the government does this and the people see and believe that this it
is so, the dream of rule of law and the prevalence of justice will remain elusive.
The absence of a democratic culture and tradition of rule of law are
Pakistan’s biggest problems. If we do not address these issues directly, the
state of Pakistan will continue to suffer. The need of the hour is to establish a
rule of law that applies to all, the rulers and the ruled, and that includes a
prohibition against military intervention.

The Present
Despite the people’s commitment and the role the media has and is
playing, it is sad that the present political scenario is no better than the past.
There exists in Pakistan only the appearance of democracy; the country has a
long way to go to actually be a democracy.
President General Pervez Musharraf has repeatedly said that democracy
has taken root in Pakistan. He points to the freedom the press enjoys, the
existence of a functioning Parliament, and the accountability of officials, along
with the enhanced role of women in national politics. He has also remarked
that it might seem strange that he, being a person in uniform, talks about
democracy and insists he has established a lasting system of democracy, but
he claims he has and that to do so is his Providence-ordained task.6
No matter what Musharraf says, the people of Pakistan can see that an
Army Chief has become their ruler, that he is equipped with vast powers under
the 8th and 17th Amendments7 to the Constitution, that he created a majority by
cobbling together different elements in the aftermath of the 2002 elections, and
that whoever might be occupying the seat of the Prime Minister — Mir
Zafarullah Jamali, Chaudhri Shujaat Hussain, or Mr. Shaukat Aziz — he is the
one who makes that appointment. These Prime Ministers apparently assumed
their offices with the Parliament’s majority’s vote, but there is no illusion as to
who enjoys the real power. As for the degree of freedom of the press, this is
neither a sudden occurrence nor a gift from anyone. It is the press itself that
has protected its freedom and secured its place for itself.

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General Musharraf’s assertions are not new. What is more important,

however, is that while he reiterated them in New York (September 2005)
during his recent visit, and said that a President should not be in uniform, he
declined to give assurance that he would give up his uniform in 2007. When
pressed, he said that he would “cross the bridge on reaching it.” This is what
he used to say when asked whether he would give up his uniform by
December 31, 2004 (according to an agreement with the MMA in the form of
the 17th Amendment). The bridge was there and the whole world saw how he
crossed it! His statement that “no U.S. official, including President Bush, asked
him to doff his uniform” indicates that the chances he will remove his uniform
are slim, even in 2007. Musharraf counts the recently concluded local bodies
elections as an indication that democracy is well on its course in the country.
Such assertions, in spite of all the allegations against the transparency of these
elections, suggest that the same drama will be repeated in the next general
elections.

The Future?
What is the future of democracy in Pakistan? In his recent book, Stephen
P. Cohen talks about possible scenarios for Pakistan in the future. In the first,
“Continuation of Establishment-dominated oligarchic system,” he says: “Over
the next five or six years: do not underestimate the capability of a small elite
to manage a big country, but do not exaggerate their ability to work together
and avert disaster.” In his words, the outcome of such a scenario is: “Pakistan
manipulates terrorist threat, Establishment searches for external alliances,
nuclear and missile production continues despite weak economy, little
movement in relations with India.” In the second scenario, even if a political
and democratic government is restored, it would remain weak and the military
would continue to call the shots from behind the scenes.
The prospects for true democracy in Pakistan are apparently not very
bright. The absence of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif has weakened their
political parties. It is almost certain that the circle around these parties will be
narrowed further before the next election, which may force the parties to
boycott them. The government will also not allow the MMA (a political alliance
of six religious parties) to benefit in any way from the vacuum. All this implies
that the Q-League (the ruling faction of the Muslim League) will be in a
position to dominate the next Parliament as well.
The country is in danger of moving towards one-party rule under the
umbrella of General Musharraf, who will secure for himself the right to
continue in office with his uniform and even maneuver his unopposed
election, and who will be content with his rule and its continuation at the cost
of weakening all political forces in Pakistan except the Q-League and its allies.

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The politically conscious people of Pakistan, however, cannot accept

that Pakistan needs a democratic model in which the Army Chief becomes
President, with a central and key role in the system and full concentration of
powers in his hands, and in which notable political figures have been kept out
and disallowed to play their due role.
If General Musharraf remains adamant about running a democracy under
his thumb, and if his political allies continue to be opportunistic, wanting to
see him President at the time of general elections in 2007, then forces in the
opposition may wind up in a boycott of elections. Will this benefit the country?
Obviously not.
The key to preventing political tension lies with General Musharraf
himself. The first thing to do in this regard is to assure the people that the next
elections will really be free and fair, and to encourage people to forget the
past. A good start would be by appointing the next Chief Election
Commissioner with the opposition’s consent. Then, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif
should be allowed to return and lead their party during elections. Political
space should be provided to all political actors without prejudice and
manipulation.
The people of Pakistan and their leaders need to believe that ‘controlled’
or ‘compromised’ democracy is not Pakistan’s destiny; its progress lies in
adherence to democracy with its well-established and very well-known norms.
Although the military has come to occupy an important position in the political
setup, acquiescing to it as “an immutable reality” and, then, compromising on
principled positions does not behoove true democrats.

Endnotes
* The writer is one of the most widely read columnists in Pakistan. He served as
Federal Minister of Information and Media Development during the interim government of
Malik Meraj Khalid from November 1996 to February 1997.
1. Elections for district governments in Pakistan were held in three phases; began in
August and concluded in October 2005.
2. Congress claimed to represent all communities in India: Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs,
Parsis, Christians, etc. No doubt, prominent Muslim figures such as Badruddin Tyabji and
Maulana Azad became its Presidents, but they remained mere figure-heads–Goakhale, Tilak,
Gandhi, and Nehru were the men who really pulled the reins, directly or from the behind
the scenes.
3. In order to secure a greater role in national affairs and legitimize it, the military
has sought some kind of constitutional arrangement for its role in politics. General Zia was
the first military ruler who proposed setting up of a National Security Council (NSC) for the
top brass to share policy-making with civilian political leaders. He added Article 152-A to
the 1973 Constitution through the Revival of Constitutional Order (RCO) in March 1985 to
establish the NSC. The formation of NSC was opposed by most political circles and had
to be dropped as part of the deal with the Parliament to get its approval for the revised

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version of RCO as the Eighth Constitutional Amendment in October 1985. Then, in his
address at the Navy War College in October 1998, Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat
underlined the need for creating an institutional arrangement at the highest level for
devising effective policies for coping with ongoing economic drift and political management
problems. Five days after his assumption of power, Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf
announced formation of an NSC headed by the Chief Executive (the title he chose for
himself). In December 2003, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and the government
signed an agreement for resolving the political impasse on the Legal Framework Order
(LFO). One of the provisions of this agreement provided that the NSC would not be a
constitutional body but would be set up through legislation. Other opposition parties stayed
away from this agreement, which took the form of the 17th Amendment.
4. In addition, the government’s ill-devised policies in the economic field created
anxiety, unrest and instability. The policy of nationalization of industrial and educational
institutions, for example, gave rise to widespread apprehensions that the government’s
continuation in office would result in increasing government control and squeeze the space
for private business. The nationalization policy produced the worst situation of high
inflation rate and declining purchasing-power. Inadvertently, the rulers not only invited
public rage against themselves, but, to an extent, created a sort of disillusionment with
democracy for they were democratically elected rulers!
5. Benazir Bhutto and her spouse have allegedly been involved in corruption on a
massive scale, but the way the Accountability Bureau targeted them during the Nawaz era
did not give to the common man the impression that the process of accountability was
neutral or judicious. The process of ‘victimization’ against Benazir Bhutto has become so
long and the moral and legal foundations on which it is based are so weak that, in spite of
all the allegations against them, the former ruling couple has started winning sympathies in
some hearts. The nation had risen in 1996–97 for establishing the tradition of judicious
accountability, but the Nawaz government failed to give it a proper shape. This was a great
disservice to the nation. If a neutral and credible machinery had been established for the
purpose of accountability, this would have strengthened the notion of rule of law along with
considerably reducing the level of corruption.
6. The claim of establishing a democratic setup according to Pakistan’s peculiar
ground realities is not new. General Musharraf is not the first to say so. General Ayub had
similarly talked about basic democracy, controlled democracy and the system that better
reflects the needs of the nation, etc. His system was a house of cards that vanished with his
own removal from the scene. General Yahya too tried to give a so-called democratic
constitution that actually revolved around his person. Zia-ul-Haq used at times Islam and at
others made reference to a diary of Quaid-e-Azam to flout well-established democratic
principles and continue with his Martial Law. When he had to hold elections in 1985, he
held them on a non-party basis to keep the political parties out.
7. These Amendments are like a bargain in which measures taken during the Martial
Law tenures were given indemnity in exchange for bringing an end to Martial Law rule. The
8th Amendment was passed in 1985 to lift Zia’s Martial Law, while the 17th Amendment was
passed in 2003, after an agreement between the government and the MMA (United Action
Front), to fix a date for General Musharraf to give up his army post (in fact, either of the
two offices he held: the President and the Army Chief) and pave way for real parliamentary
democracy.

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