G.R. No.
L-2662             March 26, 1949 In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO
TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO
ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.
Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and S. Melville Hussey for
respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged
before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having
unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in
violation of the laws and customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of
Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey
and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to
permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.
First. — "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our
constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an
adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is
charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international." Hence petitioner argues — "That in view off the
fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this
commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."
Second. — That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf
of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port who are not attorneys authorized by
the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an independent state and
their appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to
practice law in the Philippines.
Third. — That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not being a party in
interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation governing the
trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This
Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
—
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the of the nation.
Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the
United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of
aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the
promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity
with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in chief of
all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when
we said —
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities incident of war may
remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance incident to a conduct of war is the
adoption of measure by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to
disciplinary measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the
law of war. (Ex parte  Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to create a military commission for the
trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in the language of a writer a military
commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice
or military occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty agreement.
(Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar Association Journal June, 1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of
war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order
No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in
violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the
first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and
Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law.
In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who
were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even
if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of
international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines was under the
sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to
the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation
were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce
the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against crimes against our people. In
this connection it is well to remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those
charged with the crime of treason committed during then Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same
sovereign people. . . .
By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a
Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic.
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Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port in
the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to practice law in Philippines in
accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our
national sovereignty.
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not
by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68
which provides for the organization of such military commission is a valid and constitutional law. There is
nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys
qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in military
tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed
of legal training.
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair
and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her
people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has
been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State Government
which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity
is to allow them representation in said trials.
Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the personality of attorneys
Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United State and its people have been equally
if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission.
It can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of
its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the crimes charged
which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner in its custody, this Court
will not interfere with the due process of such Military commission.
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
A military commission was empanelled on December 1, 1948 to try Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda for Violation of
the laws and customs of land warfare.
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American citizens and not authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law
were appointed prosecutor representing the American CIC in the trial of the case.
The commission was empanelled under the authority of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines
the validity of which is challenged by petitioner on constitutional grounds. Petitioner has also challenged the
personality of Attorneys Hussey and Port to appear as prosecutors before the commission.
The charges against petitioner has been filed since June 26, 1948 in the name of the people of the Philippines as
accusers.
We will consideration briefly the challenge against the appearance of Attorneys Hussey and Port. It appearing that
they are aliens and have not been authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law there could not be any question
that said person cannot appear as prosecutors in petitioner case as with such appearance they would be practicing
law against the law.
Said violation vanishes however into insignificance at the side of the momentous question involved in the
challenge against the validity of Executive Order No. 68. Said order is challenged on several constitutional
ground. To get a clear idea of the question raised it is necessary to read the whole context of said order which is
reproduced as follows:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68.
ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE AND PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATION
GOVERNING THE TRIAL OF ACCUSED WAR CRIMINAL.
I, Manuel Roxas president of the Philippines by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and laws of
the Philippines do hereby establish a National War Crimes Office charged with the responsibility of
accomplishing the speedy trial of all Japanese accused of war crimes committed in the Philippines and prescribe
the rules and regulation such trial.
The National War crimes office is established within the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army of the
Philippines and shall function under the direction supervision and control of the Judge Advocate General. It shall
proceed to collect from all available sources evidence of war crimes committed in the Philippines from the
commencement of hostilities by Japan in December 1941, maintain a record thereof and bring about the prompt
trial maintain a record thereof and bring about the prompt trial of the accused.
The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct liaison with the Legal Section General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for the Allied power and shall exchange with the said Office information and evidence of
war crimes.
The following rules and regulation shall govern the trial off person accused as war criminals:
ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS
(a) General. — person accused as war criminal shall be tried by military commission to be convened by or under
the authority of the Philippines.
II. JURISDICTION
(a) Over Person. — Thee military commission appointed hereunder shall have jurisdiction over all persons
charged with war crimes who are in the custody of the convening authority at the time of the trial.
(b) Over Offenses. — The military commission established hereunder shall have jurisdiction over all offenses
including but not limited to the following:
(1) The planning preparation initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international
treaties agreement or assurance or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of
the foregoing.
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(2) Violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violation shall include but not be limited to murder ill-treatment
or deportation to slave labor or for other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory; murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war or internees or person on the seas or elsewhere; improper treatment of hostage;
plunder of public or private property wanton destruction of cities towns or village; or devastation not justified by
military necessity.
(3) Murder extermination enslavement deportation and other inhuman acts committed against civilian population
before or during the war or persecution on political racial or religion ground in executive of or in connection with
any crime defined herein whether or not in violation of the local laws.
III. MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSIONS
(a) Appointment. — The members of each military commission shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines or under authority delegated by him. Alternates may be appointed by the convening authority. Such
shall attend all session of the commission, and in case of illness or other incapacity of any principal member, an
alternate shall take the place of that member. Any vacancy among the members or alternates, occurring after a
trial has begun, may be filled by the convening authority but the substance of all proceeding had evidence taken in
that case shall be made known to the said new member or alternate. This facts shall be announced by the president
of the commission in open court.
(b) Number of Members. — Each commission shall consist of not less than three (3) members.
(c) Qualifications. — The convening authority shall appoint to the commission persons whom he determines to be
competent to perform the duties involved and not disqualified by personal interest or prejudice, provided that no
person shall be appointed to hear a case in which he personally investigated or wherein his presence as a witness
is required. One specially qualified member whose ruling is final in so far as concerns the commission on an
objection to the admissibility of evidence offered during the trial.
(d) Voting. — Except as to the admissibility of evidence all rulings and finding of the Commission shall be by
majority vote except that conviction and sentence shall be by the affirmative vote of not less than conviction and
sentence shall be by the affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds (2\3) of the member present.
(e) Presiding Member. — In the event that the convening authority does not name one of the member as the
presiding member, the senior officer among the member of the Commission present shall preside.
IV. PROSECUTORS
(a) Appointment. — The convening authority shall designate one or more person to conduct the prosecution
before each commission.
(b) Duties. — The duties of the prosecutor are:
(1) To prepare and present charges and specifications for reference to a commission.
(2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the prosecution before the commission of all cases referred for trial.
V. POWER AND PROCEDURE OF COMMISSION
(a) Conduct of the Trial. — A Commission shall:
(1) Confine each trial strictly to fair and expeditious hearing on the issues raised by the charges, excluding
irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any unnecessary delay or interference.
(2) Deal summarily with any contumacy or contempt, imposing any appropriate punishment therefor.
(3) Hold public session when otherwise decided by the commission.
(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall determine, or as may be directed by the convening
authority.
(b) Rights of the Accused. — The accused shall be entitled:
(1) To have in advance of the trial a copy of the charges and specifications clearly worded so as to apprise the
accused of each offense charged.
(2) To be represented, prior to and during trial, by counsel appointed by the convening authority or counsel of his
own choice, or to conduct his own defense.
(3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel present relevant evidence at the trial in support of his
defense, and cross-examine each adverse witness who personally appears before the commission.
(4) To have the substance of the charges and specifications, the proceedings and any documentary evidence
translated, when he is unable otherwise to understand them.
(c) Witnesses. — The Commission shall have power:
(1) To summon witnesses and require their attendance and testimony; to administer oaths or affirmations to
witnesses and other persons and to question witnesses.
(2) To require the production of documents and other evidentiary material.
(3) To delegate the Prosecutors appointed by the convening authority the powers and duties set forth in (1) and (2)
above.
(4) To have evidence taken by a special commissioner appointed by the commission.
(d) Evidence.
(1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion shall be of assistance in proving or disproving the
charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would have probative value in the mind of a reasonable man. The
commission shall apply the rules of evidence and pleading set forth herein with the greatest liberality to achieve
expeditious procedure. In particular, and without limiting in any way the scope of the foregoing general rules, the
following evidence may be admitted:
(a) Any document, irrespective of its classification, which appears to the commission to have been signed or
issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the armed forces of any Government without proof of the
signature or of the issuance of the document.
(b) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by the International Red Cross or a
member of any medical service personnel, or by any investigator or intelligence officer, or by any other person
whom commission considers as possessing knowledge of the matters contained in the report.
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(c) Affidavits, depositions or other signed statements.
(d) Any diary, letter to other document, including sworn statements, appearing to the commission to contain
information relating to the charge.
(e) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents, if the original is not immediately
available.
(2) The commission shall take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge, official government documents of
any nation, and the proceedings, records and findings of military or other agencies of any of the United Nation.
(3) A commission may require the prosecution and the defense to make a preliminary offer of proof whereupon
the commission may rule in advance on the admissibility of such evidence.
(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from responsibility nor be considered in mitigation
of punishment. Further action pursuant to an order of the accused's superior, or of his Government, shall not
constitute a defense, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the commission determines that justice
so requires.
(5) All purposed confessions or statements of the accused shall bee admissible in evidence without any showing
that they were voluntarily made. If it is shown that such confession or statement was procured by mean which the
commission believe to have been of such a character that may have caused the accused to make a false statement
the commission may strike out or disregard any such portion thereof as was so procured.
(e) Trial Procedure. — The proceedings of each trial shall be conducted substantially as follows unless modified
by the commission to suit the particular circumstances:
(1) Each charge and specification shall be read or its substance stated in open court.
(2) The presiding member shall ask each accused whether he pleads "Guilty" or "Not guilty."
(3) The prosecution shall make its opening statement."(4) The presiding member may at this or any other time
require the prosecutor to state what evidence he proposes to submit to the commission and the commission
thereupon may rule upon the admissibility of such evidence.
(4) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution shall be heard or presented. At the close of the case for
the prosecution, the commission may, on motion of the defense for a finding of not guilty, consider and rule
whether he evidence before the commission may defer action on any such motion and permit or require the
prosecution to reopen its case and produce any further available evidence.
(5) The defense may make an opening statement prior to presenting its case. The presiding member may, at this
any other time require the defense to state what evidence it proposes to submit to the commission where upon the
commission may rule upon the admissibility of such evidence.
(6) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense shall be heard or presented. Thereafter, the prosecution and
defense may introduce such evidence in rebuttal as the commission may rule as being admissible.
(7) The defense and thereafter the prosecution shall address the commission.
(8) The commission thereafter shall consider the case in closed session and unless otherwise directed by the
convening authority, announce in open court its judgment and sentence if any. The commission may state the
reason on which judgment is based.
(  f  ) Record of Proceedings. — Each commission shall make a separate record of its proceeding in the trial of
each case brought before it. The record shall be prepared by the prosecutor under the direction of the commission
and submitted to the defense counsel. The commission shall be responsible for its accuracy. Such record, certified
by the presiding member of the commission or his successor, shall be delivered to the convening authority as soon
as possible after the trial.
(g) Sentence. — The commission may sentence an accused, upon conviction to death by hanging or shooting,
imprisonment for life or for any less term, fine or such other punishment as the commission shall determine to be
proper.
(h) Approval of Sentence. — No. sentence of a military commission shall be carried into effect until approved by
the chief off Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death or life imprisonment shall be carried into execution until
confirmed by the President of the Philippines. For the purpose of his review the Chief of Staff shall create a Board
of Review to be composed of not more than three officers none of whom shall be on duty with or assigned to the
Judge Advocate General's Office. The Chief of Staff shall have authority to approve, mitigate remit in whole or in
part, commute, suspend, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence imposed, or (without prejudice to the accused)
remand the case for rehearing before a new military commission; but he shall not have authority to increase the
severity of the sentence. Except as herein otherwise provided the judgment and sentence of a commission shall
final and not subject to review by any other tribunal.
VI. RULE-MAKING POWER
Supplementary Rule and Forms. — Each commission shall adopt rules and forms to govern its procedure, not
inconsistent with the provision of this Order, or such rules and forms as may be prescribed by the convening
authority]or by the President of the Philippines.
VII. The amount of amount of seven hundred thousand pesos is hereby set aside out of the appropriations for the
Army of the Philippines for use by the National War Crimes Office in the accomplishment of its mission as
hereinabove set forth, and shall be expended in accordance with the recommendation of the Judge Advocate
General as approved by the President. The buildings, fixtures, installations, messing, and billeting equipment and
other property herefore used by then Legal Section, Manila Branch, of the General Headquarters, Supreme
Commander for the Allied Power, which will be turned over by the United States Army to the Philippines
Government through the Foreign Liquidation Commission and the Surplus Property Commission are hereby
specification reserved for use off the National War Crimes Office.
Executive Order No. 64, dated August 16, 1945, is hereby repealed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and
of the Independence of the Philippines, the second.
MANUEL ROXAS
President of the Philippines
By the President:
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EMILIO ABELLO
Chief of the Executive Office
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION
Executive Order No. 68 is a veritable piece of Legislative measure, without the benefit of congressional
enactment.
The first question that is trust at our face spearheading a group of other no less important question, is whether or
not the President of the Philippines may exercise the legislative power expressly vested in Congress by the
Constitution. .
The Constitution provides:
The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and House
of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.)
While there is no express provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative power by
agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole context of the Constitution would dispel any doubt as to the
constitutional intent that the legislative power is to be exercised exclusively by Congress, subject only to the veto
power of the President of the President of the Philippines, to the specific provision which allow the president of
the Philippines to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus and to place any part of the Philippines
under martial law, and to the rule-making power expressly vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court.
There cannot be any question that the member of the Constitutional Convention were believers in the tripartite
system of government as originally enunciated by Aristotle, further elaborated by Montequieu and accepted and
practiced by modern democracies, especially the United State of America, whose Constitution, after which ours
has been patterned, has allocated the three power of government — legislative, executive, judicial — to distinct
and separate department of government.
Because the power vested by our Constitution to the several department of the government are in the nature of
grants, not recognition of pre-existing power, no department of government may exercise any power or authority
not expressly granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue express authority of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes Office and the power to establish government office is
essentially legislative.
The order provides that person accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commissions. Whether such a
provision is substantive or adjective, it is clearly legislative in nature. It confers upon military commissions
jurisdiction to try all persons charge with war crimes. The power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the
prosecution of person accused of any crime is exclusively vested by the Constitution in Congress. .
It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial of trial. This provision on procedural subject constitutes a
usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the Supreme Court.
It authorized military commission to adopt additional rule of procedure. If the President of the Philippines cannot
exercise the rule -making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court, he cannot, with more reason,
delegate that power to military commission.
It appropriates the sum of P7000,000 for the expenses of the National War Crimes office established by the said
Executive Order No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of legislative power as the power to vote
appropriations belongs to Congress.
Executive Order No. 68., is, therefore, null and void, because, though it the President of the Philippines usurped
power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the Supreme Court.
Challenged to show the constitutional or legal authority under which the President issued Executive Order No. 68,
respondent could not give any definite answer. They attempted, however, to suggest that the President of the
Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68 under the emergency power granted to him by Commonwealth Act No.
600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, and Commonwealth Act No. 671, both of which are transcribed
below:
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 600.
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATION TO SAFEGUARD THE INTEGRITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND TO INSURE THE TRANQUILITY OF ITS INHABITANTS.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence of war in many parts of the world has created a national emergency which makes it
necessary to invest the President of the Philippines with extraordinary power in order to safeguard the integrity of
the Philippines and to insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and all
subversive to the people adequate shelter and clothing and sufficient food supply, and by providing means for the
speedy evacuation of the civilian population the establishment of an air protective service and the organization of
volunteer guard units, and to adopt such other measures as he may deem necessary for the interest of the public.
To carry out this policy the President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the force
and effect off law until the date of adjournment of the next regulation which shall have the force and effect of law
until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the First Congress of the Philippines, unless sooner
amended or repealed by the Congress of Philippines. Such rules and regulation may embrace the following
objects: (1) to suppress espionage and other subversive activities; (2) to require all able-bodied citizens (a) when
not engaged in any lawful occupation, to engage in farming or other productive activities or (b) to perform such
services as may bee necessary in the public interest; (3) to take over farm lands in order to prevent or shortage of
crops and hunger and destitution; (4) to take over industrial establishment in order to insure adequate production,
controlling wages and profits therein; (5) to prohibit lockouts and strikes whenever necessary to prevent the
unwarranted suspension of work in productive enterprises or in the interest of national security; (6) to regulate the
normal hours of work for wage-earning and salaried employees in industrial or business undertakings of all kinds;
(7) to insure an even distribution of labor among the productive enterprises; (8) to commandership and other
means of transportation in order to maintain, as much as possible, adequate and continued transportation facilities;
(9) to requisition and take over any public service or enterprise for use or operation by the Government;(10) to
regulate rents and the prices of articles or commodities of prime necessity, both imported and locally produced or
manufactured; and (11) to prevent, locally or generally, scarcity, monopolization, hoarding injurious speculations,
and private control affecting the supply, distribution and movement of foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizer, chemical,
building, material, implements, machinery, and equipment required in agriculture and industry, with power to
requisition these commodities subject to the payment of just compensation. (As amended by Com. Act No. 620.)
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SEC. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and carrying out its objective, the President may designate any
officer, without additional compensation, or any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National
Government.
SEC. 3. Any person, firm, or corporation found guilty of the violation of any provision of this Act or of this Act or
any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the President under the authority of section one of this Act shall be
punished by imprisonment of not more than ten years or by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by both.
If such violation is committed by a firm or corporation, the manager, managing director, or person charge with the
management of the business of such firm, or corporation shall be criminally responsible therefor.
SEC. 4. The President shall report to the national Assembly within the first ten days from the date of the opening
of its next regular session whatever action has been taken by him under the authority herein granted.
SEC. 5. To carry out the purposed of this Act, the President is authorized to spend such amounts as may be
necessary from the sum appropriated under section five Commonwealth Act Numbered four hundred and ninety-
eight.
SEC. 6. If any province of this Act shall be declared by any court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional
and void, such declaration shall not invalidate the remainder of this Act.
SEC. 7. This Act shall take upon its approval.
Approved, August 19, 1940.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE
PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULE AND REGULATIONS
TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted the National Assembly of the Philippines;
SECTION 1. The existed of war between the United State and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves
the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting
emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provision of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the President is hereby authorized,
during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulation as he may deem necessary to carry
out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to
transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, department, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the
order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create new subdivision, branches,
departments, offices, agency or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to
continue in force laws and appropriation which would lapse or otherwise became inoperative, and to modify or
suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to imposed new taxes or to
increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or
otherwise, and to authorize the expensive of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or
municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of
the collection of credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other power as he may deem necessary to
enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation promulgated by him under the
power herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations. promulgated hereunder shall be
in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide.
Approved December 16, 1941.
The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947. Said Acts had
elapsed upon the liberation of the Philippines form the Japanese forces or, at the latest, when the surrender of
Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.
When both Acts were enacted by the Second National Assembly, we happened to have taken direct part in their
consideration and passage, not only as one of the members of said legislative body as chairman of the Committee
on Third Reading population Known as the "Little Senate." We are, therefore in a position to state that said
measures were enacted by the second national Assembly for the purpose of facing the emergency of impending
war and of the Pacific War that finally broke out with the attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. We
approved said extraordinary measures, by which under the exceptional circumstances then prevailing legislative
power were delegated to the President of the Philippines, by virtue of the following provisions of the Constitution:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out declared
national policy. (Article VI, section 26.)
It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation beyond the emergency created by
the war as to extend it farther would be violative of the express provision of the Constitution. We are of the
opinion that there is no doubt on this question.; but if there could still be any the same should be resolved in favor
of the presumption that the National Assembly did not intend to violate the fundamental law.
The absurdity of the contention that the emergency Acts continued in effect even after the surrender of Japan can
not be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation and even before the surrender of Japan, or since the middle of
1945, the Congress started to function normally. In the hypothesis that the contention can prevail, then, since
1945, that is, four years ago, even after the Commonwealth was already replaced by the Republic of the
Philippines with the proclamation of our Independence, two district, separate and independence legislative organs,
— Congress and the President of the Philippines — would have been and would continue enacting laws, the
former to enact laws of every nature including those of emergency character, and the latter to enact laws, in the
form of executive orders, under the so-called emergency powers. The situation would be pregnant with dangers to
peace and order to the rights and liberties of the people and to Philippines democracy.
Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President of the Philippines, a possibility that no one
can dispute the President of the Philippines may take advantage of he long recess of Congress (two-thirds of every
year ) to repeal and overrule legislative enactments of Congress, and may set up a veritable system of dictatorship,
absolutely repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the fundamental guarantees of
the due process and equal protection of the law. It is especially so, because it permit the admission of many kinds
6|Page
evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal and by which it is impossible to determine
whether an accused is guilty or not beyond all reasonable doubt.

The rules of evidence adopted in Executive Order No. 68 are a reproduction of the regulation governing the trial
of twelve criminal, issued by General Douglas Mac Arthur, Commander in Chief of the United State Armed
Forces in Western Pacific, for the purpose of trying among other, General Yamashita and Homma. What we said
in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the decision promulgated on December 19, 1945, in the Yamashita
case, L-129, and in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the resolution of January 23, 1946 in disposing the
Homma case, L-244, are perfectly applicable to the offensive rules of evidence in Executive Order No. 68. Said
rules of evidence are repugnant to conscience as under them no justice can expected.

For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the Yamashita and Homma cases, we vote to declare
Executive Order No. 68 null and void and to grant petition.

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G.R. No. L-4254             September 26, 1951
BORIS MEJOFF, petitioner,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
Ambrosio T. Dollete for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianson and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied in a decision of this
Court of July 30, 1949. The history of the petitioner's detention was thus briefly set forth in that decision, written
by Mr. Justice Bengzon:
The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a
secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested
as a Japanese spy, by U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Later he was handed to theCommonwealth
Government for disposition in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 682. Thereafter, the People's Court
ordered his release. But the deportation Board taking his case up, found that having no travel documents Mejoff
was illegally in this country, and consequently referred the matter to the immigration authorities. After the
corresponding investigation, the Board of commissioners of Immigration on April 5, 1948, declared that Mejoff
had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a
designation port of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to
Russia. The petitioner was then under custody, he having been arrested on March 18, 1948. In May 1948 he was
transferred to the Cebu Provincial Jail together with three other Russians to await the arrival of some Russian
vessels. In July and August of that year two boats of Russian nationality called at the Cebu Port. But their masters
refused to take petitioner and his companions alleging lack of authority to do so. In October 1948 after repeated
failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where he has
been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is for the best
interests of the country to keep him under detention while arrangements for his departure are being made.
The Court held the petitioner's detention temporary and said that "temporary detention is a necessary step in the
process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for his deportation, the
Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable lenght of time." It took
note of the fact, manifested by the Solicitor General's representative in the course of the of the oral argumment,
that "this Government desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense . . .
making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land." No period was fixed within
which the immigration authorities should carry out the contemplated deportation beyond the statement that "The
meaning of 'reasonable time' depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the
availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements with the governments concerned and the efforts
displayed to send the deportee away;" but the Court warned that "under established precedents, too long a
detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
Mr. Justice Paras, now Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and the writer of this decision
dissented. Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Perfecto voted for outright discharge of the prisoner from custody.
Mr. Justice Paras qualified his dissent by stating that he might agree "to further detention of the herein petitioner,
provided that he be released if after six months, the Government is still unable to deport him." This writer joined
in the latter dissent but thought that two months constituted reasonable time.
Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has not found way
and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although it should be said in justice
to the deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein (Sowapadji vs. Wixon, Sept. 18, 1946,
157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are "stateless," which the petitioner claims to be. It is no less true however, as
impliedly stated in this Court's decision, supra, that foreign nationals, not enemy against whom no charge has been
made other than that their permission to stay has expired, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection
against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the
land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
Whether an alien who entered the country in violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as long as the
Government is unable to deport him, is a point we need not decide. The petitioner's entry into the Philippines was
not unlawful; he was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de facto  government whose decrees were
law furing the occupation.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its
plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to
all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree
and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social
origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law"
(Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.
In U. S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp., 201, it was said that the court "has the power to release from custody an alien
who has been detained an unreasonably long period of time by the Department of Justice after it has become
apparent that although a warrant for his deportation has been issued, the warrant can not be effectuated;" that "the
theory on which the court is given the power to act is that the warrant of deportation, not having been able to be
executed, is  functus officio  and the alien is being held without any authority of law." The decision cited several
cases which, it said, settled the matter definitely in that jurisdiction, adding that the same result had reached in
innumerable cases elsewhere. The cases referred to were United States ex rel. Ross vs. Wallis, 2 Cir. 279 F. 401,
404; Caranica vs. Nagle, 9 Cir., 28 F. 2d 955; Saksagansky vs. Weedin, 9 Cir., 53 F. 2d 13, 16 last paragraph; Ex
parte Matthews, D.C.W.D. Wash., 277 F. 857; Moraitis vs. Delany, D.C. Md. Aug. 28, 1942, 46 F. Supp. 425.
The most recent case, as far as we have been able to find, was that of Staniszewski vs. Watkins (1948), 90 Fed.
Supp., 132, which is nearly foursquare with the case at hand. In that case a stateless person, formerly a Polish
national, resident in the United States since 1911 and many times serving as a seaman on American vessels both
in peace and in war, was ordered excluded from the United States and detained at Ellis Island at the expense of the
steamship company, when he returned from a voyage on which he had shipped from New York for one or more
European ports and return to the United States. The grounds for his exclusion were that he had no passport or
immigration visa, and that in 1937 had been convicted of perjury because in certain documents he presented
himself to be an American citizen. Upon his application for release on habeas corpus, the Court released him
upon his own recognizance. Judge Leibell, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, said in part:
When the return to the writ of habeas corpus came before this court, I suggested that all interested parties . . .
make an effort to arrange to have the petitioner ship out of some country that he would receive him as a resident.
8|Page
He is, a native-born Pole but the Polish Consul has advised him in writing that he is no longer a Polish subject.
This Government does not claim that he is a Polish citizen. His attorney says he is a stateless. The Government is
willing that he go back to the ship, but if he were sent back aboard a ship and sailed to the Port (Cherbourg,
France) from which he last sailed to the United States, he would probably be denied permission to land. There is
no other country that would take him, without proper documents.
It seems to me that this is a genuine hardship case and that the petitioner should be released from custody on
proper terms. . . .
What is to be done with the petitioner? The government has had him in custody almost seven months and
practically admits it has no place to send him out of this country. The steamship company, which employed him
as one of a group sent to the ship by the Union, with proper seaman's papers issued by the United States Coast
Guard, is paying $3 a day for petitioner's board at Ellis Island. It is no fault of the steamship company that
petitioner is an inadmissible alien as the immigration officials describe him. . . .
I intend to sustain the writ of habeas corpus and order the release of the petitioner on his own recognizance. He
will be required to inform the immigration officials at Ellis Island by mail on the 15th of each month, stating
where he is employed and where he can be reached by mail. If the government does succeed in arranging for
petitioner's deportation to a country that will be ready to receive him as a resident, it may then advise the
petitioner to that effect and arrange for his deportation in the manner provided by law.
Although not binding upon this Court as a precedent, the case aforecited affords a happy solution to the quandry
in which the parties here finds themselves, solution which we think is sensible, sound and compatible with law
and the Constitution. For this reason, and since the Philippine law on immigration was patterned after or copied
from the American law and practice, we choose to follow and adopt the reasoning and conclusions in the
Staniszewski decision with some modifications which, it is believed, are in consonance with the prevailing
conditions of peace and order in the Philippines.
It was said or insinuated at the hearing ofthe petition at bar, but not alleged in the return, that the petitioner was
engaged in subversive activities, and fear was expressed that he might join or aid the disloyal elements if allowed
to be at large. Bearing in mind the Government's allegation in its answer that "the herein petitioner was brought to
the Philippines by the Japanese forces," and the fact that Japan is no longer at war with the United States or the
Philippines nor identified with the countries allied against these nations, the possibility of the petitioner's
entertaining or committing hostile acts prejudicial to the interest and security of this country seems remote.
If we grant, for the sake of argument, that such a possibility exists, still the petitioner's unduly prolonged detention
would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger
that is by no means actual, present, or uncontrolable. After all, the Government is not impotent to deal with or
prevent any threat by such measure as that just outlined. The thought eloquently expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson
of the United States Supreme Court in connection with the appliccation for bail of ten Communists convicted by a
lower court of advocacy of violent overthrow of the United States Government is, in principle, pertinent and may
be availed of at this juncture. Said the learned Jurist:
The Governmet's alternative contention is that defendants, by misbehavior after conviction, have forfeited their
claim to bail. Grave public danger is said to result from what they may be expected to do, in addition to what they
have done since their conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit every opportune disloyal to
act helpful to Communist countries, it is still difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of
persons by the courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. lmprisonment to protect society from
predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses
and injustice that I am loath to resort it, even as a discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of
such offenses as those of which defendants stand convicted.
But the right of every American to equal treatment before the law is wrapped up in the same constitutional bundle
with those of these Communists. If an anger or disgust with these defendants we throw out the bundle, we alsocast
aside protection for the liberties of more worthy critics who may be in opposition to the government of some
future day.
x x x           x x x           x x x1âwphïl.nêt
If, however, I were to be wrong on all of these abstract or theoretical matters of principle, there is a very practical
aspect of this application which must not be overlooked or underestimated — that is the disastrous effect on the
reputation of American justice if I should now send these men to jail and the full Court later decide that their
conviction is invalid. All experience with litigation teaches that existence of a substantial question about a
conviction implies a more than negligible risk of reversal. Indeed this experience lies back of our rule permitting
and practice of allowing bail where such questions exist, to avoid the hazard of unjustifiably imprisoning persons
with consequent reproach to our system of justice. If that is prudent judicial practice in the ordinary case, how
much more important to avoid every chance of handing to the Communist world such an ideological weapon as it
would have if this country should imprison this handful of Communist leaders on a conviction that our highest
Court would confess to be illegal. Risks, of course, are involved in either granting or refusing bail. I am naive
enough to underestimate the troublemaking propensities of the defendants. But, with the Department of Justice
alert to the the dangers, the worst they can accomplish in the short time it will take to end the litigation is
preferable to the possibility of national embarrassment from a celebrated case of unjustified imprisonment of
Communist leaders. Under no circumstances must we permit their symbolization of an evil force in the world to
be hallowed and glorified by any semblance of martyrdom. The way to avoid that risk is not to jail these men until
it is finally decided that they should stay jailed.
If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying principle is of universal application.
In fact, its ratio decidendi applies with greater force to the present petition, since the right of accused to bail
pending apppeal of his case, as in the case of the ten Communists, depends upon the discretion of the court,
whereas the right to be enlarged before formal charges are instituted is absolute. As already noted, not only are
there no charges pending against the petitioner, but the prospects of bringing any against him are slim and remote.
Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon
these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents in
such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the
Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall
be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also
put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the
Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
No costs will be charged.
9|Page

G.R. No. 153675             April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by
respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated
December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April
10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The
petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap.
201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the
common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against
him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional
arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That
same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning
the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity
of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled
off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same
case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding
that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was
then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application
for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent
to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is
granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and
answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes
of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited
in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure
order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest
office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the
assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees
from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or
statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
10 | P a g e
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this
Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila,
Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well
as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do
not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J.,
later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus  is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus  finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It
cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore
the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public
international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now
being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these
universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of
the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person
and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only
to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the
former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international
law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of
every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v.
Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General
Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due
process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II,
Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human
rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has
admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the
obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the
necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee
had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed
the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the
machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation
proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign
nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of
an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human
Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.
11 | P a g e
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is
no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the
right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to
enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state
or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender
of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state
to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a
criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though
such punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations
between different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to
prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he
fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation
of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of
extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if
such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of
urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and
that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to
the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process
of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of
liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the
latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.
As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of
admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance
of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is
based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective
extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore,
deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily
met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither
be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in
civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases
cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from
fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should
order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition
proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO
OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
12 | P a g e

VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in
this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us
to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled
"Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council
under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a
grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North
EDSA.1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner
Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by
their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against
the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then
Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23 July 1990, the
CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA
pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR.4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own
ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase
light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist
from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and
arrest."6
A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among
other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of
Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor
dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in
the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this
Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North
Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a
certain business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or
cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance.8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to
dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would
bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and
political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their
privilege to engage in business."9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt
charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on
the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved).10
In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition
of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each
of them.
On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to
dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint
filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights.
The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger
limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the
power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly
and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of
women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and
traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to
man.
In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however,
in our resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to
"CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580."17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
13 | P a g e
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were
demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for
public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment,18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its
Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who
had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No.
163,20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded
as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights.21
The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of
human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to
victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the
members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body.23 This view, however, has not
heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,24 the Court, through then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no
way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-
judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of
a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its
is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not
a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in
the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been
propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of
the society, have given the following varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of
the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or
Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press,
of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the
right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in
politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social services.25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . .
Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by
it.26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right,
innate and inalienable.28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the
14 | P a g e
scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural,
political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and
attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights,
encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in
adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these
rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in
fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among
those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human
Rights in the Philippines,"29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights
expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law
on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to
arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges,
until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of
grievances became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were
subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, and judges lost independence and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were
required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort
confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and the International
Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions
during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human rights
and also because civil and political rights have been determined by many international covenants and human
rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent
legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise
nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on
the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his
political right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights
advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the
right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights
that are considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and
political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are other
violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the
commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under
the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which
cover civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments
regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This
particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is,
perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and defined as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral
parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human
rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past
regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as
a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent
with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the
committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights
of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases
of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
15 | P a g e
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the
proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The
coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning
when the reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human
Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other
convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of
which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights
specified in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to
link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the
convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of
amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and
political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense
of the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the
need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the
right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must
be envisioned initially by this provision — freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right
to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective
violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a
specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the
concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an
international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to those
that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the
different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen
has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how
much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do
not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very
delicate — torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons who are
allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human
Rights Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the
little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and
political violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we
will not receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering
the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and
are not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property,
marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its
general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable
searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.32
Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human
rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political
detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of
disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the
16 | P a g e
enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of
priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take
comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They
have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights
that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation."35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this
Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to
be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards
hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that
the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within
the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the
appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and
academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is
merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act
about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said
Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has
been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby
prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for
contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the Puno, JJ., concur.
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or
 
indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only  
to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial
powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate  
with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like,
in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the Separate Opinions
instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it
does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court, speaking  
through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer
December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the
"Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a
never derived by implication.
cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of
and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.
behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as
issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the
well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights
action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ
violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of
of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the
civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate
preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes
(Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
omitted).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners.
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to
Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very
any appropriate agency of government.37
constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and
affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.

17 | P a g e
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.

# Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J.,  dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2
December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in
"Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a
cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human
rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of
human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as
well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights
violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of
civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate
(Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners.
Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very
constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger
without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and
investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.

18 | P a g e
G.R. No. 117472 June 25, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.
 
PER CURIAM:p
Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty is indeed a deterrent as far as
the commission of heinous crimes is concerned and while the attendant details pertaining to the execution of a
death sentence remain as yet another burning issue, we are tasked with providing a clear-cut resolution of whether
or not the herein accused-appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human society for the infliction of the primitive
and bestial act of incestuous lust on his own blood.
Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated September 7, 1994, for the crime of Rape,
rendered after marathon hearing by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as charged in the complaint, aggravated by the fact that the same was
commited by the accused who is the father/stepfather of the complainant, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH, as provided for under RA. No. 7659, to pay the complainant Rodessa Echegaray the sum
of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.1
We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:
COMPLAINT
The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of
force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned complainant, his daughter, a minor, 10 years of age, all against her will and without her consent, to
her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW2
Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered the plea
of "not guilty."
These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-General in his brief:
This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.
Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a fifth-grader, born on September 11, 1983.
Rodessa is the eldest of five siblings. She has three brothers aged 6, 5 and 2, respectively, and a 3-month old baby
sister. Her parents are Rosalie and Leo Echegaray, the latter being the accused-appellant himself. The victim lives
with her family in a small house located at No. 199 Fernandez St., Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City (pp. 5-9, Aug. 9, 1994, TSN).
Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her three brothers in their house as her
mother attended a gambling session in another place, she heard her father, the accused-appellant in this case, order
her brothers to go out of the house (pp. 10-11, ibid). As soon as her brothers left, accused-appellant Leo
Echegaray approached Rodessa and suddenly dragged her inside the room (p. 12, ibid). Before she could question
the appellant, the latter immediately, removed her panty and made her lie on the floor (p. 13, ibid). Thereafter,
appellant likewise removed his underwear and immediately placed himself on top of Rodessa. Subsequently,
appellant forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's organ causing her to suffer intense pain (pp. 14-15, ibid).
While appellant was pumping on her, he even uttered. "Masarap ba, masarap ba?" and to which Rodessa
answered: "Tama na Papa, masakit" (p. 16, ibid). Rodessa's plea proved futile as appellant continued with his act.
After satisfying his bestial instinct, appellant threatened to kill her mother if she would divulge what had
happened. Scared that her mother would be killed by appellant, Rodessa kept to herself the ordeal she suffered.
She was very afraid of appellant because the latter, most of the time, was high on drugs (pp. 17-18, ibid.). The
same sexual assault happened up to the fifth time and this usually took place when her mother was out of the
house (p. 19, ibid.). However, after the fifth time, Rodessa decided to inform her grandmother, Asuncion Rivera,
who in turn told Rosalie, Radessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother proceeded to the Barangay Captain where
Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to the precinct where she
executed an affidavit (p. 21, ibid.). From there, she was accompanied to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for medical examination (p. 22, ibid.).
Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during the time when her mother was pregnant.
Rodessa added that at first, her mother was on her side. However, when appellant was detained, her mother kept
on telling her. "Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo, nakakulong" (pp. 39-40, ibid.).
When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the person of Dra. Ma. Cristina B. Preyna,3 the
complainant was described as physically on a non-virgin state, as evidenced by the presence of laceration of the
hymen of said complainant (TSN, Aug. 22, 1995, pp. 8-9).4
On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:
. . . the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She asserted that the RAPE charge against the
accused was only the figment of her mothers dirty mind. That her daughter's complaint was forced upon her by
her grandma and the answers in the sworn statement of Rodessa were coached. That the accusation of RAPE was
motivated by Rodessa's grandmother's greed over the lot situated at the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project, Barangay
San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, which her grandmother's paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave
to the accused in order to persuade the latter to admit that Rodessa executed an affidavit of desistance after it
turned out that her complaint of attempted homicide was substituted with the crime of RAPE at the instance of her
mother. That when her mother came to know about the affidavit of desistance, she placed her granddaughter under
the custody of the Barangay Captain. That her mother was never a real mother to her.
She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted homicide as her husband poured alcohol on her
body and attempted to burn her. She identified the certification issued by the NHA and Tag No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2).
That the Certification based on the Masterlist (Exh. 3) indicates that the property is co-owned by accused and
Conrado Alfonso. That Rodessa is her daughter sired by Conrado Alfonso, the latter being the paramour of her
mother. That Conrado Alfonso waived his right and participation over the lot in favor of the accused in
consideration of the latter's accepting the fact that he is the father of Rodessa to simulate the love triangle and to
conceal the nauseating sex orgies from Conrado Alfonso's real wife.
19 | P a g e
Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of the complainant has a very strong motive in
implicating him to the crime of RAPE since she was interested to become the sole owner of a property awarded to
her live-in partner by the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project. That he could not have committed the imputed crime
because he considers Rodessa as his own daughter. That he is a painter-contractor and on the date of the alleged
commission of the crime, he was painting the house of one Divina Ang of Barangay Vitalis, Parañaque, Metro
Manila (Exh. 4). The travel time between his work place to his residence is three (3) hours considering the
condition of traffic. That the painting contract is evidenced by a document denominated "Contract of Services"
duly accomplished (see submarkings of Exh. 4). He asserted that he has a big sexual organ which when used to a
girl 11 years old like Rodessa, the said female organ will be "mawawarak." That it is abnormal to report the
imputed commission of the crime to the grandmother of the victim.
Accused further stated that her (sic) mother-in-law trumped-up a charge of drug pushing earlier and he pleaded
guilty to a lesser offense of using drugs. The decretal portion of the judgment of conviction ordering the accused
to be confined at the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center irked the grandmother of Rodessa because it was her wish that
accused should be meted the death penalty.
Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong motive of Rodessa's grandmother in implicating
him in this heinous crime because of her greed to become the sole owner of that piece of property at the National
Housing Authority-Madrigal Project, situated at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, notwithstanding rigid
cross-examination. He asserted that the imputed offense is far from his mind considering that he treated Rodessa
as his own daughter. He categorically testified that he was in his painting job site on the date and time of the
alleged commission of the crime.
Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that she is the laundry woman and part time baby
sitter of the family of accused. That at one time, she saw Rodessa reading sex books and the Bulgar newspaper.
That while hanging washed clothes on the vacant lot, she saw Rodessa masturbating by tinkering her private parts.
The masturbation took sometime.
This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray, the fourth and last witness for the defense.
She stated that she tried hard to correct the flirting tendency of Rodessa and that she scolded her when she saw
Rodessa viewing an X-rated tape. Rodessa according to her was fond of going with friends of ill-repute. That (sic)
she corroborated the testimony of Mrs. Punzalan by stating that she herself saw Rodessa masturbating inside the
room of her house.5
In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the lower court dismissed
the defense of alibi and lent credence to the straightforward testimony of the ten-year old victim to whom no ill
motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant can be attributed. The lower court likewise regarded as
inconsequential the defense of the accused-appellant that the extraordinary size of his penis could not have
insinuated itself into the victim's vagina and that the accused is not the real father of the said victim.
The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a reversal of the lower court's verdict
through the following assignment of errors:
1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SINISTER MOTIVE OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S GRANDMOTHER? THAT PRECIPITATED THE FILING OF THE CHARGE OF RAPE,
HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED GUILTY AS CHARGED.
2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE HEALED LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7
O'CLOCK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF ACCUSED TO THE
VAGINA OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED
COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED, NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT DENIAL.
3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI THAT ACCUSED WAS IN
PARAÑAQUE ON THE DATE AND TIME OF THE IMPUTED CRIME HENCE, IT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.6
Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death penalty, requires a thorough and
judicious examination of the circumstances relating thereto, this Court remains guided by the following principles
in evaluating evidence in cases of this nature: (a) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to
prove but more difficult for the accused though innocent to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where only two persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution must stand and fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 7
Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this Court to tilt the scales of justice in favor
of the accused-appellant notwithstanding that he cries foul insisting that the rape charge was merely concocted
and strongly motivated by greed over a certain lot situated at the NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing Project,
Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The accused-appellant theorizes that prosecution
witness Asuncion Rivera, the maternal grandmother of the victim Rodessa, concocted the charge of rape so that,
in the event that the accused-appellant shall be meted out a death sentence, title to the lot will be consolidated in
her favor. Indeed, the lot in question is co-owned by the accused-appellant and Conrado Alfonso, the live-in
partner of Asuncion Rivera, according to the records of the National Housing Authority (Exh. "3"). The accused-
appellant would want us to believe that the rape charge was fabricated by Asuncion Rivera in order to eliminate
the accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So, the live-in partners would have the property for their own.8
We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so callous as to instigate her 10-year old
granddaughter to file a rape case against her own father simply on account of her alleged interest over the disputed
lot.9
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is credible where she has no motive
to testify against the accused. 10
We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old Rodessa which the trial court
found convincing enough and unrebutted by the defense. The trial court not surprisingly noted that Rodessa's
narration in detail of her father's monstrous acts had made her cry.11 Once again, we rule that:
. . . The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of the rape as to the circumstances of the
rape must be given weight, for testimony of young and immature rape victims are credible (People v. Guibao, 217
SCRA 64 [1993]). No woman especially one of tender age, practically only a girl, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter expose herself to a public trial, if she were not
motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People v. Guibao, supra). 12
The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in his
attempt to bolster his claim that the rape accusation against him is malicious and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's
testimony that the accused-appellant was already naked when he dragged her inside the room is inconsistent with
her subsequent testimony that the said accused-appellant was still wearing short pants when she was dragged
inside the room. Secondly, Rodessa's sworn statement before the police investigator which indicated that, while
the accused was executing pumping acts, he uttered the words "Masarap ba?", differ from her testimony in court
wherein she related that, when the accused took out his penis from her vagina, the accused said "Masarap, tapos
20 | P a g e
na." Thirdly, the victim's grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, recounted in her sworn statement that it was the accused
who went to see her to apprise her of the rape committed on her granddaughter. However, in her testimony in
court , Asuncion Rivera claimed that she was the one who invited the accused-appellant to see her in her house so
as to tell her a secret.13 These alleged discrepancies merely pertain to minor details which in no way pose serious
doubt as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Whether or not the accused was naked when he dragged
Rodessa inside the room where he sexually assaulted her bears no significant effect on Rodessa's testimony that
she was actually raped by the accused-appellant. Moreover, a conflicting account of whatever words were uttered
by the accused-appellant after he forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's private organ against her will cannot
impair the prosecution's evidence as a whole. A determination of which version earmarks the truth as to how the
victim's grandmother learned about the rape is inconsequential to the judgment of conviction.
As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin: 14
This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the narration of the witness do not detract from
its essential credibility as long as it is on the whole coherent and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in fact
suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed as it is not to he expected that he will be
able to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall.
After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses deserves our utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness.
With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are bereft of clear and concrete proof of
the accused-appellant's claim as to the size of his penis and that if that be the fact, it could not have merely caused
shallow healed lacerations at 3:00 and 7:00 o'clock. 15 In his testimony, the accused-appellant stated that he could
not have raped Rodessa because of
the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina had he actually done so. 16 This Court gives no
probative value on the accused-appellant's self-serving statement in the light of our ruling in the case
of People v. Melivo, supra,17 that:
The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs capable of varying degrees of distensibility. The
degree of distensibility of the female reproductive organ is normally limited only by the character and size of the
pelvic inlet, other factors being minor. The female reprodructive canal being capable of allowing passage of a
regular fetus, there ought to be no difficulty allowing the entry of objects of much lesser size, including the male
reproductive organ, which even in its largest dimensions, would still be considerably smaller than the full-term
fetus.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various parts of he vaginal wall, though not as
extensive as appellant might have expected them to be, indicate traumatic injury to the area within the period
when the incidents were supposed to have occurred. (At pp. 13-14, emphasis supplied)
In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof. 18 A mere knocking at the doors of the pudenda,
so to speak, by the accused's penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is
not required to sustain a conviction. 19 In the case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-legal examiner, categorically testified
that the healed lacerations of Rodessa on her vagina were consistent with the date of the commission of the rape as
narrated by the victim to have taken place in April, 1994. 20
Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-appellant erroneously argues that the
Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered as evidence in support of the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not
be corroborated because there is no law expressly requiring so. 21 In view of our finding that the prosecution
witnesses have no motive to falsely testify against the accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, in this case,
uncorroborated by other witnesses, should be completely disregarded. 22 More importantly, the defense of alibi
which is inherently weak becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused-appellant as
perpetrator of the crime of rape by his victim, Rodessa. 23
The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself to do some painting job at the house of
one Divina Ang in Parañaque, Metro Manila, within 25 days from April 4, 1994, is not proof of the whereabouts
of the accused-appellant at the time of the commission of the offense.
The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis of the complaint, dated July 14,
1994. The gravamen of the said offense, as stated in paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is the
carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. 24 Rodessa positively identified his father accused-
appellant, as the culprit of Statutory Rape. Her account of how the accused-appellant succeeded in consummating
his grievous and odious sexual assault on her is free from any substantial self-contradiction. It is highly
inconceivable that it is rehearsed and fabricated upon instructions from Rodessa's maternal grandmother Asuncion
Rivera as asserted by the accused-appellant. The words of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the
Court, more than two decades ago, are relevant and worth reiterating, thus:
. . . it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the offended parties are young and immature girls like
the victim in this case, (Cited cases omitted) there is marked receptivity on its, part to tend credence to their
version of what transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The state, as parens patria, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves
fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on
the unfortunate victim alone. The consternation it causes her family must also be taken into account It may reflect
a failure to abide by the announced concern in the fundamental law for such institution There is all the more
reason then for the rigorous application of the penal law with its severe penalty for this offense, whenever
warranted. It has been aptly remarked that with the advance in civilization, the disruption in public peace and
order it represents defies explanation, much more so in view of what currently appears to be a tendency for sexual
permissiveness. Where the prospects of relationship based on consent are hardly minimal, self-restraint should
even be more marked. 25
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death Penalty Law, Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code was amended, to wit:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eigthteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the penalty imposed by the trial court by
declaring that he is neither a father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa although he was a confirmed lover of
Rodessa's mother. 26 On direct examination, he admitted that before the charge of rape was riled against him, he
had treated Rodessa as his real daughter and had provided for her food, clothing, shelter and education. 27 The
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Court notes that Rodessa uses the surname of the accused-appellant, not Rivera (her mother's maiden name) nor
Alfonso (her grandmother's live-in partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the cross-examination that
she, the accused-appellant, and her five children, including Rodessa, had been residing in one house only. 28 At
any rate, even if he were not the father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save him from
the abyss where perpetrators of heinous crimes ought to be, as mandated by law. Considering that the accused-
appellant is a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother, 29 he falls squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death
Penalty Law under the term "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."

The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is reason enough to conclude
that accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by
the accused on his young victim has become all the more repulsive and perverse. The victim's tender age and the
accused-appellant's moral ascendancy and influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to succumb to the
accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has made it inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the
accused-appellant face the supreme penalty of death. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104.

SO ORDERED.

# Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J.,  dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2
December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in
"Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a
cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human
rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of
human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as
well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights
violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of
civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate
(Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners.
Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very
constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger
without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and
investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.

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