Failure of Conciliation:Perceptions and Realities

Author(s): Debi S. Saini

Source: Indian Journal of Industrial Relations , Oct., 1992, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Oct., 1992), pp.
105-122
Published by: Shri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27767241

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IJIR, Vol. 28, No.2, October, 1992

FAILURE OF CONCILIATION:PERCEPTIONS
AND REALITIES

DEBI S. SAINI

The paper attempts to show that the perceptions research cannot

adequately explain the phenomenon of failure of conciliation. We
need more convincing explanations by studying the attitudes
and experiences of the disputant parties as also the role
dispensation of various representatives who participate in the
conciliation system. The failure perceptions are compared with
the actual cases of conciliation failure. H is argued that contrary
to perceived causal factors tike unrealistic demands, lack of trust
between parties, and tack of commitment on the part of
conciliation officers, conciliation fails because the Industrial*
disputes-resolution system, which gives over-arching powers to
the state, enables the managements to successfully resort to
unfair labour practices and thus to succeed in their goat of
weakening or breaking the unions.

INTRODUCTION

The working of conciliation machinery is, without doubt, an important aspect

of industrial relations. This is more so in an industrial relations system like
India, where state plays a major role in the processing of industrial disputes
at various institutional levels. In India, few researches have been
undertaken on the phenomenon of "failure" of conciliation as such. There
are some studies by social scientists exclusively on conciliation (see, for
example, Pradip Kumar, 1966; Patil, 1977; Murty et al. 1986). These
studies, broadly speaking, attempt to find the "factors" which explain the

Dr. Debi S. Saini is Professor of Labour Law, Gandhi Labour Institute, Ahmedabad.
This paper is based on a larger research entitled: "Compulsory Adjudication in Industrial
Relations" undertaken at the Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. The author thanks Professor
Upendra Baxi, Vice-Chancellor, University of Delhi, for his guidance and critical comments on
the earlier draft. The usual disclaimers, however, apply.

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 106 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations

failure of conciliation. Apart from presenting the aggregate data on disputes

statistics, these studies portray the opinions and perceptions of workmen
and management's representatives. Another study (Ramaswamy,1984)
uses the working of conciliation system to examine the role of state in
industrial relations. This,however,is based on disputes- processing in two
very large-sized concerns. Undoubtedly, of course, it reflects the
emergence of a new era in industrial relations research in India.

This paper attempts to show that the opinions and perceptions research
cannot adequately explain the phenomenon of failure of conciliation.
Undoubtedly, it is not intended to undermine the value of perceptions in
certain specific sit ations. But we need more convincing explanations in
this regard by studying the attitudes and experiences of the disputant parties
as also from the study of role dispensation of various representatives who
participate in the conciliation system. Thus, it is not appropriate to read facts
into only the perceptions of the concerned parties; facts need to be
established independently and objectively. To confront this limitation of
perceptions research, this paper seeks to compare the perceived factors
responsible for the failure of conciliation with the realities which explain this
phenomenon as obtained through the reconstruction of actual industrial
disputes. The 'industrial disputes' referred here pertain to the 'private sector'
and belong to the category of 'collectively-espoused disputes'.

The Legal Framework of Conciliation

The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA) is the principal central law in
India which provides the framework of conciliation. Under this law, among
others, the conciliation machinery has been assigned the role of "mediating
in and promoting the settlement of industrial disputes." Towards this end,
the IDA obliges the Conciliation Officer (CO) to "without delay investigate
the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and right settlementthereol
and.do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the
parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement" (emphasis added). If a
settlement is arrived at "in the course of conciliation proceedings", the CO
"shall" send a report to the appropriate government together with the
memorandum of settlement signed by the "parties to the dispute".2 If the
conciliation fails, he sends a "failure report" whereby he is expected to state
the "steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances.
together with a full statement of such facts and circumstances", and the
reasons for the failure of the conciliation.

The failure report is considered by the appropriate government in

referring a dispute for adjudication, though the government is not bound to
do so. The failure report is thus a connecting link between the conciliation

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Failure of Conciliation : Perceptions and Realities 107

system and the Tribunal/Labour Court system.3 It is for this reason that the
conciliation process has been referred to as "the invisible stage of
adjudication" (Saini, 1991 :257). Thus, it may seem difficult to examine any
of these two systems in isolation; they are deeply inter-connected. Though
the output of the conciliation system becomes the input of the tribunal
system, the latter, by its existence and working, exerts influence on the
working of the former. Therefore, when we examine the failure of
conciliation, it is important to understand it in a holistic context.

THE RESEARCH SETTING AND THE METHODOLOGY

This study is based on the fieldwork conducted at the Faridabad

Industrial Complex in Haryana, which is located to the south of New Delhi.
Faridabad has four Labour Officers : One is the Deputy Labour
Commissioner (DLC), and three are the Labour-cum-Conciliation Officers.
Each of the three Conciliation Officers (COs) conciliates industrial disputes
occuring in his geographical jurisdiction. The DLC is the Conciliation Officer
for all industrial disputes which occur in industries in the whole Faridabad
belt but employ 500 or more workmen. Apart from the conciliation powers,
the DLC is responsible for the labour administration in the whole complex,
and therefore supervises the work of the three Labour-cum-Conciliation
Officers who too enjoy powers of - apart from conciliation - labour
administration in their respective circles.

The field work of the study was conducted over a period of 29 months
- from September 1984 to February 1987 - with intermittent intervals. The
principal form of data collected was the sociological reconstruction of 33
collective disputes. Table 1 gives a list of these 33 disputes and the
abbreviated form in which each of these disputes has been cited. 29 of these
disputes resulted in Tribunal awards which were published in the Gazette
of the Government of Haryana over a period of five years: 1978 to 1982.
The reconstructed disputes were treated as units of observation. This
sample of 29 disputes consisted of : i) 10 disputes which involved full-blown
adjudication; ii) 12 disputes which were compromised and resulted in
'Settlement Awards'; and iii) 7 disputes which were abandoned at the
Tribunal by the concerned workmen/trade unions and resulted in 'No
Dispute Awards'. The reconstruction of these disputes involved studying of
conciliation files, including COs confidential reports, Tribunal- proceedings
files, and interviewing of the concerned disputant parties. Ramaswamy
(1984:23) rightly sees "vast source of data" and a "veritable treasure house"
in these files (he too had access to the conciliation files of the two disputes
he studied), which, he laments, have remained untapped by labour
researchers.

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 108 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations

Over and above these 29 disputes, the author observed the conciliation
proceedings of four live disputes, which too were reconstructed in a similar
way. Three of these four cases resulted in settlements before the concerned
CO i.e. 12(3) settlements. One (PSL (33)) was partially referred for
adjudication by the Tribunal. Thus, in 30 of these cases, the disputes were
not resolved at the conciliation level. The interviewees in these
reconstructed 33 disputes - also known as disputant parties - were one set
of respondents. Another set of respondents were 76 professionals in
Faridabad consisting of: management consultants (17), outside union
leaders belonging to various union federations (32), and practising labour
lawyers (27). This category of respondents will be known as the
general-category interviewees. They were interviewed about their
perceptions and general disputing experiences of the various facets of
industrial disputes resolution including the failure of conciliation. The third
set of data were gathered by discussions4 with the three COs and the DLC
about their perceptions of the conciliation system.

The Dynamics of Failure of Conciliation

The failure of an industrial-dispute-resolution mechanism, it should be

noted, need not necessarily be a problem of the attitudes, integrity, and
skills of the people who man that mechanism. It could be attributable to a
host of other factors, including structural and cultural. Of course, the
structural factors in the longrun produce the cultural context; and a cultural
context which gets developed and works contrary to the intended objectives
of a system, may also lead to the building of pressures for structural changes
and readjustments. Some of the important structural factors which are
important in regard to the working of conciliation are the roles assigned and
powers conferred to the COs, the role of political executive in the system's
working, the constitution of the system, and its relationship with other
collateral systems. Yet other factors which determine the outcome of
conciliation could relate to the power position, attitudes, susceptibilities of
the disputant parties: workmen and their unions, and employers and their
representatives. An important point that needs to be underscored is that all
these factors are not of independent significance but often determine, and
are determined by, the impact of others. Therefore, the failure phenomenon
cannot be gauged appropriately merely by ranking of perceptions. It is rather
important to go into the dynamics of conciliation processes to know the
dominant variables which determine their outcomes.

In short, an important question is whether failure results from just the

attitudes, or is it the institutional structure of the system which produces the
attitudes as manifestations of its covert potentialities. It is with a view to

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Failure of Conciliation : Perceptions and Realities 109

finding answer to this question that this study attempted to explore the
causal factors from many angles. To this end, an open-ended interview
schedule was administered (to know the factors that lead to failure of
conciliation) on the union/workmen's representative; and the management
representative involved in the sampled disputes and in the four conciliation
disputes. The same schedule was also administered to the general
category professionals in Faridabad, including trade union leaders,
management consultants, and practising labour lawyers. The rankings of
inhibiting factors by all interviewees were then standardised to find the
weighted ranks. Also, the failure of conciliation was discussed with the COs
by way of general questions. More importantly, the factors responsible for
the failure of conciliation in the sampled disputes were explored and
tabulated.

Thus, the dynamics of failure of conciliation were understood through

three sets of data : (a) the rankings through standardised interview schedule
(these can be located in Tables 2 to 7); (b) the observations of the COs;
and (c) the factors located in the reconstructed cases.

PERCEPTIONS

As observed earlier, five sets of perceptions of conciliation failure were

obtained in terms of the most probable factors that inhibit effectiveness of
conciliation. These perceptions, as ranked in Tables 2 to 7, were obtained
through the administration of interview schedule, from five categories of
respondents. Table 2 shows the ranking priorities given to the three most
important scheduled factors by the concerned workmen's/union
representatives involved in the sampled disputes and conciliation cases.
Likewise, Table 3 gives the rankings by the management representatives
involved in these cases. Table 4 demonstrates similar ranks by the union
leaders, Table 5 by the management consultants, and Table 6 by the
professional lawyers, all of the general category. Table 7 attempts to
standardize the ranking priorities. The footnotes attached to Tables 2 to 7
explain the manner in which they were prepared, the scores obtained, and
ranks given.
The factors listed in the interview schedule were:

(i) unrealistic demands; (ii) insufficient training of CO; (iii) lack of trust
between the parties; (iv) availability of adjudication; (v) lack of commitment
of CO; (vi) distrust of parties in CO; (vii) heavy workload of CO; (viii) lack of
sufficient powers of CO; (ix) insufficient salary and status of CO; and (x)
poor accountability of CO. While the preferences of interviewees were being
obtained, it was noticed that respondents in many cases came out with

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 110 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations

their own preferences. These were immediately included in the schedule.

Three such factors were thus added: (xi) corruption of CO; (xii) rigidity and
prestige issue by management; and (xiii) trade union professionals' attitude
at conciliation.5 Respondents were asked to give the three most important
priorities to these factors in terms of their importance. Then, scores were
assigned to these priorities: three to the first, two to the second, and one to
the third priority. The scores were added, and the percentages and ranks
were thus arrived at.

The three most important factors perceived to inhibit effectiveness of

conciliation by the workmen's/union representatives of the disputant-parties
category as revealed by Table 2 are: (i) corruption of CO, (ii) rigidity and
prestige issue by management, and (iii) distrust of parties in CO, in the order
of their ranks. Likewise, Table 3 reveals the management representatives'
perceptions, which are: (i) unrealistic demands, (ii) trade union
professionals' attitude at conciliation, and (iii) insufficient training of CO, in
the order of their ranks.

Table 4 reveals the ranks of priorities of the general-category union

leaders, which, in their order of importance, are: (i) lack of commitment of
CO, (ii) availability of adjudication, and (iii) lack of sufficient powers of CO.
Table 5 shows ranks of priorities by management consultants in the general
category which are: (i) unrealistic demands, (ii) lack of trust between parties,
and (iii) lack of sufficient powers of CO. Table 6 shows ranks of priorities
by practising labour lawyers of the general category; the factors revealed
are: (i) unrealistic demands, (ii) lack of trust between parties, and (iii)
availability of adjudication.
These ranks were standardised and presented in Table 7. The
percentages obtained for each inhibiting factor in all the five categories were
added and totals in 3spect of all thirteen factors ranked. The standardised
ranks thus found were: (i) unrealistic demands; (ii) lack of trust between
parties; and (iii) lack of commitment by CO. Thus, with the help of Tables 2
to 7, we are able to know the perceptions of the five categories of
participants in conciliation processes and also their aggregated perceptions
on the factors that caused failure of conciliation.

When the question was discussed6 with the COs, almost all of them
opined that disputant parties lacked trust in each other; particularly, the
management wanted to pay the least, and the workmen wanted to get the
maximum. The clash of expectations results in rigid attitudes by the parties.
Small managements first of all try to break unions. They succeed in quite a
few cases. If they do not, they prefer to settle as per the exigencies of the
situation. Two of these four COs felt that if they had more powers, they could
effect larger number of settlements. The COs also wanted more

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Failure of Conciliation : Perceptions and Realities 111

responsible behaviour from outsider union leaders.

REALITIES

After knowing these rankings of priorities by the respective interest

groups, the author tabulated the key reason of failure of conciliation in each
of the 29 sampled disputes and one conciliation dispute where settlement
could not take place. The same are available in Table 8. The process of
knowing the key reason was not any mechanical task. It involved a careful
reading of the reconstructed cases in all their complexities. Apart from the
role of conciliation machinery, the role of state in handling industrial conflict
and the messages transmitted by the tribunal system about its potentiality
to realise the intended objectives of the dispute resolution syst?m were also
articulated.7 As this table reveals, it was found that in most cases (56.8 per
cent), conciliation failed due to the management's belief that it would be
able to break or weaken the union by resorting to unfair labour practices,
either by influencing the CO or/and the outsider union leader. In 30 per cent
cases, conciliation failed due to the rigid attitude of the management, which
it thought morally justified to adopt on the basis of its capacity to pay.
In one case (i.e. 3.3 per cent), the management was disinclined to oblige
the union which it did not like; though in a somewhat similar case it had earlier
obliged its favoured union. In another case (i.e. 3.3 per cent), the union leader
settled all but one demands. It was found that he was fond of taking cases to
the Tribunal, in the hope of extracting bigger sums of money from management
at opportune times and simultaneously to project, through a larger number of
appearances at the Tribunal, to the ignorant workmen that he was a very
successful trade union leader. In another case (3.3 per cent): BIL (11), the
workmen did not seek conciliation as they thought that the conciliation
machinery was useless and irrelevant to settlement of disputes. One case (3.3
per cent): BCM(12), involved a situation where the workmen became unduly
rigid, as they believed that the Labour Minister would help them.
Table 8 was made after considerable study of each aspect involved in
a dispute.8 Some cases were such which could fall in more than one
category. For example, in PSL (33), not only the management was confident
of smashing the CITU union,9 by resorting to unfair labour practices, it was
also disinclined to concede to a non- favoured union. In HSL (1) also, even
though the key factor in the failure of conciliation was the management's
disinclination to concede to a non-favoured union but it admittedly
influenced the CO to reject the reference; and, in fact, he did recommend
the rejection. However, the union later on put political pressure to obtain
the reference of the demand.

On analysing cause 1 of failure of conciliation, to which 56.8 per cent

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 112 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations

cases are attributable, it is found that it consists of the management's

expectation of breaking or weakening the union through various devices.
In many cases, managements refusedto participate in conc/7/aton but could
succeed in breaking the union or dismissing its leaders after the reference
had been made, resulting into the abandonment of the concerned cases.
This happened in JSF (6), ASL (10), UCB (23), CEW (25), FRF (27), and
FAP (29). In most other cases, the union leaders were allegedly bribed to
influence the proceedings in management's favour.

Likewise, in cases attributable to cause 2 for failure of conciliation, the

nearest cause was identified, though unfair labour practices were
committed in some of these cases also (e.g. PHL(15), UMM (16), UAL (21),
and ARL(24)).
From the data presentation, it is clear that conciliation fails because the
dispute-resolution system enables the managements to successfully resort
to unfair labour practices, and thus to succeed in their goal of weakening
or breaking the unions. The most conspicuous manifestation of the failure
of conciliation was the management's refusal to grant labour's demands
because of a perception of the labours' vulnerability in the compulsory
adjudication system, of which conciliation system is an essential part. A
question may be asked: what explains a good number of settlements which
are effected by the COs? It is natural that the labour, as any other party in
its position, attempts to minimize its frustrating experiences (letswaart,
1981-82) by signing settlements even with discontent in its heart. Most of
the 12 (3) settlements were cases of covert coercion by managements. The
coercion was possible due to the partisan exercise of reference
recommendation by the COs, the state's collusion (Saini, 1992: 334-382)
with employers and outsider union leaders, projection of inability by the
tribunals (ibid 383-461) to realise for labour the intended objectives of the
IDA, and by 'juridification'(Saini,1991 & 1991b) of industrial relations, which
ultimately benefits the employers. Such a state of affairs enables the
perpetuation of commission of unfair labour practices, which result in
authoritarian managements, their rigid attitudes, and refusal to share with
labour the information on the working of the industry. All this is made
possible by the present structure of the Conciliation-Adjudication model,
which gives over-arching powers to state in industrial relations. The state
uses these powers, in effect, to control labour.

It was also found that in a substantial number of cases (30 per cent),
the disputant parties took rigid stands and felt morally justified to do so.
However, this can be said about some cases attributable to cause 1 also
where having decided that they were justified in rejecting workmen's
demands, the managements resorted to unfair labour practices to confront,

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Failure of Conciliation : Perceptions and Realities 113

what they perceive to be, an unjust system for them to survive honestly. It
should be recognised that the system makes no convincing arrangements
to decide the capacity to pay. Total ad hocism prevails in this respect. Even
the CO - as happens in almost all cases - start asking: for how much ad hoc
increase the workmen would agree in place of the demands mentioned in
the demand charter. Even the demand charters, therefore, contain
irresponsible and exorbitant demands without any serious intentions to
realise them. The structure of the conciliation - and its adjunct the
adjudication system - thus have perpetuated and internalised ad hocism in
the industrial conflict resolution system.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The key point that emerges from the discussion is that perceptions of
causal factors by the actors in the dispute resolution system - participants
like labour and management and adjuncts like parties' representatives -
may not be adequate to gauge the real causes of failure of conciliation. We
rather need factual and theoretical presentation of the experiences and
attitudes of the concerned parties. Common man, it should be noted, does
not follow theories in his perceptions and opinions (Baxi, 1982). The
perceptions should rather help us in our theoretical understanding of the
working of an institution like the conciliation system.

The study reveals that the conciliation system has been so structured
that it is used by employers to avoid workers' collectives as interest groups
on equal footings. They, naturally, look for alternative means of confronting
the labour power, which involves softer options rather than indulging in
genuine sharing of industrial gains and discussing resultant issues at the
negotiation table. Thus, the attitude of unrealistic demands on the part of
workers, lack of commitment on the part of the COs, and the
authoritarianism on the part of managements are mere manifestations of a
deeper systemic malaise. In fact, the covert structuring of the conciliation
system in its present form is unable to promote realisation of genuine
conciliation and disputes negotiations.

Indian industrial relations scene has witnessed repeated but futile

attempts on the part of the Indian state to restructure the dispute resolution
system, beginning from the 1950 Bill, that was allowed to lapse, till the 1988
Industrial Relations Bill, which met the same fate. The very forces which
contribute to the failure of conciliation, as understood here, have frustrated
these attempts. The crux of industrial relations problems in India is the lack
of trust between parties. This has been allowed to develop by the
inequitability images projected by the working of the existing
conciliation-adjudication model. The workman knows that the system is

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 114 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations

unjust, but thinks that it is inevitable (Saini,1991 a and 1991 b). He thinks
that better people (conciliators , adjudicators and bureaucrats) are needed
for its better management. Bui:, unless a countervailing power is given to
labour by "systemic restructuring, the workman's hope will remain merely a
mirage. These are clear indications from this study of failure of conciliation.

The contemporary concern for industrial relations reforms in India,

therefore, must keep this situation of disequilibrium in the power-position of
the parties. In certain isolated situations power table gets turned also in
workmen's favour, but these are only exceptions. The forthcoming IR Bill,
therefore, should carve out positions, powers and procedures in such a way
that the IR structure is debureaucratised anC dejuridified. This will require
autonomous institutions to be nurtured. We may call them Industrial
Relations Commissions (IRCs) or by some other name, but their structure
needs a careful articulation as per the existing industrial relations realities.

Notes
1. See Section 12(2), The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Ibid. S.12(3); Such settlements are also known as 12(3) settlements.
3. The 'failure report' is a confidential document and is not available to any disputant party
who wants to know the recommendations of the CO about the reference of the dispute.
4. The conciliation officers concerned did not like to give formal interviews. Therefore,
informal discussions were held with them during various stages of the fieldwork.
5. It was initially thought that to include a factor like corruption of the CO may make
respondents unduly suspicious, and might prove to be problematic. Likewise was
thought about the resort to questionable practices by managements and professional
union leaders. Therefore, these factors had to be carefully managed.
6. As noted earlier, the COs were not asked to give any rankings. General discussions
were held with them.
7. See Saini (1991 ), Chapters 4 to 8.
8. The facts of the disputes were reconstructed to the nearest possibility after careful
examination of the concerned records, communications, admissions by the parties, and
the interviews conducted.
9. In this case, the management had a favoured union which was affiliated to the Indian
National Trade Union Congress (INTUC); it also had the support of the State
Government.

REFERENCES
Baxi, Upendra (1982) : The Crisis of the Indian LeqaI System, New Delhi: Vikas.
letswaart, Heleen F.P. (1981 -82) : "Labour Relations Litigation: Chile, 1971 -72", Law&Society
Review, Vol.16, 625.
Murty, B.S., Giri, D.V., and Rath, BP. (1986) : "Conciliation Machinery in Orissa: A Study",
Indian Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol.21, 428-447.
Patil, B.R. 1977 : Conciliation in India, Allahabad: Chugh.
Pradip Kumar (1966) : " The Working of Conciliation Machinery in India", Indian Journal of

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Failure of Conciliation : Perceptions and Realities 115

Industrial Relations, Vol. 2, 34.

Ramaswamy, E.A. (1984) : Power and Justice, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Saini, Debi S. (1991) : "A Socio-Legal study of Compulsory Adjudication in Industrial
Relations". Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, Delhi.
Saini, Debi S. (1991a) : "Compulsory Adjudication of Industrial Disputes: Juridification of
Industrial Relations", Indian Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 27,1-19.
Saini, Debi S. (1991 b) : "Collective Labour Law, Labour Disputes, and Labour Adjudication in
India: Legitimacy of a Colonial Model", paper presented to the Joint Meeting of Law
and Society Association and Research Committee on the Sociology of Law of the
International Sociological Association (1991), University of Amsterdem, Absterdem,
The Netherlands (June 26-29V
TABLE 1 List of Reconstructed Disputes

CASE ABBREVIATION NAME OF THE CASE

1 HSL Highclass Sheets Ltd.
2 GRIL Giant Rubber India Ltd.
3 ECL Essac Cotton Mills Ltd.
4 AML Aman Meters Ltd.
5 AMT Ardit Machine Tools
6 JSF Jazz Steel Fastners Pvt. Ltd.
7 TCC Technique Consultation
8 PML Print Machines Ltd.
9 APL Avis Production Pvt Ltd.
10 ASL Ashok Synthetics Pvt Ltd.
11 BIL Bask India Ltd.
12 BCM Bhushan Carbon Mfg. Co. Ltd.
13 HVG Himalaya Vikas Glass Pvt Ltd.
14 EL Equipments Ltd.
15 PHL Partap House Ltd.
16 UMM Union Machinery Mills Ltd.
17 SEC Swastik Engineering Co. Ltd.
18 RVL Robin Vikas Ltd.
19 OEW Om Engineering Works
20 SKW Swan Knitting Works
21 UAL Uma Automobile Ltd.
22 HPL Hammer Private Ltd.
23 UCB Unique Conveyor Belts
.24 ARL Ashish Rubber Ltd.
25 CEW Cast Engineering Works
26 OS Oshima Steel
27 FRF Frontal Rubber Factory Pvt. Ltd
28 SEW Sidhu Engineering Works
29 FAP Ferguson And Allied Products PVt. Ltd
30 SL Sahnis Ltd.
31 FIL Fenning India Ltd.
32 KGK Kanwar G.khemka Ltd.
33 PSL Parikshit Steels Mills Ltd.

* The real names of the concerned employers have been changed and pseudonyms are
being used, to follow the policy of concealing their identity.

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116 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations

TABLE-2 Factors Inhibiting Effectiveness of Conciliation: Disputant Parties

(Union/Workmen's Representatives)

Inhibiting Factors Frequency of Priorities Total Rank

First Second Third Score
Priority Priority Priority
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

1 Unrealistic Demands 1 9(4.5) 9,10

2 Insufficient Training 2 11 (5.6) 6,7
of CO
3 Lack of Trust 2 17(8.6) 4
Between Parties
4 Availability of 9(4.5) 9,10
Adjudication
5 Lack of Commitment 11(5.6) 6,7
of CO
6 Distrust of Parties 20(10.1) 3
In CO
7 Heavy Workload of CO -(0)
8 Lack of Sufficient 2 10(5.0)
Powers of CO
9 Insufficient Salary And -(0)
Status of CO
10 Poor Accountability of 15(7.6)
CO
11 Corruption of CO 18 66(33.3)
12 Rigidity and Prestige 8 30(15.2)
Issue by Management
13 Trade Union Professional's -(0)
Attitude at Conciliation

TOTAL 33 33 33 198(100%)

Scores given to various priorities were: three to first.two to second, and one to third
priority. The scores were added, and percentages and then ranks were arrived at. The
figures given in parentheses in Column 5 indicate percentage of total scrore of each
inhibiting factor.

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Failure of Conciliation : Perceptions and Realities 117

TABLE-3 Factors Inhibiting Effectiveness of Conciliation: Disputant Parties

(Management's Representative)

Inhibiting Factors Frequency of Priorities Total Rank

First Second Third Score
Priority Priority Priority
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

1 Unrealistic demands 36(23.1) 1

2 I nsuff icient training 19(12.2) 3
of CO
3 Lack of trust 14(9.0) 5
between parties
4 Availability of 8(5.1) 6
adjudication
5 Lack of commitment 18(11.5) 4
of CO
6 Distrust of Parties 7(4.5) 7,8
in CO
7 Heavy workload of CO 3(1.9) 11,12
8 Lack of sufficient 7(4.5) 7,8
powers of CO
9 Insufficient salary 1(0.1) 13
and status of CO
10 Poor accountability 3(1.9) 11,12
11 Corruption of CO 6(3.8) 9
12 Rigidity and prestige 5(3.2) 10
issue of management
13 Trade union 29(18.6) 2
professional's attitude
at conciliation

Total 26 26 26 156(100)

Scores given to various priorities were: three to first.two to second, and one to third
priority. The scores were added, and percentages and then ranks were arrived at. The
figures given in parentheses in column 5 indicate the percentage of total score of each
inhibiting factor.

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118 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations

TAB LE-4 Factors Inhibiting Effectiveness of Conciliation: General Category-Union

Leader

Inhibiting Factors Frequency of Priorities Total Rank

First Second Third Score
Priority Priority Priority

1 Unrealistic demands 2 10(5.2) 9,10

2 Insufficient training 2 13(6.8) 8
of CO.
3 Lack of trust 1 19(9.9) 4
between parties
4 Availability of 3 24(12.5) 2
adjudication
5 Lack of commitment 7 39(20.3) 1
of CO
6 Distrust of parties 1 10(5.2) 9,10
in CO
7 Heavy workload of CO 1 6(3.2) 11
8 Lack of sufficient 5 23(12.0) 3
powers of CO
9 Insufficient salary
and status of CO
10 Poor accountability 1 14(7.3)
of CO
11 Corruption of CO 5 17(8.8) 5,6
12 Rigidity and prestige A 17(8.8) 5,6
issue of management
13 Trade union
professionals
attitude at conciliation

Total 32 32 32 192(100)

Scores given to various priorities were: three to first.two to second, and one to third
priority. The scores were added, and percentages and then ranks were arrived at. The
figures in parentheses in column 5 indicate percentage of total score of each inhibiting
factor.

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Failure of Conciliation : Perceptions and Realities 119

TAB LE-5 :- Factors Inhibiting Effectiveness of Conciliation: Second Category -

Management Consultants

Inhibing Factors Frequency of Priorities Total Rank

First Second Third Score
Priority Priority Priority
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

1 Unrealistic demands 7 3 1 28(27.5) 1

2 Insufficient training 1 1 3(2.9) 7, 8
of CO
3 Lack of trust 3 3 4 19(18.6) 2
between parties
4 Availability of 2 3 1 13(12.7) 4
adjudication
5 Lack of commitment 2 2 2 12(11.8) 5
of CO
6 Distrust of parties 1 - 2(2.0) 9,10
in CO
7 Heavy workload of CO
8 Lack of sufficient 2 2 4 14(13.7) 3
powers of CO
9 Insufficient salary 1 1(1.0) 11,12
and status of CO
10 Poor accountability 1 2 4(3.9) 6
of CO
11 Corruption of CO 1 - 2(2.0) 9,10
12 Rigidity and prestige 1 1(1.0) 11,12
issue of management
13 Trade union 1 3(2.9) 7,8
professional's
attitude at conciliation

Scores given to various priorities were: three to first, two to second and one to third
priority. The scores were added, and percentages and then ranks were arrived at. The
figures in parentheses in column 5 indicate percentage of total score of each inhibiting
factor.

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120 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations

TAB LE-6 :- Factors Inhibiting Effectiveness of Conciliation: Second Category

Practicising lawyers

Inhibiting Factors Frequency of Priorities Total Rank

First Second Third Score
Priority Priority Priority
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

1 Unrealistic demands 12 2 41(25.3) 1

2 Insufficient training 1 4 12(7.4) 5
of CO
3 Lack of trust 1 8 25(15.4) 2
between parties
4 Availability of 2 5 22(13.6) 3
adjudication
5 Lack of commitment 2 1 10(6.2) 7
of CO
6 Distrust of parties 1 1 7(4.3) 9
in CO
7 Heavy workload of - 1 2(1.2) 11
CO
8 Lack of sufficient 3 3 20(12,3) 4
powers of CO
9 Insufficient salary
and status of CO
10 Poor accountability 1 1 9(5.6)
of CO
11 Corruption of CO 3 1 11(6.8) 6
12 Rigidity and prestige 1 3(1-9) 10
issue of management
13 Trade union (0)
professional's
attitude at conciliation

Scores given to various priorities were: three to first, two to second, and one to third
priority. The scores were added, and percentages and then ranks were arrived at. The
figures given in parentheses in column 5 indicate percentage of total score of each
inhibiting factor.

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Failure of Conciliation : Perceptions and Realities 121

TABLE-7 Ranking of Inhibiting Factors by Interviewees of All Five Categories*

Inhibiting Factors Percentages obtained

Disputant parties General Category Total
Interviewees _ Per Rank
Workmen/ Manage- Union Manage- Lawyers cen
Unions ments Lea ment tage
ders consul
tants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

1 Unrealistic demands 4.5 23.1 5.2 27.5 25.3 85.6 1

2 Insufficient training 5.0 12.2 6.8 2.9 7.4 34.3 7
of CO
3 Lack of trust 8.6 9.0 9.9 18.6 15.4 61.5 2
between parties
4 Availability of 4.5
5.1 12.5 12.7 13.6 48.4 5
adjudication
5 Lack of commitment 5.6 11.5 20.3 11.8 6.2 55.4 3
of CO
6 Distrust of 10.1 4.5 5.2 2.0 4.3 26.1 10
parties
7 Heavy workload 0.0 1.9 3.2 0.0 1.2 6.3 12
of CO
8 Lack of sufficient 5.0 4.5 12.0 13.7 12.3 47.5 6
powers of CO
9 Insufficient salary 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.1 13
and status of CO
10 Poor accountability 7.6 1.9 7.3 3.9 5.6 26.3 9
of CO
11 Corruption of CO 33.3 3.8 8.8 2.0 6.8 54.7 4
12 Rigidity and prestige 15.2 3.2 8.8 1.0 1.9 30.1 8
issue by management
13 Trade union 0.0 18.6 0.0 2.9 0.0 21.5 11
professional's
attitude at conciliation

The table aims at standardising the priorities of all the interviewees. Percentages
obtained for each inhibiting factor in all five categories i.e. disputant parties
(Workmen/Union representatives, and Management representatives), and general
category interviewees (Union Leaders, Management Consultants and Lawyers) - were
added and totals in respect of all the thirteen factors ranked.

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 122 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations

TABLE-8 :- Causes for Failure of Conciliation in Reconstructed Disputes

S.No. Key Cause Perceived Case No. Total Per

No. Centage
(1) (2) (3) (4)

AMT(5),JSF(6),
1 Authoritarian attitude of management APL(9),)
to union formation/activities
ASL(10),HVG(13),EL(14),)
RVL(18),OEW(19),SKW(20),)
and its hope to break the union 17 56.8
HPL(22),UCB(23),CEW(25),)
or weaken rt by resorting to unfair
OS(26),FRF(27),SEW(28),)
labour practices(i.e.influencing
the CO and/or the outside FAP(29),PSL(33))
union
leader) and thus not agreeing
at conciliatio ..

2 Rigid attitude of management GRL(2),AML(4),TCC(7),)

which rt thought was morally PML(8),PHL(15),UMM(16),) 30
justified on the basis SEC(17),UAL(21),ARL(24))
of capacity to pay.)

3 Management's disinclination to HSL(1) 3.3

concede to a non-favoured union.

4 Outside union leader's inclination ECL(3) 3.3

io take the case to the
Tribunal and prolong it there
for selfish motives.

5 Conciliation not sought due to

lack of faith in the machinery BIL(11) 3.3
6 Conciliation not sought due to BCM(12) 3.3
the belief that political
executive will help.

Total 30 100

Source : Conciliation Files and Disputant Parties Interviews.

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