Professional Documents
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Marc David Baer
Jewish Quarterly Review, Volume 103, Number 4, Fall 2013, pp. 523-555
(Article)
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DOI: 10.1353/jqr.2013.0033
and modern Turkey’s secular political elite, which is their ‘‘big secret.’’
The 2006 sequel, Efendi 2: Beyaz Müslümanların büyük sırrı (Master 2: The
White Muslims’ big secret), details the supposed Jewish origins of the
country’s leading Sufis, Muslim families, and Islamists, which is also their
‘‘big secret.’’6 By 2010, over 250,000 copies of Efendi 1 and 2 had been
sold. As Yalçın explains, he wrote the books ‘‘with the aim of uncovering
a secret: that secret Judaism is our reality. We cannot write history over-
looking it.’’7
The four books by Yalçın and Poyraz echo the Marxist nationalist
Yalçın Küçük’s eight-hundred-page rant Tekelistan (The monopoly state),
published in 2003 to rouse Turks naively unaware of how their lives are
controlled by Jews, with a cover portraying cockroaches crawling over
what seem to be the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center.8 In Küçük’s
anti-Semitic scenario, Turkey is a colony administered by a cabal of secret
Jews. The United States dominates Turkey through descendants of
seventeenth-century Jewish converts to Islam known as Dönme, and
Freemason agents educated in American missionary or Dönme schools
and planted in Turkey to open the door for Sufis, Islamists, and corporate
capitalism. They have included secularist prime ministers and presi-
dents from the 1960s to 2002. Thus, for example, Kemal Derviş, a vice-
president at the World Bank, was made Turkey’s minister of economics
at the beginning of the new millennium to impose the will of international
financial circles on the country, overstepping governmental authority and
implementing drastic new financial policies, applauded in the media. The
media cartel is also in the hands of the Dönme, as is the bureaucracy.
‘‘Facing these facts,’’ Küçük concludes, ‘‘can we still have any doubt that
there is a conspiracy? I do not think so.’’9 By conspiracy, the author
explicitly means ‘‘a Jewish conspiracy’’ or a ‘‘Jewish-Dönme’’ conspir-
acy, since the Dönme ‘‘support world Jewry and follow their political
line.’’10
Küçük has been blamed for introducing a ‘‘new’’ anti-Semitism to Tur-
key and Yalçın credited with causing a once marginal phenomenon to
reach alarming levels of acceptance and popularity.11 Indeed, measured
6. Soner Yalçın, Efendi: Beyaz Türklerin büyük sırrı, 83rd printing (166,000 cop-
ies sold) (Istanbul, 2010); Yalçın, Efendi 2: Beyaz Müslümanların büyük sırrı, 53rd
printing (105,000 copies sold) (Istanbul, 2008).
7. Yalçın, Efendi, 566. The statement is repeated in Efendi 2, 437.
8. Yalçın Küçük, Tekelistan (Istanbul, 2003).
9. Ibid., 676.
10. Ibid., 252, 691.
11. Necati Polat, ‘‘Yeni anti-semitizm: Efendi üzerine notlar’’ (The new anti-
Semitism: Notes concerning Efendi), Doğu Batı 7.29 (October 2004): 179–80.
Polat defines ‘‘new’’ anti-Semitism as the modern idea, used by the Nazis, that
Jews are driven by their nature to work against the nation’s political, societal,
and especially economic interests. Polat does not deploy the common North
American and European definition of ‘‘the new anti-Semitism,’’ which considers
Arab and Muslim hostility to Israel as anti-Semitism, the supposed inheritor of
‘‘Christian European anti-Semitism in general, and German Nazi anti-Semitism
in particular.’’ Gilbert Achcar, The Arabs and the Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli War of
Narratives, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (New York, 2009), 274–75.
12. For an overview of the history of debates about Dönme in the Turkish
Republic, see Paul F. Bessemer, ‘‘Who Is a Crypto-Jew? A Historical Survey of
the Sabbatean Debate in Turkey,’’ Kabbalah 9 (2003): 109–52.
13. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1968), 28.
14. For examples of early modern Muslim anti-Jewish sentiment, see Marc
David Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe
(New York, 2008), 85–96 and 132–38. Although he uses the phrase ‘‘anti-
Semitism’’ in the title of an article, Pál Fodor concurs that premodern Ottoman
Muslim anti-Jewish sentiment was not anti-Semitism. See Pál Fodor, ‘‘An Anti-
Semite Grand Vizier? The Crisis in Ottoman-Jewish Relations in 1589–1591 and
Its Consequences,’’ in Fodor, In Quest of the Golden Apple: Imperial Ideology, Politics,
and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul, 2000), 206.
15. That Islam lacks the same theological animus toward Jews as Christianity
is borne out by the fact that anti-Judaism was primarily a Christian phenomenon
in the Ottoman Empire. See Uriel Heyd, ‘‘Ritual Murder Accusations in
Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Turkey’’ (Hebrew), Sefunot 5 (1961): 135–50;
Jacob Landau, ‘‘Ritual Murder Accusations and Persecution of Jews in Nine-
teenth-Century Egypt’’ (Hebrew), Sefunot 5 (1961): 415–60; Amnon Cohen, ‘‘Rit-
ual Murder Accusations against the Jews during the Days of Suleiman the
Magnificent,’’ Journal of Turkish Studies 10 (1986): 73–78; Jacob Barnai, ‘‘Blood
Libels in the Ottoman Empire, 15th–19th Centuries,’’ in Anti-Semitism through the
Ages, ed. S. Almog (New York, 1988), 189–94; Stanford Shaw, ‘‘Christian Anti-
Semitism in the Ottoman Empire,’’ Belleten 54 (1990): 1073–1149; and Esther
Benbassa, ‘‘Le Procès des sonneurs de tocsin: Une accusation calomnieuse de
meurtre rituel à Izmir en 1901,’’ in Society and Community: Proceedings of the Second
International Congress for Research of the Sephardi and Oriental Jewish Heritage 1984,
ed. A. Haim (Jerusalem,. 1991), 35–53, translated into Turkish as ‘‘Kampana
çalanlar davası: 1901’de Izmir’de cereyan etmiş bir kan iftirası vak’ası,’’ Tarih ve
Toplum 30 (Haziran 1986): 44–50.
16. Nuray Mert has claimed that anti-Semitism in Turkey derives from Arab
anti-Zionism: Nuray Mert, ‘‘Efendi,’’ Radikal, June 1, 2004; and Nuray Mert,
‘‘Efendi: Bir mit olarak tarih’’ (Efendi: History as myth), Virgül 75 (July 2004):
30–32. For a convincing analysis comparing hatred of Jews and hatred of Mus-
lims, see the essays in Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in
Europe, ed. M. Bunzl (New York, 2007), and Paul Silverstein, ‘‘The Fantasy and
21. See Rifat Bali, Cumhuriyet yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme serü-
veni, 1923–1945 (Jews in early republican Turkey: An adventure in Turkification)
(Istanbul, 1999); and ‘‘Türk anti-semitizmi,’’ in Modern Türkiye’de siyası̂ düşünce
(Political thought in modern Turkey), vol. 5, Muhafazakârlık (Conservatism), ed.
M. Gültekingil, T. Bora, Y. Aktay (Istanbul, 2007), 402–9.
22. Esra Özyürek, ‘‘Christian and Turkish: Secularist Fears of a Converted
Nation,’’ Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29.3 (2009):
398–412. See also Füsun Üstel,‘‘Okul, gençler ve ‘öteki’ler’’ (School, youth, and
‘‘others’’), in Türkiye’de gençlik çalışması ve politikaları (Youth work and politics in
Turkey), ed. N. Yentürk (Istanbul, 2008), 447, 455; and Étienne Copeaux,
Espaces et temps de la nation turque: Analyse d’une historiographie nationaliste, 1931–1993
(Paris, 1997);. published in Turkish translation as Tarih ders kitaplarında Türk tarih
tezinden Türk-Islâm sentezine, 1931–1993 (Istanbul, 2006).
odds with those of the Turks. Moreover, they take advantage of the fact
that the Dönme attribution is as impossible to deny as to prove.
There is no means to determine whether a Muslim Turk today has
Jewish heritage from the Ottoman era. The Ottoman bureaucracy kept
no register of converts and conversion. Once a Jew became a Muslim,
he or she adopted a Muslim name, and his or her non-Muslim past was
forgotten. In the seventeenth century, the era in which Shabbatai Tsevi
and then his followers, the Dönme, became Muslims, a Jewish person
could convert and erase all Jewish ‘‘taint.’’23 Early modern anti-Jewish
sentiment was not modern racial anti-Semitism that posits an ‘‘eternal
Jewish biology,’’ which can never be purified, even by religious change.
Whereas a convert’s origins were forgotten within a generation in the
Ottoman Empire, even a person whose ancestors converted two and a
half centuries earlier can be considered a member of his or her ancestral
religion and ethno-national group in the present Turkish Republic, which
is what we see in the case of the Dönme. Who the descendants of Dönme
‘‘really were’’ has been irrelevant for the conspiracy mongers and is there-
fore not addressed in this essay. Suffice it to say that Dönme did not
consider themselves Jews. Jews did not consider the Dönme as Jews
either. According to Islamic and secular Ottoman law, the Dönme were
not Jews, because they had converted to Islam.24 The imposition of sur-
names in 1934 by the Turkish Republic did not clarify matters. Sharing a
common surname does not mean sharing familial relations or heritage.
Because ‘‘Dönme’’ is such a plastic, unprovable category and can be
applied to anyone—especially since it is believed members of the group
bear a Muslim name in public but a Jewish name in private—the label
becomes credible.25
Jean-Paul Sartre wrote: ‘‘It is not the Jewish character that provokes
anti-Semitism, but rather, that it is the anti-Semite who creates the
Jew.’’26 Sartre was not saying that those called Jews are Jews; rather, he
was focusing on the mentality of those who see Jews everywhere. Yalçın
is one. He identifies a ‘‘Jewish problem,’’ which is not ‘‘purely Jewish
T H E FI R S T C O N S P I R AC Y T H E O R I E S A B O U T TH E D ÖN M E
Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories are not new to Turkey. As Elie Ked-
ourie, Bernard Lewis, and Feroz Ahmad have shown, at the beginning of
the twentieth century, British diplomats articulated anti-Semitic conspir-
acy theories centering on the Dönme to explain away the events sur-
rounding the 1908 constitutional revolution. Sir Gerard Lowther, British
ambassador to Constantinople from 1909 to 1913, repeatedly alleged a
crypto-Jewish-Judeo-Masonic conspiracy and called the ruling CUP
‘‘the Jew Committee of Union and Progress.’’ Minister of finance Meh-
met Cavid Bey was a ‘‘secret Jew, an official manifestation of the occult
power of the Committee, one of the only members of the Cabinet who
really count, and the apex of Freemasonry in the empire,’’ Lowther
claimed.29 Originating ‘‘in a line of clerical and nationalist thought famil-
iar on the Continent,’’ the notion of a Jewish-Masonic plot ‘‘was taken
up in some British circles, and a few years later seized upon by Allied
propagandists as a means of discrediting their Turkish enemies,’’ Bernard
Lewis asserts.30 Feroz Ahmad also locates anti-Semitic conspiracy theo-
ries in ‘‘British Foreign Office reports, the dispatches of the Istanbul cor-
respondent of The Times (London), and the conservative press of the
Ottoman capital,’’ which was ‘‘in some cases owned by Greeks.’’31 None
of these influential scholars of Ottoman history, however, entertained the
Emmanuel Carasso was a member of that delegation. That the first was a
Dönme and the second a Jew became pegs upon which Muslims were
able to hang their fears of Jewish conspiracy.35
When he became the head of the Committee of Muslim Unity at the
beginning of 1909, Vahdeti began to claim that the Dönme were behind
the spread of Freemasonry and thus of atheism in the empire, and that
this was a Jewish plot. In order to connect the dots in this argument,
Vahdeti had to prove that the Dönme were secret Jews. He quickly found
the evidence he sought when he turned to the media. Vahdeti notes how
in an article in a recent issue of the Dönme-owned Salonikan newspaper
Zaman (Epoch), the term gavur (infidel) was misspelled as yavur. The
author implies that the misspelling was neither a random mistake nor a
slip of the typesetter but was based on the fact that Jews, whose mother
tongue was assumed to be Judeo-Spanish, mispronounced Ottoman
Turkish words that way.36 Later he more explicitly articulates his racist
view of the Dönme, writing: ‘‘The reason the author of the piece . . .
spelled it that way is because that is precisely his predominant natural
tendency in pronouncing the word.’’37 Vahdeti had caught the slip, how-
ever, which revealed the true and unchanging Jewish essence of the
Dönme.
The anti-Semitic and anti-Dönme sentiment of Derviş Vahdeti and the
other writers in Volkan was shared by the political journalist Ebüzziya
Tevfik (d. 1913), who had been immersed in European, especially
French, language and literature, the main avenues introducing him to
anti-Semitic thought. Already in 1888, Tevfik had published the first
Turkish-language history of the Jews, which was ‘‘colored by anti-
Semitism.’’38 After the constitutional revolution, when the strict censor-
ship regime was lifted, Tevfik openly articulated anti-Semitic views,
depicting the CUP’s reforms as the work of anti-Islamic Jewish conspira-
tors and labeling Jews ‘‘parasites.’’ He argued that ‘‘the economic domi-
nation of the Jews is so strong that one could designate this congregation
of money changers that controls the financial and commercial markets as
the monarchs of money,’’ whose power no one in Europe or the Middle
East could resist.39 According to this line of thinking, since ‘‘money is the
master of the world and the Jews are the masters of money,’’ the Jews
were the world’s puppet masters, capable of accomplishing any of their
aims.40 Tevfik also posited a link between Freemasonry and Zionists in
Salonika, the home of the Dönme, claiming that after the 1908 revolution,
Jews established Masonic lodges in the city in order to pursue their aim
of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine.41
In 1909, Tevfik displayed the turn to anti-Semitism when he wrote of
the existence of an unchanging Jewish character—hiding one’s true
nature behind a veil of hypocrisy and dissimulation—that could apply to
anyone, regardless of their religion. Thus he labeled the members of the
London Chamber of Commerce ‘‘Jews’’ even though they were Chris-
tians.42 This racist conception would prove very useful. If there was an
eternal Jewish type, then the Jewish or crypto-Jewish (Dönme) label
could even be applied to people who could not conceivably be Jews,
whether because they were Christians or because they were descendants
of Jews whose ancestors had converted to Islam two centuries before,
such as Mehmet Cavid. Between 1909 and 1911, Cavid’s Muslim oppo-
nents in parliament called him a Salonikan Dönme in league with interna-
tional Jewish capital.43
Decisions by the CUP and actions taken by its leaders set in motion a
chain of events that led to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and its
replacement by the Republic of Turkey. In its first two decades, the Turk-
ish Republic exiled the royal family; abolished the sultanate and the
caliphate; shattered the authority of the Muslim religious establishment;
outlawed independent religious education and the wearing of religious
insignia and clothing, including the veil and the turban; eliminated
Islamic law and law courts and imposed secular civil law; replaced the
Arabo-Persian Ottoman script with Latin-based Modern Turkish;
adopted the Christian calendar and work week; nationalized the econ-
omy; and gave women the right to vote and hold political office. A new
secular state governed by a new elite destroyed Islamic institutions and
appropriated their power bases and financial holdings.
Those who lost their societal position sought a scapegoat to blame.
Because many Muslims assumed that the revolutions of 1908 and 1923
were fomented by Dönme, who were simply Jews, they hatched many
conspiracy theories about their true aims. Islamists and extreme rightists
argued that ‘‘international Jewry’’ working through ‘‘crypto-Jewish’’
Dönme agents had first divided and destroyed the Ottoman Empire and
then replaced it with the anti-Muslim secular Turkish Republic, headed
by an alleged secret Jew, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.44 The anti-Dönme
conspiracy theories of 1908 took on new life with the establishment of
the Turkish Republic in 1923, but due to press censorship they were not
openly articulated until the World War II era.
44. For examples of this conspiracy theory, see Rifat Bali, ‘‘The Dönmes as a
Theme of Turkish Anti-Semitism,’’ in Bali, A Scapegoat for All Seasons, 249–76.
45. Türesay, ‘‘Antisionisme et Antisémitisme dans la Presse ottoman,’’ 164.
46. Sina cephesinde Yahudi casuslar (Izmir, 1933) and Suzi Liberman (Istanbul,
1935). For a complete bibliography of his works, see Rifat Bali, ‘‘Yaşam öyküsü,
yayımları, ve düşünce dünyası ile Cevat Rifat Atilhan’’ (Cevat Rifat Atilhan’s
biography, publications, and world view), in Bali, Musa’nın evlatları cumhuriyet’in
yurttaşları (Moses’ children, the republic’s citizens) (Istanbul, 2001), 247–51.
47. Bali, ‘‘Türk anti-semitizm,’’ 403. For a biography of Atilhan, see Bali,
‘‘Yaşam öyküsü, yayımları, ve düşünce dünyası ile Cevat Rifat Atilhan,’’ 211–46.
There are two types of Jews. One is the authentic Jew, who can be
recognized by his speech. Another is the Dönme, who cannot be so
identified. In order to identify this type it is necessary to look carefully
for the degenerate Jewish features of his face. There is no difference
whatsoever between the Jew and the Jewish Dönme. One says, ‘‘We
Jews,’’ while the other says, ‘‘You Turks.’’50
48. In 2005 Mein Kampf was a best-seller in Turkey but was banned two years
later thanks to the efforts of the state of Bavaria, which owns the copyright. Yet
in 2010 a Japanese manga edition, specifically targeting youth—with a striking
red cover depicting a youthful Adolf Hitler, who is presented in a sympathetic
way—evaded this ban and was published in Turkish, the only language into
which this version of the book has been translated. Miraç Zeynep Özkartal,
‘‘Kavgam, yasağı ‘manga’yla deldi’’ (The manga version of Mein Kampf pokes a
hole in its prohibition, Milliyet, May 27, 2010). Adolf Hitler, Kavgam-Manga,
trans. D. Aybar (Istanbul, 2010).
49. On the pogrom, see Hatice Bayraktar, ‘‘The Anti-Jewish Pogrom in East-
ern Thrace in 1934: New Evidence for the Responsibility of the Turkish Govern-
ment,’’ Patterns of Prejudice 40.2 (2006): 95–111; Bayraktar, ‘‘Zweideutige Individuen
in schlechter Absicht’’—Die anti-Semitischen Ausschreitungen in Thrakien 1934 und ihre
Hintergründe, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen Band 297 (Berlin, 2011); and Rifat
Bali, 1934 Trakya olaylari (Istanbul, 2008).
50. Nihal Atsız, ‘‘Komünist, Yahudi, ve Dalkavuk’’ (Communist, Jew, and
toady), Orhun 5 (March 12, 1934), quoted in Bali, ‘‘The Dönmes as a Theme of
Turkish Anti-Semitism,’’ in Bali, A Scapegoat for All Seasons, 254.
51. Bali, ‘‘Yaşam öyküsü, yayımları, ve düşünce dünyası ile Cevat Rifat Atil-
han,’’ 220.
Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the State of Israel in its former
territory were the result of an anti-Muslim Freemason-Dönme-Jewish
conspiracy.58 In his view, the conspiracy was the result of ‘‘international
Jews’’ dethroning Sultan Abdülhamid II because he rejected Theodor
Herzl’s request to establish a Jewish state in Palestine.59 He articulated
this view explicitly in his 1956 account of the dethronement of Abdül-
hamid II, in which he claims that ‘‘the triumvirate of Dönme, Zionists,
and Freemasons’’ were the real puppet masters ‘‘who prepared the sce-
nario and directed’’ the overthrow of Abdülhamid II ‘‘in order to bring
the entire Turkish nation to its knees, tear our great fatherland into
pieces, and establish their own sultanate on a section of it.’’60 He ex-
plained the role of the Freemasons with the assertion that ‘‘Freemasonry
is wholly the lackey of Zionism.’’61 Other writers expressed the same view
in Sebilürreşâd, especially its publisher and editor Eşref Edib (d. 1971).
Edib argued that ‘‘taking the Turkish nation’s political destiny into its
hands, the Dönme entered the Salonikan branch of the CUP, then they
let the Zionists’ Freemasons into the CUP, and following the 1908 Consti-
tutional Revolution they entered the parliament and administration; after
this they became the group which determines the nation’s political and
economic fate.’’62
Islamist Sebilürreşâd’s extreme right counterpart was Büyük Doğu (The
great East), founded in 1943 by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (d. 1983), edu-
cated at the Sorbonne in Paris in the 1920s. Kısakürek viciously attacked
Jews and Dönme in his writings and promoted the idea that Jews are
the secret rulers of all lands, including Turkey. To Kısakürek, since the
mid-nineteenth century, ‘‘most of the heroes presented as revolutionaries
in the fields of politics, administration, social life, the economy, and the
1952 which maintained ‘‘that Freemasonry was but a front for ‘Zionist imperial-
ism’ that, since the French Revolution, had been determined to conquer the
world.’’ Gavin Brockett, ‘‘Provincial Newspapers as a Historical Source: Büyük
Cihad and the Great Struggle for the Muslim Turkish Nation (1951–53),’’ Interna-
tional Journal of Middle East Studies 41.3 (2009): 446.
58. Debus, Sebilürreşâd, 221–23.
59. Bali, ‘‘Türk anti-semitizmi,’’ 403–4, 406–7; and Bali, ‘‘Cevat Rifat Atil-
han,’’ ibid, 404–7. .
60. Cevat Rifat Atilhan, Ilim ışığında ve tarih önünde 31 Mart faciası (A scholarly
and historical account of the tragedy of March 31) (Istanbul, 1956), 8, 9, 12. On
March 31, 1909, anti-CUP counterrevolutionaries, incited by Derviş Vahdeti’s
Volkan, revolted. The insurrection was quickly suppressed.
61. Ibid., 32.
62. Eşref Edib, ‘‘Dönmeliğin Türkleştirilmesi’’ (The Turkification of the
Dönme), Sebilürreşad 6.140 (December 1952): 228.
cultural sphere’’ in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey ‘‘have been none
other than puppets of this secret power, whether they know it or not.’’63
He promoted this conspiracy in his commentary to the Protocols of the
Elders of Zion published in serial form in Büyük Doğu in 194664 and three
years later, when the same journal printed a translation of Henry Ford’s
The International Jew.65 By the early 1950s, Kısakürek linked Jews,
Dönme, Masons, ‘‘Jewish capitalism,’’ and Zionists in his conspiracy the-
ories.66 Freemasonry was ‘‘but a tool; for it was the servant of a higher
and more secret organization, that is, the Jew.’’67 He saved his most
vicious attacks for the journalist and newspaper owner Ahmet Emin Yal-
man (d. 1972). In a letter labeled ‘‘Response to a Kike,’’ Kısakürek asked
Yalman ‘‘what gives you the courage to speak in the homeland of the
Muslim Turks, you are a Dönme, your grandfather carries the blood of
Shabbatai Tsevi; you aim to destroy Islam and the Turkish nation!’’68 He
also accused Yalman of being a traitor who desired the creation of an
American mandate over Turkey after World War I.
Attacks on Yalman in Büyük Doğu claimed he prostituted Turkish
women to American Jews by sponsoring beauty contests, graphically
illustrated in a cartoon in which Yalman appears as a spider trapping
63. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, ‘‘Siyon Hakimlerinin Protokolleri,’’ Büyük Doğu 49,
October 4, 1946, republished in Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Yahudilik-Masonluk, Dön-
melik, ed. S. Ak (Istanbul, 2006), 10–11.
64. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, ‘‘Siyon Hakimlerinin Protokolleri,’’ Büyük Doğu
49–52 and 58, October 4, 1946–December 13, 1946, republished in Kısakürek,
Yahudilik-Masonluk, Dönmelik, 9–29. According to its publisher, the book aims to
‘‘recognize the secret powers that destroy the unity and integrity of the nation
and homeland like a moth eating it from within’’ and ‘‘to realize their influence in
and occupation of the heart of the fatherland.’’
65. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, ‘‘Ford’un kitabı’nda Yahudi’’ (Henry Ford’s Jew),
Büyük Doğu 21–22, 24–25, July 29, 1949–August 26, 1949, republished in Kısa-
kürek, Yahudilik-Masonluk, Dönmelik, 60–81.
66. See Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, ‘‘Tarihi nüfuz ve muvaffakiyetleri’’ (Historical
influence and success) Büyük Doğu 4, November 4, 1949, republished in Kısa-
kürek, Yahudilik-Masonluk, Dönmelik, 113–16; and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek,
‘‘Yahudi davası’’ (The Jewish problem), Büyük Doğu 58, June 1, 1951, repub-
lished in Kısakürek, Yahudilik-Masonluk, Dönmelik, 95–97. This reached culmina-
tion in Son devrin din mazlumları (Oppression of Islam in recent history), which
claims that the CUP, a puppet in the hands of the cabal of Jews, Dönme, and
Freemasons, deposed Abdülhamid II in order to suppress Islam. Necip Fazıl
Kısakürek, Son devrin din mazlumları (Istanbul, 1969), 3, 4, 12.
67. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, ‘‘Masonluk, mutlak Yahudilik müessesesidir!’’
(Freemasonry: Without doubt a Jewish organization!), Büyük Doğu 10, Decem-
ber 16, 1949, reprinted in Kısakürek, Yahudilik-Masonluk, Dönmelik, 137.
68. The letter appears on the web site http://www.necipfazil.com.
74. The Handbook of the Jewish Question was again translated and published in
1972 as Tarih boyunca Yahudi meselesi (The Jewish problem throughout history)
(Ankara).
75. Hikmet Tanyu, Tarih boyunca Yahudiler ve Türkler, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1976/
77); and Abdurrahman Küçük, Dönmeler ve Dönmelik Tarihi (Ankara, 1979). See
Jacob M. Landau, ‘‘The Dönmes: Crypto-Jews under Turkish Rule,’’ Jewish
Political Studies Review 19.1–2 (2007): www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/Show
Page.asp?DBID⳱1&TMID⳱111&LNGID⳱1&FID⳱388&PID⳱0&IID⳱
1669 (accessed October 5, 2011).
76. It first appeared in two volumes in 1976–77 and was reprinted as one
volume as recently as 2005.
77. Abdurrahman Küçük, Dönmeler ve Dönmelik Tarihi (Ankara, 1979), 460.
78. http://www.otuken.com.tr/tarihce.asp.
Türkeş (d. 1997).79 While Tanyu was merely a party member, Küçük
became general secretary and a parliamentarian representing Ankara
between 1999 and 2002.
In the wake of the works of Kısakürek, but especially those of Tanyu
and Küçük, in the following decades similar books sought increasingly
merely to ruin the reputation of successful or prominent Turks by tarring
them with the Dönme label. A typical example of anti-Dönme conspiracy
theories from Islamists in the 1980s and 1990s is Yahudilik ve dönmeler
(Judaism and the Dönme) by Yesevizade (pen name of Şakir Alparslan
Yasa).80 It aims like the others to prove ‘‘that many politicians and busi-
nessmen in Turkey are in fact Jews or Dönme, part of a universal plot
(together with Freemasons) to dominate the world.’’81 Yesevizade’s claims
are partly based on those of Tanyu, to whose book he devotes a whole
chapter, and Küçük. Yahudilik ve masonluk (Judaism and Freemasonry)
and Şeytanın dini masonluk (Freemasonry: Satan’s religion) by Harun
Yahya (pen name of Adnan Oktar), books arguing the same case, were
widely disseminated; the former, published in 1986, was distributed gratis
at mosques in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s.82
Ertuğrul Düzdağ, Mehmed Şevket Eygi, and the self-proclaimed
Dönme Ilgaz Zorlu became the main peddlers of these conspiracies in the
1990s and the new millennium. Düzdağ published a transcription into
Modern Turkish of Derviş Vahdeti’s Ottoman-language Volkan news-
paper and published Yakın Tarihimizde gizli gerçekler (Hidden realities in
our recent history) and Yakın tarihimizde Dönmelik ve Dönmeler (Dönme
religion and the Dönme in our recent history).83 The latter two works
echoed earlier Islamist and . extreme rightist conspiracies. The title of
Islamist journalist Eygi’s Iki kimlikli, gizli, esrarlı ve çok güçlu bir cemaat:
Yahudi Türkler yahut Sabetaycılar (A secret, mysterious, and very powerful
community with a dual identity: Turkish Jews or Sabbateans) displays
the author’s contempt for both Jews and Dönme and belief in conspirac-
ies concerning their alleged influence.84 Zorlu’s, Evet, ben Selanikliyim: Tür-
kiye Sabetaycılığı üzere makaleler (Yes, I am a Salonikan: Articles
concerning Turkish Sabbateanism), a collection of articles published in
the 1990s, is an alleged insider account of how Dönme secretly practice
Judaism and have dominated Ottoman and then Turkish politics from
the era of the CUP to the present.85 From its opening paragraph, the
author confirms the worst fears of Turkish anti-Semites:
The subject of this book is the strange history of a group of people who
live among us as if there are no differences between us, not indicating
any peculiarities in religion, language, and traditions in public, but who
in fact are members of a secret religious community who have exerted
great effort to maintain their own mystical tradition and kept it alive
for three centuries in private.86
The author gives voice to some of the most bizarre allegations about the
corrupt morals of the Dönme, the worst anti-Semitic stereotypes, and
perpetuates the conspiracy theory that the Dönme destroyed the Otto-
man Empire so that the ‘‘secret Jew’’ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s secular
state could oppress Muslims, while Dönme continue secretly to rule.
According to Rifat Bali, with the appearance of Zorlu, the Dönme
began to be ‘‘discussed, written about and debated at levels unprece-
dented since the founding of the Republic.’’87 The book quickly went
through several reprintings, lasted several months on the best-seller list,
and was even named book of the month in November 1998 by the now
defunct literary journal Matbuat (The press). Zorlu gained national and
international press attention partly for his claims that 100,000 Dönme
live in Turkey, among them the head of the Turkish armed forces Çevik
Bir and Tansu Çiller (prime minister 1993–96; deputy prime minister
.
84. Mehmet Şevket Eygi, Iki kimlikli, gizli, esrarlı ve çok güçlu bir cemaat: Yahudi
Türkler yahut Sabetaycılar (Istanbul, 2000).
85. Ilgaz Zorlu, Evet, ben Selanikliyim: Türkiye Sabetaycılığı üzere makaleler
(Istanbul, 1998).
See Rifat Bali, ‘‘Evet, ben Selânikliyim,’’ Virgül 15 (1999): 44–47; and Marc
David Baer, ‘‘Revealing a Hidden Community: Ilgaz Zorlu and the Debate in
Turkey over the Dönme/Sabbateans,’’ Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 23.1
(1999): 68–75.
86. Zorlu, Evet, Ben Selanikliyim, 1.
87. Rifat Bali, ‘‘A Scapegoat for all Seasons: The Dönmes, or Crypto-Jews of
Turkey,’’ in Bali, A Scapegoat for all Seasons, 69.
Since the general election of 2002 brought the Islamist Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan to the office of prime minister in 2003, self-declared leftists and
secular nationalists have borrowed the main anti-Semitic trope of the
Islamists and extreme rightists: namely, that Dönme, acting on behalf of
world Jewry, conspired to destroy the Ottoman Empire and to this day
control Turkey. Unlike their anti-Semitic predecessors, these writers have
alleged that it is the Islamists who are the Jewish agents of ‘‘international
Jewry’’ intent on destroying the Turkish Republic.
That secret Jews have been placed in influential positions in order to
carry out an international Jewish plot against Turkey and that an interna-
tional network of Jews establishes Turkish political parties and controls
them are major themes in the work of Ergün Poyraz. In Musa’nın çocukları
(Moses’ Children), Poyraz claims:
ruling political party headed by Erdoğan) ‘‘proves’’ how Jews allied with
the U.S. and British intelligence services founded the party.91
In a section of Musa’nın çocukları crudely titled ‘‘Jew,’’ Poyraz explicitly
refers to Islamist anti-Semitic anti-Dönme conspiracy theories, trac-
ing the history of the supposed Jewish-Dönme conspiracy to the late
Ottoman Empire. He quotes Sebilürreşâd founder Eşref Edib’s quatrain
expressing how people of Jewish background dominated the Committee
of Union and Progress: ‘‘Because of the Dönme our government / Turned
into a kind of Jewish state. / They also jewed [cheated] the office of the
mufti, / And in the end gave it to Moses.’’92 He adds: ‘‘In fact, institutions
such as these [the Young Turks and CUP], which sheltered copious num-
bers of Jews, were the cause of the continuous Ottoman loss of territory
and the empire’s eventual destruction. The Jews, whom we embraced in
1492, now engage in every type of wicked ruse and are expending all of
their power to destroy the current state.’’
Soner Yalçın repeats the same themes. According to him, ‘‘If a Turk
wishes to establish a political party or be the candidate for the leadership
of a political party, then without fail he has to go to the United States,
where he needs someone who is especially close to the Jews, someone
who has won their trust, a person who can establish relations for him
with powerful people and lobbies.’’93 He sees an Ottoman precedent, as
did his Islamist and extreme rightist counterparts, for it was supposedly
the Dönme who were the driving force bringing the Sufis and Masons
together, and in turn, due to their common political interests, the three
united in founding the CUP.94 The main argument of Soner Yalçın’s
Efendi is that the Dönme have dominated Ottoman and Turkish political,
economic, and cultural life, while serving an international ‘‘Jewish inter-
est’’ to the detriment of Turks for the past century. The Evliyazade family
of Izmir and their relatives have ‘‘always kept a secret . . . What was the
91. Poyraz, Musa’nın AKP’si (Istanbul, 2007). The claim that the United States
was behind the AK Party was subsequently made in Merdan Yanardağ, Bir ABD
projesi olarak AKP (The AKP as an American project) (Istanbul, 2007); and Erol
Manisalı, AKP, ordu, Amerika üçgeninde Türkiye (Turkey in the triangle of the AKP,
army, and America) (Istanbul, . 2008). Many other books, such as Bahadir Selim
Direk, Küresel tuzak: Ilımlı Islam (Global trap: Moderate Islam) (Istanbul, 2008),
also allege that the United States created a moderate Islam to undermine the
secular Turkish Republic. Perhaps the most prominent person among those artic-
ulating this view is the popular secular theologian and Kemalist Yaşar Nuri Öz-
türk. See his Allah ile aldatmak (To cheat with God) (Istanbul, 2008).
92. Poyraz, Musa’nın çocukları, 77–78.
93. Yalçın, Efendi 2, 51.
94. Ibid., 262–63.
and Masons.101 For confirmation of this thesis, taken from Islamists and
extreme rightists, he notes that Dönme, who reached the highest level in
the Masonic hierarchy, were among the CUP politicians who overthrew
Abdülhamid II.102 Moreover, most of the CUP leadership consisted of
Dönme.103 As minister of the interior, one of the leaders of the CUP, the
alleged Dönme, Sufi, and Mason Mehmet Talat Pasha (assassinated in
Berlin in 1921), became one of the triumvirate ruling the Ottoman
Empire during World War I.104
In the wake of World War I, Yalçın adds Zionist to this triumvirate of
troublemakers in Turkey. He asks whether it is a coincidence that most
of the founders of the ‘‘Wilson Principles Society’’ were Dönme educated
in American missionary schools.105 Wilson is labeled a devoted Zionist.
‘‘During World War I, Zionism became the state policy of the American
administration,’’ Yalçın writes. ‘‘Without a doubt, the fact that Jews in
the United States dominated finance and the media played a great
role.’’106 In order to bring its Zionist policies to fruition, the United States
took special care in selecting its ambassadors to Istanbul. During World
War I, the two ambassadors were Jews. By the end of the war, the Zion-
ists no longer had any need for Abdülhamid II and the CUP. To reach
their goals, they continued their lobbying in the United States, England,
France, and the USSR. What they depended on most was American
Jewish capital, and, of course, their local lackeys. After the war, pro-
English leading Evliyazades were sympathetic to the United States, sup-
ported the Wilson Principles, and represented American firms in Tur-
key.107 The reason Turkey supported the creation of an independent
Jewish state and was one of the first states to recognize Israel is obvious
to the author: its leading policymakers were secret Jews.108
Yalçın implies that the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa
Kemal, was a Dönme closely connected to the Evliyazade family.109 After
repeating the claim that the Dönme never married their daughters to
outsiders, the author asserts that Mustafa Kemal’s wife Latife was a
descendant of the group, since her Uşakizade family was related to the
Evliyazade family.110 Moreover, ‘‘the Evliyazade’s little girl Beria and the
Uşakizade’s tiny baby Latife would one day both marry Salonikans. And
the day would come when one of the Salonikan grooms would sign the
execution orders for the other.’’111 The reader later discovers that Yalçın
is referring to Doctor Nâzım and Mustafa Kemal, the former hanged for
not supporting the war for independence and for his supposed role in an
alleged assassination plot against the Turkish leader in Izmir, in 1926.112
Explaining the continuing Dönme dominance of politics from World War
I to the early republican era, the author claims that ‘‘when the CUP was
in power between 1913 and 1918, Evliyazade Refik, the father-in-law of
CUP leader Doctor Nâzım, was mayor of Izmir. When Mustafa Kemal
came to power [in 1923], his father-in-law, Uşakizade Muammer Bey,
became mayor. Actually nothing had changed: the Uşakizades and Evliy-
azades were relatives! The mayor’s office in Izmir was always in the
hands of certain families!’’113
Carrying his history into the post-Atatürk period, Yalçın discusses how
Mahmud Celal Bayar (d. 1983) was an intimate friend of the Evliya-
zades.114 The former CUP member Bayar founded the Demokrat Parti,
an economically liberal party, along with Adnan Menderes and Fuad
Köprülü, in 1946, and was Turkish president from 1950 to 1960, when
Menderes served as prime minister. The author uses genealogical excur-
sions—based partly on the claims of Ilgaz Zorlu—to link Menderes’s
(and Köprülü’s) ancestors to Jews and Dönme and marriage into the
Evliyazade family,115 in order to demonstrate that these men were
Dönme, and that Dönme control of Turkey lasted at least until the 1960
military coup. The author also quotes approvingly a key argument of
Kısakürek’s study of Menderes published by the Ötüken press:
The party’s name was far from Turkish, but close to the language of
the Dönme: Demokrat Parti. Is the party itself a democrat, or is it the
democrats’ party? This name offending the genius of the Turkish lan-
guage must have sprung from the mouth of a Dönme. According to
proper Turkish [usage], the name should have been either Demokrat
Partisi [Democrat Party] or Demokrasi Partisi [Democracy Party].116
The essential Jewish nature of the Dönme and the Dönme identity of the
most influential people in Turkey is thus revealed for both Islamist and
extreme rightist and leftist writers. Menderes and his foreign minister
Fatin Rüşdu Zorlu appear in the Evliyazade family tree inside Efendi’s
front cover (as does Atatürk’s foreign minister Tevfik Rüşdü Aras). To
substantiate the conspiracy theory that the Dönme have controlled Tur-
key from the late Ottoman to the republican era, the author adds the
supposition that many Evliyazades helped found the Demokrat Party to
his claim that they were behind the CUP and the Republican People’s
Party, in other words, the political parties that ran Turkey in turn from
1908 to 1960. The ‘‘smoking gun’’: Mustafa Kemal and Adnan Menderes
were supposedly relatives.117
The secularists are the latest victims of radical cultural, political, and eco-
nomic change.118 Although Islamist parties first joined coalition govern-
ments in the 1970s, it was especially with the 1980 coup, when the
military promoted an ideology of ‘‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis,’’ that Tur-
key’s political field became open to Islamist-leaning parties. A second
major transformation introduced in the wake of the coup was the incre-
mental freeing from state planning of the economy, converted to a market
economy marked by privatization and financial liberalization, and finally
opened to global capitalism. The introduction of new capital in Turkey
has led to the creation of a new Muslim wealthy class. These Muslims,
including women who wear the headscarf, have found their voice in
Islamist political parties, or in parties dominated by religious Muslims.
The Muslim nouveau riche and Muslim politicians are the new elite in
Turkey. Through their decade-long absolute majority in parliament and
116. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Benim gözümde Menderes (My opinion of Men-
deres) (Istanbul, 1970), 59, quoted in Yalçın, Efendi 1, 421.
117. Yalçın, Efendi 1, 304, 408.
118. On the secular elite deploying Kemalist symbolism in their private lives
as a response to the perceived threats of political Islam, Kurdish separatism, and
neoliberalism, see Esra Özyürek, Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and
Everyday Politics in Turkey (Durham, N.C., 2006).
holding of the office of the president, they have dislodged the secular elite
old guard from their hold on the political system and have begun to dilute
the power of the judiciary and army, the secular pillars of the state they
constructed. Out of power, secularists accuse those in power of being
Dönme.
In the face of profound cultural and political change, ‘‘conspiracy
thinking proves an antidote to powerlessness. It lifts the despair of vul-
nerability and arms believers with the knowledge to understand and
defeat the enemy.’’119 The enemy of the anti-Semite is ‘‘constituted author-
ity.’’120 The main audience of Küçük, Poyraz, and Yalçın is made up of
secular nationalist republicans who are graduates of prestigious second-
ary schools and universities, members of the upper middle class, and pro-
fessionals. This class as a whole imagines its values and lifestyle under
siege and threatened by the social, economic, and political changes that
Turkey has undergone in the past decade.121 It exhibits especially great
fear of and hostility toward Kurds and Islamists, and such fears lend
credence to conspiracy theories that can explain how the first group has
been able to reassert its identity and the second, which appeared to have
offered an olive branch to the first, has risen to power. The Kemalist
upper class mourns the apparent failure of the secular nationalist project,
which was an attempt to make Kurds into Turks and Muslims into secu-
larists. It grieves a collective loss of confidence in its elite place in society,
its status, and its political power. It nurses feelings of exclusion and
wrong by the rise of identity politics. As a first defensive reaction, the
secular elite has sought to define and reassert its own identity and politi-
cal positions vis-à-vis all other groups, especially Armenians, Greeks, and
Kurds, which are seen in essentialized or racist ways. Scared secularists
emphasize the assumed differences between its class and its nightmare
others.122 Thus its first reaction was to recycle the myths of the founding
of the republic and see every development through the prism of 1918–
23—endlessly rearticulating the fears of an Ottoman Empire besieged by
imperial powers and their local Christian lackeys, bent on the annihilation
of the Turks.
The pattern repeats itself. Secularists then turned against the supposed
119. Robert Alan Goldberg, Enemies Within: The Culture of Conspiracy in Modern
America (New Haven, Conn., 2001), 240.
120. Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, 32.
121. Füsun
. Üstel and Birol Caymaz, Seçkinler ve sosyal mesafe (Elites and social
distance) (Istanbul, 2009), available at www.aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/seck
inler-ve-sosyal-mesafe.pdf.
122. Ibid., 52–53.
secret Jew hiding within the religious Muslim and behind other internal
enemies. The Kurds were turned into secret Jews. In the wake of the
establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region in post–Saddam Hussein
northern Iraq, conspiracy theories were launched regarding not only the
alleged Jewish origins of leading Kurdish intellectuals and politicians in
Turkey and Iraq but ‘‘Jewish’’ (i.e., Israeli) plans to colonize Israeli
Kurdish Jews in northern Iraq to create a ‘‘Judeo-Kurdistan.’’123 Jewish
Kurds were then allied with evil Zionists in the popular imagination. The
top-grossing film in Turkey in 2006, Kurtlar Vadisi: Iraq (Valley of the
wolves: Iraq), features as a main character a Jewish doctor who harvests
Iraqi organs to sell to wealthy Israelis.
Why the Jews? The changed politico-economic field of the past decade
speaks to the anxiety of this class and the reasons pushing it to believe in
conspiracies against it. But these explanations cannot inform us why this
class would for the first time see the stock figure of the Jew in Turkey,
the Dönme, the ‘‘secret Jew’’ within, as its enemy. Turks had many other
scapegoats from which to choose. Why not a conspiratorial figure of
another ethnic or religious or national background? Much has been made
of President Gül allegedly being an Armenian, and of Prime Minister
Erdoğan being a Georgian, and thus not ethnic Turks; the latter is also
supposedly a U.S. citizen.124 Erdoğan’s national origins have been used
to explain why he offered cultural freedoms to Kurds, allowed a medieval
Armenian church to be rebuilt and used as a house of prayer, and other
policies that an ethnic Turk would supposedly never consider, for they
betray Turkish interests. But none of the best-selling books emphasize
that he is merely a Georgian. Rather, they imagine him to be a Jew.
Those disenfranchised by the rise of a new elite in Turkey express
their fears by articulating anti-Semitism, just as their counterparts in the
Ottoman Empire did a hundred years ago. Doing so, they borrow a page
from European anti-Semitism, for like the first anti-Semitic political par-
ties in Germany in the 1880s, ‘‘by attacking the Jews, who were believed
to be the secret power behind governments, they could openly attack the
state itself.’’125 Moreover, it is striking how the conspiracy theories in
which the Dönme figure are, from the perspective of the history of anti-
Semitism, quite conventional. Kısakürek in the 1950s and Poyraz fifty
years later posit that there is an ‘‘international Jew’’ who secretly runs the
beauty pageants in the 1950s.133 Beauty pageants had been a main motif
of the anti-Dönme rhetoric of extreme rightists in the 1950s, which led to
the attempted assassination of Ahmet Emin Yalman.
C O N C L US I O N
then the context in which their authors are writing is the second. The
‘‘particular cultural and social conditions’’ Bali notes that lay the ground-
work for publications on the Dönme becoming best-sellers among secu-
larists in the new millennium includes the rise of Islamists to power; the
popularity of conspiracy theories about unelected power brokers, or a
‘‘deep state’’ within Turkey controlling its politics; belief that a ‘‘white’’
Turkish elite dominates political, social, economic, and cultural life;
acceptance of anti-American, anti-Zionist, and anti-Jewish sentiment;
and belief that Israel is behind the establishment of a Kurdish state.139
The extraordinary events at the start of the new millennium—the attack
on the Twin Towers, the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, deteriorat-
ing relations between the United States and Turkey, anti-Americanism
reaching the extent that less than 10 percent of those polled had a favor-
able view of the United States, ruptured relations between Turkey and
Israel, a renewed Kurdish rebellion in Turkey and the creation of an
autonomous Kurdish province in Iraq, the ever worsening, ever deadlier
Israeli repression of Palestinians, and financial crises in Turkey—all
served to radicalize public discourse.
In the past decade, following the rise of Islamists to power in Turkey—
Tayyip Erdoğan’s AK Party has ruled with an absolute majority since
2002, promoting policies supporting the United States and international
capital—secularists have resuscitated the theories first enunciated by
Derviş Vahdeti and expressed by Turkish anti-Semites, including Atilhan,
Atsız, Kısakürek, and Tanyu, from the 1930s to the 1970s, Yesevizade in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, and Ertuğrul Düzdağ, Mehmet Şevgi
Eygi, and Ilgaz Zorlu in the 1990s and new millennium. Küçük, Yalçın,
and Poyraz have adapted the conspiracy theories expressed by Islamists
and extreme rightists and made them conform to their worldview. While
Küçük and Poyraz do not often openly acknowledge their debt to their
Islamist and extreme rightist predecessors, Küçük only mentioning a debt
to Zorlu, and Poyraz quoting a poem of Edib, Yalçın includes a bibliogra-
phy in his works, which allows one to trace the source of his ideas. The
bibliographies of Efendi 1 and 2 read as a Who’s Who of Turkish anti-
Semites and their conspiracy theory focusing on the Dönme. They
include Büyük Doğu (The great East) from 1952, the year of the assassina-
tion attempt on Yalman, Atilhan’s Siyonizm ve Protokoller (Zionism and the
Protocols),140 and the same author’s Yahudiler dünyayı nasıl istila ediyorlar?
139. Rifat Bali, ‘‘A Delusional Obsession: The ‘Dönme Question,’ ’’ in A Scape-
goat for All Seasons, 91–98.
140. Siyonizm ve Protokoller (Istanbul, 1955).
(How do the Jews take over the world?), whose cover depicts a globe
trapped within a Star of David,141 as well as works by Kısakürek, Tanyu,
Düzdağ, and Eygi. Zorlu’s Evet, ben Selanikliyim (Yes, I am a Salonikan)
and Derviş Vahdeti’s Volkan are referred to in the body of the texts, dis-
playing familiarity with their main arguments.142
Such secular opponents of the current regime charge that the religious
Muslims who are Turkey’s political and business leaders are really Jews
and part of a secret Jewish plot, working through Freemasons and
backed by Jewish capital in league with the United States, to put in place
a Jewish political party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), dis-
solve the secular Turkish Republic, and replace it with an antisecular
republic led by a secret Jew—Erdoğan.