money to respondent.
  With the help of Atty.
AC 9000
TOMAS TAN VS. ATTY GUIMBA
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative
complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Tomas P. Tan, Jr. against
respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba for
gross unethical conduct.
The facts are as follows.
Complainant, a self-made businessman
with a tailoring shop in Naga City, filed a
verified Complaint[1] against respondent, also a
resident of Naga City, before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP)-Camarines Sur
Chapter. Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3,
[2]
 Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, the said Chapter forwarded the
complaint to the IBP Board of Governors for
proper disposition.
Complainant narrated that sometime
in August 2000, respondent asked to be lent
₱350,000.00. Respondent assured him that
she would pay the principal plus 12% interest
per annum after one year.  She likewise
offered by way of security a 105-square-
meter parcel of land located in Naga City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 2055[3] and registered in her father’s
name.  Respondent showed complainant a
Special Power of Attorney[4] (SPA) executed
by respondent’s parents, and verbally
assured complainant that she was authorized
to sell or encumber the entire
property.  Complainant consulted one Atty.
Raquel Payte and was assured that the
documents provided by respondent were
valid.  Thus, complainant agreed to lend
Payte, respondent executed in complainant’s
favor an “open” Deed of Absolute Sale over
the said parcel of land, attaching thereto the
SPA.  Complainant was made to believe that if
respondent fails to pay the full amount of the
loan with interest on due date, the deed of
sale may be registered.  Accordingly, he gave
the amount of ₱350,000.00 to respondent.
Respondent, however, defaulted on
her loan obligation and failed to pay the same
despite complainant’s repeated demands. Left
with no recourse, complainant went to the
Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to
find out that respondent deceived him since
the SPA did not give respondent the power to
sell the property but only empowered
respondent to mortgage the property solely
to banks. Complainant manifested that he had
lent money before to other people albeit for
insignificant amounts, but this was the first
time that he extended a loan to a lawyer and
it bore disastrous results. He submitted that
respondent committed fraud and deceit or
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
Upon being ordered by the IBP to
answer the above allegations, respondent
filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a
Responsive Pleading[5] but no answer or
comment was ever filed by her before the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
Likewise, the IBP-CBD allowed respondent to
answer the Amended Complaint subsequently
filed by complainant but she did not file any
answer thereto.[6]  She also chose not to
attend the mandatory conference hearings set
on July 18, 2006, June 13, 2007 and January
25, 2008 despite due notice. Thus, she was
deemed to have waived her right to
participate in the proceedings.
On February 9, 2009, IBP
Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. rendered
his report[7] finding respondent guilty of
violating Canon 1, [8] Rule 1.01[9] and Canon
7[10] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommending that she be
1
suspended from the practice of law for one
year. Commissioner De La Rama opined that
while respondent appears to be a co-owner of
the property as evidenced by an annotation on
the back of TCT No. 2055 showing that half of
the property has been sold to her, it was
evident that she employed deceit and
dishonest means to make complainant believe,
by virtue of the SPA, that she was duly
authorized to sell the entire property.
On August 28, 2010, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report
and recommendation of Commissioner De La
Rama, Jr. in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-446:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and
APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of
the above entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution
as Annex “A”; and, finding the
recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering
Respondent’s violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for her
failure to submit verified
Answer and did not even
participate in the mandatory
conference, Atty. Haide V.
Gumba isSUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1)
year. [11]
We agree with the findings and
conclusion of the IBP, but find that a
reduction of the recommended penalty is
called for, pursuant to the principle that the
appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.[12]
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is
the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, or whether it renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.[13] Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates all
lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession.  Lawyers are
similarly required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the same Code, not to engage in any
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Here, respondent’s actions clearly
show that she deceived complainant into
lending money to her through the use of
documents and false representations and
taking advantage of her education and
complainant’s ignorance in legal matters.  As
manifested by complainant, he would have
never granted the loan to respondent were it
not for respondent’s misrepresentation that
she was authorized to sell the property and if
respondent had not led him to believe that he
could register the “open” deed of sale if she
fails to pay the loan.[14]  By her misdeed,
respondent has eroded not only
complainant’s perception of the legal
profession but the public’s perception as
well.  Her actions constitute gross misconduct
for which she may be disciplined, following
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, which provides:
            SEC. 27. Disbarment or
suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. — A member of the
bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or
2
 by reason of his conviction of as a punishment, but as a means to protect
a crime involving moral the public and the legal profession.[17]
turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Haide
required to take before the B. Vista-Gumba is found administratively liable
admission to practice, or for a for grave misconduct.  She
wilful disobedience appearing is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
as an attorney for a party to a for SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately,
case without authority so to with a warning that a repetition of the same or
do. The practice of soliciting a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or
through paid agents or Let notice of this Resolution be spread
brokers, constitutes in respondent’s record as an attorney in this
malpractice. Court, and notice thereof be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
            x x x x Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts concerned.
We further note that after filing a
Motion for Extension of Time to File a           SO ORDERED.
Responsive Pleading, respondent wantonly
disregarded the lawful orders of the IBP-CBD
to file her answer and to appear for the
mandatory conferences despite due
notice.  Respondent should bear in mind that
she must acknowledge the orders of the IBP-
CBD in deference to its authority over her as a
member of the IBP.[15]

Complainant now asks that

respondent be disbarred. We find, however,
that suspension from the practice of law is
sufficient to discipline respondent. It is worth
stressing that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution. Disbarment will
be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and the character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and a member of the bar. Where
any lesser penalty can accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
[16]
 In this case, the Court finds the penalty of
suspension more appropriate but finds the
recommended penalty of suspension for one
year too severe. Considering the
circumstances of this case, the Court believes
that a suspension of six months is sufficient.
After all, suspension is not primarily intended

3
 respondent’s car and when he
AC 5321 was side by side with
respondent’s car, he angrily
RAMON GONZALES VS. Atty. ARNEL C. ALCARAZ
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- confronted respondent and
--- -- -- -- -- -- x then drove on. Complainant
  claims that respondent then
DECISION chased him and shot him
  twice but fortunately missed
  him by a few inches[,] but
PANGANIBAN, CJ: broken glass coming from the
  shattered window allegedly
  hit him and slightly wounded
          Disbarment cases are sui generis.  Being his right arm and
neither criminal nor civil in nature, these are stomach.  Complainant adds
not intended to inflict penal or civil that respondent allegedly
sanctions.  The main question to be tried to escape but he was
determined is whether respondent is still fit able to chase him and block
to continue to be an officer of the court in the his way at the Nichols Toll
dispensation of justice. Gate where the PNCC guards
  responded to his call for
  assistance.  According to
The Case and the Facts complainant, respondent
  attempted to escape and avoid
          This case arose from a Complaint- the PNCC guards by
Affidavit[1] filed by Ramon C. Gonzalez with ‘proclaiming boisterously that
the Office of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme he is a lawyer and a customs
Court.  The Complaint was subsequently official’ but complainant was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the able to block his way again
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and and their vehicles collided in
recommendation.[2]  Complainant charged the process.  Complainant
Atty. Arnel C.Alcaraz with grave misconduct, claims that he requested the
abuse of authority, and acts unbecoming a PNCC guards to confiscate
lawyer.  The antecedents were summarized respondent’s firearm and
by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline accompany them to the
(IBP-CBD) as follows: nearest police station.  At the
  time of the ‘arrest,’
“x x x [C]omplainant al respondent allegedly opened
leges that on 11 August 2000, the back door of his car and
while he was driving along the pretended to have
South Superhighway upon accidentally dropped so much
entering the Sucat Toll Gate money which distracted the
heading towardsMakati, policemen from further
respondent, who was driving searching the car.
a Nissan Infiniti suddenly cut  
across his path while “At the police station,
overtaking him and almost hit respondent allegedly
his car had he not been able to identified himself and his lady
evade it. According to companion, a
complainant, he chased certain Ferlita Semeniano, and
[said] that he was the Deputy

4
Customs Collector assigned x x x                      x x x                     
at Batangas City.  Complainant x x x
claims that respondent  
yielded ‘one (1) Super .38 cal. “In his Comment dated
Springfield Automatic Pistol, 04 January 2001, respondent
SN NMII 3138, one (1) claims that the present
magazine with seven (7) live administrative case is
ammos and three (3) spent unfounded and unwarranted
(empty) shells.’  Complainant and was allegedly filed in bad
adds that respondent faith, with malice and ill
presented only an unsigned motive and allegedly has no
Memorandum Receipt (MR) of other purpose but to harass,
the firearm without any vex, humiliate and dishonor
Mission Order or Permit to him.  In support thereof,
Carry.  Complainant claims respondent points to the fact
that respondent allegedly kept that complainant filed
calling persons to help him ‘substantially identical
and a ‘fabricated Mission complaint affidavits with the
Order was brought and same identical alleged cause
presented by another person of action as that of the present
more than eight hours after administrative case at
the shooting incident and [various] judicial, quasi-
apprehension.’ judicial and administrative
  tribunals and accused him of
“Complainant alleges forum-shopping.
that the Nissan Infiniti used by  
respondent is allegedly a “Respondent denied
luxury vehicle which was not the narration of facts stated in
covered by any document complainant’s Complaint-
whatsoever and ‘it was not Affidavit as ‘self-serving, a
verified whether stolen or misrepresentation of facts and
smuggled.’ obviously
  tainted.’ Respondent claims
“Complainant finally that he was not the aggressor
alleges that the PNP Crime during the incident and that
Laboratory examined his car he did not provoke
and ‘they recovered one slug complainant.  Respondent
in between the wall of the left claims that he ‘justly acted in
rear door while the other self-defense and defense of a
bullet went through the right stranger under the true
front seat and exited at the left actuality of facts and
rear door of complainant’s car circumstances the[n]
and that cases of Frustrated prevailing.’
Homicide and Illegal  
Possession of Firearms were “Respondent also
already filed at claims that the acts
the Parañ aque City complained of in the present
Prosecutor’s Office. case were not connected with
  the practice of the legal
profession and the fact that he

5
 was a lawyer is merely
coincidental, immaterial and
irrelevant.
 
x x x                    x x x                      dated March 12, 2005, the board of governors
x x x
 
“In connection with
the cases filed by the parties
against each other,
respondent submitted the xxx
Resolutions/Decisions issued
in said cases to show that the
charges filed against him by
the complainant were
dismissed while the criminal
cases he filed against the
latter [were] filed in court.
x x x                     x x x                      x x x
“Finally, it is the
submission of the respondent
that since the alleged acts
complained of are not within
the sphere of his professional
duties as a lawyer, but rather
are acts done in his non-
professional or private
capacity, the same, cannot
allegedly be the subject of an
administrative complaint for
disbarment.”[3]
 
Report and Recommendation
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
 
          In his Report,[4] IBP Investigating
Commissioner Rafael Antonio M. Santos said
that the dismissal of the criminal and other
administrative charges filed by complainant
indicated that respondent’s version of the
incident was given credence by the
investigating officials and agencies of the
various other tribunals in which these
charges were filed.  Consequently, since no
sufficient evidence warranted the imposition
of further disciplinary sanctions on
respondent, the investigating commissioner
recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case.
 
          In Resolution No. XVI-2005-29
of the IBP adopted the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Santos. 
 
          On July 8, 2005, the Resolution, together
with the records of the case, was transmitted
to this Court for final action, pursuant to
Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.  On August 4, 2005, complainant asked
this Court to set aside Resolution No. XVI-
2005-29 of the IBP board of governors.   Upon
orders of this Court,[5] respondent filed
on August 22, 2005, his Comment on
complainant’s plea.
The Court’s Ruling
          The Court disagrees with the findings
and recommendation of the IBP.
 
Administrative Liability of Respondent
 
          At the outset, we stress that the
dismissal of the criminal cases against
respondent did not erase the occurrence of
the shooting incident, which he himself does
not deny.  Moreover, this incident has been
established by clear and convincing
evidence.  Thus, he must face the
consequences of his actions.
The first Canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides as
follows:
 
“CANON 1. - A lawyer
shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.”[6]
 
          Furthermore, respondent bound himself
to “obey the laws” in his attorney’s oath,
[7]
 which underscores the role of lawyers as
officers of our legal system. A lawyer’s brash
transgression of any, especially a penal, law is
6
repulsive and reprehensible and cannot be
countenanced by this Court.[8]
 
          Admitting that he fired shots in the
direction of complainant while they were
speeding along South Luzon Expressway,
[9]
  respondent justifies his actions by claiming
self-defense and defense
stranger.  During the traffic altercation,
complainant allegedly exchanged angry
words with respondent and, from an open car
window, even threw a handful of coins at the
latter.[10]  Respondent further avers that, from
his higher vantage point, he saw complainant
draw a pistol.[11]  The former contends that
when he fired the shots, he had no intention
of hitting complainant but merely wanted to
scare him away.  by complainant cannot be considered a
 
          Reviewing the factual circumstances, we
are convinced that the defenses proffered are
mere afterthoughts.  Based on the physical
and documentary evidence, complainant’s
version of the incident is more credible.  respondent had no legal reason to shoot “in
 
                    First, the allegation of respondent that
complainant hit him with coins is highly
improbable.  At that time, both vehicles were
speeding along the highway. Since the PNP
Crime Laboratory Report[12] showed that the
bullets fired by respondent had come from
the right side, his vehicle must have been to
the right of complainant’s.  If we were to
accept this version, the coins hurled by
complainant had to pass through his car’s
right window and then through the left
window of respondent’s admittedly taller
sports utility vehicle (SUV).  Given their
relative positions, it is highly incredible that
the coins could have hit respondent and his
companion.
 
          Second,  assuming that respondent and
his companion were indeed hit by coins, this
alleged fact was not a sufficient unlawful
aggression that would justify shooting at
complainant.
 
          As a lawyer, respondent should know
that the following three requisites must
concur to justify self-defense: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person claiming self-defense.[13]  On the
other hand, in defense of a stranger, the first
two requisites must also be present together
of a with the element that the person defending
was not induced by revenge, resentment or
other evil motive.[14] 
 
          Of these requisites, unlawful aggression
is a conditio  sine qua non for upholding both
self-defense and defense of a stranger; the
fundamental raisond’etre  of these defenses is
the necessity to prevent or repel an
aggression.[15]  The alleged throwing of coins
sufficient unlawful aggression.  Unlawful
aggression presupposes actual, sudden,
unexpected or imminent threat to life and
limb.[16]  There was no aggression to prevent
or repel.  Absent this imminent threat,
the direction of complainant.” 
 
          Third, for lack of supporting evidence,
neither can merit be accorded to
respondent’s claim of imminent threat after
allegedly seeing complainant draw a
pistol.  The Joint Affidavit[17] of PNCC
Officers Florencio Celada y  Seso, Jr. and
Mario Puso y  Visaya mentioned no firearm
found in the possession of
complainant.  Except for the bare and belated
allegations of respondent, there was no
showing that complainant’s alleged
possession of the pistol had been reported to
the PNCC officers or later to the police
headquarters.  Thus, without proof of the
existence of the firearm, respondent has not
convincingly shown any legal justification for
his act of firing at complainant.[18]
 
          Fourth, right after the shooting incident,
respondent fled the scene.  He stopped only
when PNCC officers blocked his vehicle in
response to complainant’s call for
assistance.  If respondent was only protecting
himself and his companion, then his righteous
7
indignation should have propelled him to
report immediately his version of the incident
to the PNCC officers.  legal profession and the
 
Disbarment Proceedings
Sui  Generis
 
          Respondent maintains that the dismissal
of the cases filed by complainant against him
in the various tribunals and agencies proves
that the present case for disbarment is
unfounded.  pertaining to the office of an
 
          We do not agree.
          Well-established is the rule
that administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own.  These cases
are distinct from and proceed independently
of civil and criminal cases.[19]  In Re  Almacen,
[20]
 the Court discoursed on this point thus:
 
“x x x [D]isciplinary proceedin
gs [against lawyers]
are sui  generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal,
x x x [they do] not involve
x x x a trial of an action or a
suit, but [are] rather
investigation[s] by the Court
into the conduct of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no
sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be
initiated by the
Court motu  proprio. Public
interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real
question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence,
in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the
proper and honest
administration of justice by
purging the profession of
members who by their
misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities
attorney. x x x.”[21]
 
Respondent’s administrative liability
stands on grounds different from those in the
other cases previously filed against him; thus,
the dismissal of these latter cases does not
necessarily result in administrative
exculpation.  Settled is the rule that, being
based on a different quantum of proof, the
dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence does not necessarily
foreclose the finding of guilt in an
administrative proceeding.[22]
 
Misconduct Committed
in a Private Capacity
 
          Untenable is respondent’s argument
that the acts complained of cannot be the
subject of a complaint for disbarment,
because they were done in his private
capacity.
 
          Whether in their professional or in their
private capacity, lawyers may be disbarred or
suspended for misconduct.  This penalty is a
consequence of acts showing their
unworthiness as officers of the courts; as well
as their lack of moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor.[23]  When the
misconduct committed outside of their
professional dealings is so gross as to show
them to be morally unfit for the office and the
privileges conferred upon them by their
license and the law, they may be suspended
or disbarred.[24]
 
8
          In Cordon v.  Balicanta,[25] this Court sense of responsibility, as well as of respect
explained the rationale for this holding as for law and order.
follows:  
  Accordingly, administrative sanction
          “x x x.  If the practice of is warranted by respondent’s gross
law is to remain an honorable misconduct.  In line with Lao v. Medel,[27] Co v.
profession and attain its basic Bernardino,[28] and Saburnido v.Madroño,[29] su
ideal, those enrolled in its spension from the practice of law for one year
ranks should not only master is appropriate in this case.
its tenets and principles but  
should also, in their lives, WHEREFORE, Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz is
accord continuing fidelity to found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is
them.  Thus, the requirement hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the
of good moral character is of practice of law, effective upon his receipt of
much greater import, as far as this Decision.  He is warned that a repetition
the general public is of the same or a similar act will be dealt with
concerned, than the more severely.
possession of legal  
learning.  Lawyers are SO ORDERED.
expected to abide by the
tenets of morality, not only
upon admission to the Bar but
also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain
one's good standing in that
exclusive and honored
fraternity.  Good moral
character is more than just the
absence of bad
character.  Such character
expresses itself in the will to
do the unpleasant thing if it is
right and the resolve not to do
the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. This must be so
because ‘vast interests are
committed to his care; he is
the recipient of unbounded
trust and confidence; he deals
with his client's property,
reputation, his life, his all.’”[26]
 
 
          The vengeful and violent behavior
exhibited by respondent in what should have
been a simple traffic altercation reveals his
conceit and delusions of self-importance.  By
firing his gun openly in a congested highway
and exposing complainant and the general
public to danger, he showed his utter lack of a

9
  
AC 7481           Complainant is the registered owner of a
parcel of land located in San Dionisio,
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court Parañ aque City covered by Transfer
Baguio City Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21176[2] of the
  Register of Deeds for the Province of
EN BANC Rizal.   Being a resident of the United States of
LORENZO D. A.C. No. 7481 America (USA), he entrusted the
BRENNISEN,   administration of the subject property to
Complainant, Present: respondent, together with the corresponding
    owner's duplicate title.
  CORONA, C.J.,  
  CARPIO,  
  VELASCO, JR.           Unbeknownst to complainant, however,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE respondent, through a  spurious Special
  CASTRO. Power of Attorney (SPA)[3] dated February 22,
  BRION, 1989, mortgaged and subsequently sold the
  PERALTA, subject property to one Roberto Ho (“Ho”), as
  BERSAMIN, evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale[4] dated
  DEL CASTILLO, November 15, 2001.  As a result, TCT No.
ATTY. RAMON U. ABAD, 21176 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No.
CONTAWI, VILLARAMA, JR. 150814[5] issued in favor of Ho. 
Respondent. PEREZ,  
  MENDOZA,  
SERENO,           Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant
REYES, and filed the instant administrative complaint
PERLAS-BERNABE, against respondent for having violated his
JJ oath as a lawyer, causing him damage and
  prejudice.
Promulgated:  
   
   April 24, 2012           In his counter-affidavit,[6] respondent
  denied any formal lawyer-client relationship
 x------------------------------------------------------------- between him and the complainant, claiming
-----------------------x to have merely extended his services for free.
  He also denied receiving money from the
  complainant for the purpose of paying the
DECISION real estate taxes on the property.  Further, he
  averred that it was his former office
PER CURIAM: assistants, a certain Boy Roque (“Roque”) and
  one Danilo Diaz (“Diaz”), who offered the
          Before the Court is an administrative subject property to Ho as collateral for a
complaint[1] for disbarment filed by loan.  Nevertheless, respondent admitted to
complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen against having confirmed the spurious SPA in his
respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi for deceit favor already annotated at the back of TCT
and gross misconduct in violation of his No. 21176 upon the prodding of Roque and
lawyer's oath. Diaz, and because he was also in need of
  money at that time.  Hence, he signed the real
The Facts estate mortgage and received his
proportionate share of P130,000.00 from the

10
proceeds of the loan, which he asserted to complainant was
have fully settled. cancelled in year
  2000 and a new
  one, TCT No.
          Finally, respondent denied signing the 150814 was
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Ho and issued in favor of
insisted that it was a forgery. Nonetheless, he Mr. Roberto Ho;
sought complainant's forgiveness and  
promised to repay the value of the subject 5.      The Special
property. Power of Attorney
  dated 24 February
  1989 in favor of
          In the Resolution[7] dated July 16, 2008, Atty. Ramon U.
the Court resolved to refer the case to the Contawi is
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for spurious and was
investigation, report and recommendation. not signed by
  complainant
  Lorenzo D.
The Action and Recommendation of the Brennisen;
IBP  
  6.      That respondent
  received
          During the mandatory conference held Php100,000.00 of
on October 21, 2008, the parties stipulated on the mortgage loan
the following matters: secured by the
  mortgagee on the
1.      That complainant aforementioned
is the owner of a property of
property covered complainant;
by TCT No. 21176  
(45228) of the 7.      That respondent
Register of Deeds did not inform the
of Parañ aque; complainant about
  the unauthorized
2.      Respondent was mortgage and sale
in possession of of his property;
the Owner's  
Duplicate 8.      That respondent
Certificate of the has a loan
property of the obligation to Mr.
complainant; Roberto Ho;
   
3.      The property of 9.      That respondent
the complainant has not yet filed
was mortgaged to any case against
a certain Roberto the person whom
Ho; he claims to have
  falsified his
4.      The title to the signature;
property of  

11
 10.         That respondent
did not notify the
complainant that
the owner's copy
of TCT No. 21176
was stolen and
was taken out
from his office.
[8]
 
          In its Report[9] dated July 10, 2009, the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),
through Commissioner Eduardo V. De Mesa,
found that respondent had undeniably
mortgaged and sold the property of his client
without the latter's knowledge or consent,
facilitated by the use of a falsified SPA.  Hence,
in addition to his possible criminal liability
for falsification, the IBP-CBD deduced that
respondent violated various provisions of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility and
accordingly recommended that he be
disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys.
 
          On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report
of Commissioner De Mesa through Resolution
No. XIX-2011-248[10] as follows:
“RESOLVED to ADOPT
and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation
of the Investigating
Commissioner in the
above-entitled case,
herein made part of
this Resolution as
Annex 'A' and finding
the recommendation
fully supported by the
evidence on record
and the applicable
laws and rules, and
finding Respondent
guilty of falsification;
making or using
falsified documents;
and for benefiting from
the proceed[s] of his
dishonest acts, Atty.
Ramon U. Contawi is
hereby DISBARRED.”
 
The Issue
 
          The sole issue before the Court is
whether respondent violated his lawyer's
oath when he mortgaged and sold
complainant's property, which was entrusted
to him, without the latter's consent.
 
 
The Court's Ruling
 
 
          After a punctilious examination of the
records, the Court concurs with the findings
and recommendation of Commissioner De
Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent acted with deceit when, through
the use of a falsified document, he effected
the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his
client's property for his personal benefit. 
          Indisputably, respondent disposed of
complainant's property without his
knowledge or consent, and partook of the
proceeds of the sale for his own benefit.  His
contention that he merely accommodated the
request of his then financially-incapacitated
office assistants to confirm the spurious SPA
is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully
aware that complainant's signature reflected
thereon was forged.  As aptly opined by
Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent
transactions involving the subject property
were effected using the owner's duplicate
title, which was in respondent's safekeeping
and custody during complainant's absence.  
 
 
          Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa
and the IBP Board of Governors correctly
12
recommended his disbarment for violations
of the pertinent provisions of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
 
Canon 1 – A lawyer
shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and
promote respect for
law and legal
processes.
 
Canon 1.01 – A lawyer
shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 16 – A lawyer
shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties
of his client which may
come into his
possession.
 
Canon 16.01 – A
lawyer shall account
for all money or
property collected or
received for or from
client.
Canon 16.03 – A
lawyer shall deliver
the funds and property
of his client when due
or upon demand.
 
Canon 17 – A lawyer
owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and
he shall be mindful of
the trust and
confidence reposed in
him.
 
 
          In Sabayle v. Tandayag,[11] the Court
disbarred one of the respondent lawyers and
ordered his name stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys on the grounds of serious
dishonesty and professional misconduct.  The
respondent lawyer knowingly participated in
a false and simulated transaction not only by
notarizing a spurious Deed of Sale, but also –
and even worse – sharing in the profits of the
specious transaction by acquiring half of the
property subject of the Deed of Sale.
 
 
          In Flores v. Chua,[12] the Court disbarred
the respondent lawyer for having deliberately
made false representations that the vendor
appeared personally before him when he
notarized a forged deed of sale.  He was found
guilty of grave misconduct.
 
          In this case, respondent's established
acts exhibited his unfitness and plain inability
to discharge the bounden duties of a member
of the legal profession. He failed to prove
himself worthy of the privilege to practice
law and to live up to the exacting standards
demanded of the members of the bar.  It
bears to stress that “[t]he practice of law is a
privilege given to lawyers who meet the high
standards of legal proficiency and morality.
Any violation of these standards exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability.”[13]
 
          Moreover, respondent's argument that
there was no formal lawyer-client
relationship between him and complainant
will not serve to mitigate his liability. There is
no distinction as to whether the transgression
is committed in a lawyer's private or
professional capacity, for a lawyer may not
divide his personality as an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another.[14]
 
 
          With the foregoing disquisitions, the
Court thus finds the penalty of disbarment
proper in this case, as recommended by
Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of
Governors.  Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court provides:
 
13
      “SEC. 27. attached to respondent's personal record as
Disbarment or attorney.
suspension of
attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds
therefor. - A member
of the bar may
be disbarred or
suspended from his
office as attorney by
the Supreme Courtfor
any deceit,
malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in
such office, xxx or for
any violation of the
oath which he is
required to take
before admission to
practice xxx”
(emphasis supplied)
 
 
          The Court notes that in administrative
proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, is required.[15]  Having
carefully scrutinized the records of this case,
the Court therefore finds that the standard of
substantial evidence has been more than
satisfied.
 
 
          WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY.
RAMON U. CONTAWI, having clearly violated
his lawyer's oath and the Canons of
Professional Responsibility through his
unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct,
is  DISBARRED and his name
ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.
 
         
Let copies of this Decision be served
on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in the country for their information
and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be

14

A.C. No. 4306
March 28, 2007
REMBERTO C. KARA-AN, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. REYNALDO A. PINEDA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
In a Complaint for Disbarment filed before
the Office of the Bar Confidant on September
6, 19941, herein complainant Remberto C.
Kara-an charged respondent-lawyer
Reynaldo A. Pineda with gross misconduct as
an officer of the court and member of the Bar
for violation of the lawyer’s oath, specifically
his failure to abide by his duties: (1) to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to support the Constitution
and obey the laws of the Philippines; (2) to
observe and maintain the respect due the
courts of justice and judicial officers; and (3)
not to delay any man’s cause, for any corrupt
motive or interests.
The antecedent facts:
Complainant Remberto C. Kara-an filed a
Complaint for Injunction and Damages
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-2078 against
one Amado M. Bulauitan and several John
Does before the Makati Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 150. Respondent Atty.
Reynaldo A. Pineda entered his appearance as
counsel for the defendant. On July 12, 1994,
the respondent moved for the resetting of the
hearing from July 13, 1994 to July 20, 1994
due to a prior professional engagement. In
the same pleading, the respondent
manifested that he was still in the process of
preparing his formal written opposition to
the case.2 On July 20, 1994, the respondent
failed to submit any answer or written
opposition but instead made an agreement
with the judge and the complainant to reset
the hearing to August 1, 1994.3 On August 1,
1994, as the respondent failed to appear, the
RTC deferred the hearing to August 15,
1994.4 On this account, the complainant filed
a Motion for Contempt dated August 2, 1994
before the RTC.5
A little more than a month later, or on
September 6, 1994, the complainant filed this
Complaint for Disbarment against the
respondent, alleging therein that the
respondent failed to appear on August 1,
1994 before the RTC, despite his agreement
to set the hearing of the injunction case on
the said date, to file his answer or written
opposition to the complaint for injunction. In
his Comment filed on November 16, 1994, the
respondent posited that the complaint is but
a form of harassment in order to discourage
him from pursuing cases against the
complainant; and that the same is premature
since the RTC has yet to decide the pending
motion for contempt.6 Per Resolution dated
February 20, 1995, this Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and decision.7
Hearings were conducted after which, the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
through Investigating Commissioner Elpidio
G. Soriano III rendered a Report and
Recommendation dated February 6, 2006,
recommending that the prayer for
disbarment be denied, but that the
respondent be reprimanded for his failure to
explain the cause of his absence in a hearing
before the RTC and his failure to appear in
several hearings before the IBP-CBD.
On July 7, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors
passed a Resolution adopting and approving
with modification the recommendation of
Commissioner Soriano, as follows:
"RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-371
Adm. Case No. 4306
15
Remberto C. Kara-an vs.
Atty. Reynaldo A. Pineda
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, for Respondent’s
failure to explain the cause of his absence in
the hearing before the Regional Trial Court
and for his failure to appear in several
hearings before the Commission on Bar
Discipline, Atty. Reynaldo A. Pineda is
REPRIMANDED with stern Warning that a
repetition of his actuation shall be dealt with
severely."
We adopt the July 7, 2006 IBP Resolution. A
perusal of the records shows that the
evidence adduced by the complainant is
insufficient to warrant the imposition of the
supreme sanction of disbarment.
Disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power
to disbar must always be exercised with great
caution, only for the most imperative reasons
and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the
standing and moral character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and member of the bar.
Accordingly, disbarment should not be
decreed where any punishment less severe –
such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine –
would accomplish the end desired.8
sought by the complainant is unduly harsh,
taking into account that this appears to be the
respondent’s first offense.
However, it is worthy to note that respondent
indeed fell short of his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of
justice10 due to his failure to attend the
August 1, 1994 hearing before the RTC and
his subsequent failure to attend some of the
hearings before the IBP-CBD without giving
any reasonable explanation for his absences,
which failure contributed to the delay of the
resolution of this case. The respondent should
have been more conscientious in complying
with such duty as dictated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility and as required
by his oath as a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
prayer for disbarment is DENIED for lack of
merit. Nevertheless, respondent Atty.
Reynaldo A. Pineda is hereby REPRIMANDED
with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future shall be
dealt with severely. Let a copy of this
Resolution be attached to the respondent’s
personal records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

As aptly observed by the Investigating

Commissioner, the complainant failed to
establish by clear and convincing proof that
the respondent’s failure to appear in the
hearing on August 1, 1994 before the RTC
was made oppressively or with ill-motives as
to qualify the same to gross misconduct,
willful disobedience or improper conduct
tending to obstruct the administration of
justice.9 Moreover, the penalty of disbarment

16