Evolution of Russian S&T System

By: Kaushalendra Kumar

Russia, the largest country of the world in terms of its area , has a rich history,
geography, society and economics. It is endowed with huge natural resources along with varying
topography and climatic conditions. After a long era of monarchy , there took place Russian
Revolution in 1914 which resulted in the beginning of Marxian socialism which was more or
less based on state own factor of productions and state ownership of all the properties within
the state. Then the country participated in First World War which gave a blow to its economy.
This also resulted in formation of Soviet Union - a conglomeration of socialist states with
Russia as its prominent member state. Another major historical event was Second world War
which in a sense initiated the process of structural streamlining of science, technology,
innovation and research. This is followed by a bipolar world which involved a arms race
which had a technological race at its core. In 1991 Soviet Union got disintegrated and the era
of multilateral world began and continued till date. In Historical terms it is said that Economy
is equivalent to empire. But at presents time it is the technological richness which is at the
core of economical empowerment and pivot of world order.
Forward-looking activities and technology foresight in particular emerged initially as an attempt
to identify future developments of science and technology (S&T). The first large-scale
national S&T foresight studies conducted in Japan, and 15–20 years later in the US, Germany,
and UK, were intended to better inform design and implementation of national S&T policies.
Later, as S&T and innovation came to play a greater role in social and economic
development, S&T policy became more complex and systemic. An upsurge of studies of
national innovation systems (NIS) have created a solid foundation for designing more
elaborate policy tools, which require more substantial information not only about an existing
situation but also future trends in the field of S&T. Traditional statistical, bibliometric and
patent indicators reflecting the existing state-of-the-art had to be complemented with
evidence based insights concerning future challenges and opportunities. When analysing the
emergence and development of forward looking activities in a particular country, it is important
to take into account the relevant institutional settings (evolved over time) related to
economic development, knowledge production, and distribution. This is because historical
transformation of a NIS covers production structure, technology and institutions.

Evolution of S&T

System: Phase-I (1920-

1940)

It is difficult to imagine serious discussions about the future during the devastating World War
I (1914–1918), October revolution (1917), and subsequent Civil War in Russia (1918–
1921). Nevertheless, even in those hard times, the key role of science in industrial
development was clearly understood by both researchers and the national leadership. In 1915,
the famous Russian geologist Vladimir Vernadsky initiated the creation of the Commission
for Study of Natural Productive Forces at the Russian Academy of Sciences, which was
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transformed in 1920 into the State Commission on Electrification of Russia. In 1918, Vladimir
Lenin in his “Sketch of a Plan

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for Scientific and Technological Works” instructed the formation of expert commissions for
quick development of an industrial reorganisation and economic growth plan. Lenin's idea
incorporated rational territorial development and concentration of industrial enterprises with
respect to the available natural resources and minimisation of losses within value added chains,
electrification of industry, and transport. This period was marked by the first attempts to
establish a longer term planning system with particular attention paid to technologies as one of
the key elements of economic development. Nikolay Kondratiev devoted great efforts to the
study of economic conjuncture cycles based on the analysis of large statistical datasets. He
developed the theory of long waves in economic dynamics. Later, in 1926–1927, Kondratiev
developed the theory of planning in a market economy, although policy makers rejected it in the
years following the New Economic Policy (NEP). He mentioned that “plans without any
foresight are nothing” and they should be based on foreseeing trends and take account of their
potential impacts. At this stage, STI policy was primarily devoted to expanding a network of
research institutions able to provide S&T support to the fast growing and extensive basic
industries. Therefore, forward looking activities were focused on the planned trajectories of
military and industrial development and targeted accumulation of knowledge promising the rapid
return of investment in those areas. At the same time, some efforts were made to develop the
theoretical foundations of forecasting (rather than foresight) in the administrative planned
economy.

Phase-II (1940-1970)

World War II and consequent Cold War gave another impetus to accelerating military threats for
the Soviet Union. These threats were of a much bigger concern, especially after the bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. S&T had become one of the most important sources of innovation-
based industrial growth and military power. At the same time, new military-oriented, large-scale
endeavors required integration and careful long-term planning of research activities. These years
were marked by great successes of the USSR in military-oriented multidisciplinary areas of “Big
Science”, namely in the fields of nuclear energy and space research. For such reasons, the State
Committee for Science and Technology was established in 1946 as a central government agency
responsible for S&T planning and coordination across sectoral ministries. This Committee later
played an important role in pursuing future oriented programmes. Nuclear related studies started
back in the 1920s and the first cyclotron in Europe was built in the Radium Institute (in
Leningrad) in 1937, and systemic research to develop an atomic bomb (the so-called Uranium
Project) was initiated in 1943. The Uranium Project involved dozens of research institutes and
industrial enterprises. Several so-called “closed science cities” arranged around those
establishments and specialised in allied R&D and production activities were erected across the
country. The first nuclear reactor in Russia started in 1946, while the first testing of the nuclear
bomb took place in September 1949. The threat-thinking approach turned out to be effective in
the framework of an administrative system for thorough planning of necessary activities aimed at
resolving clearly stated large-scale problems in the medium and long term.. With the vital need
to move from extensive economic growth to intensification of production and innovation, the
centrally planned administrative economy started to slow down. This deceleration occurred
because the economic actors controlled by the government agencies were primarily interested in
fulfilling their production plans (and accordingly, in minimising the planned target indicators)
than in taking account of customers' needs. This led to intense debates among economists, in
particular after the 20th Forum of the Communist Party in 1956 that allowed greater freedom
of discussions. The debates centred on how to optimise planning of manufacturing activities
and economic development in general. In this connection the first research labs for economic-
mathematic methods were established in Novosibirsk and Leningrad (headed by Vasily
Nemchinov and Leonid Kantorovich, respectively). In 1963, the Central Economic and
Mathematical Institute was set up in Moscow. Overall, the Soviet school of modeling and
planning of socialist economy consisted of several hundred scientists. Their studies were
largely focused on computer-aided optimisation of economic plans on the basis of Input-
Output tables. The mathematical models behind this research could be used for a wide
range of economic applications. Some took into account technology-related parameters. In
1975, L. Kantorovich received the Nobel prize in economics for his contribution to the theory
of optimal allocation of resources.

Phase-III (1970-
1990)

After the oil crisis of the early 1970s, developed market economies paid more attention to both
funding S&T and elaborating new instruments of S&T policies to find ways to respond
to emerging challenges. Overall gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) in developed countries
grew from USD 97.2 billion in 1973 to USD 189.6 billion in 1980. Relevant policy
measures provided a foundation for technology- and innovation-based intensive economic
growth. A substantial focus on transdisciplinary studies aimed at commercial and
entrepreneurial-driven applications required new more diverse forms of “Technoscience”
research. On top of existing labs in R&D institutions and universities, ad-hoc research
networks increasingly emerged. Russian economists clearly understood the necessity to
promote S&T under transition from extensive growth of production to intensive
development: “The bigger is the gap between the demand and existing capacities, the bigger is
the load on S&T”. Extensive discussions of the role of S&T in economic progress, which
started in the late 1970s, laid the foundation for the first large-scale attempts to forecast S&T
development at the national level. The national forecast was considered as a system of studies
covering particular technological processes and production methods, which envisaged
identifying and assessing the following issues:

 main S&T shifts during the last decades;

 technologies that are already developed but yet to be implemented;
 science results to be developed into new technologies;
 potential results of research that require significant funding;
 potential areas of basic research that require significant funding.

The Complex Progamme of Scientific and Technological Progress (CPSTP) for the period
of 1991–2010 (published in 1988) included recommendations on: the dynamics, structure,
and utilisation of national S&T and education capacities; proposals for structural policies in S&T
and allocation of relevant human, physical, and financial resources; and background materials
for the identification of economic, organisational, and other measures needed for S&T
development. The developments forecasted in the CPSTPwere never realised. They were not
even taken seriously into consideration by the then existing system of allocating resources for
internationally recognized R&D areas as ICT, biotechnology, medicine, and broader life
sciences. R&D
institutions did not have modern equipment; by 1990, 60% of them were not supplied with their
own buildings. Nevertheless, the whole exercise provided a significant contribution to the
forward-looking activities in Russia both organizationally and methodologically.

Phase - IV (Post Soviet Era)

The inability of the Soviet economic system to meet major new challenges in a rapidly
changing world fundamentally undermined political stability and, in the end, this led to the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The dynamics of the main R&D indicators show a
number of common features at the beginning of the transition period, but later on the
trajectories of S&T development in the newly formed countries were determined by rather
different social, political and economic factors. The main idea of the transformation of
scientific systems in the post- Soviet states was that of ‘creative destruction’ and of the
reorientation of scientific activities from military to civilian goals. In fact, most newly
independent states were unable to preserve a ‘critical mass’ of scientific activities in order to
remain among the main producers of research results. In many post-Soviet countries, inputs
from the R&D system have failed to generate wealth-creating outputs because of an apparent
systemic inability to use resources effectively. In addition, many Russian-speaking specialists
left these countries for political or cultural reasons. Thus, in the Central Asian states, Russian-
speaking specialists had previously formed the core of the republics’ R&D manpower, and their
outflow created problems not only in R&D institutions, but even in the servicing of relatively
complex equipment, such as hydroelectric stations. The resources devoted to R&D in the post-
Soviet countries (except for Russia and Ukraine, to some extent) have not been sufficient for
effective scientific and technological development. For
proponents of S&T policy the issue is whether S&T policy can help Russian economy to get out
of its protracted structural crisis. Whether S&T will become a part of the solution or part of the
problem will determine the long-term rate of economic growth as well as the nature of its
S&T system. However, we should not overestimate the role and the scope of S&T policy.
Technology and innovation policies do not operate in a vacuum and their success or failure
should be seen in relation to framework conditions and other institutional factors that influence
innovation process.
Assessment of factors influencing the creation and growth of new technology-based firms (NTBFs) in Russia
Framework conditions (demand side) Technology and innovation policy (supply side)
  Declining economic growth during the
1990s/turnaround in growth in early 2000s
 Weak competition policy
 Unstable macroeconomic situation and
uncertain expectations inhibit innovation and
long-term investment
 Weak relationships of NTBFs with large firms
as customers or vehicles for access to
technology
 Very low sophistication of financial markets
 Low mobility in labour markets
 Large pool of qualified labour force
 Complicated and destimulative tax system
 High interest rates
source: S. Radosevic / Research Policy 32 (2003) 1105–1124
 Developed public R&D and technology procurement
but not used as a tool of innovation policy
 Undeveloped systems of specialised advisory services
 Large firms and universities as sources of qualified
personnel
 Undeveloped management skills
 Undeveloped system of intellectual property rights
and international standards
 Systems of business and technology incubators is Still
in early stages of development
 Finance for innovation is extremely limited
 Lacking direct promotion of formal and informal
venture capital
To summarise, we have seen how the largest post-Soviet states have yet to create the
relevant institutions and proper instruments needed for the effective transformation of their
R&D systems. Unfortunately, every year the possibilities for the implementation of effective
transformation policies are shrinking, as the number of researchers declines and the
research centers lose their ability to conduct research. With time running out, what remains of
the R&D sectors face mounting problems in ensuring that they possess the creative capabilities
needed to compete internationally. Very recently, the Russian government started an ambitious
program of financial support for R&D, accompanied by the creation of university-based
research centres throughout the country. However, it is still too early to reach any conclusions
about the impact of these reforms on the research community or on indicators of R&D
performance. In Ukraine, major transformations of R&D still lie ahead. Reforms of the R&D
sector have to be an integral part of the general economic transformation. In the economic
sphere, a key precondition for successful change in the R&D system is the switch to an
intensive growth policy accompanied by appropriate structural changes, which, in turn, have
to be based on innovation. Above table suggests that innovation and technology policy cannot
compensate for unfavorable framework conditions, weak business opportunities or other
hindering factors. Yet, a developed innovation and technology policy is one of essential
ingredients for changing unfavorable framework conditions. The issue is whether current
S&T policy in Russia is contributing to changing framework conditions and to innovation. As
argued in sections above Russian S&T policy is still not operating as a promoter of structural
change but more as buffer to further erosion of R&D system. Revival of growth offers unique
opportunity for S&T policy to play more active role in promoting structural change, which in
turn have to be based on innovation. The emergence and evolution of forward-looking
activities, as the case of Russia shows, has been closely correlated with the overall change in
macroeconomic and political environment. Tackling the challenges will enable foresight to
help transforming crisis-caused consequences into opportunities that can enhance competitive
advantages stemming from technological progress and innovation.

References
:
 I. Yegorov / Research Policy 38 (2009) 600–609
 S. Radosevic / Research Policy 32 (2003) 1105–1124
 Gokhberg, L., Sokolov, A., Technology foresight in Russia in historical
evolutionary perspective, Technol. Forecast. Soc.Change (2016),
 Higher School of Economics, 2016. Science and Technology Indicators: 2016.
Data Book.National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow