HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, PRINCIPLES AND
METHODS OF INTUITIONISM*
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historical development of the mental
T HE
mechanism of mathematical thought
is naturally closely connected with the
modifications which, in the course of his-
tory, have come about in the prevailing
philosophical ideas firstly concerning the
origin of mathematical certainty, secondly
concerning the delimitation of the object
of mathematical science. And that the
mental mechanism of mathematical thought
during so many centuries has undergone so
little fundamental change is due to the cir-
cumstance that, in spite of all revolutions
undergone by philosophy in general, the
belief in the existence of properties of time
and space, immutable and independent of
language and experience, remained well.
nigh intact until far into the nineteenth
century. Exact knowledge of these pro·
perties was called mathematics, and was
generally pursued in the following way:
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for some familiar regularities of (outer or
inner) experience which, with any attainable
degree of approximation, seemed invariable,
complete invariability was postulated. These
regularities were called axioms and were
put into language. Thereupon extensive
systems of properties were developed
from the linguistic substratum of the
axioms by means of reasoning guided by
experience but linguistically following and
using the principles of classical logic.
We will call the standpoint governing
this mode of thinking and working the
observational standpoint, and the long period
characterized by this standpoint the
observational period.
During the observational period mathe·
matics was considered functionally, if not
existentially, dependent on logic, and logic
itself was considered autonomous.
For space the observational standpoint
became untenable when, in the course of
the 19th and the beginning of the 20th
• Paper read to Section A of thc South African Association
for the Advanc{'mcnt of Science, Cape Town, July, 1952.
South African Journal of Science
L. E. J. Brouwer
University of Amsterdam
century, as a consequence of a series of
discoveries with which the names of
I,obatchefsky, Bolyai, Riemann, Cayley,
Klein, Hilbert, Einstein, Levi-Civita and
Hahn are associated, mathematics was
gradually transformed into a mere science
of numbers. Simultaneously, besides obser.
vational space, a great number of other
spaces, sometimes exclusively originating
from logical speculations, with properties
distinct from the traditional but no less
beautiful, gradually found an arithmetical
representation. Consequently the science
of classical (Euclidean) three-dimensional
space had to continue its existence as a
chapter without priority, on the one hand,
of (exact) science of numbers, on the other
hand, as applied mathematics, of (naturally
only approximative) descriptive natural
science.
Encouraged by the important part which,
in this process of extending the domain of
conceivable geometry, had been played by
the logico.linguistic method, which, without
any guidance by experience, operated on
words by means of logical rules, the Old
Formalist school (Dedekind, Cantor, Peano,
Hilbert, Russell, Zermelo, Couturat) finally,
for the purpose of a rigorous treatment of
mathematics and logic (though not for the
purpose of choosing the subjects of investi·
gation of these sciences) rejected any ele·
ment extraneous to language and logic.
Thus logic and mathematics were divested
by this school both of their essential differ·
ence in character and of their autonomy.
However, the hope originally fostered by
the Old Formalists that mathematical
science erected according to their principles
would be crowned one day with a proof of
noncontradictority, was never fulfilled, and,
nowadays, in view of the results of certain
investigations of the last few decades, has,
I think, been relinquished.
139 October-November, 1952
 Of a totallv different orientation was the
Pre-intuitionist school, led mainly by
Poincare, Borel and Lebesgue. These
thinkers seem to have maintained a modi-
fied observational standpoint for the intro-
duction of natural numbers, of the principle
of complete induction, and of all mathe-
matical entities and theories springing
from this source without the intervention
of axioms of existence, hence for what
might be called the 'separable' parts of
arithmetic and algebra. For these parts of
mathematics. even for such theorems
as were de~luced by means of classical
logic, they postulated an existence and
exactness independent of language and
logic, and regarded their noncontradictority
as certain, even \vithout logical proof. For
the continuum however, they seem not to
have sought an origin extraneous to language
and logic. On some occasions they seem to
have contented themselves with an ever-
unfinished and ever-denumerable system of
'real numbers,' generated by an ever·
unfinished and ever-denumerable system of
laws defining convergent infinite sequences
of rational numbers. In doing so they seem
to have overlooked that such an ever·
unfinished and ever-denumerable system of
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, real numbers' is incapable of fulfilling the
mathematical functions of the continuum,
for the simple reason that it cannot have a
measure positively differing from zero. On
other occasions thev seem to have intro-
duced the continuu;l by having recourse to
some logical axiom of existence lacking
sensory as well as epistemological evidence,
such as the 'axiom of ordinal connected-
ness,' or the 'axiom of completeness.'
But in both cases, in their further develop-
ment of mathematics, they unreservedly
continued to apply classical logic, including
the principle of the excluded third. They
did so regardless of the fact that the non-
contradictority of systems thus constructed
had become very doubtful after the dis-
covery of the logico-mathematical anti-
nomies.
Thus. in point of fact, Pre· intuitionism
re-established on the one hand the essential
difference in character between logic and
mathematics. and on the other hand the
autonomy of logic and of a part of mathe-
matics. On these two autonomous domains
of thought the rest of mathematics reo
mained dependent.
Oktobe1'-No~'embel' 1952
'Vhen We Old Formalist standpoint had
been badly shaken, mainly by Pre·intuition-
ist criticism, Hilbert founded the New
Formalist school, which postulated existence
and exactness independent of language-
it is true not for mathematics proper, but
for meta· mathematics or mathematics of the
second order, i.e. the scientific consideration
of the symbols occurring in purified mathe.
matical language, and of the rules of mani-
pulation of these symbols. Thus New
Formalism, in contrast with Old Formalism,
consciously and in confesso, made use of
the intuition of natural numbers and of
complete induction. It is true that auto·
nomy was postulated here for a much
smaller part of mathematics than in the
case of Pre·intuitionism.
But no attention was paid by New
Formalism to the circumstance that, be-
tween the perfection of mathematical
language and the perfection of mathe·
matics proper, no clear cOllnection can be
seen.
The situation left by Formalism and Pre-
intuitionism can be summarized as follows :
for the elementary theory of natural num-
bers, the principle of complete induction,
and more or less considerable parts of
algebra and theory of numbers, exact
existence, absolute reliability, and non-
contradiotority were universally acknow-
ledged, independently of language and
without proof. There was little concern
over the existence of the continuum.
Introduction of a set of predeterminate
real numbers 'with a positive measure was
attempted by logico-linguistic means, but a
proof of the noncontradictory existence of
such a set was lacking. For the whole of
mathematics the rules of classical logic were
accepted as reliable aids in the search for
exact truths.
In this situation intuitionism intervened
with two acts, of which the first seems
necessarilv to lead to destructive and
sterilizing· consequences; then, however,
the second yields ample possibilities for
recoyery and new deyelopments. To begin
with, the
FIRST ACT OF DITCITIO"SISM
completely separates mathematics from
mathematical language, in particular from
140 Suid.AfrikaaI18€ .]ocnlaal mn lVetenskap
 the phenomena of language ~t'hich are de·
scribecl by theoretical logic, and recognize8 that
intuitionist mathematic.'] 'i8 an es.']en6ally
languageless acth'ity of the mind lwdng its
origin in the perception of a mot' e of
tim e ,i.e. of the falling apart of a life
moment into hco distinct thing8, one of
1rhich gives way to the other, but is retained
by memory. If the two-ity thu8 born is dive8ted
of all quality, tllne remains the mp tY
form of the common substra·
t Ii m 0 f all t 11' 0 - it i e s. It is til is
cornmon substratum, thi8 empty form, which
is the basicintllition of mathe-
matics.
How much of ' separable' mathcmatics
can be rebuilt in a slightly modified form,
by unlimited self-unfolding of the basic
intuition, is introspectively realized.
In the edifice of mathematical thought
thus erected, h1nguage plays no other part
than that of an efficient. but never infallible
or exaet, technique for memorizing mathe-
matical constructions, and for suggesting
them to others: so that mathematical
language by itse"lf can never create new
mathematical systems. But on account of
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the highly logical character of usual mathc.
matical language the follo\\"ing question
naturally presents itself;
Suppose that an intuition'ist mathematical
construction has been carefully described by
rnean8 of words, and then, the intro.spective
character of the mathematical con.stnwtion
being ign01'ed for a moment,£ts linguistic
de.scription is considered by it.self and .sub-
mitted to a linguistic application of a principle
of classical logic. 18 it then always possible
to perform a languagele.s8 mathematical con-
struction finding it8 expre8sion in the logico
lingui8tic figure in question?
After a careful examination one answers
this question in the affirmative (if one allo,vs
for the inevitable inadequacy of language as
a mode of description) as far as the prin-
ciples of contradiction and syllogism are con·
cerned; but in the negative (except in special
cases) with regard to the principle of the
excluded third, so that the latter principle,
as an instrument for discovering new
mathematical truths, must be rejected.
Indeed, if each linguistic application of
the principle of the excluded third in a
Soulh Ajr'ican Journal oj Science
mathematical argument were to accompany
some actual intuitionist-mathematical con-
struction, this "would mean that each
intuitionist-mathematical assertion (i.e.
each assignment of a property to an in-
tuitionist-mathematieal entity) can be
judged, i.e. can either be proved or he
reduced to absurdity.
Now every construction of a bounded
finite character in a finite mathematical
system can be attempted only in a finite
number of ways, and each attempt can
either be carried through to completion,
or be continued until further progress is
impossible. It follows that cvery assertion
of possibility of a construction of a bounded
finite character in a finite mathematical
system can be judged. So, in this exccptional
case, application of the principle of the
excluded third is permissible.
In order to show that this is not so for
infinite systems, we shall call a hypothetical
property f of natural numbers a fleeing
property, if it satisfies the following con·
ditions:
1. for each natural number it can be
decided either that it possesses the property
f, or that it cannot possibly possess the
property f;
2. no method is known for calculating a
natural number possessing the property j ;
3. the assumption of existence of a
natural number possessing the property f
is not known to lead to an absurdity.
In particular, a fleeing property is called
opaque, if the assumption of existence of a
natural number possessing f is not known
to be non-contradictory either.
Obvious examples of fleeing properties
can casily be given.
Xow should we assert of a fleeing property
f, on the grounds of the principle of the
excluded third, that a natural number
possessing the property f either exists or
cannot exist, then this assertion, precisely
because of the nature of fleeing pro-
perties, would be an utter falsehood;
which shows conclusively that, in the
language of intuitionist mathematics, blind
applications of the said principle are not
permissible.
From the intuitionist standpoint the
dogma of the universal validity of the
141 October·November, 1952
 principle of the excluded third in mathe-
matics can only be considered as a pheno-
menon of history of civilization, of the
same order as the former belief in the
rationality of 'TT or in the rotation of the
firmament about the earth. That the dogma
was nevertheless able to retain its currency
for so long, may perhaps be explained by
the following two circumstances: firstly
that (as is easily recognized) within a given
domain of mathematical entities previously
obtained, for a single assertion the principle
is non· contradictory ; secondly that the
principle stands the test of application to an
extensive group of everyday phenomena of
the exterior world.
We have seen in the preceding how the
first act of intuitionism affected classical
mathematics in two ways: in the first
place, owing to the disappearance of' the
logical basis for the continuum, so large a
part becomes illusory that essentially only
the separable parts of algebra and theory of
numbers remain; in the second place even
in this remaining portion, several chapters
based on the principle of the excluded
third have to be rejected. Under these
circumstances one might fear that in-
Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010).
tuitionist mathematics must necessarily be
poor and anaemic, and in particular would
have no place for analysis. But this fear
would have presupposed that infinite
sequences generated by the intuitionist
self-unfolding of the basic intuition would
have to be fundamental sequences, Le.
predeterminate infinite sequences Which,
like classical ones, proceed in such a way
that, from the beginning, the mth term is
fixed for each m. Such, however, is not the
case; on the contrarv, a much wider field
of development whi~h includes analysis,
and in several places far exceeds the fron-
tiers of classical mathematics, is opened by
the
SECOND ACT OF INTUITIONISM
which recognize.~ the possibility of generating
new mathematical entities:
firstly in the form of infinitely pro-
(;eeding sequences PI' P2" .. , whose
terms are chosen more or less freely
from mathematical entities pre-
viously acquired; in such away that the
freedom of choice existing perhaps for the
first element PI may be subjected to a la.~ting
Oktober·November 1952
restriction at some following pv, and again
and again to sharper lasting restrictions or
even abolition at further subsequent pv' s, *
while all these restricting interventions, as
well as the choices of the pv's themselves, at
any stage may be made to depend on possible
future mathematical experiences of the creating
sUbject;
secondly in the form of mathematical
species, i.e. propert'ies supposable
for mathematical entities previously
a c qui red, and satisfying the condition that,
if they hold for a certain mathematical en-
tity, they also hold for all mathematical
entities which have been defined to be equal to it,
relations of equality having to be symmetric,
reflexive and transitive; mathematical en-
titi~ previously acquired for which the
property holds are called e l em e n t s of the
8pecies.
With regard to this definition of species
we have to remark firstly that, during the
development of intuitionist mathematics,
some species will have to be considered as
being re-defined time and again in the same
way, secondly that a species can very well
be an element of another species, but
never an element of itself.
Two mathematical entities are called
different, if their equality has been proved
to be absurd.
Two infinitely proceeding sequences of
mathematical entities aI' a 2 , . . . , and
bI> b2 , • • • are called equal or identical, if
a v= bv for each v, and distinct, if a natural
number s can be indicated such that as and
b. are different.
The second act of intuitionism creates
the possibility of introducing the intuitionist
continuum as the species of the more or le88
freely proceeding convergent infinite se·
quences of rational numbers, t and more
• In former publications I have sometimes admitted re·
strictions of freedom with regard also to fnture restrictions of
freedom. However this admission is not justified by close intro-
spection and moreover would endanger the simplicity and
rlgour of further developments.
t As the common notion of a rational number and the
common notion of a convergent infinite sequence are both
imbued with images of measure, the method followed in the
text for the introduction of the continuum might suggest
tll&t the intuitionist continuum depends on the concept of
measure. This, however, is bv no means the case. The
intuitionist closed continuum can be spread over an arbitrary
fundamental sequence which has been completely ordered as
an everywhere dense species with a llrst and a last clement
and has been provided with a definition of convergence based
exclusively on the relations constituting Its everywhere dense
order. The metrical method of introducing the continuum
which is given in the text was chosen to abbreviate the
approach to some applicatiOI.J! of the fan theorem.
142 Suid-Afrikaan.se J oernaal van Wetenskap
 generally the intuitionist n-dirnensional
Cartesian space as the species of the rnore or
less freely proceeding conyergent infinite
sequences of the 'n-dimensional rational
grid,' which expression may ?e c~nsidered
self-explanatory. These speCIeS wIll prove
to be susceptible of a standard representa-
tion making t.hem considerably more survey-
able and manageable than the classical
species of the predeterminate real numbers
and of the predeterminate real points of
Cartesian n-dimensional spaces.
The development of t.his standard repre-
sentation must be preceded by the intro-
duction of some new concepts.
By a node of order n we understand a
sequence of n natural numbers (n I),
called t.heindices of the node ..
A node pi of order n rn, (rn 2: I), will
be called an mth de8cendant of a node P of
order n, and p will be called the rnth
ascendant of p', if P is an initial segment of
p'. For rn = I, P' is also called an imrnediate
descendant of p, and P the irnmediate as-
cendant of p'.
A finite sequence of nodes consisting of a
node PI of order 1, an imlllediate descendant
P2 of PI' an immediate descendant Pa
Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010).
of P2' •.. , up to an immediate descendant
Pn of Pn~l' will be called a rod of order n.
An infinite (not necessarily predeter-
minate) sequence of nodes consisting of a
node PI of order I, an immediate descendant
P2 of PI' an immediate descendant Pa of P2'
and so on ad infiniturn, will be called an
arrow.
Naturally an arrow may grow in com-
plete freedom, i.e. in the passage from
pv to P v+ll the choice of a new index for
Pu+l to be joined to those of pv may be
completely free for each v, for as long as
the creating subject may desire. On the
other hand this freedom in the generation of
the arrow may at any stage be completely
abolished, at the beginning or at any pv,
by means of a law fixing all further nodes in
advance. From this moment the arrow con-
cerned "rill be called a sharp arrow. Further-
more, the freedom in the generation of the
arrow, without being completely abolished,
may, at any po, undergo some restriction,
and this restriction may be intensified at
further pv's. Finally all these interventions,
by virtue of the second act of intuitionism,
South Afr(can Journal of Science
may, at any stage, be made to depend on
possible future mathematical experiences
of the creating subject.
\Ve will consider a species of nodes a to
which a law lV( a) assigns the following
nodes; of order I the natural numbers which
do not exceed a certain definite natural
number rn o, and of each order n + I the
immediate descendants of each node P of
order n belonging to a whose (n + I )th
index, joined to those of p, does not exceed
a certain definite natural number rnp. Then
this law lV( a) at the same time defines the
species w( a) of the arrows consisting ex-
clusively of nodes of a. This species of
arrows w( a) is called a fan, and the law
lV( a) is called a fan key.
For fans can be proved the
FAN THEOREM; If to each arrow a of a
fan F has been assigned a natural nurnber
pta), then a natural nurnber s can be indicated
such that, for any a, pta) is cornpletely deter-
mined by the 8th node of a. It follows that,
moreover, for pta) a finite maximum can be
indicated.
Passing now to the developm.ent. o.f t~e
standard representation o~ .th~ mtmt~omst
continuum and the intmtlOl1lst n-dlmen-
sional Cartesian space, \ve will treat
explicity only the case of the intuitionist
two-dimensional space, also called the
intuitionist plane. The same reasoning,
with little modification, applies to other
values of n.
Calling the two-dimensional rational grid
simply the 'rational grid,' we shall under-
stand by a limiting point an element. of the
intuitionist plane, i.e. a (not necessanly pre-
determinate) convergent infinite sequence
of elements of the rational grid. A pre-
determinate limiting point will al.so be
called a sharp lirniting point. Agal~, re-
garding as self-explanatory the meanmg of
coincidence of two limiting points, we shall
call the species of the li~it~~g poin~s co-
inciding with a given !l~l!mg ~omt a
limiting point core, and a hmltmg pomt core
containing a sharp limiting point, a sharp
limiting point core.
Denoting by a and n arbitrary intege~s,
we will consider the species of the fimte
binary fractions a. 2- n in their natural
order, and we will call a pair of these.
143 October-November, 1952
 fractions a grid interval. In particular the
grid intervals consisting, for a ccrtain n
and a certain a, of a. 2-(n+1} and
(a ~- 2). 2-(n+11, will be called Ainl_grid
intfl'1;al8. They will be K'" I-grid intervals
if a is e'-en. All Ain} -grid intervals, for aU
n, will be A-grid intervals, and all K (n I-grid
intcrYltls, for all n, will bc K-grid intervals.
By a grid square ,ye shall understand an
ordered pair (i.e. a pnjr consisting of a
'first element' and tt 'second element ')
of grid intervals, by a, A(nl-yrid square a,
similar pair of Ain l.grid intervals, by a
Kinl_yrid square a similar pair of K( 11 1_grid
interyals. All A(n I-grid squares, for all n,
(tre A-grid squares, and all K(n l-grid squares,
for all n, are K-grid squares. With regard to
the mutual position of two A-grid squares a
and b. the meaning of the following expres-
sions may be supposed self-explanatory:
a lips inside b, a lies out8ide b, a touches b
intf'rnally, a touche8 b externally. Further-
more we shall say that a and b overlap if a
A-squl1,re lying inside both can be indicated;
that a lie8 within b if a lies inside b, and
does not touch b; and that a and b lie
apart if they lie outside each other and do
not touch each other.
Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010).
The union g of a fundamental sequence
K1(g), K2(g), . . . of K-grid squares lying
outside each other wlIl be called a grid area,
if for each Kv(g) we can indicate a finite
number of elements Kv,(g), Kv,(g), . . . ,
KVlnv(g) of the same fundamental sequence
lying outside each other, and together
enclosing Kv(g), i.e. all touching Kv(g) ex-
ternally in such a way that no place is
left for any further K-grid square touching
Kv(g) externally, and lying outside KV1 (g),
.. " Kw"v(g)·
The union of an arbitrarv finite number of
K-grid squares lying outside each other
will be called a grid portion. With regard
to the mutual position of two A-grid squares
or grid portions a and b, the meaning of the
following expressions may be considered
self-explanatory: a lies inside b, a lies
outisde b, a and b touch each other externally,
a and b lie apart, a and b overlap, while a
will be said to lie within b, if it lies inside
b, and cannot possibly touch any K-grid
square lying outside b. A ,I.-grid square
or grid portion a will be said to lie inside
or within the grid area g if for an 8 suitably
chosen it lies inside the union of K1(g),
Oklober·Novembel' 19;32
K2 (Y), .... KS-l(g), K,(g). The grid area y
will be said to lie within the A-grid square,
yrid portion or grid area b if Kv(g) lies within
b for each v.
\Vhat is meant by the m·ea81trP of a
A-grid square and, in this connection, by
measurability of a grid area, and by the
measure of a measurable grid area, may be
considered self-explanatory.
A (not necessarily predeterminate) infinite
sequence of A-grid squares k 1 • k2' . . .,
such that kV+1 lies ,,-ithin kv for each v,
will be called a binary point or simply a
poi 111.
Tw'o binary points k'll k' 2' . • • and Ie" l'
Ie" 9, • , • will be said to coincide if it is
ce;tain that k,IJ.' and k" v overlap for each p
and each v. Obviously coincidence is a
transitive relation. The species of the binary
points coinciding with a given binary point
will be called a binary point core or simply
a point core.
A limiting point will be said to liein8ide
the A-grid 8quare or grid portion b if it
coincides with a limiting point 1'1' r 2 , • • •
possessing a tail segment inside b; it will
be said to lie within the A-grid square or
grid portion b if it lies inside a A-grid square
lying within b.
A point kv k2' . . . will be said to lie
inside the A-grid square or grid portion
b if kv and b overlap for each v; it will be
said to lie within the A-grid square or grid
portion b if it lies inside a A-grid square
lying within b.
A point or limiting point will be said to
lie in8ide or within the grid area g or to be
surrounded by the grid area g if it lies inside
a grid portion lying within g.
By a k(v) (v> 0) we shall understand a
A(4v+1 I-grid square, and by a standard
point a point k1' k2' . . . for which each
kv is a k(vl. It can be proved that every
limiting point p coincide8 with a standard
point q, i.e. to each limiting point p can be
assigned a standard point q, in such a way
that within each k(v) of q lies a tail segment
of p. Furthermore, coinciding limiting
points coincide with coinciding standard
points.
If by the 'unity grid square' L we
understand the K(OLgrid square consisting
of two equal K(OLgrid intervals (0, 1), it
144 Suid-AfrikaailS€ Joernaal mil lVefens/.:ap
 can be proved in particular that each
limiting point p lying inside L coincides
with a standard point q lying inside L. The
species of the unitary limiting points, Le.
the limiting points lying inside L, will be
called the unitary intuitioni8t plane or
simply the 'unitary plane, and the species
of the unitary standard points, Le. the
standard points lying inside L, will be called
the ~mitary .standard plane.
By c01lniiny the finite species of the k'
overlapping L, and for each k(v) overlapping
L countiny the finite species of the k(v+l)
lying inside this k(v), and overlapping L,
we bring about a (1, 1) correspondence
bctween the unitary standard plane and a
fan w. This correspondence has far-reaching
consequences.
If, for example. we 20ttempt to sur-
round the unitary plane with a grid area t/;,
we shall in particular have to surround
the unitary stfmdard plane with t/;. So,
by drtue of the fan theorem, a natural
number 111, mtIl be indicated such that all
unitary standa,rd points corresponding to
arrows of 'W containing the same rod K
of order m, must lie inside one and the
same grirl portion p(K) lying within t/;.
Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010).
Now indicating by G the species of the
unitary standard points containing K,
by H the kIm) corresponding to K, and
by H' the grid portion consisting of all
K (4m+5)_ grid squares lying inside Land
within H (so covering a grid square con-
centric and homothetic with H and with
side length i of the side of H), we remark
that if there existed a A-square lying
inside H' and outside p(K), a square of a
point of G, so a point of G, could be in.
dicated lying outside p(K). Consequently
no A-square lying inside H' can lie out-
side p(I(), i.e. H' must lie inside p(I{),
hence within t/;. This being the case,
independently of the choice of K from the
rods of w of order m, finally also L proves
to lie within t/;. It follows that a measurable
grid area surrounding all unitary limiting
poini8 the intuitionist plane mu.st have a
mea-sure I.
How different the plight of the classical
Cartesian plane appears if we suppose a
procedure which, after the choice of a
fixed natural number n, at the end of
the mth century from today, will surround
SOllth African .Journal of Science
the species of all predetermined limiting
points defined until then, with a measurable
grid area Ym whose measure does not
exceed 2- n - m • Then the union of Yv Y2'
Ya, . . . would in the course of centuries
constitute a grid area Y whose measure
would never exceed 2- n , and which would
in due time surround all present and future
limiting points of the classical Cartesian
plane. Hence, as n could be chosen
arbitrarily large, there can be no question of
any positive measure for the classical
Cartesian plane.
Defining limiting numbers, numbers,
standard numbers, limiting number cores
and number cores analogously with limiting
points, points, standard points, limiting
point cores and point cores respectiYely,
and considering the notion of a 'distance'
of two limiting number cores self-explana-
tory, we finally will proye, by means of the
fan theorem, that each full unitary function
of the unitary continuum (Le. each assign-
ment of a unitary limiting number core f(z)
to each unitary limiting number core Z)i8
1lniformly continuous.
For, such a full function implies an
assignment of a unitary standard number
'l'(x) to each unitary standard number x,
in such a way that, to coinciding :r, co-
inciding 'l'(x) are assigned. It is with regard
to this assignment 'l'(x) that we make the
following successive statements:
first, to each natural number PI' a naturai
number pz can be assigned, such that each
two standard numbers coinciding with
standal'd numbers whose arrows contain
the same rod of order PZ' have a distance
smaller than 2-P l ;
8econd (by virtue of the fan theorem), to
each natural number pz a natural number
l)a can be assigned such that the first pz
squares of 'l'(x) are e\"erywhere completely
defined by the first Pa squares of x, so that
to all stlmdard numbers x whose arrows
contain the same rod of order Pa, are as-
signed the same k (P2) of 'l'(x), and to all
standard numbers x coinciding with stan·
dard numbers whose arrows contain the
same rod of order Pa' are assigned standard
numbers 'l'(x) coinciding with standard
numbers whose arrows contain the same
rod of order P2 ;
145 October-November, 1952
 third to each natural number Pa a natural
number P4 can be assigned, such that .two
arbitrary standard numbers x with a distance
< 2-P 4 have overlapping k(Pa+l)'s, so that
both these standard numbers lie within one
and the same k (j 8), hence coincide with two
standard numbers x whose arrows contain
the same rod of order Pa.
Consequently to each natural number PI
has been assigned a natural number P4
such that to each two standard numbers x
with a distance < 2-P4 have been assigned
standard numbers cp(x) with a distance
< 2-PI, so that also to each two limiting
number cores z with a distance < 2-P~
have been assigned limiting number cores
l(z) with a distance < 2-Pl. Precisely this
is the meaning 01 saying that 1('1.,) is umjormly
continuous .
VENUE OF THE JUBILEE CONGRESS
Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010).
A tlneral view of the University of Cape Town, at which the Jubilee Congress of the South African Association for the
, Advancement of Science was held.
Oktober-N(nJember 1952 146
Professor H.· Vallois
pROFESSOR HENRI V ALLOIS is Director of
the Musee de l'Homme in Paris and
Professor at the School of Anthropology, a,s
well as editor of the Bulletins and Memoirs
of the :Paris Anthropological Society and
editor of the publication L ' Anthropologie.
He was born at Nancy in 1889 and graduated
in medicine at the University of Montpellier
in 1910, subsequently taking a Doctorate in
natural science at the University of Paris.
He WitS on the staff at Montpellier from
1912 to 1921, when he accepted the chair of
anatomy at the University of Toulouse. He
has undertaken a great deal of field research
in Europe, west and north Africa and the
near East, his principal work being directed
towards solving the problems of human
palaeontology and the origins of different
races. He has many publications to his
credit, apart from the valuable contributions
he has made through his editorial activities.
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