Thomson1994 - Family Structure and Child Well-Being-Economic Resources vs. Parental

Family Structure and Child Well-Being:
Economic Resources vs. Parental Behaviors*
ELIZABETH THOMSON, University of Wisconsin-Madison

THOMAS L. HANSON, University of Wisconsin-Madison
SARA S. McLANAHAN, Princeton University
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

Abstract
We used data from the National Survey of Families and Households to investigate
economic resources and parental behavior explanations for family structure effects on
children. The economic explanation received considerable support in terms of single-
mother disadvantage and accounted for a smaller proportion of disadvantage associated
with mother-partner families. Parental behaviors, particularly maternal and paternal
support, accounted for much smaller proportions of disadvantages found in mother-
stepfather as well as mother-partner families. Parental behaviors did not appear to
mediate any of the economic resource effects on children.
During the past decade, a considerable body of research has shown that
(1) children raised by both original parents are advantaged in several domains
of well-being compared to children whose parents divorce or who are born to
single mothers; and (2) parents' marriage or remarriage does not eliminate the
disadvantages. These findings have been replicated with different data sets, for
different ages of children, and across race/ethnic groups. (See reviews by
Amato & Keith 1991; Chase-Lansdale & Hetherington 1989; Demo & Acock
1988; Emery 1988; McLanahan & Booth 1989.)
Research on the processes through which family structure affects child well-
being has focused on two central features of family life — economic resources
and parental behaviors . 1 Although there is considerable empirical evidence that
economic resources are implicated in family structure effects on children, the
role of parental behaviors is less clear. In addition, few attempts have been
made to integrate the two explanations. In this article we use data from a
* Preliminary analyses were reported at the annual meetings of the American Sociological
Association, Washington, D.C., 11-14 August, 1990 and in NSFH working paper 29. The research
was supported by grant HD26122 and Center Grant HD05876 from the Center for Population
Research, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. The National Survey
of Families and Households was funded by NIH Grant HD21009. Direct correspondence to
Elizabeth Thomson, Center for Demography and Ecology, 1180 Observatory Drive, University
of Wisconsin, Madison WI 53706.
© The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces, September 1994, 73(1):221-42
222 / Social Forces 73:1, September 1994
nationally representative sample of families with children to answer three

questions: (1) To what extent do economic resources account for differences
between family types in children's well-being; (2) to what extent do parental
behaviors account for such differences; and (3) what is the relationship between
economic resources and parental behaviors, i.e., are differences in parenting due
to differences in family economic circumstances, and do they mediate adverse
effects of economic strain? Our analysis extends previous research by distin-
guishing never-married from previously married mothers and by including
cohabiting couples as well as stepfamilies.

Family Structure, Family Resources, and Child Well-Being
Parents provide two key resources to children — money and time. Money
provides not only food, shelter and clothing, but also high quality neighbor-
hoods and schools, and opportunities for experiences that foster cognitive and
social development. Parents' time provides the combination of support and
control associated with positive child outcomes (Baumrind 1966; Maccoby &
Martin 1983). Money and time are in some sense interchangeable; parents spend
time earning money and spend money to buy time (e.g., child care, consumer
goods). Neither resource alone, however, is sufficient for healthy child develop-
ment (Bronfenbrenner 1990; Coleman 1988).
Effects of parents' time or money on child well-being are likely to be
interrelated. Bronfenbrenner (1990), for example, views economic resources as
enablers for optimal parent-child relationships. Parents under economic stress
are less able than other parents to provide adequate levels of support and
control (Elder, Nguyen & Caspi 1985; Elder et al. 1992; Lempers, Clark-Lempers
& Simons 1989; Whitbeck et al. 1991). Coleman (1988) sees parents' time with
children as a form of "social capital" expended on children, which enables the
intergenerational transmission of parents' economic resources (including human
and financial capital).
Both money and parental time are associated with family structure in ways
that could explain poorer outcomes for children in single-parent families and
stepfamilies. Economic resources are the predominant explanation for problems
of children of mother-only households, since single mothers have much lower
incomes than married couples. Much of this income difference is due to effects
of divorce or nonmarital births, rather than to preexisting differences between
women who experience these events (Bane 1986; Duncan & Hoffman 1985; Hill
1992; Smock 1992). Conversely, remarriage improves the economic resources
available to children (Holden & Smock 1991).
Most analyses of the association between family structure and child well-
being control for parents' economic resources. In cross-sectional studies, income
differences account for up to half of the differences between children in single-
parent and two-parent families (McLanahan 1985). Many of these studies do
not, however, distinguish human capital and other economic resources that may
be common causes of family structure and child outcomes from the economic
consequences of nonmarital births, divorce, cohabitation, or remarriage. Panel
studies, which focus on these effects, also vary in the extent to which changes
Family Structure and Child Well-Being / 223
in economic resources account for changes in child well-being associated with

divorce or remarriage (Cherlin et al. 1991; Morrison & Cherlin 1992; Mott &
Menaghan 1993; Sandefur, McLanahan & Wojtkiewicz 1992). The fact that
disadvantages associated with divorce and single parenthood are also
experienced by children in stepfamilies does not mean that the economic
resources provided by parents' (re)marriage are irrelevant to child well-being,
but does suggest that other family differences — perhaps differences in parental
behaviors — may counterbalance economic effects.
Children may receive less parental time and attention in both single-parent

families and stepfamilies. Single parents appear to exert weaker control and
make fewer demands on their children than married parents (e.g., Amato 1987;
Astone & McLanahan 1991; Dornbusch et al. 1985; Furstenberg & Nord 1985;
Hetherington, Cox & Cox 1982; Thomson, McLanahan & Curtin 1992). Step-
parents, on the other hand, generally provide lower levels of warmth and
support to children, in comparison to original parents (see previous citations),
and may therefore not fully substitute for the original parent.
Although several studies have also investigated parental behavior explana-
tions for family structure variation in child well-being, the findings are not very
conclusive. Longitudinal observations of small samples have shown that effects
of divorce on parenting behavior change over time and are paralleled by
changes in children's well-being (Hetherington 1987; Hetherington, Cox & Cox
1982; Hetherington & Clingempeel 1992). The sample sizes for these studies
were not sufficiently large to determine whether the association between family
structure and child outcomes was accounted for by differences in parental
behaviors. Analyses of large-scale surveys have shown that effects of family
structure on children are attenuated but not entirely accounted for by parenting
(Astone & McLanahan 1991; Hogan & Kitagawa 1985; Matsueda & Heimer 1987;
Morgan, Alwin & Griffin 1979; Peterson & Zill 1986). Unfortunately, none of
these studies includes and distinguishes between single parents and step-
families; as pointed out above, single-parent families and stepfamilies seem to
differ from original two-parent families on different dimensions of parental
behavior.
Potential links between economic resources and parenting behaviors have
received little attention in studies of family disruption and child well-being. For
example, Hetherington (1987) reports that the single mothers who were
"matched" on socioeconomic status had incomes less than half that of married
couples in the sample. While these mothers may have had adequate incomes,
they certainly experienced more economic pressure than their married counter-
parts, and this pressure could underlie their short-term declines in parental
support and longer-term declines in parental control. Divorced mothers also
work longer hours than married mothers, which could adversely affect
supervision and control and, through depleting mothers' energy, maternal
support. 2 In several studies based on large-scale surveys, parental behaviors
account for some but not all of the association between parents' economic
resources and child well-being (Astone & McLanahan 1989; Dornbusch et al.
1987; McLeod & Shanahan 1993; Matsueda & Heimer 1987; Parcel & Menaghan
1990). One series of studies suggests that the strongest links between economic
resources and parenting are adverse effects of economic strain on fathers'
supportive behaviors (Elder, Nguyen & Caspi 1985; Elder et al. 1992; Lempers,
Clark-Lempers & Simons 1989).
Never-married mothers have had quite different experiences from previous-
ly married single mothers, but they are usually combined in analyses of family
structure effects. Similarly, maternal cohabitation has not been compared to
maternal remarriage as a source of child problems. Never-married mothers have
fewer economic resources than previously married mothers. On the other hand,
divorce or widowhood could have more disruptive effects on maternal support
and control than the experience of raising a child alone from birth. Hence, it is

not clear whether we should expect children whose mothers never married to
have poorer outcomes than children whose mothers are separated, divorced, or
widowed.
Economic differences between cohabiting and remarried couples may be
relatively low, and due primarily to the younger ages of cohabiting couples.
However, we would expect stepfathers to be more committed to stepchildren's
welfare than unmarried men are to their partner's children, and this distinction
suggests that children living with cohabiting mothers would have poorer
outcomes than those living with their mother and stepfather.
Using the same data we analyze below, Thomson, McLanahan and Curtin
(1992) found only small differences, if any, between never- and ever-married
single mothers in parental control, and provided evidence suggesting that
control problems were a function of the number of adults available to help with
child rearing rather than single mothers' parenting skills. Comparisons between
mother-stepfather and mother-partner families produced mixed results;
cohabiting couples reported higher or similar levels for some indicators of
parental support, and lower levels for other indicators, compared to remarried
couples. In addition, cohabiting couples reported lower levels of control (similar
to single-parent families) than did step- and original two-parent families. To the
extent that parental behaviors contribute to child well-being, these findings
suggest that effects of any economic differences between cohabiting and
remarried couples may be compensated for or exacerbated by differences in
parental behaviors. They also suggest that differences in parental control
between never- and ever-married mothers will be due entirely to differences in
economic resources.
Sample and Measures
The 1987-88 National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) provides new
data to investigate the economic and parental behavior explanations for family
structure effects on children (Sweet, Bumpass & Call 1988). The sample includes
a wider age range of children than is available in previous national samples,
and oversampling of single parents and cohabiting couples enables us to
distinguish between children living with never- vs. ever-married single mothers,
and children living with cohabiting vs. remarried mothers. Of the 13,017
randomly selected respondents, 5,666 reported a child or stepchild (including
children of cohabiting partners) younger than 19 living in the household. We
limited our analytic sample to families in which a randomly selected "focal
child" was between age 5 and 18. Parents whose children were all younger than
5 were asked fewer questions and different sets of questions about child rearing
and child outcomes than were parents of older children.
Family structure was determined by the relationship of each parent to
children younger than 19 in the household. (The National Survey of Families
and Households does not provide sufficient information to determine whether
all children 19 and older living elsewhere are children of both parents in a two-
parent household.) Original two-parent families are married-couple families in
which all children younger than 19 in the household were born to or adopted

by the couple. Mother-stepfather families are those in which only the husband
has stepchildren younger than 19 in the household (the couple may also have
a child together); mother-partner families were defined in a parallel manner,
except that the mother is cohabiting rather than married. Single mothers were
divided into ever- and never-married mothers. Small numbers of parents in
other family arrangements were excluded. The maximum analytic sample size
is 3,488.
Information on the focal child's well-being was provided by the primary
respondent — the single parent or randomly selected female or male parent in
married or cohabiting families. NSFH measured children's academic performance
differently for older and younger children. For adolescents (age 12-18), reports
were obtained of the child's usual grades, from "mostly F's" (0) to "mostly A's"
(4), with midpoint categories such as "mostly A's or B's" (3.5). For children
aged 5 to 11, parents reported instead the child's relative school performance,
ranging from "near the bottom of the class" (0) to "one of the best in the class"
(4). School behavior problems were measured for both age groups by a dicho-
tomous indicator, with a value of 1 if the child had dropped out of school or, in
the past year, had been suspended, expelled, or had experienced sufficient
behavior problems that the parent was asked to meet with a teacher. This
variable was coded 0 otherwise.
Parents were also asked to rate the child on ten behaviors, from "not at all
true" (1) to "often true" (3) during the past year. Based on a confirmatory factor
model in which these responses were treated as ordinal indicators (Muthén
1988), we constructed normalized factor scores for four behavioral dimensions. 3
Although each of the ten indicators was included in each scale, externalizing was
represented primarily by "loses temper easily" and "bullies or is cruel or mean
to others;" internalizing by responses to "fearful and anxious," "unhappy, sad,
or depressed;" sociability by "gets along with other children," "carries out
responsibilities on her/his own," and "always does what you ask;" and initiative
by "is willing to try new things," "keeps self busy," "is cheerful and happy."
Reliabilities for the four factor scores were not very high, estimated at .46, .35,
.57, and .46, respectively. Because most of the items in each factor score receive
minuscule weights, these reliabilities should be viewed as based on two or three
items, rather than ten. 4
Parental support was represented by frequency of activities with children.
Responses were obtained separately from mothers and fathers in self-
administered questionnaires and refer to "the children." Parents reported
weekly breakfasts, weekly dinners (0-7), frequency of three home activities
(playing or working on a project, reading or helping with homework, having
private talks) and frequency of outings with children (the last four items rated
on a scale from 1 = never or rarely, ... 6 = almost every day). Because home
activities might overlap considerably, we averaged those three responses and
then averaged the mean response with individual indicators of breakfasts,
dinners, and outings. Cronbach's alpha for the constructed scale is .71 for
mothers, .74 for fathers.
Parental control was measured by responses of the primary respondent
(randomly the mother or the father in two-parent families) in the main
interview, specific to the focal child. We computed an average score from three

indicators. The first measures the child's supervision at home: allowed alone at
home overnight, in the evening but not overnight, in the afternoon but not
evening or overnight, and none of these times, scored from 1 to 4. The second
indicator is a measure of television restrictions, scored with the same endpoints
(1 = no restrictions, 2.5 = restrictions on either programs or amount of time, and
4 = restrict both programs and time). Third, parents reported how consistently
the child was required to let parents know of her/his whereabouts away from
home, with four responses ranging from "hardly ever" to "all the time;" since
84% of parents reported "all the time," we dichotomized this response (1 = all
the time, 0 otherwise). The parental control summary scale therefore gives a
much smaller weight to the "inform whereabouts" response than to the more
variable supervision and television restriction measures. Its reliability was
estimated at .56; correlations with measures of maternal and paternal support
were .36 and .28, respectively. 5
We used the natural logarithm of household income and a dummy variable
to indicate the family's poverty status as measures of economic resources . 6 We
measured mother's employment hours per week with nonemployed mothers
coded at zero, and included a dummy variable for nonemployed mothers.
Parents' education and race/ethnicity were assumed exogenous to family
structure, economic resources, and parental support or control, as were
characteristics of the child and her/his sibship. Parent education was measured
in years completed (high school graduates = 12, college graduates = 16, etc.),
using the higher education reported for resident parents in two-parent families.
Race/ethnicity was measured as European American, African American, or
Mexican American if both parents reported the same identification or if only
one parent's race/ethnicity was known; other families were classified in a
residual race/ethnic category. In addition to the focal child's age (measured in
single years) and sex (male = 0, female = 1), we included sibship size (number
of children younger than 19 in the household) and sex composition (only boys,
boy/girl, only girls), and whether the focal child is the only or oldest sibling
(including step- and half siblings, and any siblings age 19 or older, in the
household or elsewhere). We also controlled for parents' age (older parent when
both parents' ages were known).
Considerable numbers of families with valid data on child well-being and
family structure would be lost to analysis if we excluded cases with any
nonresponses. The largest proportion of nonresponses are due to
nonparticipation of the primary respondent's spouse or partner, with smaller
but substantial proportions of responding parents who did not answer questions
on income and/or parental activities. Only a few primary respondents did not
provide valid responses for measures of parental control or exogenous variables.

We included these cases in our analysis by assigning predicted values for
income, mother's employment hours, and parent activities, from the least-
squares regression of valid responses on the set of exogenous variables and
family type. The poverty indicator was constructed from the predicted income
and the poverty line for each family (based on number and ages of members),
and assigned a value of 0 for the few families without complete data on
membership. Mother's nonemployment was predicted for nonrespondents from
the predicted employment hours. The few nonresponses on education and

parental control were assigned the mean with a dummy variable for mean
substitution in the regression equations.
Analyses and Results

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for child outcomes, economic resources,
and parental behaviors by family type. The data are weighted to adjust for
sampling probabilities, but the Ns refer to actual sample sizes.
As expected, children living with both biological or adoptive parents
(original parents) are advantaged on every outcome in comparison with
children living in other types of families. Children in mother-stepfather families
are not significantly different from children in original families on academic
performance, but they are disadvantaged in terms of social adjustment (behavior
problems and temperament).
Table 1 also shows that original families have considerably more income
and lower poverty rates than single-mother families, especially those headed by
never-married mothers. Mother-partner families are less economically secure
than mother-stepfather families, but still have much higher incomes and lower
poverty rates than single-mother households. Employment rates for mothers are
similar across families, except for the high proportion of never-married mothers
who are not employed. And, except for never-married mothers, mothers in
disrupted families work longer hours than those in original two-parent families.
Children in original families also receive more support from their mothers
and are subject to more parental controls than children in most other types of
families. Again, never-married mothers are different, reporting levels of support
similar to mothers in original families, and higher levels of parental control.
Both differences are due to the much lower employment levels of never-married
mothers, affording them greater opportunities to supervise their children. When
employment is controlled, both scores for these mothers are more similar to
those of ever-married single mothers. Paternal support is also highest for
children living with their original father, lowest for children living with
stepfathers.
In our analyses reported below, we first estimate models that treat child
well-being as a function of family structure and background characteristics
(sibship composition, child's age and sex, and parents' age, education and
ethnicity). The coefficients from these models serve as our baseline estimates of
the effect of family structure on child well-being. Next, we estimate models
adjusting separately for economic resources and parental behavior. By com-
TABLE 1: Economic Resources, Parental Behaviors, and Child Well-Being a
Original Mother- Mother- Single Mother

Parents Stepfather Partner Ever- Never-
Married Married
Academic performanceb
Child aged 5 to 11
Mean 3.09 2.92 2.50 `2.78 2.67
Std. dev. .89 .94 .92 1.08 .96
Child aged 12 to 18

Mean 2.98 2.86 2.64 2.74 2.75
Std. dev. .80 .88 .76 .82 .79
Behavior problems
Proportion .11 .19 .21 .23 .26
Externalizing`
Mean -.04 .07 .02 .07 .05
Std. dev. .46 .52 .54 .54 .51
Internalizing`
Mean -.04 .05 .04 .05 .01
Std. dev. .29 .32 .33 .34 .28
Sociability`
Mean .05 -.09 -.06 -.07 .01
Std. dev. .45 .50 .50 .55 .49
Initiative`
Mean .04 -.05 -.04 -.04 .02
Std. dev. .27 .30 .29 .33 .28
Annual income (In)
Mean 3.51 3.40 3.26 2.37 1.71
Std. dev. 1.43 1.31 .99 1.65 1.66
Proportion poor .11 .15 .18 .42 .77
Mother hours employed
Mean 23.12 26.18 26.15 27.53 20.22
Std. dev. 18.61 19.10 19.21 19.70 19.88
Prop. not employed .32 .30 .31 .30 .47
Maternal support
Mean 4.41 4.01 4.14 4.09 4.38
Std. dev. 1.27 1.26 1.19 1.38 1.34
Parental control
Mean 2.06 2.05 2.01 1.92 2.32
Std. dev. .74 .71 .67 .75 .66
Paternal support
Mean 3.77 3.28 3.52 - -
Std. dev. 1.24 1.34 1.37
Number of families 1,845 456 125 851 211
a Source: 1987-88 National Survey of Families and Households. Respondents with a child
aged 5 to 18 living in the household.
b
Scales range from 0 to 4.
` Scores constructed from weighted sum of ten Z scores.
paring the coefficients from these models to those in the baseline, we can judge
whether differences in economic resources and parental behavior account for
any of the association between family structure and child well-being. We also
compare coefficients in these models to those from a combined model to
determine whether parental behaviors mediate effects of economic strain.
The models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic
(for school behavior problems) regression. Before estimating the equations
presented below, we tested for interactions of child's gender with family
structure, economic resources, and parental behavior. We found no statistically

significant interactions of child's gender with family structure, and the pattern
of estimated regression coefficients was not consistent with hypothesized
stronger adverse effects of single-mother families for boys and stepfather
families for girls. Among the economic resource and parental behavior
indicators, only the interaction between child's gender and parental control
produced statistically significant increments in model fit and/or statistically
significant regression coefficients, and then only for externalizing and initiative.
The pattern of regression coefficients for all outcomes indicated that parental
control increased well-being only for girls. (Analyses available on request.) Since
none of the direct effects of family structure were changed by the inclusion of
interaction terms, we present results from additive models, combining data for
boys and girls.
Table 2 reports regression coefficients obtained from our baseline model.
Notice that most of the family structure differences shown in Table 1 are
statistically significant, even after controlling for background characteristics.
Children in stepfather families are similar to children from original families in
terms of academic performance, but they are worse off in terms of temperament
and behavior problems. Children in other types of disrupted families are
consistently worse off than children in original families, with one notable
exception. Adolescent children living with never-married mothers do not have
significantly lower grades than those living with two original parents. (Other
nonsignificant coefficients for disrupted family effects are much larger than their
standard errors and are in the hypothesized direction.) That is, all the difference
in grades between adolescents living with never-married mothers and those
with both original parents is due to family differences in exogenous control
variables, primarily the much lower educational attainments of never-married
mothers.
Children in stepfather families perform better academically and are less
likely to have school behavior problems than children in mother-partner
families, but they score higher on externalizing and internalizing, lower on
sociability. Children living with previously married mothers are also
advantaged on some outcomes over those whose mothers have never married,
but as noted above, these differences are not uniform across outcomes.
Tables 3, 4, and 5 present coefficients obtained from models that adjust for
economic resources and parental behavior, respectively. Table 3 reports results
for academic performance, Table 4 for school behavior and temperament
problems, and Table 5 for positive temperaments. The parental behavior models
include only measures of maternal support and parental control, so that single
mothers — for whom no resident fathering behaviors are defined — can be
TABLE 2: Baseline Models: Family Structure and Child Well-Being a
Academic Performance School

Child Child Behavior
Aged 5-11 Aged 12-18 Problems
Family
Original parents -

Mother-stepfather -.067 -.072 .655**
.076 .063 .156
Mother-partner -.395** -.335** .928**
-.121 .129 .252
Single mother
Ever-married -.162** -.173** .655**
-.063 .048 .124
Never-married -.233* -.098 .919**
.096 .111 .212
R2 .092** .096** -
L2 (vs. null) - - 231**
Valid cases 1,645 1,641 3,295
Externalizing Internalizing Sociability Initiative

Family
Original parents
Mother-stepfather .093** .069** -.135** -.080**

.027 .017 .027 .016
Mother-partner .045 .052 -.109* -.081**
.048 .029 .047 .028
Single mother
Ever-married .115** .080** -.095** -.057**
.021 .013 .021 .013
Never-married .138** .070** -.082** -.043
.039 .024 .039 .023
R2 .056** .050** .036** .048**

Valid cases 3,397 3,397 3,397 3,397
a All models include sibship characteristics, child's age and sex, parents' age, education,
race/ethnicity. OLS regression or logistic coefficients, standard errors below.
Source: 1987-88 National Survey of Families and Households, respondents with a child
aged 5-18 living in the household.
*p<.05 **p<.01
compared with two-parent families. 8 In subsequent analyses reported below, we

investigate effects of paternal support in two-parent families.
When we compare the coefficients for single mother families in Table 2
and 3, we see that low income and poverty account for a substantial portion of
the effect of family structure on children's academic performance . 8 The
coefficients for ever-married and never-married mothers in equation 2 (columns
1 and 3 in Table 3) are about 40% smaller than corresponding coefficients in
Table 2, and are no longer statistically different from 0. In contrast, the single-
mother coefficients for equation 3 (columns 2 and 4) do not change very much

when we adjust for differences in parental behavior.
Comparing coefficients for mother-partner families in Tables 2 and 3, we
find that neither economic resources nor parental behavior account for much of
the difference in children's school performance. The reduction in the coefficients
is less than 10% in both instances.
The results in Table 4 for school behavior problems, externalizing, and
internalizing are similar to those for academic performance. Because income
effects are somewhat weaker for this set of outcomes, economic resources
account for a smaller portion of family structure effects than for academic
performance. The only family effect somewhat reduced by parental behavior
differences is that of stepfather families, and the reductions are modest, 5% to
20%. Lower maternal support accounts for between 15% and 20% of the
difference in children's temperament between stepfather and original families.
The results for sociability and initiative in Table 5 are consistent with those
reported in the previous two tables. Income accounts for as much as 50% of the
difference between children in single-mother and original-parent families, and
for as much as 20% of the difference between children in mother-partner and
original-parent families. Parental behavior accounts for between 13% and 35%
of the disadvantage associated with living in a stepfather or mother-partner
family, and for virtually none of the disadvantage associated with living in a
single-mother family.
In summary, income plays a major role in accounting for the negative
consequences associated with single-mother families (up to 50%). Income does
not, however, explain why children in other two-parent families are more
disadvantaged than children in original families. In contrast to income, parental
behavior plays only a minor role in accounting for disadvantages associated
with disrupted families, and its role is limited to children in mother-stepfather
and mother-partner families.
In our combined models (not presented here), effects of economic resources,
maternal support and parental control were virtually identical to those found in
the separate models, and the changes in family structure effects were
approximately the sum of changes associated with each set of variables. This is
due primarily to the absence of economic resource effects on parental behaviors.
The only significant effects we found were negative effects of mother's
employment on maternal support, but mother's employment had no significant
direct (controlling for income) effects on child outcomes, nor were any positive
effects suppressed by a negative pathway through maternal support. Of course,
the absence of income effects is due in part to the fact that effects of income/
poverty are net of education and in part to the offsetting effects of mother's
TABLE 3: Economic Resources and Parental Behavior Models: Academic

Performance'
Child Aged 5-11 Child Aged 12-18
Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 2 Eq. 3
Original parents - -

Mother-stepfather -.059 -.061 -.065 -.053
.076 .076 .063 .063
Mother-partner -.365** -373** -.313* -.302*
.122 .121 .130 .129
Single mother
Ever-married -.101 -.160** -.104 -.167**
.069 .063 .053 .048
Never-married -.143 -.222* -.031 -.091
.103 .096 .115 .111
Income (ln) .025 - .053*
.024 .022
Poor -.093 - -.021
.072 .067
Mother's employment
Hours/work -.002 - -.002
.002 .002
Not employed -.102 - .002 -
.104 .089
Maternal support - .016 - .061**
.022 .017
Parental control - .088 - .000
.057 .038
R2 .092** .095** .102** .103**

Valid cases 1,645 1,645 1,641 1,641
a All models include sibship characteristics, child's age and sex, parents' age, educa-
tion, race/ethnicity. OLS regression coefficients, standard errors below.
Source: 1987-88 National Survey of Families and Households. Respondents with a
child age 5-18 living in the household.
*p<.05 **p<.01
TABLE 4: Economic Resources and Parental Behavior Models: Problem

Behavior and Temperaments a
Behavior Problems Externalizing Internalizing

Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 2 Eq. 3
Original parents - - - -

Mother-stepfather .633** .620** .090** .074** .069** .059**
.156 .157 .027 .027 .017 .016
Mother-partner .868** .877** .028 .017 .049 .036

.255 .254 .048 .048 .030 .029
Single mother
Ever-married .520** .646** .099** .109** .075** .076**
.135 .125 .024 .021 .014 .013
Never-married .801** .906** .117** .131** .062* .066**

.224 .212 .042 .039 .026 .024
Income (1n) -.055 - .008 - -.001

.049 .009 .006
Poor .121 - .066** - .014

.155 .027 .017
Mother's employment
Hours/work .012* - .001 - -.000
.006 .001 .001
Not employed .184 - -.016 - -.012

.234 .037 .023
Maternal support - -.129** - -.055** - -.029**

.043 .007 .004
Parental control - .125 - -.010 - -.010

.103 .017 .011
R2 - - .058** .072** .051** .063**
L 2 (vs. null) 240** 246** - - - -
Valid cases 3,295 3,295 3,397 3,397 3,397 3,397
a All models include sibship characteristics, child's age and sex, parents' age, education,
race/ethnicity. OLS or logistic regression coefficients, standard errors below.
Source: 1987-88 National Survey of Families and Households. Respondents with a child
aged 5 to 18 living in the household.
*p<.05 **p<.01
TABLE 5: Economic Resources and Parental Behavior Models: Positive Child

Temperament'
Sociability Initiative
Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 2 Eq. 3
Original parents

Mother-stepfather - .131 ** -.117* - .077** - .069**
.027 .026 .016 .016
Mother-partner -.086 -.084 -.070* -.053*

.047 .047 .028 .028
Single mother
Ever-married -.062** -.089** -.036** -.053*
.023 .021 .014 .012
Never-married -.037 -.078* -.018 -.040

.042 .039 .024 .023
Income (In) .002 - .007

.009 .005
Poor -.086** - -.034*

.027 .016
Mother's employment
Hours/work -.001 - -.001
.001 .001
Not employed .001 - -.009

.037 .022
Maternal support - .058** - .031**

.007 .004
Parental control - .002 - .004

.017 .010
R2 .041** .054** .052** .063**

Valid cases 3,397 3,397 3,397 3,397
aAll models include sibship characteristics, child's age and sex, parents' age, educa-
tion, race/ethnicity. OLS regression coefficients, standard errors below.
Source: 1987-88 National Survey of Families and Households. Respondents with a
child aged 5 to 18 living in the household.
*p<.05 **p<.01
employment. 10 Where income or poverty had significant effects on child

outcomes, we found no change in those effects when maternal support and
parental control were included in the model.
Paternal Support
What is obviously missing from the models presented above is the role of
paternal support, which differs in original, mother-stepfather, and mother-
partner families (Thomson, McLanahan & Curtin 1992). We therefore re-

estimated the models presented above for two-parent families (original, step,
and cohabiting), adding measures of paternal support to the parental behavior
models. Although father and mother support are positively correlated (r = .36),
father support improved the fit of the combined model (economic resources
plus maternal support and parental control) for all outcomes, except sociability
and initiative. As a result, the patterns reported above were strengthened.
To illustrate effects of paternal support, Table 6 presents results for
academic performance and school behavior problems. Similar results were
found for positive and negative temperaments. Two models are presented. The
first combines economic resources, maternal support, and parental control.
Although single mothers are excluded from this analysis, the coefficients are
similar to the combined set of coefficients presented in Tables 3 (for academic
performance) and 4 (school behavior problems)." The second model adds the
measure of paternal support.
Because cohabiting male partners report levels of paternal support closest
to that of original fathers, and because stepfathers report the lowest levels,
paternal support accounts for more of the performance and behavior difference
for children living with stepfathers than it does for children living with
cohabiting male partners (equation 5 vs. equation 4). As expected from the
positive association between maternal and paternal support, effects of maternal
support are also slightly reduced when paternal support is added to the model.
Although paternal support significantly increases the proportion of variance
accounted for by parental behaviors, the direct effects of family structure remain
at more than 85% of original strength. Therefore, paternal support does not alter
our previous conclusion that the parental behavior explanation for family
structure differences receives only weak support.
Although previous research suggests that paternal support is most strongly
affected by economic strain, we did not find that paternal support mediated
effects of economic resources on children. Among two-parent families, the
combination of income and the poverty status indicator had statistically
significant effects on paternal support. The linear term was positive, but poverty
status also had a positive coefficient, indicating that poor fathers had higher
scores than would be predicted by household income alone. Effects of economic
resources on child outcomes were not, however, reduced when paternal support
was included
TABLE 6: Paternal and Maternal Support Models'
Academic Performance School

Behavior
Child Aged 5-11 Child Aged 12-18 Problems
Eq. 4 Eq. 5 Eq. 4 Eq. 5 Eq. 4 Eq. 5
Original parents

Mother-stepfather -.054 -.042 -.065 -.033 .591** .529**
.074 .073 .064 .066 .162 .165
Mother-partner -355** -.346** -.342** -333** .798** .769**

.120 .119 .131 .131 .271 .271
Income (ln) .034 .032 .063* .063* -.027 -.021

.026 .026 .030 .030 .071 .071
Poor -.081 -.087 .141 .142 .011 .032

.087 .087 .098 .098 .233 .234
Mother's employment
Hours/work -.005 -.005* -.002 -.002 .013 .013
.003 .003 .003 .003 .007 .007
Not employed -.157 -.165 -.001 -.003 .041 .054

.103 .103 .101 .101 .282 .282
Maternal support .039 .030 .069** .054* -.131* -.098

.025 .026 .022 .023 .060 .062
Parental control .070 .055 -.051 -.052 .162 .171

.066 .066 .047 .047 .137 .138
Paternal support - .071** - .051* - -.140*

.025 .023 .065
R2 .098** .104** .111** .115** - -
L2 (vs. null) 199** 204**
Valid cases 1,167 1,167 1,112 1,112 2,287 2,287
a All models include sibship characteristics, child's age and sex, parents' age, educa-
tion, race/ethnicity. OLS or logistic regression coefficients, standard errors below.
Source: 1987-88 National Survey of Families and Households, married or cohabiting
respondents with a child aged 5 to 18 living in the household.
*p<.05 **p<.01
Discussion and Conclusions
Our analyses confirm much previous research showing that economic dis-
advantages of single-mother families account for much of disadvantages of
children from these households. This is particularly true for academic perfor-
mance, somewhat less so for problem behaviors and temperaments. Although
never-married single mothers have substantially fewer economic resources than
previously married single mothers, both types of families are similar in the

extent to which economic disadvantage accounts for poorer child outcomes. We
have also demonstrated that a similar, though weaker, process operates to
explain disadvantages found for children living with their mother and her
cohabiting male partner, since those families are also at an economic dis-
advantage compared to married couple families.
Parental behaviors are weakly but consistently implicated in problems
experienced by children living with their stepfathers or mother's cohabiting
partner. Lower levels of maternal as well as paternal support in these families,
compared to original two-parent families, appear to contribute to problem
behaviors and less engaging temperaments. Children in mother-stepfather
families experience no disadvantages, however, in terms of academic perfor-
mance. It's particularly noteworthy that cohabiting and remarried mothers, as
well as their male partners, report lower levels of support than original parents
living together. This could be due to competition of the relatively newer
marital/cohabiting relationship for time and attention that would otherwise be
devoted to the parent-child relationship.
Although ever- and never-married single mothers shared much in common,
we found some differences, the most striking of which are that never-married
mothers have very low levels of education (average less than high school
graduate), high rates of nonemployment, and low number of hours worked.
While nonemployment translates into higher maternal support and control, lack
of education has opposing effects on children. As a result, outcomes were quite
similar for children living with never- and ever-married mothers.
We expected that mother-partner families would fall somewhere in between
single-mother and mother-stepfather families on economic resources, parental
behaviors, and child outcomes, but did not find such consistent patterns.
Mother-partner families reported lower levels of economic resources but higher
levels of parental support than mother-stepfather families; both differences are
consistent with the fact that mother and cohabitants are typically younger than
their married counterparts. Children living with cohabiting mothers had the
lowest academic ratings and highest school behavior problems, a ranking that
persisted after economic resource and parental behavior differences were
controlled. And children's temperament scores were similar to those of children
in other disrupted families. In spite of double-sampling, the number of mother-
partner families was relatively small compared to other family types, so that
some of these "inconsistencies" may be due more to sampling error than to real
effects of maternal cohabitation.
We are also mindful of the fact that many of our measures were not very
reliable, and that measurement error is likely to have attenuated estimates of
structural parameters. For example, the fact that parental behaviors did not
account for as much of the stepfamily or cohabiting family effect as did
economic resources for single mother effects could be due to greater precision
in measuring income than in measuring parental support or control. This could
also account for the fact that we did not find positive effects of income on
parental support, particularly paternal support, and that parental behaviors did
not mediate any economic resource effects. On the other hand, measures of

parental support and control were consistently significantly associated with
education, race/ethnicity, and sibship characteristics in expected ways, and
parental support had positive effects on child outcomes. Even the parental
control measure, having a relatively low reliability, had significant positive
effects for female children. Some of the differences between our results and
those reported by others may be due to differences in specification of the
income effect (e.g., poverty or income alone rather than in combination; with or
without controls for education), or differences in ages of children and sample
selection. Since evidence on parental behavior responses to economic strain is
limited, we are reluctant on the basis of our measures and results to conclude
that economic resources and parental behaviors are not linked in their effects on
child well-being.
Our analysis has, of course, excluded an additional source of parental
support and control, the nonresident father. Even though involvement of
nonresident fathers is typically low, and even though little evidence has been
found for positive effects of such involvement (e.g., Furstenberg et al. 1983;
Furstenberg, Morgan & Allison 1987; King 1994; Mott 1990; Seltzer 1991), we
could be missing part of the parental behavior effect. If nonresident father
involvement had positive effects on children, we would expect differences
between disrupted and original families to be slightly attenuated. Since parental
remarriage (and perhaps parental cohabitation) is associated with lower levels
of nonresident parent contact, the largest effect of nonresident father support
might be expected for single-mother families. And for those families, we already
included some of the nonresident father effect by controlling for family income
(which includes child support). It is also possible that nonresident parent
involvement exacerbates conflicts between the resident and nonresident parents
(Giles-Sims 1987; Maccoby, Depner & Mnookin 1990) and could increase the gap
between children in disrupted vs. intact families.
We find it particularly interesting that there are no significant differences in
academic performance between mother-stepfather and original two-parent
families, but that children in the former families exhibit more problematic
behaviors and temperament. These are also the only differences accounted for
to any degree by parental support and control. Stepfamily relationships may be
ambiguous and are therefore inherently more awkward than taken-for-granted
original family relationships. This disadvantage may not have strong effects on
later-life attainments so long as children perform well in school. On the other
hand, school behavior problems and less attractive temperaments may have
longer-term effects on the child's ability to form close relationships, and may
therefore be precursors of problem marital and parental relationships in
adulthood. Overall, the circumstances of single mothers appear to transmit

primarily economic inequality, while those of mother-stepfather families may
transmit inequalities in the emotional quality of adult life.
Notes
1. Debate continues over causal connections between family structure and child well-being.
Some analyses suggest that the true source of disadvantage is parental conflict, rather than
divorce, separation, or stepfamily formation. Whether specified as a cause or consequence of

family disruption and resulting structure, conflict may be considered exogenous to parental
behaviors or economic resources associated with different family types, so its exclusion from
our models does not compromise tests of the two explanations. We investigated a related issue,
whether time since divorce or remarriage moderated effects of single motherhood or
stepfather/male partner presence on parenting behaviors or child outcomes. Consistent with
results reported by Thomson and her colleagues (1992), no effects of time were found on
parenting behavior or on child outcomes.
2. Sanik and Mauldin (1986) reported that employment per se did not reduce single mothers'
time with children compared to married mothers, but they did not investigate effects of
employment hours.
3. Factor scores were computed by summing the products of the estimated factor weights and
the normal score corresponding to the cumulative probability of each ordered response
category (1, 2, 3). Computations are available on request.
4. Estimated reliabilities for scales based only on the primary items, whether using the original
scoring or the Z score values, were very similar to those for scales based on the ten weighted
scores.
5. Exhaustive measurement analyses using a few additional indicators in the NSFH failed to
produce a measure of parental control with higher reliabilities or stronger associations with
exogenous control variables or parental support. We also estimated our models with the three
individual indicators, with virtually no change in the estimated effects of family structure,
economic resources, or parental support.
6. We also tested categorical measures of income and a linear plus quadratic term, but
produced no better fit than with the natural logarithm. Preliminary analyses also included
measures of parents' wealth (home equity, value of stocks and other financial capital), but these
indicators were very strongly associated with income, and did not add any explained variance
in child outcomes, beyond that accounted for by income.
7. Another predominant characteristics of never-married mothers is that most are African
American. This may also be a small factor in adolescents' grades, since net of education, the
regression coefficient for African American parents was positive, as were coefficients for
parents in other minority groups.
8. NSFH questions on nonresident fathers were different from those asked of resident fathers,
stepfathers or cohabiting male partners. In this analysis, we do not attempt to compare the two
types of fathering behaviors.
9. The fact that individual regression coefficients for economic resources are not statistically
significant is due in part to the fact that the total effects of income and mother's employment
are represented by pairs of parameters, and in part to the offsetting effects of maternal
employment (increasing income while decreasing time).
10.When we estimated models without maternal employment or education, we found that
poverty was significantly positively associated with parental support and control; but the effect
reversed or became nonsignificant when maternal employment hours were controlled. We also
tested interactions between effects of family structure and income/poverty on parental support
and control, and on child outcomes; statistically significant interactions were found for
adolescent grades and for undercontrol. But both interactions were based on differences
between a very small number of nonpoor never-married single mothers and poor never-
married single mothers. Since including the interaction terms did not change the conclusions
we draw below and would complicate interpretation of regression coefficients, we do not

include these interactions in models presented.
11. An exception is the effect of maternal cohabitation on adolescent grades. When single
mothers are not included in the analysis, the comparison between children living with mother
and partner and children living with both original parents becomes more negative. But the
pattern of change in coefficients when economic resources, maternal support, and parental
control are included in the models is the same as that observed in the full analysis.
References

Amato, Paul R. 1987. "Family Processes in One-Parent, Stepparent, and Intact Families: The
Child's Point of View." Journal of Marriage and the Family 49:327-37.
Amato, Paul R., and Bruce Keith. 1991. "Parental Divorce and the Well-Being of Children: A
Meta-Analysis." Psychological Bulletin 110:26-46.
Astone, Nan Marie, and Sara S. McLanahan. 1989. "Family Structure and High School
Completion: The Role of Parental Practices." Discussion Paper 905-89, Institute for
Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin.
. 1991. "Family Structure, Parental Practices, and High School Completion." American
Sociological Review 56:309-20.
Bane, Mary Jo. 1986. "Household Composition and Poverty." Pp. 209-31 in Fighting Poverty,
edited by Sheldon Danziger and Daniel Weinberg. Harvard University Press.
Baumrind, Diana. 1966. "Effects of Authoritative Parental Control on Child Behavior." Child
Development 37:887-907.
Bronfenbrenner, Urie. 1990. "Discovering What Families Do." Pp. 27-38 in Rebuilding the Nest:
A New Commitment to the American Family, edited by David Blankenhorn, Steven Bayme,
and Jean Bethke Elshtain. Milwaukee: Family Service America.
Chase-Lansdale, Lindsay, and E. Mavis Hetherington. 1989. "The Impact of Divorce on Life-
Span Development: Short and Long-Term Effects." Pp. 105-50 in Life Span Development and
Behavior. Vol. 10, edited by Paul B. Baltes, David Featherman, and Richard M. Lerner.
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Cherlin, Andrew J., Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, Kathleen E. Kiernan,
Philip K. Robins, Donna Ruane Morrison, and Julien O. Teitler. 1991. "Longitudinal
Studies of Effects of Divorce on Children in Great Britain and the United States." Science
252:1386-89.
Coleman, James S. 1988. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." American Journal
of Sociology 94:595-S120.
Demo, David H. and Alan C. Acock. 1988. "The Impact of Divorce on Children." Journal of
Marriage and the Family 50:619-48.
Dombusch, Sanford M., J. Merrill Carlsmith, Steven J. Bushwall, Philip L. Ritter, Herbert
Leiderman, Albert H. Hastorf, and Ruth T. Gross. 1985. "Single Parents, Extended
Households, and the Control of Adolescents." Child Development 56:326-41.
Dombusch, Sanford M., Philip L. Ritter, P. Herbert Leiderman, Donald F. Roberts, and Michael
J. Fraleigh. 1987. "The Relation of Parenting Style to Adolescent School Performance."
Child Development 58:1233-57.
Duncan, Greg J., and Saul D. Hoffman. 1985. "Economic Consequences of Marital Instability."
Pp. 427-67 in Horizontal Equity, Uncertainty, and Economic Well-Being, edited by Martin
David and Tim Smeeding. University of Chicago Press.
Elder, Glen H., Jr., Tri Van Nguyen, and Avshalom Caspi. 1985. "Linking Family Hardship to
Children's Lives." Child Development 56:361-75.
Elder, Glen H., Jr., Rand D. Conger, E. Michael Foster, and Monika Ardelt. 1992. "Families
Under Economic Pressure." Journal of Family Issues 13:5-37.
Emery, Robert E. 1988. Marriage, Divorce, and Children's Adjustment. Sage.

Furstenberg, Frank F., Jr., and Christine W. Nord. 1985. "Parenting Apart: Patterns of
Childrearing after Marital Dissolution." Journal of Marriage and the Family 47:893-904.
Furstenberg, Frank F., Jr., S. Philip Morgan, and Paul D. Allison. 1987. "Paternal Participation
and Children's Well-Being after Marital Dissolution." American Sociological Review 52:695-
701.
Furstenberg, Frank F., Jr., James L. Peterson, Christine Winquist Nord, and Nicholas Zill. 1983.
"The Life Course of Children of Divorce: Marital Disruption and Parental Contact."
American Sociological Review 48:656-68.
Giles-Sims, jean. 1987. "Parental Role Sharing between Remarrieds and Ex-spouses." Youth and

Society 19:134-50.
Hetherington, E. Mavis. 1987. "Family Relations Six Years after Divorce." Pp. 185-205 in
Remarriage and Stepparenting: Current Research and Theory, edited by Kay Pasley and
Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman. Guilford Press.
Hetherington, E. Mavis, and W. Glenn Clingempeel. 1992. Coping with Marital Transitions.
Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development. Serial no. 227, vol. 57,
nos. 2-3.
Hetherington, E. Mavis, Martha Cox, and Roger Cox. 1982. "Effects of Divorce on Parents and
Children." Pp. 233-85 in Nontraditional Families: Parenting and Child Development, edited by
Michael E. Lamb. Lawrence Eribaum.
Hill, Martha S. 1992. "The Role of Economic Resources and Remarriage in Financial Assistance
for Children of Divorce." Journal of Family Issues 13:156-78.
Hogan, Dennis P., and Evelyn M. Kitagawa. 1985. "The Impact of Social Status, Family
Structure, and Neighborhood on the Fertility of Black Adolescents." American Journal of
Sociology 90:825-55.
Holden, Karen C., and Pamela J. Smock. 1991. "The Economic Costs of Marital Dissolution:
Why Do Women Bear a Disproportionate Cost?" Annual Review of Sociology 17:51-78.
King, Valarie. 1994. "Nonresident Father Involvement and Child Well-Being: Can Dads Make
a Difference?" Journal of Family Issues 15:78-96.
Lempers, Jacques D., Dania Clark-Lempers, and Ronald L. Simons. 1989. "Economic Hardship,
Parenting, and Distress in Adolescence." Child Development 60:25-39.
Maccoby, Eleanor E., and John A. Martin. 1983. "Socialization in the Context of the Family:
Parent-Child Interaction." Pp. 1-101 in Handbook of Child Psychology. 4th ed. Vol. 4, edited
by E. Mavis Hetherington. Wiley.
Maccoby, Eleanor E., Charlene E. Depner, and Robert H. Mnookin. 1990. "Coparenting in the
Second Year after Divorce." Journal of Marriage and the Family 52:141-55.
Matsueda, Ross L., and Karen Heimer. 1987. "Race, Family Structure and Delinquency: A Test
of Differential Association and Social Control Theories." American Sociological Review
52:826-40.
McLanahan, Sara S. 1985. "Family Structure and the Reproduction of Poverty." American Journal
of Sociology 90:873-901.
McLanahan, Sara S., and Karen Booth. 1989. "Mother-Only Families: Problems, Prospects, and
Politics." Journal of Marriage and the Family 51:557-80.
McLeod, Jane D., and Michael J. Shanahan. 1993. "Poverty, Parenting, and Children's Mental
Health." American Sociological Review 58:351-66.
Morgan, William R., Duane F. Alwin, and Larry J. Griffin. 1979. "Social Origins, Parental
Values, and the Transmission of Inequality." American Journal of Sociology 85:156-66.
Morrison, Donna Ruane, and Andrew J. Cherlin. 1992. "The Divorce Process and Young
Children's Well-Being: A Prospective Analysis." Paper presented at the annual meeting of
the Population Association of America, Denver, 30 April - 2 May.
Mott, Frank L. 1990. "When is a Father Really Gone: Paternal-Child Contact in Father-Absent
Homes." Demography 27:499-517.
Mott, Frank L., and Elizabeth G. Menaghan. 1993. "Linkages between Early Childhood Family
Structure, Socio-Economic Well-Being, and Middle-Childhood Socio-Emotional Develop-
ment." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America,
Cincinnati, 1-3 April.
Muthén, Bengt 0.1988. LISCOMP: Analysis of Linear Structural Equations with a Comprehensive
Measurement Model. 2d ed. Mooresville, Indiana: Scientific Software.
Parcel, Toby L., and Elizabeth G. Menaghan. 1990. "Maternal Working Conditions and
Children's Verbal Facility: Studying the Intergenerational Transmission of Inequality from

Mothers to Young Children." Social Psychology Quarterly 53:132-47.
Peterson, James L., and Nicholas Zill. 1986. "Marital Disruption, Parent-Child Relationships,
and Behavioral Problems in Children." Journal of Marriage and the Family 48:295-307.
Sandefur, Gary D., Sara S. McLanahan, and Roger A. Wojtkiewicz. 1992. "The Effects of
Parental Marital Status during Adolescence on High School Graduation." Social Forces
71:103-21.
Sanik, Margaret M., and Teresa Mauldin. 1986. "Single versus Two Parent Families: A
Comparison of Mother's Time." Family Relations 35:53-6.
Seltzer, Judith A. 1991. "Relationships between Fathers and Children Who Live Apart: The
Father's Role after Separation." Journal of Marriage and the Family 53:79-101.
Smock, Pamela J. 1992. "The Economic Costs of Marital Disruption for Young Women in the
United States: Have They Declined over the Past Two Decades?" Discussion Paper 984-92,
Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Sweet, James, Larry Bumpass, and Vaughn Call. 1988. "The Design and Content of the
National Survey of Families and Households." NSFH Working Paper no. 1, Center for
Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Thomson, Elizabeth, Sara S. McLanahan, and Roberta Braun Curtin. 1992. "Family Structure
and Parental Socialization." Journal of Marriage and the Family 54:368-78.
Whitbeck, Les B., Ronald L. Simons, Rand D. Conger, Frederick 0. Lorenz, Shirley Huck, and
Glen H. Elder, Jr. 1991. "Family Economic Hardship, Parental Support, and Adolescent
Self-Esteem." Social Psychology Quarterly 54:353-63.

Thomson1994 - Family Structure and Child Well-Being-Economic Resources vs. Parental

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Thomson1994 - Family Structure and Child Well-Being-Economic Resources vs. Parental

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Family Structure and Child Well-Being:

Economic Resources vs. Parental Behaviors*

ELIZABETH THOMSON, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

nationally representative sample of families with children to answer three

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

in economic resources account for changes in child well-being associated with

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

Sample and Measures

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

provide valid responses for measures of parental control or exogenous variables.

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

Analyses and Results

TABLE 1: Economic Resources, Parental Behaviors, and Child Well-Being a

Original Mother- Mother- Single Mother

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

TABLE 2: Baseline Models: Family Structure and Child Well-Being a

Academic Performance School

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

Externalizing Internalizing Sociability Initiative

Mother-stepfather .093** .069** -.135** -.080**

R2 .056** .050** .036** .048**

compared with two-parent families. 8 In subsequent analyses reported below, we

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

TABLE 3: Economic Resources and Parental Behavior Models: Academic

Child Aged 5-11 Child Aged 12-18

Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 2 Eq. 3

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

R2 .092** .095** .102** .103**

TABLE 4: Economic Resources and Parental Behavior Models: Problem

Behavior Problems Externalizing Internalizing

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

Mother-partner .868** .877** .028 .017 .049 .036

Never-married .801** .906** .117** .131** .062* .066**

Income (1n) -.055 - .008 - -.001

Poor .121 - .066** - .014

Not employed .184 - -.016 - -.012

Maternal support - -.129** - -.055** - -.029**

Parental control - .125 - -.010 - -.010

TABLE 5: Economic Resources and Parental Behavior Models: Positive Child

Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 2 Eq. 3

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

Mother-partner -.086 -.084 -.070* -.053*

Never-married -.037 -.078* -.018 -.040

Income (In) .002 - .007

Poor -.086** - -.034*

Not employed .001 - -.009

Maternal support - .058** - .031**

Parental control - .002 - .004

R2 .041** .054** .052** .063**

employment. 10 Where income or poverty had significant effects on child

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

TABLE 6: Paternal and Maternal Support Models'

Academic Performance School

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/73/1/221/2233111 by guest on 05 April 2021

Mother-partner -355** -.346** -.342** -333** .798** .769**

Income (ln) .034 .032 .063* .063* -.027 -.021

Poor -.081 -.087 .141 .142 .011 .032

Not employed -.157 -.165 -.001 -.003 .041 .054

Maternal support .039 .030 .069** .054* -.131* -.098

Mother-stepfather .093 .069 -.135 -.080

R2 .056 .050 .036 .048

R2 .092 .095 .102 .103

Mother-partner .868 .877 .028 .017 .049 .036

Never-married .801 .906 .117 .131 .062* .066**

Maternal support - -.129 - -.055 - -.029**

Maternal support - .058 - .031

R2 .041 .054 .052 .063

Mother-partner -355 -.346 -.342 -333 .798 .769

R2 .098 .104 .111 .115 - -

L2 (vs. null) 199 204