IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY

INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
A. M. No. 491
October  6, 1989

FACTS: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention
Center, the newly-elected officers were set to take their oath of office on July
4,1989 before the Supreme Court en banc. However, disturbed by the
widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who
had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments
published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering
and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office
of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce,
and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious
intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were
done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities, the Supreme
Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar,
resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into
the veracity of the reports. Media reports done by Mr.Jurado, Mr. Mauricio and
Mr. Locsin in the newspapers opened the avenue for investigation on the
anomalies in the IBP Elections. The following violations are, Prohibited
campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive
vice-president, the officers or candidates for the House of Delegates and Board
of Governors, Use of PNB plane in the campaign, Giving free transportation to
out-of-town delegates and alternates, Formation of tickets and single slates,
Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, and entertainment to delegates,
Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon, Paying the dues or other
indebtedness of any member (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws), Distribution of materials
other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec.
14[a], IBP By-Laws), Causing distribution of such statement to be done by
persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec.
14[b], IBP By-Laws) and Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote,
or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws). The prohibited
acts are against the IBP By-Laws more specifically Article I, Section 4 of the IBP
By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Sec. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections and
Section 12[d] of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above
rules: Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the
prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 [Prohibited Acts and Practices
Relative to Elections) of the By-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for
the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without
prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the
By-laws of the Integrated Bar.

ISSUE: Is the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar
conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated
Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-
political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.

DECISION: It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in
the 1987 Constitution [See. 8, Art. VIII] providing for a Judicial and Bar Council
composed of seven [7] members among whom is "a representative of the
Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the
position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The
much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might
have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. The decision are:
1.  The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
2.  The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of
Delegates [approved by this Court in its Resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter
No. 287] of the following national officers:
 
[a]  the officers of the House of Delegates;
[b] the IBP president; and
[c]  the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-
Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President
elected by the Board of Governors [composed of the governors of the nine (9)
IBP regions] from among themselves [as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original
IBP By-Laws] should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the
Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year
term [which was abolished by this Court's Resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287] should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall
automatically succeed to the office of President. The incoming Board of
Governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves.
The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine [9] IBP
regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive
Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency
among the nine [9] regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation
shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors
from among nine [9] regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation
basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective
regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of
Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board.

5. Section 33[b], Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:

[b] The President and Executive Vice-President of the IBP shall be the Chairman
and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary,
Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the House of Delegates.'

6. Section 33[g] of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-

Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of
Delegates, is hereby repealed.

7. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 37. Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine [9] Governors from
the nine [9] regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one [1] Governor for each region to be elected by the
members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of
Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region.

8. Section 39, Article V, is hereby amended as follows:

Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one [1] month
before the national convention. -  The delegates from each region shall elect the
Governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be
rotated among the chapters in the region.
9. Section33 [a], Article V, is hereby amended by adding the following provision
as part of the first paragraph:

No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be

held prior to any election in an election year.

11. Section 39 [a], [b], [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], and [7] of Article VI should be, as
they are hereby, deleted. All other provisions of the By-Laws, including its
amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 [Bar Matter
No. 287] that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.

12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine [9] IBP
regions within three [3] months, after the promulgation of the Court's Resolution
in this case. Within thirty [30] days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet
at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves, the IBP
National President and Executive Vice-President. In these special elections, the
candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989,
particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of
Tickets and Single Slates", as well as those identified in this Resolution as
connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible
and may not present themselves as candidates for any position.

13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker Board shall be appointed by the
Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the
dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such
further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

In the matter of the brewing controversies in the

election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, December 14, 2010, EN BANC,
CORONA, C.J.
FACTS:
A. M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC originated from three (3) separate Protests
filed regarding the elections for the Regional Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for the Greater Manila Region (hereafter, GMR), Western Visayas, and
Western Mindanao held in April 2007 for a term of two (2) years starting July 1, 2007.

The GMR Election Protest (Atty. Elpidio Soriano v. Atty. Manuel M. Maramba)
Atty. Victoria Loanzon, Treasurer of the IBPQuezon City Chapter (IBP-QC Chapter)
requested the office of the IBP President Atty. Feliciano Bautista, seeking an
interpretation of Section 8 on the Chapter ByLaws of Article IV and Sec. 31, Article V of
the IBP By
Laws in reference to the qualification of the delegates who would vote in the election for
GMR Governor on April 25, 2009. Through Resolution No. XVIII-2009, the Board
of Governors headed by Atty. Bautista, held that “the additional delegate(s) shall be
elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter only from among the remaining duly
elected officers and members of the Board.” Believing that the resolution imposed an
additional qualification for the Delegates to be elected by the Board of Officers of IBP
Chapters that are entitled to more than two (2) delegates the QC chapter requested the
recall of Resolution No. XVIII-2009. On April 23, 2009, five (5) members of the Board
of Governors headed by Exec. V.P. Rogelio Vinluan recalled the said resolution and
resolved further that the election of the additional delegate(s) for Chapters entitled to
more than two (2) delegates shall be elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter from
among the general membership who are in good standing. The IBP-QC chapter then
nominated Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano III as
candidate for the position of Governor for the Greater Manila Region (GMR). At the
same time, the chapter elected its Delegates for the election of the IBP Governor for
GMR to be held on April 25, 2009. On April 25, 2009, GMR Governor Magsino,
acknowledged the Resolution No. XVIII-2009 and declared declared Atty. Loanzon and
Atty. Laqui as
Delegates of the IBP-QC Chapter, entitled to vote in the election of the GMR Governor.
Although his declaration was challenged, Gov. Magsino defended that the resolution of
Vinluan was void since there was no Quorum during the special meeting. Thereafter, the
elections were held. Atty. Soriano and Atty. Maramba were nominated for the position of
IBP Governor for GMR. After the casting of votes and counting of ballots, including
those cast by Loanzon and Laqui (the alleged non-delegates), Atty. Maramba was
declared winner by garnering a vote of 13 as against Atty. Soriano's 12

The Western Mindanao Region Election Protest (Atty. Benjamin B. Lanto v. Atty.
Nasser Marohomsalic)
During the April 25, 2009 meeting for the nomination/election of the candidates for the
Regional Governor of Western Mindanao, Atty. Lanto, from IBPLanao del Sur Chapter,
informed the delegates that the Board of Officers of his Chapter--through a resolution
signed by all its officers except for Chapter President Atty. Macalawi--officially
nominated Lanto for Regional Governor of Western Mindanao. Despite said resolution,
Macalawi nominated Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic for Regional Governor of Western
Mindanao. The
nomination of Marohomsalic was recognized and accepted by the presiding officer,
outgoing Gov. Carlos L. Valdez Jr. Lanto and Marohomsalic each received five (5) votes
after the votes were counted. On April 27, 2009, Lanto filed a Protest questioning
Marohomsalic's nomination and the counting of votes in his favor and claiming that
under Section 6, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, only one nominee shall come from
any IBP chapter. He asserted that the Chapter's Board of Officers, not the Chapter
President, by a majority
vote shall determine the Chapter's official nominee for Governor of its region.

The Western Visayas Region Election Protest (Atty. Cornelio P. Aldon and Atty.
Benjamin Ortega v. Atty. Erwin Fortunato)
Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the IBP-Romblon Chapter was proclaimed the duly elected
Regional Governor for Western Visayas in the April 25, 2009 elections. In separate
protests, Atty. Cornelio P. Aldon of IBP-Antique Chapter and Atty. Benjamin Ortega of
IBPNegros Occidental Chapter claimed they were nominated by their respective chapters
for Governor of Western Visayas but were not allowed to be elected on account of the
"Rotation Rule" under Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws. Despite their
disqualification, Ortega obtained three (3) votes, Aldon obtained one (1) vote; and
Fortunato, the eventual winner, obtained five votes, with one (1) delegate opting to
abstain. Aldon and Ortega argued that the rotation rule is merely directory and not
mandatory and claimed a failure of elections, as nominees from the other chapters were
disqualified

Resolutions of the protests (by the Board of Governors)

In its subsequent resolutions, the protests of Atty. Fortunato and Soriano III were upheld.
Atty. Fortunato was declared as the duly elected IBP Gov. of Western Visayas. A new
election of the IBP GMR was ordered where Soriano III won as IBP Governor. In the
case of Atty. Lanto, the protest of Atty. Marohomsalic was denied and further on
declared Atty. Lanto as the duly elected IBP Governor of the Western Mindanao Region.

Election of the next IBP Executive Vice President (EVP)

On May 9 2009, two (2) simultaneous elections for the Executive Vice President for the
2009-2011 term was held - one was called and presided over by Executive Vice President
Rogelio Vinluan, while the other election for the same position was presided over by
outgoing IBP Pres. Feliciano Bautista. GMR Gov. Soriano was elected as the next
Executive vice president during the elections presided over by Atty. Vinluan while in the
meeting
presided by Bautista, Atty. Roan Libarios was elected as the next IBP EVP. Because of
the disputes relating to the elections for Governor of the GMR, EVP of the IBP and other
IBP
Positions the SC through an En Banc Resolution created a Special Committee to
investigate.

ISSUE:
1. What is the correct interpretation of Section 31, Article
V of the IBP By Laws?

2. Who was validly elected Governor for the Greater Manila Region?

3. Who was validly elected Governor for Western Visayas Region?

4. Who was validly elected Governor for Western Mindanao Region?

5. Who was validly elected IBP Executive Vice President for the next term?

6. WON Atty. Rogelio Vinluan is guilty under the administrative complaint for "grave
professional misconduct, violation of attorney's oath, and acts inimical to the IBP”

RULING:
1. There is a manifest intention in Sec. 31, Art. V of the By-Laws to reserve membership
in the House of Delegates (which is the deliberative body of the IBP) for the elected
officers of the Chapter since they have already received the mandate of the general
membership of the Chapter. Thus, Attys. Loanzon and Laqui were properly recognized as
delegates of the QC Chapter.

2. Given that Atty. Loanzon and Atty. Laqui were valid delegates, Atty. Maramba is the
duly elected IBP Gov. of the GMR. Furthermore, Atty. Soriano III is disqualified under
principle of rotation of the governorship (Bar Matter No. 586, May 14, 1991).
Governorship shall rotate once in as many terms as the number of chapters there are in
the region, to give every chapter a chance to represent the region in the Board of
Governors.

3. Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the Romblon Chapter was duly elected as Governor for the
Western Visayas Region not only because he obtained the highest number of votes
among the three (3) candidates for the position, but also because under the rotation rule, it
is now the turn of the Romblon Chapter to represent the Western Visayas Region in the
IBP Board of Governors.

4. It was Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic not Atty. Benjamin Lanto that is qualified to be
elected Governor of Western Mindanao Region. The special committee reported that the
resolution declaring Atty. Lanto as a delegate cannot be held valid since there was a
withdrawal of nine (9) signatures from the Resolution, left only four (4) votes in support
of Lanto's nomination - a puny minority of the 14- member Board of Officers of the
Lanao del Sur Chapter.

5. The elections for the IBP Executive Vice President separately held on May 9, 2009 by
the Vinluan Group were null and void for lack of quorum. The presence of five (5)
Governors-elect is needed to constitute a quorum of the 9- member Board of Governors-
elect who shall elect the Executive Vice President. In the case of Vinluan group, Atty.
Soriano (GMR) and Atty. Lanto (Western Mindanao Region) were among the six
Governors who elected Atty.
Soriano as EVP, but since Soriano and Lanto were not validly elected IBP Governors the
election held was null and void.

6. The Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "(a)
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Added to
this, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 requires that "(a) lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Atty. Vinluan
who presided the special meeting on April 23, 2009 violated Sec. 42, Art. VI of the By-
Laws which provides that it is the President who shall call a special meeting, and it is also
the President who shall
preside over the meeting, not Atty. Vinluan, the EVP. Thus, the resolution of the meeting
recalling Resolution No. XVIII-2009 was null and void since the meeting was illegal.
Furthermore, under Vinluan, a Board Resolution was passed declaring Pres. Bautista
"unfit to preside" over the election and "designating EVP Vinluan to preside over the
election" in lieu of Pres. Bautista. This resolution according to the SC, was uncalled and
unwarranted, and caused disunity and disorder in the IBP. The acts of Atty. Vinluan's
Group in defying President Bautista, due to Atty. Vinluan's desire to propel his fraternity
brother, Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano, to the next presidency of the IBP, smacked of
politicking, which is strongly condemned and strictly prohibited by the IBP By-Laws and
the Bar Integration Rule.

With the premises considered, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan et. Al. are all found GUILTY of
grave professional misconduct arising from their actuations in connection with the
controversies in the elections in the IBP and are hereby disqualified to run as national
officers of the IBP in any subsequent election.
(e) IBP Dues
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., B.M. No. 1370, [May 9, 2005], 497 PHIL 535-
544

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.

Facts:

Petitioner, In his letter dated 22 September 2004, sought exemption from

payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid
accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to
the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from
July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December
1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be
assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil
Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while
in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he
was working in the USA. The letter was referred to the IBP for comment.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues
during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law (that is, when he was in
the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003.)

Held:

No. Petitioner cannot be exempted from payment of IBP dues. He is ordered to

pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the
years 1977-2005, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension
from the practice of law.

The IBP submitted its comment stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is
not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in
the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one
of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by
the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as
provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the
validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to
defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP
Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in
defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule
allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent,
that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It
asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the
IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have
been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It
also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing
proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved
by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members
from payment of the annual dues.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free
to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of his annual dues.

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to
the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar - which power
required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable
fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration. There is nothing in the law or rules which allows
exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by
the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his
intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP
could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues.
Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity
thereof warrants such drastic move.

SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A.

ADAZA, Respondent.

The Case:
Atty. Samuel Arnado called the attention of the Court to the practice of Atty. Homobono
Adaza (respondent) of indicating “MCLE application for exemption under process” in his
pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 201, and “MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration” in a pleading filed in 2012.  When he inquired from the MCLE office,
he learned that respondent did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter No. 850
for the First (2001-2004), Second (2004-2007), and Third (2007-2010) Compliance
Periods.  When the case was referred to the MCLE Committee for evaluation, report and
recommendation, the Committee came out with its findings:  respondent applied for
exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods, on the ground of “expertise in
law”.  The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on January 14, 2009.  He also did
not apply for exemption nor complied with the Third Compliance Period.  The Court then
required the respondent to file his comment.  In his comment, he alleged that he did not
receive a copy of the letter of the complainant, who belongs to the Romualdo and
Arnaldo Law Office, the law office of his political opponent, the Romualdo family.  He
then enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing
law for about 50 years.  His achievements ranged from appearing as counsels to several
poetical personalities, writing books, becoming a public servant, and even refusing to be
appointed a Supreme Court justice.

In its report and recommendation, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that “respondent
had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that respondent’s
failure to comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients
because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records and considered
invalid.

The OBC reported that according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be
exempted (from compliance) pursuant to expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar
Matter No. 850, the applicant must submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to
establish his expertise in a certain area of law." The OBC reported that respondent failed
to meet the requirements necessary for the exemption. The OBC recommended that
respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of non-compliance
with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended respondent’s suspension
from the practice of law for six months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended
that respondent be directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE
Governing Board.”

The Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Adaza should be held administratively liable for failure to comply
with MCLE requirements.

The Ruling:
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education
“to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of
law.”1 The First Compliance Period was from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the
Second Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007; and the Third
Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainant’s letter
covered respondent’s pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 which means
respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance
Period from 15 April 2010 to 14 April 2013.

The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four
compliance periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an application for
exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board,
respondent’s application for exemption covered the First and Second Compliance
Periods. Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The
MCLE Governing Board denied respondent’s application for exemption on 14 January
2009 on the ground that the application did not meet the requirements of expertise in law
under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Office failed to
convey the denial of the application for exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only
informed respondent, through its letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano,
when it received inquiries from complainant, Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin
Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent’s MCLE
compliance. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23
October 2013, which the MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November
2013. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was sent to respondent in a
letter2   dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo.

Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar
Matter No. 850. His application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance
Periods was filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status
of his application for exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February
20123  to the MCLE Office asking the office to act on his application for exemption but
alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office.4  He did not comply with
the Fourth Compliance Period.

A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-
compliance fee of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the
IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which
case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.

Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it
would only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent
for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished
proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period.

The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the
requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his application for exemption, filed
after the compliance periods, would be granted. He purportedly wrote the MCLE Office
to follow-up the status of his application but claimed that his secretary forgot to send the
letter. He now wants the Court to again reconsider the MCLE Office’s denial of his
application for exemption when his motion for reconsideration was already denied with
finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013. He had the temerity to
inform the Court that the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14 February 2014,
which was beyond the 60-day period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, and without even indicating when he intended to comply with
his deficiencies br the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked
the Court to allow him to continue practicing law while complying with the MCLE
requirements.

Respondent’s failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the
directives of the MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the
IBP. While the MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should
recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent
member, there is nothing that prevents the Court from using its administrative power and
supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of Governors o
declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP.

(1)   REMIND  the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on
matters that require its immediate attention, such as but not limited to applications for
exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested parties within a reasonable
period;

(2)  DENY  the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE
compliance as the matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing
Board on 28 November 2013;

(3)  DECLARE  Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and  SUSPEND  him from the practice of law for  SIX MONTHS, or
until he has fully complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-
compliance and reinstatement fees.

(2) Civility
(a) In general
Bugaring vs Espanol
Rexie Efren A. Bugaring – petitioner
Judge Dolores S. Español of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite - respondent
judge

During a hearing for the annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title in the case of
Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc. v. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et. al.,
petitioner (here-in counsel for Alvarans), together with his assistant operating a
video camera and taking pictures of the proceedings, manifested that he was
ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite in
contempt of court the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado
Concepcion. Despite the court asking petitioner to allow the defendant’s counsel
to finish his manifestation and respect the court’s decision to give defendant
counsel time to write their comment, petitioner kept insisting that he be allowed
to mark his evidence and even accused the court of being antagonistic and
biased and threatening to file an inhibition to the Hon. Court.
FACTS:

 During the hearing of the case, plaintiffs and counsel were present
together with one operating a video camera who was taking photos of the
proceedings of the case while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring, was
making manifestation to the effect that he was ready to mark his
documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of court)
the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite – Diosdado Concepcion
 The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did
not in fact instruct his assistant to take photos and added that the reason
they had with them a camera was because they had just come from a
function
 Counsel sent out his assistant after the Court took exception to the fact
that although proceedings are open to the public and it being a court of
record, the situation at hand is an abuse of discretion of the court since
the court was not asked for permission to do so.
 When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested
that he needed the services of counsel and right then and there appointed
Atty. Barzaga to represent him, the case was allowed to be called again
 On second call, Atty. Bugaring started to insist that he be allowed to mark
and present his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty.
Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written
pleading for his client.
 The court declared him out of order. Atty. Bugaring served 3 days and
paid a fine of P3,000 as instructed by the court.
 After serving his sentence and paying the fine, he filed for a declaration of
said order to be null and void. He argued that he was never in contempt of
court given that 1) he always addressed it with respect by using the
phrase “your Honour please” and 2) he was merely carried away by his
emotions in espousing the case of his client.
 CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but ordered the excess P1,000 to be
returned

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the RTC erred in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court

RULING:

NO.

a.The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the
due administration of justice.

b.As regards court’s legal basis for citing contempt of court, and in light of Atty.
Bugaring defense of being polite and using the phrase “your Honour
please” during the proceedings, the court ruled that his deference to the
court in consistently addressing respondent judge as “your Honour please”
is denied by his behaviour therein:

i. Veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (in
violation of Rule 11.03, Canon 11)
 ii. The hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent Judge was
partial in favour of the other party (in violation of Rule 11.04, Canon
11)
iii. Behaving without due regard to the trial court’s order to maintain
order in the proceedings (in disregard of Canon 1)
iv. Behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who
at the time was making representation in behalf of the other party,
was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to
further a word in edgewise (in violation of Canon 8 and Canon 22)
v. Refusal of petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province
of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (in
violation of Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution and Canon 18,
and Canon 12)

c. Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his
emotions in espousing the case of his client—by persisting to have his
documentary evidence marked despite the respondent judge’s contrary
order—he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect the
interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. The
Court of Appeals aptly stated: But “a lawyer should not be carried away in
espousing his client’s cause” (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656).
He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every
effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice pursuant to Canon 12, Canons of Professional
Responsibility (Gomez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249
SCRA 432, 439). He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure
to defeat the ends of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the execution
of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04,
Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid.).

d. The CA however directed the RTC to return P1,000 to Atty. Bugaring as it

exceeded the ceiling set by SC Admin. Circ. No. 22-95 of P2,000.

The assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. The RTC is ordered to RETURN

to petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000 out of the original fine
of P3,000.

Atty. Ramon P. Reyes vs. Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong, A.C. No.

5148, July 1, 2003

FACTS: Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime his services were engaged by
one Zonggi Xu, a Chinese-Taiwanese, in a business venture that went
awry. Xu, through Atty. Reyes, filed a complaint for estafa against Pan, who was
represented by respondent Atty. Chiong. The latter neither appeared on the two scheduled
hearings nor submitted his counter-affidavit. Atty. Chiong argued that he had shown no
disrespect in impleading Atty. Reyes as co-defendant in the civil case. He alleged that
Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an additional defendant because of the irregularities
the latter had committed in conducting the criminal
investigation. Atty. Reyes was impleaded, because he allegedly connived with his client
(Xu) in filing the estafa case, which Xu knew fully well was baseless. According to Atty.
Chiong, the irregularities committed by Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal investigation
and complainant‘s connivance therein were discovered only after the institution of the
collection suit. Commissioner of the IBP held that Atty. Chiong had no ground to
implead Prosecutor Salanga. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office and
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Chiong violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility

HELD: Yes. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that

―a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.‖ Respondent‘s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The
Civil case was for the "collection of a sum of money, damages and dissolution of an
unregistered business venture." It had originally been filed against Spouses
Xu, but was later modified to include complainant and Prosecutor
Salanga. The amendment of the Complaint and the failure to resort to the proper remedies
strengthen complainant‘s allegation that the civil action was intended to gain leverage
against the estafa case. If respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor Salanga‘s
resolution, they should
have used the proper procedural and administrative remedies. Respondent could have
gone to the justice secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for
Reinvestigation of Prosecutor Salanga‘s decision to file an information for estafa.
Moreover, he could have instituted disbarment proceedings against complainant and
Prosecutor Salanga, if he believed that the two had conspired to act illegally. As a lawyer,
respondent should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies. Thus, the
filing of the civil case had no justification. It appears that respondent took the estafa case
as a personal affront and used the civil case as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered
by his client. His actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of every
lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.

WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and is hereby

SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effective immediately.

Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. vs. Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr., A.C.
No. 5768, March 26, 2010

FACTS: On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr.

filed a complaint-affidavit with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate
disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer for the
following offenses:

1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff‘s counsel in Civil Case

7040, filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained
abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty.
Barandon presented a falsified document in court.

2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil

Case 7040 for alleged falsification of public document when the
document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on
February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer
nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory
to the document.

3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC)

Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened
Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan,
kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa
Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur,
umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."

4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document

without bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court
and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized
document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven
otherwise.

5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against
repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual
harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte;
a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for
libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October
2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son who
worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems,
Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed
him with inflammatory language.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating
Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the
charges against him.

2. WON if in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is

justified.

HELD: No. The IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating
Commissioner did not erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the
charges against him.

RATIO: Under the Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and
candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:

Rule 8.01. – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Atty. Ferrer‘s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence

shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay
Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with
pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified
and that Atty. Barandon authored the same.

Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a

proper forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer.
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings
despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:

Rule 7.03. – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life
behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Though a lawyer‘s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has
no place in the dignity of judicial forum. All lawyers should take heed that they are
licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal
profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.Atty. Ferrer‘s
display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance
of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was
a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of
Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective
upon his receipt of this Decision.

ATTY. RICARDO M. ESPINA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JESUS G. CHAVEZ, RESPONDENT.

The Facts:
Atty. Ricardo filed a complaint for ejectment against Remedios Engiuo before the MTC of Carmen,
Agusan del Norte, who was represented by Atty. Jesus G. Chavez, then employed by the Public
Attorneys Office.  In the course of the trial, Ricardo wrote the Department of Justice complaining
about Jesus’ conduct during the pendency of the case, such as his writing a transmittal letter to the
Provincial Prosecutor recommending the filing of a case for falsification of private document and
use of falsified document against Ricardo, his wife and his parents.  The case was eventually
dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor.  The DOJ on the other hand transmitted Ricardo’s letter to
the Chief of PAO, who required Jesus to submit his Comment and for Ricardo to submit his
rebuttal.  In his rebuttal, Ricardo wrote “ Baka kulangpo ng indoctrination itong si Atty. Chavez sa
concept ng Torrens system, i-suspend nyo po muna siya not for the purpose of penalizing him but
for him to be given time to take continuing legal education on Torrens system.  “.  The Chief PAO
dismissed his complaint.  Ricardo hence filed his Complaint for Disbarment against Jesus.  The
IBP Commissioner ruled that Jesus’ act of transmitting the complaint for falsification against
Ricardo and his parents in connection with the ejectment case was not an unfair and dishonest
means employed by Atty. Chavez., since the complaint contained conflicting averments thus she
concluded that Atty. Chavez was honestly mistaken when he construed the contradictory
allegations in the complaint for ejectment as criminal falsification under the Revised Penal Code.
He noted that lawyers are not liable for honest mistakes. He dismissed the complaint given the
dearth of competent evidence on record to substantiate Atty. Espina’s allegation that the
transmission of the complaint for falsification was intended to gain an advantage in the civil
complaint for ejectment.  The IBP Board affirmed the findings and recommendation of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner.

The Issue:
1. Whether or not Atty. Chavez should be held administratively liable for endorsing the falsification
complaint.
2. Whether or not Atty. Chavez intended to obtain improper advantage in a case or proceeding.

The Ruling:
We affirm the IBP Report and Recommendation.
The complaint is anchored on the alleged violation by Atty. Chavez of Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, viz:

Canon 1: A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of law.
Rule 19.01: A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.(Underscoring supplied.)

Atty. Espina contends that Atty. Chavez violated the above-quoted provisions when he
indispensably participated in the filing of the falsification complaint against him, his wife and his
parents. The falsification case was filed, according to Atty. Espina, solely for the purpose of gaining
an improper advantage and leverage in the ejectment case. 1 Atty. Espina further argues that Atty.
Chavez participated in the filing of the baseless criminal complaint by (i) goading Enguio to file the
criminal complaint and (ii) ensuring that the criminal complaint was acted upon by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor by sending the transmittal letter to the said office under Atty. Chavez’s
signature. We find Atty. Espina’s position unmeritorious and without basis. What Rule 19.01
prohibits is the filing or the threat of filing patently frivolous and meritless appeals or clearly
groundless actions for the purpose of gaining improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Two
elements are indispensable before a lawyer can be deemed to have violated this rule: (i) the filing
or threat of filing a patently frivolous and meritless action or appeal and (ii) the filing or threat of
filing the action is intended to gain improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Our
jurisprudence is replete with cases on these points. In Pena v. Atty. Aparicio, the lawyer sent a
demand letter to his client’s employer which contained threats of filing criminal charges for tax
evasion, falsification of documents and cancellation of business license ifthe separation pay
allegedly due to his client was not paid. The lawyer drafted the demand letter in response to the
notice to return to work sent by the employer. We held that Atty. Aparicio did exactly what Canon
19 and its Rules prohibit. The threat to file the cases against the employer was designed to secure
leverage to compel the latter to give in to Atty. Aparicio’s demands. The letter in this case
contained more than just a simple demand to pay. It contained threat to file retaliatory charges
against the complainant which had nothing to do with the claim for separation pay. The letter was
obviously designed to secure leverage to compel the employer to yield to the client’s claims. 5
In Ong v. Atty. Unto, we reprimanded a lawyer when he sent a demand letter which also contained
the threat of various charges against the complainant if the latter failed to comply with the lawyer’s
demands. The lawyer, in fact, made good his promise when the complainant did not heed his
warning. The lawyer filed an array of criminal and administrative charges against the complainant,
which charges were irrelevant to his client’s claim. We held in  Ong that: It is evident from the
records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to
file various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made
good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. We
find the respondent’s action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did
not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client. In Atty. Briones v. Atty.
Gimenez,8 Atty. Briones charged Atty. Gimenez (a special administrator of an estate) for violating
Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this case, the Atty. Gimenez filed a
criminal complaint9 against Atty. Briones for resisting and seriously disobeying an order of the trial
court in an estate settlement proceeding, directing him (Atty. Briones) to deliver the residue of the
estate to the heirs. We noted that before Atty. Gimenez assisted the heirs in filing the criminal
complaint, he sent demand letters to Atty. Briones to comply with the order to deliver the residue of
the estate to the heirs. When Atty. Briones did not reply to the demand letters, Atty. Gimenez filed
the criminal complaint on behalf of his clients against Atty. Briones for refusing to obey the lawful
order of the court. We held that Atty. Gimenez should have first filed the proper motion with the
Regional Trial Court for execution of the order instead of immediately filing the criminal complaint.
We concluded that fair play demands that Atty. Gimenez should have filed the proper motion with
the Regional Trial Court to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate delivered to his clients,
instead of prematurely filing criminal charges against Atty. Briones. It can be gleamed from the
above-cited cases that Rule 19.01 is violated only when the criminal complaint filed or threatened
to be filed is patently frivolous, meritless and clearly groundless and is aimed solely at gaining the
sole purpose of improper advantage. In Pena v. Atty. Aparicio, the demand letter was explicit and
blatant in its threat of filing several actions (which included tax evasion, a matter totally unrelated to
the pending labor case) if the employer failed to accede to the demand for payment of separation
pay allegedly due to the employee. It was clearly and obviously done to compel the employer to
grant the demand for separation pay. Similarly, in Ong v. Atty. Unto, the letter contained threats of
criminal prosecution if the complainant did not accede to the lawyer’s demand. The lawyer
subsequently filed totally unrelated and irrelevant criminal and administrative cases against the
complainant when the latter failed to comply with the demand letter. Without doubt, these cases
were filed to force the complainant to give in to the lawyer’s demands. Finally, in Atty. Briones v.
Atty. Gimenez, the criminal complaint was filed after the complainant did not comply with the
demand letter. There was also an available remedy in the civil action which could have given effect
to Atty. Gimenez’s demand without having to file the criminal complaint. The facts of the present
case differed from the above-cited cases.  We note that Atty. Espina did not only fail to substantiate
his allegation that Atty. Chavez masterminded the filing of the criminal complaint for falsification; he
also failed to show that the criminal complaint was patently frivolous, meritless and groundless, and
that it was filed to gain improper advantage in favor of his client. First, the fact that Atty. Chavez
endorsed the criminal complaint to the Provincial Prosecutor was, in itself, not contrary to Rule
19.01. We point out that Atty. Chavez was then a PAO lawyer. In this capacity, he had the duty to
assist clients who could not afford the services of a private lawyer. His assessment on the merit of
the criminal complaint might have been erroneous but the act of endorsing the affidavit-complaint
to the Provincial Prosecutor did not per se violate Rule 19.01. Moreover, the affidavit-complaint for
Falsification was signed and executed by Enguio and not by Atty. Chavez. Atty. Chavez merely
transmitted the affidavit-complaint to the Provincial Prosecutor for the latter’s consideration. We
cannot conclude, solely given these facts and Atty. Espina’s bare assertions, that Enguio was
goaded into filing the criminal complaint. Second, the criminal complaint was not patently frivolous
and groundless. It was not unreasonable for Atty. Chavez to conclude (albeit incorrectly according
to the assessment of the Provincial Prosecutor) that there was a case for violation of Article 172 of
the RPC. Article 172 in relation to paragraph 4 of Article 171 of the RPC penalizes the making of
untruthful statements in a narration of facts. The basis of Enguio’s affidavit-complaint was the
contrary statements in the ejectment complaint on when Atty. Espina’s parents acquired knowledge
of Enguio’s alleged illegal possession of the property. The body of the ejectment complaint alleged
that the plaintiffs discovered Enguio’s illegal possession in November 2003. On the other hand, the
letter attached to the complaint explicitly indicated that Enguio has been notified as early as 1997
that her possession and occupation of the land was illegal. This explains Enguio’s allegation in her
affidavit-complaint that “in order to fashion a case for Ejectment, respondent made an untruthful
statement in the narration of facts.” As the IBP Commissioner correctly observed, the criminal
complaint was not exactly unfounded or wanting in basis. That it was later dismissed by the
Provincial Prosecutor for lack of probable cause is of no consequence. We cannot expect and
require Atty. Chavez (or any lawyer for that matter) to be infallible in his judgment on the merit of
every criminal charge he endorses to the prosecutor. It is only required that the complaint is not
patently frivolous and filed solely to ensure improper advantage. It is also unwise to characterize
every criminal complaint that arose from or is connected with a separate case or proceeding to be
within the coverage of Rule 19.01. The better policy is to balance the prohibition under Rule 19.01
with the equally important right of the State to prosecute criminal offenses. We stress that the key
test is whether the criminal complaint is patently meritless and clearly filed to gain improper
advantage. Unless the criminal complaint is patently frivolous and obviously meant to secure an
improper advantage, a lawyer who files such criminal complaint should not be automatically
deemed to have violated Rule 19.01. Otherwise, lawyers who have a valid cause for filing a
criminal action may be compelled not to proceed because of fear of administrative sanctions.
Finally, unlike in the cases cited above, there is no clear and concrete proof that the falsification
complaint was filed to ensure improper advantage to Enguio.Other than the fact that the
falsification complaint arose from the narration of facts in the ejectment complaint, Atty. Espina
failed to show that the falsification complaint was meant to ensure improper advantage to Enguio.
Atty. Espina merely made this conclusion by inference but his basic premises were not supported
by evidence. We cannot presume that Enguio gained or stood to gain improper advantage to the
detriment of Atty. Espina’s parents by the mere filing of the falsification complaint. After all, both the
ejectment and falsification complaints were eventually dismissed. As a final point, we note with
concern the excessive antagonism between Atty. Espina and Atty. Chavez. It appears that this
case is no longer about the alleged violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility but a
protracted and bitter fight between brothers in the legal profession. Both claim that the other party
is arrogant and ignorant of the law. The pleadings contained serious attacks on the professional
competence and personal integrity of one another. These are acts that this Court should not allow
to pass without comments. We take this occasion to remind lawyers of their duties to their
professional colleagues. Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear:  a
lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper. While the fervor shown by Atty. Espina and Atty. Chavez in defending their clients’
respective claims has been admirable, we find it unfortunate that they allowed their personal
animosity and bruised egos to affect their handling of these cases. Although we dismiss the
present complaint because of lack of merit, we strongly warn both counsels that any future
infraction of the Code of Professional Responsibility may warrant actual penalty.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby   AFFIRM  the recommendation of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and DISMISS the Disbarment/Suspension complaint against   ATTY. JESUS
G. CHAVEZ.  At the same time, we warn both counsels about their use of intemperate language in
their pleadings and in dealing with one another.
SO ORDERED.
BRION, J.:
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and   Leonen, JJ., concur.

(b) Use of proper of language

Antonio A. Alcantara, vs. Atty. Mariano Pefianco, A. C. No. 5398,
December 3, 2002

FACTS: On May 18, 2000, Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a
client in the Public Attorney‘s Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San
Jose, Antique, a woman approached them. Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara,
the incumbent District Public Attorney of the PAO in San Jose, Antique,
saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the group and suggested
that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in
another room. At this point, Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting
nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client, saying "Why
do you settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will realize
his mistake." Atty. Alcantara was surprised by the sudden outburst and
advised him to cool off but, to no avail Atty. Pefianco continued to scold
Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with Atty. Pefianco, Atty. Alcantara went
inside his office. He asked his clerk to put a notice outside prohibiting
anyone from interfering with any activity in the PAO. Alcantara then went
out to attend a hearing, but when he came back he heard Pefianco
saying "Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO, what
an idiot." Pefianco upon seeing Alcantara, pointed his finger at him and
repeated his statement for the other people in the office to hear.
Alcantara confronted Pefianco and told him to observe civility or else to
leave the office if he had no business there. Pefianco resented this and
started hurling invectives at Alcantara. According to Alcantara, Pefianco
even took a menacing stance towards him. The incident caused a
commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert Minguez, the
Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify Atty. Pefianco. Two guards of
the Hall of Justice came to take Pefianco out of the office, but before
they could do so, he tried to attack Alcantara and even shouted at him,
"Gago ka!" Fortunately, the guards were able to fend off Pefianco‘s blow
and Alcantara was not harmed. Atty. Alcantara filed a complaint against Atty. Pefianco
for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar for using improper and offensive language
and threatening and attempting to assault him. Complainant Alcantara also submitted the
affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil,
Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations. In
his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that the sight of the
crying woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved him and prompted him to take
up her defense. He said that he resented the fact that complainant Alcantara had ordered a
employee to put a sign outside prohibiting "standbys" from hanging round in the PAO.
Respondent Pefianco claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the
woman‘s case Alcantara, with his bodyguard, arrived and shouted at him to get out of the
PAO. He claimed that two security guards also came, and Alcantara ordered them to take
him out of the office. Contrary to complainant‘s claims, however, Pefianco said that it
was Alcantara who moved to punch him and shout at him, "Gago ka!" Prior to the filing
of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman an administrative and criminal complaint against complainant. However, the
complaint was dismissed by the said office.

ISSUE/S: WON respondent Atty. Pefianco should be reprimanded for his

actions in the said case

HELD: Yes, respondent Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility: ―A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

RATIO: The Court agrees with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP
that respondent Atty. Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed
not only to deny the accusations against him but also to give any
explanation for his actions. The evidence on record indeed shows that it
was respondent Pefianco who provoked the incident in question. The
affidavits of several disinterested persons confirm complainant‘s allegation
that respondent Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty.
Salvani and even attempted to lay hands on the complainant.
Canon 8 admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound
to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably,
fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves
without reproach at all times. In the case at bar, respondent‘s meddling in a matter in
which he had no right to do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand
an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or could not be
settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to respondent, but the
latter insisted on his view about the case.
Atty. Mariano Pefianco was found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and, considering it was his first offense, he was fined in the
amount ofP1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the
future will be sanctioned more severely.

Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao, vs. Atty. Virgil R. Castro, A.C. No.

6396, October 25, 2005

FACTS: Respondent Atty. Castro went to Atty. Rosalie‘s (complainant)

office to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784 had
already been remanded to the MCTC. Atty. Castro was not the counsel of
record of either party in the said civil case. Atty. Rosalie is the Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. Atty. Rosalie informed Atty. Castro that
the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of the decision of the
Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the
records to the court of origin. To this, Atty. Castro retorted scornfully, ―Who will certify
the Court of Appeals‘ Decision, the Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still
have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy?‖ Surprised at this outburst, Atty. Rosalie
replied, ―Sir, it‘s in the Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the party you
claim to be representing.‖ Atty. Castro then replied, ―Then you should have notified me
of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office
since then, but you never bothered to notify me.‖ Atty. Rosalie replied, ―It is not our
duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement.‖ Atty. Castro then answered, ―You mean
to say it is not your duty to remand the record of the case?‖ Atty. Rosalie responded,
―No, Sir, I mean, it‘s not our duty to notify you that you have to submit a copy of the
Court of Appeals‘ decision.‖ Atty. Castro angrily declared in Ilocano, “Kayat mo nga
saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay?” (―You mean to say you don‘t care anymore? Is
that the way it is?‖) He then turned and left the office, banging the door on his way out to
show his anger. The banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people at the
adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place. After a few minutes, Atty
Castro returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at Atty. Rosalie and
shouted, “Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah!”
(―Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against my client, don‘t turn
your ire on me!‖) Atty. Rosalie was shocked at Atty. Castro‘s words but still managed to
reply, ―I don‘t even know your client, Sir.‖ Atty. Castro left the office and as he passed
by Atty. Rosalie‘s window, he again shouted,“Ukinnam nga babai!” (―Vulva of your
mother, you woman!‖) Atty. Rosalie suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it
happened in her office of which she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff.
She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her
ability to command full respect from her staff. The Complaint-Affidavit was supported
by an Affidavit signed by employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed
the incident.
A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was also filed.
The CBD-IBP issued an Order requiring respondent to submit his answer to
the complaint. The hearing for the administrative complaint before the
CBD was set. However, on day of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Atty. Rosalie
filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next hearing date in view
of respondent‘s public apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for
forgiveness which she accepted. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be reprimanded and warned that any other complaint for breach of his
professional duties shall be dealt with more severely.The IBP submitted to this Court a
Notice of Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.

ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Castro violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility

HELD: Yes. Atty. Castro violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. He is fined in the amount of P10,000.00 with a warning that
any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely.

RATIO: Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that

lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the
legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards
each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at
all times. In the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784,
respondent acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of
court and uttered at her the most vulgar of
invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering
that he did all these to a woman and in front of her subordinates. He thus
violated Canon 8 of the CPR. The penalty was tempered because
respondent apologized to the complainant and the latter
accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be
absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the
consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent
afterwards.

A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES,

Respondent.

Facts:

This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint 1 for

disbarment dated April 16, 2012 filed by complainant Maximino Noble III
(Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Atty. Orlando O. Ailes filed an action for damages against his brother
Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo) who filed a separate case of Grave Threat and
Estafa against the respondent. Maximino was the counsel of Marcelo who
represented him in his civil case (Action for Damages).

When Maximino was furnished a copy of the complaint, he discovered

that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading
Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent
and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others:

“Better dismiss your hi-track lawyer who will impoverish you with his
unconscionable professional fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records,
never appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x
get rid of Noble as your lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from
you, x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol."

Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services

of Counsel7 in the complaint for damages, which stated that Maximino

"x x x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in
a manner not befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner and,
aside from charging enormous amount of professional fees and questionable
expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far only in preparing
and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise
Agreement, both of which he sent to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted,
Maximino filed the instant complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03
of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages.
Meanwhile, criminal charges against the respondent were downgraded to unjust
vexation and the latter pleaded guilty.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is found guilty of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon
7 and the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Ruling:
Yes. Respondent is guilty.
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
 lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should

always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.
The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of the judicial forum. IBP found that the text message between Marcelo
and Orlando is only a casual communication considering that they were
conveyed privately, however to the Court the tenor of text messages should not
taken for granted and that the intention of it were clearly to malign and annoy
Maximino, as evident from the use of the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise,
Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of
Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation
of the above-quoted rules.
Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation
in the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and
purposes, an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a
departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the lawyer to administrative
liability. The Court has consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and
reputation of a party. Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how
Orlando transgressed the CPR when he maligned Maximino to his client.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY
of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues and STERNLY
WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN,
Presiding Judge, MTC, San Mateo, Rizal v. ATTY.
RODOLFO FLORES
A. C. No. 8954, 13 November 2013, Del Castillo, J.

A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of the

constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised
responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom
with responsibility

FACTS.
During the proceedings of Civil Case No. 1863,where Atty. Flores was counsel for
defendant, Judge Manahan issued an Order3 where she voluntarily inhibited
from said case in view of the administrative complaint it filed against Atty. Flores. Upon
investigation, it was found that during the preliminary conference in Civil Case No.
1863, Atty. Flores entered his appearance and filed his PreTrial Brief without proof of
MCLE compliance hence it was expunged from the records. The preliminary
conference was reset several times for failure of Atty. Flores to appear and submit his
Brief indicating his MCLE compliance. He was given a last chance to submit his Brief
with the stern warning that failure to do so shall be considered waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September 14,
2010 stating among others, the following allegations: 4. When you took your oath as
member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth, justice and fair play. Do you think you
are being truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater? 5. Ignorance of the law excuses no
one for which reason even Erap was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. But even worse is
a lawyer who violates the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine Constitution
commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the
plaintiff is violative of the foregoing divine and human laws. (3 More than mere
contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and
discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and
judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious ground
for disciplinary action of a member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.)

Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which
was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. Thereafter
it filed a Letter stating as follows: If only to give your Honor another chance to prove
your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the attached Motion which you may once
more assign
to the waste basket of nonchalance. With the small respect that still remains, I have asked
the defendant to look for another lawyer to represent him for I am no longer interested in
this case because I feel I cannot do anything right in your sala. The Investigating Judge
found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by failing to obey court
orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his
pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the
practice of law for one year

ISSUE:
Should Atty. Flores be held liable for its failure to give due respect to the court and for
using intemperate language in his pleadings?

HELD:
YES. There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit
proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him.
"Court orders are to be respected not becausethe judges who issue them should be
respected, but
because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of
the Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a government of
laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the positions,
but because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is
disrespect to that branchof Government to which they belong, as well as to the State
which has instituted the judicial system." Atty. Flores also employed intemperate
language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be
circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect. At this juncture, it is well to
remind respondent that: While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client
full devotion to his client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client's
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only
within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the
context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised
responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is
not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of
justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and common sense.

However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the
infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction
committed by respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the
penalty of one year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before
this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a century. Thus, he is already in
his
twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine respondent in the
amount of P5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to obey
and respect court processes.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00

with STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.

JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, -versus- ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE,

Respondent.
A. C. No. 10303, SECOND DIVISION, April 22, 2015, BRION,J.

Lawyers are prohibited to use of intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in a

lawyer’s professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person.
Canon 8, Rule 8.01 clearly states that a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive, or otherwise, improper. Based on the record,
it is clear that the respondent, in the reply that he drafted, called
complainant a “notorious extortionist”. This is a clear violation of the Canons
mentioned above and a confirmation of the respondent’s lack of restraint in the use and
choice of his words. While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. In
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his
pleadings, must be dignified.

FACTS:
Joy Gimeno (Complainant) filed a Complaint against Atty. Paul Zaide (Respondent)
charging the latter with usurpation of a notary public’s office, falsification, use of
intemperate, offensive, and abusive language, and violation of lawyer-client trust. It
was submitted that complainant was respondent’s former client. Complainant
engaged the services of the Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an
annulment of title case that involved her husband and her parents-in-law. Despite
the previous lawyer-client relationship, respondent still appeared against her in the
complaint for estafa and violation of RA 3019 filed against the complainant with the
Ombudsman. Complainant posited that by appearing against a former client, Atty.
Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of conflicting clients’
interests. Furthermore, complainant also alleges that the respondent called her a
“notorious extortionist” in the same administrative complaint filed against her.
In his defense, respondent denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and
abusive language in his pleadings. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner found the respondent administratively liable for
violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using
abusive and insulting language in his pleadings. It was recommended that the
respondent be suspended for a total of nine months. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the penalty to
be imposed increasing it to one year.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent may be held administratively liable for the use of
intemperate, offensive, and abusive language against the complainant

RULING:
Lawyers are prohibited to use of intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in a
lawyer’s professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other
person. The prohibition stems from the following canons and rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,

FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND
SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT

DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.

Based on the record, it is clear that the respondent, in the reply that he drafted,
called complainant a “notorious extortionist”. This is a clear violation of the Canons
mentioned above and a confirmation of the respondent’s lack of restraint in the use
and choice of his words. While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his
pleadings, must be dignified.

WHEREFORE,  premises considered, the Court resolves to  ADOPT  the

recommended penalty of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is found   GUILTY  of violating the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive
language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is
hereby  REVOKED, and he is declared  DISQUALIFIED  from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is
also  SUSPENDED  for one (1) year from the practice of law.

CAMACHO V. PAGULAYAN

FACTS:
AMA Computer College (AMACC) had a pending case in the RTC for expelling
some students due to having published objectionable features or articles in the school
paper. Thereafter, Atty. Camacho who is the counsel for the expelled students filed a
complaint against Atty. Pangulayan, counsel for AMACC, for violation of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Ethics which provides that "A lawyer should not in any way
communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel,
much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but
should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to
avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he
should not undertake to advise him as to law." The complaint was based on the fact that
Atty. Pangulayan procured and effected from the expelled students and their parents
compromise agreements in which the students waived all kinds of claims they may have
against AMACC and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed
against it. The compromise agreements were procured by Atty. Pangulayan without the
consent and knowledge of Atty. Camacho given that he was already the counsel for the
students at that time. It was averred that the acts of Atty. Pangulayan was unbecoming
of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Pangulayan violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Ethics
HELD:
YES! Atty. Pangulayan is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law for
having violated the Code of Professional Ethics.

In this case, when the compromise agreements were formalized and effected by
Atty. Pangulayan, Atty. Camacho was already the retained counsel for the students in
the pending case filed by the students against AMACC and Atty. Pangulayan had full
knowledge of such fact. However, Atty. Pangulayan still proceeded to negotiate with the
students and the parents without at least communicating the matter with their lawyer
even being aware that the students were being represented by counsel.
Such failure of Atty. Pangulayan, whether by design or oversight, is an
inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty
owing to a colleague. Atty. Pangulayan in this case fell short of the demands required of
him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

*In relation to our topic (not stated in case), such act of Atty. Pangulayan is also
in violation of Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "A
lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give
proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel."

FRANCISCO BINAY-AN, et al. vs. ATANACIO ADDOG

A.C No. 10449, 28 July 2014

FACTS:
Complainants herein, who happened to be the heirs of Barot Binay-an, are the plaintiffs
in a civil case for the Annulment of Documents against defendants Angeline Damaso and
the Cordillera Small Business Assistance Center, Inc. before the National Commission on
Indigenous People (NCIP). Complainants are represented by Atty. Jerome Selmo while
the defendants are represented by respondent Atty. Atanacio Addog.

From the allegations of the complainants, on Feb. 8, 2008, Damaso, who is the
constituted representative of the heirs of Barot Binay-an, called for a meeting in
Mandarin Restaurant. This meeting was attended by the respondent as well as Paul Palos
and Bienvenido Palos, both of which are also heirs of Barot Binay-an. There, Paul and
Bienvenido were convinced by the respondent and by Damaso to execute separate
Affidavits of Desistance, which was later notarized by the respondent. This notarized
affidavits were then submitted by respondent to the NCIP, which denied the same. The
NCIP Hearing Officer cautioned the respondent on the ethical consideration in having the
affidavits submitted. The respondent later withdrew his representation for the defendants.
Thus, a complaint for misconduct was filed against the respondent before the IBP.

On his part, respondent, while admitting that he was present in Mandarin Restaurant and
notarized the affidavits of desistance, denied the complainants’ charge. He also denied
lawyering for Paul and Bienvenido. According to him, he submitted the said affidavits in
behalf of his clients and not in behalf of the complainants.
The IBP Board of Governors, adopting with modifications the findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, recommends that respondent be
suspended for a period of six (6) months. The respondent filed his MR but the same was
denied.

ISSUE:
W/N respondent is guilty of misconduct

RULING:
YES. Respondent, despite knowing that the Complainants Palos were not represented by
a counsel during that meeting they had with defendant Angeline Damaso, communicated
with the Palos and in fact indications are ripe that it was he who convinced them to
execute their affidavits of desistance in exchange for monetary consideration. This
presumption is strongly supported by the fact that the affidavits were prepared and
notarized by him during the said meeting. Significantly, he did not take it upon himself to
inform Atty. Jerome W. Selmo about the act of his clients. He too failed to advise the
Palos to first consult their counsel about it. In fact he showed that he needed the affidavits
badly as in fact he went on to present the same to the NCIP Hearing Officer to prove that
the Palos had clearly wanted to withdraw their complaint against the defendants. The
affidavits of desistance [were], however, rejected by the NCIP Hearing Officer.

Canon 8, Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “A lawyer shall
not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.”

In this case, the respondent knew that Paul and Bienvenido were represented by counsel,
Atty. Selmo. His act of preparing the affidavit of desistance, even assuming that it was
only the joint affidavit of Paul, Isabela Daniel and Romana which he drafted and
notarized was true, nonetheless encroached upon the legal functions of Atty. Selmo.
Worse, the respondent even disclosed that the affidavits of desistance were executed by
the affiants in exchange for a certain sum of money. It was unscrupulous of the
respondent to compel some of the complainants in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07 to
execute the affidavit of desistance sans the knowledge and agreement of Atty. Selmo.

Similarly, in this case, the respondent's acts clearly violated the ethical tenets of the legal
profession and must, therefore, be disciplined. "Such acts constituting malpractice and
grave misconduct cannot be left unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and
trust in the legal profession, they likewise prevent justice from being attained."

WHEREFORE, Atty. Atanacio D. Addog is hereby imposed the penalty of SUSPENSION

from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately upon his
receipt of this Resolution, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar acts
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
(3) Solicitation and Advertising
(a) Advertising

Atty. Khan v. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, August 19, 2003.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession
in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be
the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves. There is no question that respondent committed the acts
complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements.
What adds to the gravity
of respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage
Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but
also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary
climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an
annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,
he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have
refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

FACTS:
On July 5, 2000, a paid advertisement appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
which reads “ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/ 521-2667”. Ma.
Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme
Court called up and pretended to be an interested party. Espeleta spoke to Mrs.
Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, is an expert of
annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months,
provided that it will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Atty.
Simbillo’s charge fee is P48, 000.00, half of which payable at the time of filing of the
case and the remaining after a decision has been rendered. Further research of the
Court Administrator and Public Information Office of the Supreme Court revealed
that the same advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of
the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of Philippine Star. On September 1,
2000, Atty. Ishmael Khan, in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief
of Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo
for improper advertisement and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule
2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section
27 of the Rules of Court. In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to
him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that
the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition
on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that
the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he
prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not
contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified. The case was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. On July 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed a
resolution finding the respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court
and suspended Atty. Simbillo from practice of law for one (1) year with the warning
that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE:
Whether or not publishing legal services in newspaper is an act of improper
advertisement and solicitation of legal services violative of the rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (YES)

RULING:
Atty. Simbillio is GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy
is not capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves. There is no question that
respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is
that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he
wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary
climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that
an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of
the case, he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined
and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However,
for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury
to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names
of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even
the use of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable.

(b) Firm name

Petition for authority to Continue Use of Firm Name “Sycip, Salazar,

Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo, G.R. No. x92-1, July 30, 1979.

Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the
firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased
partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm
particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics "prohibits all agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased
lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business
of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not
lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the
part of the recipient." Accordingly, neither the widow nor the
heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their
lawyerpredecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there can be no corresponding
liability. Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by
law firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an
old
firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the
profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself
starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on
that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners

FACTS:
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of
Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed
to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed
away. Petitioners argued that under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from
continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased
partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice.
Second, The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use
of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because
Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association declares that: ". . . The continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner whenpermissible by local custom, is not unethical, but care should
be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. . . ." Third,
there is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their
respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
circulation for several days. Fourth, no local custom prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is no custom or usage
in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the
name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm. Lastly,
the continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted
practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the surviving partners may be allowed to retain the name of the
partners who already passed away in the name of the firm. (NO)

RULING:
Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta,
Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership
names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the
Civil Code which provides:

"Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may
not include the name of one or more of the partners.
"Those who, not being members of the partnership include their names in the firm
name, shall be subject to the liability of a partner."

It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership
must either be those of living partners and, in the case of non-partners, should be
living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code
prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of
assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm
cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly
where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
"prohibits all agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased
lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future
business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such
division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or
responsibility on the part of the recipient." Accordingly, neither the widow nor the
heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer
predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there can be no corresponding
liability. Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use
by law firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use
of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the
practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a
name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old
firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name
of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a
practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. The possibility of
deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased
partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel
might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm
title. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create
undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able
lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from
scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old
firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.

A.C. No. 9896 March 19, 2014

MA. ELENA CARLOS NEBREJA, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN REONAL,
Respondent.
Legal Ethics Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

FACTS:
On June 26, 2006, complainant filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBP)
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines against respondent. Complainant alleged
that she engaged respondent's services to file her petition for annulment. After
paying respondent, however, complainant did not receive any word from him as to
the status of her petition for annulment. She was told that her petition was
dismissed for lack of evidence. He then again asked for sums of money. Complainant
again, despite respondent’s receipt of sums of money, failed to receive any update
from respondent. Complainant met with respondent to secure copies of her
annulment case file. Respondent merely handed to her photocopies of her marriage
contract and her children’s birth certificates. When she asked for copies of her case
files, he just told her that his law office could not let her use the pleadings of the
case.
Complainant checked her records and found respondent’s demand letter bearing
the
address of his claimed law office, "18/f Century Towers Building, Legaspi St. corner
de la Rosa, Makati." When complainant tried to look for the said office, she
discovered that there was no such building. She also found respondent’s calling card
bearing the address, "86 Magat Salamat Street, Project 4, Quezon City," which,
complainant found out, was respondent’s residential address. These and other
circumstances made complainant suspect that he did not file any petition for
annulment at all. In his answer and position paper, respondent denied having been
engaged by complainant to handle her petition for annulment and having been paid
therefor. Respondent averred that complainant did not engage him to be her lawyer
because she was unemployed and could not afford his legal services. CBD found that
respondent was liable for inexcusable negligence for failing to file her petition for
annulment, found that indeed, respondent used a fictitious office address to deceive
complainant and recommended his suspension from the practice of law and ordered
him to return the amounts taken from the complainant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is liable

RULING:
Yes. Despite the engagement of his services, respondent did not file the contracted
petition.
His conduct, as held in Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose, amounted to inexcusable
negligence. This was found to be contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoined a lawyer not to
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the
lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.
Thus, a lawyer was held to be negligent when he failed to do anything to protect his
client's interest after receiving his acceptance fee.9 In another case,10 this Court has
penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of the status of the case, among
other matters. In another instance, for failure to take the appropriate actions in
connection with his client's case, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law
for a period of six months and was required to render accounting of all the sums he
received from his client. In this case, respondent clearly received his acceptance fee,
among others, and then completely neglected his client’s cause. Moreover, he failed
to inform complainant of the true status of the petition. His act of receiving money
as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the complainant's case and,
subsequently, failing to render the services, was a clear violation of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, the December 11, 2008 Resolution of the IBP adopting

and approving the September 25, 2008 Recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP that Atty. Benjamin Reonal be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year is
hereby  APPROVED. The order to return the amounts received from
complainant is hereby  DELETED. This decision is immediately
executory and is without prejudice to the filing of any civil or criminal
action against respondent.

© Solicitation

Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553 (Resolution), [June 17, 1993]
Petitioner: ULEP
Respondent: LEGAL CLINIC

FACTS:

Petitioner prays that the respondent be ordered to cease and desist from
issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes
A and B and to perpetually prohibit persons/entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than
those allowed by law.

· Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.

ANNULMENT. VISA.

· Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce

through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office
hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems,

Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancées.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
 Petitioner submits that the advertisements above reproduced are
unethical, demeaning of the law profession and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the Bar
and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements.

In response, the respondent claims that it is not engaged in the practice of

law but in the rendering of legal support services through paralegals with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines.

ISSUE:
W/N the services offered by respondent as advertised by it constitute the
practice of law

HELD:
YES.

A person engaged in a lawful calling is not engaged in the practice of law

provided that:

1. Legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-

legal problem

2. Services performed are not customarily reserved to the

members of the Bar

3. No separate fee is charged for legal advice or information

In this case, the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop of

sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain
of paralegal, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the
practice of law.

Thus, the respondent is engaged in the practice of law.

Linsangan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 (Resolution), [September 4, 2009], 614 PHIL
327-337
Petitioner: PEDRO L. LINSANGAN
Respondent: ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan

Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.

FACTS:

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie

Labiano, convinced his client to transfer legal representation. Respondent
promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To
induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text
messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange
for a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card.
Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing
and circulation of the said calling card. The complaint was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services and
encroach the professional service of the complainant

HELD:
Yes. the court found that respondent had encroached on the professional
practice of complainant, violating Rules and other canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of
the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as
merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or
skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s
estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service
to which every member of the bar is called.

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which
provides:

RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any
suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. This rule proscribes "ambulance
chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to
protect the community from barratry and champerty
Although responent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later
admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless

seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s
word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule
that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to
retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his
services.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,

respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as
filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or
premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The
phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to
change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money
was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking
advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03,

2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby   SUSPENDED  from
the practice of law for a period of one year  effective immediately from receipt
of this resolution. He is  STERNLY WARNED  that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Manuel G. Villatuya Vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos, AC 6622 (July 10, 2012)
Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) filed this complaint for disbarment against Atty. Bede
S. Tabalingcos (respondent).
FACTS:
In this Complaint for disbarment, complainant Villatuya charged Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos with:

 Unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two financial consultancy firms as

fronts for his legal services;

 Non-payment of fees to complainant despite having promised to complainant (a

financial consultant), via a verbal agreement, that the latter would be entitled to
₱50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle,
in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients; and

 Gross immorality for marrying two other women while his first marriage was
subsisting, as supported by three different marriage contracts bearing the name
of respondent and three other women secured by the complainant.
In his defense, respondent asserted that complainant himself was unprofessional and
incompetent in performing his job and that there was no verbal agreement between
them regarding the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He presented
documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid. Respondent also
denied committing any unlawful solicitation. Respondent did not specifically address the
allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.

ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by non-
payment of fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice

RULING:
1. Under Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is proscribed by
the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a
person not licensed to practice law. There was no violation of this provision in this
case, for complainant failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of
that agreement.

2. The Court held that respondent indeed used the business entities such as Jesi & Jane
Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., both owned by him, to solicit
clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the
Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. A
lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.
Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in
such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar.

3. Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as

a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted
grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court.

Adjudication:
The Court resolved the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:

 The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
 Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral
conduct.
(c) Use of Media
Cruz v. Salva

FACTS: Manuel Monroy was killed in 1953 and a number of persons were
accused of such killing. These persons were found guilty sentenced to the
penalty of death. They all appealed. Pending the appeal, President Magsaysay ordered a
reinvestigation of the case which was conducted
by the intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators
of Malacanang. The result of the reinvestigation also points to the convicted persons as
the real killers of Monroy. The counsel of the defendants wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by the
investigator of Malacanang which was made available to him. Salva formed a committee
composed of himself as the chairman and two assistant city attorneys. Salva subpoenaed
Cruz to appear at his office for the investigation. Atty. Baizas, counsel of Cruz,
questioned the jurisdiction of the committee to conduct the investigation considering that
the case was pending appeal in SC. Salva contended that he subpoenaed Cruz et al
because of their request to do so and that were it not for his request, he would not conduct
the investigation. Although Cruz denied having made such request, the SC believed that
he indeed made a request of
reinvestigation. However, the Supreme Court was interested in the manner to which the
investigation headed by Salva was conducted. The investigation was made not in Salva‘s
office but in the session hall of the Municipal Trial Court to accommodate a big crowd
that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members of the press. Microphones
were installed. There were reporters everywhere and photographers were busy taking
pictures.

ISSUE: W/N Salva violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility

HELD: Yes. The way Salva conducted the investigation is reprehensible. He

publicized and sensationalized the case. He committed what was regard
a grievous error and poor judgment. His actuations went well beyond the
bounds of prudence, discretion, and good taste. Salva was publicly
reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and
sensationalism he had given to and allowed in connection with his
investigation which is considered and found to be contempt of court.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in
part and denied in part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent
Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the
uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and
allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to be
contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same
would meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.