B.

The Attorney-Client Relationship

Questions:
•What is the nature of the attorney-client relationship?

The relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the
highest order. It is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity
and good faith.

•When and how is the attorney-client relationship created? Why is it

important to know this?

An attorney-client relationship is most often created when both the attorney

and client formally agree to work together on a legal matter.

•What are the lawyer’s responsibilities for the duration of the

attorney-client relationship? After the relationship is terminated?

Cases:
•Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 99-634, June 10, 2002
Complainant: DOMINADOR P. BURBE
Respondent: Atty. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA

FACTS:
● Respondent lawyer was introduced to complainant at the
Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices who agreed to legally
represent the latter in a money claim and a possible civil case
against certain parties for breach of contract. Upon
respondent's instruction, complainant deposited the amount of
P25,000.00 allegedly for the filing fees of the case to be
filed. A week later, complainant was informed by respondent
that the complaint had already been filed in court. In the
months that followed, complainant did not receive any notice
from the court.
● Complainant also frequented respondent's office to inquire, but
the latter repeatedly told him each time to just wait. Sensing
that he was being given the run-around by respondent,
complainant went to the Office of the Clerk of Court to verify
the progress of the case and found out that there was no record
at all filed by respondent on his behalf.
● Feeling disgusted for the inconvenience and deception of
respondent who admitted that he had spent the money for the
filing fee for his own use, complainant filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines a complaint against respondent for
 misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct.
Respondent, on the other hand, averred that despite performing
his services, he was not paid by complainant.
● The Commission submitted its Report and Recommendation to the
Court recommending that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

ISSUE: WON respondent violated the rule that lawyers must be

scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their
professional capacity

HELD:: YES.
● Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the
prosecution or the defense of the client's cause. They who
perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect
the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of
justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect
of the community for the legal profession. Members of the bar
must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and
integrity of the profession.
● Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client
relationship existed between him and complainant, because the
latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds
that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for
the kumpadre of one of his partners.
● We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from
the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal
advice regarding the former's business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or
charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did
not afterward handle the case for which his service had been
sought.
● Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding
the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the
complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. Hence,
despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner
of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to
complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was
duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare —
and had actually prepared — at the soonest possible time, in
order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code
 of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not
neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
● This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree
to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in them. They owe entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the
client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and
abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the
client, save by the rules of law legally applied.
● In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by
complainant — as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law
office of respondent — the latter also violated the rule that
lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money
entrusted to them in their professional capacity. Rule 16.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers
shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties
that may come into their possession.
● Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross
violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession. It may be true that
they have a lien upon the client's funds, documents and other
papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they
may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have
been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the
satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these
considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly
account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct. In any event, they must
still exert all effort to protect their client's interest
within the bounds of law.
● If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the
bar, and to the public. Respondent fell short of this standard
when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted
to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint
promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does not
exculpate him from his breach of duty.
● On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to
disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar
must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the
character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.
 ● WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of
violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as
the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include
a copy in respondent's file.

•Hadjula v. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 2007

FACTS:
[C]omplainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as
they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP), claimed that
she approached respondent for some legal advice and further alleged
that in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be
kept confidential she disclosed personal secrets only to be informed
later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter
to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of
respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had
already heard her secrets.[R]espondent denied giving legal advice to
the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the
observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive
documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the
BFP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Atty. Madiana breached her duty of preserving the
confidence of a client and violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility

HELD:
YES. Respondent was reprimanded and admonished.

RATIO:
The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to
seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved
between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain
restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the
burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer,
respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential
information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The
seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Supreme
Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling
evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to
condone the error of respondent’s ways, what at bottom is before the
Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing
charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever
convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the
personal information respondent gathered from her conversation with
complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end
of the day, it appears clear to the Court that respondent was
actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in
the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating
the rule on confidentiality.

3) Duty to serve as counsel de oficio

•Rule 14.02, CPR
•ROC Rule 138, Sec. 31
•ROC Rule 138, Sec. 20 (h)
•ROC Rule 116, Sec. 6-8
•ROC Rule 124, Sec. 2
•P.D. No. 543
•Ledesma v. Climaco, G.R. No. 23815, June 28, 1974
•People v. Sta. Teresa, G.R. No. 130663, March 20, 2001

D. Fidelity to client's cause

(1) Duty of fidelity to the client's cause
•CPR Canon 17

•Angalan vs. Delante, 578 SCRA 113 (2009)

AC No. 7181
February 6, 2009
(en banc)

FACTS:

In April 1971, herein complainants mortgaged 8.102 hectares of their

property to the Eustaquio espouses in consideration of a loan in the
amount of P15,000. The Eustaquios prepared a document and sked the
complainants to sign it; but because complainants were illiterates,
they affixed their marks instead. It turned out that the document was
a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. Hence, TCT
No. 9926 was issued in the name of Navarro Eustaquio.

Complainants engaged the services of respondent Atty. Leonido Delante

in November 1971 as shown in the receipt by respondent of P12,000
representing full payment of his professional fees from the
complainants. Thereafter, an amicable settlement was entered into
between complainants and the Eustaquios which stipulated that the
complainants would repurchase the lot at P30,000. But since the
complainants did not have the money, Atty. Delante advanced the money
to complainants, possessed the property and gathered its produce.

When the complainants tried to repay the money and recover the
property, Atty. Delante refused. Complainants learned that Delante
transferred the title of the property to his name as evidenced by TCT
No. T-57932.

On April 30, 2004, complainants filed with the RTC of Davao a

complaint for (1) nullification of the deed of absolute sale, and (2)
nullification of TCT No. T-57932; and on December 28, 2005 charged
respondent with gross violation of the Code Professional
Responsibilty. In April 2007, complainants filed with the Court a
motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of
desistance.

ISSUES:

(1.) Whether or not a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment

and an affidavit of desistance terminates the disbarment proceeding;

(2.) Whether or not respondent committed grave violation of the Code

of Professional Responsibility when he bought the property of his
clients without their consent and against their will.

HELD:

1. A motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit

of desistance is immaterial. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court states that, “No investigation shall be interrupted or
terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same.”

2. Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. Canon 16 states that lawyers shall hold in trust all
properties of their clients that may come into their possession.
Respondent should have held in trust TCT No. T-9926 and returned the
property to complainants upon demand. Instead of holding in trust the
property of complainants, respondent (1) transferred the title of the
property to his name, (2) refused to return the property to
complainants, and (3) referred to complainants’ charges as malicious
and untruthful.

Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and

confidence reposed in them. Respondent should have been mindful of
the trust and confidence complainants reposed in him. Complainants
allege that they are illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio took
advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of respondent in
the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of
protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage
of complainants and transferred the title of the property to his
name.
Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, the Court finds
the recommended penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17
constitutes gross misconduct. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Court for gross misconduct.

A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate

clients and who is incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a
lawyer.

The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons

16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS that his
name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

•Quilban v. Robinol
April 10, 1989| Per Curiam
Canon 14 > Rule 14.02 Valid Ground for Refusal

FACTS:
 Colegio de San Jose used to own a parcel of land at the
Seminary Road, Barrio Bathala, Quezon City. Fr. Escaler was the
administrator. It sold said land to the Quezon City Government
as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital. Squatters,
however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966.

 The Colegio gave permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to

construct buildings in the said land. Seeing the crowded
shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc broached to Father
Escaler the idea of donating or selling the land cheap to the
squatters. Following that advice, the squatters formed
t“Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala” , with Bernabe
Martin as President.

 Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he

connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other
Samahan members. The land was ultimately sold to Rivera at P15
per square meter (SP=P15/sqm; FMV=P100-P120/sqm). Rivera
obtained TCT No. 175662 to the property in his name alone.

 32 families filed a civil case against Rivera, with the hat

said defendants be ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in
favor of said plaintiffs after reimbursement. CFI QC dismissed
the case.

 To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the

Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R.
Robinol for which he was paid P2,000. He was also to be given
by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case,
 equal to the portion that would pertain to each of them. This
was confirmed through writing. In November 1978, CA reversed
CFI’s ruling.

 To raise P41,961.65 (amount paid by Rivera), the Samahan

officers collected, little by little, P2,500 from each head of
family. P68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the
officers. The 75,000 was fully paid in June 1979.

 The officers learned that Atty. Robinol had not yet turned over
the said amount. His defense was there was a motion of
intervention filed. But, such motion was already dismissed long
before.

 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a “first consensus” to

change their counsel. The officers of the Samahan thereafter
approached Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their
counsel.

 Upon Atty. Montemayor’s advice, the officers sent Atty.

Robinol a letter dated 17 March 1980 informing the latter of
their decision to terminate his services and demanding the
return of the P75,000.
 The Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before
this Court requesting the investigation of Atty. Robinol for
refusal to return the P75,000.00 and praying that the Court
exercise its power of discipline over members of the Bar
unworthy to practice law.

 [Defense] Instead of getting a portion of the property that

will pertain to each of the plaintiffs, he wants his portion
converted to cash, and the cash equivalent of his portion is
P50,000 and he is ready to give back the amount of P12,470.00.

 Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment against Atty.

Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily
accepted the case without his (Robinol’s) formal withdrawal
and conformity and knowing fully well that there was no
consensus of all the plaintiffs to discharge him as their
counsel.

 [Defense] There was substantial compliance with Sec. 26, Rule

138 of the Rules of Court, as shown by the formal entry of
appearance in Civil Case, written consent of clients, notice to
Atty. Robinol, non-objection of Atty. Robinol in Atty.
Montemayor’s appearance and implied consent of the court.
 SolGen: Suspend Atty. Robinol for 3 mos, Dismiss Atty.
Montemayor’s case.
ISSUE: W/N the Atty. Robinol had a valid ground of his refusal to
render his service properly to the informal settlers? NO!

RULING:
 He had a change of mind and decided to convert the payment of
his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of
the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he alleges to be the
monetary value of that area. He had no right to unilaterally do
so. It was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients
were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence. They
had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P2,500.00
per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived
of the same by one who, after having seen the color of money,
heartlessly took advantage of them.

 Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly

dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain the
money in his possession:
o His clients had lost confidence in him for he had
obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of
their interests, which he was dutybound to protect.
o He is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients’
funds intended for a specific purpose

 The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed

without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he
would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services.
There was an express contract and a stipulated mode of
compensation. The implied assumption quantum meruit, therefore,
is inapplicable.

 Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the

practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay
any man for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity
to his clients. He has also brought the profession into
disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and
reliance for the fulfillment of a lifetime ambition to acquire
a homelot they could call their own.

DISPOSITION: In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty. Santiago R.

Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer’s oath to
delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer
and client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice
of law.

NOTES:
Re: Atty. Montemayor
 We agree with the findings of the Solicitor General that he has
not exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical
conduct. 32 filed the civil case. 7 were to be inhibited for
 non-payment of atty’s fees. 21 decided to change counsels.
21/25 > more than simple majority. He had in no way encroached
upon the professional employment of a colleague.
 Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R.
Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

•Cantiller vs. Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246 (1989)

FACTS: Humberto V. Potenciano is a practicing lawyer and a member of

the Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862. He is charged with deceit,
fraud, and misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct,
malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an officer of the court.
An action for ejectment was filed against Peregrina Cantiller. The
court issued a decision against the latter. A notice to vacate was
then issued against Cantiller. Cantiller then asked the respondent to
handle their case. The complainant was made to sign by respondent
what she described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and
haphazardly composed petition for annulment of judgment”. The
petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Manila.
Later, Cantiller paid Potenciano P2,000.00 as demanded by the latter
which was allegedly needed to be paid to another judge who will issue
the restraining order but eventually Potenciano did not succeed in
locating the judge. Complainant paid P 10,000.00 to Potenciano by
virtue of the demand of the latter. The amount was allegedly to be
deposited with the Treasurer's Office of Pasig as purchase price of
the apartment and P 1,000.00 to cover the expenses of the suit needed
in order for the complainant to retain the possession of the
property. But later on Cantiller found out that the amounts were not
necessary to be paid. A demand was made against Potenciano but the
latter did
not answer and the amounts were not returned. Contrary to
Potenciano’s promise that he would secure a restraining order, he
withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was
not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Hence, the order to
vacate was eventually enforced and executed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Potenciano breached his duties as counsel of

Cantiller

HELD: When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that

he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final
conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment
of a client's cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the
client had reposed on him. The acts of respondent in this case
violate the most elementary principles of professional ethics.
The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in
protecting his client's interests. Respondent had knowledge
beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge to withdraw
his appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite such
prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a replacement nor
did he inform complainant of this fact. Lawyers should be fair,
honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing
with their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary
business proposition. It is a matter of public interest.

WHEREFORE, after considering the entirety of the circumstances

present in this case, this Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano
to be guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from
the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he can
demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume
the practice of law.

Finally, respondent is hereby ordered to return to complainant herein

the sum of eleven thousand pesos (P11,000.00) with legal interest
from the date of this resolution until it is actually returned.

• In re Maquera, 435 SCRA 417 (2004)

Maquera’s acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension

from practice of law in that jurisdiction are also valid ground for
his suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines.

FACTS: On August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain

Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case. Atty.
Leon Maquera served as Castro’s counsel in said case. Maquera was
admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On October 18,
1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of
Guam. Castro’s property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was
to
be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to
Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of redemption over the
property for one year. The right of redemption could be exercised by
paying the amount of the judgment debt within the aforesaid period.
At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castro’s property for Five
Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$500.00), the amount which Castro was adjuged
to pay him. On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of
Maquera’s legal services in the civil case involving Benavente,
entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of
redemption in favor of the latter. On January 8, 1988, Maquera
exercised Castro’s right of redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00
in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the
title to the property transferred in his name. On January 15, 1994,
the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee) conducted hearings
regarding Maquera’s alleged misconduct. On May 7, 1996, the Superior
Court of Guam rendered its Decision suspending Maquera from the
practice of law in Guam for a period of two (2) years and ordering
him to take the MultiState Professional Responsibility Examination
(MPRE) within that period. On the basis of the Decision of the
Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the said
court found Maquera liable for misconduct, “there is no evidence to
establish that Maquera committed a breach of ethics in the
Philippines.” However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him
indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of
the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal
of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under
Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar who was

disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted
the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same
infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction

HELD: Maquera’s acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year

suspension from the practice of law in that jurisdiction are also
valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the
Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyer’s sworn duty to act
with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states
that “[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall
be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him;” and Rule 1.01
which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is
also a continuing requirement to maintain one’s good’s standing in
the legal profession. The Guam Superior Court’s judgment ordering
Maquera’s suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not
automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds
for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if
the basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds
for
disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment
of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence
of Maquera’s unethical acts as a lawyer. More fundamentally, due
process demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself
and to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in
an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer
must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is only
after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent
lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that an
investigation may be conducted ex parte.
Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be suspended
or disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the disciplinary
proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his
subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction.

•Mattus v. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922, October 1, 2013

FACTS:
The complainant were the accused in a case for estafa thru
falsification of public document so they engaged the services of
Atty. Villaseca to represent them in the proceedings. The complainant
maintained that she and German were convicted due to Atty.
Villaseca’s gross and inexcusable negligence in performing his
duties as their counsel. In her complaintaffidavit, the complainant
alleged, among others, that Atty. Villaseca: (1) was often absent
during court hearings but still collected appearance fees; (2)
frequently sought the postponement of trial when he was present; (3)
failed to ask the RTC to direct a NBI expert to examine the
signatures of the spouses Leslie and Zuraida Porter in the special
power of attorney (SPA); (4) failed to file a demurrer to evidence
despite having been granted sufficient time by the RTC to submit one;
(5) failed to present evidence on behalf of the defense, and only
filed a memorandum; (6) did not inform her and German of the dates of
the presentation of defense evidence and the promulgation of
judgment; and (7) erroneously indicated the wrong case number inthe
notice of appeal. According to the complainant, Atty. Villaseca’s
negligence in handling the case resulted in her own and her
husband’s conviction. Atty. Villaseca explained that he made known
to the complainant that the testimony of a handwriting expert was
necessary only if the prosecution would be able to produce the
original copy of the SPA. Atty. Villaseca also claimed that his
absences during the hearings, as well as his numerous motions for
postponement, were justified and were never intended for delay. He
denied having collected appearance fees when he didnot attend the
scheduled hearings, and maintained that the fees he received were
intended to compensate him for his services in the other cases filed
by the complainant. Atty. Villaseca further claimed that he
immediately corrected the case number in the notice of appeal when he
discovered this error.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Villaseca should be held liable for violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING:
YES. The Court stressed at the outset that a lawyer “is expected to
exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his client’s cause,
for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves
the ends of justice.” Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a
client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He owes entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld
from his client, save by the rules of law,legally applied. A lawyer
who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does
honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to
the legal profession. A lawyer engaged to represent a client bears
the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost
diligence.

Atty. Villaseca was suspended from the practice of law for five (5)
years, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

(2) Duty to give candid, honest advice on merits and prospects of

case
•CPR Rule 15.05: Candid, honest advice on prospects of case
•Rule 7, Sec. 3, Rules of Court

•Lopez v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-28078, April 29, 1971

An original action for certiorari  challenging a judgment of the

Court of Appeals as null and void for having been allegedly entered
in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.

On August 7, 1961, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered

judgment approving the money claim of respondent Pedro A. Aquino
against the petitioner estate by ordering the then special
administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria, "to pay from the
available funds of the estate the sum of P20,000.00 with 12% interest
per annum from June 10, 1954 to Pedro A. Aquino."

Both parties appealed from the said judgment to the Court of Appeals,
insofar as it was adverse to them, and on January 20, 1967, the
appellate court in an extended nineteen-page decision penned by
Justice Ruperto C. Martin, which dealt mainly and exhaustively with
the contentions of appellant estate, found for respondent as
appellant, and affirmed the lower court's judgment with modifications
in favor of respondent, as follows: "IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, except
with the modification of the order as to the payment of the
corresponding interest stipulated in the promissory note (Exhibit C)
the claim of Atty. Pedro A. Aquino is hereby approved and allowed,
and the administratrix ordered to pay, from the available funds of
the estate, the sum of P20,000.00 with compound interest at the rate
of 12% per annum from July 27, 1953, plus P500.00 as attorney's fees,
to Pedro A. Aquino."

According to the present petition itself, the estate's counsel of

record in the appellate court, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive
the notice and copy of the appellate court's judgment sent to him by
registered mail; but the estate's attorneys in the intestate
proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del
Castillo and Macaraeg, were verbally informed by respondent's counsel
of the judgment rendered on appeal by the appellate court.1

Pursuant to said information, petitioner caused to be filed on March

9, 1967, with the appellate court an "Appearance with Motions for
Substitution and to be served with a copy of the Judgment,"
stating inter alia, that the former special administratrix, Asuncion
Domingo Sta. Maria had long resigned as such with the permission of
the intestate court, that the other co-special administrator, Atty.
Luis Domingo, Jr. (who had caused the prosecution of the appeal) was
removed from his trust by the intestate court's order dated May 21,
1963, for having squandered cash funds of the estate, and that as a
consequence, Mrs. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez was appointed judicial
administratrix and has since been administering the estate alone;
that Mrs. Lopez as judicial administratrix wished to file a motion
for reconsideration of the appellate court's judgment and that the
clerk of court be directed to serve copy of said judgment on her
counsel instead of on Atty. Unson as the former special
administrator's counsel "for purposes of starting of time to move for
re-hearing or reconsideration;" and praying that as present judicial
administratrix, she be substituted in lieu of the former joint
administrators and that her counsel be served with copy of the
appellate court's decision.

Upon due opposition of respondent on the ground of finality of the

judgment, the appellate court denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration per its resolution of April 27, 1967.

No further move was made by petitioner thereafter until almost five

months later when on September 23, 1967, after respondent had filed
in the intestate court a motion for execution of the judgment, as
affirmed in his favor by the appellate court, it filed the present
petition. Upon the representations — contrary to the records — that
the appellate court had granted "new or further relief" in favor of
respondent by awarding compound interest on the sum due respondent
and that Atty. Unson has ceased to be the estate's lawyer since May
21, 1963 with the removal of the former administrator, Luis Domingo,
Jr. as such, the Court issued on October 3, 1967, the corresponding
summons and required respondents to answer the petition.
The Court, upon urgent supplemental petition of petitioner, further
issued on November 7, 1967, upon a P1,000.00 bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement, through sale of the
estate's properties, of the appellate court's judgment.

The court finds no merit in the petition.

1. The records at bar amply show that Atty. Jose A. Unson was the
counsel on record of the petitioner estate in the appellate court and
never filed any withdrawal as such counsel. As a matter of fact, even
after the removal on May 21, 1963 of Luis Domingo, Jr. as
administrator of the estate, Atty. Unson filed in the appellate court
his memorandum dated August 17, 1963, for the estate as appellant.
While it may be true that Atty. Unson ceased as counsel for the
estate and for the former administrator sometime on November 8,
1966, when the intestate court granted his motion dated November 2,
1966, to withdraw as counsel by virtue of his appointment to and
assumption on February 8, 1966 of the public office of Assistant
Administrator of the Sugar Quota Administration,2 this was true only
insofar as the case in the intestate court was concerned. He
continued on record in the appellate court as counsel for the estate
as appellant therein and did not file therein any withdrawal as
counsel and neither did the petitioner inform said court of any
change of counsel or of party-administrator, as required by Rule 138,
section 26 of the Rules of Court. More so, no appearance of any new
counsel for the estate was ever filed with the appellate court.

2. Notice and copy of the appellate court's decision of January 20,

1967, were therefore duly served by registered mail on the estate's
counsel of record at his address of record at 307 Trinity Building,
San Luis, Ermita Manila in accordance with Rule 13, section 8 of the
Rules of Court.3 And in accordance with said Rule, service by
registered mail of the appellate court's decision upon the
petitioner's counsel of record was deemed completed and effected upon
the addressee's failure to claim his mail on the fifth day after the
first notice of the postmaster.4 This has ever since been the
prevailing rule in the interests of public policy and sound
administration of justice, as most recently affirmed in Fojas vs.
Navarro,5 citing a long line of applicable precedents.

3. The present administratrix gives no satisfactory explanation as to

her failure to substitute herself vice Luis Domingo, Jr., since the
latter's removal on May 21, 1963, when she became the sole
administrator (which she previously shared with Luis from December
21, 1961), or to then engage new counsel vice Atty. Unson in the
appellate court. Her very motion for substitution filed on March 9,
1967  with the appellate court after its decision of January 20,
1967  recognized the fact that the appellate court had already duly
handed down its adverse decision and merely expressed her wish to
belatedly file a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the
petitioner estate. After the appellate court's denial of her motion
on April 27, 1967, she was apparently resigned to the futility of
filing any such motion, in view of the finality  of the appellate
court's decision — for such motion was never filed.

4. One vital factor that the present administratrix, Mrs. Lopez, has
obviously failed to appreciate, wittingly or otherwise, is that the
party in the Subject case was the intestate estate of the deceased
Luis C. Domingo, Sr. and that Atty. Unson represented the estate as
counsel in the said case. The fact that his services were engaged by
Luis Domingo, Jr. in his (Luis') official capacity as administrator,
did not make him the personal counsel of Luis. Thus, nothwithstanding
Luis' removal as administrator, Atty. Unson continued to represent
the estate as counsel in the appellate court. He continued to be
authorized to represent the estate as its counsel, until the new
administrator should terminate his services, which she never did.

5. The representations made by the present administrator and her

counsel in the petition at bar — filed almost five months after the
appellate court's denial of her belated motion for substitution and
to be served with copy of its decision — to the effect that the
appellate court had granted respondent "new and further relief" in
its decision by the award of compound interest on the sum due
respondent are deplorable. They failed to set out before the Court
the full facts, viz, that respondent had duly prayed for the award
of compound interest by the intestate court in accordance with the
very stipulation of the promissory note sued upon; that respondent
had duly moved the intestate court to reconsider its decision failing
to provide for such compound interest; that the intestate court, in
denying respondent's motion, merely stated "that the issue may just
as well be decided in the appellate court, since both parties had
indicated their intention to appeal; and that respondent in fact
filed his appeal from this adverse portion of the intestate court's
decision, as well as the non-award of the stipulated attorney's fees
of P500.00. The appellate court therefore properly modified the
intestate court's decision by awarding such compound interest and
attorney's fees as prayed for in the errors assigned in respondent's
brief as appellant.

6. It results clearly that the petition, alleging and praying that

the appellate court's decision of January 20, 1967, be declared null
and void for having been rendered and entered in excess of or without
jurisdiction or that this Court send for the records from the
appellate court "for purposes of review and thereafter render its own
decision reversing the judgment [of the appellate court]"
notwithstanding its long having become final and executory, is
utterly untenable and without legal justification.

7. Petitioner's counsel are reminded of this Court's admonition

in Pajares vs. Abad Santos,6 and other cases cited therein, to wit,
that "the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so
that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases
may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7,
section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that 'the signature of
an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay'  and expressly admonishes that 'for a willful
violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary
action.' "

WHEREFORE, the petition is ordered dismissed and petitioner's counsel

shall pay treble costs. The writ of preliminary injunction issued of
November 7, 1967 is hereby dissolved and upon promulgation of this
decision, respondent may proceed immediately with the enforcement and
execution by the intestate court of the appellate court's judgment of
January 20, 1967, in his favor. This decision shall be noted in the
personal record of the counsel for petitioner and of their associate
attorney, Teodoro P. Regino, who signed and verified the petition. So
ordered.

•Gillego v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-27428, May 29, 1971

Direct appeal on a question of law from the order of the Court of

First Instance of Sorsogon dismissing appellant's petition for
certiorari seeking to restrain the execution of a judgment of
ejectment rendered by the municipal court of Matnog, Sorsogon, on the
ground of the latter court's alleged loss of jurisdiction over the
ejectment case after the lapse of one year from the filing of the
complaint.

On January 15, 1964, respondents Salvacion Diaz and Manuel Gata filed
a complaint for ejectment and illegal detainer of a certain
residential property against petitioner before the municipal court of
Matnog, Sorsogon, presided by respondent judge Mayorico Gallanosa.

After numerous postponements attributed by respondents to the efforts

of respondent judge to effect an amicable settlement of the case
(petitioner's wife being the sister of respondent Salvacion Diaz) and
to postponements secured by the parties, judgment of ejectment was
rendered on November 1, 1965 by respondent judge, sentencing "the
defendant Leodigario Gillego and other occupants therein to vacate
the premises as soon as possible, to pay the amount of P315.00 as
rentals in arrears at the rate of P15.00 a month which is considered
a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises
from the final filing of the complaint to date, and finally to pay
P100.00 as attorney's fee and the cost of this action."
The judgment having become final and executory, respondents filed on
February 16, 1966 the corresponding motion for execution of judgment,
but petitioner filed with the lower court on March 22, 1966 the
present petition for certiorari with injunction, praying for a
declaration of nullity of the judgment of ejectment on the sole
ground that "the said decision of the respondent Municipal Judge of
Matnog, rendered on November 1, 1965 is null and void ab initio for
the reason that the same was rendered by him after he has lost
jurisdiction over the case due to the lapse of one year from the date
of filing of the complaint.

The lower court made short shrift of the petition, and issued its
order of May 3, 1966, dismissing the petition without costs, upon the
authority of Alejandro vs. Court of First Instance of
1 2 3
Bulacan,  Barrueco vs. Abeto,  Gallano vs. Rivera  and Casilan vs.
Tomassi,4 and ruling that "(T)he Municipal Judge of Matnog,
Sorsogon, did not lose jurisdiction over the case just for the reason
that the decision was rendered more than one year after the filing of
the complaint."

Hence, this appeal which the Court finds bereft of merit.

Sections 9 and 11 of Rule 4 of the old Rules of Court (now Rule 5,

sections 8 and 10) providing that "Adjournment. — Inferior courts
may adjourn the hearing of an action from day to day as the interest
of justice requires, but shall not have power to adjourn hearings for
a longer period than five (5) days for each adjournment, nor for more
than fifteen (15) in all," and that at the conclusion of trial, the
municipal judge shall render judgment, "But he may adjourn the
disposition of the case to a stated day, not exceeding one week from
the time of conclusion of the trial, for the consideration of the
judgment, if he requires time for consideration" — have long been
uniformly held by the Court in the above-entitled cases of Alejandro,
Gallano and Casilanto be merely directory in character, a violation
or non-observance of which would not nullify the judicial proceeding,
although a willful disregard or reckless violation thereof by a judge
would constitute a breach or neglect of duty which may subject him to
appropriate administrative action.

In Casilan, where the Court reaffirmed anew the above-cited cases,

including Barrueco  involving the counterpart provision of Rule 31,
section 4 of the old Rules of Court (now Rule 22, section 3) for
courts of first instance, the Court stressed that the requirement in
the cited Rule "for the judge of an inferior court to decide a case
within one week after trial is not jurisdictional and that a
violation thereof does not render the decision void but subjects the
judge to disciplinary action."

The Court has but last month reaffirmed the doctrine in People vs.
Catolico  5 emphasizing that (I)ndeed, the Rule could not but be
directory rather than mandatory in character, for it could not have
been possibly intended to divest without sanction of law the trial
courts of their jurisdiction and authority to try and decide cases
within their competent jurisdiction, as conferred by statute."

The earlier case of Monteblanco vs. Hinigaran Sugar

Plantations6 cited by petitioner-appellant clearly has no
application to the present case. In that case, the action for
detainer first instituted in 1924 was not sought to be reactivated
until after more than eight years later in 1933, and the ratio
decidendi  was that "(F)or purposes of the law, the case had died in
the justice of the peace court one year after it had been remanded
thereto by the Court of First Instance, with no step having been
taken towards its termination in one way or another." Plaintiffs
there had been deemed to have abandoned their detainer suit after the
lapse of over eight years, with the consequent loss of jurisdiction
of the inferior court over the case, since, as stated by the Court.
"(I)t is known that under the law (Acts Nos. 3881 and 4115), justice
of the peace courts alone have jurisdiction in cases of forcible
entry and detainer, when the action arising therefrom is commenced
within one year from the time said acts took place."

Petitioner, in his brief on appeal, would belatedly assail the

municipal court's ejectment judgment against him on the alleged
ground that the said suit should have been considered as one between
members of the same family under Article 222 of the Civil Code (since
he is a brother-in-law of respondent Salvacion Diaz) and it had not
been shown that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made
but failed, as enjoined by said codal provision.
Assuming arguendo the applicability of the cited article, it is
much too late now for petitioner to raise this question for the first
time here on appeal. Not having raised it in the ejectment suit,
which has long become final and executory he is barred now by laches
and waiver from invoking the cited provision. Not having raised it
either in his petition for certiorari below, where the sole issue
raised by him was the alleged nullity of the municipal court's
ejectment judgment "for loss of jurisdiction over the case due to the
lapse of one year from the date of filing of the complaint," he is
doubly barred from raising it for the first time in this appeal,
under the well-settled principle that issues of fact or of law not
properly brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal and will not be considered by the
reviewing court.7

The case at bar recalls to mind the Court admonition, through Mr.
Justice J. B. L. Reyes, in a similarly unmeritorious case8 that
"(T)he circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove
that appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and
prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves severe
condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that the courts could well
devote to meritorious cases." In Lopez vs. Aquino9 promulgated last
month, the Court exhorted counsel that "the cooperation of litigants
and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court
dockets with umneritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more
faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which
provides that 'the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support
it; and that it is interposed for delay'  and expressly admonishes
that 'for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be
subjected to disciplinary action'."

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed and

petitioner's counsel shall pay treble costs in both instances. Let
this decision be noted in the personal record of petitioner's
counsel.

•Canon 8, Canons of Professional Ethics

(3) Duty to discourage litigation and settle controversies outside of

court whenever
possible
•CPR Rule 1.03: Not encourage any suit or proceeding
•Saburnido vs. Madrono, G.R. AC No. 4497, Sept. 26, 2001
•CPR Rule 1.04
•CPR Rule 15.04
•Castaneda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 (1975)
•ADR Act of 2004, Rep. Act No. 9285, Chapters 1 & 2

(4) Duty to serve client with competence and diligence

•CPR Canon 18

•Tejano v. Baterina, A.C. No. 8235, January 27, 2015

FACTS: Joselito Tejano charged Judge Dominador Arguelada and his

lawyer, Benjamin Baterina for allegedly acting in conspiracy with one
another to take possession of his family’s property. According to
him, he filed a case for recovery of possession and damages in Civil
Case No. 4046-V against the Province of Ilocos Sur when the latter
built an access road traversing their property without instituting an
expropriation proceeding. The case was raffled to Branch 21 of the
Vigan City RTC in October 1988. Prior to his appointment to the
court, Judge Arguelada was the prosecutor in Branch 21 and
represented the province of Ilocos Sur. In his affidavit, Tejano
alleged that the judge and Atty. Baterina colluded with each other in
the former’s bid to take over his family’s property, as shown by
the fact that the judge was collecting rentals from the squatters in
the property. With respect to Atty. Baterina, Tejano alleged that the
latter miserably failed advance his cause. Specifically, Tejano
alleged that Atty. Baterina:
1) failed to object when the judge waived their right to present
evidence after several postponements of the hearing, despite the fact
that his mother was ill at the hospital;
2) manifested in open court that he would file a motion for
reconsideration of the order, but did not file the same;
3) manifested in open court that he would not be presenting any more
witnesses without consulting them; and
4) failed to file his formal offer of exhibits despite order from the
court.

Since the OCA had no jurisdiction to hear the case against Baterina,
the latter referred the case to the Court, which required Baterina to
file his Comment. In his Compliance after the court required him to
show cause why he should not be held liable for failing to file his
comment, Baterina explained that he is recuperating from a kidney
ailment; he explained that the reason he could not attend the case
was that in 2002, he was suspended from the practice of law for two
years, which fact he made known to Tejano mother and sister. Even
so, the trial court did not appoint a lawyer for the plaintiff, and
proceeded to hear the case without plaintiff’s lawyer. The culprit
in Tejano predicament was the displayed bias and undue conflict of
interest of Judge Arguelada.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Baterina is guilty of gross

Negligence

HELD: YES. The Code of Professional Responsibility governing

the conduct of lawyers, states:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH

COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
x x x x
RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the

status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client’s request for information.

Lawyers have a “fourfold duty to society, the legal profession,

the courts and their clients,” and must act “in accordance with
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility.”When a lawyer agrees to
take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due
diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s
services are engaged, “he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care
and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed on him.”” A lawyer’s acceptance
to take up a case “impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to
its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and
executory.”Atty. Baterina’s duty to his clients did not
automatically cease with his suspension. At the very least, such
suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his
clients that he would be unable to attend to their case and advise
them to retain another counsel. A lawyer – even one suspended from
practicing the profession – owes it to his client to not “sit idly
by and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty.””
The client “should never be left groping in the dark” and instead
must be “adequately and fully informed about the developments in his
case.”Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed
the proceedings to run its course without any effort to safeguard his
clients’ welfare in the meantime. His failure to file the required
pleadings on his clients’ behalf constitutes gross negligence in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibilityy and renders him
subject to disciplinary action.The penalties for a lawyer’s failure
to file the required brief or pleading range from warning, reprimand,
fine, suspension, or in grave cases, disbarment. Further, Atty.
Baterina’s reckless disregard for orders and directives of the
courts is unbecoming of a member of the Bar. His conduct has shown
that he has little respect for rules, court processes, and even for
the Court’s disciplinary authority. Not only did he fail to follow
the trial court’s orders in his clients’ case, he even disregarded
court orders in his own disciplinary proceedings. Considering Atty.
Baterina’s medical condition at that time, a simple explanation to
the Court would have sufficed. Instead, however, he simply let the
orders go unheeded, neglecting his duty to the Court. Lawyers, as
this Court has previously emphasized, “are particularly called upon
to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost
in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the
court.” As such, Atty. Baterina should “know that a resolution of
this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be
complied with promptly and completely.”

WHEREFORE, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY  of gross

negligence. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5)
years. He is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

•Llunar v. Ricafort, A.C. No. 6484, June 16, 2015

FACTS:
In September, 2000, Adelita engaged the services of Atty. Romulo
Ricafort for the recovery of a parcel of land owned by the Banez
family but which was fraudulently registered to a different name. 
The lot was the subject of foreclosure proceedings, hence, Adelita
gave to Atty. Ricafort the amount of P95,000.00 (partial redemption
fee, as filing fees, and attorneys fees). Three years later,
complainant learned that Atty. Ricafort did not file any case with
the RTC of Legazpi City, hence, she demanded the return of
P95,000.00. The latter averred that there was a complaint for
annulment of title filed against Ard Cervantes, though not him, but
by another lawyer.  Thus, he was willing to refund the amount less
the P50,000.00 which he gave to Atty. Abitria.  Adelita refused to
recognize the case filed by Atty. Abitria, insisting she did not hire
him as counsel; also, the complaint was filed three years late and
the property cannot be redeemed from the bank anymore.She also
learned that Atty. Ricafort was indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law since 2002 in A.C. No. 5054, thus she suspected it
was the reason why another lawyer filed the case.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ricafort should be held administratively liable

RULING:
The respondent is found guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings
with his client and in engaging in the practice of law while under
indefinite suspension, and thus impose upon him the ultimate penalty
of DISBARMENT.

The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him

liable for grave misconduct. First, the respondent did not exert due
diligence in handling the complainant’s case. He failed to act
promptly in redeeming the complainant’s property within the period
of redemption. What is worse is the delay of three years before a
complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court. The
respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant’s case and
wasted precious time and opportunity that were then readily available
to recover the complainant’s property. Under these facts, the
respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which states that “a lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.”

Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts

given to him by the complainant for handling the latter’s case. On
three separate occasions, the respondent received from the
complainant the amounts of P19,000.00, P70,000.00, and P6,500.00 for
purposes of redeeming the mortgaged property from the bank and filing
the necessary civil case/s against Ard Cervantes. The complainant
approached the respondent several times thereafter to follow up on
the case/s to be filed supposedly by the respondent who, in turn,
reassured her that actions on her case had been taken.
After the complainant discovered three years later that the
respondent had not filed any case in court, she demanded that the
respondent return the amount of P95,000.00, but her demand was left
unheeded. The respondent later promised to pay her, but until now, no
payment of any amount has been made. These facts confirm that the
respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates every lawyer
to “hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession”1  and to “account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.”2  In
addition, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds or
property he holds for his client gives rise to the presumption that
he has appropriated these funds or property for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client.3 

Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright

with the complainant that he was under indefinite suspension from the
practice of law. The respondent should have disclosed this fact at
the time he was approached by the complainant for his services. Canon
15 of the CPR states that “a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.”
The respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a member of the
Bar when he accepted the complainant’s case despite knowing that he
could not and should not practice law.

Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite

the indefinite suspension imposed on him. This infraction infinitely
aggravates the offenses he committed. Based on the above facts alone,
the penalty of suspension for five (5) years from the practice of law
would have been justified, but the respondent is not an ordinary
violator of the profession’s ethical rules; he is a repeat violator
of these rules.

•Rule 18.01
•Rule 18.02
•Rule 18.03: Not to neglect legal matters

•Legarda vs. CA, 209 SCRA 722 (1992)

TOPIC: AUHTORITY TO APPEAR, AUTHORITY TO BIND CLIENTS, COMPENSATION,

ATTY’S LIEN

“It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's

cause; he covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution
until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due
diligence or abandons his client's cause makes him unworthy of the
trust reposed on him by the
latter.”

Ponente: PER CURIAM (By the Court as a Whole), 1992

FACTS:
Legarda was the defendant in a case where private respondent, New
Cathay House compels her to sign the lease agreement in order to
operate a restaurant therein. After hearing, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by the Court. After which, Atty. Coronel
entered his appearance as counsel for the petitioner. Petitioner
failed to file her answer within the extended period granted by the
court. Upon motion by Private Respondent, she was declared in
default, thereby paving the way for the presentation of evidence ex
parte (without notice to or argument from the adverse party).Lower
Court rendered a decision by default in which damages were charged
against petitioner. No appeal was made by the respondent thus, the
decision became final, and upon motion of respondent, a writ of
execution was ordered. Petitioner’s property was levied and sold at
public auction. The one-year redemption period has expired, in which,
a final deed of sale was issued by the Sheriff.Petitioner with new
counsel filed a petition for the annulment of the decision before the
Court of Appeals. However, it was through Atty. Coronel that they
filed a consolidated comment in which they alleged that she was
deceived by a representative of New Cathay House; which made her to
believe that the respondent would withdraw the file complaint against
her, upon, their agreement on the conditions of lease. This prompt
her to advice her lawyer not to file an answer to the complaint
anymore. Court of Appeals dismissed the Appeal pronouncing that,
based on the facts; it is a case of simple neglect from Petitioner’s
Counsel who simply failed to answer on the defendants behalf.With no
further motion from the petitioner and her counsel, the Court of
Appeals’ decision became final. Petitioner was then ordered to
vacate her property. Legarda with a new counsel sought relief
(petition for Certiorari) in the Supreme Court alleging, among
others, that she was deprived of proper representation in court and
divested her of property through the gross negligence of her previous
counsel, Atty. Coronel. Supreme Court found merit in petitioner’s
motion and ordered the annulment of all the decisions rendered by the
lower court. It also ordered Atty. Coronel to show cause why he
should not be held administratively liable for his acts and omissions
which caused grave injustice to the petitioner. Even after he was
granted a 30 day extension, he failed to respond to the Court’s
order, and asked for another extension on the grounds that he was
hospitalized.

DECISION:
The second motion for extension of Atty. Coronel was denied, and he
was suspended for 6 months for gross negligence in the defense of
petitioner Legarda.

Atty. Coronel's failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and

attending to the interest of his client caused the latter material
prejudice. The Court held that the facts of the case clearly showed
that Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates that "A lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence." He failed to observe particularly
Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires that "A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."

•Endaya vs. Oca, 410 SCRA 344 (2003)

FACTS:
A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against Artemio
Endaya and his wife. An answer was prepared by a Mr. Ramirez for the
spouses. At the beginning of the preliminary conference, spouses
appeared without counsel. Endaya sought the services of the Public
Attorney’s Office. Atty. Oca was assigned to handle the case. At the
continuation of the prelim conference, Oca filed motion for amendment
of answer. Motion was denied. The judge then ordered all parties to
submit their affidavits and position papers. The court also said that
30 days after the submission of the last paper or upon expiration of
the period for filing, judgment shall be rendered on the case. Oca
failed to submit any affidavit or position paper. Nonetheless, the
complaint for unlawful detainer was dismissed because those who filed
the case were not really parties-in-interest. The case was appealed
to RTC. Oca failed to submit anything again. RTC reversed the MTC
decision. Spouses were ordered to vacate the property and pay a
certain amount for rentals. Endaya confronted Oca about the decision.
Oca feigned that he did not receive anything. Upon checking with the
clerk of court, Oca did indeed receive a copy of the decision. Hence
this administrative complaint.

ISSUE:
 W/N Oca committed professional misconduct

HELD:
YES. Suspended for 2 months from practice of law.

In his comment, Oca put up the defense that he did not file any
paper in the MCTC because it would just be a repetition of the
answer. Endaya filed his reply which just reiterated what he put in
his complaint. SC ordered Oca to file a rejoinder. Guess what, Oca
once again failed to file anything. Oca explained that he failed to
file a rejoinder because he believed in good faith that it was no
longer necessary. In the IBP investigation, Oca once again failed to
submit anything.

Oca only appeared once in the MCTC and practically abandoned the
spouses thereafter. The facts show that Oca failed to employ every
legal and honorable means to advance the cause of his client. For
intentionally failing to submit the pleadings required by the court,
respondent practically closed the door to the possibility of putting
up a fair fight for his client. Oca cannot just appear only once for
the spouses. A lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the
lawyer-client relationship is terminated. Oca’s story shows his
appalling indifference to his clients’ cause, deplorable lack of
respect for the courts and a brazen disregard of his duties as a
lawyer.

However, Endaya misrepresented that the original answer was

prepared by a non-lawyer when in fact it was prepared by a lawyer. He
also assured Oca that he had strong evidence to support their case.
Endaya never gave anything to Oca to support their claim.The PAO is
burdened with a heavy caseload. Given these circumstances the
professional conduct of Oca does not warrant disbarment.

•Carandang vs. Obmina, A.C. No. 7813, April 21, 2009

FACTS:
Carandang lost in an eviction case. He confronted his counsel, Atty.
Obmina, on why he had not inform him about his case and for not
appealing the same in the higher court. Carandang claimed that if
only his counsel inform him about his case, his reglementary period
to appeal the decision should not have been lapsed.Consequently,
Carandang filed a sworn-statement in the Commission on Bar discipline
of the IBP stating his complaint about what Atty. Obmina done to his
case. After the investigation, the IBP ruled that the respondent who
has in his possession the complete files and address of the
complainant, should have exerted efforts to even notify Mr. Carandang
as to what happened to his case. Whether the decision is adverse [to]
or in favor of his client, respondent is duty bound to notify the
clients pursuant to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Ethics which
provides that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence."  Further under Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, "a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."  Lastly, under Rule
18.04, "a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request
for information." That as a result of the respondent’s failure to
notify the complainant, the latter lost the case leading to his
eviction. Thus, the IBP suspended Atty. Obmina from the practice of
law for 1 year.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Obmina be suspended from the practice of law?

RULING:
YES.
Canon 18 states that "[a] lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence." Rules 18.03 and 18.04 provide that "[a]
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable" and "[a]
lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information."
Contrary to Atty. Obmina’s promise, there is no evidence on record
that Atty. Obmina took the initiative to notify Carandang of the
trial court’s adverse decision. Atty. Obmina again put Carandang at
fault for failure to advance the appeal fee. Atty. Obmina’s futile
efforts of shifting the blame on Carandang only serve to emphasize
his failure to notify Carandang that the trial court already
promulgated a decision in Civil Case No. B-5109 that was adverse to
Carandang’s interests. Atty. Obmina cannot overlook the fact that
Carandang learned about the promulgation of the decision not through
Atty. Obmina himself, but through a chance visit to the trial court.
Instead of letting Carandang know of the adverse decision himself,
Atty. Obmina should have immediately contacted Carandang, explained
the decision to him, and advised them on further steps that could be
taken. It is obvious that Carandang lost his right to file an appeal
because of Atty. Obmina’s inaction. Notwithstanding Atty. Obmina’s
subsequent withdrawal as Carandang’s lawyer, Atty. Obmina was still
counsel of record at the time the trial court promulgated the
decision in Civil Case No. B-5109.In Tolentino v. Mangapit, we
stated that:

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform

her client of whatever information she may have acquired which it is
important that the client should have knowledge of. She should notify
her client of any adverse decision to enable her client to decide
whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the client
informed of the developments of the case will minimize
misunderstanding and [loss] of trust and confidence in the attorney.
The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is
ever present the need for the lawyer to inform timely and
adequately the client of important developments affecting the
client’s case. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests.

The Court finds well-taken the recommendation of the IBP to suspend

Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina from the practice of law for one year.

•Agot vs. Rivera, 732 SCRA 12 (2014)

Legal Ethics; Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 18, Rule 18.03; Canon 16,
Rule 16.01
FACTS:
Respondent undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US
immigrant visa in complainant’s favor prior to the scheduled
wedding. In consideration therefor, complainant paid respondent the
amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment and undertook to pay the balance
of P350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa. The parties
likewise stipulated that should complainant’s visa application be
denied for any reason other than her absence on the day of the
interview and/or for records of criminal conviction and/or any court
issued hold departure order, respondent is obligated to return the
said downpayment. However, respondent failed to perform his
undertaking within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even
scheduled for interview in the US Embassy. As the demand for refund
of the down payment was not heeded, complainant filed a criminal
complaint for
estafa and the instant administrative complaint against respondent.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and
accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension
for a period of four (4) months, with a warning that a repetition of
the same would invite a stiffer penalty. The Investigating
Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful conduct
for: (a) misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b)failing
to deliver the services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in
returning complainant’s downpayment of P350,000.00.

ISSUE:
Should respondent be held administratively liable for violating the
Code of Professional
Responsibility?

RULING:
YES. As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only
a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing. In this regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the CPR, provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.

In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an

immigration lawyer, which resulted to complainant seeking his
assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and
paying him the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal
services.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to

him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.

Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the
cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence,
care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a
legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence for which he must be held administratively liable, as in
this case.
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property

collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand.

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly

fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith.
The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or
received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return
upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this
case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as
of professional ethics.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found

guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of
Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of
this Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn

A. Agot the legal fees he received from the latter in the amount of
₱350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this
Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant
the imposition of a more severe penalty.

•Rule 18.04: Inform client of status of case

•Blanza vs. Arcangel, 21 SCRA 1 (1967)

FACTS: On April, 1955, Atty. Arcangel volunteered to help them in

their respective pension claims in connection with the death of their
husbands, both P.C. soldiers. They handed Arcangel pertinent
documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. After
which, they noticed that respondent lost interest and no progress was
made. After 6 years they finally asked respondent to return the said
documents but the latter refused. Upon questioning by Fiscal Rana to
whom the case was referred by the Solicitor General respondent
admitted having received the documents but explained that it was for
photo stating purposes only. His failure to immediately return them
was due to complainants’ refusal to hand him money to pay for the
photo stating costs which prevented him from withdrawing the
documents. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and
turned over the documents to the fiscal. Fiscal found respondents
explanation satisfactory and recommended the respondents exoneration.
However, Sol Gen feels that respondent deserves at least a severe
reprimand considering his failure to attend to complainants pension
claims for 6 years; his failure to immediately return the documents
despite repeated demands.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Arcangel is guilty of professional non-feasance

HELD: NO. Respondent’s explanation for the delay in filing the

claims in returning the documents has not been controverted by
complainants. On the contrary, they admitted that respondent asked
them to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did not give him
any money. Hence, complainants are partly to blame. Moreover, the
documents and their photostats were actually returned by respondent
during the fiscal’s investigation with him paying for the
photostating costs himself. As for the alleged failure of the
respondent to all her documents to omplainant Pasion, the former
denies this. the affidavit of Mrs. Blanza pardoning respondent cannot
prejudice complainant.

Accordingly, the case against respondent is dismissed. So ordered.

•Abay vs. Montesino, 417 SCRA 77 (2003)

Atty. Montesino failed to file the appellant’s brief of his

client NIT in a civil case, resulting to the dismissal of the appeal.
Respondent claims that this was due to him deeming it futile to
pursue the appeal and wanting to take another legal course of action
to protect his client’s rights. The IBP and SC found him guilty of
violating CPR and suspended him for 6 months with warning.

IMPORTANT PEOPLE
Eduardo T. Abay – complainant, stockholder of NIT
Atty. Raul Montesino – respondent

FACTS
1. Atty. Montesino was the counsel of Negros Institute of
Technology in an action for Cancellation of Title of
Ownership, Recovery of Ownership and Possession and Damages
with Preliminary Injunction against Vicente Galo’s estate.
RTC dismissed the case on Apr. 27, 1995.
 2. Nov. 3, 1995 – RTC denied the respondent’s MR. Respondent
filed a Notice of Appeal in the CA but failed to submit the
appellant’s brief even after a total of 120 days extension
(beyond the 45 reglementary period). Mar. 19, 1999 – CA
dismissed the appeal.
3. Complainant prays for the disbarment of respondent alleging
that the latter abandoned the appeal without knowledge of
NIT and never told that the appeal had already been
dismissed.
4. Respondent avers that his failure to file the brief was due
to his discovery that the property sought to be recovered
was subject to another civil case as a result of overlapping
rights of transfers: a Contract of Sale in favor of
Florserfina Grandea and a Contract of Mortgage in favor of
Ludovico Hidalgo.
5. Thus, respondent advised NIT to abandon the appeal and file
instead an appropriate Complaint against Grandea and Hidalgo
to recover the properties. However, complainant demanded to
continue with the appeal. Thinking that his advice was the
best way to protect his client’s rights, he let the period
to submit appellant’s brief lapse.
6. The IBP Commissioner found him guilty of violating the CPR
and expressed that the respondent should have given due
importance to the decision of his client. She recommended a
suspension of 6 months with warning, which was adopted by
the IBP Board in its Resolution.

ISSUE with HOLDING

1. W/N respondent was guilty of violating the CPR for failing
to file his client’s appellant’s brief? YES.
 Respondent’s failure to file appellant’s brief was a
violation of Rules 18.031 and 18.042 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
o Not filing an appellant’s brief is prejudicial
because such could result to the dismissal of the
appeal, as in this case. Respondent failed to exercise
due diligence, and his abandonment of his client’s
cause made him unworthy of the trust that is reposed
in him.

1
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
2
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
 o Even if respondent was honestly protecting the
interests of complainant, the former still had no
right to waive the appeal without the latter’s
knowledge and consent. If he felt unable to continue
his retainership, he should have properly withdrawn
his appearance and allowed the client to appoint
another lawyer.
 Respondent also violated Rule 12.033 for failing to file
the appellant’s brief despite being granted several
extensions.
 Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause. Regardless
of their personal views, they must present every remedy
or defense within the authority of the law in support of
that cause.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Atty. Raul T. Montesino is found guilty of negligence;
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months and WARNED
that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt
with more severely.

DOCTRINE
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the clients request for information.
•Lagua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173390, June 27, 2012

In dismissing the present Petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court, we find no valid, justifiable reason for petitioner’s
failure to file his appellant’s brief with the Court of Appeals (CA)
that would warrant a reversal of the CA Resolutions dated 25 November
20051 and 17 May 2006.2 To rule otherwise would make light of this
Court’s extraordinary certiorari jurisdiction, which operates only
upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate tribunal.3

On 11 April 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig rendered a

Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H finding the
accused petitioner guilty of homicide and sentencing him to 8 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum in each case. On 19 May 2003, petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423. On 18 June
2003, he filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail Pending Appeal, which
the CA granted without objection from the Office of the Solicitor

3
which mandates that [a] lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for
his failure to do so.
General.4 On 6 November 2003, an Order of release upon bond was issued
in his favor by the Division Clerk of Court of the CA.5

On 14 October 2003, petitioner received the Order from the CA

requiring, within 45 days from receipt thereof, or until 28 November
2003, the filing of his Appellant’s Brief.6 He filed a Motion for
Extension of another 45 days from 28 November 2003, or until 12
January 2004, within which to file the said brief. On 8 January 2004,
he filed a Second Motion for Extension asking for an additional 45
days, which the CA granted with a warning that no further extension
shall be allowed.7 Thus, petitioner had 45 days from 12 January 2004
or until 26 February 2004.

Despite the two extensions, petitioner Lagua still failed to file his
appellant’s brief. On 5 May 2004, the CA ordered him through counsel
to show cause, within five days from receipt, why the appeal should
not be dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of
Court. He again failed to submit his brief within the reglementary
period and to comply with the Court’s 5 May 2004 Resolution. Thus,
on 1 September 2004, the CA issued a Resolution declaring the appeal
abandoned and accordingly dismissed pursuant to the Rules.

On 14 October 2004, petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Salvador

Quimpo, manifested to the Court that he had already withdrawn as
defense counsel for petitioner, but that he had failed to secure the
latter’s conformity.8 The following day, petitioner himself filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 September 2004 Resolution,
requesting more time to secure the services of another counsel. On 20
October 2004, the Solicitor General, manifesting that accused-
appellant’s abandonment of his appeal rendered the judgment of
conviction final and executory, moved for his immediate arrest and
confinement at the New Bilibid Prison.9

In its Resolution dated 9 February 2005, the CA stated that it had

never received a Notice of Withdrawal from Atty. Quimpo, but
nevertheless granted a 30-day period for petitioner and his new
counsel to file a Notice of Appearance. Again, petitioner failed to
comply. On 8 July 2005, the CA issued another Show Cause Order,
directing him to explain within 10 days why he had not caused the
appearance of his new counsel, and why the appeal should not be
considered abandoned. Instead of filing a timely compliance,
petitioner’s new counsel, Atty. Emerson Barrientos filed a Notice of
Appearance on 8 March 2005 or almost a month after the Show Cause
Order.

On 17 August 2005, the CA filed a Resolution stating that in the

interest of justice, the Notice of Appearance was considered
sufficient compliance with the Order of 8 July 2005. It granted the
Motion for Reconsideration, set aside the Order of Dismissal issued
on 1 September 2004, and gave petitioner and his new counsel a non-
extendible period of 30 days within which to file the appellant’s
brief.

Notwithstanding the new non-extendible period, petitioner again

failed to seasonably file his brief, prompting the CA to issue the
first assailed Resolution dated 25 November 2005, which, for the
second time, declared his appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissed.
Roused from inaction, he filed another Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief on 19 December 2005, or 18
days after his counsel received the 25 November 2005 Resolution.

In its second assailed Resolution issued on 17 May 2006, the CA

denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the
Appellant’s Brief to be expunged from the records, viz:

Indeed the present appeal has been dismissed twice by the Court
because of accused-appellant’s failure to file his brief. The
present motion for reconsideration of the second dismissal of the
appeal was even filed three (3) days beyond the reglementary period.
Ineluctably, the dismissal of the present appeal has become final and
accused-appellant has lost his right to appeal.

It bears stressing that accused-appellant cannot simply trifle with

the rules of procedure on the pretext that his life and liberty are
at stake. For appeal is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law granting
the privilege.10 x x x.

Petitioner comes to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on

the part of the lower court in declaring the appeal abandoned,
pointing to the negligence and errors of his counsel as the cause of
the two-year delay in coming up with the brief. Petitioner reasons
that there would be no prejudice to the People if his appeal is
reinstated, and that he has a good defense that can lead to his
acquittal.

We dismiss the Petition.

The certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is rigorously

streamlined, such that Rule 65 only admits cases based on the
specific grounds provided therein. The Rule applies if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The independent action for certiorari will
lie only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proven to exist.
Grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of
power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the
whimsical, arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of power that amounts
to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law
or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck
down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross.11

In the present case, petitioner would have us strike down the

Resolutions of the CA declaring his appeal as abandoned for
purportedly being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Yet, far from
committing the grievous error petitioner presents it to be, the CA
merely exercised the authority expressly granted to it under Rule
124, which we quote below:

Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute.

– The appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or on its own
motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this
rule, except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de
oficio.

Petitioner was represented by private counsel (and not counsel de

oficio) to whom the CA had granted multiple extensions: two for Atty.
Quimpo; and two for Atty. Barrientos, whose Notice of Appearance was
submitted a month after the Show Cause Order of 8 July 2005. As for
Atty. Quimpo, he filed his Manifestation more than a month after the
CA had first issued the dismissal. It was only because of the plea
for compassion in petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration that the
CA granted him another 30 days in order to secure the services of
another lawyer. Again, petitioner failed to comply. Both he and the
new counsel, Atty. Barrientos, also failed to comply with the second
Show Cause Order.

Yet again, the CA allowed Atty. Barrientos’ Notice of Appearance and

considered it substantial compliance with the second Show Cause
Order. Out of the CA’s liberality, petitioner was given another 30
days to come up with the Appellant’s Brief. This he failed to
submit, prompting the CA, for the second and final time, to declare
his appeal as abandoned. Even then, his Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief was filed 18 days after his
counsel received the CA Resolution.

In his Petition, Lagua bewails the negligence and mishandling by his

two previous counsels as the reason for the delay, which has lasted
for more than two years. However, it is clear from the facts that
despite the liberality and consideration afforded to him by the CA,
he is by no means blameless. More importantly, his excuse cannot
serve as a substitute for the jurisdictional requirements under Rule
65. It does not amount to any grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack or excess of discretion that may be attributable to the
appellate court. Under the circumstances, the CA was well within the
authority granted to it under the cited rule.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence and
mistakes of counsel are binding on the client.12 Otherwise, there
would never be an end to a suit, so long as counsel could allege its
own fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain
remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law.

The rationale for this rule is reiterated in the recent case

Bejarasco v. People:

The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts,

including even mistakes in the realm of procedural technique. The
rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained, holds the
implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental
to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his
client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of
the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or
omission of the client himself.

It is the client’s duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time

to time in order to be informed of the progress and developments of
his case; hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his
lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough. 13 
(Emphasis supplied.)

In Tan v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:

As clients, petitioners should have maintained contact with their

counsel from time to time, and informed themselves of the progress of
their case, thereby exercising that standard of care "which an
ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his business."

Even in the absence of the petitioner’s negligence, the rule in this

jurisdiction is that a party is bound by the mistakes of his counsel.
In the earlier case of Tesoro v. Court of Appeals, we emphasized –

It has been repeatedly enunciated that "a client is bound by the

action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to
complain that the result might have been different had he proceeded
differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such
grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there
would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be
employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned."

Thus, with the ordinary remedy of appeal lost through the

petitioner’s own fault, we affirm that no reversible error was
committed in the dismissal of the petition by the appellate court.14

Petitioner was granted bail, and he had all the time to contact his
counsel or follow up on the appeal himself.1âwphi1 He is similarly
responsible for procuring the services of new counsel after having
been told of Atty. Quimpo’s withdrawal. Yet he offered no
explanation why it took him so long to apprise Atty. Barrientos of
the case, or why they had repeatedly failed to comply with the CA’s
Orders after several extensions. As he has lost the ordinary remedy
of appeal because of his own laxity, we cannot allow him to
haphazardly take advantage of the remedy of certiorari.

The Court cannot tolerate habitual failure to follow the procedural

rules, which are indispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition
of justice. Otherwise these rules would be rendered useless.15 In
Polintan v. People, the Court of Appeals gave the petitioner therein
a total of 75 days to submit his Appellant’s Brief, but he failed to
do so. In that case, the accused Polintan filed a "Very Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief." This Court affirmed the CA
Resolution declaring his appeal abandoned, after finding his excuses
too flimsy to warrant reversal.

In the present case, accused Lagua was given more time, not only to
file his Appellant’s Brief, but also to secure new counsel to
adequately prepare the appeal. The CA issued two Show Cause Orders
and two Resolutions declaring the appeal as abandoned. Despite these
issuances, his second Motion for Reconsideration was filed 18 days
after his receipt of the second and final CA Resolution. To our mind,
this delay is indicative of sheer laxity and indifference on his
part, for which he has lost the statutory right of appeal. Even
during the intervening period after counsel has withdrawn, litigants
are expected to be vigilant and conscious of the status of their
cases, viz:

The appellate court committed no error therefore in dismissing the

appeal. Petitioners-appellants have shown no valid and justifiable
reason for their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have
only themselves to blame for their counsel’s utter inaction and
gross indifference and neglect in not having filed their brief for a
year since receipt of due notice to file the same. They could not
even claim ignorance of the appellate court’s notice to file brief
since it had required withdrawing counsel Valente to secure their
written conformity before granting his withdrawal as counsel, and
certainly they must have ascertained from him as well as new counsel
the status of their appeal — which accounts for Atty. Valente’s
repeated prayers in his two motions for withdrawal for the granting
of sufficient time for new counsel to file the brief. They had almost
a year thereafter to make sure that their new counsel did attend to
their appeal and did file the brief.16

In Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang v. Gaviola,17 the Court made a

clear finding of negligence on the part of the lawyer handling the
petitioner’s case, but nevertheless affirmed the denial of the
appeal. It confirmed that the petitioner was bound by his counsel’s
negligence. It ruled that "the right to appeal is not a natural right
or a part of due process, but is merely a statutory privilege that
may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the law."

Neither can we deem petitioner Lagua’s Motion for Reconsideration

with Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief as substantial compliance
with the procedural requirement. In Cariño v. Espinoza, 18 the
appellate court rightly disallowed the submission of the Appellant’s
Brief after a delay of seven months. In this case, it took petitioner
almost two years from 26 February 2004 (after the CA gave him a
second non-extendible period of 45 days) to finally submit his
Appellant’s Brief on 19 December 2005.

Lastly, it is erroneous for petitioner to declare that there would be

no prejudice to the People if his appeal is reinstated. 19 The judgment
of conviction having attained finality, respondent is now entitled to
execution as a matter of right. This Court has recently declared:

Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains

finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The
enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded, for
the immediate enforcement of the parties’ rights, confirmed by final
judgment, is a major component of the ideal administration of
justice. This is the reason why we abhor any delay in the full
execution of final and executory decisions. Thus, a remedy intended
to frustrate, suspend, or enjoin the enforcement of a final judgment
must be granted with caution and upon a strict observance of the
requirements under existing laws and jurisprudence.20 x x x.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions issued

by the Court of Appeals on 25 November 2005 and 17 May 2006 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 27423 are hereby AFFIRMED.

(5) Duty to represent client with zeal within the bounds of the law
•CPR Canon 19
•CPR Rule 19.01
•CPR Rule 19.02
•CPR Rule 19.03
•Rule 138, Sec. 20 (d)

•Millare vs. Montero, 246 SCRA 1

A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995
FACTS:
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable
judgment from the MTC of Abra which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the
premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co,
through respondent as counsel, appealed the decision to the RTC. She
neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals adjudged by the
MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. The CA
dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to
comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines. According to the CA, Co should have
filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal. The judgment
of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986.Respondent
filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate
the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:
(1) Civil Case No. 344 — Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil
Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the
Regional Trial Court, Abra; (2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 — Appeal from
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Abra;(3) CA-G.R. SP No.
11690 — An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or Reformation
or Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of Appeals; (4) G.R.
No. 86084 — Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the Supreme
Court; (5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 — Appeal And/Or Review By
Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and, (6) SP
Civil Action No. 624 — Petition For Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent resorted to devious and underhanded
means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC
adverse to his clients. YES

2. Whether or not respondent is guilty of forum shopping. YES

HELD:
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
is required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law."
The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him
not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case
(Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Under Canon
12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required
to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. A lawyer shall not
file multiple actions arising from the same cause (Rule 12.02). A
lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04) The rights of
respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully
protected and her defenses were properly ventilated when he filed the
appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to
devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of the judgment
rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became
executory even pending its appeal with the RTC because of the failure
of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as
they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the
decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No.
11690) was defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there was no
allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his
client was denied due process, or "that the judgments in the former
cases were secured through fraud." Judging from the number of actions
filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment,
respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. The Court explained that
forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in one
forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable resolution
of his case By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of
recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts
were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the
Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses
as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws.

WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.

(7) Duty to refrain from impropriety that influences the court

•CPR Canon 13
•CPR Rule 13.01: Not cultivate familiarity with judges
• In re De Vera, 385 SCRA 285 (2002)

•Nestle Phil., Inc. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542 (1987)

NATURE:
Resolution

FACTS:
-During the period July 8-10, 1987, members of the respondent labor
unions (Union of Filipino Employees and Kimberly Independent Labor
Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia) intensified
the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987
in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They
set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme
Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the
Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees.
They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a
kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in
utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their
red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing
the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers.

These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by
Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fenian as Chairmen of the
Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas,
counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order
that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease
immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and
that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the
pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc
issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to
withdraw graciously and requiring the leaders of the respondent union
leaders to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and
then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt
of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE
why he should not be administratively dealt with.

On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared

before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, apologizing
for their actions described and assuring that the acts would not be
repeated. Atty. Espinas likewise manifested to the Court that he had
explained to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the
cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted
under the circumstances. He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency
considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders
of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mang. gagawa as Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK),
an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in
the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro
Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor union.

Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers

that any delay in the resolution of their cam is usually for causes
beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court has always
remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution.

To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully
understood the reason for the citation and that they win abide by
their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court
required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this
effect, which respondents complied with on July 17, 1987

ISSUE:
WON THE RESPONDENTS and ATTY. ESPINAS SHOULD BE HELD IN DIRECT
CONTEMPT OF COURT?

HELD: NO. Contempt charges dismissed.

The respondents who are nonlawyers are not knowledgeable in her
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware
that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected
by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of
justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse
thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection,
nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of
justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of
advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the
shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his
attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to
the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. It is their
duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on
matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and
to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational
program for their members.

The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the
full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to
pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case
pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the
proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or
other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as
impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside
interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass
the administration of justice.

Courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should
be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be
decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination
of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.

WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are

DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to
pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the
other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within
the premises of any and all courts.

•Lantoria vs. Bunyi, 209 SCRA 528

A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992

FACTS:
An administrative complaint was filed by Lantoria against Bunyi, a
member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that Bunyi committed acts
of graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a
member of the IBP, and corruption of the judge and bribery in
relation to Bunyi’s handling of a civil case wherein Bunyi was
counsel of Mrs. Mascarinas. The latter was the owner of the farm
involved and Lantoria is the supervisor and manager of the said farm.
Three civil cases presided by Judge Galicia involved an ejectment
suit of squatters in the said farm where the defendants were declared
in default.

Correspondences between Lantoria and Bunyi showed that Bunyi

initially enclosed a letter in an envelope addressed to Judge Galicia
in a confidential and private manner. Judge Galicia thru the
mediation of Lantoria informed Bunyi that he is willing to let Bunyi
write the decisions for the 3 civil cases. Lantoria informed the same
to Bunyi which later delivered the 3 decisions thru Lantoria.
 Three years later, Lantoria file the present case against Bunyi
alleging that they won the said cases because Bunyi wrote the
decisions in those cases. Bunyi contends that Lantoria had knowledge
of the request of Judge Galicia to Bunyi as the said judge had two
salas before him. Also, Bunyi contends that the drafting of the
decision was not an idea spawned by him. Furthermore, he contends
that his participation is merely on revision.

The solicitor general investigated the matters and found that

Bunyi prepared the draft of the decisions and that he had previous
communications with the judge regarding drafting the same. Moreover,
Bunyi admitted that he prepared the said decisions and that the
subject letters do exist. The Solicitor General found Bunyi guilty of
highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform
his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the
independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts
which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in which
he is counsel. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

Lantoria did not attend hearing of the case and later filed his
withdrawal of the same. Bunyi gave an apology but he denied the
allegations of offering a gift to Judge Galicia.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bunyi violated Rule 13.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for lawyers

HELD:
YES. The determination of the merits of the instant case should
proceed notwithstanding withdrawal of complaint due to the Bunyi
having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he
even asked for an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such
letters had on his duty as a lawyer.

Clearly, respondent violated Canon 13 of the Professional Ethics on

attempts to exert personal influence on the court. A lawyer should
not communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of
a pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device
or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or
favor.

In the new Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer's attempt to

influence the court is rebuked, as shown in Canon 13 and Rule 13.01,
respectively. CANON 13 – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his
cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or
gives the appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 – A lawyer
shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.
Court finds Bunyi guilty of unethical practice in attempting to
influence the court where he had pending civil case. WHEREFORE,
respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year from the date of notice
hereof.

•CPR Rule 15.06: Not to claim influence

•Mercado vs. Security Bank, 482 SCRA 501 (2006)

R E S O L U T I O N

SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J.:

The dignity of the Court can never be protected where infraction of

ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people
should not be given cause to break faith that a magistrate is the
epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of
justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect.1

Incidental to the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is the

contempt proceedings against petitioner Jose Teofilo T. Mercado
arising from his letter dated October 18, 2004, insinuating that: (1)
the ponente succumbed to the "tremendous pressure" of Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in denying his petition; (2) the Security Bank
Corporation, respondent, financed the ponente's travel to the United
States; and (3) the ponente gave respondent a "go signal" to sell his
property.

The facts are as follows:

On December 12, 2003, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Ma. Agnes R.

Mercado, petitioners, filed with this Court a Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (a) Decision 2 dated
May 27, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71570 dismissing their petition for
annulment of judgment; and (b) its Resolution3 dated October 23,
2003 denying their motion for reconsideration.

On January 12, 2004, we denied the petition because of petitioners'

failure to show that a reversible error had been committed by the
Appellate Court.4

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the

Court of Appeals, in dismissing their petition for annulment of
judgment, merely relied on technical rules of procedure, thereby
sacrificing the greater interest of justice and equity; and that
their former counsel's gross negligence constitutes extrinsic fraud,
a ground for annulling the trial court's judgment.
On March 24, 2004, we issued a Resolution granting petitioners'
motion for reconsideration and reinstating their petition. We
likewise required Security Bank Corporation, respondent, to comment
on the petition.

In its comment, respondent averred that the issues raised in the

present petition are mere rehash of the issues petitioners raised
before the Appellate Court. As to the alleged negligence of their
counsel, respondent pointed out that the same cannot be considered an
extrinsic fraud since through the same counsel, they actively pursued
and recovered moral damages and attorney's fees. Furthermore,
assuming that petitioners' counsel refused to file a motion for
reconsideration with the trial court, still, they had the option to
terminate his services and hire another; and that they should not
have waited for four (4) years before filing the petition for
annulment of judgment.

On June 7, 2004, we issued a Resolution denying the petition on the

ground that petitioners indeed failed to show that a reversible error
had been committed by the Appellate Court.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but we dismissed the

same in our Resolution dated September 15, 2004, thus:

We find no compelling reason to grant petitioner's motion for

reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that before a petition

for annulment of judgment can prosper, petitioners must first file an
appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief as required
by the Revised Rules of Court. Having failed to do so, they cannot
avail of an action for annulment of judgment, otherwise, they would
benefit from their inaction or negligence.

It bears emphasis at this point that an action for annulment of

judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal.

Petitioners' contention that their failure to appeal from the trial

court's Decision was due to the negligence of their former counsel
lacks merit. Records show that they participated actively, through
their counsel, in the proceedings before the trial court. As party
litigants, they were expected to be vigilant of their interests and,
therefore, should monitor the progress of the case. Thus, they should
have constantly communicated with their counsel to be advised of the
status of their case. This way, they would not have lost their
opportunity to appeal.

Granting that petitioners' petition for annulment of judgment is in

order, still the same is dismissible. For the remedy of annulment of
judgment to prosper, either one of the following grounds must be
present: (1) extrinsic fraud or (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of
due process. Petitioner argues that their counsel's negligence
constitutes extrinsic fraud. We are not convinced. Extrinsic fraud
can be committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is
prevented from presenting his case to the court. This situation is
not present in this case.

We reiterate that in G.R. No. 151816, we ruled that the Court of

Appeals did not commit reversible error in dismissing petitioners'
petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the trial court's
order of execution of its Decision in favor of respondent bank.

In fine, this Resolution should now write finis to the instant case.5

Petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration but was denied

for being prohibited.

On October 18, 2004, petitioner Mercado wrote Chief Justice Hilario

G. Davide, Jr. stating that:

On March 24, 2004, the Third Division, in its Resolution, granted our
Motion for Reconsideration and even gave due course and reinstated
our petition.

But when I received the Resolution dated June 7, 2004 denying my

Petition for Review on July 12, 2004, I immediately called my
counsel, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, on the phone. I asked him why on
earth the ponente denied again my petition on the same ground 'for
failure of petitioners to show that a reversible error had been
committed by the appellate court? My counsel said, the ponente
informed him that she has to deny our petition on the same ground
because of the tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice to favor
Security Bank Corporation (SBC). By the way, my counsel and the
ponente are very close and long time friends to each other. When I
heard the bad news, I was so shocked in disbelief. It is true, what
you did is unthinkable, ungodly, and malicious. It is also very
suspicious that after a few days after my conversation with Atty.
Villanueva, he and his family left for London, leaving my case to the
care of one of his Associates. Later on, the ponente herself left for
the U.S.A. to visit her children. Is this a coincidence? As the
saying goes, 'when there is smoke, there is fire.' Another
coincidence, before the receipt of the Resolution dated June 7, 2004,
denying our petition on the basis of SBC's unsubstantiated 'Comment,'
SBC sold our property to M. Miranda Development Corporation and
succeeded in getting a permit to demolish the four (4) building
erected in our property from the Forbes Park Association, even if the
case is still pending and we have not even filed our Motion for
Reconsideration with the Supreme Court, not to mention the Lis
Pendens annotated on the title of the property in the name of SBC.
The person who bought our property from SBC for P120,000,000.00 is
known to my nephew and us. While the buyer is drinking with my nephew
and others, not knowing that one of them is my nephew, he bragged to
them that he just bought the property of the Mercados in Forbes Park.
The buyer said 'I paid already the property because SBC told me that
they already have the go-signal from the ponente to sell the
property.' Few days thereafter, all the improvements in our property
were totally demolished by a construction company owned by my
provincemate in Pampanga by the name of Mr. Bana, whom I personally
met at the site while the demolition was being carried out.

Have you no conscience at all? Are you not bothered of the final
judgment after life? Is this the legacy you want to impart to your
children and all the Filipino people? What you did to my family and I
is unforgivable not only to God and to humanity. You have deprived us
of our precious possession without due process. This is also the
abode of my wife, my children, their respective spouses, and my 10
grandchildren, not to mention the several household members and their
families.

I would like to believe that the Supreme Court is the last bulwark of
true justice. If you, the Chief Justice, himself, are the first
person to make a mockery of our laws, no wonder why foreign investors
do not want to invest in our country because they said, there is no
justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular. This is in
the highest degree of injustice. You have deprived us of our basic
fundamental rights in the protection of our property without due
process. There is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in
particular. Do you think I will bring my case to the Supreme Court by
mere question of facts? From our petition for Annulment of Judgment
filed before the Court of Appeals and now the Petition for Review
on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, my wife and I as petitioners-
movants have clearly invoked 'LACK OF JURISDICTION' on the part of
the trial court to adjudicate respondent SBC's 'counterclaim' for the
payment of the loan. As I understand, when the ground invoked as
basis for Annulment of Judgment is 'LACK OF JURISDICTION', the
Petition may be filed at any time before it is barred by estoppel or
laches, neither of which is obtaining in our case. Even in layman's
legal point of view, this Petition of ours clearly and undoubtedly
raises a question of law.

Please I beg of you, have a last hard look on our Petition and the
two (2) Motions for Reconsideration and let us focus and not evade on
the real issue on 'LACK OF JURISDICTION' on the part of the trial
court and not concentrate on negligence of counsel and other trivial
reasons, etc. Or better yet, please refrain from influencing the
members of the Third Division. Let them deliberate regularly on our
case or inhibit themselves on the case. Please let the Institution
serve justice, and not individual pecuniary interests. SBC's counsels
are experts in fabrication of facts and in misleading the courts. I
have a feeling that they might as well have led you to believe
something, which is not true. Please don't be an instrument of their
wicked schemes, lest the Supreme Court itself becomes their means to
perpetrate injustice. This is the only Bank which is not interested
in amicable settlement in spite of my several sincere offers of
amicable settlement since the case was filed in 1995 up to 2003, and
these are all in writing and duly received by SBC. Unfortunately, all
my offers were rejected by them.

I wrote you this letter as a last resort because my family and I

looked up at you before as the most honest and upright Chief Justice.
As we would like to know if you really had intervened and put
pressure, as the Ponente said to Atty. Villanueva, (my counsel) to
favor SBC because if you did, then we rest our case. Please enlighten
us before we seek another forum to seek redress the injustices,
sleepless nights, humiliation and embarrassment we suffered. If we
are wrong about you, and I hope we really are wrong, please accept
our appeal for forgiveness and apologies. GOD is my witness, that
what I have told you is the truth.

Mr. Chief Justice, the Filipino people know how religious you are.
Please do what a religious man ought to do in serving justice. Please
live up to our, as well as HIS expectations. (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary

On November 2, 2004, Chief Justice Davide required Mercado's lawyer,

Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, to comment on the letter and show cause why
he should not be held in contempt of court.6

On November 17, 2004, the Court's Third Division ordered Mercado to

personally appear on November 22, 2004 and show cause why he should
not be held in contempt of court.7

On the scheduled date, Mercado, together with Atty. Pablo G.

Macapagal, his new counsel, appeared before the Third Division and
swore to the truth of the letter he wrote. 8 He manifested that he
only stated therein what Atty. Villanueva told him - that his
petition was denied for the second time "because of the tremendous
pressure from the Chief Justice." He further manifested that during
the wake of Atty. Villanueva's mother, he (Atty. Villanueva) pointed
to Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, bragging that she is "a very
very good, close and long time friend of his." 9 However, while
stating this, Mercado referred to Justice Conchita Carpio Morales as
Justice Gutierrez.10

Forthwith, the Third Division issued in open court a

11
Resolution  directing Atty. Macapagal to submit a written
explanation why Mercado should not be held in contempt of Court.
For his part, Atty. Villanueva submitted a comment,12 strongly
denying Mercado's allegations in his letter. He denied having told
petitioners that their petition had to be denied again "because there
was a tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice in favor of Security
Bank Corporation." He also stressed that there was no correlation
between the ponente's trip to the United States and his trip to
London. He explained that he and his family went to London to attend
the graduation of his daughter, Cherriemaya Veloso Villanueva. To
substantiate this, he submitted a photocopy of "London School of
Economics (LSE) and Political Science Presentation Ceremonies" where
the name of his daughter, Cherriemaya Veloso Villanueva, is listed as
one of the successful graduates. He likewise submitted a photocopy of
his passport indicating his departure for London on July 14, 2004 and
his arrival in the Philippines on July 27, 2004. In addition, he said
he never met anyone from respondent bank, including its lawyers, and
that there is no truth to Mercado's statement regarding his nephew's
alleged encounter with the new owners of the subject property.

On December 13, 2004, Mercado submitted his explanation13 why he

should not be punished for contempt of court. He claimed that the
contemptuous statements in his letter merely reiterate the tenor of
Atty. Villanueva's statements. He offered an apology, explaining that
he wrote the letter while he was "under the impulse of personal
stress" as he was losing his residential house.

On January 26, 2005, the Third Division ordered both Mercado and
Atty. Villanueva to appear on February 21, 2005 to elucidate their
respective positions.

Mercado testified that it was Atty. Villanueva who informed him that
the ponente is Justice Gutierrez. Atty. Villanueva even bragged that
she is his "very, very close friend."

For his part, Atty. Villanueva testified that it was Mercado who
informed him that Justice Gutierrez is the ponente. He also
confirmed that she attended the wake of his mother. But he denied
Mercado's claim that he pointed to Justice Gutierrez and said that
she is his close friend.14

Thereafter, the Third Division designated Court of Appeals Justice

Renato C. Dacudao as Commissioner to receive evidence on the factual
issues involved in the contempt incident.15

On May 18, 2005, Justice Dacudao submitted his Investigation, Report

and Recommendation. He found Mercado "guilty of improper conduct
tending to bring the authority and the administration of justice by
the Court into disrespect when he openly belittled, degraded, and
embarrassed the Highest Court of the land, particularly the Chief
Justice x x x." However, he held that "there was no showing that he
acted with malice and/or in bad faith or that he was properly
motivated." Thus, he recommended that Mercado be fined in the sum of
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

We cannot sustain Justice Dacudao's finding that Mercado did not act
with malice or bad faith in imputing those derogatory and
disrespectful remarks against Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.

Bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and

conscious doing of a wrong.16 It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-
interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.17 Malice is of the same
genre. It connotes a sinister motive.

Mercado's addressing such letter to Chief Justice Davide is a perfect

illustration of bad faith and malice tending directly to degrade the
administration of justice. It transgresses the permissible bounds of
fair comment and criticisms bringing into disrepute, not only the
authority and integrity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, but
also of the entire Judiciary. While feigning to be searching for
truth on whether Chief Justice Davide indeed exerted "tremendous
pressure" to the ponente, he repeatedly humiliated him and the
Judiciary in the most loutish and insolent manner. He accused him of
doing an "unthinkable, ungodly, and malicious" act and of depriving
his (Mercado's) family of their "basic fundamental rights in the
protection of (their) property without due process." He concluded
that what Chief Justice Davide did to his family "is unforgivable not
only to God and to humanity." In an insulting and insolent tenor, he
stated that "if the Chief Justice, himself, is the first person to
make a mockery of our laws," then there is "no wonder why foreign
investors do not want to invest in our country."

Furthermore, he alleged that an irregularity or bribery attended the

denial of his Petition for Review . He insinuated that the travels of
Atty. Villanueva and the ponente abroad were financed by respondent
bank, stating that "when there is smoke, there is fire." He also
recklessly accused the ponente of giving respondent bank a "go-
signal" to sell his property. In this backdrop, he asked Chief
Justice Davide to "refrain from influencing the members of the Third
Division;" "let them deliberate regularly on the case or inhibit
themselves on the case;" and "let the Institution serve justice, and
not individual pecuniary interests."

Finally, he condemned the entire Judiciary by saying "there is no

justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular." And with
impudence, he threatened Chief Justice Davide to enlighten him before
he "seeks another forum to seek redress for the injustices, sleepless
nights, humiliation and embarrassment" his family suffered.

Without doubt, Mercado's letter is marked with malice, bad faith, and
gross disrespect. He committed a remarkable feat of character
assassination and honor vilification. Contrary to his claim that he
is just verifying the truth of Atty. Villanueva's statements, the
words in his letter are more accusatory than inquisitorial. What is
disconcerting is that his accusations have no basis in fact and in
law. Obviously, they caused intense pain and humiliation on the part
of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.

The Resolution of the Third Division of this Court dated September

15, 2004 denying Mercado's motion for reconsideration is well
explained. A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action
for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost
remedy of appeal." A party must have first availed of appeal, a
motion for new trial or a petition for relief before an action for
annulment can prosper. Its obvious rationale is to prevent the party
from benefiting from his inaction or negligence. Also, the action for
annulment of judgment must be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud or
(b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.18 Having failed to
avail of the remedies and there being a clear showing that neither of
the grounds was present, the petition must be dismissed. Only a
disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition unacceptable.

Mercado bewails the denial by the Third Division of his petition

through a mere Minute Resolution and after reinstating the petition.
Apparently, he finds the Court's manner of denial and change of heart
unusual and casts sinister undertone to them.

In In Re Laureta,19 we ruled that the Court is not "duty-bound" to

render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis
is given depending on its evaluation of a case. In the same case, we
held that "the recall of a due course Order after a review of the
records of the case is a common occurrence in the Court." Like the
respondents in the said case, Mercado should not think that it is
only his petition which has been subjected to such recall.

The Third Division initially denied Mercado's petition because it is

apparent on its face that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in dismissing his petition for annulment of
judgment. Considering his motion for reconsideration alleging that
the Appellate Court merely relied on technical rules of procedure and
that his former counsel committed gross negligence, the Third
Division took the most prudent course by reinstating the petition.
Now, after considering the petition and the comment thereon, the
Third Division was convinced that, indeed, the Appellate Court did
not commit any reversible error. Is this irregular? The answer is a
resounding "no." The reinstatement of a petition does not guarantee
that it will be subsequently granted. Otherwise, the filing of
comment and subsequent pleadings would be an exercise in futility.
Now, in a bid to escape liability for contempt, Mercado invokes
freedom of speech and privacy of communication.

We are not persuaded.

A person charged with contempt of court for his utterances which

clearly constitute contempt may not ordinarily escape liability by
merely invoking the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.
Liberty of speech must not be confused with abuse of such liberty.
When he attributed those contemptuous remarks to Chief Justice Davide
and the ponente, Mercado abused such liberty. His statements cast
aspersions to their reputation and integrity and create a distrust to
the Judiciary.

The fact that Mercado's letter was addressed only to the Chief
Justice does not rinse it of its contemptuous character. In In Re
Laureta,20 we ruled that letters addressed to individual Justices, in
connection with the performance of their judicial functions become
part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the
entire court.

Accordingly, we hold Mercado guilty of indirect contempt of court.

Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,

provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.

- After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given
to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:

x x x x x x

d. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,

obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

x x x x x x

As for Atty. Villanueva, while Justice Dacudao did not categorically

state that he (Atty. Villanueva) told Mercado that Chief Justice
Davide exerted "tremendous pressure" on the ponente, the reason why
the petition was dismissed for the second time, however, we are
inclined to believe that Atty. Villanueva gave such information to
Mercado. Not only that, Atty. Villanueva also revealed the name of
the ponente; that he and the ponente have known each other since
1964; and that the ponente would be at

the wake of his mother, thus:

After a careful and conscientious examination of the evidence adduced
in the instant case, the undersigned investigator is fully convinced
that it was only through Atty. Villanueva that petitioner could have
learned or known the name of the ponente in the case.

As between petitioner and Atty. Villanueva, the undersigned

investigator in inclined to give more credence to the testimony of
petitioner. Not only was petitioner consistent, firm, and candid and
detailed in his testimony, but he was also able to corroborate his
claims, by submitting his diary which contained vital entries and by
presenting the testimony of his nephew. x x x

Moreover, it was admitted by Atty. Villanueva that he and Justice

Gutierrez have known each other since 1964 and that Justice Gutierrez
was in the wake of his mother. These admissions tend to strengthen
the allegations of petitioner that Atty. Villanueva was the one who
told him the name of the ponente; that Atty. Villanueva told him that
he and the ponente are very close; and that when petitioner attended
the wake of Atty. Villanueva's mother, he was told by Atty.
Villanueva that Justice Gutierrez, the ponente, was coming.

Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

states that "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body."
Further, Rule 15.07 provides that "a lawyer must impress upon his
client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Atty. Villanueva took the forbidden course. In informing Mercado that
he was "a very very good, close and long time friend" of the ponente,
Atty. Villanueva impressed upon the former that he can obtain a
favorable disposition of his case. However, when his petition was
dismissed twice, Mercado's expectation crumbled. This prompted him to
hurl unfounded, malicious, and disrespectful accusations against
Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.

We have repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold assurances to

their clients. A lawyer who guarantees the successful outcome of a
litigation will exert heavy pressure and employ any means to win the
case at all costs. But when the case is lost, he will blame the
courts, placing them under a cloud of suspicion. As what happened in
this case, Atty. Villanueva's statements led Mercado, not only to
suspect but also to believe, that the entire Court, together with
Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, could be pressured or
influenced,

Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect

due to courts and the judicial officers.21 Atty. Villanueva's
conduct, no doubt, degraded the integrity and dignity of Chief
Justice Davide and the ponente and this Court as well.
Thus, we find Atty. Villanueva also guilty of indirect contempt of
court.

On the appropriate penalty, the general rule is that courts have

inherent power to impose a penalty for contempt reasonably
commensurate with the gravity of the offense. And that the degree of
punishment for contempt is said to lie within the sound discretion of
the court.22 Considering the circumstances obtaining herein, we
believe that Mercado and Atty. Villanueva should be fined P50,000.00
each and warned that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more
severe penalty.

One last word. The reason for the inherent power of courts to punish
for contempt is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability
of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the institution
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.23 Thus, we must act to
preserve its honor and integrity from assaults of disrespect. One
reason why respect of the public for the Judiciary has diminished is
because of unscrupulous lawyers who imply that judges and justices
can be influenced or bribed. Such conduct has no place in the legal
profession.

WHEREFORE, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Atty. Jose P. Villanueva are

declared GUILTY  of indirect contempt of court. They
are FINED  P50,000.00 each and WARNED that a repetition of similar
acts will warrant a more severe penalty.

(8) Duty to exercise good faith in business transactions with clients

•CPR Rule 15.08: Dual profession

•Nakpil vs. Valdez, 286 SCRA 758 (1998)

FACTS:Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in

Moran, Baguio. He went into an agreement with Atty. Carlos Valdes for
the latter to buy the property in trust for Nakpil. Valdes did buy
the property by contracting 2 loans. The lands’ titles were
transferred to his name.When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his
wife) acquired the services of Valdes and his accounting and law
firms for the settlement of the estate of Jose Nakpil. What Valdes
did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the list of assets of
Jose Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to his company, the
Caval Realty Corporation) while including the loans he
contracted.What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the
CFI.While the case was pending, Imelda also filed an administrative
complaint or disbarment against Valdes. The CFI dismissed the action
for reconveyance. The CA reversed the CFI.The complaint for
reconveyance went up to the SC and was decided in favor of Nakpil.
The SC held that Valdes only held the lots in trust for Nakpil.
ISSUE:W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his
acts, namely:
o Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil;
• Including his loans as claims on the estate; and
•
Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting
firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN
against the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law
firm.

HELD:The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1

year.The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes
broke the trust reposed on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter
agreed to use his professional services as a lawyer and an
accountant. As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of
representing
conflicting interests which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule15.03. In
the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the
estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other.
Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets and
liabilities of the estate and, at the same time,computed the claims
of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between
the interests of the estate which stands.

E. Conflict of interest
Questions:
•What is conflict of interest? Why are there proscriptions against it?
•What are the kinds of conflict of interest?
•What are the tests for determining conflict of interest?
•How can conflicts of interest be avoided? Mitigated?
•What are the defenses against a charge of conflict of interest?
1) ABA-ROLI, Code of Professional Responsibility (Annotated), pp. 112-115.
2) Codal provisions:
•CPR Canon 15
•CPR Rule 14.03 (b)
•CPR Rule 15.01
•CPR Rule 15.03
•CPR Rule 21.07
•CPR Rule 6.03
•Canons 6, Canons of Professional Ethics (CPE)
3) Cases:
•Perez vs. De La Torre, 485 SCRA 547 (2006)
Facts and Complaint: In December 2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping
for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and
jailed by the police authorities. Respondent went to the municipal building of
Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made representations that he
could secure their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions.
unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs of the murder
victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against
them, including herein complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial
confessions as the mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being
charged.

Defense: Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while
being detained at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in
drafting an extrajudicial confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of
kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents
about his decision to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of his
constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be utilized as a state-witness.

Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial
confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and only after he was
convinced that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist the accused in
executing the extrajudicial confession.

Ruling: Atty. Dela Torre is suspended for 3 years.

Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall

not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain from
representing two parties having conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing
precisely the foregoing, and without any proof that he secured the written consent of
both parties after explaining to them the existing conflict of interest, respondent
should be sanctioned.

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on

principles of public policy and good taste. In the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including
the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore,
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to
keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety
and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

At the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused in
the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the family of the
murder victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the murder case
invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients. Respondent assisted in
the execution by the two accused of their confessions whereby they admitted their
participation in various serious criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was
retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims. Respondent, who presumably
knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his better judgment before
conceding to accused’s choice of counsel. It did not cross his mind to inhibit himself
from acting as their counsel and instead, he even assisted them in executing the
extrajudicial confession.
•Samson vs. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: "A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." Atty. Era thus owed to Samson
and
his group entire devotion to their genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of their rights. He was expected to exert his best efforts and ability to
preserve the clients’ cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his clients
likewise served the ends of justice.
FACTS:
Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding
scam perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level Marketing
Business (ICS Corporation), a corporation whose corporate officers were led by
Sison. Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the
criminal prosecution of Sison and her group.
Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the possibility of
an amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson and the others
that undergoing a trial of the cases would just be a waste of time, money and effort
for them, and that they could settle the cases with Sison and her group, with him
guaranteeing the turnover to them of a certain property located in Antipolo City
belonging to ICS Corporation in exchange for their desistance. They acceded and
executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in turn they received a deed of
assignment.
Samson and his relatives later demanded from Atty. Era that they be given instead a
deed of absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the property among themselves.
However, Atty. Era told them that whether or not the title of the property had been
encumbered or free from lien or defect would no longer be his responsibility. He
further told them that as far as he was concerned he had already accomplished his
professional responsibility towards them upon the amicable settlement of the cases
between them and ICS Corporation. They were dismayed to learn that they could
not liquidate the property because it was no longer registered under the name of ICS
Corporation but was already under the name of Bank Wise Inc.
Due to the silence of Atty. Era for sometime thereafter, Samson and his group wrote
to him on to remind him about his guarantee and the promise to settle the issues
with Sison and her cohorts. But they did not hear from Atty. Era at all. During the
hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his group.
This forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find out later on,
however, that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel
for Sison in her other criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC in Quezon
City involving the same pyramiding scam that she and her ICS Corporation had
perpetrated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Era should be held liable for violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15
and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (YES)
RULING:
In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era with violating Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests
by accepting the responsibility of representing Sison in the cases similar to those in
which he had undertaken to represent Samson and his group, notwithstanding that
Sison was the very same person whom Samson and his group had accused with Atty.
Era’s legal assistance.
Atty. Era’s contention that the lawyer-client relationship ended when Samson and
his group entered into the compromise settlement with Sison was unwarranted. The
lawyer-client relationship did not terminate as of then, for the fact remained that he
still needed to oversee the implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed
with the criminal cases until they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the
trial court. It is also relevant to indicate that the execution of a compromise
settlement in the criminal cases did not ipso facto cause the termination of the
cases not only because the approval of the compromise by the trial court was still
required, but also because the compromise would have applied only to the civil
aspect, and excluded the criminal aspect.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
"A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." Atty. Era thus owed to
Samson and his group entire devotion to their genuine interest, and warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of their rights. He was expected to exert his best
efforts and ability to preserve the clients’ cause, for the unwavering loyalty
displayed to his clients likewise served the ends of justice.

•Hornilla vs. Salunat, 405 SCRA 220 (2003)

Facts:

Benedicto Hornilla and Atty. Federico Ricafort filed an administrative complaint with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commision on Bar Discipline against Atty.
Ernesto Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of interest. They allege
that Atty. Salunat is a member of ASSA Law and Associates which was the retained
counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA). Also, Atty.
Salunat’s brother is a member of the PPSTA Board.

Members of the PPSTA filed an intra-corporate case against members of the Board of
Directors before the Securities and Exchage Commission and the Ombudsman for
unlawful spending and undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA. Atty. Salunat
entered his appearance as counsel of the PPSTA Board. Hornilla and Atty. Ricafort
argue that Atty. Salunat was guilty of conflict of interest since he was engaged by the
PPSTA and paid out of the corporate funds which they contributed.

Atty. Salusat refused to withdraw from the case and argued that he only filed a
“Manifestation of Extreme Urgency” as regards the Ombudsman case while a
different lawyer handles the SEC case. He also points out that his brother being a
member of the Board is immaterial and he entered into the retainer contract with the
PPSTA Board not in his individual capacity but in behalf of ASSA Law Firm.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, after investigation, recommended that Atty.
Salunat be suspended form the practice of law for six months. The Board of
Governors adopted a resolution approving the recommendation.

Issue:

W/N Atty. Salunat is guilty of conflict of interest?

Held:

YES, however, the SC found it proper to just admonish Atty. Salunat given that it was
only his first offense.
Atty. Salunat is a Managing Partner at the ASSA Law Firm, which was the retained
counsel of PPSTA, and yet he appeared as counsel of record for the Board of
Directors in the case “Philippine Public School Teacher’s Association, Inc. et al. v.
1992-1995 Board of Directors of the PPSTA”. Clearly there is conflict of interest
when he represented the parties against whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed a suit.
By filing the “Manifestation of Extreme Urgency” with the Ombudsman, he already
entered his appearance therein, constituting the conflict of interest.

The SC said that a lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent
members of the same corporation’s board of directors in a derivative suit brought
against them and to do so would be tantamount to conflicting interests.

The Court also defined conflict of interest as when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose
it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client”. Another test is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithflness
or double dealing in the performance thereof.

•Solatan vs. Inocentes, 466 SCRA 1 (2005)

Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar Inocentes.
The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Genito,
owners of an apartment complex when the Genito Apartments were placed under
sequestration by the PCGG. They represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG
and the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment cases against non-paying tenants occupying
the Genito Apartments.
Solatan’s sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. She left the apartment
to Solatan and other members of her family. A complaint for ejectment for non-
payment of rentals was filed against her and a decision was rendered in a judgment by
default ordering her to vacate the premises. Solatan was occupying said apartment
when he learned of the judgment. He informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange
the execution of a new lease contract by virtue of which he would be the new lessee
of the apartment. Atty. Inocentes referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge
of ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito Apartments.
During the meeting with Atty. Camano, an verbal agreement was made in
which complainant agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his sister, including
awarded attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Complainant issued a check in the name of
Atty. Camano representing half of the attorney’s fees.
Complainant failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in coordination
with Atty. Camano enforced the writ of execution and levied the properties found in
the subject apartment. Complainant renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to release
the levied properties and allow complainant to remain at the apartment. Acting on
Atty. Camano’s advice, complainant presented an affidavit of ownership to the sheriff
who released the levied items. However, a gas stove was not returned to the
complainant but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments
where he was temporarily staying.
Complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty.
Camano and Atty. Inocentes. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to suspend Atty.
Camano from the practice of law for 1 year and to reprimand Atty. Inocentes for
exercising command responsibility.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Atty. Camano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
2) Whether or not Atty. Inocentes violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility

HELD: All lawyers must observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings
with their clients.
1. An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal representative for a
person without being retained. No employment relation was offered or accepted in the
instant case.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires all lawyers to
observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their clients. Unquestionably, an
attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest conflicting with that of his
client may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, the advice given by Atty. Camano in
the context where the complainant was the rightful owner of the incorrectly levied
properties was in consonance with his duty as an officer of the court. It should not be
construed as being in conflict with the interest of the spouses Genito as they have no
interest over the properties. The act of informing complainant that his properties
would be returned upon showing proof of his ownership may hint at infidelity to his
clients but lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal.

2. Atty. Inocentes’ failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters

under the charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. As name practitioner
of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to make reasonable
efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in conformity to the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latter’s
dealings with complainant. This is the linchpin of his supervisory capacity over Atty.
Camano and liability by virtue thereof. Partners and practitioners who hold
supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising
themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by persons over which
they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary efforts to foreclose
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by persons under their charge.

•Daging vs. Davis, A.C. No. 9395, November 12, 2014

Legal Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03
FACTS:
Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She
leased
from Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building space where she operated the bar.
Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal from Davis &Sabling Law
Office
signed by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Sabling).
This
eventually resulted in the signing by the complainant,, the respondent and Atty.
Sabling of a
Retainer Agreement dated March 7, 2005.
Because complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated
the
lease. Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac went to
complainant's
music bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed her that Balageo would
take over the operation of the bar.
Complainant likewise alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and
Balageo
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that
time, Davis
& Sabling Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer Agreement remained
subsisting
and in force. However, respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment
case
and filed, on behalf of the latter, an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the
Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a business partner of
Balageo
in the operation of the bar. Respondent further alleged that it was not him who
handled the
complainant’s case, but his partner, Atty. Sabling.
ISSUE:
Whether the Respondent should be held administratively liable based on the
allegations in
the complaint.
RULING:
Yes, as provided by Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, “A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.”
"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client." The
prohibition
against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the
lawyer
has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. In
Quiambao v. Atty. Bamba, this Court emphasized that lawyers are expected not only
to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
Moreover, In Hiladov. David, reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr., this Court
held
that a lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged
the
services of his law firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion
and
undermines the integrity of justice. Thus, respondent's argument that he never took
advantage of any information acquired by his law firm in the course of its professional
dealings with the complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment.
Undeniably
aware of the fact that complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have
immediately informed both the complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other
members of his law firm, cannot represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise,
they
would be representing conflicting interests and violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have simply advised both complainant and
Balageo to instead engage the services of another lawyer.
The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be reprimand or
suspension
from the practice of law ranging from six months to two years.

•Aninon vs. Sabitsana, Jr., A.R. No. 5098, April 11, 2012

Facts: This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is
charged of: (1) violating the lawyer’s duty to preserve confidential information
received from his client;1 and (2) violating the prohibition on representing conflicting
interests.2

The complainan, Josefina ANIÑON, related that she previously engaged the legal
services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of
Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja,
Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a
civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L.
Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana
of using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing the civil case.

Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and
execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any confidential
information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment complaint was
instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint
who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint
for this reason.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing

conflicting interests.
Ruling: Yes. On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial
evidence to support Atty. Sabitsana’s violation of the above rule, as established by the
following circumstances on record:

One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect
her interest over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal
advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and
executed in the complainant’s favor.

Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal
interest over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty.
Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed with
the complainant’s interests.

Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients,
Atty. Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Cañete.

Four, Atty. Sabitsana’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between

his two clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case
against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he impleaded the
complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was for
the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and
executed for the complainant.

By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another
client in the same action; he also accepted a new engagement that entailed him to
contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal
services had been previously retained.

To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides

an exception to the above prohibition. However, we find no reason to apply the
exception due to Atty. Sabitsana’s failure to comply with the requirements set forth
under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of facts to the
complainant and to Zenaida Cañete before he accepted the new engagement with
Zenaida Cañete. The records likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a
letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Cañete’s adverse claim to the
property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the adverse claim; Atty.
Sabitsana however did not disclose to the complainant that he was also being engaged
as counsel by Zenaida Cañete.11 Moreover, the records show that Atty. Sabitsana
failed to obtain the written consent of his two clients, as required by Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Confilct of Interest

The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with
the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that
must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information
to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless
to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on
an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his
part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and
transactions with the client.6 Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility quoted below:

Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

"The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation

where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
action."7 The prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer would not be called upon to
contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that
there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to
the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated." 8 To be held
accountable under this rule, it is "enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of
whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the
lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the
duty of undivided fidelity to both clients."9

Three(3) Tests of Conflict of Interest

One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of
one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a
lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for
the other client, there is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation

would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new
relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through
their connection or previous employment.10 [emphasis ours]

•Orola vs. Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties.
In the settlement of Trinidad Laserna-Orola’s
(Trinidad) estate, the Heirs of Trinidad were represented
by Atty. Villa while Atty. Azarraga represented Maricar,
Karen, and the other heirs of the late Antonio (son of
Trinidad) with respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos as
collaborating counsel. In the course of the proceedings,
the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for
the removal of EmilioOrola, the husband of Trinidad, as
administrator and, in his stead, sought the appointment of
Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted. Subsequently,
respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating
counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the
reconsideration of the RTC Order.
Due to the respondent’s new engagement,
complainants (Heirs of Trinidad and Karen) filed a
disbarment complaint before the IBP, claiming that he
violatedRule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to
represent conflicting interests in the subject case, and
Section 20, Rule 138 as he breached the trust and
confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of
Antonio. Complainants claimed that while Maricar, the
surviving spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen,
consented to the withdrawal of respondent’s appearance,
the same was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after
he had already entered his appearance for Emilio on
October 10, 2007. In this accord, respondent failed to
disclose such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was
not able to obtain their written consent as required under
the Rules.
In his defense, respondent contended that he
never appeared as counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for
the Heirs of Antonio. He averred that he only
accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily appear on
her behalf as their counsel of record could not attend the
scheduled June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings and that his
appearances thereat were free of charge. In fact, he
obtained Maricar’s permission for him to withdraw from
the case as no further communications transpired after
these two hearings. Finally, he clarified that his
representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a
mediator, rather than a litigator, and that since no
settlement was forged between the parties, he formally
withdrew his appearance on December 6, 2007. In support
of his assertions, respondent submitted the affidavits of
Maricar and Atty. Azarragarelative to his limited
appearance and his consultation with Maricar prior to his
engagement as counsel for Emilio.The IBP found respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests only with respect to Karen. The
Investigating Commissioner observed that while
respondent's withdrawal of appearance was with the
express conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless
failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was already of
age and one of the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under
Rule 15.03 of the Code.On the other hand, the
Investigating Commissioner held that there was no
violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as
complainants themselves admitted that respondent “did
not acquire confidential information from his former client
nor did he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in
the course of his previous employment.” A penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for six months was
imposed against respondent.
ISSUE: Is respondent guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code?
RULING: YES. The Court agrees with the IBP’s finding
that respondent represented conflicting interests and,
perforce, must be held administratively liable therefor. (3-
month suspension)
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a
lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same
action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is
founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.
It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which
is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf
of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for
the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict
of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their
connection.(Hornilla v. Salunat)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s
immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s
employment with the client.
In this case, when respondent proceeded to
represent Emilio, who was removed for committing acts
prejudicial to the interest of the heirs, for the purpose of
seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case,
he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of
Antonio – particularly, Karen – in violation of the above
stated rule.Respondent's justification that no confidential
information was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him
for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of
interests, as enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute
prohibition from representation with respect to opposing
parties in the same case. That respondent’s previous
appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was
only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be given
any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the
inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the
lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to
represent conflicting interests.
Neither can respondent's asseveration that his
engagement by Emilio was more of a mediator than a
litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement among
the family members render the rule inoperative. In fact,
even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper
since Rule 15.04, Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires
the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned
before he may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in
settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent failed in this
respect as the records show that respondent was remiss in
his duty to make a full disclosure of his impending
engagement as Emilio’s counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio
– particularly, Karen – and equally secure their express
written consent before consummating the same.

•PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 546 (2005)

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement
or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service. Here, the advice given by respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General on
the
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
FACTS
Former Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for
the assistance and supervision of the court in the GenBank’s liquidation. Mendoza
gave advice on the procedure to liquidate the GenBank. Subsequently, President
Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
President Marcos, his family and cronies. The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against
Tan, et al. and issued several writs of sequestration on properties they allegedly
acquired. Tan, et al. were represented by former SolGen Mendoza, who has then
resumed his private practice of law. The PCGG filed motions to disqualify Mendoza
as counsel for Tan, et al., alleging that then SolGen and counsel to Central Bank,
“actively intervened” in the liquidation of GenBank, which was subsequently
acquired by Tan, et al.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza. (NO)
RULING
The “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the
case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.”
Said procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265,
section 29. Thus, the Court held that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on
the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Supreme Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a
litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent
legal representation - the danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an
opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork.
B. To the legal profession (Canons 7-9)
1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Rule 139-A)
a) Membership and dues
2) Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession
3) Courtesy, fairness and candor toward professional colleaques
4) No assistance in unauthorized practice of law

F. Privileged communication: confidences and secrets

Questions:
•What is the attorney-client privilege? What is its rationale?
•What is the extent of its scope? Limitations?
1) Codal provisions:
•Canon 21: Preserve client’s confidences and secrets
•CPR Rule 21.01
•CPR Rule 21.02
•CPR Rule 21.03
•CPR Rule 21.04
•CPR Rule 21.05
•CPR Rule 21.06
•CPR Rule 21.07, cf. CPR Rule 15.01, Rule 14.03
•CPR Rule 15.02
•ROC Rule 138, Sec. 20 (e)
•ROC Rule 130, Sec. 21 (b)
•Art. 208, Revised Penal Code
•CPE, Canon 37
2) Cases:
•Genato vs. Silapan, 406 SCRA 75 (2003)
FACTS
Atty. Silapan rented a small commercial space (as his law office) in Genato's building
in Quezon City. Atty. Dacanay, Genato's retained lawyer, accommodated Silapan and
even made him handle some of Genato's cases. Silapan borrowed from Genato P200K
which he intended to use as DP for the purchase of a new car. In return, Silapan
issued a postdated check of approx. P177K to cover for 6 months interest of the loan.
Moreover, he mortgaged to Genato his house and lot in QC.

In 1993, Silapan introduced to Genato a certain Romero, who wanted to borrow

money from him as well. 

Subsequently, Silapan failed to pay the amortization of the car. The financing firm,
City Trust Company, which financed the payment of the car, demanded from Genato
the payment of the car. Genato tried to encash the postdated check, but it was
dishonored due to closed account.

Genato filed a BP 22 case against Silapan and a foreclosure case of the real estate
mortgage.

In 1993, before paying for the next installment on his car, Silapan asked Genato to
execute a Deed of Sale transferring ownership of the car to him. However, Genato
said that he will do so after the termination of his criminal case, where he wanted
Silapan, his former counsel, to offer bribe money to the members of the review
committee of DOJ. He also wanted Silapan to offer bribe money to the prosecutor
assigned and to the presiding Judge.

ISSUE
W/N Silapan committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to Genato
illegal practices and disclosing his alleged intention to bribe government officials in
connection with the pending case.

HELD
YES. Canon 17 provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. An attorney is not
permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a
client, unless the latter consents. 

However, the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications is limited

only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a
lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of
a crime. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no
professional employment in the strict sense.

The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not pertinent
to the foreclosure case. It was improper for Silapan to use it against Genato in the
foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation and his professional
competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case.

•Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 122 (1996)

"Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco” was a complaint
filed by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners in this case, partners of
the ACCRA Law Firm, were among the defendants. The reason they were involved in
that case is because ACCRA had performed legal services for its clients, which
included the organization and acquisition of business associations or organizations,
with the correlative services where its members acted as incorporators or as
stockholders. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law
firm acquired information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and
business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and
private respondent Raul Roco admitted that they assisted in the organization and
acquisition of the companies, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA
lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceeding.
In that case, they were charged with conspiracy (with Cojuangco) and using of
coconut levy funds in setting up various coconut levy funded corporations, creating a
monopoly, with the help of the president. Also they were charged with having used
insidious means and machinations in using “ACCRA Investments corporation” to
acquire 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of the UCPB (15M shares).
PCGG had excluded Raul Roco in that case since he had undertaken to reveal
the identity of the principals for whom he had acted. Petitioners filed a motion so that
they may be excluded as well. PCGG set the following conditions: (a) the disclosure
of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-
client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners
executed in favor of its client covering their respective shareholdings. Petitioners
refused, so the motion was denied. This petition for certiorari is about that motion
and its denial:
“The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-
client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing
the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the
PCGG; (1) Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client
privilege includes the identity of the clients (2) The factual disclosures
required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of petitioners
ACCRA lawyers' alleged clients but extend to other privileged
matters.”
:: Can the lawyers in this case invoke attorney-client privilege and refuse to divulge
the identity of their clients and their knowledge of his/their transactions? YES.
[1] “It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as
defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of
activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite
obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being
used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the
PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause
of action as against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended
Complaint.”
(Discuss the fiduciary duty of the lawyer to his client here)
[2] As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in
mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the
United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of this client. The reasons advanced for the general rule are well
established. First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged
information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins
to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-
client privilege does not attach until there is a client. Third, the privilege generally
pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Exceptions: 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists
that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyer's advice. 2) Where disclosure would open the client to
civil liability; his identity is privileged. 3) Where the government's lawyers have no
case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name
would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to
convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged. Basically, information
relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the
client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then
reveal client confidences.
√ The circumstances clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead
to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is
privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject
matter or the substance. There is no question that the preparation of the (documents
requested by PCGG) documents was part and parcel of petitioners' legal service to
their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers.
Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the
alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations. Second,
revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the
prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link that would
inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the client of a crime.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their
expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case
should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources
and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients,
information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction
which may or may not be illegal.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of
attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that
they should wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters
learned in confidence before they can raise their objections. But petitioners are not
mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not
willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to
maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of
respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners as parties-defendants in
"Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al."

•Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan, 377 SCRA 509 (2002)

•Dalisay vs. Mauricio, 479 SCRA 307 (2006)

At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding
Atty. Melanio "Batas" Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross
misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months.

Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondent’s services as counsel in Civil

Case pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal.
Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorney’s fees in the total amount
of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for
her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the
return of her money and documents, but respondent refused.

nvestigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that "for the amount of P56,000.00 paid
by the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the
respondent except his alleged conferences and opinions rendered when complainant
frequented his law office."

In his Reply, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case. She
hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration of
nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree.

WON Respondent violated CPR

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every
person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment.
But once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is
established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause.5 From then on, he
is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve
the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with
wholehearted devotion.

Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00

from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had
been remiss in the performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier, "there is
nothing in the records to show that he (respondent) entered his appearance as
counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044." Neither is there any
evidence nor pleading submitted to show that he initiated new petitions.

There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of the
profession demands that, in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees
to complainant. In Pariñas v. Paguinto,10 we held that "a lawyer shall account for
all money or property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for
a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case
must immediately be returned to the client on demand." Per records, complainant
made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the money.

Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil

Case No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First,
Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the
course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent
his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same
Canon specifically provides:
Rule 19.02 – A lawyer who has received information that his clients has,
in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or
tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and
failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should

have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If
complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her.

•Lee vs. Simando, A.C. No. 9537, June 10, 2013

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to ADOPT the
findings and recommendation of the IBP in Resolution No. XIX-20 10-
733 suspending respondent Atty. Amador L. Simando for six ( 6)
months from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

G. Duty to hold client’s moneys and properties in trust

1) Codal provisions and cases:
•CANON 16: Hold client’s moneys and properties in trust
•Art. 1491, Civil Code
•Zalamea v. De Guzman, A.C. No. 7387, November 3, 2016
FACTS:
Complainant seeks the legal advised of the property of their ill mother. And
sometimes respondent help them to pay their loan in the bank, however, complainant
failed to pay the bank, so the wife of the lawyer paid for it. And they became the
owner. Comes now, complainant filed an disbarment case against respondent lawyer,
for the reason that he cannot acquire said property because of prohibition of lawyers-
client relationship, and a violation under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, lawyers are
prohibited to acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person
or through the mediation of another, their client's property and rights in litigation,
hence:

ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:

5. Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within
whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession.

6. Any others specially disqualified by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent lawyer violates such prohibition?

HELD: The prohibition which rests on considerations of public policy and interests is
intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his
fiduciary and confidential relationship with him. De Guzman could not have possibly
exerted such undue influence, as a lawyer, upon the Zalameas, as his clients. In fact, it
was Manuel Enrique who approached the Spouses De Guzman and asked them if they
would be willing to become business partners in a lechon business. It was also
Manuel Enrique who turned to De Guzman for help in order to reacquire the already
foreclosed Speaker Perez property. They had agreed that De Guzman would simply
pay the required downpayment to BDO and EMZEE would pay the remaining balance
in installment. And when EMZEE continued suffering losses, Angel took care of the
monthly amortizations so as not to lose the property.

Clearly, the re!Relationship between the Spouses De Guzman and the Zalamea
brothers is actually one of business partners rather than that of a lawyer and client.
Atty. De Guzman's acquisition of the Speaker Perez property was a valid consequence
of a business deal, not by reason of a lawyer-client relationship, for which he could
not be penalized by the Court. De Guzman and his wife are very well allowed by law
to enter into such a transaction and their conduct in this regard was not borne out to
have been attended by any undue influence, deceit, or misrepresentation.

“Doctrine”
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his
duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in
Section 27,3 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a
breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice. The persons mentioned in
Article 1491 are prohibited from purchasing said property because of an existing trust
relationship. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and
rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights,
as well as with the client. The very first Canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility5 provides that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal process." Canon 17 states that "a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him, while Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust
all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Further,
Section 3, Rule 13 8 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an
oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.
And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the
Court. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal
system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and
reprehensible act which the Court will never countenance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 3, 2015

and the Resolution dated February 9, 2016, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139652 are hereby REVERSED  and SET ASIDE.

•CPR Rule 16.01: To account

•Berbano vs. Barcelona, 410 SCRA 258 (2003)
SUMMARY:
Berbano, one of the heirs of Rufino Esteban Hilapo, appointed as
attorney-in-fact Porfrio Daen to settle their land dispute with Filinvest Dev.
Corp. Pending the land dispute, Daen was incarcerated. She sought the assistance of
Barcelona in releasing Daen. Berbano and Daen's nephew gave
Barcelona a total of PhP64,000 for the cause as Barcelona purported that he
knew a Justice of the Supreme Court who can help with Daen's release but
that he would need money for it. However, Daen was not released from jail as
promised and Berbano, in her several attempts to recover the money, was
evaded by Barcelona.

The Court held that Berbano has violated several canons of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, including Canon 16 and Rule 16.01, which
demands that lawyers must account for all the money received from the
client. Furthermore, Barcelona had a previous administrative complaint
against him of similar nature and had, as in that case, ignored all hearings and
notices from the Investigating Commissioner. Barcelona was thus declared
disbarred from the practice of law and was ordered to return PhP64,000 to
Berbano.

DOCTRINE:
The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes
and the courts but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good
faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to
their fiduciary relationship.

FACTS:
11 Mar 1999 – Felicitas Berbano filed a sworn affidavit before the IBP and
alleged the following:
o Berbano was one of the heirs of Rufino Esteban Hilapo and had appointed Porfirio
Daen as their attorney-in-fact in the settlement of a land dispute against Filinvest Dev.
Corp. with the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) involving
244 hectare land in Alabang, Muntinlupa

o 26 Jan 1999 – Daen was arrested by a Muntinlupa police who presented an expired
warrant dated Feb 1990 and was detained at Muntinlupa City Jail, Tunasan

o Naty Sibuya, a friend, recommended Wenceslao Barcelona, her cousin-in-law, to

assist in the release of Daen

o 26 Jan 1999 - Barcelona purported that he could have Daen released the following
day if he would be given PhP50,000. Berbano gave him only PhP15,700 as it was
already around 10:30PM and could only gather the money from their relatives

o 27 Jan 1999 – At a Max's Restaurant, 12NN, Berbano handed Barcelona a pay-to-

cash cheque amounting to PhP24,000 dated 29 Jan 1999. Barcelona claimed that the
Justices of the Supreme Court do not accept cheques but took the cheque presented
nonetheless

o 28 Jan 1999 – Berbano gave an additional PhP10,000 in cash to Barcelona through

the latter's wife. As the cheque was allegedly not encashed according to Barcelona,
PhP15,000 was given to him by Gil Daen, Porfrio's nephew. Berbano also gave
PhP1,000 for Barcelona's gasoline expenses.

o 3 Feb 1999 – Barcelona told Berbano that Daen will be released the following day

o 4 Feb 1999 – Daen was not released and Barcelona, according to his wife, was in
Mindanao attending a peace talk with the Muslims

o After more than a week – Barcelona promised that he would return the PhP64,000
but was never heard from or seen again by Berbano

15 Apr 1999 – Investigating Commissioner J. Virgilio A. Bautista of CBD IBP
required Barcelona to submit an answer to the complaint. Barcelona never submitted
despite due notice received by him.

13 Aug 1999 – Respondent failed to appear in the hearing and was then considered in
default. Complainant testified and manifested that she would bring the PhP24,0000
cheque.

Complainant and respondent failed to appear in the following hearings:
1 Oct and 19 Nov in 1999, 12 Oct and 14 Dec in 2001 and 28 Jun 2002.

23 Dec 2002 – Commissioner Bautista recommended that respondent was
guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommended that he be disbarred and ordered to
return the PhP24,0000.

IBP Board of Governors affirmed the recommendation but modified the
penalty to suspension for 6 years

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON Barcelona should be disbarred? YES.
a. Respondent callously demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a
client under the pretext of having connections with a Justice of the Supreme
Court

b. Respondent had the audacity to say that Justices of the Supreme Court do not
accept cheques
c. Respondent had been charged and found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer in Gil T. Aquino v. Atty Wenceslao C. Barcelona where he asked and
received an amount of PhP60,000 as he misrepresented that he knew a legal
assistant named Gonzalo Mericullo in PNB who could restructure the loan of the
then complainant. No such person was employed by PNB and as a result,
Aquino's property was foreclosed. The Court suspended respondent for six
years.

d. Respondent has a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the

proper connections to secure the relief they seek and ask for money allegedly to
be given to said connections

e. Act of respondent of not filing his answer and not attending the
hearings displays his contempt for legal proceedings

Court ordered the disbarment of Barcelona as he was found guilty of

gross misconduct and in violating Canons 1, 7, 11, 16 and Rule 16.01 and
ordered that PhP64,000 be returned to the complainant within 30 days from
receipt of the notice.

•CPR Rule 16.02: To keep client’s fund separate

•Hernandez vs. Go, 450 SCRA 1 (2005)
TL; DR: The respondent convinced the complainant to execute deeds of sale to him
for her properties because he would sell the properties and use the money to pay off
the complainant’s loans. He abused her trust and kept the lots for himself and instead,
paid the creditors with his own money. The respondent is disbarred from the practice
of law.
FACTS:
The complainant Nazaria Hernandez was currently facing suits for money against her
because of the unpaid loans that her husband had left when he had abandoned his
family.
Hernandez availed of the legal aid of respondent Luciano Go. The latter advised the
former to sell all her lots to him without any monetary consideration for each of the
lots. The respondent promised to sell the lands to third parties and the funds collected
from the sales would be used to pay Hernandez’s creditors.

In 1974, it turned out that the respondent did not in fact sell the lots in question. What
he did was to pay off the loans using his own money. Up to the point of this
complaint, the respondent still owns the lots in question.
The respondent denies all the allegations and claims that he did not breach the trust
between him and his client.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the respondent should be disciplined for his actions

RULE:
YES. Respondent Atty. Jose Go is found to be unfit to practice the law profession and
is duly DISBARRED from the brotherhood of lawyers.

RATIO:
The respondent clearly abused his client’s trust in him in having convinced her to sell
the lots in question in his favor without so much as a cent going to Hernandez. He not
only deceived Hernandez but he had taken advantedg of the latter during a financial
plight.

The IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline found the respondent to be guilty of
violating Canons 16 and 17 and improperly rendered a resolution to penalize him with
6 months of suspension. The IBP Board of Governors found this penalty to be too
light and sentenced him to 3 years of suspension.

The Supreme Court, however, relied on Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court which states that a lawyer may be disbarred from the practice if he is found
to have done a gross misconduct in his office. The court found that the respondent
truly did perform misconduct and the punishment that is due him should be
disbarment.

CANONS:
Canon 16. "A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession."
Canon 17. "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him."

WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is

DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

•CPR Rule 16.03: Delivery of funds, lawyer’s lien

•Businos vs. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 40 (1997)
FACTS:
Complainant (C) entrusted upon Respondent (R), being their counsel in a case, the
withdrawal of money deposited in the Clerk of Court and the collection of rent from a
school for him to deposit the same to the bank account of C's husband. R failed to do
so and told C that he has spent it for his personal use but promise to pay the same.
Albeit several demands, R failed to deposit the money in the account of C's husband.
For that reason, C filed an administrative case against R. The IBP ordered R to
comment on the same but the latter did not do so. Another order was given with fine.
R paid the fine but, after obtaining extension of time, he failed to submit any
comment. The IBP recommended suspension for the erring lawyer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the punishment is commensurate to the acts committed by the R

HELD:
No. R, by converting the money of his clients to his own personal use without their
consent, and by deceiving the complainant into giving him an amount purportedly to
be used as a bond which was not required is, undoubtedly, guilty of deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct. By so doing, he betrays the confidence reposed in
him by his clients. Not only has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he
has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession. His blatant disregard of the
Court orders aggravated his violation. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily
reposed by clients required in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty
to his client, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally
speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing
should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
profession.

WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior in

palpable disregard of Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon 11 thereof, and consistent with the
urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions and high standards of the legal
profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in the members of the Philippine
Bar, the Court Resolves to DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT
from the practice of law. His name is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

•Rayos vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 169079, February 12, 2007

NATURE: Petition for Review of the Resolution of IBP dismissing Francisco Rayos’
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ponciano Hernandez.

FACTS: Atty Hernandez was the counsel of Rayos in a Civil Case for damages
against NAPOCOR. RTC dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, CA reversed the
RTC decision and awarded damages in favor of Rayos. SC affirmed the CA Decision
which became final and executory. NAPOCOR issued a Check in the amount of
₱1,060,800.00 payable to Rayos which was turned over to Atty. Hernandez as
counsel. When Rayos demanded the turn over of the check, Atty. Hernandez refused
and justified his retention as a means to ensure payment of his attorney’s fees. Rayos
initiated this complaint for disbarment for Atty. Hernandez’ failure to return the rest
of the award in the amount of ₱557,961.21. In his answer Atty. Hernandez alleged
that they had a contract for attorney’s fees on a contingent basis on 40%-60% sharing
of the court award. Atty. Hernandez was entitled to receive 60% of the award – 40%
as attorney’s fees and 20% as litigation expenses. He asseverated that he deposited
Rayos’ share of the 40% award in a bank under Rayos’ name.

ISSUE #1: Whether Atty. Hernandez is justified in retaining the amount awarded to
Rayos to assure payment of his attorney’s fees

HELD: NO.
Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client
constitute trust funds and must be immediately paid over to the client. Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.

When Atty. Hernandez withheld and refused to deliver the check, he breached the
trust reposed on him. The claim that Rayos failed to pay his attorney’s fees is not an
excuse for Atty. Hernandez’ failure to deliver the amount. A lawyer is not entitled to
unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the mere fact alone that the
client owes him attorney’s fees. The failure of an attorney to return the client’s money
upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own
use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality, as well as of professional
ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.
It is true that under Canon 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, an
attorney has the following rights:

Rule 16.03- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.

But the fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected
for his client, does not relieve him of his duty to promptly account for the moneys
received; his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. Thus, what
respondent should have properly done was to provide the petitioner with an
accounting before deducting his attorney’s fees and then to turn over the remaining
balance of the award collected.

The relationship of attorney and client has always been rightly regarded as one of
special trust and confidence. An attorney must exercise the utmost good faith and
fairness in all his relationship vis-à-vis his client. Respondent fell far short of this
standard when he failed to render an accounting for the amount actually received by
him on behalf of his client and when he refused to turn over any portion of said
amount to his client upon the pretext that his attorney’s fees had not at all been paid.
Respondent had, in fact, placed his private and personal interest above that of his
client.

Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law
advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births
are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike
mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental
interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State
regulation.

A lawyer’s compensation for professional services rendered is subject to the

supervision of the court, not just to guarantee that the fees he charges and receives
remain reasonable and commensurate with the services rendered, but also to maintain
the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to which he belongs. Upon taking his
attorney’s oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority of
the courts to regulate his right to charge professional fees.

ISSUE #2: Whether a contingent fee comprising of 40% as attorney’s fees and 20%
as litigation expenses is unreasonable and unconscionable

HELD: YES.
A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized
as valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. The amount of
contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will
be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher
compensation is allowed as contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer
may get nothing if the suit fails. Contracts of this nature are permitted because they
redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer "especially in cases where the
client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal
services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee
to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee
arrangement is the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for
injuries sustained and have their rights vindicated."

Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court
in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. Section 13 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics states that

“a contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable

under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness."

Likewise, Rule 138, Section 24, of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney’s; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be

entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation
for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the
attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as
to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its
conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable
or unreasonable.

The reduction of unreasonable attorney’s fees is within the regulatory powers of the
courts. When the courts find that the stipulated amount is excessive or the contract is
unreasonable, or found to have been marred by fraud, mistake, undue influence or
suppression of facts on the part of the attorney, public policy demands that said
contract be disregarded to protect the client from unreasonable exaction. Stipulated
attorney’s fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate
compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon
the client. Generally, the amount of attorney’s fees due is that stipulated in the retainer
agreement which is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyer’s compensation.

A stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation in a written contract for professional

services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be
allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable or
unconscionable. In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney’s fees is fixed on the
basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorney’s services. Courts
may ascertain also if the attorney’s fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable
under the circumstances. In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover
more than what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

We have identified the circumstances to be considered in determining the

reasonableness of a claim for attorney’s fees as follows: (1) the amount and character
of the service rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and
importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the
responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected
by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called
for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social
standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; (9) whether the fee is absolute or
contingent, it being recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee
when it is contingent than when it is not; 35 and (10) the financial capacity and
economic status of the client have to be taken into account in fixing the
reasonableness of the fee.
Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the
following factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
Chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

The contingent fee claimed was grossly excessive and unconscionable. Such a fee
structure, when considered in conjunction with the circumstances of this case, also
shows that an unfair advantage was taken of the client and legal fraud and imposition
perpetrated upon him. Lawyers should not be permitted to get a lion’s share of the
benefits due the poor and the helpless. Contracts for legal services between the
helpless and attorney should be zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share of the
benefits be not denied to the former. This Court has the power to guard a client,
especially an aged and necessitous client, against such a contract.

Since Atty. Hernandez, after all, succeeded in obtaining a favorable decision for his
client in his efforts in litigating the case for 15 years and he took risk in representing
petitioner on a contingent fee basis, a fee of 35% of the amount awarded to petitioner
would be a fair compensation for respondent’s legal services.

WHEREFORE the Court Resolves that:

1. Respondent is guilty of violation of the attorney’s oath and of serious professional
misconduct and shall be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely;

2. Respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount equivalent to thirty-five

percent (35%) of the total amount awarded 51 to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951;
and

3. Respondent is to return the amount of Two Hundred Ninety Thousand One

Hundred Nine Pesos and Twenty-One Centavos (₱290,109.21), which he retained in
excess of what we herein declared as fair and reasonable attorney’s fees, plus legal
interest from date of finality of this judgment until full payment thereof.

•CPR Rule 16.04: No borrowing, lending

•Barnachea vs. Quicho, 399 SCRA 1 (2003)
FACTS:
The services of the respondent (R) was engaged by the complainant (C) for the
transfer under her name of the title of a property previously owned by the latter's
sister. In connection with the said employment, C issued checks payable to R for the
expenses of the said transfer and his legal services. R encashed the checks. However,
the money did not serve its purpose. When C demanded for its return, R failed to do
so and sent a letter instead and a postdated check. When the said check was due, the
funds were not available. C went to the IBP to file a complaint against R. The IBP
ordered R to repay his client for the principal amount and gave a reprimand.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order was commensurate to the acts of R21
HELD:
No. A lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his client. The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney
an absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way,
directly or indirectly, with the interest of his client. In this case, respondent
miserably failed to measure up to the exacting standard expected of him.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, Respondent Atty. Edwin T. Quiocho is

found guilty of violation of Canons 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One (1) Year with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely. He is DIRECTED to restitute to the complainant the full amount of
P41,280.00 within ten (10) days from notice hereof. Respondent is further
DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of said amount within ten (10)
days from said payment. If Respondent fails to restitute the said amount within the
aforesaid period, he shall be meted an additional suspension of three (3) months for
every month or fraction thereof of delay until he shall have paid the said amount in
full. In case a subsidiary penalty of suspension for his failure to restitute the said
amount shall be necessary, respondent shall serve successively the penalty of his one
year suspension and the subsidiary penalty. This is without prejudice to the right of
the complainant to institute the appropriate action for the collection of said amount.

•Navarro vs. Solidum, A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014

Legal Ethics: Rule 1.01; Canon 16 Rule 16.01; Rule 16.04

FACTS:
A complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, is filed by Natividad P. Navarro and
Hilda S. Presbitero against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. In April 2006, respondent signed a
retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the release of the payment for the
latter’s 2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod which was the subject of a Voluntary
Offer to Sell to the Department of Agrarian Reform. Respondent and Presbitero
agreed to an attorney’s fee of 10% of the proceeds from the VOS or the sale of the
property, with the expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but deductible from
respondent’s fees. Respondent received P50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for the
expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it.

In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo, also engaged respondent’s
services to handle the registration of her lot. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to
finance the expenses for the registration of the property. Respondent undertook to
register the property in consideration of 30% of the value of the property once it is
registered. Respondent obtained P200,000 from Navarro for the registration expenses.
Navarro later learned that the registration decree over the property was already issued
in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would not have spent for
the registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the real situation of
the property. On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000 from
Navarro to finance his sugar trading business. Respondent and Navarro executed a
Memorandum of Agreement and agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a period of one
year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of 10% per month; and (c) shall be secured by a
real estate mortgage over a property. They also agreed that respondent shall issue
postdated checks to cover the principal amount of the loan as well as the interest
thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro, drawn against an account in
Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence of Navarro. In
June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of P1,000,000 from Navarro,
covered by a second MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA.
Respondent sent Navarro, through a messenger, postdated checks drawn against an
account in Bank of Commerce, Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise discussed
with Navarro about securing a "Tolling Agreement" with Victorias Milling Company,
Inc. but no agreement was signed. At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of
P1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third MOA, except that the real estate
mortgage was over property located in Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent
sent Presbitero postdated checks drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod
City Branch. Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the property mortgaged
under the third MOA, and respondent promised to execute a real estate mortgage over
a 1,000-square-meter parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property he
mortgaged to Navarro. However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional
security. Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to
pay complainants a total of P900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal
amount or the interest thereon. In September 2006, the checks issued by respondent to
complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts against which they
were drawn were already closed. When complainants called respondent’s attention, he
promised to pay the agreed interest for September and October 2006 but asked for a
reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding months. A supplemental complaint
was filed charging respondent with accepting cases while under suspension. In
response, respondent alleged that he accepted Presbitero’s case in February 2006 and
learned of his suspension only in May 2006.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent is liable for the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own
account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he
mortgaged to her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it
was exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the
accounts were already closed.
RULING:
The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent
agreed to pay a high interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the
MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA
he drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also
established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for
P1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only P150,000, showing that he deceived
his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that
the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did not apprise
Presbitero as to the real value of the property. Respondent failed to refute that the
checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan
Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. The court is inclined to agree
with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that the account
belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch
of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to
Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and
complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts in respondent’s name. It
is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court has ruled that conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the
performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity,
and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court. In the instant case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in
respondent’s private capacity. Although Navarro financed the registration of Yulo’s
lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-client relationship. However, respondent
was Presbitero’s counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was established that
respondent misled Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral
for his loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of
Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional
collateral but he failed to do so. Respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his client,
Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both
Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements.
Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later,
using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he
prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his son’s account whose name was
similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records
that will show that respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from
complainants. Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:

“A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS

CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.”

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on
the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or
from his client. The Court agrees with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill
this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received various
amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of them. The respondent
had been less than diligent in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for
the registration of Yulo’s property. As regards Presbitero, it was established that the
respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from
his client, Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. Rule 16.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

“A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.”

Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed P1,000,000 from his client
Presbitero. At the time he secured the loan, respondent was already the retained
counsel of Presbitero. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability
to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. In his dealings with his
client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as
the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.

Accordingly, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule
1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Court DISBARS him from the practice of law effective
immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.

Furthermore, Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from

Hilda S. Presbitero, amounting to P50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar
Confidant his compliance with this order within thirty days from finality of this
Decision.

H. Attorney’s Fees
1) Codal provisions and cases:
•CANON 20: To charge only fair and reasonable fees
•Rep. Act No. 5185, Sec. 6
•ROC Rule 138, Sec. 24, 32
•Quirante vs. IAC, 169 SCRA 769 (1989)

FACTS: (chronological order)

 Dr. Indalecio Casasola had a contract with a building contractor named
Norman Guerrero  
 Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc. (Philamgen) acted as
bondsman for Guerrero. In view of Guerrero's failure to perform his part of the
contract within the period specified, Dr. Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty. John
Quirante, sued both Guerrero and Philamgen 
 Philamgen filed a cross-claim against Guerrero for indemnification
 RTC: in favor of Dr. Indalecio Casasola by rescinding the contract
ordering Guerrero and Philamgen to pay actual damages of P129,430, moral
damages of P50,000, exemplary damages of P40,000 and attorney's fees
of P30,000 ordering Guerrero alone to pay liquidated damages of
P300/day from December 15, 1978 to July 16, 1979 and ordering Philamgen
to pay  Dr. Casasola the amount of the surety bond equivalent to P120,000. 
  Petition to quash the writ of execution and to compel the trial court to give due
course to the appeal was dismissed
 In the mean time, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and several children as
survivors
 Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney's
fees
 According to him, there was an oral agreement between him and the
late Dr. Casasola that in case of recovery of the surety bond  - P30K
and in case of damages excess of the surety bond, divided equally bet.
the heirs, Atty. Quirante and Atty. Cruz.
 RTC: granted the motion for confirmation

ISSUE(S): W/N Atty. Quirante can claim attorney's fees

HELD: NO. Present recourse is hereby AFFIRMED

RATIO:
Attorney's fees may be asserted either in:
The very action in which the services in question have been rendered - as in this case
the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum
prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to
recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel
have been rendered rests on the assumption that the court trying the case is to a certain
degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services. The rule
against multiplicity of suits will in effect be served a separate action

2 Kinds of Attorney's fees

1. Item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code wherein the
award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his
counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by
execution.

2. Claims are based on the contract for professional services, with the attorney as the
creditors and the clients as the debtors.

It is further observed that the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis for
their fees provides that the recovery of the amounts claimed is subject to certain
contingencies.

We are of the considered view that the orderly administration of justice dictates that
such issue be likewise determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also necessarily
involves the same contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent
of recovery of attorney's fees by both petitioners herein. The court below will be in a
better position, after the entire case shall have been adjudicated.

We, therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the
respondent court which holds that the alleged confirmation to attorney's fees should
not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto, since it is also premised on the
eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family, hence the same objection of
prematurity obtains and such a holding may be pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary
matters that may be presented for consideration by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing observation, the decision of the respondent court
subject of the present recourse is hereby AFFIRMED.

•Metropolitan Bank vs. CA, 181 SCRA 367 (1990)

FACTS: 
Atty. handled several cases from 1974 to 1983 concerning the declaration of nullity of
certain deeds of sale. Pending resolution in the RTC, Atty filed a motion to enter his
charging lien equal to 25% of the market value of the litigated properties as atty fees. 
The court granted and the atty’s lien was annotated on the TCTs. The cases were later
dismissed with prejudice at the instance of the plaintiffs therein. Thus the Bank now
had the TCT’s in its name and the atty’s lien was carried over. Atty. filed a motion to
fix his Atty Fees based on quantum meruit. RTC granted the motion and fixed the fees
at 936K. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: 
Is Atty. entitled to a charging lien? Is a separate suit necessary for enforcement of the
lien?

HELD: 
Yes. CA reversed without prejudice to proper to the bringing of proper proceedings.
A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees,
requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance
of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A
lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in
the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client
in the action from which the fee is to be paid. Here, there was no money judgment.
Thus there is no charging lien. And court has no authority to fix a charging lien. A
petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident
in the main action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any
other money claim.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with the modification that

Paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion of the judgment of the lower court shall be
reworded as follows:

3. Debiting Savings Account No. 2498 in the sum of P586,589.00 only and thereafter
allowing defendant Golden Savings & Loan Association, Inc. to withdraw the amount
outstanding thereon, if any, after the debit.

•CPR Rule 20.01: Fee guide

•Roxas vs. de Zuzuarregui, 481 SCRA 250 (2006)

It is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice and in the
Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice and democracy. Respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. In the case at bar, the Court finds
the statements made by Atty. Roxas to have been made mala fides and exceeded the
boundaries of decency and propriety. By his unfair and unfounded accusation against
Justice Nazario, and his mocking of the Court for allegedly being part of a
wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice, he abused his liberty of speech.

FACTS:
In a Resolution, the Court En Banc ordered Atty. Romeo G. Roxas to explain in
writing why he should not be held in contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary
action when he, in a letter addressed to Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario
with copies furnished to all other Supreme Court Justices, intimated that Justice
Nazario decided G.R. No. 152072 and No. 152104 on considerations other than the
pure merits of the case, and called the Supreme Court a "dispenser of injustice." Atty.
Roxas stated in his letter, particularly, that the decision did not meet the standards or
adhered to the basic characteristics of fair and just decision, such as objectivity,
neutrality and conformity to the laws and the Constitution.
In his letter of explanation, Atty. Roxas extended apologies to Justice Nazario, to the
other members of the High Court and to the High Court itself as a revered institution
and ultimate dispenser of justice. He said he was merely exercising his right to
express a legitimate grievance or articulate a bona fide and fair criticism of the
Honorable Court's ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Roxas should be held in contempt (YES)

RULING:
It is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice and in the
Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice and democracy. Respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the
institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. When confronted with
actions and statements, from lawyers and non-lawyers alike, that tend to promote
distrust and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, this Court will not hesitate
to wield its inherent power to cite any person in contempt. In so doing, it preserves its
honor and dignity and safeguards the morals and ethics of the legal profession. In the
case at bar, the Court finds the statements made by Atty. Roxas to have been made
mala fides and exceeded the boundaries of decency and propriety. By his unfair and
unfounded accusation against Justice Nazario, and his mocking of the Court for
allegedly being part of a wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice, he abused his
liberty of speech.

•Masmud vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 183385, February 13, 2009

FACTS:
In 2003, Evangeline Masmud filed a complaint on behalf of her late husband
Alexander against First Victory Shipping Services for non payment of permanent
disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowances, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees of his late husband Alexander and then Alexander hire
Atty. Go as his counsel. In consideration of Atty. Go’s legal services, Alexander
agreed to pay attorneys fees on a contingent basis, as follows: 20 % of total monetary
claims as settled or paid and an additional 10 % in case of appeal. It was likewise
agreed that any ward of attorney’s fees shall pertain to respondent’s law firm as
compensation.

The Labour Arbiter rendered a decision granting the monetary claims of Alexander.
However Alexander’s employer filed an appeal with the NLRC. During the pendency
of the proceedings before the NLRC, Alexander died thereafter Atty. Go substitute
Evangelina as complainant. The NLRC denied the motion of the Alexander’s
employer. On appeal before the CA, the decision of the Labour Arbiter was affirmed
with modification. Eventually, the decision of the NLRC became final and executor
and Atty. Go moved for the execution of the NLRC decision, which was granted by
the Labour Arbiter. The surety bond of the employer was garnished and Atty. Go
moved for the release of the said amount to Evangelina. The Labour Arbiter directed
the NLRC Cashier to release the amount of P 3, 454, 079. 20 to Evangelina and P
680,000.00 will go to Atty. Go. Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record an
enforce attorneys lien alleging that Evangelina reneged on their contigent fee
agreement. Evangelina paid only the amount of P680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of
the award as attorneys fees, thus, leaving a balance of 10% pertaining to the counsel
as attorneys fees.

Evangelina manifested that Atty. Go’s claim for attorneys fees of 40% of the total
monetary award was null and void based on Article 111 of the Labour Code is the law
that should govern Atty. Go’s compensation as her counsel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Go’s compensation is under the concept of attorneys fees
governed by Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court or under the extraordinary
concept governed by Article 111 of the Labour Code

RULING:
Atty. Go’s compensation should be governed by Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court and not Article 111 of the Labour Code. The retainer contract between Atty. Go
and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee. The contract shall control in the
determination of the amount to be paid, unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable. Attorney's fees are unconscionable if they affront
one's sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. The decree of unconscionability or
unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee contract will not preclude
recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by the court of a reasonable compensation for
the lawyer's services.
 
The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be considered
in assessing the proper amount of compensation that a lawyer should receive. Canon
20, Rule 20.01 of the said Code provides:
 
CANON 20 A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND
REASONABLE FEES.
 
 Rule 20.01. A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in
determining his fees:
 
(a)  The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
 
(b)  The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
 
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
 
(d)  The skill demanded;
 
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case;
 
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees
of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
 
(g)  The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting
to the client from the service;
 
(h)  The contingency or certainty of compensation;
 
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
 
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
 
Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court
in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. The amount of contingent
fees agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid
for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher
compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer may
get nothing if the suit fails. The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee
contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina’s husband. The CA committed no error of
law when it awarded the attorneys fees of Atty. Go and allowed him to receive an
equivalent of 39% of the monetary award.
 
The issue of the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a question of fact. Well-settled is
the rule that conclusions and findings of fact of the CA are entitled to great weight on
appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons which are
absent in the case at bench. The findings of the CA, which are supported by
substantial evidence, are almost beyond the power of review by the Supreme Court.

Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he
should receive adequate compensation for his efforts. Even as we agree with the
reduction of the award of attorney's fees by the CA, the fact that a lawyer plays a vital
role in the administration of justice emphasizes the need to secure to him his
honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of
the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against
injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse
on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to ensure that a lawyer
acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees.
With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost
not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the
protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to
escape payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the
best in him to secure justice for his client, he himself would not get his due.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 31, 2007 and the
Resolution dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96279 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

•CPR Rule 20.02: Client’s consent of fees for referral

•Urban Bank vs. Pena, 364 SCRA 597 (2001)

In 1994, Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to Urban Bank, Inc.
(UBI). The land was sold for P240 million. As the land was occupied by unauthorized
sub-tenants, ISCI’s lawyer, Atty. Magdaleno Peña had to negotiate with them for
them to relocate. But the said occupants, knowing that the land was already
transferred to UBI, refused to recognize Peña. ISCI then communicated with UBI so
that the latter may authorize Peña to negotiate with the tenants. Peña had to barricade
himself inside the property to keep the tenants out who were forcing their way in
especially so that the local cops are now sympathetic to them. Peña then had a phone
conversation with Teodoro Borlongan, president of UBI, where Peña explained to him
the situation. In said conversation, Peña asked authorization from Borlongan to
negotiate with the tenants. Peña also asked that he be paid 10% of the purchase price
or (P24 million) for his efforts. Borlongan agreed over the phone on the condition
that Peña should be able to settle with the tenants otherwise he forfeits said 10% fee.
Peña also asked that said authorization be put into writing.
The authorization was put into writing but no mention was made as regards the 10%
fee, (in short, that part was not written in the written authorization released by UBI).
Peña was able to settle and relocate the tenants. After everything was settled and the
property is now formally under the possession of UBI, Peña began sending demands
to UBI for the latter to pay him the P24 million fee agreed upon, plus his expenses for
the relocation of the tenants and the hiring of security guards or an additional P3
million. But UBI refused to make payment hence Peña filed a complaint for recovery
against UBI.
The trial court ruled in favor of Peña as it found there indeed was a contract of agency
created between  and UBI and that Peña is entitled to the 10% fee plus the expenses
he incurred including litigation expenses. In sum, the trial court awarded him P28
million.
The Court of Appeals however reversed the order of the trial court. It ruled that no
agency was formed but for his legal services, Peña is entitled to payment but applying
the principle of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, Peña should only be paid P3
million.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Magdaleno Peña is entitled to receive the P28 million

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable. Peña is entitled to
payment for compensation for services rendered as agent of Urban Bank, but on the
basis of the principles of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. In the first place,
other than the self-serving testimony of Peña, there was no other evidence presented
to support his claim that Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10% over the phone. The
written authorization later issued merely confirms the power granted him to negotiate
with the tenants. The written authorization proved the existence of agency but not the
existence of any agreement as to how much Peña should be paid.

Absent any such agreement, the principle of quantum meruit should be applied. In this
case, Peña is entitled to receive what he merit for his services, or as much as he has
earned. In dealing with the tenants, Peña didn’t have to perform any extraordinary
acts or legal maneuvering. Hence, he is entitled to receive P1.5 million for his legal
services. He is also entitled to reimbursement for his expenses in securing the
property, to wit, P1.5 million for the security guards he had to hire and another P1.5
million for settling and relocating the 23 tenants. Total of P4.5 million.

The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in

which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

•CPR Rule 20.03: Client’s consent of acceptance of fee

•ROC Rule 138, Sec. 20 (e)
•CPR Rule 20.04: Avoid compensation controversy with client
•ROC Rule 138, Sec. 24, 32
•Malvar v. Kraft Foods, G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2013

The respondent lawyer has the right recover in full its compensation based on its
written agreement with his client who unceremoniously and without any justifiable
reason terminated its legal service and required it to withdraw from the case. A client
may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the
contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of
the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the
client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in
the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment
of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment
of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case
wherein his services had been retained by the client.

FACTS
The case initially concerned the execution of a final decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in a labor litigation between Complainant and Respondent where the former was
ruled to be illegally dismissed by the latter and thus entitled to payment of her full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, plus attorney’s fees. However,
the matter has mutated into a dispute over attorney's fees between the complainant
and her attorney after she entered into a compromise agreement with the respondent
under circumstances that the attorney has bewailed as designed to prevent the
recovery of just professional fees. A Motion for Intervention was filed by the
Intervenor, complainant’s lawyer, who claimed that the complainant unceremoniously
and without any justifiable reason terminated its legal service and required it to
withdraw from the case; and that complainant’s precipitate action had baffled,
shocked and even embarrassed the Intervenor, because it had done everything legally
possible to serve and protect her interest. It added that it could not recall any instance
of conflict or misunderstanding with her, for; on the contrary, she had even
commended it for its dedication and devotion to her case. According to the Intervenor,
it was certain that the compromise agreement was authored by the respondents to
evade a possible loss of P182,000,000.00 or more as a result of the labor litigation,
but considering the Intervenor’s interest in the case as well as its resolve in pursuing
complainant’s interest, they saw the Intervenor as a major stumbling block to the
compromise agreement that it was then brewing with her. Obviously, the only way to
remove the Intervenor was to have her terminate its services as her legal counsel. This
prompted the Intervenor to bring the matter to the attention of the Court to enable it to
recover in full its compensation based on its written agreement with her the
complainant.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Motion for Intervention to protect attorney’s rights can prosper,
and, if so, recover attorney’s fees

RULING
A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without the intervention of the
attorney, for the former is generally conceded to have exclusive control over the
subject matter of the litigation and may at anytime, if acting in good faith, settle and
adjust the cause of action out of court before judgment, even without the attorney’s
intervention. It is important for the client to show, however, that the compromise
agreement does not adversely affect third persons who are not parties to the
agreement. By the same token, a client has the absolute right to terminate the
attorney-client relationship at any time with or without cause. But this right of the
client is not unlimited because good faith is required in terminating the relationship.
The limitation is based on Article 19 of the Civil Code, which mandates that "every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." The right is also
subject to the right of the attorney to be compensated. This is clear from Section 26,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 26. Change of attorneys. - An attorney may retire at anytime from any action
or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also
retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his
client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing,
determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of
the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the
former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party. A
client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if
the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the
dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover
from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney
may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the
payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in
the case wherein his services had been retained by the client.

In fine, it is basic that an attorney is entitled to have and to receive a just and
reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of
his client. The attorney who has acted in good faith and honesty in representing and
serving the interests of the client should be reasonably compensated for his service. In
the absence of the lawyer’s fault, consent or waiver, a client cannot deprive the lawyer
of his just fees already earned in the guise of a justifiable reason. Here, Malvar not
only downplayed the worth of the Intervenor’s legal service to her but also attempted
to camouflage her intent to defraud her lawyer by offering excuses that were not only
inconsistent with her actions but, most importantly, fell short of being justifiable. As a
final word, it is necessary to state that no court can shirk from enforcing the
contractual stipulations in the manner they have agreed upon and written. As a rule,
the courts, whether trial or appellate, have no power to make or modify contracts
between the parties. Nor can the courts save the parties from disadvantageous
provisions. The same precepts hold sway when it comes to enforcing fee
arrangements entered into in writing between clients and attorneys. In the exercise of
their supervisory authority over attorneys as officers of the Court, the courts are
bound to respect and protect the attorney’s lien as a necessary means to preserve the
decorum and respectability of the Law Profession. Hence, the Court must thwart any
and every effort of clients already served by their attorneys’ worthy services to
deprive them of their hard-earned compensation. Truly, the duty of the courts is not
only to see to it that attorneys act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it
that attorneys are paid their just and lawful fees.

WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the compromise agreement; GRANTS the

Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney's Rights; and ORDERS Czarina T. Malvar
and respondents Kraft Food Philippines Inc. and Kraft Foods International to jointly
and severally pay to Intervenor Law Firm, represented by Retired Associate Justice
Josue N. Bellosillo, its stipulated contingent fees of 10% of ₱41,627,593.75, and the
further sum equivalent to 10% of the value of the stock option. No pronouncement on
costs of suit.
•Balingit v. Cervantes & Delarmente, A.C. No. 11059, November 9, 2016
WHEREFORE, Atty. Teodoro B. Delarmente and Atty. Renato M. Cervantes are
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. Both are STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely. They are also DIRECTED to return to complainant the amount of
P45,000.00. Finally, respondents are DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of
their receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when their suspension
shall take effect.

I. Withdrawal of Services
•Canon 22
•CPR Rule 22.01
•Montano vs. IBP, 358 SCRA 1 (2001)

FACTS:
On November 14, 1992, the complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as
his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before
the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 37467 wherein the complainant
was the plaintiff-appellant. The parties agreed upon attorney’s fees in the amount of
P15,000.00, fifty percent (50%) of which was payable upon acceptance of the case
and the remaining balance upon the termination of the case. The complainant paid
respondent the amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the attorney’s fee and paid
the additional amount of P4,000.00 even before the respondent counsel had prepared
the appellant’s brief. The respondent counsel also demanded payment of the
remaining balance of 3,500.00 prior to the filing of the brief. The respondent lawyer
withdrew his appearance as complainant’s counsel without his prior knowledge and/or
conformity and returned the case folder to the complainant due to complainant’s
failure to pay the amount of P3,500.00. The complainant file a case to the Court on
the ground that the conduct by respondent counsel exceeded the ethical standards of
the law profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt with administratively.
Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of the maximum
penalty of disbarment. The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The Investigating
Commissioner found respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional conduct and
recommended that he be “severely reprimanded.” However, IBP Board of Governors
resolved that the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner meted to
respondent be amended to “three (3) months suspension from the practice of law for
having been found guilty of misconduct, which eroded the public confidence
regarding his duty as a lawyer.” Respondent counsel sought reconsideration alleging
that IBP misapprehended the facts and that, in any case, he did not deserve the penalty
imposed. Respondent counsel further averred that complainant’s refusal to pay the
agreed lawyer’s fees was deliberate and in bad faith; hence, his withdrawal as counsel
was “just, ethical and proper.” In its Resolution No. XIII-97-129 dated October 25,
1997, the IBP denied Atty. Dealca’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, a petition for
review on certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Is Atty. Juan S. Dealca’s conduct just and proper?

HELD:
The Court found Atty. Dealca’s conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal
profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyer shall
withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately
fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case, Atty.
Dealca’s withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay
him the attorney’s fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his
obligation. Respondent’s contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of
the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. The Court,
however, does not agree with complainant’s contention that the maximum penalty of
disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer. The power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the
bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. In
the present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient.

•CPR Rule 22.02

•Caoile vs. Macaraeg, A.C. No. 720, June 17, 2015

FACTS:
Francisco, and four others, engaged the services of Atty. Macaraeg to represent them
in Civil Case No. 11119, an action for recovery of ownership filed before the CFI of
Lingayen, Pangasinan. After the CFI rendered judgment against them, Francisco and
his codefendants decided to appeal their case before the CA. Accordingly, Atty.
Macaraeg filed a notice of appeal. Thrice he moved for extension of time to file
appellants' brief. In his last motion for extension, he alleged that he was already in the
process of doing the finishing touches on the brief and just needed to have it printed.
Yet, the extended period expired without Atty. Macaraeg filing any brief. Hence,
upon motion of the opposing party, the CA dismissed the appeal. The dismissal
became final and executory on December 13, 1963. Francisco averred that they were
unaware of the dismissal of their appeal until they were served with the CFI's writ of
execution and a notice of sale at public auction of their property in 1965. After
confirming with the CA that they indeed lost the case, Francisco confronted Atty.
Macaraeg who informed him that they lost the case because they failed to pay him in
full. Hence, this administrative complaint against Atty. Macaraeg for neglect and
dereliction of duty. In his Answer, Atty. Macaraeg averred that Francisco and his
codefendants did not pay in full for his services in filing the appeal. Anent the pacto
de retro sale which Francisco and his wife executed in his favor supposedly to cover
the balance of his professional fees, Atty. Macaraeg claimed that it was Francisco
who insisted on its execution, and that, contrary to Francisco's claim, it was intended
as payment for his services while representing Francisco before the CFI, and not as
payment for his services in filing the appeal. Atty. Macaraeg also claimed that, in any
case, Francisco did not honor the said pacto de retro sale as the possession of the lot
was never turned over to him.Atty. Macaraeg denied Francisco's accusation that he
neglected their case. He pointed out that to push through with the appeal he even
advanced some of the appeal expenses. While he admitted that he failed to submit an
appellants' brief, he averred that the same was actually the fault of his clients who
failed to provide the necessary funds to file said brief. On September 22, 1966, this
Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. From March to November 1967, the Solicitor General conducted
several hearings. In November 1972, the Office of the Solicitor General again
summoned the parties to appear before it. Notably, the return of the subpoena served
upon Atty. Macaraeg contained a notation that Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg is now
deceased. Subsequently, this case was transferred to the IBP. On October 19, 2011,
Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
came up with a Report and Recommendation. The commissioner noted the long
period of time that the Complaint has been pending. Anent the merits of the
Complaint, Commissioner Cachapero ruled that Atty. Macaraeg neglected the cause
of his clients when he thrice moved for extension of time within which to file his
brief. However, he did not file any, reasoning out that the non-filing was due to his
clients' failure to give him the necessary funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

for failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client.

RULING:
YES. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. A considerable length of time had elapsed from the
time Atty. Macaraeg' filed the notice of appeal on August 30, 1962 up to the time he
filed the third motion for extension of time to file brief on October 5, 1963. Despite
the passage of such time, however, Atty. Macaraeg still failed to file the brief, which
resulted in the dismissal of his clients' appeal. Suffice it to state that a motion for
extension to file an appellant's brief carries with it the presumption that the applicant
lawyer will file the pleading within the requested extended period. Failure to dojo
without any reasonable excuse violates the Code of Professional
Responsibility. While Atty. Macaraeg attributed the non-filing of the brief to his
clients' failure to give the amount necessary for filing the same, he should have, as
aptly stated by Commissioner Cachapero, shown a more mindful and caring attitude
towards the cause of his clients by advancing the payment. Besides, the facts of this
case show that his clients were making partial payments in their efforts to comply
with their obligation to him and were not deliberately refusing to pay him. In fact, as
claimed by Atty. Macaraeg himself, Francisco even insisted that they enter into a
pacto de retro sale in order for them to fully pay him for the services he rendered in
connection with their civil case in the CFI. In fact, if Atty. Macaraeg truly believed
that the necessary funds from his clients were not forthcoming, he could have excused
himself from the case. The Code of Professional Responsibility allows a counsel to
withdraw his services for a good cause, including the client's failure to comply with
the retainer agreement. Indeed, Atty. Macaraeg violated Rule 12.03. Nevertheless,
while the actuation of Atty. Macaraeg warrants the imposition of a penalty,
supervening circumstances call for the dismissal of this administrative case. Records
reveal that he was already 60 years old when the hearings in this disbarment case
were held in 1967. Hence, he would have been 108 years old by this time.

It is also noteworthy that the subpoena issued by the Solicitor General in 1972
contains a handwritten note that Atty. Macaraeg had already died. Thereafter, nothing
more was heard from either party despite notice. Under these circumstances, it is safe
to assume that the complainant had already lost interest in pursuing this disbarment
case against Atty. Macaraeg and that there is truth in the handwritten notation in the
return of the subpoena that Atty. Macaraeg had already passed away.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Complaint for Disbarment against Atty.
Marcelino Macaraeg is hereby DISMISSED.