Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
EVIDENCE BATCH I
1. Atienza v Board of Medicine (BOM)
“Wrong Kidney”
Principles:
a. The rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
before administrative bodies such as the BOM
b. Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or
not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all while
the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether
or not it proves an issue.
Facts:
On Feb. 4, 1995, Private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal
Medical Center (RMC) due to her lumbar pains for check-up. In
1999, she underwent diagnostic laboratory tests which revealed
that her right kidney is normal. However, her left kidney is non-
functioning and non-visualizing. She then underwent a kidney
operation.
Private respondent’s husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant),
filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before
the BOM against the doctors who allegedly participated in the
fateful kidney operation. It was alleged that the gross negligence
and/or incompetence committed by the doctors consists of the
removal of private respondent’s fully functional right kidney,
instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.
Private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant,
filed her formal offer of documentary evidence attached to it are
Exhibits A to D, which she offered for the purpose of proving that
her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the
time she was operated.
• Ex. A - photocopy for the X-Ray request form (Dec 12, 1996)
with interpretation of ultrasound results which is identical to the
certified photocopy of the document marked as Annex 2 of Dr.
Lantin’s counter-affidavit
• Ex. B - a certified photocopy of the X-ray request form (Jan 30,
1997) which also happens to be the same as or identical to the
certified photocopy of the document marked as Annex 3 to the
counter-affidavit of Dr. Pedro Lantin, III.
• Ex. C - the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form
(March 16, 1996) also marked as Annex 4, on which are
handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results
of the examination.
• Ex. D - the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form (May
20, 1999), which is also marked as Annex 16 which are
appended as Annexes 4 and 1 respectively to the counter-
affidavits filed by Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III
in answer to the complaint.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by
Editha are mere photocopies and (1) violate the best evidence
rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3)
are completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their
purpose and petitioner also contends that the exhibits are
inadmissible evidence.
Nevertheless, BOM admitted Editha Siosons (Edithas) Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence and denied petitoner’s
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA which was dismissed.Hence, this petition.
Issue:
W/N the exhibits are inadmissible as evidence
Ruling:
BOM properly admitted Editha’s formal offer of evidence.
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It is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly
applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as
the BOM.
Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of
the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may
appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility,
we have held that: It is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting
them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless
plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that
their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court,
if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other
hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding
them or ignoring them.
From the foregoing, the Court emphasized the distinction between
the admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be
accorded the same pieces of evidence:
• Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether
or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered
at all.
• The probative value of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not it proves an issue.
Furthermore, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the
substantive rights of petitioner because the fact sought to be
proved, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper
anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is
presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions
are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Likewise, the best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of
Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except
in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office.
Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of
RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits because [it]
transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building.
Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM
properly admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence and,
thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value
thereof when it decides the case.
2. Gomez v Gomez
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
Forged deeds of donation
Facts:
Consuelo Ariston Angel
Augusto (Special hold of it, before she made the report;
Maria Rita Jesus Ariston Jr Administrator of •
intestate Consuelo)
On February 15, 1980, Augusto Gomez as Special Administrator
of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez instituted two cases
involving different parcels of land and property belonging to the
deceased Consuelo Gomez.
Consuelo, Ariston Sr. and Angel Gomez were sister and brothers,
respectively. Maria-Rita Gomez-Samson, Jesus Gomez and
Ariston Gomez, Jr. are the children of Ariston, Sr. while Augusto
Gomez is the child of Angel.
In the first of the two cases, Augusto alleged that certain parcels
of land (2 parcels located in Marikina and 1 in Pasig) owned by
Consuelo were transferred fraudulently by donations inter vivos in
favor of Maria-Rita and Jesus; and Augusto wanted the subject
Deed of Donation Intervivos declared false and null and void and
be replaced by titles in the name of the Intestate Estate of
Consuelo.
In the other case, Augusto alleged in his complaint that Consuelo
was also the sole and absolute owner of certain personal
properties such as shares of stock in different corporations,
jewelry, collector’s items, cars (1978 Mercedes Benz 200 and
1979 Toyota Corona) and P200,000 in cash and that a fraudulent
Deed of Donation Intervivos was executed by Consuelo in favor
of the Aristons. Augusto also wanted to have such deed cancelled.
Both complaints were consolidated and were dismissed by the
trial court and was also affirmed by the CA. Thus, this Petition for
Review on Certiorari to SC.
Issue:
Among several issues presented, the core issue as determined by
SC is whether petitioner Augusto was able to prove that the Deeds
of Donation were merely intercalated into two sheets of paper
signed by Consuelo Gomez (Consuelo).
Ruling:
NO. The only direct evidence presented by petitioner Augusto on
the matter is the testimony of Zenaida Torres, Document
Examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Respondents, on the other hand, presented their own expert
witness, Francisco Cruz, Chief of Document Examination of the
PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other direct evidence presented by
respondents includes testimonies positively stating that the Deeds
of Donation were signed by Consuelo in their completed form in
the presence of Notary Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies
are that of Jose Sebastian himself, and that of several of the
respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr. (Ariston, Jr.), who
allegedly drafted said Deeds of Donation.
Weight and Credibility of the Expert Witnesses
Zenaida Torres's testimony, was that she had examined the two
Deeds of Donation, Documents No. 401 and No. 402, and her
findings were that the signatures were indeed those of Consuelo.
However, she opined that they were not typed or prepared in one
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continuous sitting because the horizontal lines had some
variances horizontally. Nevertheless, she admitted that the vertical
lines did not show any variance. IDSETA
Zenaida Torres failed to convince the trial court that the Deeds of
Donation were not prepared in one sitting:
• Regarding non-typing in one continuous sitting, she
admitted that she had never seen the typewriter used to
type the Donations 401 and 402, nor even tried to get
Further, Torres fell apart during cross-examination as
admitted that she had not taken any specialized studies
on the matter of "Questioned Documents," except on one
or two seminars on "Questioned Documents. In effect,
insofar as the issue of typewriting in one sitting or not, is
concerned, the testimony of Torres was completely
discredited
On the other hand, the trial court gave weight to the testimony of
Francisco Cruz:
• Cruz testified on this point that the Donations 401 and
402 were both typed in one continuous sitting. He
elucidated clearly on how he arrived at this conclusion.
He was able to determine that the typewriter used was
the elite typewriter, by showing that when his typewriting
measuring the instruments were placed over the
documents, there were twelve (12) letters that went
inside one inch, which is a characteristic of an elite
typewriter.
• Secondly, he noticed that the color tone of the typewriter
ink is the same, thru the entire documents and further
concluded that both the horizontal and vertical
alignments are in agreement.
Petitioner also alleges that the signature "Consuelo C. Gomez"
was written before the typewritten name "Consuelo C. Gomez." In
this second round of analysis of the respective testimonies of
Zenaida Torres and Francisco Cruz, the trial court arrived at the
same conclusion:
• The trial court again sided with Francisco Cruz who
testified, citing authorities, that it is impossible to
determine accurately which came first, because there
were no intersections at all.
Petitioner claims that the testimony of Zenaida Torres, having
positively maintained that the handwritten signatures "Consuelo
C. Gomez" in both Deeds of Donation were affixed before the
typewritten name, cannot possibly be overcome by the opinion of
Francisco Cruz putting in issue the fact that Torres was a court-
appointed expert, as opposed to Cruz who was merely designated
by respondents.
• On the first point, SC agrees with petitioner that positive
evidence is, as a general rule, more credible than
negative evidence. However, the reason for this rule is
that the witness who testifies to a negative may have
forgotten what actually occurred, while it is impossible to
remember what never existed.
• While we cannot say that positive evidence does not
carry an inherent advantage over negative evidence
when it comes to expert witnesses, the process by which
the expert witnesses arrived at their conclusions should
be carefully examined and considered.
• Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy
of meriting consideration, although not exclusive on
questions of a professional character. The courts of
justice, however, are not bound to submit their findings
necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh
them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value
as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
with the other elements of conviction which may have
been adduced during the trial.
Alleged patent irregularities on the face of the assailed Deeds
of Donation
Petitioner, also presents circumstantial evidence and arguments
to prove claiming that there are patent irregularities on the face of
the assailed Deeds of Donation. All these alleged irregularities are
more apparent than real with none of these alleged irregularities
connotes fraud or foul play. It is true that the condition and physical
appearance of a questioned document constitute a valuable factor
which, if correctly evaluated in light of surrounding circumstances,
may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged. However,
neither the expert witnesses, nor our personal examination of the
exhibits, had revealed such a questionable physical condition.
Payment of donor's tax before the death of Consuelo
Petitioner claims that the CA seriously erred in its finding of fact
that Consuelo herself paid the donor's tax of the properties subject
of the donation
The party asserting a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner,
however, merely formulated conjectures based on the evidence
he presented. Neither did petitioner present any evidence that the
records of the BIR Commissioner were falsified or antedated,
thus, letting the presumption that a public official had regularly
performed his duties stand. This is in contrast to respondents'
direct evidence attesting to the payment of said tax during the
lifetime of Consuelo as ruled by CA.
Credibility of Jose Sebastian
Petitioner claims that no credence should have been given to the
testimony of the notary public, Jose Sebastian, as said Jose
Sebastian is the same judge whom this Court had dismissed from
the service in Garciano v. Sebastian.
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to
discredit a witness; the testimony of such a witness must be
assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of
other witnesses must be examined for its relevance and credibility.
WHEREFORE, subject to the modification of the assailed
Decision, the Petition is DENIED.
3. State of Missouri v William Arthur Ball
“All money are the same”
Principle:
There is no logical connection between the fact of possession of
the dollar bills on one hand and robbery on the other. As it stands,
such evidence shall be excluded on the ground of irrelevancy.
Facts:
At 2:30 pm on October 15, 1958, two colored men, one tall
(William Ball) and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry
Store. Ball bought a cigarette lighter and looked at other items
while the other man moved about in the store. Later in the day, at
about 5:50, as the owner, John Kreler, was placing items in the
safe prior to closing, the two men came back and after drawing a
long barreled blue .38 gun against the owner, they took watches
and rings of the stipulated value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash
from the register.
About 3 weeks after the robbery, Ball was seen by police officers
and just as he was about to be cuffed, he shoved the officer and
attempted to run away. He was apprehended when one of the
officers fired shots at him, hitting his legs, buttocks and his back.
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When Ball was finally arrested, the officers took from his person a
brown felt hat which was recognized by the jewelry store owner, a
windbreaker type jacket, trousers, gray shirt and shoes. These
items were considered to be relevant and admissible in evidence.
However, in his motion for new trial, Ball objects that a police
officer was permitted to testify that $258.02 in currency were taken
from his person along with other personal effects such as a
crusifixion, small pen knife and a black leather wallet. He argued
that these were irrelevant and immaterial as it neither tended to
prove nor disprove any of the issues involved in this case. Such
currencies and personal effects were even neither identified by the
store owner nor by any other person as the money allegedly stolen
from the store.
Issue:
Should the currencies taken from Ball be considered relevant and
thus, admissible in evidence?
Ruling:
No. The mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no
indication that the possessor was the taker of money charged as
taken, because in general all money of the same denomination
and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is
the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to
be receivable.
In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that
the money in Ball’s possession at the time of his arrest came from
or had some connection with the robbery and in the absence of a
plain showing of his impecuniousness before the robbery and his
sudden affluence, the evidence was not in fact relevant.
The admission of the evidence infringed the right to a fair trial and
for that reason, the judgment is reversed and the case remanded.
4. Lopez vs Heesen
(This is a case decided by the New Mexico Supreme Court.
Selling of a hunting rifle model which has a defect.)
FACTS:
Sears Roebuck was engaged in designing, manufacturing and
selling of hunting fire arms. Sears sold the Higgins Model 51
Hunting Rifle in 1958. The thing about his model is its design has
a defect. This model is deemed negligently designed. In fact, its
safety device was considered unsafe and dangerous among gun
enthusiasts.
The case started when appellant Jesse Lopez filed a suit against
appellee Robert Heesen alleging that one fateful day of October
of 1958, Heesen assaulted and shot appellant Lopez with a
shotgun thereby inflicting dangerous and painful wounds and
injuries to appellant all to his damage in the total sum of $80.000.
Heesen denied the allegation of the complaint and demanded for
a jury trial. And in this trial the gun company Sears Roebuck who
sold the defected gun to Heesen was joined as party-defendant.
The amended complaint alleged that on October 14, 1958 Sears
sold to Heesen one of said Higgins Model 51 Hunting Rifles, the
one that was negligently designed or manufactured by Sears, and
that appellee Sears negligently failed to warn appellee Heesen of
the dangerous and defective condition of the rifle.
The appellant introduced evidence tending to prove that the safety
device on the Higgins Model 51 rifle is easy to knock off safety,
making the rifle dangerous. Frank Doyle, his witness, said that the
safety device, without telescopic sight, is not a safe piece, in that
the projection is too long and it is too prone to be knocked from
“safe” to “fire” position.
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
The witness of the appellee, La Violette, on the other hand,
testified that safety device on the Higgins Model 51 is supplied to
High Standard Manufacturing Company by Fabrique Nationale of
Belgium. He also testified extensively as to the advantages of the
safety device of the Higgins Model 51 rifle. The witness, Thomas
Raymond Robison, Jr., testified that the Higgins Model 51 is good
and practical in the filed for a prudent hunter and is suitable for
hunting. Ira L. Kessler, an expert witness called by defendant
testified that the Marlin Firearms Company has a fair reputation,
and that the Colt Firearms Company has an excellent reputation.
Now, the appellant contends that: 1) the trial court committed error
in permitting testimony as to the general reputation of other
firearms companies who use the same modified leaf safety device
as the Higgins Model 51 in which the witness for appellee, Paul A.
La Violette, Jr., that such companies had an excellent reputation
in the small arms field. Objection was made to this testimony on
the ground that it was wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any issue
in the case; 2) trial court erred in permitting evidence to be
introduced as to the poundage pressure required to move the
safety levers of various rifles from “safe” to “fire” position.
(You see an issue arose with regard to the pressure required to
move the safety lever form “safe” to “fire” position. And appellee
Sears showed that the poundage pressure required to move the
safety lever on a Higgins Model 51 from “safe” to “Fire” measured
2 ½ pounds. The evidence discloses that the pound pressure
required to move the safety lever on other similar devices was
sometimes little less and sometimes more than the Higgins Model
51...
In other words they couldn’t outright determine whether the 2 ½
pound pressure would be enough in order for the rifle to be safe.
And that means they needed an expert opinion on this...
The QUESTION is.. is expert opinion or shall we say Opinion
Evidence be admissible in court as adduced evidence by any
party?
This is a clear case of OPINION EVIDENCE because this is an
ultimate ISSUE OF FACT. Where the fact to be determined is
whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was dangerous
and defective or unsafe and was properly the subject of expert
testimony. Nakit.an ra ni nako. Nice siya haha)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies of other firearms companies who
use the same device are admissible as evidence in court.
RULING:
1) Under Rule 21-1-1(43) (a) the rule which favors the reception
of the evidence governs, the basis being that any evidence which
throws light on the question in issue should be admitted, leaving it
to the trial court to hold the hearing within reasonable bounds. We
hold that the testimony as to the reputation of Fabrique Nationale,
who manufacture the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 and
the reputation of Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby
Corporation, Colt Firearms Company and Jefferson Corporation,
who manufacture rifles which have the same modified leaf safety
device as the Higgins Model 51, was relevant to the issue whether
the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this
testimony.
2) Under this circumstances, it was proper for the appellee to
show that poundage pressure required to move the safety lever
on Higgins Model 51 from “safe” to “fire” measured two-and-one-
half pounds, and also to show the poundage pressure required in
4
rifles with identical safety devices because the Doyle’s testimony
was introduced under appellant’s contention that the Higgins
Model 51 rifle was unsafe and thus the issue arose as to the
pressure required to move the safety lever from “safe” to “fire”
position.
The thing about opinion evidence is its admissibility in court
depends on the facts of the case at hand. In other words, there is
no clear cut basis that expert opinions adduced as evidence in
ultimate issues of facts can outright determine the outcome of the
case. In fact it does not attempt or have the power to usurp the
functions of such in this case, the jury. As stated in the case, the
jury may still reject these expert opinions and accept some other
view. Its admissibility all depends on the jury’s assessment on how
expert the expert opinion is. Besides, opinion evidence offered by
both parties in this case was not binding upon the jury and they
were so instructed.
The opinion evidence in this case were admitted on the basis that
it aided the jury to understand the problem and led them to the
truth on the ultimate facts.
5. People vs. Marti
“Marijuana Leaves in a Gift Box”
Principle:
a. Exclusionary Rule on evidence obtained in violation against
unreasonable searches and seizures
b. Evidence procured by individuals effected through private
seizure is deemed admissible
c. Self-serving denials deserve no weight in law
d. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstances.
Facts:
On August 14, 1987, Andre Marti and his wife, Shirley Reyes, went
to an Export Forwarder to send 4 gift wrapped packages to a
friend, Walter Fierz, in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes attended
to their concerns and asked the appellant Marti if she could
examine and inspect the packages. However, Marti assured her
that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves,
merely gifts.
Before delivery to the Bureau of Customs, Anita Reyes’ husband,
Job Reyes, opened the boxes, following standard operating
procedures. Upon opening, a peculiar odor emitted. He squeezed
the bundles and felt dried leaves inside. Thereafter, Job Reyes
reported the shipment to the NBI and requested a laboratory
examination of the samples. The samples were brought to the
Narcotics Section of the NBI. Job was invited by the NBI to bring
the other packages, where Job opened the packages in the
presence of the NBI agents. Dried marijuana leaves were found
inside all four packages.
An Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Trial insued, and
Marti was found guilty. Upon appeal, appellant assigns the
following errors:
1. Evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication, thus it should be held inadmissible in evidence
2. His rights under the constitution while under custodial
investigation were not observed (Not related to discussion)
3. No credence in his explanation as to how the four parcels
came into his possession
Issue:
 Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
1. Whether or not there was a violation of his rights against
unreasonable search and seizure that would lead the
evidence to be deemed admissible or inadmissible
2. Whether or not his explanation should be given
consideration
Ruling:
1. Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
"Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
"Section 3.(1)The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed
by law.
(2)Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
Exclusionary Rule is laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal
SC, and in our SC, in Stonehill v. Diokno. This rule declares as
inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search
and seizure warrant. In several cases, the SC adhered to this rule,
and in these cases, the evidence were so obtained and procured
by the State acting through its law enforcers or other authorized
government agencies. However, in the case at bar, the evidence
sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by
a private person, acting in a private capacity and without any
intervention and participation of State authorities. It is a principle,
that in the absence of governmental interference, the rights under
the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
It is clear from the facts that the search was done by Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, following standard
operating procedures. In fact, he took samples to send to the NBI.
The mere presence of the NBI did not convert the reasonable into
a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution.
To repeat, violations against unreasonable search and seizure
may only be invoked against the State by an individual who
unjustly exercises sovereign authority. It can never be invoked
against an act done by a private individual, acting in his personal
capacity.
Similarly, the admissibility of evidence procured by an individual
effected through private seizure, equally applies to appellant’s
rights to privacy and communication.
2. Appellant contends that he was not the owner of the packages
as he was merely requested by a certain Michael, a German
National, whom he met at a pub in Ermita. In their 30-minute
conversation, the request was made and he was given P2,000
to ship the packages as Michael had to leave the country the
next day.
SC finds that the testimony is self-serving and contrary to human
experience as the story can easily be fabricated. It is not normal
for a stranger to entrust the shipment of the packages to a person
he just met in a span of 30 minutes. As to why Marti agreed to do
the errand, he failed to explain. Denials, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are considered as negative self-
serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be
5
given greater evidentiary weight to the testimony of a credible
witness. Appelant was also previously convicted of possession of
hashish in Germany, and the supposed recipient of the package
was likewise convicted for drug abuse in Zurich. Evidence to be
believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances.
6. Waterous Drug Corp. V. NLRC
“Overpriced purchase of medicines”
FACTS:
Antonia Melodia Catolico,was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner
Waterous Drug Corporation. She filed before the Office of the
Labor Arbiter a case for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and
illegal suspension against the petitioner Waterous Drug
Corporation. A case in point is medicine purchased with YSP of
ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit. Previous
P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle
is P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over
price of P64.00 per bottle (or total of P640.00). YSP sent a check
contained in the envelope which payable to Catolico as a “refund”
for the jacked-up price. I
It is furthered argued that the envelope was opened by another
employee and should therefore not be admissible as evidence for
violation of the guaranteed constitutional right on the privacy of
communication. Catolico was required to answer in writing the
charges made against her and was subsequently dismissed from
service without any hearing conducted. Labor Arbiter decided in
favour of private respondent who declared the dismissal and
suspension illegal, for failure by petitioners to prove their
allegations against private respondent and to show any
investigation was conducted, and was therefore, dismissed
without just cause and due process. The complaint for unfair labor
practice was however dismissed by the Labor Arbiter.
NLRC dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of merit, and affirmed
the labor arbiter's findings, but with modification on the dispositive
portion of the appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal
suspension as the same was already included in the computation
of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86. It
declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to
Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution.Their
motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed
this special civil action for certiorari, with the allegations that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and that due process
was duly accorded to private respondent. In addition, petitioner
further alleged that the Commission gravely erred in applying
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
Petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in the People v.
Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
ISSUE:
W/N the check drawn by YSP is admissible as evidence. YES 2.
W/N Catolico was unjustly dismissed. YES
HELD:
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC
anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid
down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims,
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise
to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of
cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment. It is evident
from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed
because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP.
Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that
there was an overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who
claims to have discovered Catolico's inappropriate transaction,
stated in his affidavit:
4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31,
1989, Ms.Catolico in violation of the [company] procedure, made
an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to supply WDRC needed
medicines like Voren tablets at a jack-up price of P384.00 per
bottle of 50 mg. which has a previous price of only P320.00;
5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy
and I found out that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. The
Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through Ms. Estelita Reyes
confirmed that there was really an overprice and she said that the
difference was refunded through their check voucher no. 629552
which was shown to me and the payee is Melodia Catolico,
through a China Bank Check No. 892068 dated November 9,
1989.
It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on
hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never testified nor executed
an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the
statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries
no probative value.
The purchase orders were silent as to Catolico's participation in
the purchase. If the price increase was objectionable to
petitioners, they or their officers should have disapproved the
transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no one to blame for
their predicament but themselves. This set of facts emphasizes
the exceedingly incredible situation proposed by petitioners.
Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere
suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal.
Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor
Code for the termination of employment; and even the dismissal
of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on
substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness,
whims, caprices, or suspicion.
7. People of the Philippines V. Eric Guillermo
“Chop-chop”
FACTS: Guillermo has been found guilty of murder by the Trial
Court of Antipolo City with evident premeditation and treachery
thereby sentencing him to suffer death penalty. The facts show
that Guillermo killed his employer Victor Keyser, owner of Keyser
Plastics, by hitting him with a piece of wood and thereafter cutting
his limbs with a carpenter’s saw.
Keyser Plastics shares its building with Greatmore Corp. where
prosecution witness Campos is employed as a security guard.
According to Campos, the spaces of the two companies are
separated by a wall, the lower part of which is made of cement but
the upper part is made of lawanit boards. The upper part made of
lawanit has two large holes which would allow a person on one
side of the wall to see the other side. He further said that on the
day of the crime, he both saw the accused and the victim enter
the premises of Keyser Plastics at around 8:00 am. At around
10:00 am, he heard some loud noises from Keyser Plastics but he
did not pay attention thinking it was just the sound from the
6
machines. He was, however, interrupted when the accused looked
through one of the holes and calmly told him that the accused has
killed his employer and needed help in disposing the body.
Shocked by this, Campos immediately called the police.
After succeeding in persuading Guillermo to give them the keys to
the locked gate, the police accosted the accused who told them
“Sir, hindi ako lalaban, susuko ako, haharapin ko ito.” When asked
where the victim’s body was, Guillermo pointed to some cardboard
boxes where the dismembered limbs and chopped torso was
found, while the victim’s head was inside a cement bag. When the
police asked how he did it, the accused answered that he first hit
the head of the victim and then dismembered the body. The
accused then turned over a blood-stained coconut lumber and a
saw. When asked as to his motive, he answered that Keyser had
been maltreating him and his co-workers. He expressed no regret
for his actions. At the police station, however, the custodial
investigation was conducted without appraising the accused of his
constitutional rights and his right to counsel.
While in police custody, Guillermo was interviewed on separate
occasions by two TV reporters, namely: Gus Abelgas of ABS-CBN
and Kara David of GMA. Appellant admitted to David that he
committed the crime and never gave it second thought. He also
disclosed to David the details of the crime. When asked why he
killed his employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him
for years, did not feed him properly, and treated him like an animal.
Both Abelgas and David said that Guillermo expressed absolutely
no remorse over his alleged misdeed during the course of their
respective interviews with him.
During the trial, Guillermo’s defense consisted of denial, that he
was a victim of a police frame-up. He said that he was a stay-in
employee and that on the day of the crime, he was asked to work
overtime during the afternoon. Since his employer did not arrive,
he fell asleep and was awakened by the police asking him to open
the gates. According to him, the police immediately handcuffed
him and looked around the premises and returned carrying boxes
and sacks. He said he was then brought to the police station where
he was advised to admit having killed his employer since there
was no other person to be blamed. When he was made to face
the media reporters, he said the police instructed him what to say.
Having been sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, Guillermo’s
case was brought for automatic review to the SC.
ISSUE/S:
1) W/N the prosecution’s evidence is sufficient to prove the
accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
2) W/N the death penalty is appropriate in accused’s case
RULING:
1) Yes.The accused contends that any evidence gathered from
him during the custodial investigation, including his confession, is
inadmissible due to the fact that he was not properly informed of
his rights. He was only made to read said rights in the wall of the
precinct.
The contention has merit. However, there are other instances,
aside from the custodial investigation, that accused had voluntarily
admitted the crime. First, he admitted the crime to Campos, whose
testimony was not countered by the defense. Second, he admitted
the crime to members of the media on two separate occasions.
Third, he voluntarily confessed before the police could enter the
scene and before any questions were posed to him.
Therefore, while the confession during the custodial investigation
is inadmissible because of the disregard of the accused’s
constitutional rights, the other instances wherein he admitted to
committing the crime are admissible since the rights enumerated
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
in the Constitution are meant to preclude the slightest use of the
States coercive power as would lead an accused to admit
something false but are not intended to prevent him from freely
and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such
power.
2) No. The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
and treachery were not sufficiently proven.
The autopsy revealed that the traumas in the head were found on
the front, left, and right side of the head but none were found at
the back of the head. Moreover, there was no witness to testify as
to how the head was hit by the accused.
One attendant circumstance, however, is amply proved by the
prosecutions evidence which shows that the victims corpse was
sewn by appellant into 7 pieces. Under the RPC, outraging or
scoffing at the corpse is a qualifying circumstance.
Dismemberment of a dead body is one manner of outraging or
scoffing at the corpse of the victim. In this case, the corpse of thee
victim was dismembered by the accused who sawed off the head,
limbs, and torso. The Information categorically alleges this
qualifying circumstance, when it stated that the appellant
thereafter, cut into pieces using said saw one Victor Keyser. This
being the case, as proved by the prosecution, accused is guilty
not just of homicide but of murder.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances in the instant
case, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed
upon accused.
(Basin lang I-ask, gi-reduce ang damages. Moral damages P500k
to P50k, exemplary P300k to P25k, compensatory P500k deleted
because of lack of proof, civil indemnity P50k, and attorney’s fees
P25k.)
8. VILLAFOR vs SUMMERS [1920] (physical examination for
pregnancy sa adulterer)
The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a
prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination.
(Section 17, Article III)
FACTS: Emeteria Villaflor and her paramour, Florentino Souingco
are charged with the crime of adultery before the CFI in Manila.
On trial before the Judge, Hon. Pedro Concepcion, upon the
petitioner of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court
ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor (petitioner herein) to
submit her body to the examination of one or two competent
doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused
refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of
her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating
to self-incrimination (Section 17, Article III). Thereupon she was
found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to
Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination
required by the court. As a result, petitioner now prays that a writ
of habeas corpus be issued to restore her to her liberty.
ISSUE/S: WoN the compelling of a woman to permit her body to
be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant violates
the constitutional right providing that no person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. –NO, the
privilege only applies to testimonial compulsion, not to a physical
examination.
RULING:
(naa’y taas na discussion on some opposing decisions sa courts
7
sa US but wala nalang nako i-include. Ang gist is conservative
courts would deny physical examination since they view it as
violative of the right against self-incrimination; while more
progressive courts allow physical examination. We follow the
progressive view since we see the absolute protection of an
accused as a loose extension of the constitutional guaranty.)
A legal shield was raised against odious inquisitorial methods of
interrogating an accused person by which to extort unwilling
confessions with the ever present temptation to commit the crime
of perjury – nemo tenetur seipsum accusare. The kernel of the
privilege as disclosed by the textwriters was testimonial
compulsion. As forcing a man to be a witness against himself
was deemed contrary to the fundamentals of republican
government, the principle was taken into the American
Constitutions, and from the United States was brought to the
Philippine Islands, in exactly as wide — but no wider — a scope
as it existed in old English days. The provision should here be
approached in no blindly worshipful spirit, but with a judicious and
a judicial appreciation of both its benefits and its abuses.
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to
go back once more to elements and ponder on what is the prime
purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the object of having
criminal laws is to purge the community of persons who violate the
laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal
procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional
provisions, are then provided, not to protect the guilty but to
protect the innocent. No rule is intended to be so rigid as to
embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain
the truth. No accused person should be afraid of the use of any
method which will tend to establish the truth. For instance, under
the facts before us, to use torture to make the defendant admit her
guilt might only result in including her to tell a falsehood. But no
evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be
held to be detrimental to the accused except in so far as the
truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty person.
Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due
process of law cause of the Constitution every person has a
natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own
body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of decency and
propriety to have to decide that such inviolability of the person,
particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's
gaze. As Mr. Justice Gray in Union Pacific Railway Co. vs.
Botsford said, "To compel any one, and especially a woman, to
lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without
lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass."
Conceded, and yet, as well suggested by the same court, even
superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let alone
is the inherent which the public has in the orderly
administration of justice. Unfortunately, all too frequently the
modesty of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer,
without any mental evasion, questions which are put to them; and
such a tendency to degrade the witness in public estimation does
not exempt him from the duty of disclosure. Between a sacrifice
of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations,
between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions
of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional
guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a
prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular
inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso
is that torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or
without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be
decided as cases arise.
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by
reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken
not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more
than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the
physical examination being made by the family doctor of the
accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the
assistant fiscal for an examination of the person of the defendant
by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should,
nevertheless, be understood as subject to the limitations herein
mentioned, and therefore legal.
9. Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners
Keywords: Medical Malpractice; Administrative case; Punitive
nature; Self-incrimination; Witness stand
Principle: A respondent in an administrative case may not be
compelled to take the witness stand without his consent if such
case, while administrative in character, possesses a criminal or
penal aspect.
FACTS:
Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed with the CFI of Manila an
action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against
the Board of Medical Examiners alleging that at the initial hearing
of an administrative case for alleged immorality, he, who was the
respondent in such malpractice case, would be made a witness.
He objected, through his counsel, relying on the constitutional
right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Board of
Medical Examiners (respondent) stated that at the next scheduled
hearing, Pascual would be called upon to testify as witness,
unless he could secure a restraining order from a competent
authority.
Pascual alleged that in ruling to compel him to take the witness
stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty of grave abuse of
discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-
incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which
could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal
in character.
The lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Board and ordered the latter to await the judicial disposition of the
matter upon petitioner’s posting of a bond amounting to P500.
According to the Board, the right against self-incrimination is
available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer
is asked of a witness. Pascual's remedy is to object once he is in
the witness stand. Respondent Board, denied that it acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
A motion for intervention was filed by Salvador Gatbonton and
Enriqueta Gatbonton, the complainants in the administrative case
for malpractice against Pascual. Their answer in intervention
sustained the power of Board of Medical Examiners, which for
them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be
distinguished, in their opinion, from the power to compel a witness
to incriminate himself. They likewise alleged that the right against
self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative
hearing.
The lower court found the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and
prohibited the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and
testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation
without his consent and against himself."
8
Issues:
1. WON a respondent in an administrative case be compelled to
take the witness stand without his consent.
2. WON the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination
should be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the
answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently
incurred.
Held:
Lower court decision was AFFIRMED.
1. NO. If the administrative case is punitive in nature,
as in this case.
In the case of Cabal v. Kapunan, an administrative charge for
unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner under the
Anti-Graft Act, the complainant requested that petitioner be
ordered to take the witness stand. Petitioner refused to be sworn
as a witness and was charged for contempt. SC found for the
petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the
accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand."
While the matter referred to an a administrative charge of
unexplained wealth, the Anti-Graft Act authorizes the forfeiture of
whatever property a public officer or employee may acquire, in
proportion to his salary and his other lawful income. As such, there
is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture
while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or
penal aspect.
In this case, petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. Since he
could suffer the revocation of his license as a medical
practitioner and result in the loss of the privilege to practice
the medical profession.
An American Supreme Court opinion is then made reference in
the case at bar: In the language of Justice Douglas: "We conclude
... that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has
been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to
lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be
watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the
deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it."
2. NO. Allowing a witness to object to questions the
answers to which could lead to a penal liability being
subsequently incurred is merely one aspect to the
right against self-incrimination.
The constitutional guarantee also protects as well the right to
silence. As far back as 1905, the SC has held that, "the accused
has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used
as a presumption of his guilt." In Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the
SC reaffirmed the doctrine stating that it is the right of a defendant
"to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take
the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own
free genuine will."
The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an
accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
objectives should not be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the
human personality. "The constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity
and integrity of its citizens."
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
Equal emphasis was also made of a person's right to privacy.
According to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force to surrender to his detriment."
In an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for
alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners
cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the
person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his
consent.
10. Manuel F. Cabal V. Ruperto Kapunan
One liner: Proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed
criminal or penal, and hence, the exemption of defendants in
criminal cases from the obligation to be witness against
themselves are applicable thereto.
Facts:
Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the
Secretary of Nation Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner
Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth,
conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman dictatorial
tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in
1958 and other equally reprehensible acts". The following month,
the President of the Philippines created a committee of five (5)
members to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth
contained in said letter-complaint and submit its report and
recommendations as soon as possible.
The Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand
in the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for
Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained
wealth. Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee, invoking
his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee
insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to,
subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be
incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused
to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand.
The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such
action as he may deem proper. The City Fiscal filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing to
obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. The
"charge" was assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Kapunan.
Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, on the
following grounds:
(1) that the City Fiscal has neither authority nor personality to file
said char and the same is null and void, for, if criminal, the
charge has been filed without a preliminary investigation, and,
civil, the City Fiscal may not file it, his authority in respect of
civil cases being limited to representing the City of Manila; (2)
that the facts charged constitute no offense for section 580 of
the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the charge is
based, violates due process, in that it is vague and uncertain
as regards the offense therein defined and the fine imposable
therefor and that it fail to specify whether said offense shall be
treated also contempt of an inferior court or of a superior court
(3) that more than one offense is charged, for the contempt
imputed to petitioner is sought to be punished as contempt of
an inferior court, as contempt of a superior court an as
contempt under section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules Court; (4)
that the Committee had no power to order an require petitioner
to take the witness stand and be sworn to, upon the request of
Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter, inasmuch as said order
violates petitioner's constitutional right against self-
incrimination.
9
Motion to quash denied.
In their answer, respondents herein allege, inter alia, that the
investigation being conducted by the Committee above referred to
is administrative, not criminal, in nature; that the legal provision
relied upon by petitioner in relation to preliminary investigations is
inapplicable to contempt proceedings.
Issue:
WON the proceedings before the aforementioned Committee is
civil or criminal in character such that if it is criminal, then the right
to self-incrimination is applicable. (ANS: Forfeiture proceedings
are criminal in character although technically a civil proceeding;
defendants may invoke right to self-incrimination)
Ruling:
Although the said Committee was created to investigate the
administrative charge of unexplained wealth, it seems that the
purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions
of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State
of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and
his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property. However, such forfeiture has been held to partake of the
nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture
of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the
exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be
witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.
It has frequently been held upon constitutional grounds under the
various State Constitution, that a witness or party called as
witness cannot be made to testify against himself as to matters
which would subject his property to forfeiture.
In Boyd vs. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed., 746), it was held that
the information, in a proceeding to declare a forfeiture of certain
property because of the evasion of a certain revenue law, “though
technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal
one”, and that suits for penalties and forfeitures are within the
reason of criminal proceedings for the purposes of that portion of
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S. which declares
that no person shall be compelled in a criminal to be a witness
against himself.
In this case, while it is an administrative proceeding, it is criminal
in nature in the sense that if he be found guilty, he stands the risk
of his property being forfeited and be dismissed from service.
Thus, he may not be forced to take the witness stand like an
accused in a criminal case.
11. BELTRAN v. SAMSON
KEY WORDS: handwriting
DOCTRINE: There is the well-established doctrine that the
constitutional inhibition [against self-incrimination] is directed not
merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the
furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth,
the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to
hold secret.
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner
Beltran [who is a municipal treasurer] complains that the
respondent judge ordered him to appear before the provincial
fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of
comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
[NOTE: at this time, there was still no information filed, this is still
on the preliminary investigation stage with the fiscal]
But the respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to
the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for by the
provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below, and against
which the instance action was brought, is based on the provisions
of Section 1687 of the Administrative Code and on the doctrine
laid down in the cases of People vs. Badilla; United States vs. Tan
Teng; United States vs. Ong Siu Hong, cited by counsel for the
respondents, and in the case of Villaflor vs. Summers cited by the
judge in the order in question.
The fiscal under Section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the
proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses
to be present at the investigation of any crime of
misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without
prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to
appear.
The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded,
seeks refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones
Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58
Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law
which reads: "Ni se le obligara a declarar en contra suya en
ningun proceso criminal" and has been incorporated in our
Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4)
and section 56.
As to the extent of this privilege, it should be noted first of all, that
the English text of the Jones Law, which is the original one, reads
as follows: "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself."
ISSUE:
W/N compelling the petitioner to write in his handwriting under
the fiscal’s dictation violates his constitutional right against self-
incrimination? –YES
HELD:
The Court finds the present action well taken, and it is ordered
that the respondents and those under their orders desist and
abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to
take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison.
As to the scope of the constitutional provision (par.3 sec.3 jones
law), this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but
extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence.
"The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional
provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure
toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is
strong and the evidence obscure, that it is the duty of courts
liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights,
and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion.
Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the
constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of
oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of
evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the
divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a
right to hold secret.
But however the question is whether the writing from the fiscal's
dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the
latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
10
documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence
against himself within the scope and meaning of the
constitutional provision under examination.
Thus, it must be considered that it has been settled that
whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his
own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his
own hand, he may on cross-examination be compelled to write
in open court in order that the jury may be able to compare his
handwriting with the one in question. It was so held in the case
of Bradford vs. People inasmuch as the defendant, in offering
himself as witness in his own behalf, waived his personal
privileges.
Similarly, in the case of Sprouse vs. Com., where the judge
asked the defendant to write his name during the hearing, and
the latter did so voluntarily. The defendant had the legal
right to refuse to write, but he preferred to accede to the
request voluntarily.
But however the cases abovementioned so resolved cannot be
compared to the one now before us. We are not concerned
here with a defendant, for it does not appear that any
information was filed against the petitioner for the
supposed falsification, and still less is it a question of a
defendant on trial testifying and under cross-examination. This
is only an investigation prior to the information and with a view
to filing it. And let it further be noted that in the case of
Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant performed the act voluntarily.
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more
than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing
is not a purely mechanical and attention; and in the case at
bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a
means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the petition
of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more
serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of
producing documents of chattels in one's possession. And
as to such production of documents or chattels, which to our
mind is not so serious as the case now before us, the same
eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says:
". . . 2264, Production or Inspection of Documents and
Chattels. — 1. It follows that the production
of documents or chattels by a person (whether
ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a
subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to
other form of process treating him as a witness (i. e. as
a person appearing before the tribunal to furnish
testimony on his moral responsibility for truth- telling),
may be refused under the protection of the privilege;
and this is universally conceded."
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege,
there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a
document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of
his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to
furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than that of
compelling the production of documents or chattels, because
here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of
the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may
identify him as the falsifier.
While it cannot be contended in the present case that if
permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting
is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer,
according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the
fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens
without resorting to the means complained of herein, that is not
reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals
may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases
are accidental and do not constitute the raison d'etre of the
privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the
protection of innocent persons.
With respect to the judgments rendered by this court and cited
on behalf of the respondents [these are the cases the judge and
the fiscal cited in favor of their position], it should be
remembered that in the case of People vs. Badilla, it does not
appear that the defendants and other witnesses were
questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not
refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their
constitutional privilege, as they could certainly do.
"The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while
absolute when claimed, may be waived by any one entitled
to invoke it." As in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng
where the defendant did not oppose the extraction from his
body of the substance later used as evidence against him.
And in the case of Villaflor vs. Summers, it was plainly stated that
the court preferred to rest its decision on the reason of the case
rather than on blind adherence to tradition. The said reason of the
case there consisted in that it was a case of the examination of
the body by physicians, which could be and doubtless was
interpreted by this court, as being no compulsion of the petitioner
therein to furnish evidence by means of a testimonial act. In reality
she was not compelled to execute any position act, much less a
testimonial act; she was only enjoined from something, preventing
the examination; all of which is very different from what is required
of the petitioner in the present case, where it is sought to compel
his to perform a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a
specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparison
12. US vs Tan Teng
Keywords: rape; gonorrhoea, chinamen
Principle: The prohibition that a person shall not be compelled to
be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will,
an admission of his guilt.
FACTS:
The defendant was charged with the crime of raping, Olivia
Pacomio, a girl, 7 years of age.
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier,
judge, found the defendant guilty of the offense of abusos
deshonestos.
th
The facts of the case are, on the 15 day of September, Oliva was
staying in the house of her sister located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in
Manila. On said day, a number of Chinamen were gambling who
have the habit of visiting the house of her sister. Oliva after taking
a bath, returned to her room where he was followed by defendant
who asked for some face powder. After using the powder upon his
private parts, he threw Oliva on the flower, and placed his private
parts upon hers.
Several days after, the sister of Oliva discovered that the Oliva
was suffering from gonorrhoea. It was during this time that Oliva
related to her sister what happened.
The sister at once foot an investigation to find the Chinamen. A
number of Chinamen were collected wherein Oliva was called to
11
identify the perpetrator. Defendant was not present at first but
when he arrived, Oliva identified him.
Defendant was arrested and was stripped of his clothing. The
policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from his body
and was turned over to the Bureau of Science (BOS) for scientific
analysis wherein he was found to be suffering gonorrhoea.
During trial, defendant objected to the admissibility of the
testimony of Oliva by reason of his age, however the trial court
held that she had sufficient knowledge and discernment, thus her
testimony deserves full credit. Also, he contended the result of the
scientific examination made by the BOS as it was not admissible
in evidence. To admit such evidence is to compel defendant to
testify against himself.
ISSUE: WON the examination conducted by BOS was in violation
of the right of Tan Teng against self-incrimination.
RULING:
No, it is not.The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine
Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against
himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract
from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his
guilt.
The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from
looking at the fact of a defendant even, for the purpose of
disclosing his identity. Such an application of the prohibition under
discussion certainly could not be permitted. Such an inspection of
the bodily features by the court or by witnesses, can not violate
the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not
call upon the accused as a witness — it does not call upon the
defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Evidence obtained in
this way from the accused, is not testimony but his body itself.
In this case, evidence clearly shows that the defendant was
suffering from the venereal disease, and that through his brutal
conduct said disease was communicated to Oliva Pacomio. In a
rape cases, it is always difficult to secure positive and direct proof.
Such crimes as the present are generally proved by circumstantial
evidence. In cases of rape the courts of law require corroborative
proof, for the reason that such crimes are generally committed in
secret. In the present case, taking into account the number and
credibility of the witnesses, their interest and attitude on the
witness stand, their manner of testifying and the general
circumstances surrounding the witnesses, including the fact that
both parties were found to be suffering from a common disease,
the accused is guilty of the crime of "abusos deshonestos”.
13. People vs Salanguit GR 133254-55, April 19, 2001
Officers should be careful as their slight mistake will absolve a
person of his crime. (referring to the marijuana possession in the
case)
FACTS:
Mr. Roberto Salanguit was charged with violation of RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act). On December 26, 1995 in Quezon City
he wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly possessed 11.14g of
Metamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and 1,254g of
Marijuana, a prohibited drug. This was confiscated by virtue of the
search warrant.
On Dec. 25, 1996, Inspector Aguilar applied for the warrant in
Branch 90 of Dasmarinas Cavite, this was supported by his
witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-
buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from
accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-
appellant from a cabinet inside his room.
The warrant is issued by Judge Dolores Espanol.They found 12
small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white
crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which
appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total
weight of approximately 1,255 grams.
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated
evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of
2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight
of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves,
one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to
be marijuana.
The accused contested the conviction in three grounds:
First, the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered on the
ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second,
the admissibility of the marijuana allegedly seized from the
accused pursuant to the plain view doctrine.Third, employment of
unnecessary force by the officers.
ISSUE:
• WON the marijuana seized is justified on the ground of
plain view doctrine by the searching party.
HELD:
FIRST, accused proposed the invalidity of the search warrant
using three grounds: one, no probable cause to search for drug
paraphernalia. Second, search warrant issued for more than one
specific offense. And lastly. Place to be searched was not
described with sufficient particularity.
To rebut the first ground, the court held that the fact that there was
no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of the
drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the
search warrant was void. The fact would be material only if the
drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police officer. None
was taken by the searching party. The search warrant is only void
in so far as it authorized the seizure of the drug paraphernalia but
valid as to the seizure of the metamphetamine hydrochloride. In
Aday vs. Supreme Court, the invalid portions of the search warrant
are severable from the authorization of the named articles. In
conclusion, the first part of the search warrant authorizing the
search of the accused’s house for undetermined quantity of shabu
is valid even though the second part of the search for the drug
paraphernalia is not.
To rebut the second ground, even though the possession or use
of shabu and the possession of drug paraphernalia are punished
under two provisions of RA 6425, still the Court follows similar
jurisprudence. In People vs Dichoso, it is said that the argument
is pedantic. The Dangerous Drug Act of 1972 is a special law that
deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are prohibited and
regulated and defines and penalizes categories of offense which
are closely related or which belong to the same class. Accordingly,
one search warrant may thus be validly issued for the violation of
Dangerous Drug Act
To rebut the third ground, that the search warrant failed to indicate
the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the rule is that a description of
the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended to be searched. While the address stated in the warrant
12
is merely "Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City," the trial court
took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No.
160 contained several documents which identified the premises to
be searched. Also police officers who raided appellant's house
under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar
could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the
same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives.
SECOND. (this is the part of the case that is relevant to the subject
of EVEDENCE) The contention of the accused that the search
warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana. This is a correct
contention by the accused and help by the carelessness of the
police officers in writing the report.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain
view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.
For the doctrine to apply, there must be the requisites present: (a)
prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and
(c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.
The court discussed first the “prior justification and discovery by
inadvertence” Once the valid portion of the search warrant has
been executed, the “plain view doctrine” can no longer provide any
basis for admitting the other items subsequently found.
In the case at bar the police failed to allege in the case the time
when the marijuana was found, be it prior to or contemporaneous
with the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered
on accused-appellant's person or in an area within his immediate
control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search
conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet,
as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. The
court discussed second the “apparent Illegality of the evidence”
The court explained that the marijuana bricks were wrapped in
newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure.
And pointed a jurisprudence of People v. Musa in which we
declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM
agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag
which gave no indication of its contents.
THIRD, The claims that undue and unnecessary force was
employed by the searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Right to break door or window to effect
search. — The officer, if refused admittance
to the place of directed search after giving
notice of his purpose and authority, may
break open any outer or inner door or window
of a house or any part of a house or anything
therein to execute the warrant or liberate
himself or any person lawfully aiding him
when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up
the roof of his house to gain entry and had broken doors and
windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent
proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like
the barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented by
accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-
appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal
drugs under §16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
14. PEOPLE v DAMASO
DOCTRINE: The lack of objection may make any incompetent
evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether
objected to or not has no probative value.
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in
an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in furtherance
of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion,
together 6 other persons. Such information was later amended to
exclude all other persons except the accused-appellant Basilio
Damaso from the criminal charge.
On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine
Constabulary officer and some companions were sent to verify the
presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang,
Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group
apprehended 4 persons. When interrogated, the persons
apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse
at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. They found subversive
documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items. L
After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and
put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie
Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested.
They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie
Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza aka
Basilio Damaso, herein appellant. She guided the group to the
house rented by appellant. When they reached the house, the
group found that it had already been vacated by the occupants.
The Barangay Captain of the place was requested to point out the
new house rented by appellant. The group again required
Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the
group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they
already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At
first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the
group to go inside the house.
Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay
Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled 'Ang Bayan', xerox
copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who
were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa,
Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda
Morados). The group requested the persons in the house to allow
them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the
rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14
rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard,
maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and
other items.
They confiscated the articles and brought them to their
headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the
persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation.
Said persons revealed that appellant was the lessee of the house
and owned the items confiscated therefrom.
Based on this, Damaso was charged with illegal possession of
firearms. The prosecution presented as witnesses Lt. Quijardo
and M/Sgt Gomez to attest to this fact.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence is admissible or not on grounds of its being
hearsay, immaterial, or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search
warrant
HELD:
13
NO, the evidence is inadmissible.
1. There is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the
fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee
of the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were
found or the owner of the said items. The testimonies are hearsay
because the witnesses testified on matters not on their own
personal knowledge.
* The Solicitor General, however, argues that while the
testimonies may be hearsay, the same are admissible because of
the failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto.
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in
its being admitted as evidence. But, one should not be misled into
thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence,
they now have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, cannot be given credence.
2. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is
the lessee of the house, the case against him still will not prosper,
the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the
requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. Although,
there are instances when a warrantless search and seizure
becomes valid [(1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a
moving vehicle, and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view] but none
of the exceptions is present in this case.
* Solicitor General claims that the group of Lt. Quijardo entered
the appellant's house upon invitation of Luz Tanciangco and
Luzviminda Morados, helper of the appellant, so technically
speaking, there was no search as the group was voluntarily shown
the articles used in subversion; that besides, a search may be
validly conducted without a search warrant with the consent of the
person searched as in this case, appellant's helper and Luz
Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to look around the
appellant's house; and that since the evidence seized was in plain
view of the authorities, the same may be seized without a warrant.
The Court is not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one
cannot he waived by anyone except the person whose rights are
invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her
behalf. In the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not
in his house at that time. There is no evidence that would establish
the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper, or if
it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given
her authority to open his house in his absence. As a consequence,
the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have
been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could
have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant.
But the record is silent on this point.
3. There is a discrepancy between the description of the evidence
and the evidence actually presented. In the amended information,
the gun was described as an M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935.
Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different serial number
which is 1249985.
*The Solicitor General contends that the discrepancy is merely
a typographical error.
The Court does not think so. This glaring error goes into the
substance of the charge. Its correction or lack of it could spell the
difference between freedom and incarceration of the accused-
appellant.
Since the gun as identified at the trial differs from the gun
described in the amended information, the corpus delicti (the
substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually been
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
committed) has not been fully established. This circumstance
coupled with dubious claims of appellant's connection to the
house (where the gun was found) have totally emasculated
(weakened) the prosecution's case.
The evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant
of the charge. ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED
16. People v Aminnudin
“Onboard with Mary Jane (marijuana)”
Facts:
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984 after disembarking
from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City.
The PC officers earlier received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo
City and was carrying a marijuana. He was identified by name.
Acting on this tip, they waited for him and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to
him. The PC officers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and
finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspected
articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. They were verified as marijuana
leaves and an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act was filed against him. The information was amended to
include Farida Ali y Hassen. They were both arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. The fiscal subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss the charge against Ali absolving her after a thorough
investigation.
Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana and alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested, immediately handcuffed and his bag was
confiscated without a search warrant. (he also claimed that he
only sells watches which the trial court rejected given he was only
carrying two watches and has travelled to Jolo for that purpose,
spending for the fare and other expenses)
It is not disputed and in fact admitted by the PC officers who
testified that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin.
Their only justification is the tip received from a reliable and
regular informer. According to the testimony of the chief of the
arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol Jr, they received the
intelligence report pertaining to the coming of Aminnudin to Iloilo
with marijuana on June 25 on June 23 or 2 days before the arrest.
He also testified that they did not try to secure a search warrant
because they were sure that the operation will yield a positive
result and that the search warrant is not necessary.
Issue: W/N the confiscated bundles of marijuana are admissible
in evidence
Ruling:
No.In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search
warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of
the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in
flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113
of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to
dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan
v. Arca where it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law
because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no urgency as it is clear that they had
at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant
14
to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the
M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they
had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet
they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The
Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant
who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his
own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
Here, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so
or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like
any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier
of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject
to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest.
The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them
to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, the
constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so
declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is
not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from
Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence
cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by
the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized
illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes'
felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest
because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest
did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence
obtained thereby was inadmissible.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as
evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
Accused appellant is acquitted.
17. People v Zenaida Quebral
Arrest based on an informer; applicability of the Amminudin case
FACTS:
On 7 September 2007, the Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit
called Galvez and other police officers to a briefing regarding a
police informer’s report that two men and a woman on board an
owner type jeep with a specific plate number would deliver shabu
to Michael Salvador.
On the morning of September 8, 2002, PO3 Galvez and six other
police officers went to the North Luzon Expressway Balagtas Exit,
watching out for the owner type jeep mentioned. At around 4:00
p.m., such a jeep, bearing the reported plate number and with two
men and a woman on board, came out of the Balagtas Exit. Galvez
identified the two men as accused Eusebio Quebral, who drove
the jeep, and accused-appellant Fernando Lopez and the woman
as accused-appellant Zenaida Quebral. The police trailed the jeep
as it proceeded to the town proper of Balagtas and entered a
Petron gas station along the McArthur Highway.
After a few minutes, a Tamaraw FX arrived from which accused-
appellant Michael Salvador alighted. He walked towards the jeep
and talked to accused Zenaida Quebral, who then handed a white
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
envelope to him. On seeing this, PO3 Galvez, who was watching
from about 15 meters in a tinted car, signaled his back-up team to
move. The police officers alighted from their vehicles and
surrounded the jeep. Galvez took the envelope from Michael,
opened it, and saw five plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance which he believed was shabu. Arrest then ensued.
A criminal case was filed for violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. The RTC found the accused all guilty of the crime charged
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
Accused questioned the legality of the search, invoking the case
of Aminnudin. They also argued that the police officers cannot say
that what they saw from a distance constituted a crime. Two men
and a woman arrived on board a jeep at the gas station. A third
man approached the jeep, spoke to the woman and she handed
him a folded white envelope that appeared to contain something.
These acts do not constitute a crime per se. Consequently, their
arrest at this point was illegal. The subsequent search of their
persons, not being based on a valid arrest, was itself illegal.
ISSUE:
Was there a valid search and arrest?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that it was more a search preceding an
arrest. Probable cause was established through the confidential
report of the police informer corroborated with what the police
witnessed before the search and arrest. The police acted on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that a crime has been committed or is
about to be committed. Since the seized shabu resulted from a
valid search, it is admissible in evidence against the accused.
The case of People v. Aminnudin[ cannot apply to this case. In
Aminnudin, the informant gave the police the name and
description of the person who would be coming down from a ship
the following day carrying a shipment of drugs. In such a case, the
Court held that the police had ample time to seek a search warrant
against the named person so they could validly search his
luggage. In the present case, all the information the police had
about the persons in possession of the prohibited drugs was that
they were two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep. A
search warrant issued against such persons could be used by the
police to harass practically anyone.
18. Rosete v Lim
(depositions for civil case parallel with 2 criminal case—rule
on civil case applies)
Principle:
As a general rule, in civil or administrative proceedings, the
defendant may not refuse to take the stand altogether and the
right against self-incrimination may only be invoked the moment
incriminating questions are asked.
However, as an exception, when the civil or administrative
proceeding is penal in nature, the rule in criminal cases where the
defendant may refuse to take stand is applicable.
Facts:
On December 5, 1995, respondents, Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim
filed a Complaint for Annulment, Specific Performance with
Damages against AFP-RSBS (AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits System), Espreme Realty, Alfredo Rosete, Maj. Oscar
Mapalo, Chito Rosete, BPI and Register of Deeds of Mindoro
Occidental. It asked, among other things, that the Deed of Sale
executed by AFP-RSBS over certain parcels of land in favor of
15
Espreme Realty be annulled. Parallel to this civil case are two
criminal cases pending before the City Prosecutors of
Mandaluyong City and Pasig City involving the same set of facts.
On May 28, 1997, respondents filed a Notice to Take Deposition
Upon Oral Examination of petitioners Oscar Mapalo and Chito
Rosete. In response, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
and Objection to Take Deposition, arguing that, since there are
two criminal cases pending involving the same set of facts, to
permit the taking of the deposition would be violative of their right
against self-incrimination because by means of oral deposition,
respondents would seek to establish allegations of fact in the
complaint which are also the allegations of fact in the complaint
affidavits in the said criminal case. The lower court denied the
objection and scheduled the taking thereof.
Issue:
W/N the constitutional right against self-incrimination of Mapalo
and Rosete would be violated by the taking of their deposition in
the civil case although they are also respondents in another
criminal case with identical set of facts
Ruling:
No. Under Sec 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, “No person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself”. This right is
accorded to every person who gives evidence in any civil, criminal
or administrative proceedings.
As to an accused in a criminal case, it is settled that he can refuse
outright to take the stand as a witness. An ordinary witness (or a
party in a civil action), on the other hand, may not disregard a
subpoena, decline to appear before the court or to refuse to testify
altogether. His right against self-incrimination can be claimed only
when a specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put
to the witness. However, this rule admits of an exception and that
is when such civil or administrative proceeding partakes of the
nature of a criminal proceeding.
In this case, the case is civil, it being a suit for annulment, specific
performance with damages. The fact that there are two criminal
cases pending which are allegedly based on the same set of facts
as that of the civil case will not give them the right to refuse to take
the witness stand and to give their depositions as they are not
facing criminal charges in the civil case.
19. People vs Bokingco
Killing the owner of a pawnshop and apartments.
Doctrine: Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding
only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-
accused, and is considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made
by a conspirator.
FACTS:
The victim, Noli Pasion and his wife, Elsa, were residing in a house
along Mac Arthur Highway in Balibago, Angeles City. Pasion
owned a pawnshop, which formed part of his house. He also
maintained two (2) rows of apartment units at the back of his
house.
The accused Bokingco and Col killed Noli Pasion (Noli) using a
claw hammer with treachery and evident premeditation. Bokingco
enetered a guilty plea while Col opted for a not guilty plea.
Bokingco confessed to the crime during the pre-trial.
Pasion was the employer of the killers. He employed them to
construct an apartment building. Dante Vitalicio was the brother in
law of Pasion. He was living in one of the apartments owned by
his broher. He was a witness to the crime and was himself
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
attacked by Bokingco but was able to save himself with the help
of another worker. Both victims were brought to the hospital but
Pasion already expired.
Elsa the wife of Pasion testified that she was in the master’s
bedroom on the second floor of the house when she heard
banging sounds and her husband’s moans. She immediately got
off the bed and went down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col
blocked her way. Elsa asked him why he was inside their house
but Col suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear gas on her eyes
and poked a sharp object under her chin. Elsa was wounded when
she bowed her head to avoid the tear gas. Col then instructed her
to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that she
does not know the combination lock. Elsa tried offering him money
but Col dragged her towards the back door by holding her neck
and pulling her backward. Before they reached the door, Elsa saw
Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col: "tara, patay
na siya." Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco.
Elsa proceeded to Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she saw her
husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood.
Bokingco admitted that he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and
that they planned the killing several days before because they got
"fed up" with Pasion. Bokingco defended himself by saying that
Pasion who was drunk at the time went to his room and asked him
why he was not at the construction site, he said he just stayed at
his room for the whole day prompting Pasion to hit him in the head.
This caused Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion. He then
fled the scene and was captured in Mindanao. He admitted that
he harbored ill-feelings against Pasion.
Col confirmed that he was one of the construction workers
employed by Pasion. He however resigned on 26 February 2000
because of the deductions from his salary. He went home to
Cainta, Rizal, where he was apprehended and brought to Camp
Olivas. Upon reaching the camp, he saw Bokingco who pointed to
him as the person who killed Pasion. He insisted that he doesn’t
know Bokingco very well. Trial court found the two guilty of murder
with the presence of two aggravating circumstance of NIGHTTIME
and ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE. Penalty given was death. Court
of Appeals affirmed the ruling. There sentence was downgraded
to reclusion perpetua
ISSUE:
1) Whether the qualifying circumstances were properly
appreciated to convict appellant Bokingco of murder and
2) Whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a
co-conspirator.
RULING:
There is no question that Bokingco attacked and killed Pasion.
Bokingco made two (2) separate and dissimilar admissions: first,
in his extrajudicial confession taken during the preliminary
investigation where he admitted that he and Col planned the killing
of Pasion; and second, when he testified in open court that he was
only provoked in hitting Pasion back when the latter hit him in the
head. On the basis of his extrajudicial confession, Bokingco was
charged for murder qualified by evident premeditation and
treachery.
No Treachery
For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that
at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself, and that the offender consciously adopted the particular
means, method or form of attack employed by him. Nobody
witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack.
While the witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting
something on the floor, he failed to see the victim at that time.
Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion. Treachery
16
cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in the
absence of any proof of the manner in which the aggression was
commenced.
No Evident Premeditation
To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution
must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the
time when the offender was determined to commit the crime; (b)
an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his
determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. It is indispensable to show how
and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had
elapsed before it was carried out. In the instant case, no proof was
shown as to how and when the plan to kill was devised. Bokingco
admitted in court that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit
him in the head. Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that he
was treated poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish
that Bokingco planned the attack.
Exrajudicial Confession during preliminary investigation no
admissible.
It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco
mentioned his and Col’s plan to kill Pasion. Bokingco’s confession
was admittedly taken without the assistance of counsel in violation
of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible against Bokingco because he was not assisted
at all by counsel during the time his confession was taken
before a judge.
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is
anchored on the presumption that there was evident
premeditation. Having ruled however that evident premeditation
has not been proved, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime
cannot be properly appreciated. There was no evidence to show
that Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the offense.
Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance in this case. Taking into account that
fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be conceded that he
enjoyed the trust and confidence of Pasion. However, there was
no showing that he took advantage of said trust to facilitate the
commission of the crime.
A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is
proper for Bokingco for failure of the prosecution to prove the
presence of the qualifying circumstances.
No conspiracy. Ergo, Col was acquitted.
The trial court pinned Col as conspirator. This Court is well aware
of the policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of
the trial court, owing to their unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grueling examination. However, this rule admits of
exceptions, namely: 1) when the trial court’s findings of facts and
conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or 2)
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez)
when certain facts of substance and value likely to change the
outcome of the case have been overlooked by the lower court, or
3) when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of
facts. The second exception obtains in this case.
Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation
in the case before us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him
and Bokingco be proved. As a rule, conspiracy must be
established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and
must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. The
finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa’s testimony that
appellants fled together after killing her husband and the
extrajudicial confession of Bokingco. Nobody witnessed the
commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment
where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at
Elsa’s house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop
vault.
Based on the testimony of Elsa, Col sprayed something in her eye
when she ran to check what was making a strange sound in the
masters bedroom. She was then asked to give the password of
the vault and a sharp object was poked under her chin. At most,
Col’s action can be equated as attempted robbery. Elsa testified
that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed
and that they had to leave the place. This does not prove that they
acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only
proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed
simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from
the crimes they separately committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion.
Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col.
Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was
killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting
to rob the pawnshop.
Rule in Evidence – connected with our subject
In as much as Bokingco’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically
where he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible
against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay
against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made
by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to
the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than by such act or declaration.49 In order that
the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first
proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the
admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. As we have previously discussed, we did not find any
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy.
Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and
is inadmissible in evidence against Col. Bokingco’s judicial
admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he
only attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in the head. All told,
an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was
adduced to implicate him.
20. Jaime Dela Cruz vs. People
“You Can’t Just Drug Test Me”
17
Facts:
On January 31, 2006, the NBI received a Complaint from Corazon
and Charito as Corazon’s live-in-partner, Ariel, was picked up by
several unknown men believed to be police officers for allegedly
selling drugs. A number was given to the complainants and they
were told to go to the Gorordo Police Office along Gorordo
Avenue, Cebu City. They met police officer James who demanded
from them P100,000, and later lowered to P40,000, in exchange
for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants went
to the NBI office to file a complaint and narrate the circumstances.
While at the NBI Office, Charito received a call from James to bring
the money ASAP. NBI verified the text messages received by the
complainants and immediately formed a team to implement an
entrapment operation. This took place at the Jollibee branch at the
corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenue. The officers were
able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked PhP500 bill
dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the
amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. James
was required to submit urine for drug testing and it yielded a
positive result for presence of dangerous drugs.
James denied the charges and testified that he was arrested for
extortion while eating at the Jollibee branch. Jaime Dela Cruz was
charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of RA 9165.Both the
RTC and CA found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating RA 9165. Dela Cruz argues that the CA overlooked
prevailing jurisprudence stating that drug testing conducted under
similar circumstances violates a person’s right to privacy.
Issue: Whether or not the drug test conducted is legal
Ruling: Drug test done was not legal as it was conducted without
ground upon any existing law or jurisprudence.
Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of
the law, the pertinent provision of which reads:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. — A person
apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for
use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test,
shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6)
months rehabilitation in a government center for the first
offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act.
If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second
time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos
(PhP50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(PhP200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not
be applicable where the person tested is also found to
have in his/her possession such quantity of any
dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act,
in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.
In the RTC level, petitioner’s objection regarding the admissibility
of evidence was disregarded by the RTC reasoning that a suspect
cannot invoke his right to counsel upon extraction of urine as it
does not need any testimony against himself. Further, the lower
court adds that extracting urine is merely a mechanical act and
does not fall under custodial investigation.
The RTC’s argument is erroneous.
First, the drug test in Sec. 15 does not apply to persons
apprehended or arrested for ANY unlawful act, BUT ONLY for
unlawful acts listed under Article II of RA 9165. Petitioner Dela
Cruz was arrested for extortion, thereafter, he was required to
undergo a drug test by the NBI without his consent. Article II of RA
Evidence Case Digests Batch 1 2019-2020 (Pelaez) 18

9165 does not include extortion. To make the provision applicable

to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed
under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning.
Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act
of extortion.

Second, the drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial

compulsion. Despite the fact that petitioner never raised the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment, this does not mean
that he has waived his right to question the inadmissibility of
evidence taken during an illegal warrantless arrest.

There are cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been

allowed, however, the pieces of evidence obtained were all
material to the principal cause of the arrest. However, in the
case, there is no connection of obtaining a urine sample to the
charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred
when they held that the extraction of petitioner's urine for purposes
of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

Finally, the drug test was a violation of Dela Cruz’ right to privacy
and right against self-incrimination. Petitioner refused to have his
urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer
before the test. However, all his efforts were not given credence
and these are contrary to the constitutional guarantee of the right
to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

Drug testing cannot be condoned on all arrested persons

regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being
made.