Conflict Batch 3 I Atty.
Torregosa I EH 501
1. BOUDARD VS TAIT
Facts: Emilie Boudard (appellant), widow of
Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard and guardian
of her coappellants, her children born during
her marriage with the deceased (Marie
Theodore Jerome Boudard), obtained a
judgment in their favor from the Court of First
Instance of Hanoi, French Indo-China for the
sum of 40,000 piastras, plus interest. The
judgment was rendered against Stewart Eddie
Tait who had been declared in default for his
failure to appear at the trial before said court.
Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard, who was an
employee of Stewart Eddie Tait, was killed in
Hanoi by other employees of said Tait,
although "outside of the fulfillment of a duty".
Emilie Boudard and children appeal from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dismissing the case instituted by them,
thereby overruling their complaint, and
sentencing them to pay the costs.
The dismissal of appellants' complaint by the
lower court was based principally on the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of Hanoi to render the
judgment in question, for the execution of
which this action was instituted in this
jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was
discovered in the decision itself of the Court of
Hanoi which states that the appellee was not a
resident of, nor had a known domicile in, that
country.
The evidence adduced at the trial conclusively
proves that neither the appellee nor his agent
or employees were ever in Hanoi, French Indo-
China; and that the deceased Marie Theodore
Jerome Boudard had never, at any time, been
his employee.
Issue: WON the service of summons is proper
Ruling: From notes:
Under existing jurisprudence and US
authorities, the rule is uniform that in actions in
personam, the defendant can only be served
with summons and jurisdiction over him can
only be acquired if he is still within the territory
where the court sits. In other words, summons
should be served while defendant was still in
Hanoi.
Here, the defendant was already in the
Philippines when the summons was served.
Such extraterritorial service does not vest
jurisdiction in favor of the Hanoi court.
From the full text:
No.
It was really unnecessary for the lower court to
admit Exhibits D, E, F and H to M-1, nor can
these exhibits be admitted as evidence, for, as
to the first point, the appellants failed to show
that the proceedings against the appellee in the
Court of Hanoi were in accordance with the
laws of France then in force.
Moreover, it appears that said documents are
not of the nature mentioned in sections 304 and
305 of Act No. 190. They are not copies of the
judicial record of the proceedings against the
appellee in the Court of Hanoi, duly certified by
the Proper authorities there, whose signatures
should be authenticated by the Consul or some
consular agent of the United States in said
country.
The appellants argue that the papers are the
original documents and that the Honorable
French Consul in the Philippines has confirmed
this fact. Such argument is not sufficient to
authorize a deviation from a rule established
and sanctioned by law. To comply with the rule,
the best evidence of foreign judicial
proceedings is a certified copy of the same with
all the formalities required in said sections 304
and 305 for only thus can one be absolutely
sure of the authenticity of the record.
On the other hand, said exhibits or documents,
if admitted, would only corroborate and
strengthen the evidence of the appellee which
in itself is convincing, and the conclusion of the
lower court that the appellee is not liable for the
amount to which he was sentenced, as alleged
for he was not du]v tried or even summoned in
conformity with the law.
Moreover, the evidence of record shows that
the appellee was not in Hanoi during the time
mentioned in the complaint of the appellants,
nor were his employees or representatives.
The rule in matters of this nature is that judicial
proceedings in a foreign country, regarding
payment of money, are only effective against a
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
party if summons is duly served on him within
such foreign country before the proceedings.
2. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES VS CA
FACTS: Northwest Airlines is an airline
company operating its business in Japan. It
entered into a contract with a Philippine
corporation, CF Sharp, for the latter to sell
airlines tickets. When Sharp failed to remit the
proceeds, the airline sued before Japanese
Courts.
The summons intended for the Philippine
corporation was attempted to be served twice
at its office in Japan but without success. The
first attempt failed because the officer
authorized to receive summons was not
around. The second attempt also failed
because while the officer was already there, he
claimed that he is no longer authorized or he is
no longer connected with Sharp.
The summons not having been served, the
Japanese court resorted to service of
summons through diplomatic channels. Under
this mode, the Japanese court requested its
Supreme Court to direct the service of the
summons to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, and then the Ministry coordinated with
the Japanese consular office in the Philippines,
and the foreign affairs coordinated with the
Philippine court.
The court now served summons on the
defendant at its principal office in Manila. When
the Philippine corporation failed to participate
in the proceedings, the Japanese court
rendered judgment in favor of the airline, and
when the judgment cannot be satisfied in
Japan, the airline filed an action before the
Philippine court for the enforcement of the
foreign judgment.
In its defense, Sharp argued that the decision
rendered by the Japanese court is void
because it is vitiated by lack of jurisdiction over
his person. It claimed that the service of
summons was not proper, relying on the case
of Boudard v. Tait because like in that case, the
summons was served beyond the jurisdiction of
the Japanese court.
Issue: WON Japanese court has jurisidction
Ruling: YES. Consequently, the party
attacking (Sharp) a foreign judgment has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity.
Accordingly, the presumption of validity and
regularity of the service of summons and the
decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese
court must stand.
Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is
presumed to be similar with the Philippine law
on service of summons on a private foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines.
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides that if the defendant is a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines,
service may be made:
(1) on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose,
or,
(2) If there is no such resident agent, on
the government official designated by
law to that effect; or
(3) on any of its officers or agents within
the Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an
agent to receive summons, the designation is
exclusive, and service of summons is without
force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless
made upon him.
Where the corporation has no such agent,
service shall be made on the government
official designated by law, to wit:
(a) the Insurance Commissioner in the
case of a foreign insurance company
(b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the
case of a foreign banking corporation
(c) the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in the case of other
foreign corporations duly licensed to do
business in the Philippines. Whenever
service of process is so made, the
government office or official served
shall transmit by mail a copy of the
summons or other legal proccess to the
corporation at its home or principal
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
office. The sending of such copy is a
necessary part of the service.
The service on the proper government official
under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Section 128 of the
Corporation Code. Our laws and jurisprudence
indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign
corporations, duly licensed to do business
here, to the status of domestic corporations.
We think it would be entirely out of line with this
policy should we make a discrimination against
a foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and
subject its property to the harsh writ of seizure
by attachment when it has complied not only
with every requirement of law made specially of
foreign corporations, but in addition with every
requirement of law made of domestic
corporations.
In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing
business in Japan through its four duly
registered branches at the time the collection
suit against it was filed, then in the light of the
processual presumption, SHARP may be
deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was
amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts
therein and may be deemed to have assented
to the said courts' lawful methods of serving
process.
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of
summons on it by the Japanese Court was
valid not only under the processual
presumption but also because of the
presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty.
3.Nagarmull vs Binalbagan Isabela
Principle : It is true that under the provisions
of Section 50 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, a
judgment for a sum of money rendered by a
foreign court "is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title",
but when suit for its enforcement is brought in
a Philippine court, said judgment "may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact"
FACTS : Under Contract G/14370 dated May
6, 1949, plaintiff, a foreign corporation with
offices at No. 8 Dalhousie Square (East)
Calcutta, India, agreed to sell to defendant, a
domestic corporation with offices at the
Chronicle Building, Aduana Street, Manila,
1,700,000 pieces of Hessian bags at $26.20
On September 8, 1949, plaintiff advised
defendant that of the 850 bales scheduled for
shipment in July and August, the former was
able to ship only 310 bales owing to the alleged
failure of the Adamjee Jute Mills to supply the
in September, 54 bales were likewise defaulted
resulting in a total of 154 bales which is now the
object of the controversy.
Meanwhile, on October 1, 1949, the
Government of India increased the export duty
of jute bags from 80 to 350 rupees per ton, and
on October 5, 1949, plaintiff requested
defendant to increase its letter of credit to cover
the enhanced rate of export duty imposed
On November 17, 1949, plaintiff wrote
defendant a letter reiterating its claim for
corresponding to the increased export taxes on
the 154 bales delivered to defendant from the
defaulted shipments for the months of July,
August and September, 1949
On February 6, 1951, defendant received
notification from the Bengal Chamber of
Commerce Tribunal of Arbitration in Calcutta,
India, advising it that on December 28, 1950,
Plaintiff applied to said Tribunal for arbitration
regarding their claim. The Tribunal requested
the defendant to send them its version of the
case. This, defendant did on March 1, 1951,
thru the then Government Corporate Counsel,
former Justice Pompeyo Diaz.
As presented to the Tribunal of Arbitration, the
whole case revolved on the question of
whether or not defendant is liable to the plaintiff
for the payment of increased export taxes
imposed by the Indian Government on the
shipments of jute sacks. Defendant contended
that if the jute sacks in question were delivered
by plaintiff in the months of July, August, and
September, 1949, pursuant to the terms of the
contract, then there would have been no
increased export taxes to pay because said
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
increased taxes became effective only on
October 1, 1949, while on the other hand,
plaintiff argued that the contract between the
parties and all papers and documents made
parts thereto should prevail, including
defendant's letter of September 29, 1949;
The Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Tribunal
of Arbitration, refused to sustain defendant's
contention and decided in favor of the plaintiff
For about two years, the plaintiff attempted to
enforce the said award through the Philippine
Charge de'Affaires in Calcutta but constantly
failed
Rtc and CA ruled in favor of plaintiff
Issue : The main issue to be resolved is
whether or not the decision of the Tribunal of
Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of
Commerce, as affirmed by the High Court of
Judicature of Calcutta, is enforceable in the
Philippines.
Ruling: We are constrained to reverse the
appealed decision upon the ground that it is
based upon a clear mistake of law and its
enforcement will give rise to a patent injustice.
It is true that under the provisions of Section 50
of Rule 39, Rules of Court, a judgment for a
sum of money rendered by a foreign court "is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title", but when suit for its
enforcement is brought in a Philippine court,
said judgment "may be repelled by evidence of
a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact" (Emphasis supplied.)
Upon the facts of record, We are constrained
to hold that the decision sought to be enforced
was rendered upon a "clear mistake of law" and
because of that it makes appellant — an
innocent party — suffer the consequences of
the default or breach of contract committed by
appellee.
There is no question at all that appellee was
guilty of a breach of contract when it failed to
deliver one-hundred fifty-four Hessian bales
which, according to the contract entered into
with appellant, should have been delivered to
the latter in the months of July, August and
September, all of the year 1949. It is equally
clear beyond doubt that had these one-
hundred fifty-four bales been delivered in
accordance with the contract aforesaid, the
increase in the export tax due upon them would
not have been imposed because said
increased export tax became effective only on
October 1, 1949.
To avoid its liability for the aforesaid increase
in the export tax, appellee claims that appellant
should be held liable therefor on the strength of
its letter of September 29, 1949 asking
appellee to ship the shortage. This argument is
unavailing because it is not only illogical but
contrary to known principles of fairness and
justice. When appellant demanded that
appellee deliver the shortage of 154 bales it did
nothing more than to demand that to which it
was entitled as a matter of right. The breach of
contract committed by appellee gave appellant,
under the law and even under general
principles of fairness, the right to rescind the
contract or to ask for its specific performance,
in either case with right to demand damages.
Part of the damages appellant was clearly
entitled to recover from appellee growing out of
the latter's breach of the contract consists
precisely of the amount of the increase decreed
in the export tax due on the shortage — which,
because of appellee's fault, had to be delivered
after the effectivity of the increased export tax.
To the extent, therefore, that the decisions of
the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal
Chamber of Commerce and of the High Court
of Judicature of Calcutta fail to apply to the
facts of this case fundamental principles of
contract, the same may be impeached, as they
have been sufficiently impeached by appellant,
on the ground of "clear mistake of law". We can
not sanction a clear mistake of law that would
work an obvious injustice upon appellant.
4. TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE
PERKINS, RENATO D. TAYAG, vs.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC
Corporation, stock certificate, court decree,
jurisdiction
Facts: Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on
March 27, 1960 in New York City, left among
others, two stock certificates covering 33,002
shares of appellant, the certificates being in the
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
possession of the County Trust Company of
New York, which as noted, is the domiciliary
administrator of the estate of the deceased.
Then came this portion of the appellant's brief:
"On August 12, 1960, Prospero Sanidad
instituted ancillary administration proceedings
in the Court of First Instance of Manila; Lazaro
A. Marquez was appointed ancillary
administrator, and on January 22, 1963, he
was substituted by the appellee Renato D.
Tayag. A dispute arose between the domiciary
administrator in New York and the ancillary
administrator in the Philippines as to which of
them was entitled to the possession of the
stock certificates in question. On January 27,
1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila
ordered the domiciliary administrator, County
Trust Company, to "produce and deposit" them
with the ancillary administrator or with the Clerk
of Court. The domiciliary administrator did not
comply with the order, and on February 11,
1964, the ancillary administrator petitioned the
court to "issue an order declaring the certificate
or certificates of stocks covering the 33,002
shares issued in the name of Idonah Slade
Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be
declared [or] considered as lost."3
It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. admits that "it is immaterial"
as far as it is concerned as to "who is entitled
to the possession of the stock certificates in
question; appellant opposed the petition of the
ancillary administrator because the said stock
certificates are in existence, they are today in
the possession of the domiciliary administrator,
the County Trust Company, in New York,
U.S.A...."
It is its view, therefore, that under the
circumstances, the stock certificates cannot be
declared or considered as lost. Moreover, it
would allege that there was a failure to observe
certain requirements of its by-laws before new
stock certificates could be issued. Hence, its
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the court in the Philippines
can declare the stock certificates as lost
RULING: As was made clear at the outset of
this opinion, the appeal lacks merit. The
challenged order constitutes an emphatic
affirmation of judicial authority sought to be
emasculated by the wilful conduct of the
domiciliary administrator in refusing to accord
obedience to a court decree. How, then, can
this order be stigmatized as illegal?
As is true of many problems confronting the
judiciary, such a response was called for by the
realities of the situation. What cannot be
ignored is that conduct bordering on wilful
defiance, if it had not actually reached it, cannot
without undue loss of judicial prestige, be
condoned or tolerated. For the law is not so
lacking in flexibility and resourcefulness as to
preclude such a solution, the more so as
deeper reflection would make clear its being
buttressed by indisputable principles and
supported by the strongest policy
considerations.
It can truly be said then that the result arrived
at upheld and vindicated the honor of the
judiciary no less than that of the country.
Through this challenged order, there is thus
dispelled the atmosphere of contingent
frustration brought about by the persistence of
the domiciliary administrator to hold on to the
stock certificates after it had, as admitted,
voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
the lower court by entering its appearance
through counsel on June 27, 1963, and filing a
petition for relief from a previous order of March
15, 1963.
Thus did the lower court, in the order now on
appeal, impart vitality and effectiveness to what
was decreed. For without it, what it had been
decided would be set at naught and nullified.
Unless such a blatant disregard by the
domiciliary administrator, with residence
abroad, of what was previously ordained by a
court order could be thus remedied, it would
have entailed, insofar as this matter was
concerned, not a partial but a well-nigh
complete paralysis of judicial authority.
1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not
dispute the power of the appellee ancillary
administrator to gain control and possession of
all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction
of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a power is
inherent in his duty to settle her estate and
satisfy the claims of local creditors.5
It would follow then that the authority of the
probate court to require that ancillary
administrator's right to "the stock certificates
covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her
name in the books of [appellant] Benguet
Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally
beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
corporation owing full allegiance and subject to
the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its
shares of stock cannot therefore be considered
in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v.
Collector of Internal Revenue8 finds
application. "In the instant case, the actual situs
of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the
corporation being domiciled [here]." To the
force of the above undeniable proposition, not
even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute
it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were
so minded.
2. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would
seek to bolster the above contention by its
invoking one of the provisions of its by-laws
which would set forth the procedure to be
followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed
stock certificate; it would stress that in the
event of a contest or the pendency of an action
regarding ownership of such certificate or
certificates of stock allegedly lost, stolen or
destroyed, the issuance of a new certificate or
certificates would await the "final decision by
[a] court regarding the ownership [thereof]."15
Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place,
there is no such occasion to apply such by-law.
It is admitted that the foreign domiciliary
administrator did not appeal from the order now
in question. Moreover, there is likewise the
express admission of appellant that as far as it
is concerned, "it is immaterial ... who is entitled
to the possession of the stock certificates ..."
Even if such were not the case, it would be a
legal absurdity to impart to such a provision
conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a
contrariety exists between the above by-law
and the command of a court decree, the latter
is to be followed.
4. What is more the view adopted by appellant
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is fraught with
implications at war with the basic postulates of
corporate theory.
We start with the undeniable premise that, "a
corporation is an artificial being created by
operation of law...."16 It owes its life to the state,
its birth being purely dependent on its will. As
Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a
corporation was conceived as an artificial
person, owing its existence through creation by
a sovereign power."17 As a matter of fact, the
statutory language employed owes much to
Chief Justice Marshall, who in the Dartmouth
College decision defined a corporation
precisely as "an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law."18
There is thus a rejection of Gierke's
genossenchaft theory, the basic theme of
which to quote from Friedmann, "is the reality
of the group as a social and legal entity,
independent of state recognition and
concession."21 A corporation as known to
Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without
any existence until it has received the
imprimatur of the state according to law. It is
logically inconceivable therefore that it will have
rights and privileges of a higher priority than
that of its creator. More than that, it cannot
legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of
its state organs, certainly not excluding the
judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.
As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes
into being, following American law still of
persuasive authority in our jurisdiction, comes
more often within the ken of the judiciary than
the other two coordinate branches. It institutes
the appropriate court action to enforce its right.
Correlatively, it is not immune from judicial
control in those instances, where a duty under
the law as ascertained in an appropriate legal
proceeding is cast upon it.
To assert that it can choose which court order
to follow and which to disregard is to confer
upon it not autonomy which may be conceded
but license which cannot be tolerated. It is to
argue that it may, when so minded, overrule the
state, the source of its very existence; it is to
contend that what any of its governmental
organs may lawfully require could be ignored at
will. So extravagant a claim cannot possibly
merit approval.
5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of
Veterans Affairs,22 it was shown that in a
guardianship proceedings then pending in a
lower court, the United States Veterans
Administration filed a motion for the refund of a
certain sum of money paid to the minor under
guardianship, alleging that the lower court had
previously granted its petition to consider the
deceased father as not entitled to guerilla
benefits according to a determination arrived at
by its main office in the United States. The
motion was denied. In seeking a
reconsideration of such order, the
Administrator relied on an American federal
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
statute making his decisions "final and
conclusive on all questions of law or fact"
precluding any other American official to
examine the matter anew, "except a judge or
judges of the United States court."23
Reconsideration was denied, and the
Administrator appealed.
It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made
patent for our judiciary to accept as final and
conclusive, determinations made by foreign
governmental agencies. It is infinitely worse if
through the absence of any coercive power by
our courts over juridical persons within our
jurisdiction, the force and effectivity of their
orders could be made to depend on the whim
or caprice of alien entities. It is difficult to
imagine of a situation more offensive to the
dignity of the bench or the honor of the country.
Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended,
of the proposition to which appellant Benguet
Consolidated seems to be firmly committed as
shown by its failure to accept the validity of the
order complained of; it seeks its reversal.
Certainly we must at all pains see to it that it
does not succeed. The deplorable
consequences attendant on appellant
prevailing attest to the necessity of negative
response from us. That is what appellant will
get.
That is all then that this case presents. It is
obvious why the appeal cannot succeed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the
Honorable Arsenio Santos, the Judge of the
Court of First Instance, dated May 18, 1964, is
affirmed. With costs against oppositor-appelant
Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
5. Asiawest Merchant Bankers vs CA
Gist of the facts: Malasian Court rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner (Malaysian Corp)
for the recovery of performance bond it had put
up in facvor of respondent (Phil Corp). Failed
to enforce it in Malaysia, petitioner filed a case
in Philippine Court for enforcement.
Facts: Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhad is a corporation organized under
the laws of Malaysia while private respondent
Philippine National Construction Corporation is
a corporation duly incorporated and existing
under Philippine laws.
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against
private respondent, then known as
Construction and Development Corporation of
the Philippines, before the High Court of
Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled “Asiavest
Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest
CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines.”
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of
the performance bond it had put up in favor of
private respondent to guarantee the
completion of the Felda Project and the
nonpayment of the loan it extended to
Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of
Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project.
The High Court of Malaya (Commercial
Division) rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner and against the private respondent.
Following unsuccessful attempts to secure
payment from private respondent under the
judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint
before RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce
the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the
case via a Motion to Dismiss, contending that
the alleged judgment of the High Court of
Malaya should be denied recognition or
enforcement since on in face, it is tainted with
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private
respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is
a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was,
however, denied by the trial court considering
that the grounds relied upon are not the proper
grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Subsequently, private respondent filed its
Answer with Compulsory Counter claim’s and
therein raised the grounds it brought up in its
motion to dismiss. In its Reply filed, the
petitioner contended that the High Court of
Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the person of
private respondent by its voluntary submission
the court’s jurisdiction through its appointed
counsel. Furthermore, private respondent’s
counsel waived any and all objections to the
High Court’s jurisdiction in a pleading filed
before the court.
In due time, the trial court rendered its decision
dismissing petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner
interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
but the appellate court dismissed the same and
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying
recognition and enforcement to the Malaysian
Court judgment.
Ruling: Yes. Generally, in the absence of a
special compact, no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country;
however, the rules of comity, utility and
convenience of nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final
judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and
rendered efficacious under certain conditions
that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered
by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar
as the immediate parties and the underlying
cause of action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has been an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a
court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial
upon regular proceedings has been conducted,
following due citation or voluntary appearance
of the defendant and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice; and that there is
nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court
and in the system of laws under which it is
sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and
binding in the country from which it comes, until
a contrary showing, on the basis of a
presumption of regularity of proceedings and
the giving of due notice in the foreign forum
Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which was the governing law at
the time the instant case was decided by the
trial court and respondent appellate court, a
judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a
foreign country having jurisdiction to
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
The judgment may, however, be assailed by
evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n),
Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere,
enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the
lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once
the authenticity of the foreign judgment is
proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment,
is tasked with the burden of overcoming its
presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently
established the existence of the money
judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the
evidence it offered. Petitioner’s sole witness,
testified to the effect that he is in active practice
of the law profession in Malaysia; that he was
connected with Skrine and Company as Legal
Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent,
then known as Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by his
client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad,
in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons
were served on March 17, 1983 at the
registered office of private respondent and on
March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial
planning officer of private respondent for
Southeast Asia operations; that upon the filing
of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill,
Advocates and Solicitors, with address at 24th
Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala
Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance
for private respondent questioning the
regularity of the service of the writ of summons
but subsequently withdrew the same when it
realized that the writ was properly served; that
because private respondent failed to file a
statement of defense within two (2) weeks,
petitioner filed an application for summary
judgment and submitted affidavits and
documentary evidence in support of its claim;
that the matter was then heard before the High
Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates
where private respondent was represented by
counsel; and that the end result of all these
proceedings is the judgment sought to be
enforced.
In addition to the said testimonial evidence,
petitioner also offered the documentary
evidence to support their claim:
(a) A certified and authenticated copy of the
Judgment promulgated by the Malaysian High
Court dated September 13, 1985 directing
private respondent to pay petitioner the sum of
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
$5,108,290.23 Malaysian Ringgit plus interests
from March 1983 until fully paid;[24]
(b) A certified and authenticated copy of the
Order dated September 13, 1985 issued by the
Malaysian High Court in Civil Suit No. C638 of
1983;[25]
(c) Computation of principal and interest due as
of January 31, 1990 on the amount adjudged
payable to petitioner by private respondent;[26]
(d) Letter and Statement of Account of
petitioners counsel in Malaysia indicating the
costs for prosecuting and implementing the
Malaysian High Courts Judgment;[27]
(e) Letters between petitioners Malaysian
counsel, Skrine and Co., and its local counsel,
Sycip Salazar Law Offices, relative to institution
of the action in the Philippines;[28]
(f) Billing Memorandum of Sycip Salazar Law
Offices dated January 2, 1990 showing
attorneys fees paid by and due from
petitioner;[29]
(g) Statement of Claim, Writ of Summons and
Affidavit of Service of such writ in petitioners
suit against private respondent before the
Malaysian High Court;[30]
(h) Memorandum of Conditional Appearance
dated March 28, 1983 filed by counsel for
private respondent with the Malaysian High
Court;[31]
(i) Summons in Chambers and Affidavit of
Khaw Chay Tee, counsel for private
respondent, submitted during the proceedings
before the Malaysian High Court;[32]
(j) Record of the Courts Proceedings in Civil
Case No. C638 of 1983;[33]
(k) Petitioners verified Application for Summary
Judgment dated August 14, 1984;[34] and
(l) Letter dated November 6, 1985 from
petitioners Malaysian counsel to private
respondents counsel in Malaysia.[35]
Having thus proven, through the foregoing
evidence, the existence and authenticity of the
foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys
presumptive validity and the burden then fell
upon the party who disputes its validity, herein
private respondent, to prove otherwise.
However, private respondent failed to
sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon
it – to prove by clear and convincing evidence
the grounds which it relied upon to prevent
enforcement of the Malaysian High Court
judgment.
Private respondent failed to sufficiently
discharge the burden that fell upon it to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the grounds
which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of
the Malaysian High Court judgment, namely,
(a) that jurisdiction was not acquired by the
Malaysian Court over the person of private
respondent due to alleged improper service of
summons upon private respondent and the
alleged lack of authority of its counsel to appear
and represent private respondent in the suit; (b)
the foreign judgment is allegedly tainted by
evident collusion, fraud and clear mistake of
fact or law; and (c) not only were the requisites
for enforcement or recognition allegedly not
complied with but also that the Malaysian
judgment is allegedly contrary to the
Constitutional prescription that the every
decision must state the facts and law on which
it is based.[36]
Private respondent relied solely on the
testimony of its two (2) witnesses, namely, Mr.
Alfredo N. Calupitan, an accountant of private
respondent, and Virginia Abelardo, Executive
Secretary and a member of the staff of the
Corporate Secretariat Section of the Corporate
Legal Division, of private respondent, both of
whom failed to shed light and amplify its
defense or claim for non-enforcement of the
foreign judgment against it.
Mr. Calupitans testimony centered on the
following: that from January to December 1982
he was assigned in Malaysia as Project
Comptroller of the Pahang Project Package A
and B for road construction under the joint
venture of private respondent and Asiavest
Holdings;[37] that under the joint venture,
Asiavest Holdings would handle the financial
aspect of the project, which is fifty-one percent
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
(51%) while private respondent would handle
the technical aspect of the project, or forty-nine
percent (49%);[38] and, that Cora Deala was
not authorized to receive summons for and in
behalf of the private respondent.[39] Ms.
Abelardos testimony, on the other hand,
focused on the following: that there was no
board resolution authorizing Allen and Gledhill
to admit all the claims of petitioner in the suit
brought before the High Court of Malaya,[40]
though on cross-examination she admitted that
Allen and Gledhill were the retained lawyers of
private respondent in Malaysia.[41]
The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon
by private respondent in preventing
enforcement and recognition of the Malaysian
judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy
and procedure taken by the Malaysian High
Court relative to the suit for collection initiated
by petitioner. Needless to stress, the
recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment
is not necessarily affected by the fact that the
procedure in the courts of the country in which
such judgment was rendered differs from that
of the courts of the country in which the
judgment is relied on.[42] Ultimately, matters of
remedy and procedure such as those relating
to the service of summons or court process
upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to
appear and represent a defendant and the
formal requirements in a decision are governed
by the lex fori or the internal law of the
forum,[43] i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.
In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia
where the judgment was rendered that
determines the validity of the service of court
process on private respondent as well as other
matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian
procedural law is, remains a question of fact,
not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of
and must be pleaded and proved like any other
fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be
evidenced by an official publication or by a duly
attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was
then incumbent upon private respondent to
present evidence as to what that Malaysian
procedural law is and to show that under it, the
assailed service of summons upon a financial
officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is
invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption
of validity and regularity of service of summons
and the decision thereafter rendered by the
High Court of Malaya must stand.[44]
On the matter of alleged lack of authority of the
law firm of Allen and Gledhill to represent
private respondent, not only did the private
respondents witnesses admit that the said law
firm of Allen and Gledhill were its counsels in
its transactions in Malaysia,[45] but of greater
significance is the fact that petitioner offered in
evidence relevant Malaysian jurisprudence[46]
to the effect that (a) it is not necessary under
Malaysian law for counsel appearing before the
Malaysian High Court to submit a special
power of attorney authorizing him to represent
a client before said court, (b) that counsel
appearing before the Malaysian High Court has
full authority to compromise the suit, and (c)
that counsel appearing before the Malaysian
High Court need not comply with certain pre-
requisites as required under Philippine law to
appear and compromise judgments on behalf
of their clients before said court.[47]
Furthermore, there is no basis for or truth to the
appellate courts conclusion that the conditional
appearance of private respondents counsel
who was allegedly not authorized to appear
and represent, cannot be considered as
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
High Court of Malaya, inasmuch as said
conditional appearance was not premised on
the alleged lack of authority of said counsel but
the conditional appearance was entered to
question the regularity of the service of the writ
of summons. Such conditional appearance
was in fact subsequently withdrawn when
counsel realized that the writ was properly
served.[48]
On the ground that collusion, fraud and clear
mistake of fact and law tainted the judgment of
the High Court of Malaya, no clear evidence of
the same was adduced or shown. The facts
which the trial court found intriguing amounted
to mere conjectures and specious
observations. The trial courts finding on the
absence of judgment against Asiavest-CDCP
Sdn. Bhd. is contradicted by evidence on
record that recovery was also sought against
Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. but the same was
found insolvent.[49] Furthermore, even when
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
the foreign judgment is based on the drafts
prepared by counsel for the successful party,
such is not per se indicative of collusion or
fraud. Fraud to hinder the enforcement within
the jurisdiction of a foreign judgment must be
extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not
controverted or resolved in the case where
judgment is rendered,[50] or that which would
go to the jurisdiction of the court or would
deprive the party against whom judgment is
rendered a chance to defend the action to
which he has a meritorious defense.[51]
Intrinsic fraud is one which goes to the very
existence of the cause of action is deemed
already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot
militate against the recognition or enforcement
of the foreign judgment.[52] Evidence is
wanting on the alleged extrinsic fraud. Hence,
such unsubstantiated allegation cannot give
rise to liability therein.
Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that
the foreign judgment is not enforceable in view
of the absence of any statement of facts and
law upon which the award in favor of the
petitioner was based. As aforestated, the lex
fori or the internal law of the forum governs
matters of remedy and procedure.[53]
Considering that under the procedural rules of
the High Court of Malaya, a valid judgment may
be rendered even without stating in the
judgment every fact and law upon which the
judgment is based, then the same must be
accorded respect and the courts in this
jurisdiction cannot invalidate the judgment of
the foreign court simply because our rules
provide otherwise.
All in all, private respondent had the ultimate
duty to demonstrate the alleged invalidity of
such foreign judgment, being the party
challenging the judgment rendered by the High
Court of Malaya. But instead of doing so,
private respondent merely argued, to which the
trial court agreed, that the burden lay upon
petitioner to prove the validity of the money
judgment. Such is clearly erroneous and would
render meaningless the presumption of validity
accorded a foreign judgment were the party
seeking to enforce it be required to first
establish its validity.[54]
6. Saudia Arabia Airlines vs. CA (supra)
Facts: Morada was a flight attendant of
SAUDIA (the airline). During a lay-over in
Jakarta, she went to a disco dance with fellow
crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah
Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it
was almost morning when they returned to their
hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together
at the room of Thamer. When they were in the
room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after
he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff.
Fortunately, a roomboy and several security
personnel heard her cries for help and rescued
her. Later, the Indonesian police came and
arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the
latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days
later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her
about the Jakarta incident. They then
requested her to go back to Jakarta to help
arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In
Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad
and base manager Baharini negotiated with the
police for the immediate release of the detained
crew members but did not succeed because
plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid
that she might be tricked into something she
did not want because of her inability to
understand the local dialect. She also declined
to sign a blank paper and a document written
in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA
allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred
her from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession
of the Saudi Arabian government, the
Indonesian authorities agreed to deport
Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention.
Eventually, they were again put in service by
defendant SAUDIA. In September 1990,
defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to
Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff
thought that the Jakarta incident was already
behind her, her superiors requested her to see
Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of
SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she
saw him, he brought her to the police station
where the police took her passport and
questioned her about the Jakarta incident.
Miniewy simply stood by as the police put
pressure on her to make a statement dropping
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until
she agreed to do so did the police return her
passport and allowed her to catch the
afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on lune 16, 1993,
in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before
the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff
was not allowed to board the plane and instead
ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see
Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of
SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the
SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court
where she was asked to sign a document
written in Arabic. They told her that this was
necessary to close the case against Thamer
and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a
notice to her to appear before the court on June
27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA
summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once
again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for
further investigation. Plaintiff did so after
receiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila
manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation
was routinary and that it posed no danger to
her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought
plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27,
1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28,
1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff
through an interpreter about the Jakarta
incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let
her go. At the airport, however, just as her
plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer
told her that the airline had forbidden her to
take flight. At the Inflight Service Office where
she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya
Saddick took away her passport and told her to
remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until
further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again
escorted plaintiff to the same court where the
judge, to her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to her in
English, sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did
she realize that the Saudi court had tried her,
together with Thamer and Allah, for what
happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,
dancing and listening to the music in violation
of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the
male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
Facing conviction, private respondent sought
the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA.
Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance.
She then asked the Philippine Embassy in
Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal.
Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked
on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while
Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the
international flights.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the
Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against
her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia.
Shortly before her return she was terminated
from the service by SAUDIA, without her being
informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a
Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and
Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country
manager.
Issues: WON Philippine Courts have
jurisdiction over the case
Ruling: Yes. The Court characterized the
factual problem as a tort; Conflict rule on tort is
“lex loci actus”, but since several incidents
happened in different states, the Court also
applied the “state of the most significant
relationship rule” to arrive at the conclusion that
in this case, such a state was the Philippines,
thus Philippine Law on torts was applied.
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary
for us to determine under what category a
certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is
known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of
qualification". It is the "process of deciding
whether or not the facts relate to the kind of
question specified in a conflicts rule." The
purpose of "characterization" is to enable the
forum to select the proper law.
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal
relation, but a factual situation, event, or
operative fact. An essential element of conflict
rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting
factor" or "point of contact".
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a
factual relationship (such as property right,
contract claim) and a connecting factor or point
of contact, such as the situs of the res, the
place of celebration, the place of performance,
or the place of wrongdoing.
Note that one or more circumstances may be
present to serve as the possible test for the
determination of the applicable law. These "test
factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting
factors" could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his
domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person,
such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place
where a thing is, or is deemed to be
situated. In particular, the lex situs is
decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done,
the locus actus, such as the place
where a contract has been made, a
marriage celebrated, a will signed or a
tort committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in contracts and
torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to
come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or
the place where a power of attorney is
to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties
as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or
administrative proceedings are
instituted or done. The lex fori — the
law of the forum — is particularly
important because, as we have seen
earlier, matters of "procedure" not
going to the substance of the claim
involved are governed by it; and
because the lex fori applies whenever
the content of the otherwise applicable
foreign law is excluded from application
in a given case for the reason that it
falls under one of the exceptions to the
applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases
is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its
master or owner as such. It also covers
contractual relationships particularly
contracts of affreightment.
After a careful study of the pleadings on record,
including allegations in the Amended
Complaint deemed admitted for purposes of
the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that
there is reasonable basis for private
respondent's assertion that although she was
already working in Manila, petitioner brought
her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would
merely testify in an investigation of the charges
she made against the two SAUDIA crew
members for the attack on her person while
they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was
the one made to face trial for very serious
charges, including adultery and violation of
Islamic laws and tradition.
Considering that the complaint in the court a
quo is one involving torts, the "connecting
factor" or "point of contact" could be the place
or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci
actus occurred. And applying the torts principle
in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines
could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
This is because it is in the Philippines where
petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent, a Filipina residing and working
here. According to her, she had honestly
believed that petitioner would, in the exercise
of its rights and in the performance of its duties,
"act with justice, give her due and observe
honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner
failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain
acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in
another country is of no moment. For in our
view what is important here is the place where
the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged
injury to the person, reputation, social standing
and human rights of complainant, had lodged,
according to the plaintiff below (herein private
respondent). All told, it is not without basis to
identify the Philippines as the situs of the
alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the
traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi,
modern theories and rules on tort liability have
been advanced to offer fresh judicial
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping
abreast with the modern theories on tort
liability, we find here an occasion to apply the
"State of the most significant relationship" rule,
which in our view should be appropriate to
apply now, given the factual context of this
case.
In applying said principle to determine the State
which has the most significant relationship, the
following contacts are to be taken into account
and evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue:
(a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the
place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and (d) the place where
the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
Prescinding from this premise that the
Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of
and the place "having the most interest in the
problem", we find, by way of recapitulation, that
the Philippine law on tort liability should have
paramount application to and control in the
resolution of the legal issues arising out of this
case. Further, we hold that the respondent
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter of the complaint;
the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which
could properly apply Philippine law.
7. PEOPLE v. WONG CHENG (WONG
CHUN)
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the
revocation of the order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer
presented by the defendant to the
information that initiated this case and in
which the appellee is accused of having
illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while
said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two
and a half miles from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the lower court, which so held and
dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our
consideration is whether such ruling is
erroneous or not; and it will or will not be
erroneous according to said court has or has
no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the
Philippines have jurisdiction over a crime, like
the one herein involved, committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdictional waters.
There are two fundamental rules on this
particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule,
according to which crimes committed aboard
a foreign merchant vessel should not be
prosecuted in the courts of the country within
whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed, unless their commission affects
the peace and security of the territory; and
the English rule, based on the territorial
principle and followed in the United States,
according to which, crimes perpetrated under
such circumstances are in general triable in
the courts of the country within whose
territory they were committed. Of this two
rules, it is the last one that obtains in this
jurisdiction, because at present the theories
and jurisprudence prevailing in the United
States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the
United States.
In the case of The Schooner Exchange vs.
M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.]. 116),
Chief Justice Marshall said:
". . . When merchant vessels enter for
the purposes of trade, it would be
obviously inconvenient and dangerous
to society, and would subject the law to
continual infraction, and the
government to degradation, if such
individual or merchants did not owe
temporary and local allegiance, and
were not amenable to the jurisdiction of
the country. . . ."
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this
court held:
". . . No court of the Philippine Islands
had jurisdiction over an offense or
crime committed on the high seas or
within the territorial waters of any other
country, but when she came within tree
miles of a line drawn from the
headlands which embrace the
entrance to Manila Bay, she was within
territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable.
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
(Wheaton, International Law [Dana
ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit
Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer
Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew
were then subject to the jurisdiction of
the territorial sovereign subject to such
limitations as have been conceded by
that sovereignty through the proper
political agency. . . ."
It is true that in certain cases the comity of
nations is observed, as in Mali and
Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail
(120 U. S., 1), wherein it was said that:
". . . The principle which governs the
whole matter is this: Disorders which
disturb only the peace of the ship or
those on board are to be dealt with
exclusively by the sovereignty of the
home of the ship, but those which
disturb the public peace may be
suppressed, and, if need be, the
offenders punished by the proper
authorities of the local jurisdiction. It
may not be easy at all times to
determine to which of the two
jurisdictions a particular act of disorder
belongs. Much will undoubtedly
depend on the attending
circumstances of the particular case,
but all must concede that felonious
homicide is a subject for the local
jurisdiction, and that if the proper
authorities are proceeding with the
case in the regular way the consul has
no right to interfere to prevent it."
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18
Phil., 573), this court held that:
"Although the mere possession of an
article of prohibited use in the
Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign
vessel in transit, in any local port, does
not, as a general rule, constitute a
crime triable by the courts of the
Islands, such vessel being considered
as an extension of its own nationality,
the same rule does not apply when the
article, the use of which is prohibited in
the Islands, is landed from the vessel
upon Philippine soil; in such a case an
open violation of the laws of the land is
committed with respect to which, as it
is a violation of the penal law in force at
the place of the commission of the
crime, no court other than that
established in the said place has
jurisdiction of the offense, in the
absence of an agreement under an
international treaty."
As to whether the United States has ever
consented by treaty or otherwise to
renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof,
we find nothing to this effect so far as
England is concerned, to which nation the
ship where the crime in question was
committed belongs. Besides, in his work
"Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page
625, Malloy says the following:
"There shall be between the
territories of the United States of
America, and all the territories of His
Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal
liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of
the two countries, respectively, shall
have liberty freely and securely to
come with their ships and cargoes to all
such places, ports and rivers, in the
territories aforesaid, to which other
foreigners are permitted to come, to
enter into the same, and to remain and
reside in any parts of the said
territories, respectively; also to hire and
occupy houses and warehouses for the
purposes of their commerce; and,
generally, the merchants and traders of
each nation respectively shall enjoy the
most complete protection and security
for their commerce, but subject always
to the laws and statutes of the two
countries, respectively." (Art. 1,
Commerce and Navigation
Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of
opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was
held by this court not triable by our courts,
because it being the primary object of our
Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against the disastrous effects
entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being
used in our territory, does not bring about in
the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere
possession is not considered a disturbance
of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial
limits, even though aboard a foreign
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the
public order here established, because it
causes such drug to produce its pernicious
effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature
has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute. Moreover, as the
Attorney-General aptly observes:
". . . The idea of a person
smoking opium securely on board a
foreign vessel at anchor in the port of
Manila in open defiance of the local
authorities, who are impotent to lay
hands on him, is simply subversive of
public order. It requires no unusual
stretch of the imagination to conceive
that a foreign ship may come into the
port of Manila and allow or solicit
Chinese residents to smoke opium on
board."
8. US v BULL
(1910 case about cattles and carabaos
onboard a ship)
FACTS:The appellant was convicted in the
Court of First Instance of a violation of section
1 of Act No. 55, The information alleges:
"That on and for many months prior to
the 2nd day of December, 1908, the
said H. N. Bull was then and there
master of a steam sailing vessel known
as the steamship Standard, which
vessel was then and there engaged in
carrying and transporting cattle,
carabaos, and other animals from a
foreign port, to wit, the port of Ampieng,
Formosa, to the port and city of Manila,
Philippine Islands; that the said
accused H. N. Bull, while master of
said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about
the 2d day of December, 1908, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and
wrongfully carry, transport, and bring
into the port and city of Manila, aboard
said vessel, from the port of Ampieng,
Formosa, six hundred and seventy-
seven (677) head of cattle and
carabaos, without providing suitable
means for securing said animals while
in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the said
animals, in this, to wit, that the said H.
N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then
and there fail to provide stalls for said
animals so in transit and suitable
means for tying and securing said
animals in a proper manner, and did
then and there cause some of said
animals to be tied by means of rings
passed through their noses, and allow
and permit others to be transported
loose in the hold and on the deck of
said vessel without being tied or
secured in stalls, and all without
bedding; that by reason of the
aforesaid neglect and failure of the
accused to provide suitable means for
securing said animals while so in
transit, the noses of some of said
animals were cruelly torn, and many of
said animals were tossed about upon
the decks and hold of said vessel, and
cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
"All contrary to the provisions of Acts
No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Commission."
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went
into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —
"The owners or masters of steam,
sailing, or other vessels, carrying or
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or
other animals, from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from
any foreign port to any port within the
Philippine Islands, shall carry with
them, upon the vessels carrying such
animals, sufficient forage and fresh
water to provide for the suitable
sustenance of such animals during the
ordinary period occupied by the vessel
in passage from the port of shipment to
the port of debarkation, and shall cause
such animals to be provided with
adequate forage and fresh water at
least once in every twenty-four hours
from the time that the animals are
embarked to the time of their final
debarkation."
ISSUES:Whether the Philippine courthas
jurisdiction.
RULING: YES. It is contended that the
information is insufficient because it does not
state that the court was sitting at a port where
the cattle were disembarked, or that the
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
offense was committed on board a vessel
registered and licensed under the laws of the
Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the
offense created thereby on Courts of First
Instance or any provost court organized in
the province or port in which such animals
are disembarked.
This jurisdiction may be exercised by the
Court of First Instance in any province into
which such ship or water craft upon which the
offense or crime was committed shall come
after the commission thereof. Had this
offense been committed upon a ship carrying
a Philippine registry, there could have been
no doubt of the jurisdiction of the court,
because it is expressly conferred, and the Act
is in accordance with well recognized and
established public law. But the Standard was
a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that
it was not registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands under the laws thereof.
We have then the question whether the
court had jurisdiction over an offense of this
character, committed on board a foreign ship
by the master thereof, when the neglect and
omission which constitutes the offense
continued during the time the ship was within
the territorial waters of the United States. No
court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction
over an offense or crime committed on the
high seas or within the territorial waters of
any other country, but when she came within
3 miles of a line drawn from the headlands
which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay,
she was within territorial waters, and a new
set of principles became applicable.The ship
and her crew were then subject to the
jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject
to such limitations as have been conceded by
that sovereignty through the proper political
agency. This offense was committed within
territorial waters. From the line which
determines these waters the Standardmust
have traveled at least 25 miles before she
came to anchor. During that part of her
voyage the violation of the statute continued,
and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is
concerned, it is immaterial that the same
conditions may have existed while the vessel
was on the high seas. The offense, assuming
that it originated at the port of departure in
Formosa, was a continuing one, and every
element necessary to constitute it existed
during the voyage across the territorial
waters. The completed forbidden act was
done within American waters, and the court
therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of the offense and the person of the
offender.
The offense then was thus committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court,
but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the
further question whether that jurisdiction is
restricted by the fact of the nationality of the
ship. Every state has complete control and
jurisdiction over its territorial waters.
According to strict legal right, even public
vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly
power without permission, but it is now
conceded that in the absence of a prohibition
such ports are considered as open to the
public ships of all friendly powers. The
exemption of such vessels from local
jurisdiction while within such waters was not
established until within comparatively recent
times.
Local officials exercise but little
control over their actions, and offenses
committed by their crews are justiciable by
their own officers acting under the laws to
which they primarily owe allegiance. This
limitation upon the general principle of
territorial sovereignty is based entirely
upon comity and convenience, and finds its
justification in the fact that experience
shows that such vessels are generally
careful to respect local laws and
regulations which are essential to the
health, order, and well-being of the port.
But comity and convenience does not
require the extension of the same degree
of exemption to merchant vessels.
There are two well-defined theories
as to the extent of the immunities ordinarily
granted to them. According to the French
theory and practice, matters happening on
board a merchant ship which do not
concern the tranquillity of the port or
persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable
only by the courts of the country to which
the vessel belongs. The French courts
therefore claimexclusive jurisdiction over
crimes committed on board French
merchant vessels in foreign ports by one
member of the crew against another. Such
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
jurisdiction has never been admitted or
claimed by Great Britain as a right,
although she has frequently conceded it by
treaties. Writers who consider
exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory
have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but
Hall, who is doubtless the leading English
authority, says that —
"It is admitted by the
most thoroughgoing
asserters of the territoriality
of merchant vessels that so
soon as the latter enter the
ports of a foreign state they
become subject to the local
jurisdiction on all points in
which the interests of the
country are touched."
The United States has adhered
consistently to the view that when a
merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is
subject to the jurisdiction of the local
authorities, unless the local sovereignty
has by act of acquiescence or through
treaty arrangements consented to waive a
portion of such jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court of the United
States has recently said that the merchant
vessels of one country visiting the ports of
another for the purpose of trade, subject
themselves to the laws which govern the
ports they visit, so long as they remain; and
this as well in war as in peace, unless
otherwise provided by treaty.
Certain limitations upon the
jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed
by article 13 of the treaty of commerce and
navigation between Sweden and Norway
and the United States, of July 4, 1827,
which concedes to the consuls, vice-
consuls, or consular agents of each country
"the right to sit as judges and arbitrators in
such differences as may arise between the
captains and crews of the vessels
belonging to the nation whose interests are
committed to their charge, without the
interference of the local authorities, unless
the conduct of the crews or of the captains
should disturb the order or tranquillity of the
country." This exception applies to
controversies between the members of the
ship's company, and particularly to
disputes regarding wages. The order and
tranquillity of the country are affected by
many events which do not amount to a riot
or general public disturbance. Thus an
assault by one member of the crew upon
another, committed upon the ship, of which
the public may have no knowledge
whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn
from the cognizance of the local authorities.
The treaty does not therefore
deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over
offenses committed on board a merchant
vessel by one member of the crew against
another which amount to a disturbance of
the order or tranquillity of the country, and
a fair and reasonable construction of the
language requires us to hold that any
violation of criminal laws disturbs the order
or tranquillity of the country. The offense
with which the appellant is charged had
nothing to do with any difference between
the captain and the crew. It was a violation
by the master of the criminal law of the
country into who port he came. We thus
find that neither by reason of the
nationality of the vessel, the place of the
commission of the offense, or the
prohibitions of any treaty or general
principle of public law, are the courts of
the Philippine Islands deprived of
jurisdiction over the offense charged in
the information in this case.
It is further contended that the
complaint is defective because it does not
allege that the animals were disembarked
at the port of Manila, an allegation which it
is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of
the court sitting at that port. To hold with the
appellant upon this issue would be to
construe the language of the complaint
very strictly against the Government. The
disembarkation of the animals is not
necessary in order to constitute the
completed offense, and a reasonable
construction of the language of the statute
confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at
the port into which the animals are brought.
They are then within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact
of their disembarkation is immaterial so far
as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be
different if the disembarkation of the
animals constituted a constitutional
element in the offense, but it does not.
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
Whether a certain method of
handling cattle is suitable within the
meaning of the Act can not be left to the
judgment of the master of the ship. It is a
question which must be determined by the
court from the evidence. On December 2,
1908, the defendant Bull brought into and
disembarked in the port and city of Manila
certain cattle, which came from the port of
Ampieng, Formosa, without providing
suitable means for securing said animals
while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to said animals,
contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act
No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No.
275. The trial court found the following
facts, all of which are fully sustained by the
evidence.
The defendant was found guilty,
and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred
and fifty pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs. The sentence and judgment
is affirmed. So ordered.
9. People vs Tulin
FACTS: Sometime in March 1991, M/T
Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by PNOC
Shipping, loaded with thousands of barrels of
gasoline and oil, was sailing off the coast of
Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, was
suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum
ladder, by 7 fully armed pirates led by Emilio
Changco. They detained the crew and took
complete control of the vessel.
The vessel was then painted with the name
"Galilee," (the name M/T Tabango was painted
over) with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras.
The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all
the while sending misleading radio messages
to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the
vessel, reported the disappearance of the
vessel to the Coast Guard and secured the
assistance of the Air Force and Navy.
However, search and rescue operations
yielded negative results.
The "M/T Tabangao" sailed to and anchored
about 18 nautical miles from Singapore's
shoreline where another vessel called "Navi
Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco
ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer
the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi
Pride". After the transfer was completed, the
vessel went back to the Philippines.
The crew members were then released in 3
batches with the stern warning not to report the
incident to government authorities for a period
of two days otherwise they would be killed.
Later, the members of the crew called the
PNOC office to report the incident. The crew
members were brought to the Coast Guard
Office for investigation. The incident was also
reported to the NBI where the officers and
members of the crew executed sworn
statements regarding the incident. A series of
arrests was thereafter effected.
Tulin, Infante, Loyola, Changco, and a certain
Hiong were arrested. The state Prosecutor filed
a case for qualified piracy against the accused.
(Si Cheong Hiong ra atong storyaan diri kay
related sa iyang defense ang topic sa
Conflict) Accused-appellant Cheong San
Hiong adduced evidence that he was
employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as
Port Captain. The company was engaged in
the business of trading petroleum and owned 4
vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
The company was then dealing for the first time
with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who
offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the
amount of $300k. Hiong, was assigned to
supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off
the port of Singapore. Hiong was told that "M/T
Galilee" would be making the transfer. The
transfer was then made and completed.
After the above transaction, Hiong went to the
Philippines to discuss a new transaction with
Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the
new transfer. However, while sojourning, he
was arrested by the NBI.
The RTC convicted the accused hence the
case at bar.
Hiong argued, among others, that the trial court
erred in convicting and punishing him as an
accomplice when the acts allegedly committed
by him were done or executed outside of
Philippine waters and territory, stripping
the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold
him for trial, to convict, and sentence.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that
he was charged under the information with
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to
Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues
that he was convicted for acts done outside
Philippine waters or territory. For the State to
have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have
been committed within its territory.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant Cheong
Hiong can be convicted as accomplice when he
was not charged as such and when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or
executed outside Philippine waters and
territory - YES
RULING: Suffice it to state that
unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of
"M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the
pirates) and its cargo were committed in
Philippine waters, although the captive vessel
was later brought by the pirates to Singapore
where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred,
and sold. And such transfer was done under
accused-appellant Hiong's direct
supervision. Although PD 532 requires that
the attack and seizure of the vessel and its
cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and
its cargo is still deemed part of the act of
piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title 1 of Book 2 of
the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an
exception to the rule on territoriality in
criminal law. The same principle applies even
if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not
with a violation of qualified piracy under the
penal code but under a special law, PD 532
which penalizes piracy in Philippine
waters. Verily, PD 532 should be applied with
more force here since its purpose is precisely
to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine
waters. It is likewise well-settled that regardless
of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a
reprehensible crime against the whole
world.
AS REGARDS HIS CONVICTION AS AN
ACCOMPLICE: The ruling of the trial court is
within well-settle jurisprudence that if there is
lack of complete evidence of conspiracy,
the liability is that of an accomplice and not
as principal. Any doubt as to the participation
of an individual in the commission of the crime
is always resolved in favor of lesser
responsibility.
Emphasis must also be placed on Sec. 4 of PD
532 which presumes that any person who does
any of the acts provided in said section has
performed them knowingly, unless the contrary
is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant
Hiong had failed to overcome the legal
presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided
in the commission of piracy, received property
taken by such pirates and derived benefit
therefrom. Hence, Hiong is guilty.
10. Liang vs PP
Doctrine: The DFAs determination that a
certain person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in
courts; mere invocation of the immunity clause
does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the
charges.
-A diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is
such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction
of the receiving state except in the case of an
action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic
agent in the receiving state outside his official
functions.
Facts: The accused is an employee of ADB
who was charged with grave oral defamation
for uttering defamatory words against a fellow
employee. Liang was arrested and was able to
post bail. The MeTC released him under the
custody of the ADB Security. The next day the
MeTC received an “office of protocol” from the
DFA stating that Liang is covered by immunity
from legal processes under Sec. 45 of the
Agreement with ADB. The MeTC dismissed the
case without notice to the prosecution. The MR
was also denied, a petition for certiorari before
the RTC which set aside the MeTC ruling.
Hence this petition.
Liang argues that he is covered under the
Agreement and no preliminary investigation
was done to him.
Issue: WON Liang is immune from criminal
prosecution?
Held: No.First, courts cannot blindly adhere
and take on its face the communication from
the DFA that petitioner is covered by any
immunity. The DFAs determination that a
certain person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice
and in motuproprio dismissing the two criminal
cases without notice to the prosecution, the
latters right to due process was violated. It
should be noted that due process is a right of
the accused as much as it is of the prosecution.
The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner
was acting at the time of the alleged utterances
requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that
has yet to be presented at the proper time. At
any rate, it has been ruled that the mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso
facto result in the dropping of the charges.
Second, under Sec. 45 of the Agreement, the
immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but
subject to the exception that the act was done
in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to
determine if petitioners case falls within the
ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution
should have been given the chance to rebut the
DFA protocol and it must be accorded the
opportunity to present its controverting
evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly
be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission
of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires
and cannot be part of official functions. It is
well-settled principle of law that a public official
may be liable in his personal private capacity
for whatever damage he may have caused by
his act done with malice or in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,
assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity
from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state
except in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised
by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions. As already
mentioned above, the commission of a crime is
not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no
preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it
to say that preliminary investigation is not a
matter of right in cases cognizable by the
MeTC such as the one at bar.[6] Being purely
a statutory right, preliminary investigation may
be invoked only when specifically granted by
law.[7] The rule on criminal procedure is clear
that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
11. US vs FOWLER, et. al.
Facts: The two defendants have been accused
for theft for the 16 bottles of champagne as
while on board the vessel Lawton with US flag
then navigating at the high seas, as cargo
owned by a certain Lindsay. Counsel for
defendants presented a demurrer that the CFI
had no jurisdiction to try the crime charged
inasmuch that as per the information filed, the
crime was committed at the high seas, which is
outside the territorial jurisdiction of Manila. The
prosecution opposed it contending that by
virtue of the orders of the Military
Governor(MG) and the Civil Commission(CC),
admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed
on board vessel flying the flag of US has been
vested with the CFI of Manila. Further, he
argued that the president of US has the
authority to authorize the MG and CC to
establish a judicial system with authority to take
cognizance of maritime and admiralty causes,
citing a US SC decision, which according to
him is applicable in the archipelago and in the
present case. Judge ruled in favor of the
defendants.
Issue: WON the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction
to try the crime charged, which was committed
at high seas on board vessel of US.
Ruling: No. This case deals with a theft
committed on board a transport while
navigating the high seas. Act No. 136 of the
organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by
the Civil Commission, and which repealed the
former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly confer
jurisdiction or authority upon this court to take
cognizance of all crimes committed on board
vessels on the high seas. While the provisions
of the law are clear and precise with respect to
civil admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true
with respect to criminal cases. If any doubt
could arise concerning the true meaning of the
law applicable to the case, Act No. 400
effectively dissipates such doubts.
This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136,
by which the courts of justice of the Philippine
Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to
article 56, consisting of seven paragraphs,
another paragraph numbered 8, which reads
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
as follows: "Of all crimes and offenses
committed on the high seas or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the
navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago,
on board a ship or water craft of any kind
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands
in accordance with the laws thereof." The
purpose of this law was to define the
jurisdiction of the courts of First Instance in
criminal cases for crimes committed on board
vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands. The transport Lawton not being a
vessel of this class, our courts are without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime
committed on board the same.
12. MINORU FUJIKI v MARIA PAZ GALELA
MARINAY
Doctrine: For Philippine courts to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs
to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under
the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1)
an official publication or (2) a certification or
copy attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has custody is
in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine
foreign service in Japan and authenticated by
the seal of office.
FACTS: Fujiki is a Japanese national who
married Marinay in the Philippineson 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s parents.
He could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese,
Shinichi Maekara. Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married in 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were
able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void
on the ground of bigamy.Fujikithen filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Heprayed that
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared
void under the Family Code of the
Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate
the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the NSO.
RTC immediately dismissed the petition.It
based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC. Apparently, the RTC took the
view that only "the husband or the wife," in this
case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the
petition to declare their marriage void, and not
Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply.
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition.
He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that
the petitioner failed to comply with A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings. The Solicitor General argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an
injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void. The Solicitor General
cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic which held that
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in cases of bigamy.
ISSUES: (1) W/N A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is
applicable.(NO)
(2) W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.(YES)
(3) W/N the Regional Trial Court can recognize
the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.(YES)
HELD:
I.For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence
and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1)
an official publication or (2) a certification or
copy attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has custody is
in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine
Foreign Service in Japan and authenticated by
the seal of office.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a
petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties
should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition, the service of
summons, the investigation of the public
prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and
the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd
because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation
on claims and issues." The interpretation of the
RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on
the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada, this Court
explained that "if every judgment of a foreign
court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original
cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation."
Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to
delve into the merits of a foreign judgment.
III.To be sure, a petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. However, this does not apply in a
petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a
foreign judgment annulling a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not
an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of
a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under
foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of the foreign country.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse
is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public
policy. A critical difference between the case of
a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that
bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage,
is fully consistent with Philippine public policy
as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to
undergo full trial by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only
remedy available to him or her. Philippine
courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage,
without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
bigamy.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only
determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in
the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the
comity of nations. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact that needs to be reflected
in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the
public records in the Philippines. GRANTED.
13. MIJARES VS. HONORABLE RANADA
KEYWORDS: 1 Billion for Marcos victims
FACTS: The essential facts bear little
elaboration. A complaint via class suit was filed
against the Marcos Estate by ten Filipinos
representing 10,000 Filipinos whose heirs were
tortured, detained, raped or summarily
executed during the Martial Law era before the
US District Court in Hawaii. Plaintiffs invoked
the US Alien Tort Act. The District Court
awarded $ 1,964,005,859.90 and such was
affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. The
Marcos Estate did not appeal hence the
judgment became final.
The plaintiffs now filed a civil case before the
RTC Makati for the enforcement of judgment.
The plaintiffs paid only P410 as docket fees,
basing the rates on Special Proceedings
cases. Marcos estate filed a motion to dismiss
for failure to pay the correct amount of docket
fees in accordance with the SC circular since
such was arguably pecuniary in nature and
considering the fact that the damages amounts
to almost P2 billion. Plaintiffs argued that such
was incapable of pecuniary estimation since
the action was merely for enforcement of
foreign judgment. Petitioner also invokes the
Bill of Rights which state that free access to the
courts should not be denied by reason of
poverty. CHR intervened in this case. RTC
ruled that the filing fees should be
P472,000,000.00.
RTC based its decision on the graduated rates
on Section 7(a) Rule 141. Check lang nya the
provision at the bottom of the digest.These are
the only facts. The rest of this lengthy case is
about the ruling.
ISSUES:
1. WON the case is incapable of
pecuniary estimation
2. WON the proper filing fees was paid
3. WON the RTC has jurisdiction
RULING:
I. This is a case capable of
pecuniary estimation.
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of
nations have established a usage among
civilized states by which final judgments of
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may
vary in different countries.
There is an evident distinction between a
foreign judgment in an action in rem and
one in personam. For an action in rem, the
foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon
the title to the thing, while in an action in
personam, the foreign judgment is
presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as
between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.[21] However, in
both cases, the foreign judgment is
susceptible to impeachment in our local
courtson the grounds of want of jurisdiction
or notice to the party,[22] collusion,
fraud,[23] or clear mistake of law or fact.[24]
Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign
judgment is entitled to defend against the
enforcement of such decision in the local
forum.
There are distinctions, nuanced but
discernible, between the cause of action arising
from the enforcement of a foreign judgment,
and that arising from the facts or allegations
that occasioned the foreign judgment. They
may pertain to the same set of facts, but there
is an essential difference in the right-duty
correlatives that are sought to be vindicated.
For example, in a complaint for damages
against a tortfeasor, the cause of action
emanates from the violation of the right of the
complainant through the act or omission of the
respondent. On the other hand, in a complaint
for the enforcement of a foreign judgment
awarding damages from the same tortfeasor,
for the violation of the same right through the
same manner of action, the cause of action
derives not from the tortious act but from the
foreign judgment itself.
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
The rules are silent as to what initiatory
procedure must be undertaken in order to
enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines.
But there is no question that the filing of a civil
complaint is an appropriate measure for such
purpose.
It is self-evident that while the subject matter of
the action is undoubtedly the enforcement of a
foreign judgment, the effect of a providential
award would be the adjudication of a sum
of money. Perhaps in theory, such an action is
primarily for the enforcement of the foreign
judgment, but there is a certain obtuseness to
that sort of argument since there is no denying
that the enforcement of the foreign judgment
will necessarily result in the award of a
definite sum of money.
II. RTC has jurisdiction
Petitioners argue that if indeed an action for
enforcement of foreign judgment may be
capable of pecuniary estimation, itmight lead
to an instance wherein a first level court such
as the Municipal Trial Court would have
jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. But
under the statute defining the jurisdiction of first
level courts, B.P. 129, suchMTCC courts are
not vested with jurisdiction over actions for
the enforcement of foreign judgments.
The SC said that: it is still under RTC
jurisdiction since the same BP 129 states that
RTC has jurisdiction over “cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction
or any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.”
III. The proper filing fees were paid
The SC said while it is capable of pecuniary
estimation, it is still an action against an
estate based on a judgment.
We are comfortable in asserting the obvious,
that the complaint to enforce the US District
Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimation. But at the same time, it is also an
action based on judgment against an
estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit
ofSection 7(a) of Rule 141. What provision
then governs the proper computation of the
filing fees over the instant complaint? For this
case and other similarly situated instances, we
find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3),
involving as it does, other actions not involving
property.
Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the
petitioners on the premise that it was an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds
to the same amount required for other actions
not involving property. The petitioners thus paid
the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a
grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge
to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable
rule and dismissed the complaint.
RELEVANT RULES OF COURT PROVISION
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-
(a) For filing an action or a permissive
counterclaim or money claim against an
estate NOT based on judgment, or for filing
with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party,
etc., complaint, or a complaint in intervention,
and for all clerical services in the same time, if
the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or
the started value of the property in litigation, is:
1. Less than P 100,00.00 P 500.00
2. P 100,000.00 or more - P 800.00but less
than P 150,000.00
3. P 150,000.00 or more but - P 1,000.00less
than P 200,000.00 (and so on and so forth)
XXXXXXXXX
(b) For filing
1. Actions where the valueof the subject
mattercannot be estimated --- P 600.00
2. Special civil actions exceptjudicial
foreclosure whichshall be governed
byparagraph (a) above --- P 600.00
3. All other actions notinvolving property --
- P 600.00 (SC used this as basis for this
decision)
In a real action, the assessed value of the
property, or if there is none, the estimated
value, thereof shall be alleged by the claimant
and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
BONUS:
BASIS FOR ENFORCING FOREIGN
JUDGMENT
While the definite conceptual parameters of the
recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments have not been authoritatively
established, the Court can assert with certainty
that such an undertaking is among those
generally accepted principles of international
law.[68] As earlier demonstrated, there is a (1)
widespread practice among states accepting in
principle the need for such recognition and
enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of
varying degrees. The fact that there is no
binding universal treaty governing the practice
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the
principle, but only a disagreement as to the
imposable specific rules governing the
procedure for recognition and enforcement.
Aside from the widespread practice, (2) it is
indubitable that the procedure for
recognition and enforcement is embodied
in the rules of law, whether statutory or
jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign
jurisdictions. Certainly, the Philippine legal
system has long ago accepted into its
jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability
of an action for enforcement of foreign
judgment, as well as the requisites for such
valid enforcement, as derived from
internationally accepted doctrines.
LIMITATION BY OUR COURTS ON
REVIEWING FOREIGN JUDGMENT
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable
issues are generally restricted to a review of
jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of
personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of
fact or law. The limitations on review is in
consonance with a strong and pervasive policy
in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation
on claims and issues.[32] Otherwise known as
the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party
expectations resulting from previous litigation,
to safeguard against the harassment of
defendants, to insure that the task of courts not
be increased by never-ending litigation of the
same disputes, and in a larger sense to
promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrers Case of
1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest and
quietness.[33] If every judgment of a foreign
court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original
cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation.
14. TUNA PROCESSING, INC vs.
PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC.
Arbitration, General law v Special law
FACTS: Kanemitsu Yamaoka (hereinafter
referred to as the "licensor"), co-patentee of
U.S. Patent Philippine Letters Patent and
Indonesian Patent (collectively referred to as
the "Yamaoka Patent"), and five Philippine
tuna processors, namely, Angel Seafood
Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy
Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods,
Inc., and respondent Kingford (collectively
referred to as the "sponsors"/"licensees")
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement.
Purpose of the MOA is for Yamaoka to
enter into alliance with Kingford for so that he
may enforce his patents, and for the latter to be
licensed under the same patents, to enforce
them and collect royalties in conjunction with
the former.
Subsequently, petitioner Tuna
Processors, Inc (TPI) was established in the
State of California. Stipulated was an
arbitration clause whereby for any disputes
arising from the MOA, it should be
submitted before the International Dispute
Resolution in the State of California.
Later, for unknown reasons, Kingford
withdrew from TPI and reneged on its
obligations. So, TPI submitted the case for
arbitration. Then, Kingford was ordered to pay
TPI for breach of the MOA.
To enforce award, TPI filed a Petition
for Confirmation, Recognition, and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before
the RTC of Makati City. Then, a motion to
dismiss was filed by Kingford. But the first
judge, prior inhibition, denied it. Kingford
sought for the judge’s inhibition, which the
judge heeded even amidst unfounded
allegations for inhibition. The second judge,
then granted the motion to dismiss and
dismissed the petition on the ground that TPI
lacked legal capacity to sue in the
Philippines.
Hence, this direct petition to SC under
Rule 45, Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: WON TPI has the legal capacity to sue
in the Philippines.
RULING: YES, IT HAS CAPACITY TO SUE
DECISION OF RTC
TPI is a foreign Corp organized under
laws of California. So applicable law is Sec.
133 or now, 150 of the Revised Corp Code. In
a nutshell, it states that:
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501

TPI CAN FILE FOR RECOGNITION AND

NO foreign corp transacting business in ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRAL
the Philippines without license, or its AWARD.
successors or assigns shall maintain or
intervene in any action before Phil Courts or CASE REMANDED.
Admin agencies, but, it can be sued.

This was the basis of the RTC in saying

that TPI has no legal capacity because it
ADMITTED that it has no license to operate
in the country.

ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER:

Under RA 9285 (Alternative Dispute

Resolution of 2004), New York Convention,
and UNCITRAL Model Law, legal capacity is
not required for a party to seek enforcement
of foreign arbitration judgment.

DILLEMA NOW:

How to RECONCILE Sec. 133 / 150 of

the Revised Corp Code on one hand, and RA
9285, New York Convention, and UNCITRAL
Model law on the other.

SC RESOLUTION:

1) ADR of 2004 being the Municipal law, is

applicable.

2) Corp code is a GENERAL LAW (applies to

all corporations) while ADR of 2004 is a
SPECIAL LAW (specific goal is to promote
party autonomy in resolving their disputes). –
as between a general and special law, the
latter shall prevail

3) ADR of 2004 provides exclusive grounds for

the opposing party in an application for
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral
award. NONE of the grounds touched on the
capacity to sue of the party seeking the
recognition and enforcement of the award.

4) When a party enters into a contract

containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as
in this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration,
it becomes bound by the contract, by the
arbitration and by the result of arbitration.