Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 154464

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St., Pasay City,
Present:
Petitioner,
TINGA, J.,*
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Acting Chairperson,
Manila,
VELASCO, JR.,*
Public Respondent.
NACHURA, and
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St., Pasay City,
REYES, JJ.
Private Respondent.
Promulgated:

September 11, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was
directly filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 20021 and July
31, 20022 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied
the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant,
and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit
herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this
Court.

The antecedents:

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his

appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth
year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court3 that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation
personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written
permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as
counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin
Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz
vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer
had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, "Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa
sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared
the next hearing on May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to

Inhibit,4 praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that
expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could
be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It
asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of
mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served.5

In an Order6 dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition
stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not
enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to
the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration7 of the said order.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality.8 In the same Order,
the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised
document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or
conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

In a motion for reconsideration,9 petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance

was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules
were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge
denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order10 dated July 31, 2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition
and assigns the following errors:

I.

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE
PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTER’S BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-
0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY
 LITIGANT;

II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE
ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION IS PROPER
TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLE’S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.

The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may
issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the
petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the
case.

This Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and

injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court
of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an
absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application therefor will
be directed.11 A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with
the Court of Appeals.12 The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for
compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this
Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.13

Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138
and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly
before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with
dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery
of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important concerns before us.

In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule
138-A is necessary.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully
completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is
enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the
Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall
be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for
and in behalf of the legal clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his
behalf because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner’s
appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986,
this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the
failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized school’s clinical
legal education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the
law school.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of
Rule 138, which provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed
by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that
the contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to
represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may
conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance
must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual
litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from
commencement to the termination of the litigation.14 Considering that a party
personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and
procedure as those qualified to practice law,15 petitioner, not being a lawyer himself,
runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore,
Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil
Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party
exercising his right to represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student
and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It
erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of
Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in
courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party
representing himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of
Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it
released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an
addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was
incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to

be heard by himself and counsel,16 this Court has held that during the trial, the right to
counsel cannot be waived.17 The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v.
Holgado,18 where we declared that "even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know
how to establish his innocence."

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The
solicitous concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution
obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who
insists that he can, without a lawyer’s assistance, effectively undertake the successful
pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges
that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the
case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section
34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a
law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should
grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed

manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary
inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said:
"Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers that by
denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of
arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioner’s and his co-plaintiff’s loss of faith and
confidence in the respondent’s impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative
case19 against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we
dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court’s findings
of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by
clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular
trial,20 as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the
sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must
be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the
case before her.21 Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and

Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional
Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Acting Chairperson
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
 Associate Justice

Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

* Designated additional members in lieu of Associate Justices Consuelo Ynares-

Santiago and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special Order No. 517 dated August 27,
2008.
1
 Rollo, pp. 34-35.
2
 Id. at 43-45.
3
 Section 31-Rule 138. By whom litigation conducted. – In the court of justice of the
peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
4
 Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, rollo, pp. 29-30.
5
 Rollo, p. 30.
6
 Id. at 31.
7
 Annex "D" of the Petition, id. at 32-33.
8
 Rollo, pp. 34-35.
9
 Annex "F" of the Petition, id. at 36-42.
10
 Annex "G" of the Petition, id. at 43-45.
11
 People v. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 67787, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 415, 423-424.
12
 Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila, 465 Phil. 529, 543 (2004).
13
 Cruz v. Mina, G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 382, 386; United
Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 574, 593; Ark
Travel Express, Inc. v. Abrogar, 457 Phil. 189, 202 (2003).
14
 Santos v. Lacurom, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 639, 648-
649.
15
 Maderada v. Mediodea, 459 Phil. 701, 716-717 (2003).
16
 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2).
17
 Flores v. Ruiz, 179 Phil. 351, 355 (1979).
18
 86 Phil. 752 (1950).
19
 Ferdinand Cruz v. Judge Priscilla Mijares, OCA IPI No. 02-1452-RTJ,
20
 People v. Ong, G.R. Nos. 162130-39, May 5, 2006, 489 SCRA 679, 688.
21
 Abrajano v. Heirs of Augusto F. Salas, Jr., G.R. No. 158895, February 16, 2006, 482
SCRA 476, 487.

 
Cruz v. MijaresFACTS:
 

 
Ferdinand A. Cruz was the plaintiff in a civil case for Abatement of
Nuisancepending in the sala of respondent judge.

 
He sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf.
o
 
Claim anchored on Sec. 34, Rule 138: a non- lawyer may appear beforeany
court and conduct his litigation personally.

 
During the pre-trial, Judge Mijares required petitioner to secure
writtenpermission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed
toappear as counsel for himself.

 
Counsel for the defendant filed a motion to dismiss.

 
Petitioner objected, alleging that an MTD is not allowed after the
Answer hasbeen filed.

 
Respondent judge remarked, “
Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa saHuwes. Ok? 
”
 

 
Petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to inhibit: there was partiality
onthe part of respondent judge as can be seen from her contumacious remarks.

 
Motion denied. MR denied.

 
Cruz’s appearance was also denied as he failed to submit the document
required by Rule 138-
 A
 of the Rules of Court.

 
MR: basis of his appearance was Rule 138, Sec. 34, not Rule 138-A.
o
 
138
–
 applicable to any non-lawyer;
o
 
138-A
–
 specifically for law students.

 
MR denied, still invoking Rule 138-A.

 
Hence, this petition for
certiorari,
 prohibition, and
mandamus
.
ISSUES + RULING:
Does the SC have jurisdiction to entertain the petition? 
 YES.
 

 
SC has concurrent jurisdiction with RTC and CA to issue writs of
certiorari
,prohibition,
mandamus
, and injunction.

 
This concurrence does not mean that the petitioner has absolute freedom
tochoose where the petition will be filed.
o
 
Still has to give due regard to the judicial hierarchy.
o
 
Thus, petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against RTCsshould be
filed with the CA.

 
Only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons may the SC
takecognizance of petitions directly filed before it.

 
SC assumes jurisdiction over this petition as it concerns the interpretation
ofSec. 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.

 
Petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly with theSC.
What rule applies in the case of petitioner, Rule 138 or 138-A? 
 
Rule 138.
 

 
Rule 138 Attorneys and Admission to Bar
 
Section 34.
 
By whom litigation conducted 
.
—
 In the court of a justice of the peace aparty may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friendappointed by him for the purpose, or
with the aid an attorney. In any other court, aparty may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and hisappearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Rule 138-A
 
Law Student Practice Rule
 
Section 1.
 
Conditions for student practice.
 
—
 A law student who has successfullycompleted his 3rd year of the regular four-
year prescribed law curriculum and isenrolled in a recognized law school's
clinical legal education program approved bythe Supreme Court, may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal oradministrative case before any
trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to representindigent clients accepted by
the legal clinic of the law school.
Section 2.
 
 Appearance.
 
—
 The appearance of the law student authorized by thisrule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the IntegratedBar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings,motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by
thesupervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

 
Court agrees with petitioner that the basis of his appearance is Rule 138,
not138-A. As plaintiff, he can personally conduct the litigation of the case.

 
He would be acting not as counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising hisright
to represent himself.

 
The fact that petition is a law student does not mean that the applicable ruleis
always 138-A. Again, he seeks to represent himself.

 
TC’s conclusion that 138
-A superseded 138 is incorrect. It is an addendum tothe instances when a non-
lawyer may appear in courts.
Should respondent judge inhibit herself? 
 NO.
 

 
Her “
hay naku
” statement is not enough
to show arbitrariness and prejudice.

 
In fact, petitioner’s administrative case against respondent judge for
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics was dismissed for lack of merit.

 
Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties applies.
DISPOSITION:
 Petition partially granted