Naomi Weir 2012

A central theme of this module is that conflict seemingly inspired by ethnic hates is in fact driven

by the aims of political leaders. Discuss with reference to one of the ethnic wars or genocides that

took place in the 20th century.

Introduction

This question asks what causes ethnic conflict, while particularly focussing on the degree to which

ethnic conflict is driven by political leaders. The argument that ethnic conflict is driven by the aims of

political leaders is central to the theory of Instrumentalism. Instrumentalism is based upon the

notion that ethnic conflict is driven by either the relationship between economic wants – greed and

grievance – or the active manipulation of ethnic identities by political leaders for their political gain.

This essay will discuss to what degree Instrumentalism is to blame for the Rwandan Genocide of

1994, focussing on the notion of the elite manipulation of the masses.

Two other theories – Constructivism and Primordialism – have also been used to explain ethnic

conflict. Constructivism argues that ethnic conflict is a product of historical processes over time that

result in divergent ethnic identities and hostility between them. Primordialism argues that ethnic

conflict stems from ‘ancient hatreds’ between ethnic groups and that frustration comes with

differences in ‘natural ties’ that derive from religious, racial, or regional connections. It is important

to note that Primordialism has been widely discredited, and that the line between Constructivism

and Instrumentalism is not always clear. To address these theories, the essay will first look at the

arguments proposed by Primordialism before addressing the arguments proposed by

Instrumentalism and Constructivism. This essay will argue that the conflict in Rwanda is a result of

both elite manipulation and historical processes, thus fitting into both Instrumentalist and

Constructivist theories.

Rwanda and Primordialism

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The notion of Primordialism and its relation to ethnic conflict largely originates from the writings of

Clifford Geertz. He outlines the concept of Primordialism in his book The Interpretation of Cultures

where he states:

‘By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’ – or more precisely, as a

culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed ‘givens’ of social existence: immediate

contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the given-ness that stems from being born

into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language... and following particular

practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on are seen to have an ineffable, and at

times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s

neighbour, one’s fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical

necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some

unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself.’1

What he suggests, therefore is that ethnic ‘ties’ are inherent in us as human beings; that we have

deep, ‘natural’, connections that link us to some people and that lead to natural divisions with

others, whether based on race, religion, language or location. Thus division caused by natural ‘ties’

has been referred to as ‘ancient hatreds’.2 Whilst this theory may have elements of ‘common sense’

notions, this theory has been widely disregarded. Reasons for disregarding Primordialism have

included its simplifying complex situations, and its suggestions of ethnic conflict being, therefore,

natural and to be expected. As Fenton observes, in his critique of Primordialism, ‘people may think

of these divisions as natural, we known that they are culturally and socially moulded, as well as

being grounded in place, language and shared historic experience’.3

1
Geertz, C., The Interpretation of Cultures, 1973 (New York: Basic Books) pg.259-260
2
See Toft, M., The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identities, Interests, and the Invisibility of Territory, 2003
(Princeton: Princeton University Press) pg. 7-8, and Varshney, A., ‘Ethnic Conflicts and Ancient Hatreds’ in
Smelser, N. et al. (eds), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences, 2001 ( Oxford:
Pergamon) pgs. 4810-4813
3
Fenton, S., Ethnicity, 2003 (Cambridge: Polity Press) pg. 81

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The Rwandan genocide has often been portrayed as an inevitable ethnic conflict that was born out

of tribal differences and ever present ‘ancient hatreds’. The most common place in which this

portrayal of the genocide has been given space is in journalistic accounts or political explanations of

the genocide. Primordialism has served a purpose in explaining the genocide by ‘romanticising’ the

conflict: without requiring a specific perpetrator; without needing apologies from unresponsive

governments and international organisations such as the UN. It is clear that ‘‘ethnicity’ or ‘tribalism’

is frequently used as an auto-explanation of political events in Africa’, particularly by the media.4

However, the space given to Primordialism to explain the Rwandan genocide does not reflect the

truth.

The notion that the Rwandan genocide was an ‘explosion’ of natural ancient hatreds between the

Hutu and Tutsi simply isn’t true. Firstly, the ethnic differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi are

not clear. This is clearly expressed in the writings of Destexhe. Destexhe noted that the Hutu and the

Tutsi ‘both speak the same language and respect the same traditions and taboos... [and] share the

same territory’, arguing that they ‘cannot even correctly be described as ethnic groups’. 5 He

continued to express the extreme difficulty of finding ‘any kind of cultural or folkloric custom that

was specific to Hutu or Tutsi’. 6 Furthermore, he argues that ‘nobody really knows the exact origin of

the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa peoples... by all definitions, [their clear similarities] should qualify Rwanda

as a nation in its true sense’.7

Secondly, the Rwandan genocide did not see an ‘all against all’ conflict. 8 Mueller estimated that a

possible 200,000 partook in the massacres throughout Rwanda, but significantly, he notes that ‘this

would still represent less than 9 percent of the Hutu male population over the age of 13’. 9

Additionally, it is important to remember that many Hutus hid and protected ‘Tutsi neighbours and

4
Thomson, A., An Introduction to African Politics, 3rd Ed, 2010, (Oxon: Routledge) pg.62
5
Destexhe, A., Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, 1994 (London: Pluto Press) pg.36-37
6
Destexhe, Genocide, pg.36
7
Destexhe, Genocide, pg.37
8
Mueller, J., ‘The Banality of “Ethnic War”’, International Security, 25:1, (2000) pg. 42
9
Mueller, Banality, pg. 61

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sometimes strangers despite the pressure, and despite the fact that the punishment for such

behaviour could be instant, brutal death’. 10 Importantly, Primordialism argues that such ancient

hatreds would result in ‘all against all’, ‘neighbour against neighbour’ conflict, 11 the evidence from

Rwanda is therefore clearly in dispute with this theory.

The distinct flaws in Primordialism lead to a need for different explanations for ethnic conflict.

Primordialism’s inadequacies give space to the notion that ethnic conflict is driven by the aims of

political leaders. Indeed, Primordialism fails to produce a substantial alternative theory to the notion

of elite manipulation.

Rwanda and Instrumentalism

The theory of Instrumentalism has two elements. Firstly, Instrumentalism argues that ethnic conflict

often emerges out of a desire for economic gain. This is often referred to as ‘greed and grievance’ as

based on Paul Collier’s works. Secondly, Instrumentalism argues that ethnic conflict emerges from

deliberate manipulation by elites based on their rational decision to encourage or incite ethnic

conflict. In his description of Instrumentalism, Fenton stated that ‘if behaviour in terms of ethnic

attachments could be seen to be serving some individual or collective political or economic ends,

then the ethnic action could be reinterpreted as instrumental.’12 This essay will focus on the element

of elite manipulation in the Rwandan genocide.

The example of the Rwandan genocide clearly seems to support Instrumentalism and the argument

that ethnic conflict is driven by the aims of political leaders. The role of the Rwandan political elite is

clearly apparent in the wake of the genocide. Kambanda, the prime minister at that time, ‘had

controlled the administration of genocide, eliminated those unwilling to take part and made sure

that local authorities had enough people available to engage in the killing. He had sanctioned a

10
Mueller, Banality, pg. 60
11
Mueller, Banality, pg. 42
12
Fenton, Ethnicity, pg. 76

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climate of hatred and paranoia, incited violence and ultimately sanctioned mass murder.’13 This

control is evident in the use of the journal, Kangura, that openly dedicated considerable space to

inciting ethnic hatred. This journal used headlines such as ‘Inhabitants of Kigali remain vigilant: the

enemy is still among us’14 to incite ethnic hatred. In an early publication the Kangura produced ‘The

Hutu Ten Commandments’ which included statements plainly stating that any Hutu is a traitor if they

simply befriend a Tutsi, let alone marry a Tusti, whilst making clear the Hutu are a superior race. 15

The action taken by the political elite in publishing Kangura is an example of their manipulation of

ethnic hatreds throughout Rwanda. The Kangura’s message ‘was sensational and spread like

wildfire’ regardless of the low literacy rate.16

It is apparent that the Rwandan genocide was not a spontaneous eruption, but that ‘the basic

elements of the genocidal process had been planned for years by Hutu extremists who were

substantially in charge of the ruling party, the government bureaucracy, and the police.’17 The

campaign against the Tutsi began after the Rwandan Patriotic Front invasion in October 199018 and

was firmly in place by the time the elites imported ‘a huge number of machetes and other

agricultural tools’19 in 1993. Romeo Dallaire, a UN Peacekeeping commander in Rwanda at the time

has stated that ‘the violent extremism was nurtured over decades of an armed peace’. 20 It is clear

therefore that the genocide grew from the aims of political leaders and not from ancient hatreds.

The actions taken by militia and locals, however, may still be problematic as their actions surely are

their own choice. However, it is important to note that the militia were often drunk and were given

13
Melvern, L., Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide, 2004 (London: Verso), pg. 1
14
Kangura, No.20, August 1991 referred to in Thompson, A., The Media and the Rwandan Genocide¸ 2007
(London: Pluto Press) pg.333
15
‘The Hutu Ten Commandments’, Kangura, No.6, December 1990, available at
http://www.trumanwebdesign.com/~catalina/commandments.htm accessed March 2012
16
Melvern, Conspiracy, pg. 49
17
Mueller, Banality, pg.59
18
Melvern, Conspiracy, pg. 49
19
Melvern, Conspiracy, pg. 56
20
Dallaire, R., Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, 2003 (London: Random House)
pg. 514

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drugs and then transported by officials from one massacre to another. 21 Additionally, local Hutu

were under considerable pressure to join in the killings or else they would receive instant death. 22

This was true for whether they were to actively kill or to reveal hiding Tutsi. If Hutus were found to

be hiding Tutsi they also would be killed, seen therefore as Hutu moderates. Furthermore, a large

proportion of the military and the militarised were the unemployed, poor, and the homeless. ‘For

these people the genocide was the best thing that could ever happen to them. They had the

blessings of a form of authority to take revenge on socially powerful people as long as they were on

the wrong side of the political fence. They could steal, they could kill with minimum justification,

they could rape, and they could get drunk for free.’23

Dallaire states ‘Let there be no doubt: the Rwandan genocide was the ultimate responsibility of

those Rwandans who planned, ordered, supervised and eventually conducted it’. 24 Dallaire does,

however argue that ‘their extremism was the seemingly indestructible and ugly harvest of years of

power struggles and insecurity that has been deftly played upon by their former colonial rulers.’25

This statement leaves space to question the actions of the elite: Why did they choose to take such

action? Why were they determined there were such ethnic divides? Particularly as we have seen

that the differences between Tutsi and Hutu were hard to distinguish and they were under one

national ‘Rwandan’ identity in many ways. This leads us to the need to discuss the theory of

Constructivism and its place in the Rwandan genocide.

Rwanda and Constructivism

The theory of Constructivism sees ‘ethnic conflict as the product of concrete historical processes’.26

It argues that influences in history will effect relations between ethnic groups. For example, if two

21
Mueller, Banality, pg. 60
22
Mueller, Banality, pg. 60
23
Prunier, G., Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide, 1995 (New York: Columbia University Press) pg. 231-232
24
Dallaire, Shake, pg. 515
25
Dallaire, Shake, pg. 515
26
Green, D. et al., ‘What Role Does Prejudice Play in Ethnic Conflict?’, Annual Review of Political Science,
6:2003, pg.521

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groups have been at war in the past over territory, they are likely to have a particular image of each

other and that image is likely to have some grounding in hatreds of sorts. ‘Unlike primordialists and

instrumentalists, who continually refer to emotions or strategic calculations, constructivists

concentrate on external processes in explaining the politicization of ethnic identities.’27

Kambanda, the prime minister, ‘was radically anti-Tutsi and he believed that the Tutsi were racially

alien. The national policy of his government had been to create a Hutu state without them’.28 Whilst

this is the case, there must have been reasons for his hatred, and reasons for his ability to mobilise

the people. The colonial period had a distinct role in creating and exacerbating these differences

that led to such hatreds. The period after colonialism also saw several conflicts between the Tutsi

and Hutu that also had a role to play in creating a context for the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

The influence of colonialism on the ethnic divisions in Rwanda is largely agreed upon. It is important

to note, however, that the Belgians did not ‘create’ these ethnic identities, for, ‘before the

colonialists arrived the country was peaceful. Hutu and Tutsi were fighting together and conquering

new territories in Rwanda. This was total integration’.29 It is clear that ‘social distinction denoted by

the terms ‘Hutu’ and Tutsi’ was evolving in both pre-colonial and early-colonial Rwanda’, but at the

time colonialists arrived, these distinctions were not ‘uniform’ throughout the whole of Rwanda. 30

The social distinctions between the Hutu and Tutsi simply ‘corresponded to a division of tasks: the

Tutsi mainly occupied with cattle raising and the Hutu working in the land as farmers’.31 The

distinctions were not on a ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ basis.

The arrival of the German and Belgian colonisers saw the development of ‘a system of categories for

different ‘tribes’ that was largely a function of aesthetic impressions. Individuals were categorised as

Hutu or Tutsi according to their degree of beauty, their pride, intelligence and political

27
Green et al., Prejudice, pg.521
28
Melvern, Conspiracy, pg. 1
29
Eltringham, N., Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda, 2004 (London: Pluto Press) pg.164
emphasis added
30
Eltringham, Post-Genocide, pg.12-13
31
Destexhe, Genocide, pg.37

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organisation.’32 These colonisers considered the Tutsi to be superior to the Hutu.33 They believed

that the Tutsi had ‘superior marital skill and intelligence’ and ‘that the Tutsi at the central court

possessed a different physiology from that of the Hutu; and that only Tutsi were pastoralists.’34 They

then took this myth to ‘the schoolrooms of Rwanda’ using ‘European or European-educated

teachers’. 35 This construction was then accepted by the Tutsi. ‘It was not surprising that the Tutsi

were pleased with this version of history. But even the majority of the Hutu swallowed this distorted

account of the past, so great was their respect for European-style education.’36

This creation and spread of these ethnic identities were firmly put in place by the colonialists to such

a degree that they were even evident after independence. In fact, ‘each time the party in power

searched for a way out of political difficulty, it played the ethnic card... It is true that Hutu-Tutsi

antagonism has since become absorbed by the people themselves, even if it does not really

correspond to an anthropological distinction’.37

These exacerbated differences lead to increased tension between the Tutsi minority leadership and

the Hutu majority. They came to a head in the 1959 genocide. It is important to note that this

genocide, however, did not aim to completely eliminate the Tutsi, but was aimed at Tutsi elites.

December 1963 and October 1990 then saw the Tutsi refugees who had been displaced in 1959

launch armed invasions on Rwanda. The Hutu politicians used these events to claim they were

protecting ‘the newly ‘liberated people majoritaire’’.38 These situations contributed to the

reinvention and reinforcement of significant Hutu and Tutsi differences that the colonialists had

largely been responsible for creating.

32
Destexhe, Genocide, pg.38
33
Destexhe, Genocide, pg.39
34
Eltringham, Post-Genocide, pg.16
35
Des Forges, A., ‘The Ideology of Genocide’, Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 23:2 (1995) pg.45
36
Des Forges, Ideology, pg.45
37
Destexhe, Genocide, pg.36
38
Eltringham, Post-Genocide, pg.41

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The colonial period, the 1959 genocide, and the invasions in 1963 and 1990 played roles, therefore,

in constructing a history that was accessed by the Rwandan leaders in their manipulation of ethnic

hatreds. The notion that conflict seemingly inspired by ethnic hatreds is in fact driven by the aims of

political leaders is therefore not a complete theory. There are other factors at play, and the

construction of ethnic identities over history and the history of ethnic relations have a key part to

play in the instigation of ethnic conflict.

Conclusion

This essay has addressed the notion that conflict seemingly inspired by ethnic hatreds is in fact

driven by the aims of political leaders by looking at the three main theories of ethnic conflict. They

have argued that ethnic hatred is due to natural ancient hatreds, elite manipulation, and the result

of historical processes. Instrumentalism is central to the notion that ethnic conflict is driven by the

aims of political leaders; however Constructivism has a role to play and therefore, we cannot

understand the Rwandan Genocide plausibly by simply considering the concepts of Instrumentalism.

Primordialism has been disregarded due to the lack of evidence for its theory and due to its

simplification of ethnic hatred down to natural ties. Prunier has proficiently stated that ‘what we

have witnessed in Rwanda is a historical product, not a biological fatality or ‘spontaneous’ bestial

outburst. Tutsi and Hutu have not been created by God as cats and dogs, predestined from all

eternity to disembowel each other’ there had to be a motive for these killings.39 Destexhe agreed

with Prunier, stating that ‘one thing is certain, the massacres in Rwanda are not the result of a deep-

rooted and ancient hatred between two ethnic groups.’40 Primordialism, therefore does not satisfy

the need for explanation of ethnic conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide. This leaves space for the

notion that ethnic conflicts are driven by the aims of political leaders.

39
Prunier, History, pg. xi-xii
40
Destexhe, Genocide, pg.36

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This therefore leads to the theory of Instrumentalism. The role of political elites and their aims are

undoubtedly central to the Rwandan genocide. Their use of media, such as the Kangura and radio

stations, to spread propaganda describing the Tutsi as ‘cockroaches’ and the Hutu as superior is an

example of the importance of elite actions in the conflict. However, the historical processes that

took place before the 1994 genocide such as the colonial exaggeration of Tutsi and Hutu differences,

and the 1959 genocide and subsequent invasions in 1963 and 1990, also played a role in setting the

scene for the 1994 genocide. In support of this, Thompson has argued that ‘there is no doubt that

the toxic extremism that infected Rwanda was a deep-rooted and formidable foe, built from colonial

discrimination and exclusion, personal vendettas, refugee life, envy, racism, power plays, coups

d’état and deep rifts of civil war’.41

This consequently leads to the conclusion that conflict seemingly inspired by ethnic hatreds is in fact

in part driven by the aims of political leaders. Instrumentalism has a role to play in explaining ethnic

conflict, but it is not substantial enough on its own and a richer more detailed perspective is needed

to explain ethnic conflict. Constructivism provides the necessary historical background. Therefore,

the notion that conflict seemingly inspired by ethnic hatreds is in fact driven by the aims of political

leaders is in part true, but an understanding of the historical processes leading to the conflict is also

needed to explain them.

Word Count – 2,989

41
Dallaire, Shake, pg. 513

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