There is no dispute that the Proclamation issued under 

Article 356 is subject to judicial

review. The debate is confined essentially to the scope of judicial review or the area of
justiciability in that sphere. It does appear that the area of justiciability is narrow in view of
the nature of that power and the wide discretion which inheres in its exercise. This indication
appears also from the requirement of approval of the Proclamation by Parliament which is a
check provided in the Constitution of scrutiny by political process of the decision taken by
the Executive. The people's verdict in the election which follow is intended to be the ultimate
check.

41. To determine the justiciable area, we prefer to recall and keep in view that which was
said in K. Ashok Reddy v. Government of India7 thus: (SCC pp. 315-16, paras 21-23) "21. A
useful passage from Craig's Administrative Law (Second Edn., p. 291) is as under:

'The traditional position was that the courts would control the existence and extent of
prerogative power, but not the manner of exercise thereof. ... The traditional position has
however now been modified by the decision in the GCHQ case8. Their Lordships
emphasised that the review ability of discretionary power should be dependent upon the
subject-matter thereof, and not whether its 7 (1994) 2 SCC 303: JT (1994) 1 SC 401 8
Council (of Civil Service Unions v.

Minister for the Civil Service, (1985) AC 374: (1984) 3 All ER 935 prerogative power
would, because of their subject-matter, be less justiciable, with Lord Roskill compiling the
broadest list of such forbidden territory. ...'

22. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service8 (GCHQ case), Lord
Roskill stated thus: (AC p. 418, All ER P. 956) , But I do not think that right of challenge can
be unqualified. It must, I think, depend upon the subject-matter of the prerogative power
which is exercised. Many examples were given during the argument of prerogative powers
which as at present advised I do not think could properly be made the subject of judicial
review. Prerogative powers such as those relating to the making of treaties, the defence of the
realm, the prerogative of mercy, the grant of honors, the dissolution of Parliament and the
appointment of ministers as well as others are not, I think, susceptible to judicial review
because their nature and subject-matter is such as not to be amenable to the judicial
process. ...'

23. The same indication of judicial self-restraint in such matters is to be found in De Smith's
Judicial Review of Administrative Action, thus: (p. 3 2) " Judicial self-restraint was still
more marked in cases where attempts were made to impugn the exercise of discretionary
powers by alleging abuse of the discretion itself rather than alleging nonexistence of the state
of affairs on which the validity of its exercise was predicated. Quite properly, the courts were
slow to read implied limitations into grants to wide discretionary powers which might have
to be exercised on the basis of broad considerations of national policy.' "

42. It is also useful to refer to Puhlhofer v. Hillingdon London Borough Council9 wherein
Lord Brightman with whom the other Law Lords agreed, stated thus: (All ER p. 474) "Where
the existence or non-existence of a fact is left to the judgment and discretion of a public body
and that fact involves a broad spectrum ranging from the obvious to the debatable to the just
conceivable, it is the duty of the court to leave the decision of that fact to the public body to
whom Parliament has entrusted the decision-making power save in a case where it is obvious
that the public body, consciously or unconsciously, are acting perversely."

In our view, this principle is equally applicable in the present case 

There is no dispute that the Proclamation issued under Article 356 is subject to judicial
review. The debate is confined essentially to the scope of judicial review or the area of
justiciability in that sphere. It does appear that the area of justiciability is narrow in view of
the nature of that power and the wide discretion which inheres in its exercise. This indication
appears also from the requirement of approval of the Proclamation by Parliament which is a
check provided in the Constitution of scrutiny by political process of the decision taken by
the Executive. The people's verdict in the election which follow is intended to be the ultimate
check.

41. To determine the justiciable area, we prefer to recall and keep in view that which was
said in K. Ashok Reddy v. Government of India7 thus: (SCC pp. 315-16, paras 21-23) "21. A
useful passage from Craig's Administrative Law (Second Edn., p. 291) is as under:

'The traditional position was that the courts would control the existence and extent of
prerogative power, but not the manner of exercise thereof. ... The traditional position has
however now been modified by the decision in the GCHQ case8. Their Lordships
emphasised that the review ability of discretionary power should be dependent upon the
subject-matter thereof, and not whether its 7 (1994) 2 SCC 303: JT (1994) 1 SC 401 8
Council (of Civil Service Unions v.

Minister for the Civil Service, (1985) AC 374: (1984) 3 All ER 935 prerogative power
would, because of their subject-matter, be less justiciable, with Lord Roskill compiling the
broadest list of such forbidden territory. ...'

22. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service8 (GCHQ case), Lord
Roskill stated thus: (AC p. 418, All ER P. 956) , But I do not think that right of challenge can
be unqualified. It must, I think, depend upon the subject-matter of the prerogative power
which is exercised. Many examples were given during the argument of prerogative powers
which as at present advised I do not think could properly be made the subject of judicial
review. Prerogative powers such as those relating to the making of treaties, the defence of the
realm, the prerogative of mercy, the grant of honors, the dissolution of Parliament and the
appointment of ministers as well as others are not, I think, susceptible to judicial review
because their nature and subject-matter is such as not to be amenable to the judicial
process. ...'

23. The same indication of judicial self-restraint in such matters is to be found in De Smith's
Judicial Review of Administrative Action, thus: (p. 3 2) " Judicial self-restraint was still
more marked in cases where attempts were made to impugn the exercise of discretionary
powers by alleging abuse of the discretion itself rather than alleging nonexistence of the state
of affairs on which the validity of its exercise was predicated. Quite properly, the courts were
slow to read implied limitations into grants to wide discretionary powers which might have
to be exercised on the basis of broad considerations of national policy.' "

42. It is also useful to refer to Puhlhofer v. Hillingdon London Borough Council9 wherein
Lord Brightman with whom the other Law Lords agreed, stated thus: (All ER p. 474) "Where
the existence or non-existence of a fact is left to the judgment and discretion of a public body
and that fact involves a broad spectrum ranging from the obvious to the debatable to the just
conceivable, it is the duty of the court to leave the decision of that fact to the public body to
whom Parliament has entrusted the decision-making power save in a case where it is obvious
that the public body, consciously or unconsciously, are acting perversely."

In our view, this principle is equally applicable in the present case