SECTION 11 Also, respondents claimed that petitioners'

second floor was used as their residence and

as a boarding house, from which they
1. Spouses Algura v. The LGU of the City of
earned more than P3,000/mon. In addition,
Naga, et.al. (2006)
it was claimed that petitioners derived
Doctrine: Procedure on Indigent Litigants: If
additional income from their computer shop
the applicant for exemption meets the salary
patronized by students and from several
and property requirements under Section 19
boarders who paid rentals to them. Hence,
of Rule 141, then the grant of the application
respondents concluded that petitioners were
is mandatory. On the other hand, when the
not indigent litigants.
application does not satisfy one or both
 RTC Naga issued an Order disqualifying
requirements, then the application should not
petitioners as indigent litigants on the
be denied outright; instead, the court should
ground that they failed to substantiate their
apply the "indigency test" under Section 21
claim for exemption from payment of legal
of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in
fees and to comply with the third paragraph
determining the merits of the prayer for
of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules
exemption.
of Court—directing them to pay the
requisite filing fees.
Facts:
 Petitioners filed a Motion for
 In 1999, SPS Antonio and Lorencita Algura
Reconsideration, thereafter; the trial court
filed a Verified Complaint dated August
issued an Order giving petitioners the
30, 19994 for damages against the Naga
opportunity to comply with the requisites
City Government and its officers, arising
laid down in Section 18, Rule 141, for them
from the alleged illegal demolition of their
to qualify as indigent litigants. Petitioners
residence and boarding house and for
submitted their Compliance attaching their
payment of lost income derived from fees
affidavits to support of their claim to be
paid by their boarders amounting to PhP
declared as indigent litigants.
7,000.00 monthly.
 RTC Naga denied the petitioners' MR on
 Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-
the ground that the pay slip of Antonio
Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent
showed his "GROSS INCOME or TOTAL
Litigants, to which petitioner Antonio
EARNINGS was P10,474 which amount was
Algura's Pay Slip showing a gross monthly
over and above the amount mentioned in
income of P10,474. and a net pay of
the first paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18
P3,616. for the month of July 1999 and a
for pauper litigants residing outside Metro
Certification issued by the Office of the City
Manila." Said rule provides that the gross
Assessor of Naga City, which stated that
income of the litigant should not exceed
petitioners had no property declared in
PhP 3,000.00 a month and shall not own
their name for taxation purposes.
real estate with an assessed value of PhP
 Finding that petitioners' motion to litigate as
50,000.00.
indigent litigants was meritorious, RTC
NAGA granted petitioners' plea for
Issue: WON RTC Naga was correct in
exemption from filing fees.
disqualifying the petitioners as indigent
 Petitioner: As a result of respondent Naga
litigants using Rule 141, Sec.18 of Revised
City Government's demolition of a portion of
Rules of Court. (No, RTC Naga incorrectly
petitioners' house, the Alguras allegedly lost
applied Rule 141, Sec.18)
a monthly income of PhP 7,000.00 from
their boarders' rentals. With the loss of the
Held:
rentals, the meager income from Lorencita
Since complaint was filed in 1999. RTC Naga
Algura's sari-sari store and Antonio Algura's
incorrectly applied Rule 141, Section 18 on
small take home pay became insufficient for
Legal Fees when the applicable rules at that
the expenses of the Algura spouses and
time were Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent
their 6 children for their basic needs
Party which took effect on July 1, 1997 and
including food, bills, clothes, and schooling,
Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper Litigants
among others.
which became effective on July 19, 1984 up
 Respondents filed an Answer with to February 28, 2000.
Counterclaim arguing that the defenses of
the petitioners in the complaint had no The old Section 16, Rule 141 requires
cause of action, the spouses' boarding applicants to file an ex-parte motion to litigate
house blocked the road right of way. as a pauper litigant by submitting an affidavit
Respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify that they do not have a gross income of PhP
the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing 2,000.00 a month or PhP 24,000.00 a year for
Fees. They asserted that in addition to the those residing in Metro Manila and PhP
more than P3,000 net income of petitioner 1,500.00 a month or PhP 18,000.00 a year for
Antonio Algura, who is a member of the those residing outside Metro Manila or those
Philippine National Police, spouse Lorencita who do not own real property with an assessed
Algura also had a mini-store and a computer value of not more than PhP 24,000.00 or not
shop on the ground floor of their residence.
more than PhP 18,000.00 as the case may be.
Thus, there are two requirements: a) income
requirement—the applicants should not have a
gross monthly income of more than PhP
1,500.00, and b) property requirement––they
should not own property with an assessed
value of not more than PhP 18,000.00.
Undoubtedly, petitioners do not own real
property so the property requirement is met.
However with respect to the income
requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly
income of PhP 10,474.00 of petitioner Antonio
F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of
Lorencita Algura when combined, were above
the PhP 1,500.00 monthly income threshold
prescribed by then Rule 141, Section 16 and
therefore, the income requirement was not
satisfied. The trial court was therefore correct
in disqualifying petitioners Alguras as indigent
litigants although the court should have
applied Rule 141, Section 16 which was in
effect at the time of the filing of the application
on September 1, 1999. Even if Rule 141,
Section 18 (which superseded Rule 141,
Section 16 on March 1, 2000) were applied, still
the application could not have been granted as
the combined PhP 13,474.00 income of
petitioners was beyond the PhP 3,000.00
monthly income threshold.
In the light of the foregoing considerations,
therefore, the two (2) rules can stand together
and are compatible with each other. When an
application to litigate as an indigent litigant is
filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits
and supporting documents submitted by the
applicant to determine if the applicant complies
with the income and property standards
prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule
141—that is, the applicant's gross income and
that of the applicant's immediate family do not
exceed an amount double the monthly
minimum wage of an employee; and the
applicant does not own real property with a fair
market value of more than Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (PhP 300,000.00). If the trial
court finds that the applicant meets the income
and property requirements, the authority to
litigate as indigent litigant is automatically
granted and the grant is a matter of right.
However, if the trial court finds that one or both
requirements have not been met, then it would
set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove
that the applicant has "no money or property
sufficient and available for food, shelter and
basic necessities for himself and his family." In
that hearing, the adverse party may adduce
countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence
presented by the applicant; after which the trial
court will rule on the application depending on
the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of
Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may
later still contest the grant of such authority at
any time before judgment is rendered by the
trial court, possibly based on newly discovered
evidence not obtained at the time the
application was heard. If the court determines
after hearing, that the party declared as an
indigent is in fact a person with sufficient
income or property, the proper docket and
other lawful fees shall be assessed and
collected by the clerk of court. If payment is
not made within the time fixed by the court,
execution shall issue or the payment of
prescribed fees shall be made, without
prejudice to such other sanctions as the court
may impose.
The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section
19 provides specific standards while Rule 3,
Section 21 does not clearly draw the limits
of the entitlement to the exemption.
Thus, the trial court should have applied
Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the
Alguras after their affidavits and supporting
documents showed that petitioners did not
satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly
income and ownership of real property under
Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras
as indigent litigants, the trial court should
have called a hearing as required by Rule 3,
Section 21 to enable the petitioners to adduce
evidence to show that they didn't have property
and money sufficient and available for food,
shelter, and basic necessities for them and
their family. In that hearing, the respondents
would have had the right to also present
evidence to refute the allegations and evidence
in support of the application of the petitioners
to litigate as indigent litigants. Since this Court
is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the
case to the trial court to determine whether
petitioners can be considered as indigent
litigants using the standards set in Rule 3,
Section 21. (IMPORTANT)
In other words, if applicant meets the
salary and property requirement under
Sec.19 of Rule 141, the grant of application
is MANDATORY.
If the applicant does not satisfy one or both
of the requirements, the Court shall not
denied the application outright, instead,
The Court shall apply the Indigency Test
under Sec. 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound
discretion in determining if the applicant
can be exempted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and
the April 14, 2000 Order granting the
disqualification of petitioners, the July 17,
2000 Order denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration, and the September 11, 2001
Order dismissing the case in Civil Case No.
RTC-99-4403 before the Naga City RTC,
Branch 27 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Furthermore, the NAGA CITY RTC IS
ORDERED to set the "Ex-Parte Motion to
Litigate as Indigent Litigants" for hearing
and apply Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether
petitioners can qualify as indigent litigants.
2. Re: Letter Dated April 18, 2011 of Chief
Public Atty. Acosta requesting exemption
from payment of sheriff’s expenses
A.M. No. 11-10-03-O, April 18, 2011
Art. III, § 11
FACTS:
Atty. Acosta, Chief Public Officer of the
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) sent a letter to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
seeking to clarify as to the exemption of PAO’s
clients from the payment of sheriff’s expenses,
alleging that the PAO’s clients in its Regional
Office in Region VII are being charged with the
payment of sheriff’s expenses in the amount of
Php 1,000 upon the filing of a civil action in
court. She claimed that sheriff’s expenses
should not be exacted from PAO’s clients since
Sec. 6 of R.A. 9406 specifically exempts them
from the payment of docket and other fees
incidental to instituting an action in court and
other quasi-judicial bodies.
In reply to Atty. Acosta, the OCA clarified
that PAO’s clients, notwithstanding their
exemption under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406
from payment of “docket and other fees
incidental to instituting an action in court,” are
not exempted from the payment of sheriff’s
expenses. The OCA explained that sheriff’s
expenses, strictly speaking, are not considered
as “legal fees” under Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court since they are not payable to the
government; they are payable to the
sheriff/process server to defray his travel
expenses in serving court processes in relation
to the litigant’s case.
Atty. Acosta replied, maintaining that
while sheriff’s expenses may not be strictly
considered as a legal fee, they are nevertheless
considered as a fee which is incidental to the
filing of an action in court and, hence, should
not be exacted from PAO’s clients. She pointed
out that the imposition of sheriff’s expenses on
PAO’s clients would render the latter’s
exemption from payment of docket and other
fees under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 nugatory.
Considering that the matter involves an
interpretation of R.A. No. 9406, Atty. Acosta
requested that the same be referred to the
Court en banc for resolution.
The OCA maintained its position and
stance in their previous letter, stressing that
the Php 1,000 sheriff’s expenses are not the
same as the sheriff’s fee fixed by Sec. 10, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, and recommended to
the Court en banc to deny Atty. Acosta’s
request for exemption. Adopting the
recommendation of the OCA, the Court en banc
issued a resolution which denied Atty. Acosta’s
request.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the imposition of sheriff’s
expenses would hinder the access of PAO’s
clients to the courts, contrary to Art. 3, Sec.
11.
RULING:
No.
The officials and employees of PAO are
authorized to serve the summons, subpoenas
and other court processes in behalf of their
clients would relieve the latter from the burden
of paying for the sheriff's expenses despite
their non-exemption from the payment thereof
under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406. The amount
to be defrayed in the service of summons,
subpoena and other court processes in behalf
of its clients would consequently have to be
taken from the operating expenses of PAO. In
turn, the amount advanced by PAO as actual
travel expenses may be taken from the amount
recovered from the adversaries of PAO's clients
as costs of suit, attorney's fees or contingent
fees prior to the deposit thereof in the National
Treasury.
The Court, however, is not unmindful of
the predicament of PAO’s clients. In exempting
PAO’s clients from paying docket and other
legal fees, R.A. No. 9406 intended to ensure
that the indigents and the less privileged, who
do not have the means to pay the said fees,
would not be denied access to courts by reason
of poverty. Indeed, requiring PAO’s clients to
pay sheriff’s expenses, despite their exemption
from the payment of docket and other legal
fees, would effectly fetter their free access to
the courts thereby negating the laudable intent
of Congress in enacting R.A. No. 9406.
Free access to the courts and adequate
legal assistance are among the fundamental
rights which the Constitution extends to the
less privileged. Thus, Section 11, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution mandates that “[f]ree
access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.” The
Constitution affords litigants—moneyed or poor
—equal access to the courts; moreover, it
specifically provides that poverty shall not bar
any person from having access to the courts.
Accordingly, laws and rules must be
formulated, interpreted, and implemented
pursuant to the intent and spirit of this
constitutional provision.
Access to justice by all, especially by the
poor, is not simply an ideal in our society. Its
existence is essential in a democracy and in
the rule of law. Without doubt, one of the most
precious rights which must be shielded and
secured is the unhampered access to the
justice system by the poor, the underprivileged
and the marginalized.
 SECTION 12
1. Escobedo vs. Illinois [378 US 478 (1964)]
Facts: Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken
to a police station for questioning. Over several
hours, the police refused his repeated requests
to see his lawyer. Escobedo subsequently
confessed to murder. Escobedo appealed the
affirmation of his conviction of murder by the
Supreme Court of Illinois, which held that
petitioner's confession had been admissible
even though it was obtained after he had
requested and been denied the assistance of
counsel.
Issue: Was Escobedo denied the right to
counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment?
Ruling: In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice
Goldberg, the Court ruled that Escobedo’s Sixth
Amendment rights had been violated. The
Court reasoned that the period between arrest
and indictment was a critical stage at which an
accused needed the advice of counsel perhaps
more than at any other. A suspect who was
being interrogated by police while in custody,
who had not been warned of his right to remain
silent, and who had requested and been denied
an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, had
been denied the assistance of counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment. Any
statement elicited under such circumstances
could not be used against him at a criminal
trial. The Court therefore reversed Escobedo’s
judgment and remanded for further
proceedings.
Justice Harlan dissented, opining that the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois
should be affirmed because the majority's
conclusion would unjustifiably fetter legitimate
methods of criminal law enforcement.
Justice Stewart dissented on the grounds that
the right to assistance of counsel should not
attach until the formal institution of
proceedings by indictment, information, or
arraignment, and that the majority's holding
would have an unfortunate impact on the fair
administration of criminal justice.
Justice White, joined by Clark and Stewart,
dissented on the grounds that the majority's
decision will be applicable whenever the
accused becomes a suspect, rendering
admissions to the police inadmissible unless
the accused waives his right to counsel and
rendering the task of law enforcement more
difficult.
2. Miranda vs. Arizona [384 US 436 (1966)]
Facts: On March 2, 1963, Patricia McGee (not
her real name) was kidnapped and raped while
walking home after work in Phoenix, Arizona.
She accused Ernesto Miranda of the crime
after picking him out of a lineup. He was
arrested and taken to an interrogation room
where after three hours he signed a written
confession to the crimes. The paper on which
he wrote his confession stated that the
information was given voluntarily and that he
understood his rights. However, no specific
rights were listed on the paper.
Miranda was found guilty in an Arizona court
based largely on the written confession. He was
sentenced to 20 to 30 years for both crimes to
be served concurrently. However, his attorney
felt that his confession should not be
admissible due to the fact that he was not
warned of his right to have an attorney
represent him or that his statement could be
used against him. Therefore, he appealed the
case for Miranda. The Arizona State Supreme
Court did not agree that the confession had
been coerced, and therefore upheld the
conviction. From there, his attorneys, with the
assistance of the American Civil Liberties
Union, appealed to the US Supreme Court.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Supreme Court actually decided four
different cases that all had similar
circumstances when they ruled on Miranda.
Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the court
ended up siding with Miranda with a 5-4 vote.
At first, the attorneys for Miranda attempted to
argue that his rights had been violated as he
had not been given an attorney during the
confession, citing the Sixth Amendment.
However, the Court focused on the rights
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment including
that of protection against self-incrimination.
The Majority Opinion written by Warren stated
that "without proper safeguards, the process of
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected
or accused of crime contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual’s will to resist and to compel him
to speak where he would otherwise do so
freely." Miranda was not released from prison,
however, because he had also been convicted
of robbery which was not affected by the
decision. He was retried for the crimes of rape
and kidnapping without the written evidence
and found guilty a second time.
The Significance of Miranda v. Arizona
The Supreme Court decision in Mapp v. Ohio
was quite controversial. Opponents argued
that advising criminals of their rights would
hamper police investigations and cause more
criminals to walk free. In fact, Congress passed
a law in 1968 that provided the ability for
courts to examine confessions on a case-by-
case basis to decide whether they should be
allowed. The main result of Miranda v. Arizona
was the creation of the "Miranda Rights." These
were listed in the Majority Opinion written by
Chief Justice Earl Warren: "[A suspect] must be
warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if
he so desires."
3. People of the Philippines vs. Mahinay
G.R. No. 122485, February 1, 1999
Facts: Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a
houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was
to take care of Isip’s house which was under
construction adjacent to the latter’s residence.
The victim was a 12-year old girl who used to
frequent the residence of Isip. On the late
evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was
reported missing by her mother. The following
morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger
jeepney and disappeared. The victim’s body was
found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same
day. She was found in the septic tank wearing
her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy
showed that the victim was raped and was
strangled to death. Upon re-examining the
crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty
white short pants, a brown belt and a yellow
hair ribbon which was identified by the victim’s
mother to belong to her daughter. Also, they
found a pair of blue slippers which Isip
identified as that of the appellant. Also found in
the yard, three armslength away from the septic
tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a
pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively
identified by Isip as appellant’s belongings. The
appellant was soon arrested and executed an
extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated
how the crime was committed. The trial ensued
and the lower court convicted him of the crime
of Rape and was sentenced to death.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant’s extra-
judicial confession was validly taken and in
accordance with his rights under Section 12 of
the Bill of Rights.
Ruling: The conviction of the appellant is
affirmed. The Court ruled that the appellant’s
extrajudicial confession was taken within the
ambit of the law as evinced by the records and
testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned
and explained to him his constitutionally
guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial
rights.
4. People v Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 137405 September 27, 2002
FACTS: The case at bar involves an automatic
review of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, which
convicted Delfin dela Cruz of rape and
sentenced him to death. On October 24, 1996,
Marikit, then sixteen years of age, had a
reunion with her family at their farm in
Lagnas, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, on the
occasion of the birthday of her father, herein
appellant Delfin dela Cruz. The celebration
ended at past 9:00 o’clock in the evening when
appellant’s two drinking buddies left the place.
Shortly before midnight, when Marikit was
already preparing to sleep, her mother telling
her that appellant wanted to talk to her
summoned her. Marikit obeyed and, together
with her mother, she went to her father who
was waiting at the water pump near their
house. Delfin told Marikit to go with him to the
hut of their farm. Upon arriving at the hut
which was one kilometer from their house,
appellant asked Marikit ‘what is his gift.’
Marikit replied ‘I do not have a gift.’ Appellant
told Marikit ‘to just follow what he wants.’
Thereafter, appellant suddenly embraced and
kissed Marikit, and started undressing her.
She tried to resist but he threatened to harm
her. After he removed all of his daughter’s
clothes, he placed himself on top of her and
forcing her to face him. Facts stated that Delfin
‘was able to penetrate his private part on my
private part.’ During their four hours stay
inside the hut, appellant sexually abused his
daughter twice. Three days thereafter, on
October 28, 1996, Marikit decided to file a
complaint against her father. On the same
date, she submitted herself to medical
examination. The examining Health Officer, Dr.
Wilfred G. Kenept, issued a Medico-Legal
Certificate. Internal Examination shows normal
looking external genitalia, with abrasion on the
posterior aspect of the left labia minora, hymen
not intact. In a statement with the police
executed on the same date, Marikit also
disclosed that appellant had first sexually
abused her when she was still thirteen years of
age, although she did not formally lodge her
complaint then on the belief that appellant
would change his ways. The defense however
had a different version of the accounts that
they claim to have transpired. Delfin denied
having raped the complainant on the night of
October 24, 1996. He admitted that October
24, 1996 was his birthday. He allegedly
maltreated his daughter when the latter was in
first year high school but he never sexually
abused her. For the sake of his family he will
admit that it was his fault. The prosecution
has been able to prove by clear and convincing
evidence, of Delfin’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, foremost of which are the
straightforward testimony of the complaining
witness, the Medical Certificate issued by Dr.
Wilfred Kenept on October 28, 1996 that indeed
the private complainant’s hymen is no longer
intact, and the existence of abrasion on the
posterior aspect of her left labia minora, thus
indicating recent sexual intercourse
conformably with the date when she was
sexually abused, and the admission of the
accused himself in his two letters he wrote to
his daughter Marikit.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution’s evidence was
sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
HELD: The sufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence was not raised as an issue. Still, the
Court reviewed it under the principle that an
appeal in a criminal case, especially one in
which the death penalty has been imposed,
opens the entire record for scrutiny. We shall
take up the appropriate penalty as the second
issue. The trial court erred in imposing the
penalty of death for the crime charged despite
that accused was not properly informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him,
which is in violation of his constitutional right.
After a meticulous study of the evidence, we are
convinced that the prosecution has clearly and
sufficiently established the fact of rape and the
culpability of appellant for the crime alleged in
the Information. Verily, we find no reason to
doubt the trial court’s finding of guilt. The
victim testified on the details of the rape
incident in a clear, straightforward and credible
manner. There is no higher evidence of guilt
than the voluntary testimony of the accused
himself. Such admission is evidence of the
highest order, since it is supported by the
strong presumption that no person of normal
mind would deliberately and knowingly confess
to a crime unless prompted by truth and
conscience.
Furthermore, Appellant argues that the
Information under which he was arraigned
charged him only with simple rape as defined
by Article 355 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Such offense he contends, is not punishable
with the death penalty; besides, the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship
were not alleged in the Information. Indeed, in
the present case, the Information did not allege
the qualifying circumstances that the victim
was below eighteen (18) years old when the
offense was committed, and that the offender
was her father. Hence, in no way can appellant
be convicted of qualified rape, because the
Information clearly makes out a case for simple
rape only. In order that the circumstances of
minority and relationship may be appreciated,
both must be specifically alleged in the
information and duly proven during trial, with
equal certainty as the crime itself. The
qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship must at all times be pleaded in the
information, consistent with the constitutional
right of the accused to be informed of the
charges against him. It is a matter of settled
jurisprudence that qualifying circumstances
must be properly pleaded in the indictment.
5. People of the Philippines vs. Loveria
G.R. No. 79138, July 2, 1990
Facts: The accused-appellant David S. Loveria
was charged with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide under the
following information: That on or about the
21st day of February, 1985, in the Municipality
of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with three (3) John
Does whose true name, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and mutually
helping and aiding one another, armed with a
knife, with intent of gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
hold-up a passenger jeepney with Plate No.
NXG-150-Pil. '84, one of the passengers,
Richard Bales y Andres of his Seiko Wrist
Watch worth P300.00 and a colored brown
wallet containing P50.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned
amount of P350.00; that on the occasion of
said robbery, said accused, with intent to kill,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the
said knife one Ricardo Yamson y Malanon,
thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which
directly caused his death, and one Cerilo
Manzanero y Nacion the driver of the said
passenger jeepney, on the vital parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds
which ordinarily would have caused his death,
thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of homicide as
a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of cause independent of
the will of the accused, that is, due to the
timely and able medical attendance rendered to
the said Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion which
prevented his death. Upon being arraigned on
July 3, 1985, the appellant entered a plea of
not guilty. After trial, the trial court found the
appellant guilty as charged.
Issue: Whether or not David Loveria’s
constitutional right to counsel was violated.
Ruling: No. Miranda rights contained in the
constitutional provisions may be invoked by a
person only while he is under custodial
investigation which has been defined as the
"questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. Hence, for
instance, these constitutional rights may no
longer be claimed by a defendant in a criminal
case already pending in court because he is no
longer under custodial investigation. In the
case at bar, Manzanero, upon learning that
certain hold-up men were being detained at the
225th PC Company, Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal in
connection with another robbery, went there to
check. Having identified the appellant among
the detainees, he reported the matter to the
Marikina police. Thereafter, Pat. Bill Ayun
accompanied Manzanero back to the PC
headquarters in Antipolo where Manzanero
identified to Pat. Ayun the appellant as one of
the persons involved in the incident. Pat. Ayun
then took the sworn statement of Manzanero
which was presented in court. Since, as in the
Gamboa case, the appellant was not
investigated when Manzanero was in the
process of identifying him, he cannot claim that
his right to counsel was violated because at
that stage, he was not entitled to the
constitutional guarantee invoked.
6. People of the Philippines vs. Obrero (G.R.
No. 122142, May 17, 2000)
FACTS: Jimmy Obrero is a delivery boy
employed by Angie Cabosas whose business
was selling chickens to customers. Jimmy was
asked to deliver chickens to Emma Cabrera, a
regular customer.
In Jimmy’s extrajudicial confession, he stated
that the day before the robbery, his fellow
employee, Ronnie Liwanag, proposed that they
rob Emma in order to be able to go to La Union
to visit his family. On the day of the robbery,
they learned that only two helpers were then at
the residence of Emma Cabrera, thus they
decided to pull the heist.
Ronnie covered the mouth of one Nena
Berjuega to prevent her from shouting but, as
she tried to run away, Ronnie stabbed and
killed her. Ronnie then gave the knife to Jimmy
who stabbed the younger maid, Remedios Hitta
from which she died. Thereafter, they divided
the money.
This extrajudicial confession is in Tagalog and
signed by Jimmy in the presence of Atty. De los
Reyes. Atty. De los Reyes is a PC Captain of the
WPD Headquarters in UN Avenue. He was at
Station 7 of the WPD because he was
representing a client accused of illegal
recruitment. He was asked by Lt. Javier of the
WPD Homicide Section to assist Jimmy Obrero
in executing an extrajudicial confession.
At the trial, Jimmy Obrero pleaded not guilty of
the crime charged. He said that he came back
from his errand and remitted the amount of
P2000 which had been paid to him. He also
claimed that after being informed of the charges
against him, he was beaten up and detained for
a week and made to execute an extrajudicial
confession. He denied having known or seen
Atty. De los Reyes before and stated that he did
not understand the contents of the extrajudicial
confession which he signed because he did not
know how to read.
Trial court – found Jimmy Obrero guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. The court held that
the accused consented to giving his
extrajudicial confession and that absent any
showing that the assisting lawyer, though a
station commander but of another police
station, was remiss in his duty as a lawyer, the
Court will hold that the proceedings were
regularly conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jimmy Obrero’s
extrajudicial confession is valid and admissible
in evidence.
HELD: There was no proof that his confession
was obtained by force and threat. He did not
seek medical treatment nor even a physical
examination. The confession contains details
that only the perpetrator of the crime could
have given, details which are consistent with
the medico-legal findings.
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed
voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive
evidence showing the declarant’s consent in
the executing the same has been vitiated, such
confession will be sustained.
What renders the confession of Jimmy
inadmissible is the fact that he was not given
the Miranda warnings effectively. There was
only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda
rights to Jimmy without any effort to find out
from him whether he wanted to have counsel
and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or
he wanted the police to appoint one for him.
This kind of giving of warnings has been found
to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to
transmit meaningful information to the
suspect. Especially in this case, care should
have been scrupulously observed by the police
investigator that Jimmy was specifically asked
these questions considering he only finished
the fourth grade of the elementary school.
Moreover, the Constitution requires that
counsel assisting suspects in custodial
interrogations be competent and independent.
In the case at bar, he cannot be considered an
“independent counsel” as contemplated by the
law because he was station commander of the
WPD at the time he assisted Jimmy. As PC
Captain and Station Commander of the WPD,
Atty. De los Reyes was part of the police force
who could not be expected to have effectively
and scrupulously assisted accused in the
investigation.
7. Gamboa vs. Cruz
G.R. No. L-56291, June 27, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner herein was arrested and was
brought to the police station because of
vagrancy. The next day, the petitioner and with
other 5 detainees were ask to line up. The
complainant, meanwhile, during the line up
pointed to the petitioner herein as a suspect of
robbery. After that, he was asked to sit in front
of the complainant while the latter is being
investigated. An information of robbery has
been filed against the herein petitioner.
During the arraignment, the prosecution
offered and presented its evidence. While on the
other hand, the petitioner, with the assistance
of his counsel, instead preparing for his
evidence, file a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer of
evidence. The petitioner filed this motion on the
ground that the conduct of the line up, without
notice, and in the absence of his counsel
violated his constitutional right to counsel and
to due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to
counsel and to due process was violated during
the line up.
HELD: No. The Rights to counsel and to due
process is protected by the constitution
whether it be 1973 or 1987. The right to
counsel attaches upon the start of the
investigation, or when the investigating officers
tries to elicit or ask information from the
accuse,even though the questions appeases to
be innocent. At this point of stage, the
assistance of the counsel is needed in order to
avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false
or coerced admissions or confessions from the
lips fo the person undergoing interrogation, for
the commission of an offense.
When the petitioner was asked to line up with
other detainees, he was not asked any question
nor to answer. The police line up is not wart of
custodial inquest, hence the petitioner was not
entitled to right to counsel.
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the
right to counsel attaches at the start of the
investigation against the respondent, and even
before the adversary judicial proceedings
against the accused begins.
While the court finds no real need to afford a
suspect the services of counsel during a police
line up, the moment there is a move to elicit
admissions or confessions, even a plain
information which may appear innocent or
innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel,
unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall
be made in writing and in the presence of the
counsel.
8. People v. Tito Zuela
GR No. 112177 January 27, 2000
FACTS: The case is an appeal of accused
MaximoVelarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y
Temporas and Tito Zuela y Morandarte from
the decision of the RTCfinding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide.
ISSUES: Whether or not the extra-judicial
confessions were executed in accordance with
the provisions of the 1973 Constitution?
RULING: The right to counsel attaches the
moment an investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information on the crime
from the suspected offender.. In other words,
“the moment there is a move or even urge of
said investigators to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information which
may appear innocent or innocuous at the time,
from said suspect, he should then and there be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right,
but the waiver shall be made in writing and in
the presence of counsel. There was no evidence
that Maximo executed a waiver of his right to
counsel. In light of these facts, we are
constrained to rule that MaximoVelarde’s
extra-judicial statement is inadmissible in
evidence. An uncounselled extra-judicial
confession without a valid waiver of the right to
counsel – that is, in writing and in the
presence of counsel – is inadmissible in
evidence. Contrary to the ruling of the trial
court, the defect in the confessions of Tito and
Nelson was not cured by their signing the
extra-judicial statements before Judge
Bagalacsa.?Nevertheless, the infirmity of
accused-appellants’ sworn statements did not
leave a void in the prosecution’s case. Accused-
appellant Maximo repeated the contents of his
sworn statement to RomualdaAlgarin who, in
turn, related these in court. Such declaration
to a private person is admissible in evidence
against accused-appellant Maximo pursuant to
Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court
stating that the “act, declaration or omission of
a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.” The trial court,
therefore, correctly gave evidentiary value to
Romualda’s testimony.
And in the recent case of People vs. Andan, the
Court reiterated the doctrine enunciated in the
Maqueda case. In Andan, the Court said that
“when the accused talked with the mayor as
confidant and not as a law enforcement officer,
his uncounselled confession did not violate his
constitutional rights. Constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities, but
given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant
orally admitted having committed the crime.”
Treachery was not alleged in the information
but the suddenness of the assault upon Hegino
and Maria from behind was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. As such, treachery may be
appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. Treachery exists when an adult
person illegally attacks a child of tender years
and causes his death.
The crime committed is the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide defined and
penalized in Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code. The trial court correctly considered the
crime as robbery with homicide and not
“robbery with triple homicide” as charged in the
information. The term “homicide” in Article
294(1) is used in its generic sense, embracing
not only the act which results in death but also
all other acts producing anything short of
death. Neither is the nature of the offense
altered by the number of killings in connection
with the robbery. The multiplicity of victims
slain on the occasion of the robbery is only
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
This would preclude an anomalous situation
where, from the standpoint of the gravity of the
offense, robbery with one killing would be
treated in the same way that robbery with
multiple killings would be.
9. Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 97214, July 18, 1994
Facts: Petitioner is the collecting and
disbursing officer of Numancia National
Vocational School found to have
misappropriated public funds for private benefit
after a COA audit. He failed to restitute the
amount despite COA demands. A warrant of
arrest was issued but petitioner pleaded not
guilty and invokes his right to custodial
investigation since during the COA audit and
actual cash count he was made to sign the
certification on the fund shortage in the
absence of a counsel. He further contends that
the shortage of funds was due to the assurance
of certain Macasemo to settle his unliquidated
cash advance and his failure to do so resulted
to the fund shortage.
Issue: Whether or not the right to counsel be
invoked during the COA audit.
Held: No, the right to counsel could not be
invoked during the COA audit since the
procedure is not within the ambit of “custodial
investigation.” A person may be subject to
malversation of funds even in the absence of
direct proof of misappropriation as long as
there is evidence of fund shortage which the
petitioner failed to explain with convincing
justification.
10. People vs. Macam
G.R. Nos. 91011-12, November 24, 1994
Facts: Prosecution’s version: On Aug 18,1987,
Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio
Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque
went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of
Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Ferma Road QC.
Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito invited
the former to have lunch. Benito asked his
maid Salvacion Enrera to call the companions
of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle
outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D.
Roque entered the house while E. Roque
remained in the tricycle. After all the accused
had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam
grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam and
pulled out his uncle’s gun then declared a
hold-up. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam),
children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara
and brought them to the room upstairs. After a
while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and
after she screamed she was stabbed and killed
by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was
also stabbed but survived. The total value of
the items taken was P536, 700.00.
Defense’s version: Danilo Roque stated that he
being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to
Benito’s house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of
paying him, he was given a calling card by
Eduardo Macam so that he can be paid the
following day. Upon arriving, he went with the
accused inside the house to have lunch.
Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the
floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and
announced the hold-up, he was asked to
gather some things and which he abided out of
fear. While putting the said thins inside the car
of Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying
“kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan dahil
kilala ako ng mga yan”. Upon hearing such
phrase he escaped and went home using his
tricycle. He also testified that his brother
Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the
province and in no way can be involved in the
case at bar. On the following day, together with
his brother, they went to the factory of the
Zesto Juice (owned by the father of Eduardo
Macam) for him to get his payment (50.00) . He
and his brother was suddenly apprehended by
the security guards and brought to the police
headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to
admit certain things.
After which, he together with all the accused,
in handcuffs and bore contusions on their
faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces
during investigation, was brought to the QC
General Hospital before each surviving victims
and made to line-up for identification. Eugenio
Cawilan was also charged with Anti-fencing
Law but was acquitted in the said case.
Issue: Whether or Not their right to counsel
has been violated. WON the arrest was valid.
WON the evidence from the line-up is
admissible.
Held: It is appropriate to extend the counsel
guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even
before trial. A police line-up is considered a
“critical” stage of the proceedings. Any
identification of an uncounseled accused made
in a police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER,
the prosecution did not present evidence
regarding appellant’s identification at the line-
up. The witnesses identified the accused again
in open court. Also, accused did not object to
the in-court identification as being tainted by
illegal line-up.
The arrest of the appellants was without a
warrant. HOWEVER, they are estopped from
questioning the legality of such arrest because
they have not moved to quash the said
information and therefore voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court
by entering a plea of not guilty and
participating in trial.
The court believed the version of the
prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining
outside the house served as a looked out.
11. HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176229. October 19, 2011
FACTS: When Gilda Cinco search the bag of Ho
Wai Pang in the Baggage Declaration at the
arrival area, she found boxes of chocolate
which when she saw inside had white
substance. They were then brought to the PNP
after the procedures in the airport.
The RTC found Pang guilty of violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. The CA while affirming
the RTC decision took note that their right to
counsel during custodial investigation was
violated.
ISSUE: Whether the violation of the petitioner's
right to counsel made the evidence taken from
the petitioner inadmissible.
RULING: The SC held in the negative. The SC
reiterated that infractions to the accused
during the custodial investigation render only
extrajudicial confession or admissions of the
suspect inadmissible as evidence. Also, the
guilt of Pang was based on the testimony of
Cinco when she caught Pang in flagrante
delicto transporting shabu.
12. Ladiana vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002
Facts: On December 1989, petitioner, a public
officer, being then a member of the INP
assigned at the Lumban Police Station,
Lumban, Laguna, confronted Francisco San
Juan while the latter was removing the steel
pipes which were previously placed to serve as
barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along
P. Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban,
Laguna, when Francisco San Juan told the
accused that the latter has no business in
stopping him, said accused who was armed
with a firearm, with intent to kill and did then
and there feloniously attack and shoot
Francisco San Juan with the firearm thereby
causing the death of Francisco San Juan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Counter-affidavit of
the accused-petitioner may be admitted against
him as evidence of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt even if he was not assisted then by
counsel.
RULING: Yes. A preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. Evidently, a person undergoing
preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor cannot be considered as being
under custodial investigation. In fact, this
Court has unequivocally declared that a
defendant on trial or under preliminary
investigation is not under custodial
interrogation. There is no question that even in
the absence of counsel, the admissions made
by petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are not
violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear
from the undisputed facts that it was not
exacted by the police while he was under
custody or interrogation. Hence, the
constitutional rights of a person under
custodial investigation as embodied in Article
III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not
at issue in this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused’s
confession is an extrajudicial admission.
RULING: No. We do not, however, agree with
the Sandiganbayan’s characterization of
petitioner’s Counter-Affidavit as an
extrajudicial confession. It is only an
admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one
from the other as follows: "SEC. 26.
Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him. "SEC. 33.
Confession. – The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged,
or of any offense necessarily included therein,
may be given in evidence against him." In a
confession, there is an acknowledgment of
guilt; in an admission, there is merely a
statement of fact not directly involving an
acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal
intent to commit the offense with which one is
charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement
by the accused admitting the commission of
the act charged against him but denying that it
was done with criminal intent is an admission,
not a confession. The Counter-Affidavit in
question contains an admission that petitioner
actually shot the victim when the latter was
attacking him. We quote the pertinent portion:
"[K]aya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod
at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot
na T-shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa
dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa
kabila ng aking pananalag hanggang
magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa
bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na siya ay
tinamaan;" Through the above statement,
petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which
eventually led to the latter’s death -- but denies
having done it with any criminal intent. In fact,
he claims he did it in self-defense.
Nevertheless, whether categorized as a
confession or as an admission, it is admissible
in evidence against him.
SECTION 13
1. LAVIDES VS CA
G.R. 129670 February 1, 2000
FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested on April
3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610
(an act providing for stronger deterrence and
special protection against child abuse,
exploitation and discrimination, providing
penalties for its violation, and other purposes).
His arrest was made without a warrant as a
result of an entrapment conducted by the
police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the
parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel
reported to the police that their daughter, then
16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner
for an assignation that night at petitioner’s
room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman,
Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first
time the police received reports of petitioner’s
activities. When petitioner opened the door, the
police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing
only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon
they arrested him. Based on the sworn
statement of complainant and the affidavits of
the arresting officers, which were submitted at
the inquest, an information for violation of Art.
III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed against
petitioner. petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion
(1) For Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the
Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful
Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of
Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident,
Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter
of Right under the Law on Which He is
Charged. nine more informations for child
abuse were filed against petitioner by the same
complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three
other minor children No bail was
recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed
separate applications for bail in the nine cases.
TRIAL COURT: 2. The accused is entitled to bail
in all the aboveentitled case. He is hereby
granted the right to post bail in the amount of
P80,000.00 for each case or a total of
P800,000.00 for all the cases under the
following conditions: a) The accused shall not
be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the
trial of these cases. He shall and must always
be present at the hearings of these cases; b) In
the event that he shall not be able to do so, his
bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and
forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be
immediately issued and the cases shall proceed
to trial in absentia; c) The hold-departure Order
of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made
only after the arraignment to enable this Court
to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the
accused;
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the
informations against him. Pending resolution
of his motion, he asked the trial court to
suspend the arraignment scheduled on May
23, 1997. He filed a motion in which he prayed
that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to
P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be
done prior to his arraignment. the trial court,
in separate orders, denied petitioner’s motions
to reduce bail bonds, to quash the
informations, and to suspend arraignment.
Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during
which he pleaded not guilty to the charges
against him and then ordered him released
upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of
P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the
May 16, 1997 order and the "hold-departure"
order of April 10, 1997. The pre-trial
conference was set on June 7, 1997. The Court
of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b)
invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of
condition (d) on the ground that the issue had
become moot and academic. Petitioner takes
issue with the Court of Appeals with respect to
its treatment of condition (d) of the May 16,
1997 order of the trial court which makes
petitioner’s arraignment a prerequisite to the
approval of his bail bonds. His contention is
that this condition is void and that his
arraignment was also invalid because it was
held pursuant to such invalid condition.
ISSUE: WON the condition is void and the
arraignment invalid.
HELD: CONDITION IS VOID. bail should be
granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion
to quash. For if the information is quashed and
the case is dismissed, there would then be no
need for the arraignment of the accused. In the
second place, the trial court could ensure the
presence of petitioner at the arraignment
precisely by granting bail and ordering his
presence at any stage of the proceedings, such
as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the
conditions of bail is that "the accused shall
appear before the proper court whenever so
required by the court or these Rules," while
under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the
accused at the arraignment is required to
condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between (1)
filing a motion to quash and thus delay his
release on bail because until his motion to
quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot
be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion
to quash so that he can be arraigned at once
and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s
constitutional right not to be put on trial
except upon valid complaint or information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his
right to bail. The condition imposed in the trial
court’s order of May 16, 1997 that the accused
cannot waive his appearance at the trial but
that he must be present at the hearings of the
case is valid and is in accordance with Rule
114. For another condition of bail under Rule
114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to
appear at the trial without justification despite
due notice to him or his bondsman shall be
deemed an express waiver of his right to be
present on the date specified in the notice. In
such case, trial shall proceed in absentia." Jjsc
Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing
trials in absentia allows the accused to be
absent at the trial but not at certain stages of
the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and
plea, whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during
trial whenever necessary for identification
purposes, and (c) at the promulgation of
sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in
which case the accused may appear by counsel
or representative. At such stages of the
proceedings, his presence is required and
cannot be waived. IT DOES NOT FOLLOW
THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF PETITIONER ON
MAY 23, 1997 WAS ALSO INVALID. Contrary to
petitioner’s contention, the arraignment did not
emanate from the invalid condition that
"approval of the bail bonds shall be made only
after the arraignment." Even without such a
condition, the arraignment of petitioner could
not be omitted. In sum, although the condition
for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his
arraignment and the subsequent proceedings
against him are valid.
2. Yap vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
141529, June 6, 2001
Facts: Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted
of the crime of estafa for misappropriating
amounts equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the
records of the case were transmitted to the
Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail
pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and
allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5
Milion on condition that he will secure “a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the
place of his residence that he is a resident of
the area and that he will remain to be so until
final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice
to the court and private complainant.” He
sought the reduction of the bail but it was
denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He
contended that the CA, by setting bail at a
prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his
right to bail. He also contested the condition
imposed by the CA that he secure a
certification/guaranty, claiming that the same
violates his liberty of abode and travel.
Issue: Whether the proposed bail of
P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right
against excessive bail.
Held: Right to Bail
The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is
unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an
effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail. The
purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance
of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The amount should be
high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when required but no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To
fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil
liability of which petitioner is charged (in this
case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the
impression that the amount paid as bail is an
exaction of the civil liability that accused is
charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is
not intended as a punishment, nor as a
satisfaction of civil liability which should
necessarily await the judgment of the appellate
court.
3. ENRILE V SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015
Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail – The strength of the
Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of
the accused's propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to
the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure
that the accused appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion –
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the
1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule
114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
“No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution.”
FACTS: On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan
Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported
involvement in the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile
in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail,
which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3,
2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued,
leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a
Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a)
Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that,
because of his advanced age and voluntary
surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion
temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is
not a flight risk due to his age and physical
condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its
assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not bail may be granted as
a matter of right unless the crime charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua where the
evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show
that if ever petitioner would be convicted, he
will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show
that petitioner's guilt is strong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because
he is not a flight risk.
HELD:
1. YES. Bail as a matter of right – due process
and presumption of innocence. Article III, Sec.
14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
This right is safeguarded by the constitutional
right to be released on bail. The purpose of bail
is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at trial and so the amount of bail should be
high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but no higher than
what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the
1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule
114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction
of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it
has been established that the evidence of guilt
is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong,
bail may be granted according to the discretion
of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be
filed and acted upon by the trial court despite
the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has
not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the
accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the
appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall
be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may
commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on
motion of any party, review the resolution of
the Regional Trial Court after notice to the
adverse party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In
Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held:
“[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after
the hearing called to ascertain the degree of
guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether
or not he should be granted provisional
liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is
indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The
hearing should primarily determine whether
the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is
described in Cortes vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right
or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct
a hearing of the application for bail regardless
of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.
2. YES.
Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission
to bail
The Supreme Court took note of the
Philippine's responsibility to the international
community arising from its commitment to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We
therefore have the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process and for detainees to
avail of such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from
Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the
SC emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in
Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: “The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has
the responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due
process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to
make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail.
(emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective
of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused
during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded
the clear showing of the fragile health and
advanced age of Petitioner. As such the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted
whimsically and capriciously and was so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].
4. Government of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, G.R.
No. 153675, April 19, 2007
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before
Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were
issued and by virtue of a final decree the
validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The
petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region
filed a petition for the extradition of the private
respondent. In the same case, a petition for
bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that
there was no Philippine law granting the same
in extradition cases and that the respondent
was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration and was
granted by the respondent judge subject to the
following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with
the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues
raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes
of this Court, will further appear for judgment.
If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash
bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport
to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given
immediate notice and discretion of filing its
own motion for hold departure order before
this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the
government prosecutors handling this case or
if they so desire to the nearest office, at any
time and day of the week; and if they further
desire, manifest before this Court to require
that all the assets of accused, real and
personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with
the condition that if the accused flees from his
undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of
the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said
order but was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, this instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not a potential extraditee is
entitled to post bail
Held: A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Petitioner alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail; that there
is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right
to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent
maintained that the right to bail guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a
harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty. In this case, the
Court reviewed what was held in Government of
United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila,
Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007,
that the constitutional provision on bail does
not apply to extradition proceedings, the same
being available only in criminal proceedings.
The Court took cognizance of the following
trends in international law: (1) the growing
importance of the individual person in public
international; (2) the higher value now being
given to human rights; (3) the corresponding
duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to
balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
extradition, on the other. In light of the recent
developments in international law, where
emphasis is given to the worth of the individual
and the sanctity of human rights, the Court
departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held
that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
5. Camara vs. Enage
G.R. Nos. 32951-2, September 17, 1971
Facts: Petitioner De la Camara was the Mun.
Mayor of Misamis Oriental who was arrested
and detained at the Prov. Jail of Agusan for his
alleged participation in the killing of 14 &
wounding of 12 other laborers at the Tirador
Logging Co., at Agusan del Sur. The Prov. Fiscal
of Agusan filed with the CFI a case for multiple
frustrated murder and another for multiple
murder against petitioner. He then filed an
application for bail filed with the lower court
asserting that there was no evidence to link
him with such fatal incident which the court
granted and fixed the amount at Php
1,195,200.00 which is the sum of Php
840,000.00 for the information charging
multiple murder and Php 355,200.00 for the
offense of multiple frustrated murder.
Issue: Whether or not the amount of bail
required by the court is proper?
Held: NO. Before conviction, every person is
bailable except if charged with capital offenses
when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such right
flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Where,
however, the right to bail exists, it should not
be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that
is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It
is understandable why. If there were no
prohibition, the right to bail becomes
meaningless. Nothing can be clearer, therefore,
than that the challenged order fixing the
amount of bail at Php 1,195,200.00 as the bail
should be posted by petitioner is clearly
violative of the constitutional provision.
6. COMENDADOR v. GEN. RENATO S. DE
VILLA (G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991)
FACTS: The petitioners are officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines facing
prosecution for their alleged participation in
the failed coup d' etat that took place on
December 1 to 9, 1989. January 14, 1990, a
Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been
constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 to
investigate the petitioners. January 30, 1990,
the PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena
individually addressed to the petitioners. The
petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of
the charge sheet, sworn statements of
witnesses, and death and medical certificates
of victims of the rebellion. At the first
scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged
the proceedings on various grounds, prompting
the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days to file their
objections in writing through a Motion for
Summary Dismissal. February 27,1990, the
PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the
petitioners 5 days to submit their respective
counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their
witnesses. May 15, 1990, the petitioners
manifested that they were exercising their right
to raise peremptory challenges against the
president and members of GCM No.14 by
invoking Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. GCM
No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory
challenges had been discontinued under P.D.
No.39.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can
manifest the right to peremptory challenge.
HELD: Yes, the petitioners have the right to
peremptory challenge. The right to peremptory
challenge was originally provided under Article
18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War).
November 7,1972, when President Marcos
promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the
Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction,
Procedure, and other matters relevant to
military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the
peremptory challenge.
January 17,1981, President Marcos issued
Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of
the state of martial law throughout the
Philippines. With the termination of martial
law and the dissolution of the military
tribunals created there under, the reason for
the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction
that when the reason of the law ceases, the law
itself ceases. Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa
lex. Applying these rules, we hold that the
withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge
in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the
apparatus of martial law was dismantled with
the issuance of Proclamation No.2045, As a
result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived
and now again allows the right to peremptory
challenge.
SECTION 14
1.Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Previous in this case, herein petitioner
assailed the validity of twenty-four information
which the PCGG filed against him for violation
of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, more
specifically for failure to file his statements of
assets and liabilities covering the years 1962 to
1985 when he was in the government service.
The cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan as
Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429. He argued
that PCGG Commissioner Augusto E. Villarin,
who conducted the preliminary investigation,
had no authority to do so.On May 16, 1995, a
Decision was rendered in said case declaring
the preliminary investigation conducted by the
PCGG invalid.In compliance with the said
decision, the Sandiganbayan issued
resolution giving petitioner fifteen days from
receipt thereof within which to submit his
counter-affidavit and controverting evidence,
furnishing copies thereof to the PCGG. The
Sandiganbayan also gave the PCGG the same
period to file a reply affidavit or pleading if it so
desired. Thereafter, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor was directed to conduct the
reinvestigation.
At that time, however, petitioner was still in
exile abroad. Thus, he failed to submit the
required counter-affidavits. He returned to the
Philippines only on April 27, 2000, after which
he voluntarily surrendered to the
Sandiganbayan and posted the required bail
bond.Petitioner, filed a Motion to Quash the
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-
13429.He argued therein that the PCGG
Commissioner who filed the informations had
no authority to do so. Without granting the
prosecution time to oppose the motion, the
Sandiganbayan, denied the Motion to Quash
and terminated the preliminary investigation
being conducted by the prosecutor.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion in terminating the
preliminary investigation.
Ruling: The Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion when it abruptly terminated
the reinvestigation being conducted by the
prosecutor. In the previous case in G.R. No.
105248 for the holding of a preliminary
investigation was based on the Court’s ruling
that the right to a preliminary investigation is a
substantive, rather than a procedural right.
Petitioners right was violated when the
preliminary investigation of the charges against
him were conducted by an officer without
jurisdiction over the said cases. It bears
stressing that our directive should be strictly
complied with in order to achieve its objective
of affording petitioner his right to due process.
2. Buscayno vs. Military Commission Nos.
1,2,6 and 25
Facts: Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander
Dante and Jose Ma. Sison alias Amado
Guerrero, alleged subversives classified as
"PKP/HMB/CPP/MAMAO and Traditional
Armed Group personalities", were wanted by
the authorities since 1971.Buscayno and Sison
were included in the so-called "National Target
List" of active participants in the conspiracy to
seize political and state power and to take over
the government by force whose arrest was
ordered under 'General Order No. 2 dated
September 22, 1972.
In this instant case, on October 2, 1981,
Buscayno and the Sison spouses filed the
instant omnibus catchall petition for habeas
corpus, prohibition and mandamus couched in
repetitious, involuted and obfuscatory
a verbiage.They prayed that the decision of
Military Commission No. 2 dated May -1. 1981,
convicting Buscayno of subversion and murder
and sentencing him to death by firing squad,
be declared void because he was denied his
constitutional right to present evidence and
that he be released from detention. The
petitioners also asked for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, enjoining the
three Commissions from trying the petitioners,
enjoining Military Commission No. 1 from
continuing with the perpetuation of
testimonies and from requiring the petitioners
to attend the perpetuation proceedings and
enjoining the Review Board-AFP from reviewing
the decision in the subversion and murder
cases.
Issues:
a. Whether they are legally detained.
b.Whether Buscayno has been denied of his
constitutional right to present evidence.
Ruling:
a.The Court finds that they have not been
illegally deprived of their liberty and that there
is no justification to order their release.
Proclamation No. 2045 explicitly provides that
persons, like petitioners who are under
detention for rebellion and the capital offense
of subversion, cannot enjoy the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. Because the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to
them, they are not entitled to bail.
b. Generally, this Court does not exercise over
military commissions the supervisory
jurisdiction which it possesses over civil trial
courts whose interlocutory rulings and
decisions may be reviewed by this Court.
So, the issue as to whether Buscayno was
denied his constitutional right to present
evidence should first be passed upon by the
reviewing military authority and not by this
Court. The propriety of the perpetuation
proceedings in the rebellion case and the
conduct of the trial in the Commission cannot
at this stage be passed upon by this Court.The
Court have definitively ruled that the
petitioners can be tried by the military
commissions and that their cases are within
the jurisdiction and competence of military
tribunals.
3.Dumlao vs. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Dumlao questions the
constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary
to equal protection and due process guarantees
of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any
retired elective provincial or municipal official
who has received payments of
retirement benefits and shall have been 65
years of age at the commencement of the term
of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall
not be qualified to run for the same elective
local office from which he has retired.
According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to
class legislation. Petitioners Igot and
Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4
of Batas Pambansa Blg 52, which states that
any person who has committed any act of
disloyalty to the State, including those
amounting to subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be
qualified for any of the offices covered by the
act, or to participate in any partisan activity
therein: provided that a judgment of conviction
of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of
such fact and the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court
or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of
such fact.
Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned
statutory provisions violate the Constitution
and thus, should be declared null and void
Held: In regards to the unconstitutionality of
the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains
constitutional and valid. However, in regards to
the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be
declared null and void for being violative of the
constitutional presumption
of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
“Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973
Constitution). An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with
guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for
public office on the ground alone that charges
have been filed against him before a civil or
military tribunal. It condemns before one is
fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made between
a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one
against whom charges have been filed for such
acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run
for public office. A person disqualified to run
for public office on the ground that charges
have been filed against him is virtually placed
in the same category as a person already
convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto,
which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during
the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal
Code).”
4. Malana vs. People
Facts: The petitioners Dominador and Rodel,
together with their acquitted co-accused
Elenito, were charged with the crime of murder
and multiple frustrated murder before the
RTC. The charges stemmed from an incident
that left Betty dead, and her daughter Suzette
and granddaughter injured. The appellants
pleaded not guilty during the arraignment.
Vicente, the husband of deceased Betty,
testified that appellants had been threatening
to liquidate him and his family, due to their
belief that he was in the practice of witchcraft
by which he had caused the deaths of Rodels
parents-in-law. Appellants proffered the
defenses of denial and alibi. The RTC found
Dominador and Rodel guilty of two (2) separate
crimes of murder and frustrated murder, and
acquitted Elenito on the ground of reasonable
doubt. The trial court gave credence to the
eyewitness accounts of Vicente and Suzette
who positively identified the appellants as two
of the three perpetrators of the crime. However,
the trial court acquitted Elenito as he was not
positively identified by Suzette as the third
man and his physical appearance does not fit
the description of the tall fat man seen by
Suzette. The CA affirmed the guilt of
appellants.
Issue: What is the “Equipoise” rule? When can
this be invoked?
Ruling: This rule provides that where the
evidence of the parties in a criminal case is
evenly balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales
in favor of the accused. There is, therefore, no
equipoise if the evidence is not evenly
balanced. Said rule is not applicable in the
case before us because the evidence here
presented is not equally weighty. The equipoise
rule cannot be invoked where the evidence of
the prosecution is overwhelming.
Against the direct, positive and convincing
evidence for the prosecution, appellants could
only offer denials and uncorroborated alibi. It is
elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed
by positive identification that is categorical,
consistent and untainted by any ill motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in
law. The prosecution witnesses positively
identified appellants as two of the perpetrators
of the crime. It is incumbent upon appellants to
prove that they were at another place when the
felony was committed, and that it was
physically impossible for them to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. This they failed to prove. Ultimately,
the Court also said that there is no merit in
appellants assiduous assertion that they
should be acquitted under the equipoise rule in
view of what to them are doubts as to their
guilt.
5. Marquez vs. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: This petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, petitioner Joey P.
Marquez February 11, 2009 Resolution of the
5th Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB-5th
Division) in Criminal Case Nos. 27903, 27904
and 27905; and its 2] May 20, 2009 Resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration.
In the assailed issuances, the SB-5th
Division denied Marquez’s Motion to Refer
Prosecution’s Evidence for Examination by the
Questioned Documents Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
From the records, it appears that as a
result of the Report on the Audit of Selected
Transactions and Walis Ting-ting for the City of
Parañaque for the years 1996 to 1998,
conducted by the Special Audit Team of the
Commission on Audit (COA), several anomalies
were discovered involving Marquez, then City
Mayor and Chairman of the Bids and Awards
committee of Parañaque City; and Ofelia C.
Caunan (Caunan), Head of the General Services
Office of said city.
It was found that, through personal
canvass and without public bidding, Marquez
and Caunan secured the procurement of
several thousand rounds of bullets of different
calibers that were grossly overpriced from VMY
Trading, a company not registered as an arms
and ammunitions dealer with either the
Firearms and Explosives Division of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) or the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan - 5th
division committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it issued its resolutions respectively
dated february 11, 2009 and May 20, 2009
denying the petitioner’s Motion to Refer
prosecution’s evidence for Examination by the
Questioned Documents Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation which denial is in
violation of his right to present evidence and
his twin constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection of law.
Ruling: One of the most vital and precious
rights accorded to an accused by the
Constitution is due process, which includes a
fair and impartial trial and a reasonable
opportunity to present one’s defense.
It is well settled that due process in
criminal proceedings requires that (a) the court
or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity
to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered
only upon lawful hearing.
Should the trial court fail to accord an
accused reasonable opportunity to submit
evidence in his defense, the exercise by the
Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted
as this amounts to a denial of due process.
Thus, for having denied Marquez the
opportunity to be heard and to produce
evidence of his choice in his defense, the SB-
5th Division committed grave abuse of
discretion warranting intervention from the
Court. The anti-graft court should allow him to
refer the evidence of the prosecution to the
Questioned Documents Section of the NBI for
examination at the soonest time possible and
for the latter to immediately conduct such
examination and to submit the results to the
court within a reasonable time.
6. People vs. Holgado
Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged
in the court of First Instance of Romblon with
slight illegal detention because according to the
information, being a private person, he did
"feloniously and without justifiable motive,
kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the
house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours
thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her
personal liberty." On the day of the trial, the
trial court proceeded with the accused
appearing without a lawyer who then plead
guilty, submitting himself to the proceedings.
Two days later, the trial court rendered a
decision convicting the appellant.
Issue: Whether the accused was afforded due
process?
Ruling: Under this provision, when a defendant
appears without attorney, the court has four
important duties to comply with: 1 — It must
inform the defendant that it is his right to have
attorney before being arraigned; 2 — After
giving him such information the court must ask
him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 — If
he desires and is unable to employ attorney,
the court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him; and 4 — If the accused desires to
procure an attorney of his own the court must
grant him a reasonable time therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with
by the trial court. The record discloses that said
court did not inform the accused of his right to
have an attorney nor did it ask him if he
desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to
inquire whether or not the accused was to
employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable
time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio.
The question asked by the court to the accused
was "Do you have an attorney or are you going
to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question
fail to inform the accused that it was his right
to have an attorney before arraignment, but,
what is worse, the question was so framed that
it could have been construed by the accused as
a suggestion from the court that he plead guilty
if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair
hearing in violation of the due process clause
contained in our Constitution.
7. US vs. Karelsen
Facts: J. Valentine Karelsen, on the 2nd day of
April, 1903, whilst acting as postmaster at
Calamba, of the Province of Laguna, P. I., and
having in his charge public funds belonging to
the post-office, withdrew, for his own use and
benefit, the sum of $1,000, gold currency of the
United States, the property of the Post-Office
Department of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, contrary to the statutes
made and provided in such cases.This
complaint was presented on the 27th day of
April, 1903. On the 21st day of May, 1903, the
said accused presented a demurrer to the said
complaint, first, alleging on with one of the
grounds that the amount of the funds alleged to
have been embezzled does not appear in the
complaint. Second, because the penalty fixed
by article 390 of the Penal Code for
embezzlement is based upon the number of
pesetas embezzled, and that the court could not
measure the value of the money given in the
complaint in pesetas, there being no fixed
equivalent value of gold dollars in pesetas;
third, that no person should be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of
law, and in all criminal prosecutions the
defendant shall enjoy the right to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against
him and that the complaint must contain a
description of all the requisites of the crime, so
that the accused may know just what offense
he must prepare to defend himself against.
The court overruled the said demurrer. On the
same day the defendant was duly arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. The cause thereupon
proceeded to trial on the same date.The court,
after hearing the evidence adduced in the trial
of said cause, found the defendant to be guilty
of the crime of embezzlement of public funds,
hence the intention to appeal to this court from
said sentence.
It is alleged that the court committed error in
announcing its sentence based on a complaint
that is not specific,the petitioner pertaining
that one of the grounds that the amount of the
funds alleged to have been embezzled does not
appear in the complaint.
Issue: Whether the Court erred in committed
an error in announcing its sentence based on
the complaint not specifying the amount
alleged to have been embezzled by the
appellant.
Ruling: A complaint for the crime of
embezzlement ought to state the description of
the property embezzled with the same
particularity as is required in a complaint for
larceny. But in the case of larceny the property
was in the possession of the owner, and he is
presumed to know its particular description,
while in embezzlement where the offense is
committed by a person in the course of a long,
continuous employment as a clerk, cashier, or
postmaster, who is daily receiving and
disbursing large sums of money, a description
of the pieces of denominations of the money is
absolutely impossible. In such a case, if his
accounts are correctly kept, the only
description which can be made is by a general
statement of the amount which his books
disclose.
In the present case the books of the
accused showed that he had the sum of
$1,046.64, gold, United States currency,
belonging to the Post-Officce Department on
the 1st day of April, 1903. He is charged with
embezzling "$1,000, gold, legal money of the
United States." This allegation is in substance
in the terms of his own accounts, and the
court fails to see how he can in any way
misunderstand the allegation or be confused in
making his defense under it.
8. People vs. Quitlong
Facts: Jonathan Calpito and his companions
who were on their way home bought fishballs.
When Calpito counted his change, he saw that
he has been handed lesser than his supposedly
change. Commotion arose between the groups
when Calpito confronted the fishball vendor.
Calpito got stabbed and then eventually died.
The prosecution in drafting the indictment
original and amended informations failed to
explicitly allege the conspiracy among
respondents.
Issue: Whether the court violated the
constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of his
accusation because of the claim of conspiracy
without it alleged in the original information?
Ruling: An information, in order to ensure that
the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of his
accusation is not violated, must state the name
of the accused; the designation given to the
offense by the statute; a statement of the acts
or omissions so complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time and date of the commission
of the offense; and the place where the offense
has been committed. In embodying the
essential elements of the crime charged, the
information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the
culpability and liability of the accused so that
the accused can properly prepare for and
undertake his defense. One such fact or
circumstance in a complaint against two or
more accused persons is that of conspiracy.
Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital
of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to
during trial, may be corrected or supplied by
competent proof, an allegation, however, of
conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal
liability to an accused for the act of another or
others, is indispensable in order to hold such
person, regardless of the nature and extent of
his own participation, equally guilty with the
other or others in the commission of the crime.
Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be
appreciated, the individual acts done to
perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary
importance, the act of one being imputable to
all the others.  Verily, an accused must know
from the information whether he faces a
criminal responsibility not only for his acts but
also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
9. Conde vs. Rivera
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal
midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to
respond to no less the five information for
various crimes and misdemeanors, has
appeared with her witnesses and counsel at
hearings no less than on eight different
occasions only to see the cause postponed, has
twice been required to come to the Supreme
Court for protection, and now, after the
passage of more than one year from the time
when the first information was filed, seems
as far away from a definite resolution of her
troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been
denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.
Held: Philippine organic and statutory law
expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all
other accused persons, has a right to a speedy
trial in order that if proven innocent she may
go free, and she has been deprived of that right
in defiance of law. We lay down the legal
proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of
the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this
instance for more than a year, the accused
is entitled to relief by a proceeding in
mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his
liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom.
10. Mateo vs. Villaluz
Facts: Petitioners are among those being tried
by respondent Judge for the offense of robbery
in band with homicide. Thereafter, an
extrajudicial statement by one Rolando Reyes,
who was later on likewise indicted for the same
offense, implicating petitioners, was subscribed
before respondent Judge. That was the
background of a motion for his disqualification,
as the aforesaid Rolando Reyes, when called
upon to testify as an additional witness for the
prosecution impugned his written declaration
stating that it was executed as a result of a
threat by a government agent. It is now
contended that such a repudiation would not
sit well with respondent Judge, who had thus
placed himself in a position of being unable to
pass on such question with that degree of
objectivity required by due process, although
admittedly, such a move did not fall squarely
within one of the specific grounds to inhibit
judges. Respondent Judge turned down this
plea for disqualification. Hence, this petition,
based on the asserted violation of a
constitutional right not to be convicted of an
offense without due process of law. 
Issue: Whether the circumstance of a party
having subscribed before respondent Judge an
extra-judicial statement purporting to describe
the manner in which an offense was
committed, later on repudiated by him as the
product of intimidation in the course of his
having been asked to testify against
petitioners, would suffice to negate that degree
of objectivity the Constitution requires?
Ruling: The Court ruled in the affirmative.
Petitioners are thus entitled to the relief sought.
Respondent Judge could not be totally immune
to what apparently was asserted before him in
such extrajudicial statement. It is now beyond
dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in
the absence of that degree of objectivity on the
part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of
his being fair and being just. Thereby there is
the legitimate expectation that the decision
arrived at would be the application of the law to
the facts as found by a judge who does not play
favorites.
Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not in the
slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout
with his later declaration that there was
intimidation by a government agent exerted on
him. That was hardly flattering to respondent
Judge. It is not only that. His sense of fairness
under the circumstances could easily be
blunted. The absence of the requisite due
process element is thus noticeable. There is
this circumstance even more telling. It was he
who attested to its due execution on October 1,
1971 wherein Rolando Reyes admitted his
participation in the crime and in addition
implicated petitioners. At that time, their
motion for dismissal of the charges against
them was pending; its resolution was deferred
by respondent Judge until after the prosecution
had presented and rested its evidence against
affiant, who was himself indicted and tried for
the same offense, but in a separate proceeding.
It cannot be doubted then that respondent
Judge in effect ruled that such extra-judicial
statement was executed freely. With its
repudiation on the ground that it was not so at
all, coercion having come into the picture there
is apparent the situation of a judge having to
pass on a question that by implication had
already been answered by him. Such a fact
became rather obvious. For respondent Judge
was called upon to review a matter on which he
had previously given his opinion. It is this
inroad in one's objectivity that is sought to be
avoided by the law on disqualification. The
misgivings then as to the requirement of due
process for "the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge" not being met are more titan justified.
11. Garcia vs. Domingo
Facts: In Branch I the City Court of Manila
presided over by petitioner Judge, there were
commenced, by appropriate informations eight
(8) criminal actions against respondent
Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and
Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana. Fourteen trial
dates were held at the chamber of petitioner
Judge with consent and without objection from
the respondents. However later, Carbonnel
through their counsel filed to the the Court of
First Instance a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the application for preliminary,
prohibitory and mandatory in junction citing
jurisdictional defects. The respondent Judge
then issued a restraining order causing the
deferment of the judgment. After proceedings,
the latter issued an order declaring that the
“constitutional and statutory right of the
accused for a free and impartial trial” has been
violated.
Issue: Whether or not the judge denied the
accused of public trial.
Held: No, the accused is not denied of public
trial. There is no showing that the public was
excluded. Though it is to admit that the size of
the chamber reduces the number of persons
who could be present, such does not
transgress the right of a person to a public
trial. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. It is also to be duly noted that the
respondents did not object as to the fourteen
trials previously held. Moreover, the Court
cited U.s vs. Mercado wherein the trial against
the accused was held in Bilibid and that the
Court deems that the non-objection of the
accused is deemed as a waiver of his right to a
public trial.
12. People vs. Ramos
Facts: At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of
May 3. 1981, while P/Lt. E. Mediavillo and
P/Sgt. A. Linga were on routine patrol along
Taft Avenue, they had seen and observed one
Malcon Olevere , acting suspiciously near the
corner of Estrada Street. The police officers,
after identifying themselves, stopped and
frisked the suspect and found in his
possession dried marijuana leaves. The police
officers thereafter placed Malcon Olevere under
arrest. Upon investigation, suspect Olevere
declared that he bought the recovered
marijuana leaves from one ROGELIO RAMOS,
alias "Balanchoy". The following day, at about
12:00 o'clock noon, a police team with suspect
Malcon Olevere proceeded to the residence of
appellant Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan in 2366
Singalong, Malate, Manila and arrested him.
The police operatives immediately brought
appellant to the Drugs Enforcement Section
Western Police Department Headquarters for
investigation.
During the custodial investigation,
suspect Malcon Olevere executed a written
sworn statement implicating the accused-
appellant Rogelio Ramos as the source of the
marijuana leaves.  The accused, after having
been duly apprised of his constitutional rights,
verbally admitted before Lt. E. Mediavillo and
Sgt. A. Linga the commission of the offense
charged. He likewise admitted that he sold to
Malcon Olevere the marijuana leaves for
P10.00.
 After the trial, the Court of First Instance
of Manila (now the Regional Trial Court) found
the accused-appellant Ramos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in view
of the verbal admission given by the appellant
himself and the evidence offered and admitted
in court.
Issue: Whether there is competent and/or
admissible evidence in the record to justify the
conviction of the accused-appellant Ramos.
Ruling: The Court ruled negative. The lower
court erred in admitting as evidence the written
sworn affidavit of Malcon Olevere. It can be
gleaned from the records that Malcon Olevere
executed the written sworn statement declaring
that appellant Ramos sold to him the
marijuana leaves for P10.00. This piece of
evidence is a mere scrap of paper because
Malcon Olevere was not produced in court for
cross-examination. An affidavit being taken ex-
parte is often incomplete and inaccurate. Such
kind of evidence is considered hearsay.
The constitutional right to meet
witnesses face to face in order not to deprive
persons of their lives and properties without
due process of law is well-protected in our
jurisprudence.
For the court to admit the sworn
statement of Malcon Olevere without giving the
adverse party the right to cross-examine him
would easily facilitate the fabrication of
evidence and the perpetration of fraud. The
inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based,
not only on the lack of opportunity on the part
of the adverse party to cross-examine the
affiant, but also on the commonly known fact
that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by
the affiant himself but by another who uses his
own language in writing the affiant's statements
which may either be omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them.
13. Soriano vs. Angeles
Facts: Private respondent Ruel Garcia and his
uncle, Pedro Garcia, were members of the
Caloocan police. Shortly after midnight on
November 7, 1991, they barged into the
barangay hall of Barangay 56, Zone 5 in
Caloocan City, looking for petitioner Ceferino A.
Soriano, the barangay captain. Private
respondent gave petitioner fist blows on the
face four times with his left hand, while he
poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the
same time cursing him. Although there were
four barangay tanods in the barangay hall, they
could not come to the aid of petitioner because
they were held at bay by Pedro Garcia.The
Garcias then left with their companions who
had been waiting outside the hall. Petitioner
was treated for his injuries in the
hospital.Private respondent denied petitioner’s
allegations. He testified that he went to the
barangay hall in the evening of November 6,
1991 because his younger brother had been
reportedly arrested and beaten up by
petitioner. When private respondent insisted
on going inside the barangay hall, petitioner
blocked him and then pushed him on the
chest. Private respondent also pushed
petitioner, causing him to fall on a pile of
nightsticks and injure himself. All the time,
private respondent claimed he had his gun
tucked at his waist.
In acquitting private respondent, respondent
Judge Adoracion C. Angeles found it incredible
that petitioner did not resist or even say
anything when private respondent allegedly
assaulted him and that none of the four
barangay tanods who were near him came to
his aid. She thought that if petitioner had
indeed been attacked, he would have suffered
more serious injuries than a contusion on the
forehead, erythema on the chest, and a
lacerated wound on the lower lip. Respondent
judge also excluded from the evidence the
testimonies of petitioner and barangay tanod
Manuel Montoya on the ground that their
testimonies had not been formally offered in
evidence as required by Rule 132, §§34 to 35 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Issue: Whether the decision is void because it
was not rendered by an impartial tribunal.
Held: No, the SC stated that it was not
rendered by an impartial tribunal and
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
A perusal of the judgment of the trial court
showed that the parties were heard
conformably to the norms of due process,
evidence was presented by both parties and
duly considered, their arguments were studied,
analyzed, and assessed, and judgment was
rendered in which findings of facts and
conclusions of law were set forth. These
conclusions of fact or law cannot in any sense
be characterized as outrageously wrong or
manifestly mistaken or whimsically or
capriciously arrived at. The worst that may
perhaps be said of them is that they are fairly
debatable and may even be possibly erroneous.
But they cannot be declared to have been
made with grave abuse of discretion. Clearly,
there was no mistrial in this case which would
warrant the nullity of the assailed judgment.
The court explained that it is pertinent to cite
certain principles laid down by the Court
regarding the disqualification of a judge for
lack of the objectivity that due process
requires. It is settled that mere suspicion that
a judge is partial to one of the parties is not
enough; there should be evidence to prove the
charge. Bias and prejudice cannot be
presumed, especially weighed against a judge’s
sacred allegation under oath of office to
administer justice without respect to any
person and do equal right to the poor and the
rich. There must be a showing of bias and
prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial
source resulting in an opinion in the merits on
some basis other than what the judge learned
from his participation in the case.
14. People vs. Yambot
Facts: On or about February 7, 1994, in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines. the
aforenamed accused Freddie Yambot, Francis
Versoza, Arnelo Gaviola, Marciano Sayasa and
Edgardo Lingan , conspiring, confederating,
and mutually helping one another, did then
and there kidnapped Francisco J. Bernabe for
the purpose of extorting ransom, as in fact
demand therefor in the amount of P20,000,000
was made by the abovenamed accused,
detaining the said offended party in Jaen,
Nueva Ecija, until the latter was rescued on
February 13, 1994. The accused denied
presented an alibi stating the impossibility of
their presence in the crime scene.
Issue: Whether the alibi and denial of the
appellants are tenable?
Ruling: The Court finds no tenability in the
defense of denial and alibi interposed by
appellants. Denial and alibi cannot prevail over
the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses detailing out appellants' individual
acts in the perpetration of the
crime. Furthermore, the alibi theorized upon by
appellants cannot prosper for their failure to
prove the physical impossibility of their
presence in the locus criminis at the
appropriate time of commission of the crime.
But as regards appellants Freddie Yambot and
Francis Versoza, it appears that they were
denied due process of law. Enshrined in the
constitution is the paramount right of the
accused to "xxx have a compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. xxx"
Procedural due process cannot possibly be
satisfied without a "law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial." The
constitutional right of the accused to be heard
on his defense is inviolate. No court of justice
under our system of government has the power
to deprive him of that right.
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned
uneeringly that the delay in the progress of the
case under scrutiny is not entirely attributable
to appellants Yambot and Verzosa. The trial
court should have granted said appellants'
prayer for the presentation of their witness. It is
worthy to note that the trial court issued a
warrant of arrest against witness Joe Villena
but denied the counsel of said appellants to
present Joe Villena as a witness. In cases
involving death penalty, such as the case at
bar, "the Court exercises the greatest
circumspection"; "there can be no stake higher
and no penalty more severe xxx than the
termination of a human life." Appellants
Freddie Yambot and Marciano Sayasa must be
afforded amplest opportunity to defend
themselves before rendition of judgment, "lest
our conscience be bothered for rendering an
irrevocable and irreversible error."
15. People of the Philippines vs. Jarra
Facts: Petitioner Jara herein was charged of
robbery with parricide and murder, while the
other two, namely Reymundo Vergar and
Roberto Bernadas, with robbery with homicide.
At about June 9 1978, about 1:30 AM, at
Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, the
above mentioned accused conspired,
confederate with each other to rob and kill two
persons in the name of Luisa Jara, the wife of
Felicisimo Jara, and Amparo Bantique. They
killed the two by bludgeoning them with a
hammer and stabbing on their vital parts with
pair of scissors.
Vergara and Bernadas were apprehended and
made an extrajudicial confession and even the
reenactment of the crime, before the Provincial
Commander of the Philippine Constabulary in
Palawan and other police investigators,
admitting that they, and pointing to Jara as
the mastermind, killed the decease, Luisa Jara
and Amparo Bantigue. They made the said
confession and reenactment of the crime
without the assistance and benefit of a
counsel. During the arraignment, Vergara and
Bernadas however retracted their extrajudicial
statements.
Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial
confession made by Vergara and Bernadas
were admissible.
Held: No. In order for the extrajudicial
confession to be valid it should be voluntarily
given, and now, the prosecution has the
burden of proving that the extrajudicial
confession was voluntarily given (adopted from
Miranda case).
In the case at bar, and the record shows that
the interrogation was made incommunicado,
wherein Vergara and Bernadas where each
interrogated, surrounded by the policemen.
With the testimony of Philippine Constabulary
Sergeant, Oscar Ponce De Leon, assigned at
the PC Medical Dispensary TESTIFIED that he
treated Bernadas for cigarette burns and
Vergara for a wound at the tip of his right
hand. Thus it cannot be discounted that the
effect of incommunicado questioning, lighted
cigarettes and other means which leave
physical marks were utilized to secure
voluntary confession. Since the confessions
were inadmissible, Vergara and Bernadas must
be.
SECTION 15
1. Go vs. Ramos
Facts: These three cases are petitions for
review on certiorari. G.R. Nos.167569 and
167570 are regarding the preparation and filing
of deportation charges against Jimmy T. Go. On
the other hand G.R. No. seeks to set aside the
decision and resolution of the Appellate Court.
Considering that all cases arose from the same
factual milieu, the Court resolved to consolidate
G.R. Nos. 167570 and 167569 with G.R. No.
171946 per Resolution dated February 26,
2007.
It all started when Luis Ramos initiated a
petition against petitioner Go alleging that the
latter is an illegal and undesirable alien and not
a Filipino citizen. Ramos alleged that Go
represents himself as a Filipino citizen when in
fact Go’s personal circumstances and other
records indicate that he is Chinese.
Go denies the allegation and insisted that he is
a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his
father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese
father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Article IV,
Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution
and Commonwealth Act No. 625.
The complaint for deportation against Jimmy
was dismissed however the Board of
Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal,
holding that Carlos election of Philippine
citizenship was made out of time. Finding
Jimmy’s claim to Philippine citizenship in
serious doubt by reason of his father’s
questionable election thereof, the Board
directed the preparation and filing of the
appropriate deportation charges against
Jimmy.
Petitioners father and son filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with application for
injunctive reliefs before the RTC challenging
the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with
the deportation proceedings.
Go filed another petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the RTC however, RTC
dissolved the writ and dismissed the decision.
Following the dismissal of the petition the
Board issued a warrant of deportation which
SECTION 16
led to his apprehension and Jimmy’s detention
at the Bureau of immigration. Go commenced
a petition for habeas corpus, but was
dismissed by reason of his provisional release
on bail. A petition for certiorari before the CA
was filed imputing grave abuse of discretion by
the RTC for passing upon their citizenship,
claiming that what they asked for in their
petition was merely the nullification of the
Resolution and the charge sheet. The CA
dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether the petition for habeas corpus
should be dismissed.
Ruling: A petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed
by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
objective of the writ is to determine whether
the confinement or detention is valid or lawful.
If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of a person’s
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for the writ of habeas corpus, for
even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it
may, by reason of some supervening events,
such as the instances mentioned in Section
4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of
the filing of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in
court, he may no longer question his detention
through a petition for issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash
the information and/or the warrant of arrest
duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should
not be allowed after the party sought to be
released had been charged before any court.
The term "court" in this context includes quasi-
judicial bodies of governmental agencies
authorized to order the person’s confinement,
like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration.Likewise, the cancellation of his
bail cannot be assailed via a petition for
habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by
the Bureau of Immigration for deportation
pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts
have no power to release such alien on bail
even in habeas corpus proceedings because
there is no law authorizing it.
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged
before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested
pending his deportation, coupled by this
Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not
ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the
deportation proceedings, the petition for
habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.
This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch
on the other arguments advanced by
respondents regarding the same subject.
SPS. CABALLERO vs. ALFONSO, JR., et. al
(G.R. No. L-45647 August 21, 1987)
FACTS: Petitioners claiming to be the absolute
owners of several contiguous parcels of land
planted with coconut trees, situated in
Salubsub, San Isidro, Gingoog City, filed a
petition for injunction with restraining order
and damages against the herein private
respondents for having allegedly entered the
aforementioned parcels of land and illegally
harvested the fruits of the coconut trees
planted therein without petitioners’ knowledge
and consent, to the prejudice of said
petitioners.
Answering, the private respondents
admitted that the petitioners are the lawful
owners of the parcels of land described in the
petition. They claimed, however, that the
respondents Fernando Esconde, Cesar Navarro,
and Gregorio Bakerel are the tenants on the
land, while the rest, except Francisco (Frank)
Rodriguez who is allegedly an investigator
designated by the Land Reform Farmers’
Association to organize the tenants into an
association to put up a solid front in a program
to help the New Society and to secure the
success of the land reform program, are the
harvesters of the coconut lands. They also
contended that the court has no jurisdiction
over the case, which is purely agrarian in
nature and cognizable by the Court of Agrarian
Relations. After hearing, the respondent judge
found that the issuance of a temporary
restraining order would be proper in the
interest of justice and, consequently, ordered
the respondents to cease and desist from
gathering fruits from the coconut trees in the
land until the petition for injunction shall have
been heard and resolved.
The respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration,the respondent judge issued
the controversial order suspending hearings on
the case pending the comment and/or
certification thereon by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, in accordance with PD 1038.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration of
this order, but their motion was denied. Hence,
the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1038 violates the
constitutional provision on the right to a
“speedy disposition of cases.”
RULING: It is an erroneous assumption that
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is the final
arbiter on the question of whether or not an
ejectment case (or a case designed to harass or
remove a tenant) filed against a tenant, may be
tried by the courts. A close look at the law in
question will show that no such power has
been granted the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
In the first paragraph of Section 2 of the law in
question, it is stated that a case which seeks
the ejectment, harassment or ouster of a
tenant from the landholding should be referred
to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform “for a
preliminary determination of the relationship
between the contending parties.” However, the
second paragraph of the same section provides
that “the preliminary determination of the
relationship between the contending parties by
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his
authorized representative, is not binding upon
the court, judge or hearing officer to whom the
case is certified,” and that “said court, judge or
hearing officer may, after due hearing, confirm,
reverse or modify said preliminary
determination as the evidence and substantial
merits of the case may warrant.” Since the
referral of ejectment and other cases against a
tenant to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is
only for the preliminary determination of the
relationship between the contending parties
and the findings of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform are not binding on the courts, there is
no diminution of judicial power involved in the
operation of the law nor an encroachment on
the independence of the judiciary by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
This Court has categorically declared
that there is an underlying power in the courts
to scrutinize the acts of agencies exercising
quasi-judicial or legislative powers on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though
no right of judicial review is expressly given by
statute.
In the determination of whether or not the
right to a “speedy trial” has been violated,
certain factors may be considered and
balanced against each other. These are length
of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the
right or failure to assert it, and prejudice
caused by the delay.The same factors may also
be considered in answering judicial inquiry
whether or not a person officially charged with
the administration of justice has violated the
“speedy disposition of cases” guarantee.
To strike down a law on the ground that
it violates the guarantee of “speedy disposition
of cases” requires more than a citation of what
may be a misfeasance or malfeasance of a
public officer whose duty and responsibility it
is to apply and administer the law. The
challenge must be based on a clear showing
that it is the law, or its operation, and not
merely its administration, which invades and
impairs constitutionally protected personal or
property rights. In the case at bar, it is true
that the referral of cases to the Department of
Agrarian Reform opens the door to more
bureaucratic red tape and, perhaps, more
opportunities for corrupt practices. The defects
in the bureaucratic system do not, however,
constitute valid arguments against the merits of
legislative policy intended to protect the
legitimate tenant-tiller. Besides, it is not for this
Court to determine the wisdom of PD 1038.
This is a matter left for Congress to re-examine
in the exercise of its legislative authority.
BINAY vs SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. Nos. 120681-83 October 1, 1999)
FACTS: Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in
the Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity) against
Mayor Binay of Makati for ‘Illegal Use of Public
Funds’(RPC A220) and ‘Violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act’(RA 3019) on
September 1994. The informations filed
constituted crimes which were committed by
the petitioner in his incumbency in the year
1987.The petitioner filed a motion to quash
alleging that the delay of more than 6 years
constituted a violation of his constitutional
right of due process. His arraignment therefore
was held in abeyance pending the resolution of
the motions. Subsequently, the SB issued a
resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash
and further the latter’s motion for
reconsideration. In the meantime, the
prosecution filed a motion to suspend the
accused ‘pendente lite’ (benefits) which was
later granted and ordered for a 90-day
suspension. Petition for certiorari was filed by
Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the
resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration be set aside and claimed that
he was denied of his rights when the
suspension was ordered even before he could
file his reply to the petitioner’s opposition. SC
then, directed the SB to permit petitioner to file
said reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated its
previous resolutions and order after the
submission of the reply. Meanwhile, RA 7975
redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on
May 1995 so much so that the petitioner filed
before SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC
of Makati alleging that the SB has no
jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its
resolutions and suspension order on June
1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution denied
the petitioner’s motion. Hence this present
petition, prohibition and mandamus
questioning the jurisdiction of SB over the
criminal cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to
speedy disposition has been violated.
RULING: The Court finds that there was no
undue delay in the disposition of the subject
cases. The prosecution is not bound by the
findings of the Commission on Audit (COA); it
must rely on its own independent judgment in
the determination of probable cause.
Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct its
own review of the COA findings. Judging from
said findings, we find that the cases were
sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length
of time for their resolution. Whether or not
there is probable cause to warrant the filing of
the subject cases is a question best left to the
discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any
grave abuse of such discretion, the Court will
not interfere in the exercise thereof. Petitioner
in this case has failed to establish any such
abuse on the part of the Ombudsman. The
right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the
right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceedings is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured, or when without cause
or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing
test used to determine whether a defendant
has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant is weighed, and such factors as
the length of the delay, the reasons for such
delay, the assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused, and the prejudice caused
by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition
is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would
not be sufficient. In the application of the
constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must
also be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.
MARCOS vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998)
FACTS: Imelda was charged together with Jose
Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious
transaction done in 1984 while they were
officers transacting business with the Light
Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1st
Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division
was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J
Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices.
No decision was reached by the division by
reason of Atienza’s dissent in favor of Imelda’s
innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a
special division of the SB to include JJ Amores
and Cipriano as additional members. Amores
then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to
send in his manifestation. On the date of
Amores’ request, Garchitorena received
manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he
agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J
Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special
order to immediately dissolve the special
division and have the issue be raised to the SB
en banc for it would already be pointless to wait
for Amores’ manifestation granted that a
majority has already decided on Imelda’s favor.
The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been
observed.
RULING: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB
is bereft of merit as there was no strong
showing of Imelda’s guilt. The SC further
emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due
process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting
for Amores’ manifestation. Such procedural
flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan
are fatal to the validity of its “decision”
convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already
created the Special Division of five (5) justices
in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3)
justices in the First Division. At that stage,
petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the
five (5) justices, especially the new justices in
the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario
who may have a different view of the cases
against her. At that point, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may
change their mind and agree with the original
opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround
cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to
the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario.
It may be true that Justice del Rosario had
already expressed his opinion during an
informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed
restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is
not the opinion contemplated by law. But what
is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of
Justice Amores for before it could be given,
Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the
Special Division.
SECTION 17
UNITED STATES vs. BALDOMERO
NAVARRO, ET AL. (G.R. No. 1272, January
11, 1904)
FACTS: The defendants, Baldomero Navarro,
Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano are
convicted of the crime of illegal detention under
Article 481 and of 483 of the Penal Code. They
were sentenced to life imprisonment. Article
481 of the Penal Code provides that a private
person who shall lock up or detain another, or
in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be
punished with the penalty of prision mayor.
The second paragraph of article 483 provides
that one who illegally detains another and fails
to give information concerning his
whereabouts, or does not prove that he set him
at liberty, shall be punished with cadena
temporal in its maximum degree to life
imprisonment. The punishment for the crime
mentioned in article 483 of the Penal Code is
the penalty of cadena temporal in its maximum
degree to cadena perpetua, or in other words
one convicted of simply depriving a person of
his liberty may be imprisoned for a term of
from six to twelve years and one convicted of
depriving a person of his liberty and who shall
not state his whereabouts or prove that he had
set said person at liberty may be punished by
imprisonment for a term of seventeen years
four months and one day, to life, as in this
case. In other words, for failure on the part of
the defendant to testify regarding the
whereabouts of the person deprived of his
liberty, or to prove that he was set at liberty,
the punishment may be increased from
imprisonment for a term of six years to life
imprisonment. On appeal, counsel for the
defendants argued that the provisions of the
law has the effect of forcing a defendant to
become a witness in his own behalf or to take a
much severer punishment. The burden is put
upon him of giving evidence if he desires to
lessen the penalty, or, in other words, of
incriminating himself, for the very statement of
the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that
the defendant set him at liberty amounts to a
confession that the defendant unlawfully
detained the person. So the evidence necessary
to clear the defendant, under article 483 of the
Penal Code, would have the effect of convincing
him under article 481. It is claimed that such
practice is illegal, since section 5 of the
Philippine Bill provides that ". . . no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants' rights
against self-incrimination were violated.
RULING: Yes.
The right against self-incrimination was
established on the grounds of public policy and
humanity - of policy, because if the party were
required to testify, it would place the witness
under the strongest temptation to commit the
crime of perjury, and of humanity, because it
would prevent the extorting of confessions by
duress.
Under the present system, the information
must charge the accused with acts committed
by him prior to the filing of the information and
which of themselves constitute an offense
against the law. The Government cannot charge
a man with one of the necessary elements of an
offense and trust to his making out the rest by
availing himself of his right to leave the entire
burden of prosecuting on the prosecution from
beginning to end. If the disclosure thus made
would be capable of being used against him as
a confession of crime, or an admission of facts
tending to prove the commission of an offense,
such disclosure would be an accusation against
himself. In the present case, if the defendant
disclosed the whereabouts of the person taken,
or shows that he was given his liberty, this
disclosure may be used to obtain a conviction
under article 481 of the Penal Code. It is the
duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one
of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused
can not be called upon either by express words
or acts to assist in the production of such
evidence; nor should his silence be taken as
proof against him. He has a right to rely on the
presumption of innocence until the prosecution
proves him guilty of every element of the crime
with which he is charged.
ISABELA SUGAR CO., INC. vs JUDGE
HIGINIO B. MACADAEG (G.R. No. L-5924
October 28, 1953)
Facts: Petitioner Enrique J. C. Montilla and his
relatives own more than 95 per cent of the
outstanding shares of stock of the petitioner
Isabela Sugar Co., Inc., and respondents Elias
Jereos and the heirs of Jose Yulo only about
1/20 of 1 per cent thereof. At the outbreak of
the last war the Isabela Sugar Co., Inc. was
indebted to the Philippine National Bank.
Montilla paid this obligation to the bank in
Japanese military notes in a private capacity.
After the liberation, the bank agreed to
recognize as valid the payment made by
Montilla; the stockholders resolved in a
meeting to recognize this sum as an obligation
of the company in Montilla’s favor.
Respondents herein filed the complaint in civil
case No. 15273, alleging that Montilla should
be allowed to recover from the company only
the actual value of the depreciated currency
with which he had paid the company’s
obligation to the bank at the same time asked
for the taking of his deposition. In the course of
the taking of the deposition, two questions
were propounded to him, thus:clubjuris
1. Q. — Referring to this property in
Pennsylvania, is it not a fact that you bought
that property on December 7, 1943 from Alicia
Ortiz de Arcega for the price of P65,278.50 in
Japanese notes and you sold it on October 11,
1944 to Severo Capiral for P200,000 Japanese
money? In other words, you earned and made
a profit?
2. Q. — Did you pay any war profit tax for the
sale of those three properties mentioned by
you?
Issue: Whether or not the questions
propounded to him violates his right to self-
incrimination.
Ruling: Yes. It is evident, however, that the
question as to the price that Montilla paid for
the property would have a tendency to
incriminate him, within the meaning of section
79 of Rule 123, Rules of Court, even if the
question did not contain how much it was sold
for and was limited to how much he had
bought it for. In analyzing the import and
application of the constitutional privilege now
subject of the action, Chief Justice Marshall
explained that usually a crime or a criminal act
may contain two or more elements and that a
question would have a tendency to incriminate,
even if it tends to elicit only one of said
elements:ClubJuris
"Many links frequently compose that chain of
testimony which is necessary to convict any
individual of a crime. It appears to the Court to
be the true sense of the rule that no witness is
compellable to furnish any one of them against
himself. It is certainly not only a possible but a
probable case that a witness, by disclosing a
single fact, may complete the testimony against
himself, and to every effectual purpose accuse
himself as entirely as he would by stating every
circumstance which would be required for his
conviction. The fact of itself might be
unavailing; but all other facts without it would
be insufficient. While that remains concealed
within his bosom, he is safe; but draw it from
thence, and he is exposed to a prosecution. The
rule which declares that no man is compellable
to accuse himself would most obviously be
infringed by compelling a witness to disclose a
fact of this description. . . . It would seem, then,
that the Court ought never to compel a witness
to give an answer which discloses a fact that
would form a necessary and essential part of a
crime which is punishable by the laws."
(Marshall in Aaron Burr’s Trial, Robertsons
Rep. I, 208, 244, quoted in VIII Wigmore, p.
355).
US vs TAN TENG
(G.R. No. 7081, September 7, 1912)
FACTS: The sister of Oliva Pacomio (7-year old
girl) discovered that the latter was suffering
from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea.
Oliva related to her sister that in the morning of
the 15th of September 1910, after she took a
bath, Chinaman Tan Teng followed her into her
room and asked her for some face powder,
which she gave him; that after using some of
the face powder upon his private parts he threw
her upon the floor, placing his private parts
upon hers, and remained in that position for
some little time. The sister at once put on foot
an investigation to find the Chinaman. A
number of Chinamen were collected together.
Oliva was called upon to identify the one who
had abused her. Tan Teng was not present at
first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him
at once as the one who had attempted to violate
her.
Upon this information Tan Teng was arrested
and taken to the police station and stripped of
his clothing and examined. The policeman who
examined the defendant swore that his body
bore every sign of the fact that he was suffering
from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea.
The policeman took a portion of the substance
emitting from the body of the defendant and
turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the
purpose of having a scientific analysis made of
the same. The result of the examination showed
that the defendant was suffering from
gonorrhea.
During the trial, the defendant contended that
the result of the scientific examination made
by the Bureau of Science of the substance
taken from his body, at or about the time he
was arrested, was not admissible in evidence
as proof of the fact that he was suffering from
gonorrhea. That to admit such evidence was to
compel the defendant to testify against himself.
The trial court found Tan Teng guilty of the
crime of rape.
ISSUE: Whether the substance taken from Tan
Teng, which indicates that he has gonorrhea,
cannot be used as evidence against Tan Teng
on the ground that it is violative of the
constitutional injunction against self-
incrimination.
RULING: The prohibition contained in section
5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not
be compelled to be a witness against himself, is
simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant's own lips, against
his will, an admission of his guilt. The main
purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is
to prohibit compulsory oral examination of
prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the
purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or
declarations implicating them in the
commission of a crime.
The doctrine contended for by appellant would
prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a
defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing
his identity. Such an application of the
prohibition under discussion certainly could
not be permitted. Such an inspection of the
bodily features by the court or by witnesses,
can not violate the privilege granted under the
Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon
the accused as a witness — it does not call
upon the defendant for his testimonial
responsibility. The evidence obtained in this
way from the accused, is not testimony but his
body itself.
The accused was not compelled to make any
admission or answer any questions, and the
mere fact that an object found upon his body
was examined seems no more to infringe the
rule invoked than would the introduction of
stolen property taken from the person of a
thief.
VILLAFLOR vs SUMMERS
(G.R. No. 16444, September 8, 1920)
Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the
crime of adultery. The trial court, upon motion
of the assistant fiscal, ordered her to submit to
physical examination to determine if she was
pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the
order on the ground that such examination of
her person was a violation of the constitutional
provision relating to self-incrimination.
Thereupon she was found in contempt of court
and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid
Prison until she should permit the medical
examination required by the court.
Issue: Whether or not the compelling of a
woman to permit her body to be examined by
physicians to determine if she is pregnant,
violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of
Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal
Procedure providing that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.
Ruling: No. The constitutional guaranty that no
person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself is limited to a
prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. The corollary to the proposition
is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the
accused is permissible.
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of
our position is to go back once more to
elements and ponder on what is the prime
purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the
object of having criminal laws is to purge the
community of persons who violate the laws to
the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal
procedure, the rules of evidence, and
constitutional provisions, are then provided,
not to protect the guilty but to protect the
innocent. No rule is intended to be so rigid as to
embarrass the administration of justice in its
endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused
person should be afraid of the use of any
method which will tend to establish the truth.
For instance, under the facts before us, to use
torture to make the defendant admit her guilt
might only result in including her to tell a
falsehood. But no evidence of physical facts can
for any substantial reason be held to be
detrimental to the accused except in so far as
the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a
guilty person.
PEOPLE vs GALLARDE
(G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000)
Facts: Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato,
Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel
Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente,
Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon
converged at the house of Sps Eduardo and
Elena Talan. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old
daughter of spouses Talan. After a while, Roger
stood up and invited Jaime and Gallarde to
dine in the kitchen. As they partook of the
meal, Gallarde suddenly left. Jaime, too,
stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside
the house, he chanced upon Gallarde and
Editha talking to each other. Jaime whistled at
Gallarde but instead of minding him, the latter
sprinted towards the road leading to his house.
Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and
took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed
her and asked where she was going. Editha
answered that she would look for Gallarde.
Soon Editha left enroute to where Gallarde
fled. By 10:00 p.m., the drinking buddies had
dispersed but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and
Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they
talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger
arrived and informed them that Editha was
missing. Roger asked the group to help look for
her. Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay
Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her
daughter's disappearance. The latter, together
with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew
Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their
neighbors search the houses, dikes and fields
to look for the missing child. When Jaime
mentioned that Gallarde was the last person he
sawtalking to Editha, the searchers went back
to the house of Gallarde. The searchers found
Gallarde squatting with his short pants at the
toilet about 6 meters away from Gallarde's
house; his hands and knees covered with soil.
Asked where Editha was, Gallarde replied: "I do
not know, I did not do anything to her." To the
question, "where did you come from since a
while ago you were not yet in this toilet?"
Gallarde answered "I was with Kiko, I was
asleep in their house. One of the searchers
Mario Bado, got angry and countered that
Gallarde's statement was impossible because
Kiko was with him drinking. After the
confrontation at the toilet, Ex-kagawad
Fernandez brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain
Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that
Gallarde was the last person seen talking with
the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the
searchers. Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez
tripped on a wet ground. The searchers,
thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses, and a
wide hole among the disheveled grass. When
Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched
some earth aside and then Editha's hand pitted
out. Fernandez screamed in terror. Meantime,
Barangay Captain Mendoza heardshouts
saying: "She is here, she is now here already
dead!" Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy.
Captain Mendoza decided to bring Gallarde to
the municipal building. On their way though,
they met policemen on board a vehicle. He
flagged them down and turned over the person
of Gallarde, saying: "Here is the suspect in the
disappearance of the little girl. Since you are
already here, I am giving him to you." The
policemen together with Gallarde proceeded to
where the people found Editha. One of the
policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless
Editha was completely naked when she was
recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken
without any counsel present.
Gallarde was charged with the special complex
crime of rape with homicide. The trial court
rendered a decision convicting Gallarde of the
crime of murder only, not of the complex crime
of rape with homicide because of the lack of
proof of carnal knowledge, and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan
in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. The trial
court rejected the photographs (Exhibits "I," "J"
and "K") taken of Gallarde immediately after the
incident on the ground that "the same were
taken while he was already under the mercy of
the police." Gallarde appealed his conviction to
the SC.
Issue: Whether The taking of pictures of an
accused violates of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
Ruling: The taking of pictures of an accused
even without the assistance of counsel, being a
purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The constitutional right of an accused against
self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications
from the accused and not the inclusion of his
body in evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the
prohibition as the accused does not thereby
speak his guilt, hence the assistance and
guiding hand of counsel is not required. The
essence of the right against self-incrimination is
testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of
evidence against himself through a testimonial
act. Hence, it has been held that a woman
charged with adultery may be compelled to
submit to physical examination to determine
her pregnancy; and an accused may be
compelled to submit to physical examination
and to have a substance taken from his body
for medical determination as to whether he was
suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted
by his victim; to expel morphine from his
mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to
determine its identity with bloody footprints;
and to be photographed or measured, or his
garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to
move his body to enable the foregoing things to
be done.
BELTRAN vs SAMSON (G.R. No. 32025
September 23, 1929)
Facts: The petitioner complains that Judge
Samson ordered him to appear before the
provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own
handwriting from the latter. The order was
given upon petition of said fiscal for the
purpose of comparing the petitioner's
handwriting and determining whether or not it
is he who wrote certain documents supposed
to be falsified. The respondents contend that
the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy
applied for. The fiscal under section 1687 of
the Administrative Code, and the proper judge,
upon motion of the fiscal, may compel
witnesses to be present at the investigation of
any crime of misdemeanor. But this power
must be exercised without prejudice to the
constitutional rights of persons cited to appear.
The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the
fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones
Law and incorporated in General Orders, No.
58 which reads: "Nor shall he be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." As to its scope, this privilege is not
limited precisely to testimony, but extends to
all giving or furnishing of evidence.
Issue: Whether the violates the petitioner’s
right against self-incrimination was violated
when he was compelled to write for the
purpose of comparing the petitioner’s
handwriting and determining whether he wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified
Ruling: YES. Whenever a defendant, at the
trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf,
denies that a certain writing or signature is in
his own hand, he may or may not, on cross-
examination, write in open court in order that
the jury may be able to compare his
handwriting with the one in question. Here the
witness is compelled to write and create, by
means of the act of writing, evidence which
does not exist, and which may identify him as
the falsifier. It cannot be contended in the
present case that if permission to obtain a
specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not
granted, the crime would go unpunished.
Considering the circumstance that the
petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should
not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain
genuine specimens of his handwriting. But
even supposing it is impossible to obtain a
specimen or specimens without resorting to the
means complained, that is not reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by
the constitution. This constitutional privilege
exists for the protection of innocent persons. In
the case of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it
does not appear that the defendants and other
witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against
their will, and if they did not refuse to answer,
they must be understood to have waived their
constitutional privilege. “The privilege not to
give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute
when claimed, may be waived by any one
entitled to invoke it." The writ of prohibition
was GRANTED and it is ordered that the
respondents and those under their orders
desist and abstain absolutely and forever from
compelling the petitioner to take down dictation
in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison.
MAPA, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994)
FACTS: Petitioner herein was charged with
violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices.However he was granted an immunity
from suit by the PCGG related to the previous
charges against him, provided that he will
testify as witness against the Marcoses in
criminal proceedings in the United States Vs
Ferdinand Marcos, during the RICO, where
Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos
were being tried for charges of corruption. All
the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the
PCCG when they flew to New York to testify
against the Marcoses. During the trial,
Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the
1. People v. Estoista
G.R. No. L-5793 | August 27, 1953
Facts: Estoista was for acquitted for homicide
through reckless imprudence and convicted for
illegal possession of firearm under one
information by the CFI of Lanao. The firearm
with which the appellant was charged with
having in his possession was a rifle and
American prosecutor dispensed the testimony
of Mapa and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos.
Since Mapa, was not able to testify, it was
contended that the immunity from suit of
Mapa took without force and effect. However,
the record shows that the petitioners provided
information to the PCGG relating to the
prosecution of the RICO cases against the
Marcoses in New York. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the immunity given by
the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.
RULING: Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG
has the separate power to grant immunity to
any person from being prosecuted provided
they will meet the conditions provided by the
PCGG. In the case at bar, Mapa was granted
immunity from the prosecution or criminal
case where he is being tried, and the PCGG
even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa
when they flew to New York to testify implying
that Mapa was able to meet the conditions and
the PCGG accepted the information given by
him (MAPA) to testify against the Marcoses
during the RICO trial. Failure of the petitioner
to testify on the RICO can not nullify the
immunity given to him by the PCGG since the
petitioner was able to satisfy the requirements
both of the law and the parties’ implementing
agreements. Though the petitioners were not
able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it
can be said that it not their own fault.
Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on
the basis of the immunity granted by the
PCGG, which under the law has the power to
grant immunity. TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY
CAN BE GRANTED: 1. Transactional Immunity
- is broader aint he scope of its protection. By
its grant the witness can no longer be
prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising
out of the act or transaction. 2. Used-and-
derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured
that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used
against him or her in a subsequent
prosecution.
SECTION 19
belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who
held a legal permit for it. Father and son live &
in the same house, a little distance from a 27-
hectare estate belonging to the family which
was partly covered with cogon grass, tall weeds
and second growth trees. From a spot in the
plantation 100 to 120 meters from the house,
the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and
hit Diragon Dima, a la borer of the family who
was setting a trap for wild chickens and whose
presence was not perceived by the accused.
Estoista is assailing his conviction saying that
the 5-10 years penalty for the illegal possession
of firearms is cruel and excessive.
Issue: Whether or not the 5-10 years penalty
for the illegal possession of firearms is
excessive.
Held: It is of the court’s opinion that
confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing
or carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual,
having due regard to the prevalent conditions
which the law proposes to suppress or curb.
The rampant lawlessness against property,
person, and even the very security of the
Government, directly traceable in large
measure to promiscuous carrying and use of
powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which
in normal circumstances might appear
excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is
out of proportion to the present case in view of
certain circumstances, the law is not to be
declared unconstitutional for this reason. The
constitutionality of an act of the legislature is
not to be judged in the light of exceptional
cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy
net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound
to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation
as this that courts are advised to make a
recommendation to the Chief Executive for
clemency or reduction of the penalty.
2. People of the Philippines vs. Puda, G.R.
No. L-33841, October 31, 1984
Facts: Flaviano Puda was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of death after finding him guilty of
the crime of murder qualified by treachery and
premeditation with two aggravating
circumstances.
Unfortunately because of negligence of some
court personnel the records of the case were
not forwarded by the court a quo to this Court
for automatic review.
Eleven years after his conviction, the accused
wrote a letter to this Court inquiring about the
status of his case. We inquired through a letter
addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Court of
First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, about the veracity
of the allegations of the letter of the accused
and received a reply informing us that due to
the inadvertence of the then clerk in charge of
criminal cases of Branch II, the records of this
case were placed in the archives sometime in
1960 instead of being forwarded to us. Hence, it
was only then that the entire records were
elevated to this Court.
Issue: Whether or not the death penalty
imposed violates the constitutional right
against cruel and unusual punishment of the
accused.
Ruling: In the case of People v. Camano, (115
SCRA 688), we ruled that the death penalty is
not cruel, unjust or excessive. Citing the case
of Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741,
747, we further said that:
The penalty complained of is neither cruel,
unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler,
136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme
Court said that 'punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death, but
the punishment of death is not cruel within the
meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous something more than
the mere extinguishment of life.'
The Court, however, agrees with the accused's
contention that the penalty should not be
imposed on him since he has been detained
and continues to be in the death row for about
24 years now since as stated earlier, it took
eleven years after his trial and conviction
before the records of this case were discovered
and transmitted to this Court for automatic
review. For lack of the needed votes, the
penalty of death is reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
3. People vs. Mercado
G.R. No. 116239 November 29, 2000
FACTS: The defendants were convicted by the
trial court with the crime of kidnapping with
murder and sentencing them the punishment
of death. The defendants raised the
constitutionality of death penalty and the
alleged haste of the trial court in deciding the
case resulting in grave and serious errors
committed in convicting the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not death penalty is
unconstitutional and "cruel, unjust, excessive
or unusual punishment."
RULING: No the death penalty is not
unconstitutional. As settled in People vs.
Echagaray, death penalty is not a "cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is
an exercise of the state's power to "secure
society against the threatened and actual evil".
Procedural and substantial safeguards to
insure its correct application are established.
4. People of the Philippines vs. Echegaray
G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997
Facts: The SC rendered a decision in the
instant case affirming the conviction of the
accused-appellant for the crime of raping his
ten-year old daughter.
The crime having been committed sometime in
April, 1994, during which time Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death
Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-
appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme
penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which focused on the sinister
motive of the victim's grandmother that
precipitated the filing of the alleged false
accusation of rape against the accused. The
motion was dismissed as the SC found no
substantial arguments on the said motion that
can disturb the verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant
discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R.
Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-
Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal
Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-
appellant aiming for the reversal of the death
sentence.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1)
mixed factual and legal matters relating to the
trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellant's former
counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue: Whether or not the death penalty law
(RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional.
Held: No. Accused-appellant first claims that
the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment as ruled by the United
States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia. To state, however, that the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled
that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment, is misleading and
inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death
penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading
the procedures by which the death penalty was
imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury.
Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered
not so much on the nature of the death penalty
as a criminal sanction but on the
discrimination against the black accused who
is meted out the death penalty by a white jury
that is given the unconditional discretion to
determine whether or not to impose the death
penalty.
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty
because it was cruel and unusual per se. While
the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all
discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman,
it did so because the discretion which these
statutes vested in the trial judges and
sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without
any parameters, guidelines, or standards
intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate,
the intervention of personal biases, prejudices
and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial
judges and sentencing juries.
accused-appellant asseverates that the death
penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment for the crime of rape mainly
because the latter, unlike murder, does not
involve the taking of life.
In support of his contention, accused-appellant
largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without
doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in
terms of moral depravity and of the injury to
the person and to the public, it does not
compare with murder, which does involve the
unjustified taking of human life. Although it
may be accompanied by another crime, rape by
definition does not include the death of or even
the serious injury to another person. The
murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that,
does not. Life is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be
nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over
and normally is not beyond repair. We have
the abiding conviction that the death penalty,
which 'is unique in its severity and
irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for
the rapist who, as such, does not take human
life"
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing
ruling on two grounds:
first, that the public has manifested its
rejection of the death penalty as a proper
punishment for the crime of rape through the
willful omission by the state legislatures to
include rape in their new death penalty
statutes in the aftermath of Furman;
Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see
how this could have any bearing on the
Philippine experience and in the context of our
own culture.
second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly
contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual
integrity, physical privacy, and psychological
balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate
that the gauge of whether or not a crime
warrants the death penalty or not, is the
attendance of the circumstance of death on the
part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an
ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive
justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
tooth".
The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally
promulgated, provided for the death penalty in
specified crimes under specific circumstances.
As early as 1886, though, capital punishment
had entered our legal system through the old
Penal Code, which was a modified version of
the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the
penalty for the crimes of treason,
correspondence with the enemy during times of
war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder,
infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or
with the use of deadly weapon or by two or
more persons resulting in insanity, robbery
with homicide, and arson resulting in death.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly
took the form of a constitutional question of
whether or not the death penalty is a cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment
Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty
complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436,
the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than
the mere extinguishment of life.
People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a
number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or
unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that
penalty remains in the statute books, and as
long as our criminal law provides for its
imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of
judicial officers to respect and apply the law
regardless of their private opinions,"
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987
Constitution simply states that congress, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in
the said provision imposes a requirement that
for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence
of crime should first be perceived and
statistically proven following the suspension of
the death penalty. Neither does the said
provision require that the death penalty be
resorted to as a last recourse when all other
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality
in society what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the
Congress, in the interest of justice, public order
and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and
harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous
crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the
death penalty for said crimes.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which,
by the flagrantly violent manner in which the
same was committed or by the reason of its
inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard
and mockery of the law, public peace and
order, or public morals. It is an offense whose
essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity
are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized
society and hence, shock the moral self of a
people.
The right of a person is not only to live but to
live a quality life, and this means that the rest
of society is obligated to respect his or her
individual personality, the integrity and the
sanctity of his or her own physical body, and
the value he or she puts in his or her own
spiritual, psychological, material and social
preferences and needs.
Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
ransom resulting in the death of the victim or
the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to
dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting
in death, and drug offenses involving minors or
resulting in the death of the victim in the case
of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious
illegal detention where the victim is detained
for more than three days or serious physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats
to kill him were made or the victim is a minor,
robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping
where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are
clearly heinous by their very nature.
SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous
crimes because:
the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with
severely destructive effects on the national
efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty
through organized governmental strategies
based on a disciplined and honest citizenry
they have so caused irreparable and
substantial injury to both their victim and the
society and a repetition of their acts would
pose actual threat to the safety of individuals
and the survival of government, they must be
permanently prevented from doing so
People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible
violation of the sexual intimacy of another
person. It does injury to justice and charity.
Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and
physical and moral integrity to which every
person has a right. It causes grave damage
that can mark the victim for life. It is always an
intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon
decency and dignity that hurts not only the
victim but the society itself.
SECTION 20
1. LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ
FACTS: Petitioners were charged with
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
(Bouncing Check Law). They moved seasonably
to quash the informations on the ground that
the acts charged did not constitute an offense,
the statute being unconstitutional. The motions
were denied by the respondent trial courts,
except in one case, wherein the trial court
declared the law unconstitutional and
dismissed the case. The parties adversely
affected thus appealed.
ISSUES:
1. Does BP 22 is violate the constitutional
provision on non-imprisonment due to debt?
2. Does it impair freedom of contract?
3. Does it contravene the equal protection
clause?
HELD:
1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of
the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished
by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. It is not the
non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed
to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of
the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.
Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere
undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is
an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a
representation that the drawer has funds on
deposit against which the check is drawn,
sufficient to ensure payment upon its
presentation to the bank. There is therefore an
element of certainty or assurance that the
instrument will be paid upon presentation. For
this reason, checks have become widely
accepted as a medium of payment in trade and
commerce. Although not legal tender, checks
have come to be perceived as convenient
substitutes for currency in commercial and
financial transactions. The basis or foundation
of such perception is confidence. If such
confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks
as currency substitutes would be greatly
diminished or may become nil. Any practice
therefore tending to destroy that confidence
should be deterred for the proliferation of
worthless checks can only create havoc in trade
circles and the banking community.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the
public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen
pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt
the welfare of society and the public interest.
2. The freedom of contract which is
constitutionally protected is freedom to enter
into “lawful” contracts. Contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful.
Besides, we must bear in mind that checks
cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a
commercial instrument which, in this modem
day and age, has become a convenient
substitute for money; it forms part of the
banking system and therefore not entirely free
from the regulatory power of the state.
3. There is no substance in the claim that the
statute in question denies equal protection of
the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes
the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is
contended that the payee is just as responsible
for the crime as the drawer of the check, since
without the indispensable participation of the
payee by his acceptance of the check there
would be no crime. This argument is
tantamount to saying that, to give equal
protection, the law should punish both the
swindler and the swindled. The petitioners’
posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of
the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The
clause does not preclude classification of
individuals, who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
(Lozano vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419,
December 18, 1986)
SECTION 21
1. PEOPLE vs. YLAGAN
FACTS:
A complaint for physical injuries was filed
against Elisea Ylagan, herein the defendant in
the justice of the peace court in the Province of
Batangas. After preliminary investigation, the
case forwarded to the Court of First Instance,
where the provincial fiscal filed an information
charging her with serious physical injuries.
Upon arraignment, the defendant pleaded not
guilty to the information; whereupon the
private prosecutor, with the concurrence of the
deputy provincial fiscal, moved for the
dismissal of the case, which motion was
granted by the court. The attorney for the
defendant said nothing about the dismissal of
the case. 11 days later, the acting provincial
fiscal filed another information in the same
justice of the peace court, charging the same
defendant with the same offense of serious
physical injuries. After another preliminary
investigation, the case was again forwarded to
the Court of First Instance, where the
information filed in the justice of the peace
court was reproduced. Upon arraignment, the
defendant entered a plea of double jeopardy,
based on section 28 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. After hearing, the court sustained
the plea and dismissed the case. From this
order of dismissal, an appeal was taken by the
Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a double
jeopardy.
HELD:
It seems clear that under the foregoing
provisions of law, defendant in a criminal
prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed on
trial under the following conditions:
(1) In a court of competent jurisdiction; (2)
upon a valid complaint or information; (3) after
he has been arraigned; and (4) after he has
pleaded to the complaint of information.
Tested by this standard, we are of the opinion
that the appellee has been once in jeopardy for
the offense for which she is now prosecuted. All
that the law requires is that the accused has
been brought to trial "in a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction,
after issue properly joined." Under our system
of criminal procedure, issue is properly joined
after the accused has entered a plea of not
guilty. The rule against double jeopardy
protects the accused not against the peril of
second punishment, but against being again
tried for the same offense.
This is the principle underlying Section 28 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure read as follows:
A person cannot be tried for an offense, nor for
any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, for which he has been previously
brought to trial in a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction,
after issue properly joined, when the case is
dismissed or otherwise terminated before
judgment without the consent of the accused.
We believe it a sound rule to lay down, that the
mere silence of the defendant or his failure to
object to the dismissal of the case does not
constitute a consent within the meaning of
section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The right not to be put in jeopardy a second
time for the offense is as important as the other
constitutional right of the accused in a criminal
case. Its waiver cannot, and should not, be
predicated on mere silence. The order appealed
from is affirmed, with costs de oficio. So
ordered.
2. LAMERA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14
March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro
Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by
petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle
then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in
damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto
Reyes and Paulino Gonzal.
As a consequence thereof, two informations
were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with multiple physical injuries under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and (b)
an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of
Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on
Abandonment of one's victim.
On June 1987 the MTC of Pasig rendered its
decision in finding the petitioner guilty of the
crime of Abandonment of one's victim as
defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of
Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the
RTC of Pasig. In the meantime, on 27 April
1989, petitioner was arraigned for violation of
Article 365. He entered a plea of not guilty.
He filed a petition for review in the CA but
which was denied. He raised before the SC that
that he cannot be penalized twice for an
“accident” and another for “recklessness.” He
maintained that since he is facing a criminal
charge for reckless imprudence, which offense
carries heavier penalties under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be
charged under Article 275, par. 2, for
abandonment for failing to render to the
persons whom he has accidentally injured.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution for negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is
a bar to prosecution for abandonment under
Article 275 of the same Code because it
constitutes double jeopardy.
RULING:
No, the SC affirmed that the Articles penalize
different and distinct offenses. The rule on
double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect,
invoked, does not, therefore, apply pursuant to
existing jurisprudence. Hence, the petition
should be dismissed for lack of merit.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.
He is charged for two separate offenses under
the Revised Penal Code. In People vs. Doriquez,
the SC held that it is a cardinal rule that the
protection against double jeopardy may be
invoked only for the same offense or identical
offenses. Where two different laws (or articles
of the same code) defines two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses
arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential
element of the other.
The two informations filed against petitioner are
clearly for separate offenses. The first, for
reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under
the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title
Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the
Revised Penal Code. The second, for
Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275),
falls under Chapter Two (Crimes Against
Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal
Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same
Code.
Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed
by means of culpa. Crimes against Security are
committed by means of dolo.
Where the offenses charged are penalized either
by different sections of the same statute or by
different statutes, the important inquiry relates
to the identity of the offenses charged. The
constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available only where an identity is
shown to exist between the earlier and the
subsequent offenses charged.
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
RELOVA
FACTS:
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas
City Police together with personnel of the
Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with
a search warrant issued by a city judge of
Batangas City, searched and examined the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant
and Cold Storage owned and operated by
Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that
electric wiring, devices and contraptions had
been installed, without the necessary authority
from the city government, and "architecturally
concealed inside the walls of the building"
owned by Opulencia. These electric devices and
contraptions were allegedly "designed purposely
to lower or decrease the readings of electric
current consumption in the electric meter of
the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant."
During the subsequent investigation, Manuel
Opulencia admitted in a written statement that
he had caused the installation of the electrical
devices "in order to lower or decrease the
readings of his electric meter." On 24 November
1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City
filed before the City Court of Batangas City an
information against Manuel Opulencia for
violation of Ordinance 1, Series of 1974,
Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance
was, under its terms, punishable by a fine
"ranging from P5.00 to P50.00 or
imprisonment, which shall not exceed 30 days,
or both, at the discretion of the court."
Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the information
filed. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to
dismiss the information upon the grounds that
the crime there charged had already prescribed
and that the civil indemnity there sought to be
recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Batangas City Court to award. In an order
dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court
granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription, it appearing that the offense
charged was a light felony which prescribes 2
months from the time of discovery thereof, and
it appearing further that the information was
filed by the fiscal more than 9 months after
discovery of the offense charged in February
1975. 14 days later, on 20 April 1976, the
Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before
the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Branch II, another information against Manuel
Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power
under Article 308 in relation to Article 309,
paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code
(Criminal Case 266) before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he
could be arraigned thereon, Opulencia filed a
Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging
that he had been previously acquitted of the
offense charged in the second information and
that the filing thereof was violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
By Order dated 16 August 1976, Judge
Benjamin Relova granted the accused's Motion
to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. A
Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was
denied by the Judge in an Order dated 18
November 1976.
On 1 December 1976, the petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus was filed in the
Supreme Court by the Acting City Fiscal of
Batangas City on behalf of the People.
ISSUE:
Whether under the information in case 16443,
Opulencia could — if he failed to plead double
jeopardy — be convicted of the same act
charged in case 16054, in which he has
already been acquitted.
HELD:
The constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different
from the offense charged in the first or prior
prosecution, although both the first and
second offenses may be based upon the same
act or set of acts. The second sentence of
Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the
general proposition: the constitutional
protection, against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an
ordinance be different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute such as
the Revised Penal Code, provided that both
offenses spring from the same act or set of
acts. The Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds
of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause
20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
ordains that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."
The second sentence of said clause provides
that "if an act is punishable by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act." Thus, the first sentence
prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense, whereas the second contemplates
double jeopardy of punishment for the same
act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act,
provided that he is charged with different
offenses, or the offense charged in one case is
not included in, or does not include, the crime
charged in the other case. The second sentence
applies, even if the offenses charged are not the
same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a
violation of an ordinance and the other a
violation of a statute. If the two charges are
based on one and the same act conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance
shall bar a prosecution under the other.
Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not
indispensable to sustain the plea of double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
So long as jeopardy has attached under one of
the informations charging said offense, the
defense may be availed of in the other case
involving the same offense, even if there has
been neither conviction nor acquittal in either
case. Thus, where the offenses charged are
penalized either by different sections of the
same statute or by different statutes, the
important inquiry relates to the identity of
offenses charged: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is available only where
an identity is shown to exist between the earlier
and the subsequent offenses charged. In
contrast, where one offense is charged under a
municipal ordinance while the other is
penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to
the identity of the acts which the accused is
said to have committed and which are alleged
to have given rise to the two offenses: the
constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense
under a municipal ordinance are the same acts
which constitute or have given rise to the
offense charged under a statute. It is perhaps
important to note that the rule limiting the
constitutional protection against double
jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense is not to be understood with
absolute literalness. The identity of offenses
that must be shown need not be absolute
identity: the first and second offenses may be
regarded as the "same offense" where the
second offense necessarily includes the first
offense or is necessarily included in such first
offense or where the second offense is an
attempt to commit the first or a frustration
thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of
double jeopardy to be available, not all the
technical elements constituting the first offense
need be present in the technical definition of
the second offense. The law here seeks to
prevent harassment of an accused person by
multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are
nonetheless each constituted by a common set
or overlapping sets of technical elements. Acts
of a person which physically occur on the same
occasion and are infused by a common intent
or design or negligence and therefore form a
moral unity, should not be segmented and
sliced, as it were, to produce as many different
acts as there are offenses under municipal
ordinances or statutes that an enterprising
prosecutor can find. It remains to point out
that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court
of the information for violation of the Batangas
City Ordinance upon the ground that such
offense had already prescribed, amounts to an
acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code,
"prescription of the crime" is one of the
grounds for "total extinction of criminal
liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order
sustaining a motion to quash based on
prescription is a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense.
4. PEOPLE VS. BALISICAN
FACTS:
Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide
in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being
arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In
doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his
counsel de officio, he was allowed to present
evidence and consequently testified that he
stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In
addition, he stated that he surrendered himself
voluntarily to the police authorities. On the
basis of the testimony of the accused, he was
acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused
in double jeopardy.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that it is settled that
the existence of plea is an essential requisite to
double jeopardy. The accused had first entered
a plea of guilty but however testified that he
acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony
had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and
the court a quo should have required him to
plead a new charge, or at least direct that a
new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This
was not done. Therefore, there has been no
standing of plea during the judgment of
acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy
with respect to the appeal herein.
5. BRAZA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The Philippines was assigned the hosting rights
for the 12th ASEAN Leaders Summit scheduled
in December 2006. In preparation for this
international diplomatic event with the province
of Cebu as the designated venue, the DPWH
identified projects relative to the improvement
and rehabilitation of roads and installation of
traffic safety devices and lighting facilities. The
then Acting Secretary of the DPWH,
Hermogenes E. Ebdane, approved the resort to
alternative modes of procurement for the
implementation of these projects due to the
proximity of the ASEAN Summit.
One of the ASEAN Summit-related projects to
be undertaken was the installation of street
lighting systems along the perimeters of the
Cebu International Convention Center in
Mandaue City and the ceremonial routes of the
Summit to upgrade the appearance of the
convention areas and to improve night-time
visibility for security purposes. Four (4) out of
eleven (11) street lighting projects were awarded
to FABMIK Construction and Equipment
Supply Company, Inc. (FABMIK).
Three other projects were bidded out only on
November 28, 2006 or less than two (2) weeks
before the scheduled start of the Summit.
Thereafter, the DPWH and FABMIK executed a
Memorandum of Agreement(MOA) whereby
FABMIK obliged itself to implement the projects
at its own expense and the DPWH to guarantee
the payment of the work accomplished.
FABMIK was able to complete the projects
within the deadline of ten (10) days utilizing its
own resources and credit facilities. The
schedule of the international event, however,
was moved by the national organizers to
January 9-15, 2007 due to typhoon Seniang
which struck Cebu for several days.
After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed
before the Public Assistance and Corruption
Prevention Office(PACPO), Ombudsman
Visayas, alleging that the ASEAN Summit street
lighting projects were overpriced. A panel
composing of three investigators conducted a
fact-finding investigation to determine the
veracity of the accusation. Braza, being the
president of FABMIK, was impleaded as one of
the respondents. On March 16, 2007, the
Ombudsman directed the DBM and the DPWH
to cease and desist from releasing or disbursing
funds for the projects in question.
Eventually, the OMB-Visayas filed several
informations before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. 3019 against the
officials of DPWH Region VII, the officials of the
cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu and private
contractors, FABMIK President Braza and
GAMPIK Board Chairman Gerardo S. Surla
(Surla). It was alleged therein that Braza acted
in conspiracy with the public officials and
employees in the commission of the crime
charged.
On August 14, 2008, the motions for
reinvestigation filed by Arturo Radaza (Radaza),
the Mayor of Lapu-lapuCity, and the DPWH
officials were denied by the Sandiganbayan for
lack of merit. Consequently, they moved for the
reconsideration of said resolution. On August
27, 2008, Braza filed a motion for
reinvestigation anchored on the following
grounds: (1) the import documents relied upon
by the OMB-Visayas were spurious and
falsified; (2) constituted new evidence, if
considered, would overturn the finding of
probable cause; and (3) the finding of
overpricing was bereft of factual and legal basis
as the same was not substantiated by any
independent canvass of prevailing market
prices of the subject lampposts. He prayed for
the suspension of the proceedings of the case
pending such reinvestigation. The
Sandiganbayan treated Braza's motion as his
motion for reconsideration of its August 14,
2008 Resolution.
During the proceedings held on November 3,
2008, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its
August 14, 2008 resolution and directed a
reinvestigation of the case. According to the
anti-graft court, the allegations to the effect
that no independent canvass was conducted
and that the charge of overpricing was based
on falsified documents were serious reasons
enough to merit a reinvestigation of the case.
On October 12, 2009, the Sandiganbayan
issued the first assailed resolution admitting
the Amended Information, denying Braza's plea
for dismissal of the criminal case. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that Brazawould not be
placed in double jeopardy should he be
arraigned anew under the second information
because his previous arraignment was
conditional. It continued that even if he was
regularly arraigned, double jeopardy would still
not set in because the second information
charged an offense different from, and which
did not include or was necessarily included in,
the original offense charged. Lastly, it found
that the delay in the reinvestigation
proceedings could not be characterized as
vexatious, capricious or oppressive and that it
could not be attributed to the prosecution.
On November 6, 2009, Braza moved for
reconsideration with alternative motion to
quash the information reiterating his
arguments that his right against double
jeopardy was violated and, thus, warranting
the dismissal of the criminal case with
prejudice. In the alternative, Braza moved for
the quashal of the second information
vigorously asserting that the same was fatally
defective for failure to allege any actual,
specified and quantifiable injury sustained by
the government as required by law for
indictment under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, and
that the charge of overpricing was unfounded.
On October 22, 2010, the Sandiganbayan
issued the second assailed resolution stating,
among others, the denial of Braza's Motion to
Quash the information. The anti-graft court
ruled that the Amended Information was
sufficient in substance as to inform the accused
of the nature and causes of accusations against
them. Further, it held that the specifics sought
to be alleged in the Amended Information were
evidentiary in nature which could be properly
presented during the trial on the merits. Braza
was effectively discharged from the first
Information upon the filing of the second
Information but said discharge was without
prejudice to, and would not preclude, his
prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. The Sandiganbayan, however, deemed it
proper that a new preliminary investigation be
conducted under the new charge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not double jeopardy has already set
in basis of Braza "not guilty" plea in the first
Information and, thus, he can no longer be
prosecuted under the second Information.
HELD:
The petition is devoid of merit.
It is Braza stance that his constitutional right
under the double jeopardy clause bars further
proceedings in Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275. He
asserts that his arraignment under the first
information was simple and unconditional and,
thus, an arraignment under the second
information would put him in double jeopardy.
His argument cannot stand scrutiny.
While it is true that the practice of the
Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or
"conditional" arraignment of the accused is not
specifically sanctioned by the Revised Internal
Rules of the Procedure of theSandiganbayan or
by the regular Rules of Procedure, this Court
had tangentially recognized such practice
inPeople v. Espinosa, provided that the alleged
conditions attached to the arraignment should
be "unmistakable, express, informed and
enlightened." The Court further required that
the conditions must be expressly stated in the
order disposing of arraignment; otherwise, it
should be deemed simple and unconditional.
A careful perusal of the record in the case at
bench would reveal that the arraignment of
Braza under the first information was
conditional in nature as it was a mere
accommodation in his favor to enable him to
travel abroad without the Sandiganbayan losing
its ability to conduct trial in absentia in case he
would abscond. TheSandiganbayan's June 6,
2008 Order clearly and unequivocally states
that the conditions for Braza'sarraignment as
well as his travel abroad, that is, that if the
Information would be amended, he shall waive
his constitutional right to be protected against
double jeopardy and shall allow himself to be
arraigned on the amended information without
losing his right to question the same. It
appeared that these conditions were duly
explained to Braza and his lawyer by the anti-
graft court. He was afforded time to confer and
consult his lawyer. Thereafter, he voluntarily
submitted himself to such conditional
arraignment and entered a plea of "not guilty"
to the offense of violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A.
No. 3019.
Verily, the relinquishment of his right to invoke
double jeopardy had been convincingly laid
out. Such waiver was clear, categorical and
intelligent. It may not be amiss to state that on
the day of said arraignment, one of the
incidents pending for the consideration of the
Sandiganbayan was an omnibus motion for
determination of probable cause and for
quashal of information or for reinvestigation
filed by accused Radaza. Accordingly, there
was a real possibility that the first information
would be amended if said motion was granted.
Although the omnibus motion was initially
denied, it was subsequently granted upon
motion for reconsideration, and a
reinvestigation was ordered to be conducted in
the criminal case.
Having given his conformity and accepted the
conditional arraignment and its legal
consequences, Braza is now estopped from
assailing its conditional nature just to
conveniently avoid being arraigned and
prosecuted of the new charge under the second
information. Besides, in consonance with the
ruling in Cabo v.Sandiganbayan, this Court
cannot now allow Braza to renege and turn his
back on the above conditions on the mere
pretext that he affirmed his conditional
arraignment through a pleading denominated
as Manifestation filed before the
Sandiganbayan on November 13, 2008. After
all, there is no showing that the anti-graft
court had acted on, much less noted, his
written manifestation.
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that there was
a valid and unconditional plea, Braza cannot
plausibly rely on the principle of double
jeopardy to avoid arraignment under the
second information because the offense
charged therein is different and not included in
the offense charged under the first information.
The right against double jeopardy is enshrined
in Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution,
which reads:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
This constitutionally mandated right is
procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the
accused has the burden of demonstrating the
following requisites:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as in the first.
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b)
before a competent court; (c) after arraignment,
(d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e)
when the accused was acquitted or convicted,
or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. The
test for the third element is whether one offense
is identical with the other or is an attempt to
commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether
the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first
information.
Braza, however, contends that double jeopardy
would still attach even if the first information
charged an offense different from that charged
in the second information since both charges
arose from the same transaction or set of facts.
Relying on the antiquated ruling of People v.
Del Carmen,Braza claims that an accused
should be shielded against being prosecuted for
several offenses made out from a single act.
It appears that Braza has obviously lost sight, if
he is not altogether aware, of the ruling in
Suero v. Peoplewhere it was held that the same
criminal act may give rise to two or more
separate and distinct offenses; and that no
double jeopardy attaches as long as there is
variance between the elements of the two
offenses charged. The doctrine of double
jeopardy is a revered constitutional safeguard
against exposing the accused from the risk of
being prosecuted twice for the same offense,
and not a different one.
There is simply no double jeopardy when the
subsequent information charges another and
different offense, although arising from the
same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the
same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is
the prosecution for the same offense. Petition
for certiorari is DENIED.
6. IVLER VS. MODESTO-SAN PEDRO
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004,
petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC),
with two separate offenses: (1) reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2) reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage
to property for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Crimes charged: 1) reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries; and 2)
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage to property
On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to
the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, Ivler moved to quash the
Information of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and damage to property for placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence.
MeTC: denied the motion to quash
RTC: denied Ivler’s Petition for Certiorari in
dismissing his Motion to Quash
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in the information
charging him with reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property
(YES)
Defense: Ivler argues that his constitutional
right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his
prosecution in reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and damage to property having
been previously convicted in reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
for injuries for the same offense. Ivler submits
that the multiple consequences of such crime
are material only to determine his penalty
HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the
RTC. Petitioners conviction in the case of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries bars his prosecution in
criminal reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property
1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its
Consequences on Persons and Property are
Material Only to Determine the Penalty
Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses
which punish the intentional criminal act.
These structural and conceptual features of
quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of
intentional crimes.
2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless
Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for
the Same Quasi-offense
Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi-offense of criminal
negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does
not qualify the substance of the offense. And,
as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or
several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and
cannot be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light
felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other. The legislature
crafted this procedural tool to benefit the
accused who, in lieu of serving multiple
penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule
penalizing not an act defined as a felony but
the mental attitude behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, a single mental attitude regardless of
the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365
was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one
or more consequences. Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crime
resulting in one or more consequences.
Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-
crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually
impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
necessary means for committing another.
Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed
from a single charge regardless of the number
or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply
the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short,
there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be
filed in the same first level court.
7. MELO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, on December
27, 1949, with frustrated homicide, for having
allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a
kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several
serious wounds on different parts of the body,
requiring medical attendance for a period of
more than 30 days, and incapacitating him
from performing his habitual labor for the
same period of time.
On December 29, 1949, at eight o'clock in the
morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged, and at 10:15 in the evening of
the same day, Obillo died from his wounds. On
January 4, 1950, an amended information was
filed charging the accused with consummated
homicide. The accused filed a motion to quash
the amended information alleging double
jeopardy, motion that was denied by the
respondent court; hence, the instant petition
for prohibition to enjoin the respondent court
from further entertaining the amended
information.
ISSUE:
WON the amended information, filed after the
death of the victim, constitutes double
jeopardy?
RULING:
NO, it does not constitute double jeopardy.
The rule of double jeopardy in our jurisdiction
means that when a person is charged with an
offense and the case is terminated either by
acquittal or conviction or in any other manner
without the consent of the accused, the latter
cannot again be charged with the same or
identical offense.
The phrase “same offense” in the Constitution,
under the general rule, has always been
construed to mean not only the second offense
charged is exactly the same as the one alleged
in the first information, but also that the two
offenses are identical. Identity is defined in the
"same-evidence test" which was restated by the
Rules of Court in clearer form: there is identity
between two offenses not only when the second
offense is exactly the same as the first, but also
when the second offense is an attempt to
commit the first or a frustration thereof, or
when it necessary includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first
information. In other words, one who has been
charged with an offense cannot be again
charged with the same or identical offense
though the latter be lesser or greater than the
former.
However, this rule of identity does not apply
when the second offense was not in existence at
the time of the first prosecution, for the simple
reason that in such case, there is no possibility
for the accused, during the first prosecution, to
be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent (Diaz doctrine). Stating it in another
form, the rule is that "where after the first
prosecution, a new fact supervenes for which
the defendant is responsible, which changes
the character of the offense and, together with
the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new
and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the
accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicated for the new offense.
Here, it is clear that the first offense (frustrated
homicide) and the second offense
(consummated homicide) are not the same and
identical and the rule of identity is inapplicable
since the second offense was inexistent during
the first prosecution. Thus, there can be no
double jeopardy if the accused will be tried for
the second offense as alleged in the amended
information.
Also, Rule 106, Section 13, paragraph 2 of the
Rules of Court, provides:
If it appears at may time before the judgment
that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court may dismiss the
original complaint or information and order the
filing of a new one charging the proper offense,
provided the defendant would not be placed
thereby in double jeopardy, and may also
require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
Under such provision, it was just proper for the
court to dismiss the first information and order
the filing of a new one for the reason that the
proper offense was not charged in the former
and the latter did not place the accused in a
second jeopardy for the same or identical
offense.
Furthermore, when a person, who has already
suffered his penalty for an offense, is charged
with a new and greater offense under the Diaz
doctrine, said penalty may be credited to him in
case of conviction for the second offense.
8. PEOPLE VS. BULING
FACTS:
Accused was charged with less serious physical
injury to another person in which the former
pleaded guilty. After serving his sentence, the
wounds inflicted by the accused allegedly did
not heal. So, another complaint was filed
against him, this time, he was charged with
serious physical I injury.
This is now the case at bar sought to be
reversed and set aside by the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution and conviction of
Balaba for less serious physical injuries is a
bar to the second prosecution for serious
physical injuries.
RULING:
YES. Unlike in the case of Melo v. People, there
was no supervening facts in this case which
would allow for the subsequent charge against
the accused even after serving his sentence.
The physical injury then committed was the
same physical injury being brought up by the
prosecution. Thus, there was no change in the
nature of the injury suffered by the
complainant.
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed.
The judgment of conviction is set aside and the
defendant-appellant acquitted of the charge of
serious physical injuries. Without costs.
9. PEOPLE VS. TRIA-TIRONA
FACTS:
Chief Inspector Muyot was charged with
Violation of of Section 16, Article III of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended by Rep. Act No.
7659 after 489 grams of shabu was found on
his house by virtue of a search warrant. Muyot
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged during
the arraignment. After trial on the merits,
Judge Tria-Tirona rendered a decision
acquitting Muyot on ground of reasonable
doubt.
Petitioner appealed, contending that Judge
Tria-Tirona, in acquitting Muyot, committed
grave abuse of discretion by ignoring material
facts and evidence on record which, when
considered, would lead to the inevitable
conclusion of the latter's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Petitioner prays for the
nullification and the setting aside of the
decision acquitting Muyot claiming that Judge
Tria-Tirona abused her discretion in
disregarding the testimonies of the NBI agents
on the discovery of the illegal drugs.
ISSUES:
1. Can the government appeal from a judgment
acquitting the accused after trial on the merits
without violating the constitutional precept
against double jeopardy?
2. Should the judgment of conviction be set
aside?
HELD:
1. No. An acquittal is final and unappealable
on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it
happens at the trial court level or before the
Court of Appeals. In general, the rule is that a
remand to a trial court of a judgment of
acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on
certiorari cannot be had unless there is a
finding of mistrial. Only when there is a finding
of a sham trial can the doctrine of double
jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as
represented by the prosecution, were denied
due process.
There being no mistrial in the case before us,
we find no need to reexamine the evidence,
because if we do so, we will be allowing an
appeal to be made on an acquittal which would
clearly be in violation of the accuseds right
against double jeopardy.
2. The petition smacks in the heart of the lower
courts appreciation of the evidence of the
parties. It is apparent from the decision of
public respondent that she considered all the
evidence adduced by the parties. Even
assuming arguendo that public respondent
may have improperly assessed the evidence on
hand, what is certain is that the decision was
arrived at only after all the evidence was
considered, weighed and passed upon. In such
a case, any error committed in the evaluation of
evidence is merely an error of judgment that
cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of
judgment is one in which the court may commit
in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of
was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction and which error is correctible only
by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by
the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, and its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of law. Since no error of
jurisdiction can be attributed to public
respondent in her assessment of the evidence,
certiorari will not lie. (People vs. Tria-Tirona,
G.R. No. 130106. July 15, 2005)
10. LEJANO VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her
daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and
xxx, seven, were brutally slain at their home in
Parañaque City. Following an intense
investigation, the police arrested a group of
suspects, some of whom gave detailed
confessions. But the trial court smelled a
frame-up and eventually ordered them
discharged. Thus, the identities of the real
perpetrators remained a mystery especially to
the public whose interests were aroused by the
gripping details of what everybody referred to as
the Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau
of Investigation or NBI announced that it had
solved the crime. It presented star-witness
Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who
claimed that she witnessed the crime. She
pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong"
Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio
"Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging"
Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She
also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo
Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying
primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10,
1995 the public prosecutors filed an
information for rape with homicide against
Webb, et al.
The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City,
presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino,
tried only seven of the accused since Artemio
Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.
The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main
witness with the others corroborating her
testimony. These included the medico-legal
officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims,
the security guards of Pitong Daan
Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the
Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former
girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s
husband.
Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he
claimed that he was then across the ocean in
the United States of America. He presented the
testimonies of witnesses as well as
documentary and object evidence to prove this.
In addition, the defense presented witnesses to
show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the
incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of
the crime and the events surrounding it, the
trial court found a credible witness in her. It
noted her categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged
by grueling cross-examinations.
On January 4, 2000, after four years of
arduous hearings, the trial court rendered
judgment, finding all the accused guilty as
charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and
Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of
eleven years, four months, and one day to
twelve years. The trial court also awarded
damages to Lauro Vizconde.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty
imposed on Biong to six years minimum and
twelve years maximum and increasing the
award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.
The appellate court did not agree that the
accused were tried by publicity or that the trial
judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of
conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally
guilty with those who had a part in raping and
killing Carmela and in executing her mother
and sister.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial
deliberation in this case, the Court issued a
Resolution granting the request of Webb to
submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen
taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen
was then believed still under the safekeeping of
the NBI.
The Court granted the request pursuant to
section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give
the accused and the prosecution access to
scientific evidence that they might want to avail
themselves of, leading to a correct decision in
the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI
informed the Court that it no longer has
custody of the specimen, the same having been
turned over to the trial court. The trial record
shows, however, that the specimen was not
among the object evidence that the prosecution
offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an
urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
government’s failure to preserve such vital
evidence has resulted in the denial of his right
to due process.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as
eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying
Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who
committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient
evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s
testimony that he led the others in committing
the crime.
3. Whether or not the Court should acquit him
outright, given the government’s failure to
produce the semen specimen that the NBI
found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving
him of evidence that would prove his innocence;
and
4. Whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy
with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed
Carmela and put to death her mother and
sister.
HELD:
The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA
Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he
is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of
violation of his right to due process given the
State’s failure to produce on order of the Court
either by negligence or willful suppression the
semen specimen taken from Carmela.
When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule
governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the
country did not yet have the technology for
conducting the test, and no Philippine
precedent had as yet recognized its
admissibility as evidence.
Consequently, the idea of keeping the
specimen secure even after the trial court
rejected the motion for DNA testing did not
come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-
accused brought up the matter of preserving
the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied
Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed
the proceeding to move on when he had on at
least two occasions gone up to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge
alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and
the other accused.
They raised the DNA issue before the Court of
Appeals but merely as an error committed by
the trial court in rendering its decision in the
case. None of the accused filed a motion with
the appeals court to have the DNA test done
pending adjudication of their appeal. This,
even when the Supreme Court had in the
meantime passed the rules allowing such test.
Considering the accused’s lack of interest in
having such test done, the State cannot be
deemed put on reasonable notice that it would
be required to produce the semen specimen at
some future time.
Suspicious Details
Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI
since November or December 1994 as an
"asset." She supplied her handlers with
information against drug pushers and other
criminal elements. Some of this information led
to the capture of notorious drug pushers like
Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir.
Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the
"Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer.
Because of her talent, the task force gave her
"very special treatment" and she became its
"darling," allowed the privilege of spending
nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for
sometime, however, they teased her about it
and she was piqued. One day, she
unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew
someone who had the real story behind the
Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed
interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone
to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not
happen and Sacaguing continued to press her,
she told him that she might as well assume the
role of her informant.
Webb’s U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the
strongest alibi through (a) the travel
preparations; (b) the two immigration checks;
(c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second
immigration check; and (e) alibi versus positive
identification; and (f) a documented alibi.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by
positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a)
he was present at another place at the time of
the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals
expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy
of travel documents like the passport as well as
the domestic and foreign records of departures
and arrivals from airports. They claim that it
would not have been impossible for Webb to
secretly return to the Philippines after he
supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit
the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly
return to the Philippines again on October 26,
1992. Travel between the U.S. and the
Philippines, said the lower courts took only
about twelve to fourteen hours.
Effect of Webb’s alibi to others
Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches
Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him,
but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada,
Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong.
For, if the Court accepts the proposition that
Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took
place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together.
Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s
story. Without it, the evidence against the
others must necessarily fall.
Conclusion
In our criminal justice system, what is
important is, not whether the court entertains
doubts about the innocence of the accused
since an open mind is willing to explore all
possibilities, but whether it entertains a
reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For,
it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt
hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of
meat lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the
rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of
an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that
she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde
massacre that she could not produce?
The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005
and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336
and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel
Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of
the crimes of which they were charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention unless
they are confined for another lawful cause.
SECTION 22
1. IN RE. KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by
supporting delegates to the Constitutional
Convention who will propagate its ideology.
However, Under Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132
states:
No candidate for delegate to the Convention
shall represent or allow himself to be
represented as being a candidate of any
political party or any other organization, and
no political party, political group, political
committee, civic, religious, professional, or
other organization or organized group of
whatever nature shall intervene in the
nomination of any such candidate or in the
filing of his certificate of candidacy or give aid
or support, directly or indirectly, material or
otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign
for election…
A petition for a declaratory relief was filed by
Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly
recognized and existing non-stock and non-
profit corporation created under the laws of the
land, and praying for a determination of the
validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a
declaration of petitioner's rights and duties
thereunder to pursue its purposes by
supporting delegates to the Constitutional
Convention.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not R.A. No. 6132 is an ex post
facto law.
2. Whether or not the R.A No. 6132 is
constitutional.
HELD:
1. No. R.A. No. 6132 is not an ex post facto
law. Though Section 18 of R.A. No. 6132,
provides for a penalty clause, the penalty is
imposed only for acts committed after the
approval of the law and not those perpetrated
prior thereto.
2. Yes. It does not violate freedom of
expression, freedom of association, freedom of
assembly and equal protection clauses. It is
designed to prevent the clear and present
danger of the prostitution of electoral process
and denial of the equal protection of the laws.
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Two letter complaints were filed with the
Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio on October
28,1986 and December 9, 1986, a political
leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of
Congressman Democrito Plaza of Agusan del
Sur, shortly after private respondent had
replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial Governor
of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 The
complaint questioned the issuance to Governor
Paredes, when he was still the provincial
attorney in 1976 of a free patent title for a lot in
the Rosario public land subdivision in San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur. He misrepresented
to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands
that the lands subject herein are disposable
lands, thereby inducing said inspector to
recommend approval of his application for free
patent. On August 10, 1989 an information for
violation of RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was then filed in the
Sandiganbayan after an ex parte preliminary
investigation. A motion to quash the
information was filed by the private respondent
contending among others that he is charged for
an offence which has prescribed. Said motion
was granted. The crime was committed on
January 21, 1976, period of prescription was
10 years, therefore it has prescribed in 1986.
Now the motion to quash was being assailed.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the motion to quash validly
granted.
HELD:
Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the
computation of the period for the prescription
of the crime is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No.
3326, which begins to run from the day of the
commission of the crime and not the discovery
of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved
on March 16, 1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA
3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the
period for the prescription or extinguishment of
a violation of RA 3019 may not be given
retroactive application to the crime which was
committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the
accused. To apply BP 195 to Paredes would
make it an ex post facto law1 for it would alter
his situation to his disadvantage by making
him criminally liable for a crime that had
already been extinguished under the law
existing when it was committed.
3. LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the
Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain
by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among
those included in the ABRITG were petitioners
and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo
delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal
Investigation Command, that what actually
transpired was a summary execution and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang
members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman
Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators
to investigate the said incident. Said panel
found the incident as a legitimate police
operation. However, a review board modified
the panel’s finding and recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against twenty-
six respondents including herein petitioner,
charged as principal, and herein petitioner-
intervenors, charged as accessories. After a
reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended
informations before the Sandiganbayan, where
petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They
contend that the said law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or ore of the “principal accused” are
government officals with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not
qualify under said requisites. However,
pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249
was approved amending the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
“principal” from the phrase “principal accused”
in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of
Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7
which provides that the said law shall apply to
all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as of the approval hereof.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due
process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as the provisions seemed to have
been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to
continue to acquire jurisdiction over the
Kuratong Baleleng case.
2. Whether or not said statute may be
considered as an ex-post facto statute.
3. Whether or not the multiple murder of the
alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the
accused PNP officers which is essential to the
determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s
jurisdiction.
RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that
Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their
right to equal protection of the law is too
shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence
and convincing argument were presented to
warrant such a declaration. Every classification
made by the law is presumed reasonable and
the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness. The classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary when the following
concur: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinction; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class; all of
which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall
apply “to all cases involving” certain public
officials and under the transitory provision in
Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.”
Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’
argument, the law is not particularly directed
only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in
“any court.”
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex
post facto law, generally, provides retroactive
effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal
law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction
which is not penal in character. Penal laws are
those acts of the Legislature which prohibit
certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations or those that define crimes and
provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as
regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its
mode of appeal and other procedural matters,
has been declared by the Court as not a penal
law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be
challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an
offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if it is intimately connected
with the office of the offender and perpetrated
while he was in the performance of his official
functions. Such intimate relation must be
alleged in the information which is essential in
determining the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of
the amended information, there was no specific
allegation of facts that the shooting of the
victim by the said principal accused was
intimately related to the discharge of their
official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that the
said accused arrested and investigated the
victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody. The stringent requirement that the
charge set forth with such particularity as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation
to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the
amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused
PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore,
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not the
Sandiganbayan.
4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
FERRER
FACTS:
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for
violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion
Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano
Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The
abovenamed accused, feloniously became an
officer and/or ranking leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the Government of the Philippines
by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion,
or any other illegal means for the purpose of
establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian
regime and placing the government under the
control and domination of an alien power.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal
complaint was filed with the same court,
sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five
others with subversion.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the
trial court, under the decision of Hon. Simeon
Ferrer in its resolution of September 15, 1970,
declared the statute void on the grounds that it
is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and
overboard, and dismissed the informations
against the two accused.
The Government appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700,
otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law a
bill of attainder.
HELD:
No. A bill of attainder is the substitution of
judicial determination to a legislative
determination of guilt.
the
In the instant case, if Anti-Subversion Act is a
bill of attainder, it would be totally
unnecessary to charge Communists in court,
as the law alone, without more, would suffice
to secure their punishment. But the
undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be
judicially established. The Government has yet
to prove at the trial that the accused joined the
Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts,
and that they joined the Party, knowing its
subversive character and with specific intent to
further its basic objective. The ingredient of
specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of
the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This
constitutes an element of "membership"
distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge.
The former requires proof of direct participation
in the organization's unlawful activities, while
the latter requires proof of mere adherence to
the organization's illegal objectives.