SECTION 5 2. GARCES vs.

ESTENZO

FACTS: 
1. AGLIPAY vs RUIZ
On March 23, 1976, the barangay council of
Valencia, Ormoc City, adopted Resolution No.
Facts: The respondent Director of Posts
5, reviving the traditional socio-religious
announced that he would order the issues of
celebration every 5th day of April the feast day
postage stamps commemorating the celebration
of San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of
in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
Valencia. Said resolution provided for 1) the
International Eucharistic Congress, organized
acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer
by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner,
and (2) the construction of a waiting shed
Mons. Aglipay as a head of the Philippine
as the barangay’s projects. Funds for the two
Independent Church filed a petition to prevent
projects would be obtained through the selling
the said acts of the petitioner. The petitioner
of tickets and cash donations. On March 26,
also contends that the said acts were in violation
1976, the council passed Resolution No.6 which
in the provisions of the Constitution that:
specified that the hermano mayor of the fiesta,
would  be the caretaker of the image of San Vic
“No public money or property shall
ente Ferrer and that the image would remain in
ever be appropriated, applied, or used,
his residence for one year and until the election
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
of his successor as chairman of the next feast
or support of any sect, church,
day. Said resolutions were submitted to a
denomination, secretarian, institution, or
plebiscite and were duly ratified by the
system of religion, or for the use, benefit,
barangay general assembly. Funds were raised
or support of any priest, preacher,
by means of solicitations and cash donations of
minister, or other religious teacher or
the barangay residents and those of
dignitary as such, except when such
the neighboring places of Valencia. With those
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
funds, the waiting shed was constructed and
assigned to the armed forces or to any
the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was
penal institution, orphanage, or
acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council
leprosarium.”
for four hundred pesos. The controversy arose
when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao
Issue: Whether or not the acts of the respondent
Osmena refused to return that image to the
is tantamount to violation in the Constitution?
barangay council on the pretext that it was the
property of the
Ruling: No. The act of the respondent
church  because church funds were used for its 
contemplates no religious purpose in view. What
acquisition. Also, several days after the fiesta
it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary
during his mass sermon, Father Osmena
power to determine when the issuance of special
allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against
postage stamps would be "advantageous to the
the  barangay captain, Manuel C.
Government." Of course, the phrase
Veloso, apparently in connection with the
"advantageous to the Government" does not
disputed image. This provoked Veloso to file a
authorize the violation of the Constitution. It
charge for grave oral defamation against Father
does not authorize the appropriation, use or
Osmena. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente
application of public money or property for the
Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of
use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
Valencia because Father Osmena did
church. In the present case, however, the
not accede to the request of the hermano mayor
issuance of the postage stamps in question by
to have custody of the image. The barangay
the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public
council filed Resolution No. 10, authorizing the
Works and Communications was not inspired by
hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against
any sectarian denomination. The stamps were
Father Osmena for the recovery of the
not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman
image. After the barangay council had posted a
Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from
cash bond of Php 800, Father Osmena turned
the sale of the stamps given to that church.
over the image to the council, but in his answer
The officials concerned merely, took advantage
to the complaint for replevin, he assailed
of an event considered of international
the constitutionality of the said resolutions. He
importance "to give publicity to the Philippines
and members of other religious sects filed
and its people". Even if we were to assume that
against the barangay council and its members a
these officials made use of a poor judgment in
complaint in the CFI at Ormoc City, praying
issuing and selling the postage stamps in
for the annulment of the said resolutions. The
question still, the case of the petitioner would
lower court dismissed the complaint and
fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a
upheld the validity of the resolutions. 
poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of
the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be
Issue:
filled to justify the court in setting aside the
Whether the resolutions are violative of Section
official act assailed as coming within a
5 of the bill of rights.
constitutional inhibition.
Held: 
NO.
The questioned resolutions do not directly or
indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge
religious liberty, nor appropriate public money
or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or
clergyman. The image was purchased
with  private funds, not with tax money, thus it  Petitioners then moved to dismiss the complaint
belongs to the  barangay council, and as owner
of the image, it has the right to determine who
should have custody thereof. The
construction of a waiting shed is entirely a
secular matter. The momentous issues of
separation of church and state, freedom of
religion and the use of public money to favor
any sect or church are not involved at all in this
case even remotely or indirectly. It is not a
microcosmic test case on those issues. This case
is a petty quarrel over the custody of a  saint
image. It would never have arisen if the parties
had  been more diplomatic and tactful and if Fat
her Osmena had taken the trouble of causing
contributions to be solicited from his own
parishioners for the purchase of another
image of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in
his church. The barangay council also did not
favor the Catholic religion  by using the funds
raised by solicitations and donations
for the purchase of the patron saint’s wooden i
mage and making it available to the Catholic
church. The wooden image
was  purchased in connection with the celebrati
on of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint,
San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of
favoring any religion nor interfering
with religious matters or the religious beliefs of
the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the
fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of
the patron saint had to be placed in the church
when the mass was celebrated. As noted in
the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a
socioreligious affair. Its celebration is an
ingrained tradition in rural communities.  in nature. Indeed, that only a few would
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied
3. MAÑOSCA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: The case is about a petition for review on
certiorari to resolve whether or not the “public
use” requirement of Eminent Domain is
applicable in the attempted expropriation by the
Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so
declared by the National Historical Institute
(“NHI”) as a national historical landmark which
the petitioners inherited located at P. Burgos
Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila. The NHI
ascertained that the said parcel of land is the
birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of
Iglesia Ni Cristo thru the passage of Resolution
No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land
to be a national historical landmark. Such
resolution was approved by the Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports and also affirmed
by the Secretary of Justice.
The Republic thru the OSG instituted the
compliant for the expropriation of the said
property. Thereafter, OSG filed a motion for the
issuance of order to take immediate possession
of the property.
on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
incidentally, that the act would constitute an
application of public funds, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to
the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the
1987 Constitution. The SC held that there is a
valid exercise of eminent domain in this case
and that the term public use falls within the
modern context of “public use”.
Issue: What is the so-called unusual interest
that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo’s)
birthplace become so vital as to be a public use
appropriate for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain” when only members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit?
Held: This attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little
consideration, for what should be significant is
the principal objective of, not the casual
consequences that might follow from, the
exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up
the marker is essentially to recognize the
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo
to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of
the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that
greater benefit may be derived by members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could
well be true but such a peculiar advantage still
remains to be merely incidental and secondary
actually benefit from the expropriation of
property does not necessarily diminish the
essence and character of public use.
4. School District of Abingtown Township
vs. Schempp
Facts:
The case arose in 1958, when Edward Lewis
Schempp, his wife, and two of their children,
who attended public schools in Pennsylvania,
filed suit in U.S. district court in Philadelphia,
alleging that their religious rights under the
First Amendment had been violated by a state
law that required public schools to begin each
school day with a reading of at least 10
passages from the Bible. The Schempps, who
were Unitarians, claimed that the law was an
unconstitutional establishment of religion and
that it interfered with the free exercise of their
religious faith, in violation of the First
Amendment’s free-exercise clause (“Congress
shall make no law…prohibiting the free exercise
of [religion]”). They asked the court for
declaratory and injunctive relief (i.e., to declare
the law unconstitutional and to issue an
injunction against its enforcement) and to strike
down the school district’s additional
requirement that students recite the Lord’s
Prayer at the beginning of each school day.
Issue:
Whether or not Pennsylvania law requiring
public school students to participate in
classroom religious exercises violate the
religious freedom of students.
Ruling:
To summarize my views concerning the merits
of these two cases: the history, the purpose
and the operation of the daily prayer recital and
Bible reading leave no doubt that these
practices, standing by themselves, constitute
an impermissible breach of the Establishment
Clause. Such devotional exercises may well
serve legitimate nonreligious purposes. To the
extent, however, that such purposes are
really without religious significance, it has
never been demonstrated that secular means
would not suffice. Indeed, I would suggest
that patriotic or other nonreligious materials
might provide adequate substitutes --
inadequate only to the extent that the
purposes now served are indeed directly or
indirectly religious. Under such
circumstances, the States may not employ
religious means to reach a secular goal
unless secular means are wholly unavailing.
These considerations bring me to a final
contention of the school officials in these
cases: that the invalidation of the exercises
at bar permits this Court no alternative but
to declare unconstitutional every vestige,
however slight, of cooperation or
accommodation between religion and
government. I cannot accept that contention.
While it is not, of course, appropriate for
this Court to decide questions not presently
before it, I venture to suggest that religious
exercises in the public schools present a
unique problem. For not every involvement of
religion in public life violates the
Establishment Clause. Our decision in these
cases does not clearly forecast anything
about the constitutionality of other types of
interdependence between religious and other
public institutions. Specifically, I believe that
the line we must draw between the
permissible and the impermissible is one
which accords with history and faithfully
reflects the understanding of the Founding
Fathers. It is a line which the Court has
consistently sought to mark in its decisions
expounding the religious guarantees of the
First Amendment. What the Framers meant
to foreclose, and what our decisions under
the Establishment Clause have forbidden, are
those involvements of religious with secular
institutions which (a) serve the essentially
religious activities of religious institutions;
(b) employ the organs of government for
essentially religious purposes; or (c) use
essentially religious means to serve
governmental ends, where secular means
would suffice. When the secular and
religious institutions become involved in
such a manner, there inhere in the
relationship precisely those dangers -- as
much to church as to state -- which the
Framers feared would subvert religious
liberty and the strength of a system of
secular government. On the other hand,
there may be myriad forms of involvements
of government with religion which do not
import such dangers, and therefore should
not, in my judgment, be deemed to violate
the Establishment Clause. Nothing in the
Constitution compels the organs of
government to be blind to what everyone
else perceives -- that religious differences
among Americans have important and
pervasive implications for our society.
Likewise, nothing in the Establishment
Clause forbids the application of legislation
having purely secular ends in such a way
as to alleviate burdens upon the free
exercise of an individual's religious beliefs.
Surely the Framers would never have
understood that such a construction
sanctions that involvement which violates
the Establishment Clause. Such a conclusion
can be reached, I would suggest, only by
using the words of the First Amendment to
defeat its very purpose. The line between
permissible and impermissible forms of
involvement between government and religion
has already been considered by the lower
federal and state courts. I think a brief
survey of certain of these forms of
accommodation will reveal that the First
Amendment commands not official hostility
toward religion, but only a strict neutrality
in matters of religion. Moreover, it may
serve to suggest that the scope of our
holding today is to be measured by the
special circumstances under which these
cases have arisen, and by the particular
dangers to church and state which religious
exercises in the public schools present. It
may be helpful for purposes of analysis to
group these other practices and forms of
accommodation into several rough
categories.
Ruling and Analysis
The US Supreme Court held that the law
violated the First Amendment establishment
clause. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas
Clark reasoned that the establishment clause
did more that just prohibit the government from
setting up a religion. Quoting the Court's
previous decision in Everson v. Board of
Education, he wrote, ''The Amendment's
purpose was not to strike merely at the official
establishment of a single sect, creed or religion,
outlawing only a formal relation such as had
prevailed in England and some of the colonies.
Necessarily it was to uproot all such
relationships.''
This was important because at the time because
many scholars, religious leaders, and members
of congress held to the perspective that the
establishment clause did not prevent active
participation in religious exercises as long as the
government didn't favor a particular religion or
sect. So the US Supreme Court's decision
directly addressed cases like Abington where
students were being forced to participate in
school-sponsored religious activities.
But the Court didn't draw the line at forced
participation, it also held that the school was
violating the establishment clause by just
having the program--even if it was voluntary.
Again citing Everson, Clark said that the
establishment clause's purpose was to ''create a
complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority
by comprehensively forbidding every form of
public aid or support for religion.'' Thus the
program supported and provided aid for a
religion by compelling reading of the verses
along with reciting the Lord's Prayer after
reading the versus.
For Clark this highlighted the notion that the
establishment clause had a double aspect. ''On
the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of
the acceptance of any creed or the practice of
any form of worship. ... On the other hand, it
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form
of religion. Thus the establishment clause,
correctly enforced, not only prevents the co-
opting of religion by the government, but it also
protects the free exercise of religion as the two
clauses are intertwined.
Significance
This decision dramatically changed the way
schools all over the country dealt with religion.
The days of the school presenting religious
content as an exercise of religion were over. In
its ruling, the court created the secular purpose
test, which said that for any government
involvement in religion, ''there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.''
Eighteen years later in Lemon v. Kurtzman the
US Supreme Court added a third prong to the
test, which stated that the involvement must not
result in the excessive entanglement of religion
and government. This became the Lemon
test and is used today in establishment clause
cases.
Lesson Summary
Edward Schempp sued Abington School District
over a program where the children were forced
to participate in a daily Bible reading. Schempp
felt that this violated his children's First
Amendment rights, especially
the establishment clause, which prohibits the
government from establishing a religion. The US
Supreme Court held that the program that
made it mandatory to listen to Bible verses
being read, as well as students being subjected
to reading the verses, amounted to the
establishment of a religion.
The US Supreme Court reasoned that the
establishment clause does more than just
prohibit a government religion, it also prevents
the government from promoting or aiding a
religion that blurs the line between government
and religion. In their decision, the US Supreme
Court created the secular purpose test, which
said that there must be a secular purpose for
any involvement in religion, and the primary
effect neither advances nor prohibits religion.
The culmination of all of these cases came in
1971. The case, Lemon v Kurtzman (403 US 602
[1971]), established what is known today as
"The Lemon Test." The Lemon Test is used to
examine a law to see if it has the effect of
establishing a religion. The Court wrote:
In the absence of precisely stated
constitutional prohibitions, we must
draw lines with reference to the three
main evils against which the
Establishment Clause was intended to
afford protection: "sponsorship,
financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity."
Every analysis in this area must begin
with consideration of the cumulative
criteria developed by the Court over
many years. Three such tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the
statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster "an
excessive government entanglement
with religion."
The test was used in the Lemon Test to answer
the central question in that case: can the state
pay some of the salary of teachers who teach in
parochial schools? The case concerned a Rhode
Island law that provided that teachers in
parochial schools could receive a supplement
from the state if the school spent less per pupil
on non-religious education than the average
spent in public schools. If so, teachers who
taught only secular courses were eligible for the
supplemental pay. Rhode Island's argument
was that the funds were only paid to teachers of
non-religious subjects, and only based on the
per-pupil expenditures on non-religious
subjects. The Court ruled that the requirements
of the state to ensure that the teachers never
mentioned religious subjects, and the record
keeping and examination to determine the
amount spent on secular subjects would be too
much of an entanglement. The Lemoncase found
similar entanglements in similar Pennsylvania
laws. The laws may have passed the first two
prongs of the test, but failed the third.
This three-pronged test has been used in many
cases since it was first promulgated. Though the
Lemon Test is not infallible, it has largely stood
the test of time and is still in use today.
5. PASTOR DIONISIO AUSTRIA vs NLRC
Facts: Private Respondent Central Philippine
Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day
Adventists (hereinafter referred to as the "SDA")
is a religious corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine law and is represented
in this case by the other private respondents,...
officers of the SDA. Petitioner, on the other
hand, was a Pastor of the SDA until 31 October
1991, when his services were terminated.
petitioner received a letter of... dismissal citing
misappropriation of denominational funds,
willful breach of trust, serious misconduct,
gross and habitual neglect of duties, and
commission of an offense against the person of
employer's duly authorized representative, as
grounds for... the termination of his services.
The NLRC, without ruling on the merits of the
case, reversed itself once again, sustained the
argument posed by private respondents and,
accordingly, dismissed the complaint of
petitioner. The dispositive portion of the NLRC
resolution dated 23 January 1996, subject of
the... present petition, is as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
instant motion for reconsideration is hereby
granted. Accordingly, this case is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
Private respondents contend that by virtue of
the doctrine of separation of church and state,
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by
petitioner. Since the matter at bar allegedly
involves the discipline of a religious minister,
it... is to be considered a purely ecclesiastical
affair to which the State has no right to
interfere.
Issues: The issues to be resolved in this petition
are:
1. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC
has jurisdiction to try and decide the
complaint filed by petitioner against the
SDA;
2. Whether or not the termination of the
services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical
affair, and, as such, involves the
separation of church and state; and
3. Whether or not such termination is valid.
Ruling: While the State is prohibited from
interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs, the
Church is likewise barred from meddling in
purely secular matters.
The case at bar does not concern an
ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar
the State from taking cognizance of the same.
An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns
doctrine, creed, or form or worship of the
church, or the adoption and enforcement within
a... religious association of needful laws and
regulations for the government of the
membership, and the power of excluding from
such associations those deemed unworthy of
membership.[... o be concrete, examples of this
so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the
State cannot meddle are proceedings for...
excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and
other activities with which attached religious
significance. The case at bar does not even
remotely concern any of the above cited
examples.
Simply stated, what is involved here is the
relationship of the church as an employer and
the minister as an employee. It is purely secular
and has no relation whatsoever with the...
practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the
church.
The grounds invoked for petitioner's dismissal...
are all based on Article 282 of the Labor Code
which enumerates the just causes for
termination of employment.
the reason for petitioner's dismissal from the
service is not... religious in nature.
When the SDA terminated the services of
petitioner, it was merely exercising its
management prerogative to fire an employee
which it believes... to be unfit for the job. As
such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of
the case and to determine whether the SDA, as
employer, rightfully exercised its management
prerogative to dismiss an employee. This is in
consonance with the... mandate of the
Constitution to afford full protection to labor.
Under the Labor Code, the provision which
governs the dismissal of employees, is
comprehensive enough to include religious
corporations, such as the SDA, in its coverage.
Article 278 of the Labor Code on post-
employment states that "the provisions of this
Title shall apply to... all establishments or
undertakings, whether for profit or not."
Obviously, the cited article does not make any
exception in favor of a religious corporation.
This is made more evident by the fact that the
Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
particularly, Section 1, Rule 1, Book
VI on the Termination of Employment and
Retirement,... private respondents are estopped
from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction for
the first time on appeal. It is already too late in
the day for private respondents to question the
jurisdiction of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter...
since the SDA had fully participated in the trials
and hearings of the case from start to finish.
the... active participation of private respondents
in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC mooted the question on jurisdiction.
In termination cases, the settled rule is that the
burden of proving that the termination was for a
valid or authorized cause rests on the employer.
the requisites for a valid dismissal, namely: (a)
the employee must be afforded due process, i.e.,
he must be given an opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself, and; (b) the dismissal...
must be for a valid cause as provided in Article
282 of the Labor Code. Without the concurrence
of this twin requirements, the termination
would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.
Before the services of an employee can be validly
terminated, Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code
and Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code further require the
employer to furnish the employee with two (2)
written notices, to wit: (a) a written... notice
served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving to said
employee reasonable opportunity within which
to explain his side; and, (b) a written notice of
termination served on the employee indicating
that upon due consideration of all the...
circumstances, grounds have been established
to justify his termination.
The first notice, which may be considered as the
proper charge, serves to apprise the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought. The second notice on the
other hand seeks to inform the employee of the
employer's... decision to dismiss him.
This decision, however, must come only after the
employee is given a reasonable period from
receipt of the first notice within which to answer
the charge and ample opportunity to be heard
and defend himself with the assistance... of a
representative, if he so desires. This is in
consonance with the express provision of the
law on the protection to labor and the broader
dictates of procedural due process. Non-
compliance therewith is fatal because these...
requirements are conditions sine quo non before
dismissal may be validly effected.
Settled is the rule that under Article 282 (c) of
the Labor Code, the breach of trust must be
willful. A breach is... willful if it is done
intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act
done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently. It must rest on substantial
grounds and not on the employer's...
arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion;
otherwise, the employee would eternally remain
at the mercy of the employer.
Misconduct has been defined as improper or
wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not
mere error in judgment.
For misconduct to be considered serious it
must be of such grave and aggravated character
and not merely trivial or unimportant. Based on
this standard, we believe that the act of
petitioner in banging the attache case on the
table, throwing the... telephone and scattering
the books in the office of Pastor Buhat,
although improper, cannot be considered as
grave enough to be considered as serious
misconduct.
While the Constitution does not condone
wrongdoing by the employee, it nevertheless
urges a moderation of the sanctions that may
be applied to him in light of the many
disadvantages that weigh heavily on him like an
albatross on his neck.
Where a penalty less punitive would suffice,
whatever missteps may have been committed
by the worker ought not be visited with a
consequence so severe such as dismissal from
them.
6. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Petitioner IDCP is a non-governmental
organization that extends voluntary services to
the Filipino people, especially to Muslim
communities. Petitioner formulated in 1995
internal rules and procedures based on the
Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food,
inspection thereof and issuance of halal
certifications. In that same year, petitioner
began to issue, for a fee, certifications to
qualified products and food manufacturers. On
October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the
Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and
designating respondent OMA to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent
OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal
certificates and perform other related regulatory
activities.
Issue:
Whether or not EO 46 violates the non-
establishment clause and the free exercise of
religion provision found in Section 5, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
EO 46 violates Section 5, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Classifying a food product as halal
is a religious function because the standards
used are drawn from the Qur’an and Islamic
beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to
classify products as halal, EO 46 encroached on
the religious freedom of Muslim organizations
like IDCP to interpret for Filipino Muslims what
food products are fit for Muslim consumption.
By virtue of the EO, the State has forced
Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
Qur’an and Sunnah on halal food.
7. TARUC vs. DELA CRUZ (G.R. No. 144801.
March 10, 2005)
Facts: Respondent Bishop de la Cruz petitioners
expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church for disobedience to duly
constituted authority in the Church; inciting
dissension, resulting in division in the Parish of
Our Mother of Perpetual Help, Iglesia Filipina
Independiente, Socorro, Surigao del Norte when
they celebrated an open Mass at the Plaza on
June 19, 1996; and for threatening to forcibly
occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety and
fear among the general membershipreasons
Petitioners filed a complaint contending that
their expulsion was illegal because it was done
without trial thus violating their right to due
process of law.
Issue: Whether or not the courts have
jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a
religious institution.
Ruling: The case at bar is purely ecclasiastical
matters which is considered to be outside the
providence of the court due to the form of
government where the complete separation of
civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted
upon. Hence, the civil courts must not allow
themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an
ecclesiastical nature. Civil Courts will not
interfere in the internal affairs of a religious
organization except for the protection of civil or
property rights. Those rights may be the subject
of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to
the title, use, or possession of church property.
Those who unite to an ecclasiastical body do so
with implied consent to submit to the Church
government and they are bound to submit to it.
The power to exclude membership from the
church of those considered unworthy lies solely
to the Church thus it is outside the province of
the civil court. The expulsion of membership of
the petitioners was legally made. They have not
violated the due process of law because they
were given apportunity to be heared when they
were also warned of the consequences of their
actions.
8. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF
MANILA (G.R No. L-9637; April 30,1957)
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock,
non-profit religious, missionary corporation
duly registered and doing business in the
Philippines through its Philippine Agency
established in Manila. Plaintiff’s Philippine
agency has been distributing and selling bibles/
gospel portions throughout the Philippines and
translating the same into several Philippine
dialects. The acting City Treasurer of the City of
Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting
business of general merchandise without
providing the necessary Mayor’s permit and
Municipal license fee in violation of Ordinances
No. 3000 as amended, Ordinance No.2529,
3028 and 3364 and requires plaintiff to secure
within 3 days the corresponding permit and
license fees.
Plaintiff paid the defendant under protest
the said permit and fees giving at the same time
notice to the City Treasurer that suit would be
taken in Court to question the legality of the
ordinances under which the said fees were
being collected.
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinances of
the City of Manila are applicable to the
business of the plaintiff.
Ruling: The constitutional guaranty of the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right
to disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right can only be justified like
other restraints of freedom of expressions on
the grounds that there is a clear and present
danger of any substantive evil which the State
has the right to prevent. In the case at bar the
license fee herein involved is imposed upon
appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles
and other religious literature. The power to
impose a license tax on these freedom is indeed
as potent as the power of censorship which this
Court has repeatedly struck down.
For this reason, the Court believed that
the provisions of the questioned ordinances
cannot be applied to plaintiff-appellant for in
doing so it would impair the free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship as well as its right to disseminate
religious information.
9. TOLENTINO vs SECRETARY OF FINANCE
(G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995)
Facts: These are motions seeking
reconsidersation to the decision dismissing the
petitions filed in the cases for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise
known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.
It is contended by the Philippine Press Institute
(PPI) that by removing the exemption of the
press from the VAT while maintaining those
granted to others, the law discriminates against
the press. At any rate, it is avereedd “even
nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionaly
guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”.
Issue: Whether or not sales tax on bible sales
violative of religious and press freedom
Ruling: No. The Court was speaking of a
VAT in this case and not of a license tax, which,
its imposition and application to the press or to
religious groups is unconstitutional (American
Bible Society vs. City of Manila). However, a VAT
is different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax
on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on sale,
barter, lease, or exchange of goods or properties
purely for revenue purposes. To subject the
press to its payment is not to burden the
exercise of its right any more than to make the
press pay income tax or subject to general
regulation is not to violate its freedom under the
Constitution.
10. EBRALINAG, et. al. vs. THE DIVISION
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
(G.R. No. 95770; March 1, 1993)
Facts: Petitioners in this consolidated case are
students, assisted by their parents, who are
expelled from their respective schools due to
their refusal to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
required by R.A. No. 1265 and by Department
Order No. 8 of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions.
Petitioners’ parents, who belong to religious
group, Jehovah’s witnesses, admittedly teach
their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge
for they believe that those are "acts of worship"
or "religious devotion" which they "cannot
conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything
except God.” They feel bound by the Bible's
command to "guard ourselves from
idols — 1 John 5:21.” They consider the flag as
an image or idol representing the State. They
think the action of the local authorities in
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends
constitutional limitations on the State's power
and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit
which the Constitution protect against official
control.
Respondents invoke R.A. No. 1265 and the
court’s ruling on an earlier case, Gerona, which
was incorporated in Section 28, Title VI, Chapter
9 of the Administrative Code of 1987. This gives
them the authority to dismiss any teacher or
student after due investigation when they refuse
to join and participate in the flag ceremony.
On October 31, 1990, the students and their
parents filed these special civil actions for
Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition alleging
that the public respondents acted without or in
excess of their jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion
without prior notice and hearing, hence, in
violation of their right to due process, their
right to free public education, and their right to
freedom of speech, religion and worship.
Issue: Whether or not school children who are
members of a religious sect known as Jehovah’s
Witnesses may be expelled from school for
refusing, on account of religious beliefs, to take
part in the flag ceremony which includes
playing by a band or singing the Philippine
national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag
and reciting the patriotic pledge.
Ruling: The expulsion orders were annulled
and set aside.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of
highest priority and the amplest protection
among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator. The right to
religious profession and worship has a two-fold
aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to
act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long
as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts
that affect the public welfare. The only
limitation to religious freedom is the existence
of grave and present danger to public safety,
morals, health and interests where State has
right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take
part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do
not engage in “external acts” or behavior that
would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to
show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.
Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior,
there is no warrant for their expulsion.
11. ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD S.
ESCRITOR (A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4,
2003)
Facts: Alejandro Estrada wrote a letter to judge
Caoibes, Jr. of RTC Branch 253, Las Pinas City,
requesting for an investigation of rumors that
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter
in said court, is living with a man not her
husband. They allegedly have a child of
eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is neither
personally related to Escritor nor a resident of
Las Piñas City. Nevertheless, he filed the charge
against Escritor as he believes that she is
committing an immoral act that tarnishes the
image of the court, thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might
appear that the court condones her act.
During the investigation, Escritor
admitted that she has been living with Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for
twenty years and that they have a son but as a
member of the religious sect known as
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement
is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In
fact, after ten years of living together, she and
Quilapo executed on July 28, 1991 a
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.". At the
time Escritor executed her pledge, her husband
was still alive but living with another woman.
Insofar as the congregation is concerned, there
is nothing immoral about the conjugal
arrangement and they remain members in good
standing with the congregation
The declaration requires the approval of
the elders of the Jehovah’s Witnesses
congregation and is binding within the
congregation all over the world except in
countries where divorce is allowed. The
Jehovah’s congregation requires that at the time
the declarations are executed, the couple cannot
secure the civil authorities’ approval of the
marital relationship because of legal
impediments. The execution of the declaration
finds scriptural basis in Matthew 5:32 that
when the spouse commits adultery, the offended
spouse can remarry.
Moreover, at the time Escritor joined the
judiciary, her husband has already died and
there was no longer any legal impediment to
marry on her part, although Quilapio was still
married to another but separated.
Escritor, who is charged with committing
"gross and immoral conduct" under the Revised
Administrative Code, invokes the moral
standards of her religion, the Jehovah's
Witnesses, in asserting that her conjugal
arrangement with a man not her legal husband
does not constitute disgraceful and immoral
conduct for which she should be held
administratively liable.  Couples who are civilly married are considered
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be
found guilty of the administrative charge of
"gross and immoral conduct."
Held: The morality referred to in the law is
public and secular morality, not religious
morality. The distinction is important because
the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at
bar should be understood only in this realm.
Applying the balancing process, the court
found that Escritor's right to religious freedom
has been burdened as she is made to choose
between keeping her employment and following
her religious precept. She appears to be sincere
in her religious belief and practice and is not
merely using the "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for
immorality.
Further, in ruling on Escritor’s claim of
religious freedom, the court applied the
‘compelling state interest’ test from a
‘benevolent neutrality’ stance - i.e. the claim of
religious freedom would warrant carving out an
exception from the Civil Service Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest.
The case was remanded to the Office of the
Court Administrator to properly settle the issue
of the existence of a compelling state interest.
The government should be given the
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state
interest it seeks to uphold which can override
respondent's religious belief and practice. The
burden of evidence should be discharged by the
proper agency of the government which is the
Office of the Solicitor General.
12. PERFECTO vs ESIDRA
Facts:
Perfecto filed an administrative case against
Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera because
the latter allegedly falsified the birth certificate
of her child to make it appear that she married
Renato, her second husband, on March 18,
1990. The marriage records, however, show
that her marriage with Renato took place only
on June 3, 1992. Perfecto prays that Judge
Alma be dismissed for her alleged immorality
and dishonesty. On the question of integrity,
honesty, and morality, Judge Desales-Esidera
argued that everything she did was legal and in
accordance with her religious beliefs. She was,
indeed, married to her second husband on
March 18, 1990, but only under recognized
Catholic rites. The priest who officiated their
marriage had no authority to solemnize
marriages under the civil law.She said that
living in a state of sin, and may be ex-
communicated. They cannot receive the
sacraments. Thus, her marriage to Richard
Tang was not recognized by the Catholic
Church.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of
immoral conduct based on her failure to
comport herself according to the Roman
Catholic faith.
Ruling:
No, respondent is not guilty of immoral conduct
based on her failure to comport herself
according to the Roman Catholic faith.
This court may not sit as judge of what is moral
according to a particular religion. We do not
have jurisdiction over and is not the proper
authority to determine which conduct
contradicts religious doctrine. We have
jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar
as it involves conduct that affects the public or
its interest. Thus, for purposes of determining
administrative liability of lawyers and judges,
"immoral conduct" should relate to their
conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of
"immorality" under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer’s conduct must be so
depraved as to reduce the public’s confidence in
the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not
binding whenever this court decides the
administrative liability of lawyers and persons
under this court’s supervision. At best, religious
morality weighs only persuasively on us.
Therefore, we cannot properly conclude that
respondent judge’s acts of contracting a second
marriage during the subsistence of her alleged
first marriage and having an alleged "illicit"
affair are "immoral" based on her Catholic faith.
This court is not a judge of religious morality.
SECTION 6
1. VILLAVICENCIO vs LUKBAN (GR No. 14639,
March 25, 1919)
Facts: The City Mayor of Manila together with
the city’s Chief of Police Hohmann hustled 170
inmates at the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
Said inmates were placed in aboard the
streamers. The women were given no
opportunity to collect their belongings beyond
their consent and knowledge they were shipped
to Mindanao(Davao), the women were landed
and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales,
the provincial governor of Davao and by two
haciendero’s, both parties had no previous
notification that the women were prostitutes
who had been expelled from the City of Manila.
The attorney for the relatives and friends of a
considerable number of the deportees presented
an application for habeas corpus, alleged that
the women under their custody or control were
illegally restrained of their liberty. Respondents
contention that the writ should not be granted,
1) because the petitioners are not proper parties,
2) because the action should have began in
Davao, 3) because they did not have any of the
women under their custody or control, thus the
jurisdiction did not extend beyond the
boundaries of Manila. Said application of writ
was granted, but none were produced by the
respondents thus a second order was
promulgated.
Issue: Whether or not Mayor Lukban has the
right to deport the 170 women with ill repute.
Held: NO. No Law or Order or regulation
authorized the Mayor of the City of Manila or
the chief of the police of the city to force citizens
of the Philippine Islands to change their
domicile from Manila to another locality. The
writ of habeas corpus was properly granted,
and that the mayor of the city of Manila who
was primarily responsible for the deportation is
in contempt of court for his failure to comply
with the order of the court. These women,
despite their being in a sense lepers of society,
are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the some constitutional
guaranties as are other citizens.
2. MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS
DOCTRINE:
The right to return to one’s country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of
abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-
considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution,
is part of the law of the land.
FACTS:
In February 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was
deposed from presidency through the
successful People Power. His family was forced
into exile in Hawaii, and was replaced by
Corazon Aquino as President.
On his deathbed, Ferdinand Marcos wished to
return to the Philippines to die. President
Aquino barred the family’s return, citing the
dire consequences to the nation of his return at
a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward as a reason.
ISSUE:
Can the President bar the Marcoses’ return to
the Philippines?
Does the right to travel as mentioned in Section
6 of the Bill of Rights include the right to return
to the country?
RULING:
Yes, the President may bar the family from
returning to the country, because the
Constitution has vested the government the
duty and to serve the people, as mentioned in
Article II. The influence of the Marcoses have
proven to be dangerous and powerful even if
they were outside the country, as shown when
Marcos loyalists have stormed a television
station and started coup d’ etats. The family
has also attempted to return to the country
surreptitiously by hiring a group of Lebanese
mercenaries to fly them back using a private
jet, which only further proves their capacity.

The right to return to one’s country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of
abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-
considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution,
is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.] However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a
different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,
against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art.
12 (4).] Therefore, the President, by the power
vested to her by the Constitution, may limit
one’s right to return to the county, especially
when the safety and security of the nation is
involved.
3. YAP vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: 
Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the
crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts
equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the records of
the case were transmitted to the Court of
Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending
appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed
Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5 Milion on
condition that he will secure “a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the
place of his residence that he is a resident of the
area and that he will remain to be so until final
judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court and private complainant.” He sought the
reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence,
he appealed to the SC. He contended that the
CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount,
effectively denied him his right to bail. He
also contested the condition imposed by the CA
that he secure a certification/guaranty, claiming
that the same violates his liberty of abode and
travel.
Issue:
1. Whether the condition imposed by the CA
violative of the liberty of abode and right to
travel.
Held:
Liberty of abode and right to travel
The right to change abode and travel within the
Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are
not absolute rights.   No, the information sought by herein petitioners
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing
petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order
as contemplated by the above provision. The
condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is
simply consistent with the nature and function
of a bail bond, which is to ensure that
petitioner will make himself available at all
times whenever the Court requires his
presence. Besides, a closer look at the
questioned condition will show that petitioner is
not prevented from changing abode; he is
merely required to inform the court in case he
does so
SECTION 7
1. VALMONTE vs BELMONTE
FACTS:
Petitioner Valmonte, in his capacity as a lawyer,
member of the media and plain citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines, requested that he
be furnished the list of the names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-laban who were able to secure
clean loans immediately before the 1986
election thru the intercession/marginal note of
then first lady Imelda Marcos, and to furnished
petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans,
and or to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information. The deputy
general of the GSIS, Atty. Trio, replied that such
request cannot be granted, asserting that the
documents evidencing the loan transactions of
the GSIS are private in nature and in violation
of the confidentiality of such office image.
Apparently, for not receiving a reply, a second
letter was sent, saying that, failure to receive a
reply, they are free to do whatever action
necessary to pursue their desired objective in
pursuance of public concern. Respondents
contention, petitioners having failed to
pursuance of public concern.
Respondents contention, petitioners having
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, then
petitioners have no cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the document requested is
private in nature.
HELD:
as to the truth of reports that some opposition
members were granted “clean loans” by the
GSIS is a matter of public interest and concern.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the
government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs
for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its
funds assume a public character. The right to
privacy belongs to the individual in his private
capacity, it cannot be invoked by juridical
entities like GSIS.
The instant petition is granted and respondent
general Manager is ordered to allow petitioners
access to documents and records evidencing
loans granted to members of the former Batas
Pambansa, however the right to information
does not include the right to compel custodians
of official records to prepare list, abstracts,
summaries and the like.
2. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PEA (G.R No.
133250; July 9, 2002)
Facts: The government, through the
Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a
contract with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for
brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included
the construction of Phases I and II of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. Then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1084 creating PEA. On the same date, then
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in
the foreshore and offshore of the Manila
Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No.
3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the
parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP). Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA,
covering the three reclaimed islands known as
the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern
portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
Parañaque City.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. PEA and AMARI entered into
the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then
President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the
JVA.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate
President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as
the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the
Senate Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation
and in their conclusion report stated that the
JVA is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President
Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal
Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of
the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No.
560. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of
the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by
the Senate Committees. Reports were published
that there were on-going renegotiations between
PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then
President Fidel V. Ramos.
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. Petitioner prays that PEA
publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation
of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and
Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution
on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.
Issue: Whether the constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final agreement.
Ruling: The right covers three categories
of information which are "matters of public
concern," namely: (1) official records; (2)
documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions and decisions; and (3)
government research data used in formulating
policies. The first category refers to any
document that is part of the public records in
the custody of government agencies or officials.
The second category refers to documents and
papers recording, evidencing, establishing,
confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining
official acts, transactions or decisions of
government agencies or officials. The third
category refers to research data, whether raw,
collated or processed, owned by the government
and used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on
the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation
reports, recommendations, legal and expert
opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached to
such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA.
The right to information, however, does not
extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation of
powers. The right does not also apply to
information on military and diplomatic secrets,
information affecting national security, and
information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of
the accused, which courts have long recognized
as confidential. The right may also be subject to
other limitations that Congress may impose by
law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information
demanded by petitioner is privileged information
rooted in the separation of powers. The
information does not cover Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and
other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of
either house of Congress, are recognized as
confidential. This kind of information cannot be
pried open by a co-equal branch of government.
A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of
those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative
and Judicial power. This is not the situation in
the instant case.
The Court ruled, therefore, that the
constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract.
3. CHAVEZ vs. PCGG (G.R. No. 130716.
December 9, 1998)
Facts: Petitioner, invoking his constitutional
right to information and the correlative duty of
the state to disclose publicly all its transactions
involving the national interest, demands that
respondents make public any and all
negotiations and agreements pertaining to
PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-
gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise
on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth
involves an issue of “paramount public interest,”
since it has a “debilitating effect on the country’s
economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to
the national interest of the Filipino people.
Hence, the people in general have a right to
know the transactions or deals being contrived
and effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny
forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that
petitioner’s action is premature, because there is
no showing that he has asked the PCGG to
disclose the negotiations and the Agreements.
And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be
compelled to make any disclosure, since the
proposed terms and conditions of the
Agreements have not become effective and
binding.
Issues: Whether the constitutional right to
information may prosper against respondents’
argument that the “should be disclosed”
proposed terms and conditions of the
Agreements are not yet effective and binding
Held: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers
of the Constitution, we believe that it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as
well as other government representatives, to
disclose sufficient public information on any
proposed settlement they have decided to take
up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-
gotten wealth, subject to some of the following
recognized restrictions: (1) national security
matters and intelligence information, (2) trade
secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal
matters, and (4) other confidential information.
4. SERENO, Executive Director of the APMP
vs. CTRM of NEDA (GR No. 175210;
February 1, 2016)
Facts: This is a case for petition for the
dismissal of the petition for mandamus filed
and denied in the RTC by the petitioner as a
citizen and as a stakeholder in the Philippine
petrochemical industry which compels
respondent to provide him copy of the minutes
of its May 23, 2005 meeting, copies of all official
records, documents, paper and government
research data used as a basis for the issuance
of EO 486 dated January 12, 2006 which lift
the suspension of the tariff reduction on
petrochemical resins and other plastic products
under the ASEAN Free trade area common
effective preferential tariff scheme.
In the assailed decision of the RTC it ruled and
relied on Section 3 of Rule IV of the IRR of RA
6713 and it also declared that the CTRM as an
advisory body and that the record of their
communications fall under the category of
privileged information because of the sensitive
subject matters which could seriously affect
public interest.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of
mandamus by the RTC is correct
Ruling: Yes, the dismissal of the petition for
mandamus is correct.
Two requisites must concur before the right to
information may be compelled by writ of
mandamus, as follows:
1. The information sought must be
in relation to matters of public
concern or public interest; and
2. It must not be exempt by law
from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.
The first requisite the determination whether or
not information of public interest or public
concern in left to the courts on a case to case
basis. In this case, the SC held that the
information sought by the petitioner is a matter
of public concern or interest on the grounds
that the Philippine Petrochemical industry has
an essential contribution to the overall growth
of our economy.
As to the second requisite, the court stated that
it already ruled that constitutional guarantee of
the right to information does not cover the
following information:
 1. National security matters and
intelligence information;
2. Trade secrets and banking
transactions;
3. Criminal matters information or
investigations of crimes by law
enforcer before the prosecution of
the accused.
4. Diplomatic correspondence
secrets
5. Closed- door cabinet meeting
5. Executive sessions of house of
congress and internal deliberation
of the Supreme court.
Respondents argued that the meeting on May
23, 2005, the minute which the petitioners
wanted to access, was classified as a closed –
door cabinet meeting by virtue of the
committee’s composition and nature of its
mandate in dealing with foreign- affairs, trade
and policy making which was also upheld by the
SC , thus exempted by law.
Therefore, the second requirement was not met,
hence, the petition was denied affirming the
decision of the RTC.
5. ALFRED HILADO vs JUDGE AMOR REYES
Facts: Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition
for issuance of letters of administration for the
Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The
case was raffled to Judge Amor Reyes, in whose
court such a petition was
approved. Alfred Hilado, on the other hand, filed
a civil case against the estate of Roberto. For a
period of time, the counsel of Hilado was allowed
to examine the records of the case and secure
certified true copies thereof. However, one of
Hilado‘s counsels was denied access to records
of the estate by Judge Reyes ratiocinating that
only parties or those with authority from the
parties are allowed to inquire or verify the status
of the case as the counsel was not under that
instance. Hilado filed before the Supreme Court
a petition for mandamus to compel Judge Reyes
to allow them to access, examine and obtain
copies of any and all documents forming part of
the record of the Hilado‘s case contending that
these records are public, and which the public
can freely access.
Issue: Whether or not a writ of mandamus is
proper
Ruling: The term “judicial record” or “court
record” does not only refer to the orders,
judgment or verdict of the courts. It comprises
the official collection of all papers, exhibits and
pleadings filed by the parties, all processes
issued and returns made thereon, appearances,
and word-for-word testimony which took place
during the trial and which are in the
possession, custody, or control of the judiciary
or of the courts for purposes of rendering court
decisions. It has also been described to include
any paper, letter, map, book, other document,
tape, photograph, film, audio or video
recording, court reporter’s notes, transcript,
data compilation, or other materials, whether in
physical or electronic form, made or received
pursuant to law or in connection with the
transaction of any official business by the
court, and includes all evidence it has received
in a case. Decisions and opinions of a court are
of course matters of public concern or interest
for these are the authorized expositions and
interpretations of the laws, binding upon all
citizens, of which every citizen is charged with
knowledge. Justice thus requires that all
should have free access to the opinions of
judges and justices, and it would be against
sound public policy to prevent, suppress or
keep the earliest knowledge of these from the
public. Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et al. v. Judge
Llamas, this Court found a judge to have
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing
to furnish Lantaco et al. a copy of his decision
in a criminal case of which they were even the
therein private complainants, the decision being
“already part of the public record which the
citizen has a right to scrutinize.
SECTION 8
1. PAFLU vs SECRETARY OF LABOR (GR No.
L-22228, February 27, 1969)
Facts: Section 23 of RA No. 875 requires labor
organizations to submit several documents in
order to be registered as a legitimate labor
organization under the Department of Labor.
The Registration of Labor Organization,
hereinafter referred to as the Registrar, issued a
notice of hearing on the matter of cancellation
of the registration of Social Security System
Employees Association (SSSEA) , an affiliate of
PAFLU, for failure to submit several
requirements.
Counsel for SSSEA moved to postpone the
hearing, which was granted, but failed to show
up on the specified date. The next day, SSSEA
submitted several documents in compliance of
the requirements. However, the Registrar still
rendered a decision cancelling the registration
of SSSEA because the documents submitted
were not those asked for. SSSEA was allowed to
appeal. Pending resolution, this action was
instituted assailing the constitutionality of RA
No. 875 for allegedly violating their freedom to
assembly and association.
Issue: Whether or not Sec 23 of RA No. 875 is
unconstitutional.
Ruling: No. The registration prescribed in
the said section is not a limitation to the right
of assembly or association, which may be
exercised with or without said registration. The
latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the
acquisition of legal personality by labor
organizations, associations or unions and the
possession of the "rights and privileges granted
by law to legitimate labor organizations". The
Constitution does not guarantee these rights
and privileges, much less said personality,
which are mere statutory creations, for the
possession and exercise of which registration is
required to protect both labor and the public
against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as
organizers, although not truly accredited agents
of the union they purport to represent. Such
requirement is a valid exercise of the police
power, because the activities in which labor
organizations, associations and union of
workers are engaged affect public interest,
which should be protected.
2. SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs COURT
OF APPEALS
Facts:
On 9 June 1987, the officers and members of
Social Security System Employees Association
(SSSEA) staged a strike and barricaded the
entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-
striking employees from reporting for work and
SSS members from transacting business with
the SSS. The SSSEA went on strike after the
SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which
included: implementation of the provisions of
the old SSSSSSEA collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues;
payment of accrued overtime pay, night
differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of
temporary or contractual employees with 6
months or more of service into regular and
permanent employees and their entitlement to
the same salaries, allowances and benefits given
to other regular employees of the SSS; and
payment of the children's allowance of P30.00,
and after the SSS deducted certain amounts
from the salaries of the employees and allegedly
committed acts of discrimination and unfair
labor practices. The strike was reported by the
Social Security System (SSS) to the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council, which
ordered the strikers to return to work. The
strikers refused to return to work. On 11 June
1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the SSSEA, Dionisio T. Baylon, Ramon
Modesto, Juanito Madura, Reuben Zamora,
Virgilio De Alday, Sergio Araneta, Placido
Agustin, and Virgilio Magpayo, praying that a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin
the strike and that the strikers be ordered to
return to work; that SSSEA, et. al. be ordered to
pay damages; and that the strike be declared
illegal. On 11 June 1987, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order pending resolution
of the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. In the meantime, the SSSEA, et. al.
filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. On
22 July 1987, the court a quo denied the
motion to dismiss and converted the restraining
order into an injunction upon posting of a
bond, after finding that the strike was illegal. As
the SSSEA's motion for reconsideration of the
order was also denied on 14 August 1988,
SSSEA ,et. al. filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction before
the Supreme Court (GR 79577). In a resolution
dated 21 October 1987, the Court, through the
Third Division, resolved to refer the case to the
Court of Appeals. SSSEA, et. al. filed a motion
for reconsideration thereof, but during its
pendency the Court of Appeals on 9 March
1988 promulgated its decision on the referred
case. SSSEA, et. al. moved to recall the Court of
Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the Court
on 29 June 1988 denied the motion for
reconsideration in GR 97577 for being moot
and academic. SSSEA, et. al.'s motion to recall
the decision of the Court of Appeals was also
denied in view of the Supreme Court's denial of
the motion for reconsideration. SSSEA filed a
petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not SSS employees may
conduct a strike.
Ruling:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social
Justice and Human Rights (Art. XIII, Sec. 3),
provides that the State "shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance with law." By itself, this
provision would seem to recognize the right of
all workers and employees, including those in
the public sector, to strike. But the
Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
impression, for in the Sub- Article on the Civil
Service Commission, it provides, after defining
the scope of the civil service as "all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original
charters," that "the right to self-organization
shall not be denied to government employees."
Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides
that "the right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not
abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is
no question that the Constitution recognizes
the right of government employees to organize,
it is silent as to whether such recognition also
includes the right to strike. Resort to the intent
of the framers of the organic law becomes
helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the
1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees
to organize, the commissioners intended to limit
the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to
strike. Statutorily, it will be recalled that the
Industrial Peace Act (CA 875), which was
repealed by the Labor Code (PD 442) in 1974,
expressly banned strikes by employees in the
Government, including instrumentalities
exercising governmental functions, but
excluding entities entrusted with proprietary
functions. Understandably, the Labor Code is
silent as to whether or not government
employees may strike, for such are excluded
from its coverage. But then the Civil Service
Decree (PD 807), is equally silent on the matter.
Thus, on 1 June 1987, to implement the
constitutional guarantee of the right of
government employees to organize, the President
issued EO 180 which provides guidelines for the
exercise of the right to organize of government
employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided
that "the Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the
government service shall be observed, subject to
any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress." The President was apparently
referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, series
of 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under
date 12 April 1987 which, "prior to the
enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees
enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions,
all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves,
walk-outs and other forms of mass action which
will result in temporary stoppage or disruption
of public service." The air was thus cleared of
the confusion. At present, in the absence of any
legislation allowing government employees to
strike, recognizing their right to do so, or
regulating the exercise of the right, they are
prohibited from striking, by express provision of
Memorandum Circular 6 and as implied in EO
180. The Court is of the considered view that the
SSS employees are covered by the prohibition
against strikes. Considering that under the 1987
Constitution "the civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters" and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an
original charter, having been created under RA
1161, its employees are part of the civil service
and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.
This being the case, the strike staged by the
employees of the SSS was illegal. In fine,
government employees may through their
unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and
conditions of employment which are within the
ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of those which are not fixed by
law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the
dispute may be referred to the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council for appropriate
action. But employees in the civil service may
not resort to strikes, walkouts and other
temporary work stoppages, like workers in the
private sector, to pressure the Government to
accede to their demands. As now provided
under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right
of Government Employees to Self-Organization,
which took effect after the present dispute
arose, "the terms and conditions of employment
in the government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government-owned and controlled corporations
with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the
purpose of securing changes thereof.
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON.
SIMEON. FERRER (G.R. Nos. L-32613-14
December 27, 1972)
Facts: The Anti-Subversion Act outlaws the
Communist Party of the Philippines and other
"subversive associations," and punishes any
person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains
a member" of the Party or of any other similar
"subversive" organization. Feliciano Co, is an
officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal
organization aimed to overthrow the
Government of the Philippines, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the
training school of recruits of the New People's
Army, the military arm of the said Communist
Party of the Philippines. Moreover, Nilo S.
Tayag, Arthur Garcia, Renato Casipe, Abelardo
Garcia, Manuel Alavado, Benjamin Bie and
several John Does, whose identities are still
unknown, are officers and/or ranking leaders of
subversive organizations, who likewise commit
subversive and/or seditious acts, in violation of
REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as
the Anti-Subversion Law.
Issue: WON the Anti-Subversion Act is in
violation of Sec 8 of 1987 Constitution?
Ruling: No. When the Act is viewed in its actual
operation, it will be seen that it does not specify
the Communist Party of the Philippines or the
members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare
the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for the purposes
of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against
membership in the outlawed organization. The
term "Communist Party of the Philippines"
issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact
the Act applies not only to the Communist Party
of the Philippines but also to "any other
organization having the same purpose and their
successors." Its focus is not on individuals but
on conduct. As to the claim that under the
statute organizational guilt is nonetheless
imputed despite the requirement of proof of
knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to
say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy,
which has been referred to as a "dragneet
device" whereby all who participate in the
criminal covenant are liable. The contention
would be correct if the statute were construed as
punishing mere membership devoid of any
specific intent to further the unlawful goals of
the Party. But the statute specifically required
that membership must be knowing or active,
with specific intent to further the illegal
objectives of the Party. That is what section 4
means when it requires that membership, to be
unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The
ingredient of specific intent to pursue the
unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by
"overt acts." 15 This constitutes an element of
"membership" distinct from the ingredient of
guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of
direct participation in the organization's
unlawful activities, while the latter requires
proof of mere adherence to the organization's
illegal objectives.
4. STA. CLARA HOMEOWNERS vs. Spouses
VICTOR MA. GASTON and LYDIA GASTON
(G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002)
Facts: Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia
Gaston, the private respondents, filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary
injunction/preliminary mandatory injunction
and temporary restraining order before the
Regional Trial Court against petitioners Sta
Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA).
The complaint alleged that the private
respondents purchased their lots in Sta. Clara
Subdivision and at the time of the purchase,
there was no mention or requirement of
membership in any homeowners’ association.
From that time on, they have remained non-
members of the SCHA. They also stated that an
arrangement was made wherein homeowners
who were non-members of the association were
issued non-member gate pass stickers for their
vehicles for identification by the security guards
manning the subdivision’s entrances and exits.
This arrangement remained undisturbed until
sometime in the middle of March 1998, when
SCHA disseminated a board resolution which
decreed that only its members in good standing
were to be issued stickers for use in their
vehicles.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case
as it involved an intra-corporate dispute
between SCHA and its members. The proper
forum must be the Home Insurance and
Guarantee Corporation (HIGC). They stated that
that the Articles of Incorporation of SCHA,
which was duly approved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, provides that the
association shall be a non-tock corporation with
all the homeowners of Sta. Clara constituting
its membership. Its by-laws also contain a
provision that all real estate owners
automatically become members of the
association. Moreover, the private
respondents allegedly enjoyed the privileges of
membership and abided by the rules of the
association, and even attended the general
special meeting of the association members.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondents
are members of SCHA.
Ruling: Spouses Gaston are not members of
the SCHA. The constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of association includes the freedom not
to associate. The right to choose with whom
one will associate oneself is the very foundation
and essence of the partnership. It should be
noted that the provision guarantees the right to
form an association. It does not compel others
to form or join one.
Private respondents cannot be compelled to
become members of SCHA by the simple
expedient of including them in its Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws without their
express or implied consent. True, it may be to
the mutual advantage of lot owners in a
subdivision to band themselves together to
promote their common welfare. But that is
possible only if the owners voluntarily agree,
directly or indirectly, to become members of the
association. True also, membership in
homeowners’ association may be acquired in
various ways – often through deeds of sale,
Torrens certificateNs or other forms of evidence
of property ownership. However, when private
respondents purchased their property and
obtained Transfer Certificates of Title, there was
no annotation showing automatic membership
in the SCHA. Thus, no privity of contract
arising from the title certificate exists between
petitioners and private respondents.
Principles:
The approval by the SEC of the said documents
is not an operative act which bestows
membership on the private respondents because
the right to associate partakes of the nature of
freedom of contract which can be exercised by
and between the homeowners amongst
themselves, the homeowner’s association and a
homeowner, and the subdivision owner and a
homeowner/lot buyer.
5. MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
ASSOCIATION vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
(G.R. No. 95445, August 06, 1991)

Facts: There were several mass actions by some

800 public school teachers which was caused by
the alleged failure of authorities to act upon the
teachers’ grievances such as the immediate
payment of due chalk, clothing allowances, 13 th
month pay arising from the standardization law,
among others. Even on September 17, 1990,
which was a Monday and a school day, the mass
actions continued, and some of the teachers
who participated therein did not hold classes.

The Secretary of Education filed cases

against those teachers who participated in the
mass actions on the grounds of grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross
violation of the Civil Service Law, absence
without official leave, and the likes and placed
them on a 90 day preventive suspension period.
Issue: Whether or not employees in the public
service prohibited in conducting strikes.

Ruling: Yes. Employees in the public service,

unlike those in the private sector, do not have
the right to strike because this would constitute
a disturbance in public service. Public school
teachers may peaceably assemble for redress
and grievances but not during class hours, for
then this would be a strike, which is illegal for
them. In addition, employment in the
government is governed by law and the terms
and conditions of employment are affected
through statutes and administrative rules and
regulations, not by collective bargaining
agreements.