G.R. No.

203435

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
MARDY AQUINO, MARIO AQUINO, RECTO AQUINO, INYONG NARV ANTE, ROMY FERNANDEZ,
FELIX SAPLAN, BONIFACIO CAGUIOA AND JUANITO AQUINO, Accused
MARDY AQUINO AND MARIO AQUINO, Accused-Appellants

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is an appeal from the 30 March 2012 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)  in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03659 which affirmed with modification the 23 July 2008 Joint Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
39, Lingayen, Pangasinan (RTC),  in Criminal Case Nos. L-6575 and   L-6576 finding Mardy Aquino, Mario
Aquino, and Juanito Aquino guilty of murder and frustrated murder. 3

THE FACTS

In two Informations, both dated 15 August 2001, the accused were charged with murder and frustrated
murder. The information for murder reads:

That on or about the 15th day of May 2001 at around 10:30 o'clock in the morning at Barangay Balogo-
Pandel, in the municipality of Birunaley, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court; the above-named accused, armed with a knife, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Jackie N. Caguioa, inflicting upon the
latter fatal wounds which caused his death as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. 4

On the other hand, the information for frustrated murder states:

That on or about the 15th day of May 2001 at around 10:30 o'clock in the morning at Barangay Balogo-
Pandel, in the municipality of Binmaley, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Ernesto Caguioa, inflicting upon the latter the following injuries:

- Stab wound lumbar area (L)

- Zci stab wound lumbar area (L) penetration perforation jejunum prox tst.

- Laceration thinner upper pale (L)

Operation: Expeoratory Laparatomy Procedure Interroraphy Neophorraphy

the accused having thus performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce the felony by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused and that is due to timely and adequate medical assistance rendered
to said Ernesto Caguioa, which prevented his death, to his damage and prejudice.

Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the RPC. 5

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges.

Version of the Prosecution

At around 10:30 in the morning of 15 May 2001, Inyong Narvante (Inyong)  approached Ernesto
Caguioa (Ernesto)  and asked the latter for some fish as he was in a drinking spree with his friends.
Ernesto, however, refused and teased Inyong for voting for a certain Domalante. An infuriated Inyong
shouted, "vulva of your mother," and threatened that something would happen to Ernesto. Afterwards,
Inyong returned to his friends.6

Later in the morning, Ernesto was having a conversation with his son Jackie, Rick De Guzman, and
Orlando Ferrer while they were waiting for a boat to transport their catch to Dagupan. A hundred meters
away from them were Ernesto's twin sons, Edwin and Edward, together with Dicto de Guzman and
Bonifacio Doria, who were washing their fishing nets. Suddenly, Mardy, Mario, Juanito, Inyong, Recto
Aquino (Recto),  Romy Fernandez (Romy),  Felix Saplan (Felix),  and Bonifacio Caguioa (Bonifacio)  arrived
and threw stones at Edwin's group. Aggrieved, Edwin reported the incident to his elder brother Jackie and
to his father Ernesto.7

Thereafter, Jackie went to where the accused were having a drinking session to ask them why they
attacked his brothers. Ernesto followed him. Instead of answering, the accused laughed at him. All of a
sudden, Raul Bautista, Aquilino Melendez, and Juanito grabbed and restrained Jackie who was then
stabbed by Mardy and Recto.8

Ernesto attempted to help his son, but Mario held him by the neck while Felix, Inyong, Romy, and Bonifacio
grabbed his left leg. In that position, Ernesto was stabbed by Mardy and Recto, hitting him in the left arm,
left stomach, and left thigh.9

After the incident, the accused ran away leaving behind injured Ernesto and Jackie. The victims were
brought to the hospital, but Jackie died on the way. 10

Version of the Defense

Julius Caguioa, son of Bonifacio, testified that on 15 May 2001, at around one o'clock in the afternoon, he
was at the house of Romy where he saw Mario, Felix, and Bonifacio drinking. Ernesto and Jackie then
arrived and approached the group. Ernesto then hit Bonifacio with a water pipe while Jackie stabbed
Bonifacio in the upper right side of his body. 11

Miriam Puroganan, daughter of Mario, narrated that on the same date and time, she was at the house of
her mother-in-law, two meters away from Romy's house. While having lunch, she heard Romy's wife shout,
"Don't make trouble." When Miriam went out of the house, she saw Ernesto hitting her father Mario with an
iron pipe; Mardy then arrived and stabbed Ernesto order to protect Mario. 12

On his part, Mario recounted that on 15 May 2001, he was having a drinking spree with Recto, Felix, and
Romy at the latter's place. At about one o'clock in the afternoon, Bonifacio and Inyong arrived and asked
Romy if they could borrow money from him. Romy went to the balcony of his house. While Bonifacio and
Inyong were waiting for Romy, Ernesto and his sons Jackie, Edwin, and Edward arrived. Jackie then
stabbed Bonifacio and also attempted to stab Mardy but failed because Recto stabbed him first. Ernesto
struck Inyong with an iron pipe. Mario was also hit by Ernesto on the right lower leg and head, which
caused him to lose consciousness. 13

Juanito vehemently denied any participation in the incident. 1âwphi1 On 15 May 2001, at around 10:00
o'clock in the morning, he was asleep in his house. He was named in the complaint because the family of
deceased Jackie had a grudge against him because he once testified against them. 14

In his defense, Mardy averred that on the day of the incident, he was asleep in his house, about 50 meters
away from Romy's house, when his cousin Recto woke him up and informed him that his father, Mario, was
being attacked. He immediately proceeded to Romy's place and saw Jackie stab Bonifacio. He then saw
Ernesto hitting his father with a water pipe; thus, to protect his father, he stabbed Ernesto. Thereafter, he
and his father went home. 15
The Regional Trial Court's Ruling

In its decision, the RTC found Mardy, Mario, and Juanito guilty of murder and frustrated murder. 16 It
reasoned that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses clearly showed that they took advantage of their
superior strength and they conspired with one another when they assaulted Jackie and Ernesto.  The
fallo  reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond iota of doubt the guilt of the accused of the
crimes of Murder in Criminal Case No. 6575 and Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 6576, this Court in
the absence of any modifying circumstance hereby sentences all the accused in the crime of Murder to
suffer each the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the legal heirs of the victim the amount of
Php50,000.00 and to pay actual damages in the amount of Php70,000.00 for the wake and funeral
expenses; Php40,000.00 as attorney's fees and Phpl00,000.00 as moral damages for the wounded feelings
and moral shock suffered by the mother of victim Jackie Caguioa plus costs of suit; and in the crime of
Frustrated Murder all the accused to suffer each the indeterminate prison term of five (5) years and one (1)
day of Prision Correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay the
victim actual damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00; and attorney's fees in the amount of Php15,000.00
plus costs of suit.

The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be credited in full in the service of
their sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

As far as accused Recto Aquino, Inyong Narvante, Romy Fernandez, Felix Saplan and Bonifacio Caguioa
who are still at large are concerned, let this case be ARCHIVED. 17

Aggrieved, Mario and Mardy (accused-appellants)  appealed before the CA.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In its decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants but modified the penalty for frustrated
murder and the amount of damages awarded. As regards the contention that the prosecution failed to
prove intent to kill, the CA opined that the use of a deadly weapon and the number of wounds inflicted
demonstrated a deliberate and determined assault with intent to kill. It further held that a finding of abuse of
superior strength was not negated by the fact that some of the accused suffered injuries. The appellate
court declared that the prosecution sufficiently proved the presence of conspiracy considering that the
victims were simultaneously restrained and stabbed by the accused. It, however, ruled that actual damages
should be reduced to ₱20,000.00 because the receipts submitted by the prosecution showed that the heirs
of Jackie incurred only ₱20,000.00 as funeral expenses and not ₱70,000.00 as awarded by the trial court.
The CA disposed the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. But while the assailed
July 23, 2008 Joint Decision is AFFIRMED, the same is however MODIFIED as follows:

(1) In the case of Frustrated Murder, accused-appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum;

(2) In the case of Murder:

a. The award of civil indemnity in increased to ₱75,000.00;

b. The award of actual damages is reduced to ₱20,000.00;

c. The award of moral damages is reduced to ₱50,000.00. 18

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER

HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

THE COURT'S RULING

Accused-appellants may be
held liable only for homicide.

Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code  (RPC),  as amended, which
provides:

ART. 248. Murder.  Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,  shall kill another, shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua,  to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense, or of means or ,persons to insure or afford impunity;

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving
great waste and ruin;

4. On occasion of any calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of

a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity;

5. With evident premeditation;

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.

Generally, the elements of murder are: 1) That a person was killed; 2) That the accused killed him; 3) That
the killing was attended by any  of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248; and 4) That the
killing is not parricide or infanticide. 19

That Jackie Caguioa died, that accused-appellants killed him, and that the killing is neither parricide nor
infanticide remain undisputed. These circumstances are already established by the trial and appellate
courts. Accused-appellants did not offer any substantial reason to deviate from the well-known rule that
findings of fact and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court. 20 No facts
of substance and value were overlooked by the trial court which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case.21 The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are clear and straightforward. Moreover, they are
supported by the medical findings and they stand the test of reason. Thus, what remains to be resolved is
the appreciation of abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance.

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim
and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor/s and purposely selected
or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. 22 Evidence must show that the assailants
consciously sought the advantage,23 or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. 24 To take
advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force excessively out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked. 25 The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on
the age, size, and strength of the parties. 26

The prosecution in this case failed to adduce evidence of a relative disparity in age, size, and strength, or
force, except for the showing that two assailants stabbed the victim while three others restrained him.
However, the presence of several assailants does not ipso facto  indicate an abuse of superior strength.
Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative of the presence of this circumstance. 27

Further, the totality of the evidence shows that the encounter between the victim and his assailants was
unplanned and unpremeditated. It must be noted that it was Jackie and Ernesto who went to the place
where the accused were having a drinking session. Thus, there was no conscious effort on the part of the
accused to use or take advantage of any superior strength that they then enjoyed. It has not been clearly
established that the accused, taking advantage of their number, purposely resorted to holding Jackie by the
arms so that two of them would be free to stab him. In view of the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule
out the presence of abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance. Hence, accused-appellants'
guilt must be limited to the crime of homicide.

Abuse of superior strength was

not alleged in the information
for frustrated murder.

An information to be sufficient must contain all the elements required by the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.1âwphi1 In the crime of murder, the qualifying circumstance raising the killing to the category of
murder must be specifically alleged in the information. 28 Further, Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure require that both the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be specifically
alleged in the information to be appreciated as such. In this case, the information for frustrated murder
merely alleged the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. However, a perusal of the records
shows that there was not even an attempt on the part of the prosecution to prove evident premeditation.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses merely proved abuse of superior strength which, however,
was not alleged in the information. As such, in the absence of any other qualifying circumstance in the
information for Criminal Case No. L-6576, the charge against accused-appellants must be downgraded to
homicide.

Accused-appellants are guilty

of attempted homicide.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his
use of a deadly weapon in the assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die
because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. 29 If the victim's wounds are not fatal, the crime is
only attempted homicide. 30 Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth,
and severity of the victim's wounds.31

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove that Ernesto's wounds would have certainly resulted in
his death were it not for the medical treatment he received. On the contrary, Dr. Carlito V. Arenas, who
attended to Ernesto, testified that the possibility of death from such wounds is remote:

[Prosecutor Espinoza]: Based on your medical record, how many stab wounds suffered by Ernesto
Caguioa?

[Dr. Arenas]: There were four.

Q: Will you please tell us those stab wounds based on your medical records?

A: The first stab wound is on the left thoraco abdominal area chest, and the wound was as the boundary
between the abdomen and the chest. And there was another on the thennar of the left hand, and the third
stab wound is on the left thigh or the left leg.

Q: That first injury doctor, will you consider that fatal injury or serious injury?
A: The first wound, which was found at the thoraco abdominal area, on exploration during the operation, we
found out that the wound was only up to the intercostals muscle. Meaning to say, it did not penetrate any of
the internal organ.

Q: Will the victim survive even in the absence of medical treatment?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How about the second injury that was found?

A: The second injury which was found on the left thennar which is 4 cm. in length and penetrating the
tendons of the hand. Tendons are the structures which made the fingers move, and there were no vital
organs affected.

Q: The third and fourth injury, will you consider that serious?

A: The third injury was about 2.5 cm. in length and affected the quadriceps muscle or the muscles of the
thigh and there was a hematoma but there was no neurovascular involved. When I say neurovascular,
blood vessels or nerves.

Q: And the fourth injury on the leg?

A: The fourth injury on the leg only penetrated the skins and the fat tissues.

Q: Let us go back to the first injury. You said it did not penetrate or affect any internal organ, does that
require medical treatment?

A: Of course it requires medical treatment

Q: In the absence of medical treatment, will that cause to (sic) the death of the victim?

A: In this particular case, infection may follow later on which may cause some sort of blood poisoning but
this is a remote possibility.

Q: How about the possibility of death due to loss of blood for lack of timely medical treatment?

A: No, I don't think so because there was no neurovascular injuries in this particular case . 32 x x x
(emphases supplied)

Hence, considering that Ernesto's wounds were not fatal and absent a showing that such wounds would
have certainly caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance, the Court declares that in
Criminal Case No. L-6576, accused-appellants' guilt is limited to the crime of attempted homicide.

Penalty and award of damages

Under Article· 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed for the crime of homicide is  reclusion
temporal.  Considering that no aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
penalty" shall be selected from the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal,  with the minimum
penalty selected from the range of prision mayor.  Thus, we impose the penalty of imprisonment for a period
of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor  as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal  as maximum.

On the other hand, Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the imposable penalty for an
attempted crime shall be lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony.
Two (2) degrees lower of reclusion temporal  is prision correccional  which has a duration of six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years. 33
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term  of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken in
view of the attending circumstances that could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum term  shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken within the
range of prision correccional,  depending on the modifying circumstances. In turn, the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the penalty one degree lower of  prision
correccional,  that is arresto mayor  with a duration of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. 34

In the absence of any modifying circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be
taken from the medium period of prision correccional  or two (2) years and four (4) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years and two (2) months. The minimum term shall be taken within the range of  arresto
mayor.  Hence, the penalty for attempted homicide is six (6) months of arresto mayor,  as minimum term of
the indeterminate penalty, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,  as maximum term of
the indeterminate penalty.35

As regards the amount of damages in the crime of homicide, accused-appellants are ordered to pay the
heirs of Jackie Caguioa ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as
exemplary damages.36 Further, as declared by the Court in People v. Villanueva,37 when actual damages
proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than ₱25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate
damages for ₱25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. 38

For the crime of attempted homicide, accused-appellants are ordered to pay Ernesto Caguioa ₱20,000.00
as civil indemnity and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages. Considering that abuse of superior strength was duly
proved even though not alleged in the information, accused-appellants are further ordered to pay Ernesto
Caguioa ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages. 39

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 30 March 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03659 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants Mardy Aquino
and Mario Aquino are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE (Criminal Case No. L-6575)
for the killing of Jackie Caguioa and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor  as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal  as maximum. They
are ordered to pay the heirs of Jackie Caguioa the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of
actual damages.

Accused-appellants Mardy Aquino and Mario Aquino are also found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE (Criminal Case No. L-6576) and are hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor,  as minimum, to four ( 4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional,  as maximum. They are ordered to pay Ernesto Caguioa the amount of
₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of
this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186533               August 9, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EFREN CASTILLO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 7 November 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00030-MIN which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 dated 14 April 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Gingoog City, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 43, in Criminal Case No. 2000-211 finding
herein appellant Efren Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under Article 266-A, par.
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, committed against AAA, 3 thereby imposing upon him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The appellate court further ordered the appellant to pay AAA ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, in addition to the ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the trial court.

In a Complaint4 dated 10 July 2000, appellant was charged by AAA, assisted by her mother, BBB, with the
crime of rape committed as follows:

That sometime in March 2000, in XXX, XXX City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named [appellant], did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously force and
intimidate AAA, known by the [appellant] to be mentally retarded, and then forcibly committed sexual
intercourse with the said AAA, against her will.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 266-A, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
[Republic Act No.] 8353.5

When arraigned6 on 23 August 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the
crime charged.

At the pre-trial conference, both the prosecution and the defense failed to make any stipulation of
facts.7 The pre-trial conference was then terminated and trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, the private offended party; Dr. Thessa Marie
Antillon-Malimas (Dr. Antillon-Malimas), 8 the doctor in Gingoog District Hospital who examined AAA; BBB,
the mother of AAA, who was also presented as rebuttal witness; and Myrna delos Reyes-Villanueva, the
Guidance Psychologist at the Northern Mindanao Medical Center who conducted psychological tests on
AAA to determine her mental capacity.

On the basis of the testimonies of the aforesaid witnesses, the prosecution established that AAA was 18
years old9 when she was raped by the appellant. She is the eldest of the four children of BBB and CCC, the
deceased father of AAA. She began attending school when she was already eight years old. AAA,
however, was not able to finish her Grade I level primarily because of her epileptic seizures which started
when she was nine years old. Since then she suffered epileptic seizures at least once a month. During
attacks, AAA trembles and becomes stiff. AAA also had difficulty understanding her lessons in school, she
cannot write well and she had poor memory. Compared to her younger siblings, AAA had difficulty following
instructions given to her at home and in school. 10

AAA’s ordeal began sometime in March 2000 when she approached the appellant in order to collect his
debt for the rice cake he bought from her mother. Instead of settling his account, the appellant cuddled AAA
until they reached the house of a certain Atok located in Barangay Agay-ayan, Gingoog City. Once inside,
the appellant made her lie down on the bed and removed her short pants and panty. The appellant
subsequently removed his pants and underwear. When both of them were already naked, the appellant
mounted AAA and successfully inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. AAA felt pain. After satisfying his
bestial desire, the appellant instructed AAA to go home. 11

Days thereafter, such awful experience of AAA was repeated when she was on her way to visit her aunt’s
house. The appellant, who was then standing by the mango grove, approached AAA, walked along with her
and led her to a nearby chapel also in Agay-ayan, Gingoog City. While outside the chapel, the appellant
undressed AAA by removing her short pants and panty. The appellant likewise removed his pants and
underwear. In a standing position, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina and
successfully had sexual intercourse with her. 12 Thereafter, AAA told her mother, BBB, what the appellant
did to her.
On 11 May 2000, BBB accompanied AAA at Gingoog District Hospital where she was examined by Dr.
Antillon-Malimas. Upon examination, Dr. Antillon-Malimas found that AAA had a 7x6 cm. contusion
hematoma lateral aspect of the right buttocks which could have been caused by a blunt force or violence
applied on the area. Based on the appearance of the contusion, it could have been sustained two days
prior to AAA’s examination and it would exist for a period of four to five days. Dr. Antillon-Malimas’ findings
on AAA’s genitalia, particularly the vulva, revealed no swelling, no tenderness and no contusion. Her
findings on AAA’s hymen showed healed lacerations at 3 o’clock and 9 o’clock positions which could have
been caused by a blunt object or by violence or by reason of sexual intercourse. An examination of AAA’s
vaginal canal yielded negative result for spermatozoa but another contusion was found therein. 13 The result
of AAA’s physical examination was reduced into writing as evidenced by Medico-Legal Certificate 14 dated
11 May 2000.

Subsequently, AAA executed her sworn statement 15 before Senior Police Officer 4 Myrna Z. Palad (SPO4
Palad), the investigator at Gingoog City Police Station.

AAA was also subjected to psychological tests to determine her mental capacity. The psychological tests
administered by Myrna Delos Reyes-Villanueva on AAA consist of the Draw-A-Person Test and the Bender
Visual Motor Test. The aforesaid psychological tests showed that AAA has poor visual motor coordination
and low level mental functioning not within her chronological age, i.e., 21 years old at the time of her
examination. In view of that result, Myrna Delos Reyes-Villanueva concluded that AAA is suffering from
mild to moderate mental retardation with a mental age of 8 to 12 years old and can be educated up to
Grade VI level. She also noted that AAA lacked personal hygiene and has a vague concept of big numbers
and time, like days of the week. She further declared that AAA’s instinct to resist any sexual assault is
always there; however, with her low level mental functioning she could easily be deceived or persuaded by
a man to engage into sexual intercourse. 16 The result of AAA’s psychological tests was also reduced into
writing as evidenced by a Psychological Report 17 dated 2 September 2003.

For its part, the defense presented Rolando Castillo (Rolando), appellant’s father, and the appellant himself
whose testimony consists mainly of bare denial and alibi.

The appellant denied having raped AAA. He stated that it was impossible for him to rape AAA in March
2000 because for the entire period of the said month he was harvesting coconuts from the land of a certain
Elizabeth Camus from 7:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m. every day. Similarly, the house of Atok, where
the first rape incident allegedly happened, was already demolished as early as 1998 and he was one of
those who dismantled the said house.18

On 9 May 2000, the appellant admits that he went to the house of his uncle in Buenavista, Agusan del
Norte. He stayed there until he received a letter from his father sometime in June 2000 informing him that a
rape case was filed against him by AAA and advising him to go home. The appellant then decided to go
home in Agay-ayan, Gingoog City. Upon arrival, his father immediately inquired if the rape charged against
him was true to which he replied in the negative. 19

On 15 August 2000, two months after his arrival in Agay-ayan, Gingoog City, the appellant, his father, and
a certain Eddie Camus went to AAA’s place to ask her mother to have the case settled. The appellant
asked AAA’s mother, BBB, why her family filed a case against him when he did not do anything to her
daughter, AAA, to which BBB allegedly responded, "Just forgive me because the case was already filed in
court." They went home thereafter.20

The appellant also insisted that he was not arrested; instead, he surrendered voluntarily to the Barangay
Captain of Agay-ayan, Gingoog City, upon the advice of his father. It was the Barangay Captain of Agay-
ayan, Gingoog City, who accompanied him to the police station. 21

Likewise, the appellant claimed that he does not know of any reason why AAA would impute such a grave
offense against him. The only thing he could remember was AAA’s mother, BBB, who got angry at him
when he told her to get married since she is now a widow. Since then BBB did not talk to him anymore. The
appellant believed this could be the reason why AAA’s family charged him with rape. 22
The defense likewise presented appellant’s father, Rolando, who categorically admitted that AAA is
mentally retarded.23 Rolando also disclosed that he accompanied the appellant to AAA’s place to talk to her
mother and ask forgiveness in case the charge against him was true so that the matter will no longer reach
the court. The appellant then asked forgiveness from AAA’s mother by saying, "Ya, forgive me because the
charge against me is not true." Then BBB allegedly replied, "We cannot withdraw the case ‘Fren because it
was already filed in court." Rolando also divulged that immediately after they went to AAA’s house, there
were already police officers who were about to arrest the appellant but the latter ran away. When the
appellant went home, he told him to surrender, which the appellant obeyed. 24

On rebuttal, BBB disclosed that even prior to the filing of the instant case the appellant already admitted
that he truly molested AAA. The appellant, indeed, went to their house in August 2000 asking forgiveness
from her but she told him that the case was already in court. BBB also clarified that the house of Atok
where the first rape incident happened was not yet demolished in 1998. The house demolition happened
only in 2000. She was certain about this because during the demolition she was there gathering firewood. 25

The trial court, convinced on the merits of the prosecution’s case, rendered a Decision on 14 April 2004,
finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to an
imprisonment term of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to indemnify AAA in the amount of ₱50,000.00
as civil indemnity.

The records were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal. In view, however, of this Court’s ruling in
People v. Mateo,26 the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.

In his brief, the appellant assigned the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT [AAA] IS A MENTAL RETARDATE
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE SUCH MENTAL RETARDATION.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [APPELLANT] OF THE CRIME
OF RAPE UNDER ARTICLE 266-A, par. 1(B), AS AMENDED BY R.A. 8353, DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 27

The Court of Appeals, taking into consideration the aforesaid assignment of errors and after a thorough
study of the records of the case, rendered the assailed Decision dated 7 November 2008, affirming
appellant’s conviction for rape with the modification for an additional award of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages. The records were then forwarded to this Court for further review.

This Court affirms appellant’s conviction.

Appellant contends that the records are bereft of any evidence that would conclusively show that AAA was
suffering from mental retardation. BBB’s declaration that AAA is a slow thinker does not sufficiently
establish AAA’s mental retardation. Further, the "expert witness qualification" of the prosecution’s supposed
expert witness is highly questionable because she had not acquired any doctorate degree in the field of
psychology or psychiatry. More so, the psychological tests administered by her on AAA were inadequate to
establish AAA’s mental capacity.

Appellant anchors his argument for acquittal on the alleged failure of the prosecution to establish AAA’s
mental retardation to make him guilty of rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant concludes that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

We reject appellant’s position.

In rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without
her consent.28 Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353, states:

ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed.

1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present. [Emphasis supplied].

It can be deduced from the aforequoted provision that for the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution
must prove that; (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act
through force or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she is
under 12 years of age or is demented. 29 The term "woman deprived of reason" includes one suffering from
mental retardation.30 Clearly, carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the
aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary as a mental retardate is not
capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress
between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter. 31

In People v. Dalandas,32 citing People v. Dumanon,33 this Court held that mental retardation can be proven
by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even the
observation by the trial court.34

Section 50, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence explicitly provides:

SEC. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. – The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be
received in evidence regarding-

(a) x x x

(b) x x x

(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a
person. [Emphasis supplied].

Accordingly, it is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition
of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and
conduct of the person in question. Commonly, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons
upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont
said: "A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon
conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact
bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness’ own knowledge and observation, he having first
testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his
opinion." 35

The mother of an offended party in a rape case, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and
mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are,
is competent to testify on the matter. 36 Thus, even though the Guidance Psychologist who examined AAA
may not qualify as an expert witness, though the psychological tests conducted by her on AAA may not be
accurate to determine AAA’s mental capacity, such circumstance is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause.

In the case at bench, BBB testified that AAA has been suffering from epilepsy since she was nine years
old, which is one of the reasons why AAA was not able to finish her Grade I level. AAA also had to stop
schooling because she had difficulties understanding her lessons in school, she cannot write well, she had
poor memory and she had difficulty answering even the simplest question asked of her. BBB further stated
that AAA is the eldest of her four children; however, compared to her younger siblings, AAA had a hard
time comprehending the instructions given to her at home and in school.

In the same way, though the Guidance Psychologist who examined AAA may not be qualified as an expert
witness, her observations, however, as regards the appearance, manner, habits and behavior of AAA, is
also admissible in evidence as an ordinary witness’ testimony. Even before the Guidance Psychologist
administered the psychological tests on AAA, she already noticed that AAA lacked personal hygiene. While
conversing with AAA, she observed that AAA has low level mental functioning as she has difficulty
understanding simple things, has a vague concept of big numbers and time ─ like days of the week, and
has regressed behavior that is not congruent to her age, i.e., 21 years old at the time of her examination.
She also stated that she was not able to administer the Purdue Non-Language Test, which is an
Intelligence Quotient Test, on AAA due to the latter’s inability to identify the items therein.

This Court, in People v. Dalandas, clarified that a mental retardate, in general, exhibits a slow rate of
maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity. Further, the mental
retardation of persons and the degrees thereof may be manifested by their overt acts, appearance, attitude
and behavior. The dentition, manner of walking, ability to feed oneself or attend to personal hygiene,
capacity to develop resistance or immunity to infection, dependency on others for protection and care and
inability to achieve intelligible speech may be indicative of the degree of mental retardation of a person. All
these may be testified on by ordinary witnesses who come in contact with an alleged mental retardate. 37

It bears stressing that the deprivation of reason contemplated by law need not be complete; mental
abnormality or deficiency is sufficient.38 Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that AAA’s impaired learning
capacity, lack of personal hygiene and difficulty in answering simple questions, as testified to by her mother
and the Guidance Psychologist who had an opportunity to observe her appearance, manner, habits and
behavior, are indicative that she is truly suffering from some degree of mental retardation.

More telling is the trial court’s own observation on AAA’s manner of testifying that confirms the fact that
AAA is a mental retardate, to wit:

Court: Alright, Order.

The prosecution presented their first witness in the person of the victim herself, AAA, who seemed to be a
retardate.

The witness finds it hard to answer simple questions and it has to be repeated to ask questions in a simple
way as possible in order for her to understand.

In the course of her direct testimony it developed and appeared that she was already tired and she could
not concentrate well probably because of her predicament she being also an epileptic and it is for this
reason that the prosecution and the defense agreed that the cross examination of the witness be continued
later in order to give her a chance to rest x x x. 39 [Emphases supplied.]

For purposes of determining the mental capacity of a person, this Court held that the personal observation
of the trial judge suffices even in the absence of an expert opinion. 40 Hence, the aforesaid findings of the
trial court are entitled to great weight and respect being in the best position as it had the opportunity to hear
and observe the demeanor, conduct and attitude of AAA while testifying.

Surprisingly, though the appellant vehemently contends that the prosecution was not able to establish
AAA’s mental retardation, he failed to notice that his own father, Rolando, during his testimony before the
court a quo, categorically admitted and confirmed that, indeed, AAA is mentally retarded and feeble-
minded. Here we quote appellant’s father’s testimony:

Q: Will you agree with me that this AAA is somewhat mentally retardate?

A: Yes, Sir. That is really true.

 xxxx

Q: But you knew for a fact that this AAA is a feeble-minded?

A: Yes, Your Honor.41

Such testimony puts beyond doubt that AAA is truly a mental retardate. Her condition was so apparent to
people who have had an opportunity to interact and deal with her that even appellant’s own father, who
happens to be AAA’s neighbor, could not deny her mental state. The prosecution evidence settled this
issue.

As well and as much established is the fact of sexual congress between the appellant and AAA.

AAA was able to recall and narrate in detail before the court a quo how she was ravished by the appellant
on two occasions; first, at the house of a certain Atok and second, outside the chapel. On the first rape
incident, AAA vividly described how the appellant cuddled her until they reached the house of a certain
Atok. Once inside, the appellant made her lie down on the bed and removed her short pants and panty.
The appellant subsequently undressed himself and inserted his penis into her vagina. On the second rape,
AAA similarly recalled how the appellant led her to a nearby chapel. While they were outside the chapel,
the appellant undressed her and likewise removed his shorts and underwear and had sexual intercourse
with her in a standing position. Such testimony of AAA can be characterized as categorical and
straightforward. Also, as noted by the trial court, although AAA could not easily grasp the questions asked,
her answers were nonetheless marked with candidness even as they were given simplemindedly.

It bears emphasis that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have
been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and
consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant’s accusations, it even lends greater
credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and
explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the
accused.42 Moreover, it is settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting
standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. 43

It is also worth stressing that during AAA’s testimony, she positively identified the appellant as the person
who had raped her.44 Thus, the straightforward narration of AAA of what transpired, accompanied by her
categorical identification of appellant as the malefactor, sealed the case for the prosecution. 45

The fact of sexual congress between AAA and the appellant was also supported by the medical findings of
healed hymenal lacerations at 3 o’clock and 9 o’clock positions which, according to Dr. Antillon-Malimas,
could have resulted from sexual intercourse. When the victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physician’s
finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of
carnal knowledge. Laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration.46 Thus, the said medical findings, together with the straightforward testimony of AAA, even
strengthens her claim of sexual violation by appellant.

The records also failed to show that AAA was prompted by ill motive in imputing such a grave offense
against the appellant. The absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses
to testify against the appellant strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists
and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. 47 The claim of the appellant that his remark on
AAA’s mother, that since she was already a widow she should already get married, could possibly trigger
the filing of this case against him is highly implausible. As the trial court had stated, it is quite unbelievable
that BBB’s anger could have been triggered by such an innocuous joke to the extent of allowing the
examination of AAA’s private parts and subjecting AAA to the humiliation of declaring in open court the
sexual molestation she underwent in the hands of the appellant. Besides, no mother in her right mind would
possibly stoop so low as to subject her daughter to the hardships and shame concomitant to a rape
prosecution just to assuage her own hurt feelings. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an
engine of malice, especially if it will subject her daughter to embarrassment and even stigma. It is hard to
believe that a mother would sacrifice her own daughter and present her to be the subject of a public trial if
she, in fact, has not been motivated by an honest desire to have the culprit punished. 48

It is also worthy to note the testimony of the appellant that he, together with his father, and a certain Eddie
Camus, went to the house of AAA to have the case settled, which testimony was corroborated by his own
father. Appellant’s father went further in saying that they went to AAA’s house to ask for forgiveness. AAA’s
mother, BBB, confirmed appellant’s importunity. This Court has ruled that an act of asking for forgiveness is
undeniably indicative of guilt. 49 If the appellant so believed that he did not commit any wrongdoing against
AAA, he would not bother to go to AAA’s house to have the case settled and to ask for forgiveness.

The array of the prosecution evidence stresses the weakness of appellant’s defense of denial and alibi.

Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, the
same cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the victim, who in a simple and straightforward manner,
convincingly identified the appellant who sexually molested her. 50 For alibi to prosper, the accused must
show that it was impossible for him to have been at the scene of the commission of the crime at the time of
its commission.511avvphi1

In the instant case, the appellant claimed that he cannot rape AAA in March 2000 because for the entire
period of the said month he was harvesting coconuts from the land of a certain Elizabeth Camus from 7:00
a.m. until 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m. every day. Similarly, the house of Atok, where the first rape incident
allegedly happened, was already demolished as early as 1998 and he was one of those who dismantled
the said house. However, these assertions of the appellant remained uncorroborated. He also failed to
show the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. As
can be inferred from his testimony, he left Agay-ayan, Gingoog City, only in May 2000, so at the time the
rape incidents happened sometime in March 2000, he was still in the place where the crime was
committed.

In sum, AAA’s straightforward testimony, as well as her unwavering and positive identification of the
appellant as her defiler and tormentor, corroborated by the medical findings conducted by Dr. Antillon-
Malimas, was sufficient to convict the appellant. The flimsy and self-serving defenses of denial and alibi of
the appellant failed to destroy the truthfulness and the credibility of AAA’s testimony. 52

Although the complaint specifically alleged the circumstance of appellant’s knowledge of the victim’s mental
retardation at the time of the commission of the crime of rape, which qualifies the crime and makes it
punishable by death under Article 266-B, paragraph 10 53 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
prosecution did not adduce any evidence to prove the same during trial. This Court, therefore, is fully
convinced that the trial court and the appellate court correctly convicted the appellant for the crime of
simple rape54 under Article 266-A, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua.55

Anent the award of damages, civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape while
moral damages is awarded upon such finding without need of further proof because it is assumed that a
rape victim had actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award. 56 Exemplary damages, on
the other hand, are awarded under Article 2230 57 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying. 58 Thus, this Court similarly affirms the ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity and
₱50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the lower courts to AAA. However, there being no aggravating
circumstance that can be considered, no exemplary damages can be awarded to AAA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00030-
MIN dated 7 November 2008 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 70836 October 18, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TIMOTEO TOLENTINO y MAPUA alias "TEM" defendant-appellant.

CORTES, J.:

In the instant appeal from a conviction for murder, the Court is once more tasked with the resolution of the
pivotal issue of whether the prosecution has successfully discharged the onus probandi  imposed upon it in
criminal cases. The case stemmed from an information charging the accused Timoteo Tolentino y Mapua
and one John Doe with the crime of murder committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of July, 1982, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and aiding one another, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and treachery, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of Alfredo Quitoriano y Bayot, by
then and there throwing at him stones hitting him on the head and stabbing the said victim
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
said Alfredo Quitoriano y Bayot. [Information, Rollo, p. 3.]

In order to determine the Identity of the other accused, the fiscal conducted a reinvestigation and thereafter
submitted his resolution to the trial court wherein he noted the failure of the complainant during the
investigation to present any witness to establish the Identity of said John Doe. Hence the reinvestigation
was terminated with the Identity of said John Doe still undetermined [Original Records, p. 55.1 Accordingly,
only the herein accused Tolentino was arraigned and tried. A plea of not guilty was entered by the accused.
His application for bail dated August 2, 1982 was denied and so he remained in jail during the trial.

After the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, accused Tolentino filed a demurrer to the
evidence, captioned "Motion to Dismiss," alleging:

1. That there is no evidence adduced by the prosecution to show that herein accused
stabbed the deceased or conspired with somebody who might have inflicted the stab
wound sustained by the deceased;

2. That the evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that the injuries sustained by the
deceased, particularly on the head, were caused by some other means and not by stoning;

3. That the testimony of the prosecution witness, Bienvenido Ferrer, does not indicate that
the deceased was hit by a stone allegedly thrown by accused towards the deceased;

4. That the deceased died because of the fatal wounds caused by a sharp instrument,
according to the testimony of the medicolegal officer;

5. That the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged and therefore the case against
the herein accused should be dismissed. [Original Records, p. 95.]

However, the trial court resolved to defer its resolution thereon, stating in its Order dated May 27, 1983 that
"the resolution of this motion to dismiss ... is held in abeyance until the defense shall have presented its
evidence and the complete records of the proceedings from the beginning shall be available." [Original
Records, p. 123.]

Relying strongly on the merits of his demurrer to the evidence, accused waived his right to present any
evidence and moved that the case be submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented by the
prosecution and his demurrer to the evidence. He likewise filed a second motion to be released on bail.
After a consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the trial court resolved to grant the
application for bail on July 18, 1983. Thereafter, the trial court rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been proved beyond reasonable doubt is
(sic) hereby convicted of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment
and to indemnify the heirs of Alfredo Quitoriano the amount of P15,000.00. [Rollo. p. 22.]

From said decision, Tolentino interposed an appeal to this Court.

In his brief, the accused made the following assignments of errors:

I. That the trial court erred in finding that the victim was hit at the back of his head by a
stone thrown by the accused.

II. The trial court erred in not finding that the victim's wounds at the back of his head was
caused by a sharp instrument as borne by the findings and testimony of the medicolegal
expert who performed the autopsy of the body of the victim.

III. The trial court erred in not finding that accused had nothing to do with the infliction of
the mortal wounds sustained by the victim, nor he conspired or acted in concert with the
person who inflicted such injuries, much less he acted as an accomplice (sic.)

IV. The trial court erred in not rendering a judgment of acquittal. [Brief for Defendant-
Appellant, p. 2.1

To support the first and second assigned errors, the appellant relies heavily upon the testimony of the
medicolegal officer, Dr. Gregorio Blanco, who performed the autopsy on the body of the victim. According
to the appellant, the finding of the trial court to the effect that the wound located at the back of the victim's
head was caused by a stone is erroneous as the same is not supported or confirmed by the finding of the
medicolegal officer and his expert testimony before the lower court.

The necropsy report filed by Dr. Gregorio Blanco, the Chief of the Medico- Legal Division of the PC Crime
Laboratory shows the following injuries found on the body of the deceased, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

HEAD, TRUNK AND EXTREMITIES:

(1) Abrasion, right supra-orbital region, measuring 0.7 by 0.2 cm. 8 cm. from the anterior
midline.

(2) Lacerated wound, right post-auricular region, measuring 2.5 by 0.3 cm. 10 cm. from the
posterior midline.

(3) Contusion, right pre-auricular region, measuring 6 by 5 cm. 13 cm. from the anterior
midline.

(4) Contusion, right supra-scapular region, measuring 6 by 6 cm. 13 cm. from the posterior
midline, with a superimposed abrasion, measuring 3 by 3 cm.

(5) Abrasion, right infrascapular region, measuring 5 by 0.3 cm. 10 cm. from the posterior
midline.

(6) Stab wound, left axillary region, measuring 1.8 by 0.4 cm. 18 cm. from the anterior
midline, 11 cm. deep, directed downwards, posterior wards and to the right, fracturing the
5th left thoracic rib, along the mid-axillary line, lacerating both lobes of the left lung.
 (7) Abrasion, dorsum of the left hand, measuring O.6 by O.5 cm. 2 cm. lateral to its
posterior midline.

(8) Abrasion, left knee, measuring 0.7 by 0.5 cm. 1.5. cm. lateral to its posterior midline.

xxx xxx xxx

REMARKS:

Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to

injuries of the head and stab wound of the trunk. [Original Records, p. 74.]

It must be noted that the injuries denominated as Nos. 1, 2, and 3 in the necropsy report were all located in
the victim's head while the rest of the injuries denominated as Nos. 4, 5, and 6 were located on the trunk
and Nos. 7 and 8 on the extremeties of the victim. The two fatal injuries though are the lacerated wound at
the back of the victim's head (wound No. 2) and the stab wound at his left chest (wound No. 6). The
prosecution deposits that since the accused hurled stones at the back of the victim's head, the infliction of
wound No. 2 can be ascribed to him and accordingly, he can be held liable for the victim's death.

However, inasmuch as the medicolegal officer testified that the fatal injury sustained by the deceased at the
back of the head was caused by a sharp instrument  [TSN, November 5, 1982, p. 81, appellant maintains
that the allegation of another prosecution witness, Bienvenido Ferrer in his sworn statement to the effect
that the accused came from behind the victim and threw a stone hitting the back of the latter's head and
causing him to fall on the cemented ground, cannot be given any credence at all. He asserts that in view of
Dr. Blanco's unquestioned qualifications, experience and expertise and his opportunity to examine the
nature and extent of the injury inflicted upon the victim, his testimony should prevail over that of Ferrer.

The apparent conflict in the evidence introduced by the prosecution brings to the fore the main issue of
whether the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In resolving the question, the
Court has to determine how much weight should be given to the opinion of the medical expert vis-a-vis that
of the other witness.

The prosecution's case is anchored principally upon the sworn statement and testimony ** before the
court a quo of the lone eyewitness, Bienvenido Ferrer. While his testimony dwelt on the fact that he saw the
appellant throwing stones at the victim, nowhere from said testimony can it be gleaned that the stones
allegedly thrown actually hit the victim and caused such injury as will constitute a penal offense. In the light
of the absence of any other corroborating testimonies, the sparseness in details of Ferrer's testimony has
certainly weakened the prosecution's case.

Neither is the sworn statement executed by Ferrer on July 22, 1 982 and formally presented in evidence
before the court of any help to the prosecution. While said statement serves to amplify Ferrer's narration of
the stoning incident, it has not sufficiently established Tolentino's liability for the death of the victim. This
conclusion is supported by a close scrutiny of said statement:

T - Ano ba ang nakita ninyong pagkapatay nitong si Fred Quitoriano

Victoriano?

S - Ng humigit kumulang sa 8:30 ng gabi kagabi July 26,1982, ng ako'y

dumating sa aming bahay ay nakita ko si FRED QUITORIANO na
nakaupo sa may tabi ng isang lamesa sa harapan ng aming tindahan sa
No. 822 T. Sora Avenue, Old Balara, Quezon City, at siya ay kumakain ng
dinuguan at ako'y niyaya na umupo sa tabi at doon ay nakita ko rin si
TRANCING na si Mrs. TOLENTINO na kausap ng asawa ko, at hindi
nagtagal ay dumating ho si Mr. SATURNINO MOGADO na kapitbahay rin
namin kaya niyaya rin namin al FRED na kumain si SATURNINO at pati si
TRANCING ay niyaya na rin namin na kumain kaya naman nga ginawa ni
TRANCING ay naupo sa aming lamesa, subalit hindi nagtagal ay
 dumating si Mr. SIXTO TOLENTINO kaya siya ay inanyayahan namin na
kumain din ngunit hindi siya kumibo at siya ay umorder na lang ng isang
boteng beer sa tindahan namin at iniinom niya iyon habang siya ay
nakatayo sa tabi ng counter pagkatapos na maubos niya ang laman ng
bote ng beer ay umalis na si Mr. SIXTO TOLENTINO, tapos ho hindi pa
nagtatagal ay umuwi na rin si TRANCING at ako naman ay pumasok na
sa loob ng aming bahay at ako'y humiga sa supa namin sa sala at ako'y
naidlip ng sandali at ako nagising na lang ng ako makarinig ng sigawan
ng mga tao na nanggaling sa harapan ng tindahan namin kaya ang
ginawa ko ay agad akong tumayo at nagtungo sa pintuan ng bahay namin
at nakita ho si FRED QUITORIANO na kasalukuyang naglalakad patungo
sa looban namin at pagkatapos ho ay bigla kong nakita si TIMOTEO
TOLENTINO na sumulpot sa may likuran ni FRED at nakita ko na binato
niya ng isang pirasong bato si FRED at tinamaan sa ulo haya ho
napatumba si FRED sa semento at pagkatapos ay binato na uli ni TEM si
FRED habang ito'y nakahiga sa semento at tinamaan na muli si FRED ,
pagkatapos ho ay tumakbo na si TEM palabas ng aming bakuran at noon
naman ay kinarga na nina Mr. MOGADO at ni CAMILO LOPEZ si FRED
sa kotse ni CAMILO at sinamahan ko sila na dalhin itong is FRED sa
Labor Hospital subalit siya ay namatay doon makalipas ang 20 minutos.
[Original Record, p. 85, Emphasis supplied.)

From the said statement it can be gathered that the stabbing of Quitoriano occurred while Ferrer was taking
his nap, causing a commotion and eliciting shouts from the people outside which awakened him. Ferrer
categorically admitted before the trial court having seen only the stoning and not the stabbing [TSN, August
25, 1982, pp. 7 and 1 0.1 There was therefore no evidence linking the appellant to the stabbing as witness
Ferrer never saw the stabbing. This fact was conceded by the Assistant City Fiscal in his resolution dated
July 28, 1982, ordering the filing of the information against Tolentino [Original Records, p. 8.1 The
indictment for murder was accordingly premised on the appellant's act of throwing stones at the victim.

But the evidence on record is bereft of any affirmative and positive showing that such act of the appellant
produced any fatal wound or any injury for that matter. The testimony of Ferrer, it bears reiteration, merely
established the fact that appellant threw stones at the victim. While in his sworn statement, Ferrer alleged
that the stones hit the victim's head and caused him to fall, such allegation is belied by the clear and
categorical findings of the medicolegal officer who conducted the autopsy on the victim, that such injuries
were caused by means other than stoning. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, doctor, in layman's language, will you please explain your findings
relative to the finding No. 1, where is this located?

A Abrasion. The collision of the surface of the body affected by falling

down or it could be inflicted by instrument which is rough which will cause
abrasion and it is located in orbitrary region, I have here in my possession
the diagrammatic representation of different injuries incurred by the victim.

xxx xxx xxx

Q How about item No. 2 (lacerated wound), what had caused this
injury? ***

A I would say, sharp instrument which could have been inflicted to the
body of the victim thus producing lacerated wound.

Q What could have caused the wound, doctor?

 A Possible may be a "balisong.

Q How about item No. 3?

A This injury is contusion...

Q Where is this located?

A It is here. (Witness indicating diagram 1, 2, 3... wait a minute... this No.

3, right aurecular region...

COURT:

Witness is marking in chronological order corresponding to the necropsy

report the injuries sustained by the victim.

Q What could have caused injury No. 3?

A Maybe it was caused by a fistic blow. (TSN, November 5, 1982, pp. 8-9;
Emphasis supplied.]

Ferrer's testimony thus finds no corroboration even from the opinion given by the medicolegal officer who
was presented by the prosecution itself to testify on the cause of the victim's injuries. In this jurisdiction,
expert opinion constitutes one of the few exceptions to the general rule that a mere opinion of a witness
regarding a particular matter is not admissible. In this connection, Rule 130, Section 43 provides: "The
opinion of a witness regarding a question of science, art or trade, when he is skilled therein, may be
received in evidence."

as to causation are competent and in many cases controlling and binding upon the court In the field of
medicine, opinions of doctors qualified by training and experience [People v. Castro, G.R. No. L-38989,
October 29, 1982, 117 SCRA 101 4; See also Murray v. Industrial Commission, 349 P. 2d 627, 87 Ariz 190
(1960).] In this case, Dr. Blanco's opinion as to the cause of the victim's injuries should be accorded great
respect, it being peculiarly within the expertise of medical practitioners.

A careful examination of the findings of the medicolegal officer in his necropsy report, particularly on the
wounds found on the victim's head, bolsters the appellant's claim that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Wound No. 1, an abrasion, was located above the victims right eyebrow and therefore,
could not have been inflicted by the appellant as Ferrer plainly testified that the appellant was behind the
victim when he threw the stones. The same can be said of Wound no. 3, a contusion located near the right
cheek of the victim. The infliction of the fatal wound, Wound No. 2, a lacerated wound measuring only 2.5
by 3 cm., located at the back of the victims head cannot likewise be attributed to appellant as, according to
the expert opinion of the doctor who examined the wound, it was caused by a sharp instrument like a
"balisong." While the doctor's testimony on! record does not preclude the possibility that the wound could
have also been caused by a stone, it was incumbent upon the prosecution, for its case against the accused
to succeed, to elicit a positive statement to that effect from the doctor. But the prosecution absolutely failed
in this task.

That the prosecution's evidence falls short of the standard degree of proof that will sustain a judgment of
conviction is manifest from its belated attempt to cure the deficiency by a motion for correction of transcript
of stenographic notes [See Original Records, p. 111,  et. seq..] The motion adverted to an alleged omission
in the transcript of stenographic notes of a question propounded to Dr. Blanco which allegedly elicited a
response to the effect that the hitting of the head with a stone could have caused the injury. The motion
however was filed only after the accused-appellant had already filed his demurrer to the evidence, pointing
out to the absence of evidence to show that the injuries sustained by the deceased, particularly on the
head, were caused by stoning [Original Records, p. 95.] It was denied by the trial court as "there (was) no
showing that the stenographer concerned who took (sic) the proceeding and transcribed the notes failed in
her duty' [Original Records, p. 115.]
Further, the prosecution during the trial manifested that it has in its possession the stones allegedly used in
the commission of the crime [TSN, March 15, 19831 and yet, the prosecution rested its case without
formally offering in evidence the said stones. The ineptness of the prosecution in handling this case, while
certainly prejudicial to the State and the private offended party, cannot be treated by this Court with
indulgence as it will result in a complete disregard of the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until his guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In fine, the failure of the prosecution to prove that the act of the appellant produced such injury as will
constitute a penal offense is fatal to their case. In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense
charged lies on the prosecution [Rule 131, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court.] As the accused has in
his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence, the quantum of proof that will warrant a verdict of
guilt must be strong enough to erase any reasonable doubt as to his culpability. True, the trial court found
the prosecution evidence sufficient for purposes of conviction. As a rule, this Court usually desists from
disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, in deference to the basic precept
that the lower court, having seen and heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor and manner of
testifying, is in a better position to appreciate the evidence. But this doctrine must bow to the superior and
immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, because the law
presumes that a defendant is innocent and this presumption must prevail unless overturned by competent
and credible proof (People v. Galvez, G.R. Nos. L-26944-45, December 5, 1980, 101 SCRA 544.] As
authoritatively set forth by this Court in a fairly recent decision:

Appellants have in their favor the presumption of innocence as guaranteed by the

Constitution. Proof against them must survive the test of reason. Every circumstance
against guilt and in favor of innocence must be considered. Suspicion no matter how
strong should not sway judgment, for well-established is the rule that the prosecution must
rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense; that
appellants need not prove their innocence because that is presumed; that the presumption
of innocence is a conclusion of law in favor of the accused, whereby his innocence is not
only established but continues until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof
which the law has created-that is, his innocence; "that conscience must be satisfied that
defendant has been proven guilty of the offense charged. Only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty, 'a certainty that convinces and satisfies
the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it' may the presumption of
innocence be overcome. [People v. Clores, G.R. No. 61408, October 12, 1983, 125 SCRA
67, 75 citing People v. Inguito, G.R. No. 53497, October 18,1982,117 SCRA 641, 649.]

Here, the evidence of the prosecution, far from proving the culpability of the appellant for the crime
charged, discloses several probabilities, some of which point to his innocence. For one thing, Ferrer's
testimony that the appellant had just alighted in front of the carinderia at the time he threw stones at the
victim negates any possibility that he was the one who assaulted the victim with a sharp instrument [TSN,
August 25, 1982, p. 10.1 Moreover, while the established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that
the accused could himself have inflicted the fatal wounds, the Court cannot base its conviction upon mere
possibilities. It should be stressed anew that 'possibilities and suspicion are not evidence" [Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 66497-98, July 10, 1986,142 SCRA 593, 6121 and therefore should not be
taken against the accused. Here, what the prosecution managed to establish were mere circumstances
which were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. While circumstantial
evidence may suffice to support a conviction, it is imperative, though, that the following requisites should
concur:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt [Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.]
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant,  to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime'
[People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942); Emphasis supplied.] In this case the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the accused for the crime
charged.

Bearing in mind that circumstantial evidence in order to warrant conviction "must fairly exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence' [Doronado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57744, August 31, 1987, 153
SCRA 420, 433], the Court concludes that the prosecution has miserably failed to adduce such
circumstantial evidence as would produce a moral certainty that the accused committed the crime charged.
The accused is not duty-bound to dispel the doubts regarding his innocence. Accordingly, the constitutional
presumption of innocence prevails.

The third assignment of error-that the trial court erred in not finding that the accused had nothing to do with
the infliction of the mortal wounds sustained by the victim nor did he conspire or act in concert with the
person who inflicted such injuries, much less act as an accomplice-is thus impressed with considerable
merit.

Since it does not appear that any of the mortal wounds were inflicted by the accused, it behooves the
prosecution to establish the existence of conspiracy in order to hold the accused liable as a principal in the
crime of murder. But in this task, the prosecution failed utterly as admitted by the Solicitor General himself
in the appellee's brief [Reno, p. 47.] " the came as an

Neither was the a 's participation m accomplice sufficiently proved. For the doctrine -steadfastly adhered to
by this Tribunal is that '. . . (i)t is an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only that there
should be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice, but it is furthermore necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, should
cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an
efficacious way." [People v. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38, 49 (1922); Emphasis supplied.] None of these essential
rudiments of complicity were shown to exist in the instant case.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the fourth assignment of error-that the trial court erred in not rendering a
judgment of acquittal-is meritorious.

The fundamental precept that the prosecution has the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt commands strict compliance with the requisite degree of proof for discharging
that burden. A painstakingly thorough appraisal of the evidence presented by the prosecution yields no
legal basis for a verdict of conviction for it failed to meet the test of moral certainty.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused
Timoteo Tolentino is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 170473 : October 12, 2006]

[Formerly G.R. No. 146283]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. BERNIE TEODORO y CAPARAS, Appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Before this Court for automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No.
00515, which affirmed the judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)3 of Macabebe, Pampanga, Branch
25, sentencing Bernie Teodoro y Caparas (appellant) to the penalty of death for the crime of rape.
On 28 October 1999, appellant was charged in Criminal Case No. CBU-99-2459-M for rape in an
Information4 filed by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Vivian T. Dabu, which reads:

That on or about the 1st day of October 1999 at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, in the barangay of xxx,
[M]unicipality of xxx, province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused BERNIE TEODORO Y CAPARAS, with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in having carnal knowledge with [AAA 5], 5 years of age, while the
latter was sleeping at her house.

Contrary to law.

The evidence of the prosecution, consisting of the sworn statements and testimonies of the victim and
eyewitnesses, established the following facts:

The victim, AAA, was five (5) years old at the time of the incident. On 1 October 1999, AAA and her aunt,
BBB,6 were sleeping in one room of their house at Barangay xxx, xxx, Pampanga, along with AAA's brother
and sister. As the windows of the room had no screens, the four (4) slept under two (2) mosquito nets, with
AAA occupying one of them with her brother, and the others in the second. The room was illuminated by a
25-watt electric bulb and two (2) small bulbs installed at the altar. 7

At about 10:30 in the evening, AAA was fast asleep when she was awakened after a man, later identified
as the appellant, managed to gain entry into the bedroom, approach the sleeping AAA, mount her and
insert his penis into her vagina.8 AAA screamed, causing BBB to awaken. BBB quickly switched on the
main light and saw the man she recognized as the appellant inside the mosquito net, atop AAA. 9 They were
both half-naked. Appellant got out of bed immediately and covered his private parts. BBB asked appellant
how he was able to enter their room but the latter did not answer. BBB called and shouted for her mother,
CCC,10 who was watching television downstairs.11 When CCC reached the room of AAA, she saw appellant
suddenly jump out of the window. 12

Thereafter, AAA complained that her private parts were aching. Upon inspection, BBB and CCC noticed
that it was swollen and reddish. When asked what appellant did to her, AAA relayed the incident to her aunt
and grandmother. AAA was brought to the hospital the next day. Appellant was arrested the following night.

The medical examination conducted on AAA revealed that AAA's external genitalia and perineum on
the labia majora bore a "bilateral 0.5 cm, LCM abrasion," while on the labia minora, the anterior portion
towards the clitoris had a fresh abrasion about 0.5 cm with minimal bleeding. 13

Dr. Ma. Socorro Ibuen-Posadas (Dr. Posadas) who examined AAA eventually testified on the medical
findings. She stated that the injuries found on the private organ of AAA could have been caused by a man's
private organ forced to penetrate her vagina. The fresh bleeding indicated that the injuries sustained were
recent, or at least not more than three (3) days from the time of the examination. 14

Appellant denied the accusation and raised the defense of alibi. He averred that he spent the night at his
uncle's house in xxx, xxx, Pampanga at the time of the incident, a claim separately corroborated by his
uncle. He further asserted that when he was about to go to xxx Church the following day, he met the father
of AAA, who confronted him about the said incident. Despite denying the accusations hurled against him,
AAA's father still beat him and brought him to the police station.

At the trial, appellant also questioned the credibility of Dr. Posadas as an expert witness as she had not
completed the necessary training in the field of her expertise and she was under the supervision of a senior
officer who was not a signatory to the medico-legal report.

The RTC, in a Decision dated 29 September 2000, found appellant guilty of rape and imposed the penalty
of death pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, 15 otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. The
RTC also awarded P75,000.00 "by way of damages."

The legal conclusions reached by the RTC are concise enough to allow reproduction in full, herein:
The Court finds the explanation of the accused too shallow to be given credit and weight. It is unthinkable
that a five[-] year old girl, of tender age, as well as her aunt and also her grandmother, would concoct the
story of so heinous an offense without any serious and valid reason.

The defense of alibi by the accused cannot prosper as he was not able to prove that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity. In this case[,] his defense that
he was in xxx during the commission of the crime could not be appreciated considering that the place of
[the] incident can be negotiated for about 10 to 15 minutes. In the absence of strong and convincing
evidence, alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the victim as well as her
witnesses. The record does not show that the victim as well as her kins [sic] have ill-motive against the
accused.

As to the Medico[-]Legal OB-Gyne Report, which has been objected [to] by the accused thru counsel that
the doctor who issued the same is not qualified[,] could not be sustained as the examination and findings
are merely corroborative in character. The doctor is found to be qualified to testify on her findings.

The defense of the accused that the victim is an incompetent witness is of no moment. It must be borne in
mind that the victim is an innocent, wholesome and naive five-year old girl, that this Court, or anyone for
that matter, cannot expect to articulate and verbalize all answers thrown at her. Being a child and a victim
of rape, her testimony can be expected to be quite inconsistent and ambiguous although factual. 16

Pursuant to this Court's decision in People v. Mateo,17 the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals on
7 September 2004. On 30 August 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC decision.
Sustaining the finding of guilt, the appellate court further ordered appellant to pay P50,000.00 in moral
damages,18 in addition to the earlier award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.19

In denying the appeal, the appellate court expounded on the findings of the RTC. It accorded full credence
to the candid, forthright and consistent testimony of AAA in identifying the appellant who raped her and
concluded that the testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature are credible. The appellate
court noted that AAA's testimony was corroborated not only by witnesses but by medical findings, as well.
Debunking the twin defenses of denial and alibi of appellant, it stressed that denial cannot prevail over the
positive, candid and categorical testimony of AAA and it was not physically impossible, as the trial court
found, for appellant to be present at the crime scene. 20

Appellant alleges in his brief that the trial court erred (1) in finding him guilty beyond reasonable of the
crime of rape, and (2) in imposing the death penalty. 21

Appellant impugns the credibility of AAA, pointing out that when asked how she knew she was raped, she
answered "because my vagina hurts." He claims that the trial court erred in accepting this testimony as
sufficient to establish the rape. Moreover, appellant capitalizes on the medical finding that there was no
laceration on the vagina to exculpate himself from criminal liability. 22

In the review of rape cases where the credibility of the complainant is in question, this Court consistently
relies on the assessment of the trial court. As aptly noted by the Solicitor General, the findings of fact of the
trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great weight and respect. 23 Indeed, the trial
court judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the complainant, having personally heard her
and observed her deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 24

It has been consistently held in a long line of cases that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. 25 In fact, the
testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. AAA's
straightforward account of the incident categorically established the commission of the crime of rape:

Q Do you remember what happened to you one evening while you were asleep in your house?cralaw
library

A Yes, sir.
ATTY. PANGILINAN

Questioning

What happened to you?

WITNESS

Answering

My vagina was aching, sir.

Q Why was your vagina aching?cralaw library

A Someone went on top of me, sir.

Q Is he a man or a woman?cralaw library

A A man, sir.

Q And what did that man do to you?cralaw library

A He inserted his penis, sir.

Q To what?cralaw library

A To my vagina, to wit "petching," sir.

Q So you were hurt when that man was inserting his penis to your vagina?cralaw library

A Yes, sir.26

Furthermore, AAA was able to positively identify appellant as the malefactor:

Q When she turned on the light, did you see the man who sexually abused you?cralaw library

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you see his face?cralaw library

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you know his name?cralaw library

A No, sir.

Q If that man who sexually abused you that evening by inserting his penis to your vagina is in the
courtroom, will you point to him?cralaw library

A Yes, sir. That man.

(Witness pointed to a man inside the courtroom, who, when asked, gave his name as Bernie Teodoro) 27

Moreover, AAA's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the medical findings as testified to by the
medico-legal expert, Dr. Posadas, and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The testimony of Dr. Posadas established the fact that there was contact with the labia which effectively
consummated the crime of rape,28 thus:

Q One of your findings doctora, on the external genitalia and perinieum [sic] of the patient, on the labia
majora[,] it is stated here: Bilateral 0.5 cm, LCM abrasion. Another findings[sic] on the labia minora:
Anterior portion towards the clitoris abrasion about 0.5-1 cm, minimal bleeding, fresh abrasion.

Could you [kindly] explain to this Court doctora in layman's term, what do you mean by your first findings?
cralaw library

WITNESS

Answering

There are injuries to the skin, it could be a cut, sir.

ATTY. PANGILINAN

Questioning

And where did you find this doctora?

A Labia Majora, I even drew it, sir.

Q And also another finding at the Labia Minora?cralaw library

A It is the same findings. It is anterior towards the clitoris. It is just the medical term going to the clitoris, sir.

Q You also made a finding of minimal bleeding, where is this bleeding you found?cralaw library

A From the abrasion, sir.

Q At the Labia Majora?cralaw library

A Yes, sir.

Q How about this fresh abrasion?cralaw library

A It is the same thing, sir, the bilateral cut on the skin.

Q In your medical opinion, Dra., what could have caused these injuries you found on the private organ of
the victim?cralaw library

A It could be caused by a force, sir.

Q Could you consider a private organ of a man forced the said penis to penetrate/enter the vagina of victim
[AAA] who is a 5 year old girl, could it be the cause on [sic] the injuries you found?cralaw library

A Probably, sir.

Q The alleged crime was committed on October 1, 1999 and you examined her on October 2, 1999, could
you tell us if the injuries you found on the private organ of the victim is compatible to the date of infliction[,]
madam?cralaw library

A There is a [sic] fresh bleeding, fresh injuries. It could only be recent, it could be less than 3 days, sir. 29
On cross-examination, the medico-legal witness confirmed the medical findings that injuries were definitely
sustained in the labia:

Q In your medical certificate, your findings are stated here: Bilateral 0.5 cm., 1cm abrasion. {W]ill you tell us
the exact location of this?cralaw library

A I just told you, it is in the anterior portion towards the clitoris, ma'am. Are you familiar with the genitalia?
cralaw library

ATTY CRUZ

Questioning

Of course, I am a woman.

WITNESS

Answering

I even drew it. Would you like to see my drawing?

ATTY. CRUZ

I would like to see your drawing.

WITNESS

(Witness showing the same) So, this is the clitoris, this is the hymenal ring, this is the labia majora[,] there
is a 0.5-1cm abrasion.

Q In the labia majora?cralaw library

A In the labia majora, ma'am.

Q Not in the labia minora?cralaw library

A Yes, ma'am, because the labia minora of the child is not yet fully developed.

Q How about the vaginal orifice, where is that?cralaw library

A It is inside the vagina, ma'am.

Q Covered by the hymen, am I right?cralaw library

A Yes, ma'am. This is the hymenal ring, it is intact. (Witness referring to her drawing).

Q The injuries are in the labia majora?cralaw library

A Yes, ma'am.30

Thus, the contention of appellant that there were no lacerations in the vagina does not merit any
consideration. In that regard, it has been held that the medical examination of the victim is merely
corroborative in character and is not an element of rape. 31 Likewise, a freshly broken hymen is not an
essential element of rape and healed lacerations do not negate rape. 32

Appellant challenges the qualifications of Dr. Posadas to testify as an expert witness. 33 While the medical
findings are merely corroborative in character and therefore not indispensable in the successful prosecution
of the crime of rape, nevertheless we sustain the competency of Dr. Posadas. It is sufficient that the
medico-legal witness was able to establish to the satisfaction of the court that she possessed special
knowledge on the question that requires expert opinion, gained through years of study in medical school,
passing the medical board examination and practicing as an O.B. Gyne resident. 34

Apart from the testimony of the victim and of the doctor who examined her, the case for the prosecution
was fortified by the eyewitness' testimonies of BBB and CCC. BBB, who was sleeping in the same room as
AAA, testified in court:

Q Will you kindly inform this Honorable Court what was that unusual incident that happened inside your
room?cralaw library

A My niece [AAA] suddenly shouted and then cried, sir.

xxx

Q When you heard her shouting, what did you do?cralaw library

A I stood up from where I was lying down, sir.

ATTY. PANGILINAN

Questioning

Did you switch on the light?

WITNESS

Answering

Yes, sir.

Q What did you see inside the mosquito net of your niece?cralaw library

A I saw Bernie on top of my niece, sir.

Q Inside the mosquito net?cralaw library

A Yes, sir.

xxx

Q When you saw Bernie Teodoro on top of your niece [AAA], did you see if he was wearing an apparel?
cralaw library

WITNESS

Answering

He was not wearing clothes [from the] waist down, sir.

ATTY. PANGILINAN

Questioning

Do you mean he was naked [from the] waist down?

A Yes, sir.

Q What about your niece, [AAA], did you see her?cralaw library

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you see on her body?cralaw library

A She was not wearing panty, sir.35

On the other hand, CCC was watching television in the same house when she heard AAA shouting. Said
the witness:

Q While you were watching t.v. at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening do you remember if there was
anything unusual that happened in your house?cralaw library

A Yes[,] sir. [M]y granddaughter suddenly shouted[,] sir.

Q What were the shout[s] of your granddaughter[,] if you remember?cralaw library

A She was calling me[,] sir[,] and after a short while [BBB] was awaken sir.

Q Will you tell us the exact words of your granddaughter when she was calling you?cralaw library

A She shouted "Nanay", "Nanay" sir.

Q When you heard your granddaughter calling you[,] what did you do?cralaw library

A I immediately stood up[,] sir[,] and ascended the stairs.

xxx

Q What did you see?cralaw library

A I saw Bernie Teodoro about to stand while he was looking at [BBB] and then afterwards he jumped out
over [sic] the window sir.

Q You said you saw Bernie Teodoro. [W]hat was his position when you saw him?cralaw library

A He was naked [from the] waistdown[,] sir.36

Clearly, both eyewitnesses for the prosecution corroborated each other in identifying appellant as the
perpetrator.

Appellant reiterates before the Court his defense of alibi. He testified that at the time of the incident, he was
sleeping in the house of his uncle at xxx, xxx, xxx, Pampanga. His testimony was corroborated by his
uncle.

It is well-settled that alibi is one of the weakest defenses because it is easily fabricated. 37 For alibi to
prosper, the appellant must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he
must also convincingly demonstrate the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the
time of the incident.38 In the instant case, it was established that the house of the uncle of appellant, where
he purportedly was at the time of the commission of the crime, was only 10 to 15 minutes away from the
place of the incident.39 Thus, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime
when it happened, rendering his defense of alibi unworthy of credit. As correctly observed by the appellate
court:
Appellant miserably failed to prove the requisite impossibility of committing the crime of rape.

First. Appellant failed to prove that he was nowhere in the vicinity of the crime at the appointed time.
Against the prosecution witnesses' positive testimonies that appellant was seen in their room naked from
waist down, come out of the mosquito net where the naked child victim was on the appointed time, and
later on jumped out of the window, the latter had nothing to offer but denial. Time-tested is the rule that
between the positive assertions of the prosecution witness and the negative averments of the accused, the
former undisputedly deserves more credence and is entitled to greater evidentiary value.

Second. Appellant failed to prove the physical impossibility of his being present at the crime scene at the
time of its occurrence considering that it would take only about 10-15 minutes to negotiate the distance
from xxx, xxx to xxx, easily to bring within the space of time consumed the commission of the crime. Where
there is even the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi will not
hold water.40

Moreover, the alibi of appellant is unavailing against the positive identification made by the victim and other
witnesses, especially so when the alibi is corroborated only by a relative of the appellant. Hence, the
testimony of the uncle deserves scant consideration because of his perceived bias in favor of appellant.

Thus, the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the Court of Appeals should be sustained.
However, in view of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on 24 June 2006, the penalty of death cannot be
imposed. Accordingly, the penalty imposed upon appellant is reduced from death to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.41

With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we affirm the RTC decision in awarding civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00 which is mandatory upon a conviction for rape. 42 We however, modify the award of
moral damages to P75,000.00,43 in light of the prevailing jurisprudence that the victim is assumed to have
suffered such damages.44 The presence of the qualifying circumstance of minority necessitates the award
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. 45

WHEREFORE, the Decisions of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 99-2459-M and Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00515 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim, AAA, identified in the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages plus costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

                Appellee,
G.R. No. 133436
April 14, 2004
          
-versus-

CONRADO AYUMAN,
          Appellant.
 
 
DECISION
 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For automatic review is the Decision [1] dated March 4, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 97-1040 finding Conrado Ayuman, appellant, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of parricide and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death.   He was also adjudged
to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. chan robles virtual law library
The Information charging appellant with parricide reads:
“That on or about April 22, 1997, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and
taking advantage of superior strength and ascendancy over Sugar Ray Ayuman, his legitimate son, maul,
maltreat and kill the latter by slapping and hitting the latter on his head, stomach and other parts of the
latter’s young and tender body thereby inflicting upon the latter traumatic abdominal injuries, which are fatal
injuries and which caused the latter’s death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Sugar Ray Ayuman and his legal heirs.”
Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. chan
robles virtual law library
The version of the prosecution was established through the testimonies of Dr. Tammy Uy, Marino Jalalo,
SPO1 Salome Catulong, Ederico Mariano, Angelito Roluna, Grace Songcuya and SPO1 Medel
Makalino.cralaw
On April 22, 1997 at around 10:15 in the morning, Ermita Ayuman, appellant’s wife, rushed her five-year old
son Sugar Ray to the Emergency Room of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center (NMMC).  When Ederico
Mariano, a nurse, took the child’s vital signs, it appeared that he was dead on arrival.    Ederico then asked
Ermita what happened to the child.  She answered that he was mauled by his father.   Ermita’s statement
was noted in the emergency room record. [2]
At about 10:45 in the morning of the same day, SPO1 Salome Catulong of Police Precinct No. 1 of
Cagayan de Oro City, received a phone call from the NMMC informing her that a child died because he
was assaulted by his father.  Being in charge of cases involving women and children, she immediately
proceeded to the hospital.  Angelito Roluna, a newspaper reporter of the Sun Star, was with her.  Ermita
refused to answer any query from SPO1 Catulong regarding the death of her son.  But when Roluna asked
her what happened, she told him that Sugar Ray was mauled by his father. [3] This interview could only be
finished the following day when Ermita admitted to him that appellant used to hurt the child every time the
latter left the house or made mistake; that before he died, appellant kicked him; and that the child informed
her he was in pain and vomiting.  Roluna reported this interview in the “Sun Star.” chan robles virtual law
library
Also on that same day, April 22, 1997, at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, SPO1 Catulong went to the
Ayuman residence.  That was the start of the wake for Sugar Ray.  When SPO1 Catulong interviewed
Ermita, she stated that appellant maltreated the boy in order to discipline him and that appellant started to
hit him at the age of four.   Upon suggestion of SPO1 Catulong, Ermita agreed that the body of the child be
autopsied. [4]
On April 23, 1997, Dr. Tomas L. Uy of the NBI, Region 10, Cagayan de Oro City, performed the autopsy on
the body of Sugar Ray.  Prior thereto, he learned from Ermita that the child was maltreated by appellant in
their house on April 22, 1997 at about 10:30 in the morning. [5]
Dr. Uy’s Autopsy Report contains the following findings:
“Pallor, generalized. Rigor mortis, lower extremities. Livor mortis, generalized, back, buttocks, posterior
aspects of the neck and extremities. Areas of post-mortem greenish discolorations of the abdomen and
inferior aspects of the chest are noted. chan robles virtual law library
ABRASIONS: 0.2X0.4 cms. And 0.3X0.6 cm., lower thoracic region of the back, mid-aspect; 3X2 cms., right
iliac region, lateral aspect.cralaw
HEMATOMAS, violaceous: 2.2X1 cms. Forehead, right side; 1.5X2 cms., 2.5X2 cms., 1.2X1.6 cms., and
3X0.8 cms., left side of the face;  (page 2-A, record) 1.8X1.2 cms., right elbow region; 4X2.5 cms., dorsum
of right hand; 2.4X1.2 cms., left forearm, dorsal aspect, dista third; 2.5X2.2 cms., lower sternal region of the
chest; 6X3 cms., epigastric region of the abdomen.cralaw
HEMATOMA, 6X2 cms., surface of the pericardium, anterior aspect, beneath the sternum.cralaw
HEMATOMA, stomach, 5X2 cms., lesser curvature region, anterior aspect.cralaw
LACERATED WOUND, 1.5 cms. long, with irregular edges, right lobe of the liver, medial aspect, overlying
the gall bladder, surrounded by a HEMATOMA of 4X3 cms.cralaw
RUPTURE, small intestine, ileal region/portion; with irregular edges.cralaw
PERITONITIS, generalized, aero-purulent; with extensive intestinal and mesenteric adhesions; serosal
surfaces of the small and large intestines are markedly congested and covered with patches of foul-
smelling yellowish purulent exudates.   Peritoneal fluid is heavily contaminated with fecal matter.cralaw
Heart chambers, contain smell amount of dark fluid and clotted blood. chan robles virtual law library
Stomach, contains about 1 tbsp. of yellowish-green bilous substance.cralaw
Brain, markedly congested.cralaw
Other visceral organs, congested.cralaw
CAUSE OF DEATH:   Traumatic abdominal injuries.”
On April 23, 1997, Sugar Ray was buried.  Appellant was nowhere to be found.  Neither did he report for
work from April 23 to May 21, 1997. [6] During the burial, Ermita cried and shouted, “Dong, forgive your
father.  Dong, don’t leave us.” Afterwards, upon invitation of SPO1 Catulong, Ermita, with her two children,
went to the former’s office and executed the following statement quoted as follows:
       “01.   Q  -  Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the whole truth in your statement now?
A  -  Yes, I will swear.cralaw
02.    Q  -  Please state your name, age, address and other personal circumstances?
A  -  I am Ermita Ayuman y Mayuela, 36 years of age, married, presently residing at Pilgrim Compound, Del
Pilar/ Magsaysay Street, Cagayan de Oro City and originated from Manuikan, Zamboanga del Norte, a
mother of 3 children, 2 girls and one boy.cralaw
03.    Q  -  Why are you here at the police Station at OKK Police Precinct No. 1? chan robles virtual law
library
A  -  I am here to file a criminal complaint against my own husband PO3 Conrado Ayuman an active
member of Cagayan de Oro Central Fire Station, for killing our only son Sugar Ray Ayuman, 5 yrs. Old,
Kinder 2 at Faith Tabernacle situated at Del Pilar/Magsaysay, Cagayan de Oro City.cralaw
04.    Q  -  When and where did this happen?
A  -  This happened on April 22, 1997 at 10:30 in the morning more or less from our house at Del
Pilar/Magsaysay going to Northern Mindanao Medical Center but died on arrival at the hospital and the
mauling which was done by his father happened in our house and this the cause of the death of my
son.cralaw
05.    Q  -  Please narrate shortly the incident.cralaw
A  -  The father of Sugar Ray started mauling him when he was then 4 years old until the age of 5.   His
father would kick, box, slap, and beat him even if he just committed slight mistakes.   If Sugar Ray would go
out from our room to watch TV at our neighbor’s place his father would be furious and would beat him .  And
on Monday, April 21, 1997, at 10:00 a.m., more or less, my husband came home from office to get
something.  He called Ray because that time Ray went out from our room, and immediately slapped him
and the head of Ray bumped on the wall.  He let Ray get inside our room, slapped him again and I saw my
husband kick Ray many times hitting his abdomen.  I tried to stop him but he would not listen and instead
kicked Ray several times because as what he said ‘I must discipline my child because he is a boy.’   He
easily gets angry even for slightest mistakes.cralaw
06.    Q  -  What else can you say?
A  -  In that afternoon at past 1:00 o’clock of same day, he came home from his work to get epoxy to repair
his radio, and he saw Ray wiping his hands and suddenly hit Ray’s head and said ‘You will go out again as
your mother is sleeping.’  But that time I was not yet asleep and I heard everything that he said to the child
then looked for a chain but there was none; he saw a rope and tied the neck of my son to the bed, so Ray
could not go out and even told me not to untie the knot until the child sleeps, then he left going back to his
office.cralaw
07.    Q  -  What other things happened?
A  -  The following day April 22, 1997 at 9:00 o’clock in the morning my husband was at home from a 24
hours duty before that day.  He saw me wiping the hands of Ray with wet face towel and asked me by
saying ‘Is Ray having fever?  It’s because he is disobedient.’  He told the child to stand up by saying ‘stand
up Ray.’  Ray then stood up and felt nauseated and was about to vomit and told Ray ‘Pretentious child he’s
just pretending to vomit.’  Ray lay down again and I continued wiping him and massage him with sanitary
balm as he felt cold and was sweating and at that time seemed to have hard time breathing.   I could not
determine his way of breathing, sometimes very fast, and then my husband approached Ray and put his
clenched fist on Ray’s face and commanded Ray to squat then let Ray stand up and squat with open hands
in front his knees.  I told him to stop Ray from squatting, then Ray lay down again but rose up and vomited
and I saw him vomit with blood and I was so scared so I brought my child to Northern Mindanao Medical
Center, and while on our way on board motorela going to said hospital, Ray was able to say ‘Mang, maybe
I will die now’ and I told him, ‘You won’t die “Do” because we will go to the hospital.’   At that time I noticed
Ray having hard time breathing and upon arrival at the emergency room of said hospital the nurse touched
his pulse and declared that my son died on arrival.  I could not believe that my son was already dead and
did not know what to do that time.  I just embraced him and kept on crying. chan robles virtual law library
08.    Q  -  Did your husband know at that time that Sugar Ray is already dead?
A  -  Yes, because he was informed by his sibling who accompanied us to the hospital but my husband that
time did not go with us to said hospital and as what I knew from his sibling that he told his ‘manong’ (my
husband) that Sugar Ray is already dead and his response was ‘bury him’ and until now my husband has
not yet appeared.cralaw
09.    Q  -  I have no more questions, do you have something more to add?
A  -  No more as of now.cralaw
10.    Q  -  Will you sign your statement voluntarily without being coerced or intimidated by anybody?
A  -  Yes, I will sign. (Affidavit as translated, pages 185-186, records). chan robles virtual law library
(Signed) ERMITA MAYUELA AYUMAN
(Affiant)” [7]
Thereafter, SPO1 Catulong and Ermita proceeded to the office of Grace Songcuya, Clerk of Court of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro City.  Ermita subscribed and sworn to before Songcuya the
truth of her statement given before SPO1 Catulong.cralaw
However, on May 15, 1997, Ermita executed an affidavit retracting what she stated in her sworn
statements.  Nonetheless, the City Prosecutor filed with the court a quo the corresponding Information and
eventually issued a warrant of arrest against appellant.  SPO1 Catulong arrested appellant at the Central
Fire Station, Cagayan de Oro City. [8]
Marino Jalalo, testified that he and appellant’s family are neighbors.   Appellant has three children, two girls
and a boy.  But he was particularly violent to his son Sugar Ray.  Every time the boy committed a mistake,
appellant would punish him inside a room.  About 3 to 4 times a month, appellant would hit the child with a
belt or a stick and he could only cry.  Once, Marino heard the child gasping for breath as if he was being
drowned by appellant.  At one time, the boy approached Marino and asked for something to eat, saying
“Tatay, did you hear me a while ago?” At that moment, Marino noticed that the child’s head was partly
swollen.  When asked what happened to him, the child replied, “My face was pushed down.”   In the same
month and year, appellant locked the child inside a room.  Observing that Marino was around, the child
begged him for help. [9]
The defense presented as its witnesses appellant and his wife Ermita. chan robles virtual law library
Appellant denied killing his son Sugar Ray.  He testified that on April 22, 1997, when he came home at
around 9:00 o’clock in the morning, he saw his son on bed.  His wife was rubbing “sanitary balm” on him. 
While he was having breakfast, he noticed that his son was pale, had fever and was vomiting.   So he told
his wife to bring the child to the hospital.  Initially, she was reluctant because they had no money, but he
insisted.  On the same day, he went to Pagadian to borrow money from his relatives.  He returned home on
April 27, 1992.  Ermita told him that Sugar Ray died because an unidentified person slapped and kicked
him at the Cogon market.  At that time, his son was already buried.  The couple then went to the Office of
the Prosecutor to “tell the truth.” [10] chan robles virtual law library
On cross examination, appellant admitted he was strict with his children and disciplined them in a military
way. [11]
After hearing the case, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Conrado Ayuman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide committed by killing his minor son, Sugar Ray Ayuman, aggravated by treachery, lack of respect
due to Sugar Ray’s tender age, cruelty and abuse of confidence, and thereby hereby sentences him to
death, to indemnify the heirs of Sugar Ray Ayuman in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs of this
case.cralaw
His custodian is hereby also ordered to ship him to the National Penitentiary immediately, or without
delay.cralaw
SO ORDERED.”
Appellant now raises the following assignments of error: chan robles virtual law library
“I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
LACK OF EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE FILED BY THE
COMPLAINANT AND IN DISREGARDING HER TESTIMONY IN OPEN COURT.” [12]
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that he is
guilty of the crime charged.  In fact, there is no evidence directly pointing to him as the culprit.  What the
prosecution presented are mere hearsay evidence and “assumption.” While SPO1 Catulong testified that
Ermita executed a sworn statement on September 22, 1997, however, Ermita denied its veracity.  Her
affidavit of desistance tells all.cralaw
Appellant likewise maintains that the circumstantial evidence enumerated by the trial court in its assailed
Decision “do not support any finding of parricide.”
For his part, the Solicitor General, in the appellee’s brief, maintains that Ermita’s affidavit of recantation is
an afterthought and exceedingly unreliable.  Moreover, the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial
court sustains the conviction of appellant of the crime charged. chan robles virtual law library
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, defines and penalizes
parricide as follows:
“Article 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.”
The elements of the crime of parricide are:  (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any
of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.  The key element here is the relationship of the offender
with the victim. [13]
All the above elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution, specifically on the basis of
circumstantial evidence.cralaw
In People vs. Almoguerra and Aton, [14] we held:
“Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix wherefrom a court may draw
its conclusions and findings of guilt.  The rules on evidence and case law sustain the conviction of
appellants through circumstantial evidence. chan robles virtual law library
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court on circumstantial evidence, the following
requisites must concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.”
The following circumstances cited by the trial court led us to conclude that the prosecution proved by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt that appellant killed his son, thus:
1.  Appellant has the propensity in maltreating his son.   He himself testified that he disciplined the victim by
inflicting on him serious corporal punishment akin to “the military approach;” [15]
2.  Marino Jalalo, appellant’s neighbor, testified that whenever the victim committed a mistake, appellant
would bring him in a room and punish him.  He often heard the victim crying as he was being hit by
appellant with a belt or a stick.  This happened about 3 to 4 times a month; chan robles virtual law library
3.  Appellant was at home on April 22, 1997 when Ermita rushed the victim to the NMMC where he was
declared dead on arrival;
4.  Appellant immediately left after his son was rushed to the hospital by his wife;
5.  Ermita admitted to Ederico Mariano, the nurse then on duty when the victim was rushed to the hospital,
that the latter was mauled by his father.  This declaration was later entered in the NMMC emergency room
record by the same nurse;
6.  Ermita, when interviewed by SPO1 Catulong and Angelito Roluna, a newspaper reporter, also admitted
to them that appellant has been maltreating his son and mauled him before he died;
7.  Dr. Tomas L. Uy who physically examined the victim found abrasions and hematomas all over his body,
as well as lacerated wound of the liver and ruptured intestine, among others.  According to Dr. Uy, Sugar
Ray died of “traumatic abdominal injuries.” To a layman, Dr. Uy’s findings readily show that the child
suffered violent blows on his body.cralaw
8.  During the interment, Ermita shouted, “Dong, forgive your father.”
9.  Although Ermita advised appellant that the victim was slapped and kicked by an unidentified person at
the Cogon market on April 21, 1997, however, contrary to a father’s natural reaction, appellant failed to take
any action to defend a loved one or report the incident to the police; chan robles virtual law library
10.           Appellant did not return home immediately.  In fact, he was not present during the wake and the
burial of his own son, conduct so unnatural for a father like him.cralaw
The foregoing circumstances, when viewed in their entirety, are as convincing as direct evidence and as
such, negate appellant’s innocence.  Otherwise stated, the prosecution established beyond a shadow of
doubt, through circumstantial evidence, that appellant committed the crime of parricide.cralaw
Here is a father who mercilessly abused his own son and refused to bring him to the hospital, although on
the verge of death, for prompt medical treatment.  Such a heartless conduct is condemnable and is
extremely contrary to human nature.  Every father is expected to love his children and shower them with
acts of affection and tenderness.  But appellant belongs to a different breed.  Indeed, he is a tyrant without
mercy.  His intense apathy to his dying young son is beyond comprehension.cralaw
We have ruled that facts or circumstances which are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but
also inconsistent with his innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass
even direct evidence in its effect upon the court. [16]
But appellant discredits Ermita’s sworn statement because she retracted.  It bears emphasis that mere
retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible, as in this
case.  We look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court.   The rationale for the
rule is obvious:  Affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation
or for a monetary consideration.  Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the
probability that it will later be repudiated. [17] Thus, the trial court correctly disregarded Ermita’s affidavit of
desistance.  Obviously, she was influenced by appellant to execute it.  Moreover, if it were true that an
unidentified person killed their son, why did appellant fail to report the matter to the proper authorities?  
There can be no other conclusion, therefore, than that Ermita’s affidavit of retraction is an afterthought,
intended to exculpate appellant from criminal liability. chan robles virtual law library
Appellant, merely denied the commission of the crime and interposed the defense of alibi.    Alibi is
inherently weak and unreliable, unless corroborated by disinterested witnesses.  Since he was unable to
substantiate his alibi with the testimony of a credible witness, it is reduced to self-serving evidence
undeserving of any weight in law. [18]
In his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal liability, appellant insists that the
prosecution failed to prove that he is the father of the victim.  While the prosecution failed to present to the
trial court the victim’s Certificate of Live Birth, however, both appellant and his wife Ermita admitted during
the hearing that the victim is their son.  In People vs. Malabago, [19] we ruled that oral evidence of the fact
of filial relationship maybe considered. [20]
We now resolve the issue of whether the trial court imposed the correct penalty.   Under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 5 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for parricide is composed of
two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death.   In the case at bar, the trial court erred in
appreciating the aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of confidence and cruelty.   Outright, we
cannot consider these aggravating circumstances in determining the proper penalty because they have not
been alleged in the Information.  Also, there are no mitigating circumstances here. chan robles virtual law
library
Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, we
impose upon the appellant the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.cralaw
Regarding damages, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00  as civil indemnity to the victim’s mother
and sisters.  When death occurs as a result of a crime, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, [21] without need of any evidence or proof of damages. [22] We also
award them exemplary damages in the sum of P25,000.00 considering that the qualifying circumstance of
relationship is present, this being a case of parricide. [23] In People vs. Catubig, [24] we held that
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 are recoverable if there is present an aggravating
circumstance (whether qualifying or ordinary) in the commission of the crime.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 4, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case No. 97-1040, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the
sense that appellant CONRADO AYUMAN is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
and is ordered to pay the victim’s heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.cralaw
Costs de oficio.cralaw