G.R. No.

191894               July 15, 2015

DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) with prayer for issuance of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks to reverse and set aside the
August 18, 2009 Resolution  and February 8, 2010 Order  of respondent Sandiganbayan Second
1 2

Division in Criminal Case No. SB-09-CRM-0080, which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of la9k of jurisdiction.

The facts are plain and undisputed.

Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6758.  On March 24, 2009,  the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the
3 4

Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11
of R.A. No. 6713,  allegedly committed as follows:
5

That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILODUNCANO y
ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an obligation to accomplish and
submit declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth and financial and business
interests, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and
business interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which
he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle
registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to
the damage and prejudice of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest  before respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the OSP alleged, he
7

admitted that he is a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. Citing Inding v. Sandiganbayan  and
8

Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,  he asserted that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as
9

amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249,  the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and
10

hear the case because he is an official of the executive branch occupying the position of a
Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade 27.

In its Opposition,  the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the subject law
11

would clearly show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials
of the executive branch other than the Regional Director and those specifically enumerated. This
is so since the term "Regional Director" and "higher" are separated by the conjunction "and,"
which signifies that these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but are conjoined
together "relating one to the other" to give effect to the purpose of the law. The fact that the
position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade
signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position, regardless of salary
grade, fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is
claimed, was already resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP contended that the filing of the motion
to dismiss is premature considering that the Sandiganbayan has yet to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the accused.

Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan  and 12

Organo v. Sandiganbayan  in his rejoinder.

13

On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution, disposing:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the instant Motion to
Dismiss for being devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of Arrest be therefore issued against the
accused.

SO ORDERED. 14

The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions
where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was
opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides that respondent court has
jurisdiction over officials of the executive branch of the government occupying the position of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No.
6758, including those officials who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In
support of the ruling, this Court’s pronouncements in Indingand Binay v. Sandiganbayan  were 15

cited.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied;  Hence, this petition.
16

Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court
required respondents to file a comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course
thereto.  Upon compliance of the OSP, a Rejoinder (supposedly a Reply) was filed by petitioner.
17

At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27
and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Arguing that he is not included among the public officials specifically
enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the law and heavily relying as well on Cuyco,
petitioner insists that respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional
Director with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the OSP maintains that a Regional Director,
irrespective of salary grade, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
We find merit in the petition.

The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution.  By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to
18

Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued P.D. No. 1486.  The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606,  Section 20 of Batas
19 20

Pambansa Blg. 129,  P.D. No. 1860,  and P.D. No. 1861.
21 22 23

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section
4, Article XI thereof.  Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14  and 14-a,  and R.A. 7080,  which
24 25 26 27

expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No.
7975,  R.A. No. 8249,  and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.
28 29 30

For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,

and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

"B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

"C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.

x x x"

Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
are: (1) officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials
specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades.  While the
31

first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and
higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be
of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 32
That the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher" qualifies "regional director and
higher" is apparent from the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos.
1353and 844, which eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249, respectively:

As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over the
cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27
and higher by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore,
refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the Sandiganbayan.  (Emphasis 33

supplied)

To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to
concentrate on the "larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became
effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets of
that court, to wit:

It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at
Grade "26" or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade
"27" or higher and over other specific public officials holding important positions in government
regardless of salary grade; x x x  (Emphasis supplied)
34

The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to big-time
cases involving the so-called "big fishes" in the government rather than those accused who are of
limited means who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called "small fry," which, in turn, helps the
court decongest its dockets. 35

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law.  In this 36

category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.  The specific inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification
37

relating to "officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989."  As ruled in Inding:
38

Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is
occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly
interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a position lower
than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to
(g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g),
regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public
officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts "where none of the
principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher." By this
construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory
construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should
adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis
valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the
statute – its every word.39

Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,  a department
40

manager of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth),  a student regent of the
41

University of the Philippines,  and a Head of the Legal Department and Chief of the
42

Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice-Presidents and Assistant Vice-President of the

Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)  fall 43

within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any
position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is,
in fact, on all fours with Cuyco.  Therein, the accused was the Regional Director of the Land
1avvphi1

Transportation Office, Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of the crime
in 1992, his position was classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.  It was opined: Petitioner
44

contends that at the time of the commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying the position
of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with the Regional Trial
Court.

We sustain petitioner's contention.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of
regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of
Director II with Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from
office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.
45

In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC – Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the
BIR shows that, although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as
Director II with Salary Grade 26.46

There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that
respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Records disclose
that when a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court, petitioner voluntarily surrendered
and posted a cash bond on September 17, 2009.Also, he was arraigned on April 14, 2010,prior to
the filing of the petition on April 30, 2010.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
August 18, 2009 Resolution and February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division,
which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175723               February 4, 2014

THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS. LIBERTY
M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR
APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.;
WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS
MARKETING CORPORATION and SIGNATURE LINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Resolutions  dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the
1

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87948.

The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo,
assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against private
respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc.,
Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines
Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from
private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila
(RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect
under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition
for the issuance of their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the
₱19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City] the
complaint denominated as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected
Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"

which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before public respondent's sala [at Branch
112]. In the amended complaint they filed on February 16, 2004, private respondents alleged
that, in relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were
violative of the limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic Act. No. 7160 [Local
Government Code] on double taxation. They further averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No.
8011 which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and
unconstitutional by the Department of Justice. 2

In its Order  dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of
3

preliminary injunction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration  but the RTC denied it in its Order  dated October
4 5

15, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the July 9, 2004 and
October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC. 6

In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari
holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is
vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic
Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated
7

November 29, 2006.

Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:

I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction.

II- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in enjoining by issuing a Writ of Injunction the
petitioners, their agents and/or authorized representatives from implementing Section 21
of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as amended, against private respondents.

III- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction despite failure
of private respondents to make a written claim for tax credit or refund with the City
Treasurer of Manila.

IV- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that under Section 21 of the Manila
Revenue Code, as amended, they are mere collecting agents of the City Government.

V- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction because
petitioner City of Manila and its constituents would result to greater damage and prejudice
thereof. (sic)
8

Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the instant petition should be denied
for being moot and academic.

Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court discovered that a Decision  in 9

the main case had already been rendered by the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders JUDGMENT in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant to grant a tax refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to
Section 21 of the Revenue Code of the City of Manila as amended for the year 2002 in the
following amounts:

To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc. - P 11,462,525.02

To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc. - 3,118,104.63

To plaintiff Star Appliances Center - 2,152,316.54

 To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc. - 1,362,750.34

To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc. - 419,689.04

To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care Health - 231,453.62

Stores Phils., Inc.

To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp. - 140,908.54

To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp. - 220,204.70

To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp. - 94,906.34

TOTAL: - P 19,316,458.77

Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila
from herein plaintiff.

SO ORDERED. 10

The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above Decision had already
become final and executory per the Certificate of Finality  issued by the same trial court on
11

October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution  was issued by the RTC on November 25, 2009. In
12

view of the foregoing, it clearly appears that the issues raised in the present petition, which
merely involve the incident on the preliminary injunction issued by the RTC, have already become
moot and academic considering that the trial court, in its decision on the merits in the main case,
has already ruled in favor of respondents and that the same decision is now final and executory.
Well entrenched is the rule that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value. 13

In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on jurisdiction raised by petitioners
owing to its significance and for future guidance of both bench and bar. It is a settled principle
that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review. 14

However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to
likewise address a procedural error which petitioners committed.

Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which
dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such
dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final
order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed
judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the
instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is
a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 15

Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost
16

appeal.17
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest
of substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review
on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period
within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and
(3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.  Considering that the
18

present petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of
the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat
the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.

Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central issue in this case. The basic
question posed before this Court is whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil
action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA 1125) creating the CTA and
giving to the said court jurisdiction over the following:

(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed

assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed
in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or
other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs
duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or release of property affected
fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising
under the Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of
Customs; and

(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases involving the
assessment and taxation of real property or other matters arising under the Assessment
Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto.

On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending
RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its
rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the amendatory
act provides thus:

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:

a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed

assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other
laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed

assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or
other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal
Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be
deemed a denial;
 3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;

4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs

duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected,
fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;

5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally
decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;

6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically

for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the
Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;

7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural

product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural
product, commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section
301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures
under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or
not to impose said duties.

b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the
National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, That
offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and
fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the
regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any provision of law or
the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at
all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding
by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the
filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately
from the criminal action will be recognized.

2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:

a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax
cases originally decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.

b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in
the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective
jurisdiction.

c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory
assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provides, however, that collection
cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties,
claimed is less than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper
Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
 2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:

a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax
collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.

b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in
the Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their
respective jurisdiction. 19

A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is clearly stated that the CTA has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282,
which provides that th e CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory
orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it.

The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of
original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot
be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.  Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v.
20

COMELEC,  Garcia v. De Jesus,  Veloria v. COMELEC,  Department of Agrarian Reform

21 22 23

Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,  and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,  this Court has ruled against the
24 25

jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law
which expressly gives these tribunals such power.  It must be observed, however, that with the
26

exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,  these rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals
27

exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No.
8249  now provides that the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions
28

for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and
other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
(BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to
issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to
Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the
CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and
that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of
the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order
in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the
CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these
cases.

Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must
have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction
over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to
transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate
jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial,
not total.

Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case of J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al.  that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or
29

judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."  This principle was affirmed in
30

De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,  where the Court stated that "a court may issue a writ of certiorari
31

in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error,
the final orders or decisions of the lower court."  The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were
32

reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo  and Bulilis v. Nuez.
33 34

Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law,
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.

If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies
with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the
CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely the split-jurisdiction
situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice.  The Court cannot accept that
35

such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA,
the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review
over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the
Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents'
complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the
same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an
appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.

Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to
split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax
case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from
the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal
soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in
and decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in
aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ
of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its
appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to
have complete supervision over the acts of the latter. 36

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise
it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to
the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to
make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper
exercise of that jurisdiction.  For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the
1âwphi1

performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in
cases pending before it. 37

Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular
jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the
court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of
its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and
shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general
grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are
such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are
essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration
of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted
powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf
of the litigants.
38

Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers
necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive
legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and,
subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power
to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of
its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates."  Hence, demands,
39

matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming
within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such
jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be
called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within
its cognizance.40

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the
CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the
RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi-
judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their
appellate jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action
for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in a local tax case.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the November 2, 2010 Decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108441 which dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction the Petition for Certiorari of petitioner CE Casecnan Water and Energy
Company, Inc. (petitioner) against the Province of Nueva Ecija, the Office of the
Provincial Assessor of Nueva Ecija (Office of the Provincial Assessor) and the Office of
the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Ecija (Office of the Provincial Treasurer)
(respondents). Also assailed is the March 24, 2011 Resolution 3 of the CA denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 4

Factual Antecedents

On June 26, 1995, petitioner and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) entered
into a build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract known as the "Amended and Restated
Casecnan Project Agreement"5 (Casecnan Contract) relative to the construction and
development of the Casecnan Multi-Purpose Irrigation and Power Project (Casecnan
Project) in Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija and Alfonso Castaneda, Nueva Vizcaya. The
Casecnan Project is a combined irrigation and hydroelectric power generation facility
using the Pantabangan Dam in Nueva Ecija.

On September 29, 2003, petitioner and NIA executed a Supplemental

Agreement6 amending Article II of the Casecnan Contract which pertains to payment
of taxes. Article 2.2 thereof states that NIA must reimburse petitioner for real
property taxes (RPT) provided the same was paid upon NIA's directive and with the
concurrence of the Department of Finance.

On September 6, 2005, petitioner received from the Office of the Provincial Assessor
a Notice of Assessment of Real Property dated August 2, 2005, which indicates that
for the years 2002 to 2005, its RPT due was P248,676,349.60. Petitioner assailed the
assessment with the Nueva Ecija Local Board of Assessment Appeals (Nueva Ecija
LBAA) which dismissed it on January 26, 2006. Undeterred, petitioner filed a Notice
of Appeal with the Nueva Ecija Central Board of Assessment Appeals (Nueva Ecija
CBAA). During the pendency thereof, respondents collected from petitioner the RPT
due under the said assessment as well as those pertaining to the years 2006 up to
the second quarter of 2008, totalling P363,703,606.88. Petitioner paid the assessed
RPT under protest; it also initiated proceedings questioning the validity of the
collection with respect to the years 2006 up to the second quarter of 2008.
Thereafter, petitioner received a letter7 dated July 9, 2008 from the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer stating that it has RPT in arrears for the years 2002 up to the
second quarter of 2008 amounting to P1,277,474,342.10. Petitioner received another
letter8 dated August 29, 2008 from the same office clarifying that its arrearages in
RPT actually amounted to P1,279,997,722.70 (2008 RPT Reassessment). Again,
petitioner questioned this assessment through an appeal before the Nueva Ecija
LBAA. While the same was pending, petitioner received from respondents a letter
dated September 10, 2008 demanding payment for its alleged RPT arrearages.

Hence, on September 23, 2008, petitioner filed with the RTC of San Jose City, Nueva
Ecija a Complaint9 for injunction and damages with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction 10 praying to restrain the collection
of the 2008 RPT Reassessment. Petitioner emphasized, among others, that it was not
the one which should pay the taxes but NIA.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 24, 2008, the RTC denied petitioner's application for a 72-hour TRO. 11

Meanwhile, petitioner received from the Office of the Provincial Treasurer a letter
dated September 22, 2008 further demanding payment for RPT covering the third
quarter of 2008 (2008-3Q Assessment). Thus, petitioner filed on September 29,
2008 an Amended Complaint12 asking the RTC to likewise enjoin respondents from
collecting RPT based on the 2008-3 Q Assessment in the amount of P53,346,755.18.

On October 2, 2008, the RTC issued a 20-day TRO 13 enjoining respondents from
collecting from petitioner the RPT covered by the 2008 RPT Reassessment amounting
to P1,279,997,722.70, including surcharges and penalties.

Subsequently, however, the RTC denied petitioner's application for writ of

preliminary injunction in its Order 14 of October 24, 2008. It also denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration thereof in an Order 15 dated January 30, 2009.

On April 24, 2009, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari16 under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the aforementioned October 24,
2008 and January 30,2009 RTC Orders.

Riding of the Court of Appeals

In its November 2, 2010 Decision, 17 the CA observed that the Petition

for Certiorari before it was actually an offshoot of the 2008 RPT Reassessment. And
since in resolving the issue of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the issue of the
validity of the assessment and the collection of the RPT against petitioner must also
be resolved, thus jurisdiction over the case lies within the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA). Hence, the CA ruled: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DENIED DUE

COURSE and accordingly, DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.18 cralawlawlibrary

Petitioner sought reconsideration; however, it was denied in a Resolution 19 dated

March 24, 2011.

Undaunted, petitioner filed this Petition imputing upon the CA grave error in: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxx ruling that it is the Court of Tax Appeals (and not the Court of Appeals) which
has jurisdiction over the CA Injunction Case.20 cralawlawlibrary

Petitioner's Arguments

In its Petition21 and Reply22, petitioner argues that it is the CA, not the CTA, which
has jurisdiction over the subject matter of its Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner
maintains that its petition relates to an ordinary civil action for injunction and not to
a local tax case. It insists that in both the RTC injunction case and the Petition
for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner was not protesting respondents' assessment
of RPT against it; what it was seeking was respondents' enjoinment from committing
or continuing to commit acts that would probably violate its right. In particular,
petitioner points out that the RTC injunction case was intended to enjoin respondents
from collecting payment during the pendency of the case with the LBAA challenging
the validity of the 2008 RPT Reassessment. Petitioner explains that the said
injunction case was filed with the RTC because the LBAA has no injunctive power.

Respondents' Arguments

In their Comment,23 respondents argue that in resolving the issue on the propriety of

issuing a writ of injunction, the CA will have to inevitably pass upon the propriety of
the assessment of RPT on the Casecnan Project, a local tax matter which is within
the jurisdiction of the CTA. Respondents also echo the CA pronouncement that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to the assessment
and collection of RPT.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Our Ruling

There is no merit in the Petition.

It is the CTA which has the power to rule on a Petition for  Certiorari  assailing an
interlocutory order of the RTC relating to a local tax case.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act on any controversy.
It is conferred by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court. As such, if a
court lacks jurisdiction over an action, it cannot decide the case on the merits and
must dismiss it.24

With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that
of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No.
9282.25 This expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTC in
local tax cases originally decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original
or appellate jurisdiction.26

In the recent case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,27 the Court ruled that the CTA
likewise has the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari or to determine whether there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the CTA's
exclusive appellate jurisdiction, thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with
respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides,
nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly

interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in
cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It,
thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari in these cases.28 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
Further, the Court in City of Manila, citing J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo,29De
Jesus v. Court of Appeals,30 as well as the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Hon.
Judge Geronimo31 and Bulilis v. Nuez32 held that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case
of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that 'if a case may be appealed to a
particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or
body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.' This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,
where the Court stated that 'a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of
error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.' The rulings in J.M. Tuason and
De Jesus were reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo and
Bulilis v. Nuez.

Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when
by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
such court or officer.33 (Citations omitted)
Anent petitioner's contention that it is the CA which has jurisdiction over
a certiorari petition assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax
case, the Court had this to say: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over

their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise
by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same
subject matter - precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the
orderly administration of justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the
legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on
the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff
matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of
any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the
ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint
for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed
with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one
court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in
the very same case.

xxxx

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power

necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject
of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries
with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court
thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to
control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper
exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or
restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of
its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it. 34 (Citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)
Given these, it is settled that it is the CTA which has exclusive jurisdiction over a
special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in
a local tax case.

The RTC injunction case is a local tax case.

In maintaining that it is the CA that has jurisdiction over

petitioner's certiorari petition, the latter argues that the injunction case it filed with
the RTC is not a local tax case but an ordinary civil action. It insists that it is not
protesting the assessment of RPT against it but only prays that respondents be
enjoined from collecting the same.

The Court finds, however, that in praying to restrain the collection of RPT, petitioner
also implicitly questions the propriety of the assessment of such RPT. This is because
in ruling as to whether to restrain the collection, the RTC must first necessarily rule
on the propriety of the assessment. In other words, in filing an action for injunction
to restrain collection, petitioner was in effect also challenging the validity of the RPT
assessment. As aptly discussed by the CA: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxx [T]he original action filed with the RTC is one for Injunction, with an application
for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the
province of Nueva Ecija from further collecting the alleged real property tax liability
assessed against it. Simply because the action is an application for irvjunctive relief
does not necessarily mean that it may no longer be considered as a local tax case.
The subject matter and the issues, not the name or designation of the remedy,
should control. While an ancillary action for injunction may not be a main case, the
court [still has] to determine, even in a preliminary matter, the applicable tax laws,
rules and jurisprudence, x x x35 cralawlawlibrary

Moreover, in National Power Corporation v. Municipal Government of Navotas,36 as

well as in City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority,37 this Court
already held that local tax cases include RPT.

No doubt, the injunction case before the RTC is a local tax case. And as earlier
discussed, a certiorari petition questioning an interlocutory order issued in a local tax
case falls under the jurisdiction of the CTA. Thus, the CA correctly dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari before it for lack of jurisdiction. cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The November 2, 2010 Decision and March

24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108441
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. chan