Malice and Want of Probable Cause As Element or Factor of Action For False Impri

Malice and want of probable cause as element or factor..., 137 A.L.R. 504...
137 A.L.R. 504 (Originally published in 1942)
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ALR
L. S. T.
Malice and want of probable cause as element or factor of action for false imprisonment
[Cumulative Supplement]
The reported case for this annotation is Teel v. May Department Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696, 155 S.W.2d 74, 137 A.L.R. 495 (1941).
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules
ARTICLE OUTLINE
Research References
Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules
Canada
Croft v. Dunphy (1932) 4 MPR (NS) 438, [1932] 1 DLR 749 — Text
De Clerq v. Gravel (1933) Rap Jud Quebec 71 — Text
Supreme Court
Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 44 S. Ct. 52, 68 L. Ed. 146 (1923) — Text
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967) — Supp
First Circuit
Abreu-Guzman v. Ford, 69 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.P.R. 1999) — Supp
Belsito Communications, Inc. v. Decker, 845 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2016) — Supp
Cocroft v. Smith, 95 F. Supp. 3d 119 (D. Mass. 2015) — Supp
Deodatti Colon v. Rosado Rivera, 846 F. Supp. 156 (D.P.R. 1993) — Supp
Farrelly v. City of Concord, N.H., 902 F. Supp. 2d 178, 2012 DNH 166 (D.N.H. 2012) — Supp
Finucane v. Town of Belchertown, 808 F. Supp. 906 (D. Mass. 1992) — Supp
Goddard v. Kelley, 629 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. Mass. 2009) — Supp
Kay v. New Hampshire Democratic Party, 821 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1987) — Supp
Kennedy v. Town Of Billerica, 617 F.3d 520 (1st Cir. 2010) — Supp
Lewry v. Town of Standish, 984 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1993) — Supp
Opalenik v. LaBrie, 945 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Mass. 2013) — Supp
Prall v. City of Boston, 985 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. Mass. 2013) — Supp
Robinson v. Cook, 706 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2013) — Supp
Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1989) — Supp
© 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

Sayan-Resto v. Berrios, 933 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D.P.R. 2013) — Supp

Thompson v. Olson, 798 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1986) — Supp
Titus v. Town of Nantucket, 840 F. Supp. 2d 404 (D. Mass. 2011) — Supp
Turkowitz v. Town of Provincetown, 914 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 2012) — Supp
Young v. Brown University ex rel. Paxson, 63 F. Supp. 3d 198, 317 Ed. Law Rep. 649 (D.R.I. 2014) — Supp
Second Circuit
Adams v. City of New York, 226 F. Supp. 3d 261 (S.D. N.Y. 2016) — Supp
Adams v. City of New York, 993 F. Supp. 2d 306, 93 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 700 (E.D. N.Y. 2014) — Supp
Ahern v. City of Syracuse, 411 F. Supp. 2d 132 (N.D. N.Y. 2006) — Supp
Alexiadis v. New York College of Health Professions, 891 F. Supp. 2d 418, 289 Ed. Law Rep. 755 (E.D. N.Y. 2012) — Supp
Alhovsky v. Ryan, 658 F. Supp. 2d 526 (S.D. N.Y. 2009) — Supp
Alla v. Verkay, 979 F. Supp. 2d 349 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Alvarez v. County of Orange, N.Y., 95 F. Supp. 3d 385 (S.D. N.Y. 2015) — Supp
Ambrose v. City of New York, 623 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D. N.Y. 2009) — Supp
Anderson v. City of New York, 817 F. Supp. 2d 77 (E.D. N.Y. 2011) — Supp
Angevin v. City of New York, 204 F. Supp. 3d 469 (E.D. N.Y. 2016) — Supp
Bernard v. U.S., 25 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1994) — Supp
Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2014) — Supp
Biswas v. City of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 504, 303 Ed. Law Rep. 231 (S.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Blythe v. City of New York, 963 F. Supp. 2d 158, 301 Ed. Law Rep. 750 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Bordeau v. Village of Deposit, 113 F. Supp. 2d 292 (N.D. N.Y. 2000) — Supp
Bowers v. U.S., 931 F. Supp. 2d 358 (D. Conn. 2013) — Supp
Breitbard v. Mitchell, 390 F. Supp. 2d 237 (E.D. N.Y. 2005) — Supp
Brenner v. Heavener, 492 F. Supp. 2d 399 (S.D. N.Y. 2007) — Supp
Broadaway v. City of New York, 601 F. Supp. 624 (S.D. N.Y. 1985) — Supp
Bryant v. Crowe, 697 F. Supp. 2d 482 (S.D. N.Y. 2010) — Supp
Burbar v. Incorporated Village of Garden City, 961 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Butts v. Carey, 706 F. Supp. 158 (D. Conn. 1988) — Supp
Campanaro v. City of Rome, 999 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. N.Y. 1998) — Supp
Carpenter v. City of New York, 984 F. Supp. 2d 255 (S.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Carson v. Lewis, 35 F. Supp. 2d 250, 51 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 537 (E.D. N.Y. 1999) — Supp
Castro v. County of Nassau, 739 F. Supp. 2d 153, 264 Ed. Law Rep. 133 (E.D. N.Y. 2010) — Supp
Collom v. Incorporated Village of Freeport, N.Y., 691 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. N.Y. 1988) — Supp
Cooper v. City of New Rochelle, 925 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Corsini v. Bloomberg, 26 F. Supp. 3d 230 (S.D. N.Y. 2014) — Supp
Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999) — Supp
Coward v. Town and Village of Harrison, 665 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D. N.Y. 2009) — Supp
Craig v. Krzeminski, 764 F. Supp. 248 (D. Conn. 1991) — Supp
Crews v. County of Nassau, 996 F. Supp. 2d 186 (E.D. N.Y. 2014) — Supp
Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2016) — Supp
D'Angelo-Fenton v. Town of Carmel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 387 (S.D. N.Y. 2007) — Supp
Decker v. Fish, 126 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D. Vt. 2000) — Supp
Devereaux, In re, 7 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. N.Y. 1934) — Text
D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52 (S.D. N.Y. 2018) — Supp
Diop v. City of New York, 50 F. Supp. 3d 411 (S.D. N.Y. 2014) — Supp
Dukes v. City of New York, 879 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. N.Y. 1995) — Supp
Elk v. Townson, 839 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. N.Y. 1993) — Supp
Esperanza v. City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d 288 (E.D. N.Y. 2018) — Supp
Fifield v. Barrancotta, 353 Fed. Appx. 479 (2d Cir. 2009) — Supp

Fincher v. County of Westchester, 979 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) — Supp
Finigan v. Marshall, 574 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2009) — Supp
5 Borough Pawn, LLC. v. Marti, 753 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D. N.Y. 2010) — Supp
5 Borough Pawn, LLC v. City of New York, 640 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S.D. N.Y. 2009) — Supp
Folk v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 3d 363 (E.D. N.Y. 2017) — Supp
Frederique v. County of Nassau, 168 F. Supp. 3d 455 (E.D. N.Y. 2016) — Supp
Garcia v. Bloomberg, 865 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D. N.Y. 2012) — Supp
Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2015) — Supp
Garcia v. Does, 764 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014) — Supp
Gaston v. City of New York, 851 F. Supp. 2d 780 (S.D. N.Y. 2012) — Supp
Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2013) — Supp
Gonzalez v. Waterbury Police Dept., 199 F. Supp. 3d 616 (D. Conn. 2016) — Supp
Graebe v. Falcetta, 726 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. N.Y. 1989) — Supp
Grant v. City of New York, 848 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. N.Y. 1994) — Supp
Harewood v. Braithwaite, 64 F. Supp. 3d 384 (E.D. N.Y. 2014) — Supp
Harris v. City of New York, 222 F. Supp. 3d 341 (S.D. N.Y. 2016) — Supp
Haussman v. Fergus, 894 F. Supp. 142 (S.D. N.Y. 1995) — Supp
Hayes v. County of Sullivan, 853 F. Supp. 2d 400 (S.D. N.Y. 2012) — Supp
Heard v. City of New York, 319 F. Supp. 3d 687 (S.D. N.Y. 2018) — Supp
Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2019) — Supp
Hogan v. County of Lewis, N.Y., 929 F. Supp. 2d 130 (N.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Holley v. County of Orange, NY, 625 F. Supp. 2d 131 (S.D. N.Y. 2009) — Supp
Hyatt v. U.S., 968 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. N.Y. 1997) — Supp
Jackson v. City of New York, 939 F. Supp. 2d 235 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Jackson v. Tellado, 295 F. Supp. 3d 164 (E.D. N.Y. 2018) — Supp
Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2007) — Supp
Jocks v. Tavernier, 97 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D. N.Y. 2000) — Supp
Johnson v. Burns, 252 F. Supp. 3d 353 (S.D. N.Y. 2017) — Supp
Johnson v. Ford, 496 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D. Conn. 2007) — Supp
Johnston v. Town of Greece, 983 F. Supp. 348 (W.D. N.Y. 1997) — Supp
Jones v. J.C. Penny's Dept. Stores Inc., 317 Fed. Appx. 71 (2d Cir. 2009) — Supp
Justice v. Kuhnapfel, 985 F. Supp. 2d 334 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Kanderskaya v. City of New York, 11 F. Supp. 3d 431 (S.D. N.Y. 2014) — Supp
Kilburn v. Village of Saranac Lake, 413 Fed. Appx. 362 (2d Cir. 2011) — Supp
Krug v. County of Rennselaer, 559 F. Supp. 2d 223 (N.D. N.Y. 2008) — Supp
Labensky v. County of Nassau, 6 F. Supp. 2d 161 (E.D. N.Y. 1998) — Supp
Larocque v. Dorsey, 299 F. 556 (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1924) — Text
Levy v. City of New York, 935 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Lewis v. City of New York, 18 F. Supp. 3d 229 (E.D. N.Y. 2014) — Supp
Lo Sacco v. City of Middletown, 745 F. Supp. 812 (D. Conn. 1990) — Supp
Lozada v. Weilminster, 92 F. Supp. 3d 76 (E.D. N.Y. 2015) — Supp
Marchand v. Hartman, 395 F. Supp. 3d 202 (D. Conn. 2019) — Supp
Marshall v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1996) — Supp
Martinetti v. Town of New Hartford Police Dept., 112 F. Supp. 2d 251 (N.D. N.Y. 2000) — Supp
Mason v. Town of New Paltz Police Dept., 103 F. Supp. 2d 562 (N.D. N.Y. 2000) — Supp
Mazzone v. Town of Southampton, 283 F. Supp. 3d 38 (E.D. N.Y. 2017) — Supp
Mejia v. City of New York, 119 F. Supp. 2d 232 (E.D. N.Y. 2000) — Supp
Mendoza v. City of Rome, N.Y., 872 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. N.Y. 1994) — Supp
Mihalick v. Cavanaugh, 26 F. Supp. 2d 391 (D. Conn. 1998) — Supp

Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F. Supp. 2d 128 (E.D. N.Y. 1998) — Supp

Morgan v. County of Nassau, 720 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. N.Y. 2010) — Supp
Morris v. Silvestre, 604 Fed. Appx. 22 (2d Cir. 2015) — Supp
Morrison v. Lefevre, 592 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D. N.Y. 1984) — Supp
Newton v. City of New York, 640 F. Supp. 2d 426 (S.D. N.Y. 2009) — Supp
Norwood v. Mason, 524 Fed. Appx. 762 (2d Cir. 2013) — Supp
Odom v. Matteo, 772 F. Supp. 2d 377 (D. Conn. 2011) — Supp
Oliver v. Cuttler, 968 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. N.Y. 1997) — Supp
Ostroski v. Town of Southold, 443 F. Supp. 2d 325 (E.D. N.Y. 2006) — Supp
Otero v. Jennings, 698 F. Supp. 42 (S.D. N.Y. 1988) — Supp
Ozga v. Elliot, 150 F. Supp. 3d 178 (D. Conn. 2015) — Supp
Pace v. Town of Southampton, 678 F. Supp. 2d 79 (E.D. N.Y. 2010) — Supp
Pacicca v. Stead, 456 Fed. Appx. 9 (2d Cir. 2011) — Supp
Parker v. Hearn, 695 F. Supp. 1421 (E.D. N.Y. 1988) — Supp
Paulin v. Figlia, 916 F. Supp. 2d 524 (S.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Pawlicki v. City of Ithaca, 993 F. Supp. 140 (N.D. N.Y. 1998) — Supp
Peruta v. Town of Rocky Hill, 640 F. Supp. 2d 186 (D. Conn. 2009) — Supp
Peterson v. County of Nassau, 995 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. N.Y. 1998) — Supp
Pinter v. City of New York, 976 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Pittman v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 49 F. Supp. 3d 307 (E.D. N.Y. 2014) — Supp
Plumlee v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 1 La. App. 702, 1925 WL 3275 (2d Cir. 1925) — Text
Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 207, 180 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 1999) — Supp
Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1991) — Supp
Powell v. Murphy, 972 F. Supp. 2d 335 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Presnick v. Delaney, 110 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Conn. 1999) — Supp
Rarick v. DeFrancesco, 94 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D. N.Y. 2000) — Supp
Raysor v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 768 F.2d 34, 19 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 211 (2d Cir. 1985) — Supp
Riegel v. Hygrade Seed Co., 47 F. Supp. 290 (W.D. N.Y. 1942) — Supp
Rivera v. City of Yonkers, 470 F. Supp. 2d 402 (S.D. N.Y. 2007) — Supp
Rivers v. O'Brien, 83 F. Supp. 2d 328 (N.D. N.Y. 2000) — Supp
Rodriguez v. City of New York, 291 F. Supp. 3d 396 (S.D. N.Y. 2018) — Supp
Rodriguez v. Wolbach, 499 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D. N.Y. 2007) — Supp
Rosario v. Amalgamated Ladies' Garment Cutters' Union, Local 10, I.L.G.W.U., 605 F.2d 1228, 5 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 113 (2d
Cir. 1979) — Supp
Sanseviro v. New York, 158 F. Supp. 3d 131 (E.D. N.Y. 2016) — Supp
Santos v. New York City, 847 F. Supp. 2d 573 (S.D. N.Y. 2012) — Supp
Scanlon v. Flynn, 465 F. Supp. 32 (S.D. N.Y. 1978) — Supp
Schnitter v. City of Rochester, 931 F. Supp. 2d 469 (W.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Searles v. Pompilio, 652 F. Supp. 2d 432 (S.D. N.Y. 2009) — Supp
Seifert v. Rivera, 933 F. Supp. 2d 307 (D. Conn. 2013) — Supp
Selvaggio v. Patterson, 93 F. Supp. 3d 54 (E.D. N.Y. 2015) — Supp
Shaheed v. City of New York, 287 F. Supp. 3d 438 (S.D. N.Y. 2018) — Supp
Sharnick v. D'Archangelo, 935 F. Supp. 2d 436 (D. Conn. 2013) — Supp
Simpson v. City of New York, 793 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 2015) — Supp
Simuro v. Shedd, 176 F. Supp. 3d 358 (D. Vt. 2016) — Supp
Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1995) — Supp
Soto v. City of New York, 132 F. Supp. 3d 424 (E.D. N.Y. 2015) — Supp
Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2013) — Supp
Stone, In re, 278 F. 566 (N.D. N.Y. 1922) — Text

Strong v. Montava, 64 F. Supp. 2d 101 (E.D. N.Y. 1999) — Supp

Swindell v. New York State Dept. of Environmental Conservation, 371 F. Supp. 2d 172 (N.D. N.Y. 2005) — Supp
Thomas v. Culberg, 741 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. N.Y. 1990) — Supp
Thomas v. Kelly, 903 F. Supp. 2d 237 (S.D. N.Y. 2012) — Supp
Thompson v. City of New York, 603 F. Supp. 2d 650 (S.D. N.Y. 2009) — Supp
Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999) — Supp
Tretola v. County of Nassau, 14 F. Supp. 3d 58 (E.D. N.Y. 2014) — Supp
Tucker v. Gross, 39 F. Supp. 2d 244 (E.D. N.Y. 1999) — Supp
Unger v. Cohen, 718 F. Supp. 185 (S.D. N.Y. 1989) — Supp
Waddlington v. City of New York, 971 F. Supp. 2d 286 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) — Supp
Waldron v. Milana, 541 Fed. Appx. 5 (2d Cir. 2013) — Supp
Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1996) — Supp
White v. Martel-Moylan, 586 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D. Conn. 2008) — Supp
Williams v. City of Mount Vernon, 428 F. Supp. 2d 146 (S.D. N.Y. 2006) — Supp
Williams v. City of New York, 916 F. Supp. 2d 235 (E.D. N.Y. 2012) — Supp
Williams v. Savory, 87 F. Supp. 3d 437 (S.D. N.Y. 2015) — Supp
Wong v. Yoo, 649 F. Supp. 2d 34 (E.D. N.Y. 2009) — Supp
Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F. Supp. 3d 578 (E.D. N.Y. 2017) — Supp
Zainc v. City of Waterbury, 603 F. Supp. 2d 368 (D. Conn. 2009) — Supp
Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2013) — Supp
Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 838 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D. Conn. 2012) — Supp
Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1985) — Supp
Third Circuit
Adams v. Selhorst, 779 F. Supp. 2d 378 (D. Del. 2011) — Supp
Aksanov v. Harrah's Casino Hotel Atlantic City, 109 F. Supp. 3d 709 (D.N.J. 2015) — Supp
American Ry Exp Co v. McDermott, 44 F.2d 955 (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1930) — Text
Boykin v. Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, 893 F. Supp. 378, 102 Ed. Law Rep. 981 (M.D. Pa. 1995) — Supp
Broadwater v. Fow, 945 F. Supp. 2d 574 (M.D. Pa. 2013) — Supp
Clark v. Conahan, 737 F. Supp. 2d 239 (M.D. Pa. 2010) — Supp
Clarke v. Bruckner, 19 V.I. 74, 93 F.R.D. 666, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 305 (D.V.I. 1982) — Supp
Clouser v. Johnson, 40 F. Supp. 3d 425 (M.D. Pa. 2014) — Supp
Crouse v. South Lebanon Tp., 668 F. Supp. 2d 664 (M.D. Pa. 2009) — Supp
Dempsey v. Bucknell University, 834 F.3d 457, 335 Ed. Law Rep. 557 (3d Cir. 2016) — Supp
Diaz v. Bullock, 268 F. Supp. 3d 640 (D.N.J. 2017) — Supp
Dull v. West Manchester Tp. Police Dept., 604 F. Supp. 2d 739 (M.D. Pa. 2009) — Supp
Gilbert v. Feld, 842 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Pa. 1993) — Supp
Green v. City of Paterson, 971 F. Supp. 891 (D.N.J. 1997) — Supp
Heine v. Connelly, 644 F. Supp. 1508 (D. Del. 1986) — Supp
Kelly v. Jones, 148 F. Supp. 3d 395 (E.D. Pa. 2015) — Supp
Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F. Supp. 2d 581 (M.D. Pa. 2008) — Supp
Lincoln v. Hanshaw, 375 Fed. Appx. 185 (3d Cir. 2010) — Supp
Meketa v. Kamoie, 955 F. Supp. 2d 345 (M.D. Pa. 2013) — Supp
Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 3d 208 (D.N.J. 2015) — Supp
Palma v. Atlantic County, 53 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D.N.J. 1999) — Supp
Rosembert v. Borough of East Lansdowne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 631 (E.D. Pa. 2014) — Supp
Roth v. Golden Nugget Casino/Hotel, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 262 (D.N.J. 1983) — Supp
Russoli v. Salisbury Tp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Pa. 2000) — Supp
Stewart v. Moll, 717 F. Supp. 2d 454 (E.D. Pa. 2010) — Supp
Woodyard v. County of Essex, 514 Fed. Appx. 177 (3d Cir. 2013) — Supp

Fourth Circuit
Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1987) — Supp
Garcia v. Montgomery County, Maryland, 145 F. Supp. 3d 492 (D. Md. 2015) — Supp
Goines v. Valley Community Services Bd., 103 F. Supp. 3d 791 (W.D. Va. 2015) — Supp
Harrison v. Prince William County Police Dept., 640 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. Va. 2009) — Supp
Jackson v. Brickey, 771 F. Supp. 2d 593 (W.D. Va. 2011) — Supp
Kenny v. Warden, Richmond City Jail, 476 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Va. 1979) — Supp
Majors v. U.S. Air, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 853 (D. Md. 1981) — Supp
McPhearson v. Anderson, 873 F. Supp. 2d 753 (E.D. Va. 2012) — Supp
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Freeman, 199 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1952) — Supp
Reaves v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 683 F. Supp. 521 (D. Md. 1988) — Supp
Robinson v. Goff, 517 F. Supp. 350 (W.D. Va. 1981) — Supp
Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 1994) — Supp
Simons v. Montgomery County Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1985) — Supp
Wilkerson v. Hester, 114 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. N.C. 2000) — Supp
Willis v. Blevins, 966 F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. Va. 2013) — Supp
Zimbelman v. Savage, 745 F. Supp. 2d 664 (D.S.C. 2010) — Supp
Fifth Circuit
Adams v. City of Shreveport, 269 F. Supp. 3d 743 (W.D. La. 2017) — Supp
Buehler v. City of Austin/Austin Police Department, 824 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2016) — Supp
Burnaman v. J. C. Penney Co., 181 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Tex. 1960) — Supp
Clark v. Heard, 538 F. Supp. 800 (S.D. Tex. 1982) — Supp
Cole v. Carson, 802 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2015) — Supp
Crostley v. Lamar County, Texas, 717 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2013) — Supp
Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980) — Supp
Duboue v. City of New Orleans, 909 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1990) — Supp
Garza v. U.S., 881 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D. Tex. 1995) — Supp
Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1995) — Supp
Goldman v. Williams, 101 F. Supp. 3d 620 (S.D. Tex. 2015) — Supp
Hazelton v. City of Grand Prairie, Tex., 8 F. Supp. 2d 570 (N.D. Tex. 1998) — Supp
Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2017) — Supp
Holcomb v. McCraw, 262 F. Supp. 3d 437 (W.D. Tex. 2017) — Supp
Landry v. A-Able Bonding Inc., 870 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Tex. 1994) — Supp
Lewis v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 686 (S.D. Tex. 1999) — Supp
Loustalot v. Rice, 764 F. Supp. 1080 (M.D. La. 1991) — Supp
McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2017) — Supp
Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 144 A.L.R. Fed. 719 (5th Cir. 1996) — Supp
Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963) — Supp
Patterson v. Armatys, 808 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Tex. 1992) — Supp
Richardson v. Oldham, 811 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Tex. 1992) — Supp
Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999) — Supp
Seaboard Oil Co. v. Cunningham, 51 F.2d 321 (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1931) — Text
Thomas v. City of Galveston, Texas, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Tex. 2011) — Supp
Thomas v. Pohlmann, 681 Fed. Appx. 401 (5th Cir. 2017) — Supp
Tuskan v. Jackson County, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1041 (S.D. Miss. 2015) — Supp
Wicker v. City of Galveston, 944 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Tex. 1996) — Supp
Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018) — Supp

Sixth Circuit
Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 1994 FED App. 0277P (6th Cir. 1994) — Supp
Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 1999 FED App. 0280P (6th Cir. 1999) — Supp
Alexander v. Carter for Byrd, 733 Fed. Appx. 256 (6th Cir. 2018) — Supp
Apsey v. Chester Township, 608 Fed. Appx. 335 (6th Cir. 2015) — Supp
Carr v. National Discount Corp., 172 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1949) — Supp
Crawford v. Geiger, 131 F. Supp. 3d 703 (N.D. Ohio 2015) — Supp
Day v. DeLong, 358 F. Supp. 3d 687 (S.D. Ohio 2019) — Supp
Dean v. Earle, 866 F. Supp. 336 (W.D. Ky. 1994) — Supp
Fenstermaker v. City of Dayton, Ohio, 712 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Ohio 1988) — Supp
Ghaith v. Rauschenberger, 778 F. Supp. 2d 787 (E.D. Mich. 2011) — Supp
Ghaster v. City of Rocky River, 913 F. Supp. 2d 443 (N.D. Ohio 2012) — Supp
Gonzalez v. Kovacs, 687 Fed. Appx. 466 (6th Cir. 2017) — Supp
Hansel v. Bisard, 30 F. Supp. 2d 981 (E.D. Mich. 1998) — Supp
Hardesty v. City of Ecorse, 623 F. Supp. 2d 855 (E.D. Mich. 2009) — Supp
Hoover v. Walsh, 682 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2012) — Supp
Jeffers v. Heavrin, 10 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 1993) — Supp
Johnson v. City of Lincoln Park, 434 F. Supp. 2d 467, 210 Ed. Law Rep. 1095 (E.D. Mich. 2006) — Supp
Khother v. DeEulis, 527 Fed. Appx. 461 (6th Cir. 2013) — Supp
Lopez v. Ruhl, 584 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Mich. 1984) — Supp
Miller v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 2d 683 (E.D. Mich. 2011) — Supp
Naselroad v. Mabry, 184 F. Supp. 3d 534 (E.D. Ky. 2016) — Supp
Pennington v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 710 (E.D. Ky. 2000) — Supp
Risbridger v. Connelly, 122 F. Supp. 2d 857 (W.D. Mich. 2000) — Supp
Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2014) — Supp
Ross v. Meyers, 883 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1989) — Supp
Ruble v. Escola, 898 F. Supp. 2d 956 (N.D. Ohio 2012) — Supp
Saad v. Keller, 546 Fed. Appx. 552 (6th Cir. 2013) — Supp
Sanders v. Detroit Police Dept., 490 Fed. Appx. 771 (6th Cir. 2012) — Supp
Sherrod v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) — Supp
Smith v. Yono, 613 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. Mich. 1985) — Supp
Snyder v. U.S., 990 F. Supp. 2d 818 (S.D. Ohio 2014) — Supp
Solovy v. Morabito, 608 F. Supp. 2d 859 (E.D. Mich. 2009) — Supp
Sterling-Ward ex rel. Sterling v. Tujaka, 414 F. Supp. 2d 727 (E.D. Mich. 2006) — Supp
Sutherland v. Mizer, 625 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Mich. 2008) — Supp
Tapp v. Banks, 72 F. Supp. 2d 739 (E.D. Ky. 1999) — Supp
Tobias v. Pletzke, 933 F. Supp. 2d 892 (E.D. Mich. 2013) — Supp
Valdez v. U.S., 58 F. Supp. 3d 795 (W.D. Mich. 2014) — Supp
Van Hull v. Marriott Courtyard, 87 F. Supp. 2d 771 (N.D. Ohio 2000) — Supp
Weatherholt v. Meijer Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Mich. 1996) — Supp
Wesley v. Campbell, 864 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2017) — Supp
Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2015) — Supp
Wesley v. Rigney, 913 F. Supp. 2d 313, 293 Ed. Law Rep. 813, 84 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 733 (E.D. Ky. 2012) — Supp
White v. Tamlyn, 961 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Mich. 1997) — Supp
Seventh Circuit
Adrian v. Skokie Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 730 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ill. 1990) — Supp
Aleman v. Village of Hanover Park, 748 F. Supp. 2d 869 (N.D. Ill. 2010) — Supp
Bennett v. Ahrens, 57 F.2d 948 (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1932) — Text

Bentz v. City of Kendallville, 577 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2009) — Supp
Bey v. Cimarossa, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (C.D. Ill. 1999) — Supp
Boyce v. Fernandes, 77 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 1996) — Supp
Boyle v. Torres, 756 F. Supp. 2d 983, 266 Ed. Law Rep. 235 (N.D. Ill. 2010) — Supp
Brooks v. City of Aurora, Ill., 653 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2011) — Supp
Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 2015) — Supp
Clark v. Kroger Co., 382 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1967) — Supp
Cornish v. Papis, 962 F. Supp. 1103 (C.D. Ill. 1997) — Supp
Dakhlallah v. Zima, 42 F. Supp. 3d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2014) — Supp
Ebeyer v. Rodriguez, 909 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (S.D. Ind. 2012) — Supp
Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911 (7th Cir. 2017) — Supp
Fields v. Roswarski, 469 F. Supp. 2d 599 (N.D. Ind. 2007) — Supp
Fine v. Paramount Pictures, 171 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1948) — Supp
Flint v. City of Milwaukee, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1032 (E.D. Wis. 2015) — Supp
Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2010) — Supp
Harney v. City of Chicago, 702 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2012) — Supp
Holmes v. City of Chicago, 63 F. Supp. 3d 806 (N.D. Ill. 2014) — Supp
Hull v. City of Chicago, 624 Fed. Appx. 436 (7th Cir. 2015) — Supp
Hvorcik v. Sheahan, 847 F. Supp. 1414 (N.D. Ill. 1994) — Supp
Jones v. City of Chicago, 639 F. Supp. 146 (N.D. Ill. 1986) — Supp
Jones v. Village of Villa Park, 815 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Ill. 1993) — Supp
Lessley v. City of Madison, Ind., 654 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Ind. 2009) — Supp
London v. Guzman, 26 F. Supp. 3d 746 (N.D. Ill. 2014) — Supp
Mannoia v. Farrow, 476 F.3d 453 (7th Cir. 2007) — Supp
Mayorov v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 3d 678 (N.D. Ill. 2015) — Supp
McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2009) — Supp
Mosley v. La Mastus, 741 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ill. 1990) — Supp
Myatt v. City of Chicago, 816 F. Supp. 1259, 82 Ed. Law Rep. 104, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1511 (N.D. Ill. 1992) — Supp
Neal v. City of Harvey, Ill., 1 F. Supp. 2d 849 (N.D. Ill. 1998) — Supp
Neita v. City of Chicago, 830 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2016) — Supp
Nugent v. Hayes, 88 F. Supp. 2d 862 (N.D. Ill. 2000) — Supp
O'Leary v. Luongo, 692 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ill. 1988) — Supp
Olson v. Tyler, 771 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1985) — Supp
Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 82 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2000) — Supp
Phillips v. Allen, 743 F. Supp. 2d 931 (N.D. Ill. 2010) — Supp
Powell v. City of Berwyn, 68 F. Supp. 3d 929 (N.D. Ill. 2014) — Supp
Rabin v. Flynn, 725 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2013) — Supp
Ryan v. Koester, 78 F. Supp. 3d 935 (C.D. Ill. 2015) — Supp
Simmons v. Pryor, 26 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1993) — Supp
Thayer v. Chiczewski, 697 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2012) — Supp
Tibbett v. McPherson, 5 F. Supp. 3d 989 (S.D. Ind. 2014) — Supp
Turner v. Green, 704 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Ill. 1988) — Supp
Wilbon v. Plovanich, 67 F. Supp. 3d 927 (N.D. Ill. 2014) — Supp
Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2013) — Supp
Eighth Circuit
Anderson v. Franklin County, Mo., 192 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 1999) — Supp
Anderson v. Sager, 173 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1949) — Supp
Brittingham v. Gove-Ortmeyer, 174 F. Supp. 3d 1043 (E.D. Mo. 2016) — Supp
Davis v. Tamburo, 849 F. Supp. 1294 (E.D. Ark. 1993) — Supp

Duncan v. Clements, 744 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1984) — Supp

Fagnan v. City of Lino Lakes, Minn., 914 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (D. Minn. 2012) — Supp
Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2015) — Supp
Hannah v. City of Overland, Mo., 795 F.2d 1385, 21 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 130 (8th Cir. 1986) — Supp
Hoyland v. McMenomy, 869 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2017) — Supp
Kelly v. Bender, 23 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1994) — Supp
Liggins v. Morris, 749 F. Supp. 967 (D. Minn. 1990) — Supp
McDougal v. Odom, 850 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Ark. 1994) — Supp
McIntosh v. Arkansas Republican Party-Frank White Election Committee, 816 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1987) — Supp
McIntosh v. White, 582 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Ark. 1984) — Supp
New v. Denver, 787 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 2015) — Supp
Peterson v. City of Pine River, 36 F. Supp. 3d 843 (D. Minn. 2014) — Supp
Robinson v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 144 F. Supp. 713 (W.D. Mo. 1956) — Supp
Sherbrooke v. City of Pelican Rapids, 577 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2009) — Supp
Small v. McCrystal, 708 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2013) — Supp
Williams v. Decker, 767 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2014) — Supp
Ninth Circuit
Arnsberg v. U.S., 549 F. Supp. 55 (D. Or. 1982) — Supp
Bartlett v. Nieves, 712 Fed. Appx. 613 (9th Cir. 2017) — Supp
Bradford v. City of Seattle, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (W.D. Wash. 2008) — Supp
Bujaki v. Egan, 237 F. Supp. 822 (D. Alaska 1965) — Supp
Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 41 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) — Supp
Casserly v. Wheeler, 282 F. 389 (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1922) — Text
Cassette v. King County, 625 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (W.D. Wash. 2008) — Supp
Collins v. City of Sacramento, 328 Fed. Appx. 361 (9th Cir. 2009) — Supp
Cuviello v. City and County of San Francisco, 940 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2013) — Supp
Donahoe v. Arpaio, 986 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (D. Ariz. 2013) — Supp
Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (D. Ariz. 2012) — Supp
Dunn v. Hyra, 676 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2009) — Supp
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 840 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Wash. 1993) — Supp
Fraser v. County of Maui, 855 F. Supp. 1167 (D. Haw. 1994) — Supp
Freece v. Clackamas County, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Or. 2006) — Supp
Gasho v. U.S., 39 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1994) — Supp
George v. City of Long Beach, 973 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1992) — Supp
Gillis v. City and County of San Francisco, 560 Fed. Appx. 665 (9th Cir. 2014) — Supp
Goehring v. Wright, 858 F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Cal. 1994) — Supp
Hebert v. Morley, 273 F. Supp. 800 (C.D. Cal. 1967) — Supp
Hennick v. Bowling, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (W.D. Wash. 2000) — Supp
Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2009) — Supp
Knapps v. City of Oakland, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2009) — Supp
Lacy v. County of Maricopa, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Ariz. 2008) — Supp
Law v. City of Post Falls, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (D. Idaho 2011) — Supp
Lofthus v. Long Beach Veterans Hospital, 214 F. Supp. 3d 908 (C.D. Cal. 2016) — Supp
McFarland v. City of Clovis, 163 F. Supp. 3d 798 (E.D. Cal. 2016) — Supp
Meas v. City and County of San Francisco, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2010) — Supp
Pellegrino v. U.S., 73 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 1996) — Supp
Shore v. Mohave County, 472 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Ariz. 1979) — Supp
Ting v. U.S., 927 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1991) — Supp
United Steelworkers of America v. Milstead, 705 F. Supp. 1426 (D. Ariz. 1988) — Supp

Williams v. County of Alameda, 26 F. Supp. 3d 925 (N.D. Cal. 2014) — Supp
Tenth Circuit
Daniels v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 505 (D. Kan. 1995) — Supp
Elbrader v. Blevins, 757 F. Supp. 1174 (D. Kan. 1991) — Supp
Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines Co., 439 F.3d 1197, 44 A.L.R.6th 723 (10th Cir. 2006) — Supp
Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F. Supp. 331 (D. Kan. 1982) — Supp
Kerns v. Board of Com'rs of Bernalillo County, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D.N.M. 2010) — Supp
Lemons v. Lewis, 963 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Kan. 1997) — Supp
Maresca v. Bernalillo County, 804 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2015) — Supp
Martin v. City of Oklahoma City, 180 F. Supp. 3d 978 (W.D. Okla. 2016) — Supp
Miller v. Stinnett, 257 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1958) — Supp
Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 3 F. Supp. 3d 1002 (D.N.M. 2014) — Supp
Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2012) — Supp
Pauly v. White, 874 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2017) — Supp
Robinson v. Keita, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Colo. 2014) — Supp
Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d 750 (10th Cir. 2016) — Supp
Shimomura v. Carlson, 17 F. Supp. 3d 1120 (D. Colo. 2014) — Supp
Swanson v. Fields, 814 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Kan. 1993) — Supp
Tanner v. San Juan County Sheriff's Office, 864 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D.N.M. 2012) — Supp
Taylor v. Dillards Dept. Stores, Inc., 971 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1992) — Supp
Trujillo v. Rio Arriba County ex rel. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Department, 319 F.R.D. 571 (D.N.M. 2016) — Supp
Eleventh Circuit
Ball v. City of Coral Gables, 548 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2008) — Supp
Barnett v. MacArthur, 715 Fed. Appx. 894 (11th Cir. 2017) — Supp
Black v. City of Mobile, 963 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (S.D. Ala. 2013) — Supp
Bloom v. Alvereze, 498 Fed. Appx. 867 (11th Cir. 2012) — Supp
Bloom v. Miami-Dade County, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2011) — Supp
Bowens v. Superintendent of Miami South Beach Police Dept., 557 Fed. Appx. 857 (11th Cir. 2014) — Supp
Britt v. Whitehall Income Fund '86, 891 F. Supp. 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1993) — Supp
Brown v. Dillard's Inc., 170 Fed. Appx. 99 (11th Cir. 2006) — Supp
Brown v. Ridgway, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2012) — Supp
Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2009) — Supp
Daniels v. City of Hartford, Ala., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (M.D. Ala. 2009) — Supp
Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759 (11th Cir. 2006) — Supp
Ellis v. City of Fairburn, Ga., 852 F. Supp. 1568 (N.D. Ga. 1994) — Supp
Exford v. City of Montgomery, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (M.D. Ala. 2012) — Supp
Frias v. Demings, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2011) — Supp
Hendricks v. Sheriff, Collier County, Florida, 492 Fed. Appx. 90 (11th Cir. 2012) — Supp
Hernandez v. Metro-Dade County, 992 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D. Fla. 1997) — Supp
Hill v. Georgia Power Co., 786 F.2d 1071 (11th Cir. 1986) — Supp
Jackson v. Kmart Corp., 851 F. Supp. 469 (M.D. Ga. 1994) — Supp
Johnson v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (N.D. Ga. 2019) — Supp
Johnson v. White, 725 Fed. Appx. 868 (11th Cir. 2018) — Supp
Lawson v. City of Miami Beach, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2012) — Supp
Martin v. Anderson, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D. Ala. 1999) — Supp
Marx v. Gumbinner, 716 F. Supp. 1434 (S.D. Fla. 1989) — Supp
May v. City of Nahunta, Georgia, 846 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2017) — Supp
Mears v. McCulley, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (N.D. Ala. 2012) — Supp

Mills v. Town of Davie, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (S.D. Fla. 1999) — Supp

Montanez v. Celaya, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (M.D. Fla. 2014) — Supp
Nolin v. Town of Springville, 45 F. Supp. 2d 894 (N.D. Ala. 1999) — Supp
O'Boyle v. Bradshaw, 952 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2013) — Supp
Patterson v. Downtown Medical and Diagnostic Center, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1379, 7 A.D.D. 523 (M.D. Fla. 1994) — Supp
Payne v. DeKalb County, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (N.D. Ga. 2004) — Supp
Rankin v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 732 Fed. Appx. 779, 356 Ed. Law Rep. 546 (11th Cir. 2018)
— Supp
Rogers v. City of Selma, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1222 (S.D. Ala. 2016) — Supp
Rose v. Town of Jackson's Gap, 952 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Ala. 1996) — Supp
Ruffino v. City of Hoover, 891 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2012) — Supp
Ruszala v. Walt Disney World Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2000) — Supp
Siler v. Floyd, 476 Fed. Appx. 710 (11th Cir. 2012) — Supp
Tucker v. City of Florence, Ala., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ala. 2011) — Supp
Walker v. U.S., 471 F. Supp. 38 (M.D. Fla. 1978) — Supp
Wheeler v. City of Macon, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Ga. 1999) — Supp
Wilkerson v. Seymour, 736 F.3d 974 (11th Cir. 2013) — Supp
Williams v. City of Homestead, Fla., 206 Fed. Appx. 886 (11th Cir. 2006) — Supp
District of Columbia Circuit

Bennett v. U.S. Chess Federation, 468 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D.D.C. 2006) — Supp
Brown v. Metro Transit Police Department, 87 F. Supp. 3d 145 (D.D.C. 2015) — Supp
Dant v. District of Columbia, 829 F.2d 69 (D.C. Cir. 1987) — Supp
Dukore v. District of Columbia, 970 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2013) — Supp
Edwards v. Okie Dokie, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2007) — Supp
Hall v. District of Columbia, 867 F.3d 138 (D.C. Cir. 2017) — Supp
Hall v. District of Columbia, 73 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. 2014) — Supp
James v. U.S., 709 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1989) — Supp
Joyce v. U.S., 795 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1992) — Supp
Kroll v. U.S. Capitol Police, 590 F. Supp. 1282 (D.D.C. 1983) — Supp
Kyle v. Bedlion, 177 F. Supp. 3d 380 (D.D.C. 2016) — Supp
Littlepage v. Quigley, 69 F. Supp. 3d 136 (D.D.C. 2014) — Supp
Magliore v. Brooks, 844 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2012) — Supp
Olaniyi v. District of Columbia, 876 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2012) — Supp
Sacchetti v. Gallaudet University, 181 F. Supp. 3d 107, 337 Ed. Law Rep. 126 (D.D.C. 2016) — Supp
Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1993) — Supp
Wright v. U.S., 963 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1997) — Supp
Alabama
American Ry. Express Co. v. Summers, 208 Ala. 531, 94 So. 737 (1922) — Text
Burk v. Knott, 20 Ala. App. 316, 101 So. 811 (1924) — Text
Carruth v. Barker, 454 So. 2d 539 (Ala. 1984) — Supp
Childress v. Walker, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (applying Alabama law) — Supp
Daniels v. Milstead, 221 Ala. 353, 128 So. 447 (1930) — Text
De Armond v. Saunders, 243 Ala. 263, 9 So. 2d 747 (1942) — Supp
Dinmark v. Farrier, 510 So. 2d 819 (Ala. 1987) — Supp
Drill Parts and Service Co., Inc. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 619 So. 2d 1280 (Ala. 1993) — Supp
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Adkins, 222 Ala. 17, 130 So. 552 (1930) — Text
Frison v. Delchamps Store No. 11, 507 So. 2d 478 (Ala. 1987) — Supp
James v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 926 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (applying Alabama law) — Supp

Karrick v. Johnson, 659 So. 2d 77 (Ala. 1995) — Supp

Kmart Corp. v. Perdue, 708 So. 2d 106 (Ala. 1997) — Supp
Phillips v. K-Mart Corp., 682 So. 2d 1390 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) — Supp
Phillips v. Morrow, 210 Ala. 34, 97 So. 130 (1923) — Text
Roddy v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 580 Fed. Appx. 844 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying Alabama law) — Supp
Roddy v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (applying Alabama law) — Supp
Simpson v. Boyd, 212 Ala. 14, 101 So. 664 (1924) — Text
Sokol Bros. Furniture Co. v. Gate, 208 Ala. 107, 93 So. 724 (1922) — Text
Standard Oil Co. v. Humphries, 209 Ala. 493, 96 So. 629 (1923) — Text
Thomas v. Hamilton, 611 So. 2d 1038 (Ala. 1992) — Supp
Upshaw v. McArdle, 650 So. 2d 875 (Ala. 1994) — Supp
Whitlow v. Bruno's, Inc., 567 So. 2d 1235 (Ala. 1990) — Supp
Wilson v. Orr, 210 Ala. 93, 97 So. 133 (1923) — Text
Windham v. City of Fairhope, Ala., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1323 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (applying Alabama law) — Supp
Woodard v. Town of Oakman, Ala., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (applying Alabama law) — Supp
Yancey v. Farmer, 472 So. 2d 990 (Ala. 1985) — Supp
Zann v. Whidby, 904 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (applying Alabama law) — Supp
Arizona
Adair v. Williams, 24 Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853, 26 A.L.R. 278 (1922) — Text
Creamer v. Raffety, 145 Ariz. 34, 699 P.2d 908 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1984) — Supp
Gau v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 183 Ariz. 107, 901 P.2d 455 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1995) — Supp
Gortarez By and Through Gortarez v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 140 Ariz. 97, 680 P.2d 807 (1984) — Supp
Hansen v. Garcia, Fletcher, Lund and McVean, 148 Ariz. 205, 713 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1985) — Supp
Hockett v. City of Tucson, 139 Ariz. 317, 678 P.2d 502 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1983) — Supp
Arkansas
Arnold v. State ex rel. Burton, 220 Ark. 25, 245 S.W.2d 818 (1952) — Supp
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Waller, 208 Ark. 1063, 189 S.W.2d 361 (1945) — Supp
Limited Stores, Inc. v. Wilson-Robinson, 317 Ark. 80, 876 S.W.2d 248 (1994) — Supp
Mendenhall v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 285 Ark. 236, 685 S.W.2d 805 (1985) — Supp
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Yancey, 178 Ark. 147, 10 S.W.2d 22 (1928) — Text
Wells v. Adams, 232 Ark. 873, 340 S.W.2d 572 (1960) — Supp
California
Aitken v. White, 93 Cal. App. 2d 134, 208 P.2d 788 (2d Dist. 1949) — Supp
Allen v. McCoy (1933) 135 Cal App 500, 27 P2d 423 — Text
Alterauge v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 97 Cal. App. 2d 735, 218 P.2d 802 (2d Dist. 1950) — Supp
Arias v. Amador, 61 F. Supp. 3d 960 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (applying California law) — Supp
Baranchik v. Fizulich, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1210, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 423 (2d Dist. 2017) — Supp
Bettolo v. Safeway Stores, 11 Cal. App. 2d 430, 54 P.2d 24 (1st Dist. 1936) — Text
Christians v. Chester, 218 Cal. App. 3d 273, 267 Cal. Rptr. 124 (3d Dist. 1990) — Supp
Cole v. Johnson, 197 Cal. App. 2d 788, 17 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1st Dist. 1961) — Supp
Collins v. Jones, 131 Cal. App. 747, 22 P.2d 39 (2d Dist. 1933) — Text
Collyer v. S.H. Kress Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936) — Text
Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 356 (1st Dist. 2017) — Supp
Cummings v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1407, 249 Cal. Rptr. 568 (2d Dist. 1988) — Supp
Fahy v. Tarbox, 493 Fed. Appx. 892 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying California law) — Supp
Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18, 872 P.2d 559 (1994) — Supp
Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158 (2d Dist. 2007) — Supp

Gogue v. MacDonald, 35 Cal. 2d 482, 218 P.2d 542, 21 A.L.R.2d 639 (1950) — Supp
Hamilton v. City of San Diego, 217 Cal. App. 3d 838, 266 Cal. Rptr. 215 (4th Dist. 1990) — Supp
Harden v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 215 Cal. App. 3d 7, 263 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1st Dist. 1989) — Supp
Heater v. Southwood Psychiatric Center, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880 (4th Dist. 1996) — Supp
Hill v. Nelson, 71 Cal. App. 2d 528, 162 P.2d 927 (2d Dist. 1945) — Supp
Hughes v. Oreb, 36 Cal. 2d 854, 228 P.2d 550 (1951) — Supp
Jaramillo v. City of San Mateo, 76 F. Supp. 3d 905 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (applying California law) — Supp
Kaufman v. Brown, 93 Cal. App. 2d 508, 209 P.2d 156 (4th Dist. 1949) — Supp
King v. Andersen, 242 Cal. App. 2d 606, 51 Cal. Rptr. 561 (3d Dist. 1966) — Supp
Laible v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d 44, 203 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1st Dist. 1984) — Supp
McKay v. County of San Diego, 111 Cal. App. 3d 251, 168 Cal. Rptr. 442 (4th Dist. 1980) — Supp
Milliken v. City of South Pasadena, 96 Cal. App. 3d 834, 158 Cal. Rptr. 409 (2d Dist. 1979) — Supp
O'Toole v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 4th 488, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 531, 209 Ed. Law Rep. 800 (4th Dist. 2006) — Supp
People v. Johnson, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1021, 199 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1st Dist. 1984) — Supp
Shay v. County of Los Angeles, 762 Fed. Appx. 416 (9th Cir. 2019) (applying California law) — Supp
Smith v. Madruga, 193 Cal. App. 2d 543, 14 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1st Dist. 1961) — Supp
Stallings v. Foster, 119 Cal. App. 2d 614, 259 P.2d 1006 (3d Dist. 1953) — Supp
Van Fleet v. West American Ins. Co. (1935) 5 Cal App2d 125, 42 P2d 378 — Text
Ware v. Dunn, 80 Cal. App. 2d 936, 183 P.2d 128 (2d Dist. 1947) — Supp
Whaley v. Kirby, 208 Cal. App. 2d 232, 25 Cal. Rptr. 50 (4th Dist. 1962) — Supp
White v. Martin, 215 Cal. App. 2d 641, 30 Cal. Rptr. 367 (2d Dist. 1963) — Supp
White v. County of San Bernardino, 503 Fed. Appx. 551 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying California law) — Supp
Colorado
Crews-Beggs Dry Goods Co. v. Bayle, 97 Colo. 568, 51 P.2d 1026 (1935) — Text
Connecticut
Beinhorn v. Saraceno, 23 Conn. App. 487, 582 A.2d 208 (1990) — Supp
Coffey v. Callaway, 86 F. Supp. 3d 111 (D. Conn. 2015) (applying Connecticut law) — Supp
Green v. Donroe, 186 Conn. 265, 440 A.2d 973 (1982) — Supp
Marchand v. Simonson, 16 F. Supp. 3d 97 (D. Conn. 2014) (applying Connecticut law) — Supp
Outlaw v. City of Meriden, 43 Conn. App. 387, 682 A.2d 1112 (1996) — Supp
Plude v. Adams, 100 F. Supp. 3d 172 (D. Conn. 2015) (applying Connecticut law) — Supp
State v. Sherwood, 25 Conn. App. 725, 596 A.2d 470 (1991) — Supp
District of Columbia
Bauldock v. Davco Food, Inc., 622 A.2d 28 (D.C. 1993) — Supp
Chen v. District of Columbia, 256 F.R.D. 267 (D.D.C. 2009) (applying District of Columbia law) — Supp
Cutchin v. District of Columbia, 369 F. Supp. 3d 108 (D.D.C. 2019) (applying District of Columbia law) — Supp
DeWitt v. District of Columbia, 43 A.3d 291 (D.C. 2012) — Supp
District of Columbia v. Minor, 740 A.2d 523 (D.C. 1999) — Supp
District of Columbia v. Murphy, 635 A.2d 929 (D.C. 1993) — Supp
District of Columbia v. Murphy, 631 A.2d 34 (D.C. 1993) — Supp
Etheredge v. District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 908, 33 A.L.R.5th 795 (D.C. 1993) — Supp
Faniel v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Maryland, 404 A.2d 147 (D.C. 1979) — Supp
Fisher v. District of Columbia, 498 A.2d 198 (D.C. 1985) — Supp
Gabrou v. May Dept. Stores Co., 462 A.2d 1102 (D.C. 1983) — Supp
Garay v. Liriano, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (applying District of Columbia law) — Supp
Harris v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 776 F.3d 907 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (applying District of Columbia law) — Supp
Harris v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 949 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2013) (applying District of Columbia law) — Supp

Lyles v. Micenko, 468 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2006) (applying District of Columbia law) — Supp
Magwood v. Giddings, 672 A.2d 1083 (D.C. 1996) — Supp
Prieto v. May Dept. Stores Co., 216 A.2d 577 (D.C. 1966) — Supp
Reiver v. District of Columbia, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (applying District of Columbia law) — Supp
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Kelly, 448 A.2d 856 (D.C. 1982) — Supp
Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Schmidt, 225 A.2d 317 (D.C. 1967) — Supp
Scott v. District of Columbia, 493 A.2d 319 (D.C. 1985) — Supp
Scott v. U.S., 952 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2013) (applying District of Columbia law) — Supp
Tillman v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 695 A.2d 94 (D.C. 1997) — Supp
Welch v. District of Columbia, 578 A.2d 175 (D.C. 1990) — Supp
Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying District of Columbia law) — Supp
Florida
Amato v. Cardelle, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (applying Florida law) — Supp
Anderson v. City of Naples, 501 Fed. Appx. 910 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying Florida law) — Supp
Bettez v. City of Miami, 510 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) — Supp
Bolanos v. Metropolitan Dade County, 677 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) — Supp
Canto v. J.B. Ivey and Co., 595 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) — Supp
Cruz v. Green, 352 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (applying Florida law) — Supp
Cutino v. Untch, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (applying Florida law) — Supp
Delgado v. City of Miami, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1381 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (applying Florida law) — Supp
DeMarie v. Jefferson Stores, Inc., 442 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) — Supp
Dodson v. Solomon, 134 Fla. 284, 183 So. 825 (1938) — Text
Everett v. Florida Institute of Technology, 503 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) — Supp
Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Com'n v. Dockery, 676 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) — Supp
Gatto v. Publix Supermarket, Inc., 387 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) — Supp
Grand Union Super Markets, Inc. v. De Aquinos, 135 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961) — Supp
Harder v. Edwards, 174 So. 3d 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) — Supp
Harris v. Lewis State Bank, 482 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) — Supp
Hernandez v. K-Mart Corp., 497 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) — Supp
Hialeah, City of v. Rehm, 455 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) — Supp
Jack Eckerd Corp. v. Smith, 558 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) — Supp
Jackson v. Navarro, 665 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) — Supp
Johnson v. Heinrich, 543 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) — Supp
Lee v. Geiger, 419 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) — Supp
LeGrand v. Dean, 564 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) — Supp
Lewis v. Morgan, 79 So. 3d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) — Supp
McDaniel v. Sheriff of Palm Beach County, Fla., 491 Fed. Appx. 981 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying Florida law) — Supp
McKally v. Perez, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (applying Florida law) — Supp
Metropolitan Dade County v. Norton, 543 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) — Supp
Miller v. City of Jacksonville, 603 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) — Supp
Perez v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County, Fla., 917 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (applying Florida law) — Supp
Pokorny v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Largo, 382 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1980) — Supp
Rauso v. State, 425 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) — Supp
Rothstein v. Jackson's of Coral Gables, Inc., 133 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961) — Supp
Rotte v. City of Jacksonville, 509 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) — Supp
S. H. Kress & Co. v. Powell, 132 Fla. 471, 180 So. 757 (1938) — Text
Smart v. City of Miami, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (applying Florida law) — Supp
Sussman v. City of Daytona Beach, 462 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) — Supp
Toomey v. Tolin, 311 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) — Supp

Weissman v. K-Mart Corp., 396 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) — Supp
Georgia
Amason v. Kroger Co., 204 Ga. App. 695, 420 S.E.2d 314 (1992) — Supp
Arbee v. Collins, 219 Ga. App. 63, 463 S.E.2d 922 (1995) — Supp
Barber v. H & H Muller Enterprises, Inc., 197 Ga. App. 126, 397 S.E.2d 563 (1990) — Supp
Brown v. Super Discount Markets, Inc., 223 Ga. App. 174, 477 S.E.2d 839 (1996) — Supp
Collins v. Sadlo, 167 Ga. App. 317, 306 S.E.2d 390 (1983) — Supp
Conoly v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 63 Ga. App. 880, 12 S.E.2d 398 (1940) — Text
Corbin v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 151 Ga. App. 33, 258 S.E.2d 697 (1979) — Supp
Desmond v. Troncalli Mitsubishi, 243 Ga. App. 71, 532 S.E.2d 463 (2000) — Supp
Dixon v. S. S. Kresge, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 776, 169 S.E.2d 189 (1969) — Supp
Drug Emporium, Inc. v. Peaks, 227 Ga. App. 121, 488 S.E.2d 500 (1997) — Supp
Duckett & Co. v. Ozmer, 48 Ga. App. 41, 172 S.E. 118 (1933) — Text
El-Amin v. Trust Co. Bank, 171 Ga. App. 35, 318 S.E.2d 655 (1984) — Supp
Fields v. Kroger Co., 202 Ga. App. 475, 414 S.E.2d 703 (1992) — Supp
Fleming v. U-Haul Co. of Georgia, 246 Ga. App. 681, 541 S.E.2d 75 (2000) — Supp
Franklin v. Consolidated Government of Columbus, Georgia, 236 Ga. App. 468, 512 S.E.2d 352 (1999) — Supp
Gantt v. Patient Communications Systems, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 35, 406 S.E.2d 796 (1991) — Supp
Gerry v. K-Mart, 222 Ga. App. 364, 474 S.E.2d 260 (1996) — Supp
Gray v. Ector, 541 Fed. Appx. 920 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying Georgia law) — Supp
Hampton v. Norred & Associates, Inc., 216 Ga. App. 367, 454 S.E.2d 222 (1995) — Supp
Hill v. Henry, 90 Ga. App. 93, 82 S.E.2d 35 (1954) — Supp
Hudgins v. Bawtinhimer, 196 Ga. App. 386, 395 S.E.2d 909 (1990) — Supp
J.C. Penney Co., Inc. v. Miller, 182 Ga. App. 64, 354 S.E.2d 682 (1987) — Supp
Kemp v. Rouse-Atlanta, Inc., 207 Ga. App. 876, 429 S.E.2d 264 (1993) — Supp
Kline v. KDB, Inc., 295 Ga. App. 789, 673 S.E.2d 516 (2009) — Supp
K Mart Corp. v. Adamson, 192 Ga. App. 884, 386 S.E.2d 680 (1989) — Supp
Lolmaugh v. T.O.C. Retail, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 605, 436 S.E.2d 708 (1993) — Supp
Lowe v. Turner, 115 Ga. App. 503, 154 S.E.2d 792 (1967) — Supp
Mayor & Aldermen of City of Savannah v. Wilson, 214 Ga. App. 170, 447 S.E.2d 124 (1994) — Supp
McGonagil v. Treadwell, 216 Ga. App. 850, 456 S.E.2d 260 (1995) — Supp
McQueary v. Atlanta Airlines Terminal Corp., 198 Ga. App. 318, 401 S.E.2d 333 (1991) — Supp
Melton v. LaCalamito, 158 Ga. App. 820, 282 S.E.2d 393 (1981) — Supp
Merenda v. Tabor, 506 Fed. Appx. 862 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying Georgia law) — Supp
Mitchell v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 339, 506 S.E.2d 381 (1998) — Supp
Mitchell v. Stewart, 26 F. Supp. 3d 1322 (M.D. Ga. 2014) (applying Georgia law) — Supp
Mitchell v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 223 Ga. App. 328, 477 S.E.2d 631 (1996) — Supp
Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 219 Ga. App. 710, 466 S.E.2d 221 (1995) — Supp
Pinkston v. City of Albany, 196 Ga. App. 43, 395 S.E.2d 587 (1990) — Supp
Richardson v. Quitman County, Ga., 912 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (M.D. Ga. 2012) (applying Georgia law) — Supp
Scott Housing Systems, Inc. v. Hickox, 174 Ga. App. 23, 329 S.E.2d 154 (1985) — Supp
Sheppard v. Hale, 58 Ga. App. 140, 197 S.E. 922 (1938) — Text
Simmons v. Kroger Co., 218 Ga. App. 721, 463 S.E.2d 159 (1995) — Supp
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Meek, 62 Ga. App. 850, 10 S.E.2d 76 (1940) — Text
Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying Georgia law) — Supp
Smith v. Embry, 103 Ga. App. 375, 119 S.E.2d 45 (1961) — Supp
Stanford v. City of Manchester, 246 Ga. App. 129, 539 S.E.2d 845 (2000) — Supp
Todd v. Byrd, 283 Ga. App. 37, 640 S.E.2d 652 (2006) — Supp
Vlass v. McCrary, 60 Ga. App. 744, 5 S.E.2d 63 (1939) — Text

Wills v. Arnett, 306 Ga. App. 503, 702 S.E.2d 646 (2010) — Supp
Woods v. Kim, 207 Ga. App. 910, 429 S.E.2d 262 (1993) — Supp
Worn v. Warren, 191 Ga. App. 448, 382 S.E.2d 112 (1989) — Supp
Hawaii
Annan-Yartey v. Honolulu Police Dept., 351 Fed. Appx. 243 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Hawaii law) — Supp
Kalilikane v. McCravey, 69 Haw. 145, 737 P.2d 862 (1987) — Supp
Lopez v. Wigwam Dept. Stores No. 10, Inc., 49 Haw. 416, 421 P.2d 289 (1966) — Supp
Reed v. City and County of Honolulu, 76 Haw. 219, 873 P.2d 98 (1994) — Supp
Idaho
Griffin v. Clark, 55 Idaho 364, 42 P.2d 297 (1935) — Text
Herrera v. Conner, 111 Idaho 1012, 729 P.2d 1075 (Ct. App. 1986) — Supp
Sprague v. City of Burley, 109 Idaho 656, 710 P.2d 566 (1985) — Supp
Illinois
Abbott v. Sangamon County, Ill., 705 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2013) (applying Illinois law) — Supp
Aldridge v. Fox, 348 Ill. App. 96, 108 N.E.2d 139 (1st Dist. 1952) — Supp
Ames v. Snider, 69 Ill. 376, 1873 WL 8474 (1873) — Text
Beiles v. City of Chicago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (applying Illinois law) — Supp
Davis v. Temple, 284 Ill. App. 3d 983, 220 Ill. Dec. 593, 673 N.E.2d 737 (5th Dist. 1996) — Supp
Dutton v. Roo-Mac, Inc., 100 Ill. App. 3d 116, 55 Ill. Dec. 458, 426 N.E.2d 604 (2d Dist. 1981) — Supp
Fulk v. Roberts, 164 Ill. App. 3d 194, 115 Ill. Dec. 412, 517 N.E.2d 1098 (5th Dist. 1987) — Supp
Galarza v. Sprague, 284 Ill. App. 254, 1 N.E.2d 275 (1st Dist. 1936) — Text
Gill v. Village of Melrose Park, 35 F. Supp. 3d 956 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (applying Illinois law) — Supp
Grainger v. Harrah's Casino, 2014 IL App (3d) 130029, 18 N.E.3d 265 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2014) — Supp
Gray v. Burke, 466 F. Supp. 2d 991 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (applying Illinois law) — Supp
Hassenauer v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 314 Ill. App. 569, 41 N.E.2d 979 (1st Dist. 1942) — Supp
Johnson v. Dossey, 878 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (applying Illinois law) — Supp
Kincaid v. Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 283 Ill. App. 3d 555, 219 Ill. Dec. 215, 670 N.E.2d 1103 (1st Dist. 1996) — Supp
Lappin v. Costello, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 174 Ill. Dec. 114, 598 N.E.2d 311 (4th Dist. 1992) — Supp
Lindquist v. Friedman's, Inc., 366 Ill. 232, 8 N.E.2d 625 (1937) — Text
Makowski v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 3d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (applying Illinois law) — Supp
Martel Enterprises v. City of Chicago, 223 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 164 Ill. Dec. 945, 584 N.E.2d 157 (1st Dist. 1991) — Supp
McKendree v. Christy, 29 Ill. App. 2d 195, 172 N.E.2d 380 (3d Dist. 1961) — Supp
Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 189 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 137 Ill. Dec. 191, 545 N.E.2d 952 (1st Dist. 1989) — Supp
Mutter v. Sanders, 611 F. Supp. 2d 837 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (applying Illinois law) — Supp
Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA Ins. Companies, 134 Ill. App. 3d 134, 88 Ill. Dec. 968, 479 N.E.2d 988 (1st Dist. 1985) — Supp
Padilla v. City of Chicago, 932 F. Supp. 2d 907 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (applying Illinois law) — Supp
Reynolds v. Menard, Inc., 365 Ill. App. 3d 812, 303 Ill. Dec. 26, 850 N.E.2d 831 (1st Dist. 2006) — Supp
Ross v. Mauro Chevrolet, 369 Ill. App. 3d 794, 308 Ill. Dec. 248, 861 N.E.2d 313 (1st Dist. 2006) — Supp
Shelton v. Barry, 328 Ill. App. 497, 66 N.E.2d 697 (1st Dist. 1946) — Supp
Shemaitis v. Froemke, 6 Ill. App. 2d 323, 127 N.E.2d 648 (1st Dist. 1955) — Supp
Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying Chicago law) — Supp
Indiana
Chestnet v. K-Mart Corp., 529 N.E.2d 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) — Supp
Conwell v. Beatty, 667 N.E.2d 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) — Supp
Dubreuil v. Pinnick, 178 Ind. App. 526, 383 N.E.2d 420 (1978) — Supp
Duvall v. Kroger Co., 549 N.E.2d 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) — Supp
Garrett v. City of Bloomington, 478 N.E.2d 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) — Supp

Gomez v. Adams, 462 N.E.2d 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) — Supp
Haltom v. Bruner and Meis, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) — Supp
Hancock v. York, 141 Ind. App. 212, 227 N.E.2d 187 (1967) — Supp
Howlett v. Hack, 794 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying Indiana law) — Supp
Lazarus Dept. Store v. Sutherlin, 544 N.E.2d 513 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) — Supp
McConnell v. McKillip, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (applying Indiana law) — Supp
Ocasio v. Turner, 19 F. Supp. 3d 841 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (applying Indiana law) — Supp
Reiner v. Dandurand, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1018 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (applying Indiana law) — Supp
Roddel v. Town of Flora, 580 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) — Supp
Row v. Holt, 864 N.E.2d 1011 (Ind. 2007) — Supp
South Bend, City of v. Fleming, 397 N.E.2d 1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) — Supp
Street v. Shoe Carnival, Inc., 660 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) — Supp
Iowa
Kraft v. City of Bettendorf, 359 N.W.2d 466 (Iowa 1984) — Supp
Nelson v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 619 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 2000) — Supp
Sergeant v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 244 Iowa 185, 52 N.W.2d 86 (1952) — Supp
Wilson v. Lapham, 196 Iowa 745, 195 N.W. 235 (1923) — Text
Kansas
Brown v. State, 261 Kan. 6, 927 P.2d 938 (1996) — Supp
Holland v. Lutz, 194 Kan. 712, 401 P.2d 1015 (1965) — Supp
Melia v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 18 Kan. App. 2d 5, 846 P.2d 257 (1993) — Supp
Mendoza v. Reno County, 235 Kan. 692, 681 P.2d 676 (1984) — Supp
Thompson v. General Finance Co., 205 Kan. 76, 468 P.2d 269 (1970) — Supp
Torson v. Baehni, 134 Kan. 188, 5 P.2d 813 (1931) — Text
Kentucky
Callihan v. Kirk, 419 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1967) — Supp
Estep v. Combs, 366 F. Supp. 3d 863 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (applying Kentucky law) — Supp
Garvin v. Muir, 306 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1957) — Supp
Harper v. Howton, 194 Ky. 840, 241 S.W. 329 (1922) — Text
Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1985) — Supp
McCray v. City of Lake Louisvilla, 332 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. 1960) — Supp
Myers v. City of Louisville, 590 S.W.2d 348 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) — Supp
Sizemore v. Hoskins, 314 Ky. 436, 235 S.W.2d 1011 (1951) — Supp
Sternberg v. Hogg, 254 Ky. 761, 72 S.W.2d 421 (1934) — Text
Taylor Drugstores, Inc. v. Story, 760 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) — Supp
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Mitchell, 877 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) — Supp
Woosley v. City of Paris, 591 F. Supp. 2d 913, 52 A.L.R.6th 755 (E.D. Ky. 2008) (applying Kentucky law) — Supp
Louisiana
Abraham v. Boat Center, Inc., 146 So. 2d 23 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1962) — Supp
Albright v. Prentice, 425 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1982) — Supp
Attaldo v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 469 So. 2d 1132 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1985) — Supp
Barry v. Dennis, 633 So. 2d 806 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994) — Supp
Berry v. Bass, 157 La. 81, 102 So. 76 (1924) — Text
Boyer v. City of Lake Charles, 499 So. 2d 1064 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986) — Supp
Brimmer v. A. Copeland Enterprises, Inc., 609 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1992) — Supp
Brown v. City of Monroe, 135 So. 3d 792 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2014) — Supp
Brown v. Rougon, 552 So. 2d 1052 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1989) — Supp

Causey v. Katz & Bestoff, Inc., 539 So. 2d 944 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989) — Supp
Cormier v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Government, 493 Fed. Appx. 578 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying Louisiana law) — Supp
Davis v. J.C. Penney Stores, 930 So. 2d 130 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2006) — Supp
Derouen v. Miller, 614 So. 2d 1304 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993) — Supp
Dyas v. Shreveport Police Dept., 136 So. 3d 897 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2014) — Supp
Elphage v. Gautreaux, 969 F. Supp. 2d 493 (M.D. La. 2013) (applying Louisiana law) — Supp
Estorge v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 604 So. 2d 1012 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1992) — Supp
Fontenot v. Lavergne, 365 So. 2d 1168 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1978) — Supp
Freeman v. Kar Way, Inc., 686 So. 2d 51 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996) — Supp
Gibson v. State, 758 So. 2d 782 (La. 2000) — Supp
Harrison v. Phillips, 539 So. 2d 911 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989) — Supp
Johnson v. State Through Dept. of Public Safety, 451 So. 2d 104 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1984) — Supp
McMasters v. Department of Police, 172 So. 3d 105 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2015) — Supp
McNeely v. National Tea Co., 653 So. 2d 1231 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995) — Supp
Noel v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 594 So. 2d 1138 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992) — Supp
Norrell v. City of Monroe, 375 So. 2d 159 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1979) — Supp
O'Brien v. Town of Glenmora, 997 So. 2d 753 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008) — Supp
Prisk v. Palazzo, 668 So. 2d 415 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1996) — Supp
Rabalais v. Blanche, 524 So. 2d 772 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988) — Supp
Restrepo v. Fortunato, 556 So. 2d 1362 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1990) — Supp
Slaydon v. State Through Dept. of Wildlife & Fisheries, 636 So. 2d 1151 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994) — Supp
Tabora v. City of Kenner, 650 So. 2d 319 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995) — Supp
Touchton v. Kroger Co., 512 So. 2d 520 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987) — Supp
Vaughn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 734 So. 2d 156 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1999) — Supp
Wells v. Gaspard, 129 So. 2d 245 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1961) — Supp
West v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 539 So. 2d 1258 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1989) — Supp
Wilson v. City of Shreveport, 921 So. 2d 254 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2006) — Supp
Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 525 So. 2d 111 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988) — Supp
Winn v. City of Alexandria, 685 So. 2d 281 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996) — Supp
Wolfe v. Wiener Enterprises, Inc., 648 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1995) — Supp
Maryland
Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995) — Supp
Branch v. McGeeney, 123 Md. App. 330, 718 A.2d 631 (1998) — Supp
Clark's Brooklyn Park, Inc. v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178, 227 A.2d 726 (1967) — Supp
Dorsey v. Winters, 143 Md. 399, 122 A. 257 (1923) — Text
Fleisher v. Ensminger, 140 Md. 604, 118 A. 153 (1922) — Text
Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917 (1942) — Supp
Mahan v. Adam, 144 Md. 355, 124 A. 901 (1924) — Text
Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 664 A.2d 916 (1995) — Supp
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Cliser, 267 Md. 406, 298 A.2d 16 (1972) — Supp
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975) — Supp
Montgomery Ward Stores v. Wilson, 101 Md. App. 535, 647 A.2d 1218 (1994) — Supp
Ross v. Early, 899 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D. Md. 2012) (applying Maryland law) — Supp
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 122 A.2d 457 (1956) — Supp
Shipp v. Autoville Ltd., 23 Md. App. 555, 328 A.2d 349 (1974) — Supp
Stutzman v. Krenik, 350 F. Supp. 3d 366 (D. Md. 2018) (applying Maryland law) — Supp
Massachusetts
Godette v. Stanley, 490 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D. Mass. 2007) (applying Massachusetts law) — Supp

Julian v. Randazzo, 380 Mass. 391, 403 N.E.2d 931 (1980) — Supp
Lucien-Calixte v. David, 405 F. Supp. 3d 171 (D. Mass. 2019) (applying Massachusetts law) — Supp
Morrissey v. Town of Agawam, 883 F. Supp. 2d 300 (D. Mass. 2012) (applying Massachusetts law) — Supp
Watson v. Mita, 396 F. Supp. 3d 220 (D. Mass. 2019) (applying Massachusetts law) — Supp
Michigan
Bell v. Fox, 206 Mich. App. 522, 522 N.W.2d 869 (1994) — Supp
Blase v. Appicelli, 195 Mich. App. 174, 489 N.W.2d 129 (1992) — Supp
Bonkowski v. Arlan's Dept. Store, 12 Mich. App. 88, 162 N.W.2d 347 (1968) — Supp
Brewer v. Perrin, 132 Mich. App. 520, 349 N.W.2d 198 (1984) — Supp
Burns v. Olde Discount Corp., 212 Mich. App. 576, 538 N.W.2d 686 (1995) — Supp
Crawford v. Huber, 215 Mich. 564, 184 N.W. 594, 39 A.L.R. 1392 (1921) — Text
Doak v. Springstead, 284 Mich. 459, 279 N.W. 898 (1938) — Text
Flones v. Dalman, 199 Mich. App. 396, 502 N.W.2d 725 (1993) — Supp
Gooch v. Wachowiak, 352 Mich. 347, 89 N.W.2d 496 (1958) — Supp
Hall v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 153 Mich. App. 609, 396 N.W.2d 809 (1986) — Supp
Moore v. Detroit Entertainment, L.L.C., 279 Mich. App. 195, 755 N.W.2d 686 (2008) — Supp
Tope v. Howe, 179 Mich. App. 91, 445 N.W.2d 452 (1989) — Supp
Young v. Barker, 158 Mich. App. 709, 405 N.W.2d 395 (1987) — Supp
Minnesota
Altman v. Knox Lumber Co., 381 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) — Supp
Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31 (Minn. 1990) — Supp
Parada v. Anoka County, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1229 (D. Minn. 2018) (applying Minnesota law) — Supp
Perkins v. St. Louis County, 397 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) — Supp
Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2014) (applying Minnesota law) — Supp
Saterdalen v. Spencer, 725 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2013) (applying Minnesota law) — Supp
Mississippi
Howell v. Viener, 179 Miss. 872, 176 So. 731 (1937) — Text
Southwest Drug Stores of Miss., Inc. v. Garner, 195 So. 2d 837, 29 A.L.R.3d 953 (Miss. 1967) — Supp
Turner v. Hudson Salvage, Inc., 709 So. 2d 425 (Miss. 1998) — Supp
Missouri
Adams v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 272 S.W. 984 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925) — Text
Bramon v. U-Haul, Inc., 945 S.W.2d 676 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1997) — Supp
Carter v. Casey (1941) — Mo App —, 153 SW2d 744 — Text
Copeland v. Wicks, 468 S.W.3d 886 (Mo. 2015) — Supp
Dorris v. Zayre Corp., 619 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1981) — Supp
Dowell v. Lincoln County, 927 F. Supp. 2d 741 (E.D. Mo. 2013) (applying Missouri law) — Supp
Edwards v. McNeill, 894 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1995) — Supp
Greaves v. Kansas City Junior Orpheum Co., 229 Mo. App. 663, 80 S.W.2d 228 (1935) — Text
Hurst v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 107 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937) — Text
McGill v. Walnut Realty Co. (1941) — Mo App —, 148 SW2d 131 — Text
Oliver v. Kessler, 95 S.W.2d 1226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936) — Text
Palcher v. J.C. Nichols Co., 783 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1990) — Supp
Peak v. W. T. Grant Co., 386 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) — Supp
Redican v. K Mart Corp., 734 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1987) — Supp
Routh v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 708 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1986) — Supp
Schuler v. Hughes, 52 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932) — Text
Stewart v. K-Mart Corp., 747 S.W.2d 205 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1988) — Supp

Thompson v. Farmers' Exchange Bank, 333 Mo. 437, 62 S.W.2d 803 (1933) — Text
Titus v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 232 Mo. App. 987, 123 S.W.2d 574 (1938) — Text
Utz v. Mayes, 267 S.W. 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924) — Text
Vanneman v. W. T. Grant Co., 351 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. 1961) — Supp
Wilton v. Cates, 774 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1989) — Supp
Winegar v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 163 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942) — Supp
Montana
Dean v. Sanders County, 2009 MT 88, 350 Mont. 8, 204 P.3d 722 (2009) — Supp
Kichnet v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 2012 MT 68, 364 Mont. 347, 274 P.3d 740 (2012) — Supp
Roberts Litigation, In re, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (D. Mont. 2015) (applying Montana law) — Supp
Nebraska
Douglas, State ex rel. v. Ledwith, 204 Neb. 6, 281 N.W.2d 729 (1979) — Supp
Hall v. Rice, 117 Neb. 813, 223 N.W. 4, 78 A.L.R. 1421 (1929) — Text
Latek v. K Mart Corp., 224 Neb. 807, 401 N.W.2d 503 (1987) — Supp
Nevada
Garton v. City of Reno, 102 Nev. 313, 720 P.2d 1227 (1986) — Supp
Grover v. Clark County, 97 Nev. 104, 625 P.2d 85 (1981) — Supp
Hazelwood v. Harrah's, 109 Nev. 1005, 862 P.2d 1189 (1993) — Supp
Hernandez v. City of Reno, 97 Nev. 429, 634 P.2d 668 (1981) — Supp
Lerner Shops of Nev., Inc. v. Marin, 83 Nev. 75, 423 P.2d 398 (1967) — Supp
Plaza v. City of Reno, 111 Nev. 814, 898 P.2d 114 (1995) — Supp
Yada v. Simpson, 112 Nev. 254, 913 P.2d 1261 (1996) — Supp
New Hampshire
Farrelly v. City of Concord, 168 N.H. 430, 130 A.3d 548 (2015) — Supp
Hickox v. J. B. Morin Agency, Inc., 110 N.H. 438, 272 A.2d 321 (1970) — Supp
Ojo v. Lorenzo, 164 N.H. 717, 64 A.3d 974 (2013) — Supp
New Jersey
Baldwin v. Point Pleasant Beach & Surf Club, 3 N.J. Super. 284, 66 A.2d 62 (Law Div. 1949) — Supp
Carollo v. Supermarkets General Corp., 251 N.J. Super. 264, 597 A.2d 1105 (App. Div. 1991) — Supp
Di Giovanni v. Pessel, 104 N.J. Super. 550, 250 A.2d 756 (App. Div. 1969) — Supp
Fleming v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 255 N.J. Super. 108, 604 A.2d 657 (Law Div. 1992) — Supp
Hayes v. Mercer County, 217 N.J. Super. 614, 526 A.2d 737 (App. Div. 1987) — Supp
Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 38 N.J. Super. 317, 118 A.2d 854 (App. Div. 1955) — Supp
Liptak v. Rite Aid, Inc., 289 N.J. Super. 199, 673 A.2d 309 (App. Div. 1996) — Supp
Mesgleski v. Oraboni, 330 N.J. Super. 10, 748 A.2d 1130 (App. Div. 2000) — Supp
Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 117 A.3d 1206 (2015) — Supp
Pantalone v. Bally's Park Place Casino Hotel, 228 N.J. Super. 121, 549 A.2d 55 (App. Div. 1988) — Supp
Sanducci v. City of Hoboken, 315 N.J. Super. 475, 719 A.2d 160 (App. Div. 1998) — Supp
Wiegand v. Meade, 108 N.J.L. 471, 158 A. 825 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1932) — Text
Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 316 N.J. Super. 487, 720 A.2d 645 (App. Div. 1998) — Supp
New Mexico
Benavidez v. Shutiva, 2015-NMCA-065, 350 P.3d 1234 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) — Supp
Ganley v. Jojola, 402 F. Supp. 3d 1021 (D.N.M. 2019) (applying New Mexico law) — Supp
State v. Johnson, 1996-NMSC-075, 122 N.M. 696, 930 P.2d 1148 (1996) — Supp
Stienbaugh v. Payless Drug Store, Inc., 1965-NMSC-033, 75 N.M. 118, 401 P.2d 104 (1965) — Supp

New York
Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying New York law) — Supp
Adams v. City of New York, 167 A.D.3d 825, 90 N.Y.S.3d 149 (2d Dep't 2018) — Supp
Agar v. Kelsey, 253 A.D. 726, 300 N.Y.S. 630 (2d Dep't 1937) — Text
Ball v. Miller, 164 A.D.3d 728, 83 N.Y.S.3d 169 (2d Dep't 2018) — Supp
Barnes v. Bollhorst, 28 Misc. 2d 866, 215 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup 1961) — Supp
Barr v. Albany County, 50 N.Y.2d 247, 428 N.Y.S.2d 665, 406 N.E.2d 481 (1980) — Supp
Ben-Zaken v. City of New Rochelle, 273 A.D.2d 426, 710 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dep't 2000) — Supp
Bennett v. New York City Housing Authority, 245 A.D.2d 254, 665 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2d Dep't 1997) — Supp
Berson v. City of New York, 122 A.D.2d 7, 504 N.Y.S.2d 177 (2d Dep't 1986) — Supp
Blanchfield v. State, 104 Misc. 2d 21, 427 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Ct. Cl. 1980) — Supp
Boans v. Town of Cheektowaga, 5 F. Supp. 3d 364 (W.D. N.Y. 2014) (applying New York law) — Supp
Brewster v. City of New York, 111 A.D.2d 892, 490 N.Y.S.2d 601 (2d Dep't 1985) — Supp
Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 (1975) — Supp
Brown v. Roland, 215 A.D.2d 1000, 627 N.Y.S.2d 791 (3d Dep't 1995) — Supp
Callahan v. City of New York, 90 F. Supp. 3d 60 (E.D. N.Y. 2015) (applying New York law) — Supp
Caminito v. City of New York, 45 Misc. 2d 241, 256 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup 1965) — Supp
Carrillos v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 87 F. Supp. 3d 357 (E.D. N.Y. 2015) (applying New York law) — Supp
Chillemi v. Town of Southampton, 943 F. Supp. 2d 365 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) (applying New York law) — Supp
Clark v. Nannery, 292 N.Y. 105, 54 N.E.2d 31 (1944) — Supp
Coffey v. Town of Wheatland, 135 A.D.2d 1125, 523 N.Y.S.2d 267 (4th Dep't 1987) — Supp
Coleman v. City of New York, 182 A.D.2d 200, 588 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1st Dep't 1992) — Supp
Collins v. Brown, 129 A.D.2d 902, 514 N.Y.S.2d 538 (3d Dep't 1987) — Supp
Cope v. John Wanamaker of N.Y., 249 A.D. 747, 292 N.Y.S. 51 (2d Dep't 1936) — Text
Costello v. Milano, 20 F. Supp. 3d 406, 310 Ed. Law Rep. 946 (S.D. N.Y. 2014) (applying New York law) — Supp
Damilitis v. Kerjas Lunch Corp., 165 Misc. 186, 300 N.Y.S. 574 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937) — Text
DeFilippo v. County of Nassau, 183 A.D.2d 695, 583 N.Y.S.2d 283 (2d Dep't 1992) — Supp
Dennis v. State, 96 A.D.2d 1143, 467 N.Y.S.2d 737 (4th Dep't 1983) — Supp
Fortunato v. City of New York, 63 A.D.3d 880, 882 N.Y.S.2d 195 (2d Dep't 2009) — Supp
Freeman v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 243 A.D.2d 409, 663 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1st Dep't 1997) — Supp
Genovese v. Town of Southampton, 921 F. Supp. 2d 8 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) (applying New York law) — Supp
Gill v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 284 A.D. 36, 129 N.Y.S.2d 288, 49 A.L.R.2d 1452 (3d Dep't 1954) — Supp
Gisondi v. Town of Harrison, 72 N.Y.2d 280, 532 N.Y.S.2d 234, 528 N.E.2d 157, 81 A.L.R.4th 1021 (1988) — Supp
Goldstein v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co., 207 A.D.2d 723, 616 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1st Dep't 1994) — Supp
Goldstein v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co., 155 Misc. 2d 1, 597 N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Term 1993) — Supp
Grant v. City of Syracuse, 357 F. Supp. 3d 180 (N.D. N.Y. 2019) (applying New York law) — Supp
Guzman v. City of New York, 236 A.D.2d 444, 653 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2d Dep't 1997) — Supp
Guzy v. Guzy, 16 Misc. 2d 975, 184 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Sup 1959) — Supp
Heath v. State, 229 A.D.2d 912, 645 N.Y.S.2d 366 (4th Dep't 1996) — Supp
Hernandez v. City of New York, 100 A.D.3d 433, 953 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1st Dep't 2012) — Supp
Hershey v. Goldstein, 938 F. Supp. 2d 491, 297 Ed. Law Rep. 869 (S.D. N.Y. 2013) (applying New York law) — Supp
Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d 369 (S.D. N.Y. 2015) (applying New York law) — Supp
Holmes v. City of New Rochelle, 190 A.D.2d 713, 593 N.Y.S.2d 320 (2d Dep't 1993) — Supp
Hoyos v. City of New York, 999 F. Supp. 2d 375 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) (applying New York law) — Supp
Hugar v. Nigro, 207 A.D.2d 954, 616 N.Y.S.2d 833 (4th Dep't 1994) — Supp
Hunter v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 863 F. Supp. 2d 190 (E.D. N.Y. 2012) (applying New York law) — Supp
Jackson v. City of New York, 939 F. Supp. 2d 219 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) (applying New York law) — Supp
Jackson ex rel. Jackson v. Suffolk County, 87 F. Supp. 3d 386 (E.D. N.Y. 2015) (applying New York law) — Supp
Jenkins v. State, 171 A.D.3d 1368, 99 N.Y.S.3d 99 (3d Dep't 2019) — Supp

Jenks v. State, 213 A.D.2d 513, 623 N.Y.S.2d 916 (2d Dep't 1995) — Supp
Kandekore v. Town of Greenburgh, 243 A.D.2d 610, 663 N.Y.S.2d 274 (2d Dep't 1997) — Supp
Kenyon v. Lord & Taylor, Inc., 143 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup 1955) — Supp
Krafft v. State, 52 Misc. 2d 35, 275 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Ct. Cl. 1966) — Supp
Kramer v. City of New York, 173 A.D.2d 155, 569 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1st Dep't 1991) — Supp
Lawson v. New York City Housing Authority, 223 A.D.2d 532, 636 N.Y.S.2d 126 (2d Dep't 1996) — Supp
Lee v. City of New York, 272 A.D.2d 586, 709 N.Y.S.2d 102 (2d Dep't 2000) — Supp
Lewis v. Caputo, 95 A.D.3d 262, 944 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 2012) — Supp
Linehan v. State, 201 A.D.2d 706, 608 N.Y.S.2d 294 (2d Dep't 1994) — Supp
Loeb v. Teitelbaum, 77 A.D.2d 92, 432 N.Y.S.2d 487 (2d Dep't 1980) — Supp
Luppo v. Waldbaum, Inc., 131 A.D.2d 443, 515 N.Y.S.2d 871 (2d Dep't 1987) — Supp
Lynn v. State, 33 A.D.3d 673, 822 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't 2006) — Supp
Maracle v. State, 50 Misc. 2d 348, 270 N.Y.S.2d 439 (Ct. Cl. 1966) — Supp
Marks v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 284 A.D. 251, 131 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1st Dep't 1954) — Supp
Martin v. Rosenzweig, 70 A.D.3d 1112, 894 N.Y.S.2d 228 (3d Dep't 2010) — Supp
Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 276 A.D.2d 993, 714 N.Y.S.2d 572 (3d Dep't 2000) — Supp
Matthews v. City of New York, 889 F. Supp. 2d 418 (E.D. N.Y. 2012) (applying New York law) — Supp
Maxie v. Gimbel Bros. Inc., 102 Misc. 2d 296, 423 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup 1979) — Supp
Maxwell v. City of New York, 156 A.D.2d 28, 554 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1st Dep't 1990) — Supp
McKay v. City of New York, 32 F. Supp. 3d 499 (S.D. N.Y. 2014) (applying New York law) — Supp
McLoughlin v. New York Edison Co., 252 N.Y. 202, 169 N.E. 277 (1929) — Text
Melito v. City of Utica, 210 A.D.2d 888, 620 N.Y.S.2d 648 (4th Dep't 1994) — Supp
Milfort v. Prevete, 3 F. Supp. 3d 14 (E.D. N.Y. 2014) (applying New York law) — Supp
Minott v. City of New York, 203 A.D.2d 265, 609 N.Y.S.2d 334 (2d Dep't 1994) — Supp
Molina v. City of New York, 28 A.D.3d 372, 814 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1st Dep't 2006) — Supp
Morel v. Crimaldi, 256 A.D.2d 188, 683 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1st Dep't 1998) — Supp
Morgan v. New York Cent. R. Co., 256 A.D. 177, 9 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1st Dep't 1939) — Text
Morrello v. Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc., 53 N.Y.2d 775, 439 N.Y.S.2d 359, 421 N.E.2d 851 (1981) — Supp
Moulton v. State, 114 A.D.3d 115, 977 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dep't 2013) — Supp
Mubarez v. State, 115 Misc. 2d 57, 453 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Ct. Cl. 1982) — Supp
Murphy v. County of Nassau, 154 Misc. 2d 605, 585 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup 1992) — Supp
Murphy v. City of Rochester, 986 F. Supp. 2d 257, 305 Ed. Law Rep. 762 (W.D. N.Y. 2013) (applying New York law) — Supp
Nasca v. Sgro, 130 A.D.3d 588, 13 N.Y.S.3d 188 (2d Dep't 2015) — Supp
Nolasco v. City of New York, 131 A.D.3d 683, 15 N.Y.S.3d 449 (2d Dep't 2015) — Supp
O'Donnell v. K-Mart Corp., 100 A.D.2d 488, 474 N.Y.S.2d 344 (4th Dep't 1984) — Supp
Okunubi v. City of New York, 109 A.D.3d 888, 971 N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't 2013) — Supp
Orminski v. Village of Lake Placid, 268 A.D.2d 780, 702 N.Y.S.2d 181 (3d Dep't 2000) — Supp
Ostrover v. City of New York, 192 A.D.2d 115, 600 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1st Dep't 1993) — Supp
Pantazis v. Bleau Towing Service, Inc., 145 A.D.2d 816, 535 N.Y.S.2d 802 (3d Dep't 1988) — Supp
Parkin v. Cornell University, Inc., 78 N.Y.2d 523, 577 N.Y.S.2d 227, 583 N.E.2d 939, 71 Ed. Law Rep. 863 (1991) — Supp
Parkin v. Cornell University, Inc., 164 A.D.2d 240, 562 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 64 Ed. Law Rep. 1148 (3d Dep't 1990) — Supp
Paulos v. City of New York, 122 A.D.3d 815, 997 N.Y.S.2d 452 (2d Dep't 2014) — Supp
Pawloski v. State, 45 Misc. 2d 933, 258 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Ct. Cl. 1965) — Supp
Pelayo v. Port Authority, 893 F. Supp. 2d 632 (S.D. N.Y. 2012) (applying New York law) — Supp
Petrychenko v. Solovey, 99 A.D.3d 777, 952 N.Y.S.2d 575 (2d Dep't 2012) — Supp
Rakidjian v. County of Suffolk, 28 A.D.3d 734, 814 N.Y.S.2d 248 (2d Dep't 2006) — Supp
Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 239 A.D. 289, 267 N.Y.S. 221 (1st Dep't 1933) — Text
Richardson v. New York University, 202 A.D.2d 295, 609 N.Y.S.2d 180, 90 Ed. Law Rep. 332 (1st Dep't 1994) — Supp
Rivera v. City of New York, 40 A.D.3d 334, 836 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1st Dep't 2007) — Supp

Roberts v. City of New York, 171 A.D.3d 139, 97 N.Y.S.3d 3 (1st Dep't 2019) — Supp
Rodgers v. City of New York, 106 A.D.3d 1068, 966 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't 2013) — Supp
Rodney v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 149 Misc. 271, 267 N.Y.S. 86 (Sup 1932) — Text
Rodriguez v. City of New York, 149 Misc. 2d 295, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup 1990) — Supp
Romeo v. Oneida County, 135 A.D.2d 1099, 523 N.Y.S.2d 318 (4th Dep't 1987) — Supp
Rucks v. City of New York, 96 F. Supp. 3d 138 (S.D. N.Y. 2015) (applying New York law) — Supp
Sager v. Rochester General Hosp., 169 Misc. 2d 643, 647 N.Y.S.2d 408 (Sup 1996) — Supp
Sanders v. Rolnick, 188 Misc. 627, 67 N.Y.S.2d 652 (App. Term 1947) — Supp
Saunsen v. State, 81 A.D.2d 252, 440 N.Y.S.2d 281 (2d Dep't 1981) — Supp
Savane v. District Attorney of New York County, 148 A.D.3d 591, 50 N.Y.S.3d 71 (1st Dep't 2017) — Supp
Shaw v. City of New York, 139 A.D.3d 698, 31 N.Y.S.3d 155 (2d Dep't 2016) — Supp
Stearns v. New York City Transit Authority, 24 Misc. 2d 216, 200 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sup 1960) — Supp
Stratton v. City of Albany, 204 A.D.2d 924, 612 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dep't 1994) — Supp
Stuart v. Porcello, 193 A.D.2d 311, 603 N.Y.S.2d 597 (3d Dep't 1993) — Supp
Swinton v. City of New York, 61 A.D.3d 557, 877 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1st Dep't 2009) — Supp
Tepperman v. New York City Transit Authority, 133 Misc. 2d 788, 508 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1986) — Supp
Tetreault v. State, 108 A.D.2d 1072, 485 N.Y.S.2d 864 (3d Dep't 1985) — Supp
Theobald v. City of New York, 406 F. Supp. 3d 270 (E.D. N.Y. 2019) (applying New York law) — Supp
Traversara v. Pinelli, 140 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup 1955) — Supp
Vallon v. Ramage, 196 Misc. 740, 93 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup 1949) — Supp
Van Buren v. Ford, 189 Misc. 352, 71 N.Y.S.2d 551 (County Ct. 1947) — Supp
Varanelli v. Suffolk County, 130 A.D.2d 653, 515 N.Y.S.2d 584 (2d Dep't 1987) — Supp
Varriale v. Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc., 76 A.D.2d 991, 429 N.Y.S.2d 302 (3d Dep't 1980) — Supp
Versosa v. City of New York, 22 Misc. 2d 597, 194 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup 1959) — Supp
Washington-Herrera v. Town of Greenburgh, 101 A.D.3d 986, 956 N.Y.S.2d 487 (2d Dep't 2012) — Supp
Weiner v. McKeefery, 90 F. Supp. 3d 17 (E.D. N.Y. 2015) (applying New York law) — Supp
Weingarten v. Halfpenny Auto Parts, Inc., 138 A.D.2d 373, 525 N.Y.S.2d 657 (2d Dep't 1988) — Supp
Williams v. Goodfriend, 347 F. Supp. 3d 169 (W.D. N.Y. 2018) (applying New York law) — Supp
Williams v. Moore, 197 A.D.2d 511, 602 N.Y.S.2d 199 (2d Dep't 1993) — Supp
Williams v. City of New York, 114 A.D.3d 852, 981 N.Y.S.2d 114 (2d Dep't 2014) — Supp
Willinger v. City of New Rochelle, 212 A.D.2d 526, 622 N.Y.S.2d 321 (2d Dep't 1995) — Supp
Zimmerman v. City of New York, 40 Misc. 2d 179, 242 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Sup 1963) — Supp
Zwecker v. Clinch, 279 A.D.2d 572, 720 N.Y.S.2d 150 (2d Dep't 2001) — Supp
North Carolina
Adams v. City of Raleigh, 245 N.C. App. 330, 782 S.E.2d 108 (2016) — Supp
Alexander v. Lindsey, 230 N.C. 663, 55 S.E.2d 470 (1949) — Supp
Butler v. Holt-Williamson Mfg. Co., 185 N.C. 250, 116 S.E. 726 (1923) — Text
Caudle v. Benbow, 228 N.C. 282, 45 S.E.2d 361 (1947) — Supp
Marlowe v. Piner, 119 N.C. App. 125, 458 S.E.2d 220 (1995) — Supp
Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2014) (applying North Carolina law) — Supp
Moore v. Evans, 124 N.C. App. 35, 476 S.E.2d 415 (1996) — Supp
Mullins by Mullins v. Friend, 116 N.C. App. 676, 449 S.E.2d 227 (1994) — Supp
Myrick v. Cooley, 91 N.C. App. 209, 371 S.E.2d 492 (1988) — Supp
Rhodes v. Collins, 198 N.C. 23, 150 S.E. 492 (1929) — Text
North Dakota
Haggard v. First Nat. Bank of Mandan, 72 N.D. 434, 8 N.W.2d 5 (1942) — Supp
Wishnatsky v. Bergquist, 550 N.W.2d 394, 110 Ed. Law Rep. 1246 (N.D. 1996) — Supp

Ohio
Ashcroft v. Mt. Sinai Medical Ctr., 68 Ohio App. 3d 359, 588 N.E.2d 280 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1990) — Supp
Buchheit v. Youngstown State Univ., 79 Ohio Misc. 2d 64, 670 N.E.2d 1379, 113 Ed. Law Rep. 415 (Ct. Cl. 1996) — Supp
Chandler v. State, 95 Ohio App. 3d 142, 641 N.E.2d 1382 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1994) — Supp
Click v. Parish, 89 Ohio App. 318, 46 Ohio Op. 38, 60 Ohio L. Abs. 169, 98 N.E.2d 333 (3d Dist. Hardin County 1950) — Supp
Evans v. Smith, 97 Ohio App. 3d 59, 646 N.E.2d 217 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 1994) — Supp
Gover v. State, 67 Ohio St. 3d 93, 616 N.E.2d 207 (1993) — Supp
Isaiah v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 111 Ohio App. 537, 15 Ohio Op. 2d 291, 174 N.E.2d 128, 86 A.L.R.2d 430 (9th
Dist. Summit County 1959) — Supp
Lausin ex rel. Lausin v. Bishko, 727 F. Supp. 2d 610, 262 Ed. Law Rep. 428 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (applying Ohio law) — Supp
LeFever v. Ferguson, 956 F. Supp. 2d 819 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (applying Ohio law) — Supp
Matlock v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control, 77 Ohio Misc. 2d 13, 665 N.E.2d 771 (Ct. Cl. 1996) — Supp
McCoy v. Baer, 100 Ohio App. 274, 60 Ohio Op. 226, 136 N.E.2d 66 (2d Dist. Franklin County 1955) — Supp
McFinley v. Bethesda Oak Hosp., 79 Ohio App. 3d 613, 607 N.E.2d 936 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 1992) — Supp
McKee v. McCann, 2017-Ohio-4072, 102 N.E.3d 38 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 2017) — Supp
Meakens v. Benz, 515 Fed. Appx. 414 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying Ohio law) — Supp
Nappi v. Wilson, 22 Ohio App. 520, 4 Ohio L. Abs. 766, 155 N.E. 151 (2d Dist. Franklin County 1926) — Text
Piro v. Franklin Twp., 102 Ohio App. 3d 130, 656 N.E.2d 1035 (9th Dist. Summit County 1995) — Supp
Shoup v. Doyle, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (applying Ohio law) — Supp
Thomas v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 3 Ohio Op. 2d 61, 40 Ohio L. Abs. 29, 57 N.E.2d 103 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. Franklin County
1941) — Supp
Williams v. Crosby, 43 F. Supp. 3d 794 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (applying Ohio law) — Supp
Oklahoma
Courtney v. Oklahoma ex rel., Dept. of Public Safety, 722 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2013) (applying Oklahoma law) — Supp
Delong v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept. of Public Safety, 1998 OK CIV APP 32, 956 P.2d 937 (Div. 1 1998) — Supp
Irwin v. SWO Acquisition Corp., 1992 OK CIV APP 48, 830 P.2d 587 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1992) — Supp
Moore v. Target Stores, Inc., 1977 OK CIV APP 35, 571 P.2d 1236 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1977) — Supp
Moyer v. Foster, 1951 OK 203, 205 Okla. 26, 234 P.2d 415 (1951) — Supp
Overall v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 1995 OK CIV APP 107, 910 P.2d 1087 (Ct. App. Div. 4 1995) — Supp
Swafford v. Vermillion, 1953 OK 227, 261 P.2d 187 (Okla. 1953) — Supp
Oregon
Brown v. Meier & Frank Co., 160 Or. 608, 86 P.2d 79 (1939) — Text
Christ v. McDonald, 152 Or. 494, 52 P.2d 655 (1935) — Text
Joseph v. Meier & Frank Co., 120 Or. 117, 250 P. 739 (1926) — Text
McNeff v. Heider, 216 Or. 583, 337 P.2d 819 (1959) — Supp
Napier v. Sheridan, 24 Or. App. 761, 547 P.2d 1399 (1976) — Supp
O'Brien v. Eugene Chemical Exports, Inc., 63 Or. App. 284, 664 P.2d 1106 (1983) — Supp
Paget v. Cordes, 129 Or. 224, 277 P. 101 (1929) — Text
Pierson v. Multnomah County, 301 Or. 48, 718 P.2d 738 (1986) — Supp
Vandermeer v. Pacific Northwest Development Corp., 274 Or. 221, 545 P.2d 868 (1976) — Supp
Wolf v. Nordstrom, Inc., 51 Or. App. 715, 626 P.2d 953 (1981) — Supp
Pennsylvania
Berrios v. City of Philadelphia, 96 F. Supp. 3d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (applying Pennsylvania law) — Supp
Cassidy v. Abington Tp., 131 Pa. Commw. 637, 571 A.2d 543 (1990) — Supp
DiStefano v. Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., 616 Fed. Appx. 478 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying Pennsylvania law) — Supp
Fagan v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation, 299 Pa. 109, 149 A. 159 (1930) — Text
Gorman v. Bail, 947 F. Supp. 2d 509 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (applying Pennsylvania law) — Supp

Leonard v. Cole, 134 Pa. Commw. 14, 578 A.2d 53 (1990) — Supp
Luck v. Mount Airy No. 1, LLC, 901 F. Supp. 2d 547 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (applying Pennsylvania law) — Supp
McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d 797 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) — Supp
Sarin v. Magee, 333 F. Supp. 3d 475 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (applying Pennsylvania law) — Supp
Spiker v. Allegheny County Bd. of Probation and Parole, 920 F. Supp. 2d 580 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (applying Pennsylvania law)
— Supp
Wilson v. Emery, 1 Pa. D. & C. 517, 1921 WL 3161 (C.P. 1921) — Text
Rhode Island
Barth v. Flad, 99 R.I. 446, 208 A.2d 533 (1965) — Supp
Cioci v. Santos, 99 R.I. 308, 207 A.2d 300 (1965) — Supp
Dyson v. City of Pawtucket, 670 A.2d 233 (R.I. 1996) — Supp
Horton v. Portsmouth Police Dept., 22 A.3d 1115 (R.I. 2011) — Supp
Johnson v. Palange, 122 R.I. 361, 406 A.2d 360 (1979) — Supp
Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 93 R.I. 252, 174 A.2d 560 (1961) — Supp
Moody v. McElroy, 513 A.2d 5 (R.I. 1986) — Supp
South Carolina
Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015) (applying South Carolina law) — Supp
Caldwell v. K-Mart Corp., 306 S.C. 27, 410 S.E.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1991) — Supp
Gathers v. Harris Teeter Supermarket, Inc., 282 S.C. 220, 317 S.E.2d 748 (Ct. App. 1984) — Supp
Jackson v. City of Abbeville, 366 S.C. 662, 623 S.E.2d 656 (Ct. App. 2005) — Supp
Westbrook v. Hutchison, 195 S.C. 101, 10 S.E.2d 145 (1940) — Text
South Dakota
Bean v. Best, 77 S.D. 433, 93 N.W.2d 403 (1958) — Supp
Hart v. Miller, 2000 SD 53, 609 N.W.2d 138 (S.D. 2000) — Supp
Heib v. Lehrkamp, 2005 SD 98, 704 N.W.2d 875 (S.D. 2005) — Supp
Tennessee
Brown v. Christian Bros. University, 428 S.W.3d 38, 304 Ed. Law Rep. 628 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) — Supp
Brown v. SCOA Industries, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 916 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) — Supp
Holloran v. Duncan, 92 F. Supp. 3d 774 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) (applying Tennessee law) — Supp
Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W.2d 13 (1943) — Supp
McLaughlin v. Smith, 56 Tenn. App. 715, 412 S.W.2d 21 (1966) — Supp
Woods v. Harrell, 596 S.W.2d 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) — Supp
Texas
Baker Co. v. Turpin, 53 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App. Waco 1932) — Text
Bossin v. Towber, 894 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1994) — Supp
Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank of Dallas v. Britton, 134 Tex. 529, 135 S.W.2d 981 (Comm'n App. 1940) — Text
Holguin v. Lopez, 584 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (applying Texas law) — Supp
Moore's, Inc. v. Garcia, 604 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. Corpus Christi 1980) — Supp
Morris v. University of Tex., 348 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1961) — Supp
Villegas v. Griffin Industries, 975 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1998) — Supp
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Odem, 929 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1996) — Supp
Utah
McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984) — Supp
Peak Alarm Co., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2010 UT 22, 243 P.3d 1221 (Utah 2010) — Supp
Penrod v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987) — Supp
Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979) — Supp

Vermont
Crowell v. Kirkpatrick, 667 F. Supp. 2d 391 (D. Vt. 2009) (applying Vermont law) — Supp
Long v. L'Esperance, 166 Vt. 566, 701 A.2d 1048 (1997) — Supp
Virginia
Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 124 S.E. 242, 40 A.L.R. 54 (1924) — Text
Ford v. City of Newport News, 23 Va. App. 137, 474 S.E.2d 848 (1996) — Supp
Jury v. Giant of Maryland, Inc., 254 Va. 235, 491 S.E.2d 718 (1997) — Supp
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Wickline, 188 Va. 485, 50 S.E.2d 387 (1948) — Supp
S.H. Kress & Co. v. Musgrove, 153 Va. 348, 149 S.E. 453 (1929) — Text
Zayre of Va., Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47, 147 S.E.2d 710 (1966) — Supp
Washington
Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wash. 2d 582, 664 P.2d 492 (1983) — Supp
Coles v. McNamara, 131 Wash. 377, 230 P. 430 (1924) — Text
Fondren v. Klickitat County, 79 Wash. App. 850, 905 P.2d 928 (Div. 3 1995) — Supp
Goldsmith v. Snohomish County, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (applying Washington law) — Supp
Gurno v. Town of LaConner, 65 Wash. App. 218, 828 P.2d 49 (Div. 1 1992) — Supp
Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wash. 2d 552, 852 P.2d 295 (1993) — Supp
Jacques v. Sharp, 83 Wash. App. 532, 922 P.2d 145 (Div. 1 1996) — Supp
Kalkanes v. Willestoft, 13 Wash. 2d 127, 124 P.2d 219 (1942) — Supp
McBride v. Walla Walla County, 95 Wash. App. 33, 975 P.2d 1029 (Div. 3 1999) — Supp
Noel v. King County, 48 Wash. App. 227, 738 P.2d 692 (Div. 1 1987) — Supp
Sennett v. Zimmerman, 50 Wash. 2d 649, 314 P.2d 414 (1957) — Supp
Torrey v. City of Tukwila, 76 Wash. App. 32, 882 P.2d 799 (Div. 1 1994) — Supp
Tufte v. City of Tacoma, 71 Wash. 2d 866, 431 P.2d 183 (1967) — Supp
Youker v. Douglas County, 162 Wash. App. 448, 258 P.3d 60 (Div. 3 2011) — Supp
West Virginia
Lusk v. Ira Watson Co., 185 W. Va. 680, 408 S.E.2d 630 (1991) — Supp
Noce v. Ritchie, 109 W. Va. 391, 155 S.E. 127 (1930) — Text
Riffe v. Armstrong, 197 W. Va. 626, 477 S.E.2d 535 (1996) — Supp
Wisconsin
Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2014) (applying Wisconsin law) — Supp
Hardy v. City of Milwaukee, 88 F. Supp. 3d 852 (E.D. Wis. 2015) (applying Wisconsin law) — Supp
Lane v. Collins, 29 Wis. 2d 66, 138 N.W.2d 264 (1965) — Supp
Laska v. Steinpreis, 69 Wis. 2d 307, 231 N.W.2d 196 (1975) — Supp
Wallner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 253 Wis. 66, 33 N.W.2d 215, 10 A.L.R.2d 745 (1948) — Supp
Wyoming
Kimbley v. City of Green River, 663 P.2d 871 (Wyo. 1983) — Supp
(Supplementing annotation in 19 ALR 671.)
The rule that neither actual malice nor want of probable cause is an essential element of an action for false imprisonment has
been recognized in many cases reported since the publication of the earlier annotation.
United States
Casserly v. Wheeler (1922, CCA 9th) 282 F 389
Larocque v. Dorsey (1924, CCA 2d) 299 F 556

American R. Exp. Co. v. McDermott (1930, CCA 3d) 44 F2d 955

Bennett v. Ahrens (1932, CCA 7th) 57 F2d 948
Re Devereaux (1934, DC) 7 F Supp 991, 26 Am Bankr Rep(NS) 561 (reversed on other grounds in (1935, CCA 2d) 76 F2d
522, 28 Am Bankr Rep(NS) 605, writ of certiorari denied in (1935) 296 US 589, 80 L ed 416, 56 S Ct 100)
Alabama
Sokol Bros. Furniture Co. v. Gate (1922) 208 Ala 107, 93 So 724
Standard Oil Co. v. Humphries (1923) 209 Ala 493, 96 So 629
Phillips v. Morrow (1923) 210 Ala 34, 97 So 130
Fidelity & D. Co. v. Adkins (1930) 222 Ala 17, 130 So 552
Arizona
Adair v. Williams (1922) 24 Ariz 422, 210 P 853, 26 ALR 278
California
Collins v. Jones (1933) 131 Cal App 747, 22 P2d 39
Van Fleet v. West American Ins. Co. (1935) 5 Cal App2d 125, 42 P2d 378 (rehearing denied in (1935) 5 Cal App 2d 130, 43
P2d 557)
Florida
S.H. Kress & Co. v. Powell (1938) 132 Fla 471, 180 So 757
Dodson v. Solomon (1938) 134 Fla 284, 183 So 825
Georgia
Duckett & Co. v. Ozmer (1933) 48 Ga App 41, 172 SE 118
Sheppard v. Hale (1938) 58 Ga App 140, 197 SE 922
Vlass v. McCrary (1939) 60 Ga App 744, 5 SE2d 63
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Meek (1940) 62 Ga App 850, 10 SE2d 76
Conoly v. Imperial Tobacco Co. (1940) 63 Ga App 880, 12 SE2d 398
Idaho
Griffin v. Clark (1935) 55 Idaho 364, 42 P2d 297
Illinois
Linquist v. Friedman's Inc. (1937) 366 Ill 232, 8 NE2d 625 (affirming (1936) 285 Ill App 71, 1 NE 2d 529)
Iowa
Wilson v. Lapham (1923) 196 Iowa 745, 195 NW 235
Kentucky
Harper v. Howton (1922) 194 Ky 840, 241 SW 329
Maryland
Fleisher v. Ensminger (1922) 140 Md 604, 118 A 153
Dorsey v. Winters (1923) 143 Md 399, 122 A 257
Mahan v. Adam (1924) 144 Md 355, 124 A 901
Missouri
Thompson v. Farmers' Exch. Bank (1933) 333 Mo 437, 62 SW 2d 803
Teel v. May Dept. Stores Co. (reported herewith) ante, 495
Utz v. Mayes (1924, Mo App) 267 SW 59
Adams v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. (1925, Mo App) 272 SW 984
Schuler v. Hughes (1932, Mo App) 52 SW2d 453
Greaves v. Kansas City Junior Orpheum (1935) 229 Mo App 663, 80 SW2d 228
Hurst v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1937, Mo App) 107 SW2d 183
Carter v. Casey (1941) — Mo App —, 153 SW2d 744
Nebraska
Hall v. Rice (1929) 117 Neb 813, 223 NW 4, 78 ALR 1421
New Jersey

Wiegand v. Meade (1932) 108 NJL 471, 158 A 825 (good or evil intention in making arrest does not excuse or create tort of
false imprisonment)
New York
McLoughlin v. New York Edison Co. (1929) 252 NY 202, 169 NE 277 (reversing (1929) 225 App Div 846, 232 NYS 622)
Rodney v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. (1932) 149 Misc 271, 267 NYS 86
Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co. (1933) 239 App Div 289, 267 NYS 221 (modified in (1934) 265 NY 1, 191 NE 713)
Damilitis v. Kerjas Lunch Corp. (1937) 165 Misc 186, 300 NYS 574
North Carolina
Butler v. Holt-Williamson Mfg. Co. (1923) 185 NC 250, 116 SE 726
Rhodes v. Collins (1929) 198 NC 23, 150 SE 492 (good faith not an element)
Ohio
Nappi v. Wilson (1926) 22 Ohio App 520, 155 NE 151
Oregon
Joseph v. Meier & F. Co. (1926) 120 Or 117, 250 P 739
Paget v. Cordes (1929) 129 Or 224, 277 P 101
Brown v. Meier & F. Co. (1939) 160 Or 608, 86 P2d 79
Pennsylvania
Wilson v. Emery (1921) 1 Pa D & C 517
South Carolina
Westbrook v. Hutchison (1940) 195 SC 101, 10 SE 2d 145
Texas
Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Britton (1940) 134 Tex 529, 135 SW2d 981
Virginia
Crosswhite v. Barnes (1924) 139 Va 471, 124 SE 242, 40 ALR 54
S.H. Kress & Co. v. Musgrove (1929) 153 Va 348, 149 SE 453
Washington
Coles v. McNamara (1924) 131 Wash 377, 230 P 430
West Virginia
Noce v. Ritchie (1930) 109 W Va 391, 155 SE 127
"Actual malice or bad motives are not elements essential to constitute the trespass of false imprisonment." Adair v. Williams
(1922) 24 Ariz 422, 210 P 853, 26 ALR 278.
"A plaintiff need not prove malice as an essential element of the charge of false imprisonment, for the existence of malice is
not a prerequisite to his cause of action." Lindquist v. Friedman's Inc. (1937) 366 Ill 232, 8 NE 2d 625.
In Wilson v. Emery (1921) 1 Pa D & C 517, the court said that the legal wrong of false imprisonment imports malice, and that
the motive of the defendant is immaterial, except as affecting the amount of damages.
Neither malice, ill will, nor the slightest wrongful intention on the part of a defendant is necessary to support a judgment against
a peace officer for wrongful arrest for a past misdemeanor without warrant. Cross-white v. Barnes (1924) 139 Va 471, 124
SE 242, 40 ALR 54.
In Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co. (1933) 239 App Div 289, 267 NYS 221 (modified in (1934) 265 NY 1, 191 NE 713), the
court, differentiating between an action for malicious prosecution and one for false imprisonment, said that while a necessary
element of the former is the fact that a judicial proceeding has been commenced and prosecuted maliciously and without probable
cause, the gist of an action for false imprisonment is an unlawful detention.
While it would seem that arrest, imprisonment, and detention generally are all classified as imprisonment in so far as actions for
false imprisonment are concerned, the court, in Damilitis v. Kerjas Lunch Corp. (1937) 165 Misc 186, 300 NYS 574, an action

for false arrest and assault, in which it was alleged that the plaintiff had been arrested by a policeman at the instance of the
defendant's special officer, taken to the police station and there detained, and thereafter taken before a magistrate, where he was
discharged, stated that if it were dealing only with the plaintiff's detention upon the sworn complaint of the defendant's special
officer upon which he was arraigned before the magistrate, a different question from that of the false arrest of the plaintiff would
arise, and that in the magistrate's court the plaintiff's detention was upon lawful process, and in such circumstances, the burden
would be upon the plaintiff to show a want of probable cause, but that even malicious motives and the absence of probable
cause do not give a party arrested an action for false imprisonment, though they may aggravate his damages.
However, in Croft v. Dunphy (1932) 4 MPR (NS) 438, [1932] 1 DLR 749, where, in consequence of the seizure of a schooner
and her cargo of liquors for alleged violation of the Customs Act, the owner of such schooner brought action against the master
of the government boat making the seizure and had him arrested on the ground that he was about to leave the province, the
court, in an action for false arrest brought by such master, said that under the main rules of law governing cases of this character,
the plaintiff, to recover, must prove an absence of reasonable and probable cause for his arrest and also malice on the part of
the defendant. To a similar effect is De Clerq v. Gravel (1933) Rap Jud Quebec 71 CS 413.
While actual malice is not an essential element of the tort in an action for false imprisonment against a police officer, "legal"
malice is, and this may be inferred from the lack of authority in making the arrest or from a want of probable cause. Burk v.
Knott (1924) 20 Ala App 316, 101 So 811.
In an action for damages for both false arrest and malicious prosecution, in which it was contended by the defendants that a
conviction, later set aside by the municipal court, was prima facie evidence that there was probable cause for making the arrest,
and the plaintiff failed to show a lack of probable cause for such arrest, the court, in Galarza v. Sprague (1936) 284 Ill App 254,
1 NE2d 275, holding that the defendant was not liable therefor, quoted from Ames v. Snider (1873) 69 Ill 376, as follows: "A
party ought not to be held guilty when he sets in motion a criminal prosecution, simply because he fails to convict the person
accused, or indeed in every case where he fails to show that party was guilty. … It is sufficient if there is probable cause, whether
the accused is in fact guilty or not."
And in Seaboard Oil Co. v. Cunningham (1931, CCA 5th) 51 F2d 321 (writ of certiorari denied in (1931) 284 US 657, 76 L
ed 557, 52 S Ct 35), a suit to recover damages for malicious prosecution and false arrest, the court said that "it is essential for
the plaintiff, in an action for false arrest or malicious prosecution, to allege and prove both malice and want of probable cause,
but malice may be inferred from want of probable cause."
In Re Stone (1922, DC) 278 F 566, 47 Am Bankr Rep 621, where a default judgment had been recovered in an action for
malicious prosecution, the complaint alleging that the defendant had maliciously and without probable cause charged the
plaintiff with the crime of grand larceny, the court, vacating an order requiring the judgment creditor to show cause why the
execution of the judgment should not be stayed and the debt discharged in bankruptcy (the judgment debtor having been declared
bankrupt), stated that in New York a judgment for false imprisonment could not have been obtained, except upon a showing
of wilful and malicious injury to the complainant.
The question as to whether the fact that the complaint in an action for false arrest or imprisonment contained an allegation
of malice and lack of probable cause necessitated proof of such elements in order to recover was considered in Wilson v. Orr
(1923) 210 Ala 93, 97 So 133, wherein it was held that inasmuch as malice and lack of probable cause were averred in the
complaint in an action for false arrest, they must be proved by the plaintiff.
And in Standard Oil Co. v. Humphries (1923) 209 Ala 493, 96 So 629, a charge to the jury making the plaintiff's right to recover
for false imprisonment depend on proof of malice was held to have been properly refused, where, in the count upon which the
case went to the jury, there was no allegation of malice, the gist of the count being its allegation of the plaintiff's wrongful,
that is, unlawful, detention.

Contrariwise, the court, in Nappi v. Wilson (1926) 22 Ohio App 520, 155 NE 151, said that although the plaintiff in an action
for false imprisonment alleged want of probable cause and malice, he was not required to prove either in order to establish a
right to recover.
It would appear that malice was recognized as an element in an action against an inferior magistrate for false imprisonment,
in Berry v. Bass (1924) 157 La 81, 102 So 76, in which such a magistrate was held not liable for exceeding his jurisdiction by
imprisoning a defendant instead of giving him the alternative right of paying a fine, where there was no evidence that he acted
with malice, but it appeared that he had made an honest mistake.
It should be noted that even though, according to the weight of authority, actual malice or want of probable cause is not, primarily,
an element of an action for false imprisonment, the courts have been inclined to give it consideration in the determination of
damages, especially as to the question of punitive or exemplary damages.
United States
American R. Exp. Co. v. McDermott (1930, CCA 3d) 44 F2d 955
Alabama
Sokol Bros. Furniture Co. v. Gate (1922) 208 Ala 107, 93 So 724
Phillips v. Morrow (1923) 210 Ala 34, 97 So 130
Simpson v. Boyd (1924) 212 Ala 14, 101 So 664 (good faith as an element)
Fidelity & D. Co. v. Adkins (1930) 222 Ala 17, 130 So 552
Arkansas
Missouri P. R. Co. v. Yancey (1928) 178 Ark 147, 10 SW 2d 22
Florida
S.H. Kress & Co. v. Powell (1938) 132 Fla 471, 180 So 757
Illinois
Lindquist v. Friedman's Inc. (1937) 366 Ill 232, 8 NE2d 625
Kentucky
Harper v. Howton (1922) 194 Ky 840, 241 SW 329
Sternberg v. Hogg (1934) 254 Ky 761, 72 SW2d 421
Michigan
Crawford v. Huber (1921) 215 Mich 564, 184 NW 594, 39 ALR 1392 (good faith as an element)
Missouri
Thompson v. Farmers' Exch. Bank (1933) 333 Mo 437, 62 SW 2d 803
Utz v. Mayes (1924, Mo App) 267 SW 59
Schuler v. Hughes (1932, Mo App) 52 SW2d 453
McGill v. Walnut Realty Co. (1941) — Mo App —, 148 SW2d 131 ("legal malice")
Carter v. Casey (1941) — Mo App —, 153 SW2d 744
New York
Rodney v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. (1932) 149 Misc 271, 267 NYS 86
Cope v. John Wanamaker (1936) 249 App Div 747, 292 NYS 51 (motion to dismiss appeal denied without opinion in (1937)
273 NY 510, 6 NE2d 428, and affirmed without opinion in (1937) 274 NY 622, 10 NE2d 581)
Damilitis v. Kerjas Lunch Corp. (1937) 165 Misc 186, 300 NYS 574
North Carolina
Butler v. Holt-Williamson Mfg. Co. (1923) 185 NC 250, 116 SE 726
Rhodes v. Collins (1929) 198 NC 23, 150 SE 492 (good faith as an element)
Oregon
Joseph v. Meier & F. Co. (1926) 120 Or 117, 250 P 739
Christ v. McDonald (1935) 152 Or 494, 52 P 2d 655
Pennsylvania

Wilson v. Emery (1921) 1 Pa D & C 517

Texas
Baker Co. v. Turpin (1932, Tex Civ App) 53 SW2d 154
In Phillips v. Morrow (1923) 210 Ala 34, 97 So 130, evidence of good faith and reasonable cause was held not to be admissible,
in an action for false imprisonment, to reduce the verdict below the actual damages, although it was admissible to rebut a claim
of vindictive damages.
But in Hall v. Rice (1929) 117 Neb 813, 233 NW 4, 78 ALR 1421, an instruction by the court that the question of malice, in
an action for false imprisonment, was immaterial except as to the extent of damages was held erroneous, in that it authorized
the element of malice to enter into the assessment of damages.
In Teel v. May Dept. Stores Co. (Mo) (reported herewith) ante, 495, the court, while recognizing that it is not necessary for
a plaintiff to prove malice or want of probable cause to make a case of false imprisonment, held that although the defendant
would be liable in the absence of probable cause, it would not be liable where a probable, though not actual, cause was shown,
and that, no malice having been shown, the defendant, a department store, was not liable for the act of its employees, where
it was shown that such employees, having reason to believe that the plaintiff and her companion were endeavoring to procure
merchandise under false pretenses, detained them until the property was returned, since the owner of property has the right to
take action by force or confinement, reasonable under the circumstances, in defense of his property, in which event probable
cause may be an important element of the defense of justification. Such justification did not apply, however, to a continuance
of the detention after the probable cause had ended.
Other cases in which probable cause was recognized as a defense, or justification, in an action for false imprisonment include
the following:
United States
Director Gen. v. Kastenbaum (1923) 263 US 25, 68 L ed 146, 44 S Ct 52 (in which the court said that the standard of probable
cause for an imprisonment is not whether those committing the act of imprisonment considered it probable cause, but whether
the court thinks so)
Alabama
American R. Exp. Co. v. Summers (1922) 208 Ala 531, 94 So 737
California
Collyer v. S.H. Kress & Co. (1936) 5 Cal2d 175, 54 P2d 20 (in which the court, holding that where a person has reasonable
grounds to believe that another is stealing his property, as distinguished from cases where the offense has been completed, he is
justified in detaining the suspect for a reasonable length of time for the purpose of investigation in a reasonable manner, said:
"There seems to exist considerable confusion in the cases as to whether probable cause is a defense in false imprisonment cases
involving misdemeanors. The broad statement occasionally appears to the effect that probable cause is no defense in actions
for false imprisonment")
Allen v. McCoy (1933) 135 Cal App 500, 27 P2d 423 (rehearing denied and modified in (1933) 135 Cal App 510, 28 P2d
56) (officer)
Van Fleet v. West American Ins. Co. (1935) 5 Cal App2d 125, 42 P2d 378 (rehearing denied in (1935) 5 Cal App2d 130, 43
P2d 557) (officer)
Bettolo v. Safeway Stores (1936) 11 Cal App2d 430, 54 P2d 24
Kansas
Torson v. Baehni (1931) 134 Kan 188, 5 P2d 813 (officer)
Louisiana
Plumlee v. American R. Exp. Co. (1925) 1 La App 702
Michigan
Doak v. Springstead (1938) 284 Mich 459, 279 NW 898 (imprisonment by officer having probable cause to believe plaintiff
guilty of committing misdemeanor at time of arrest)

Mississippi
Howell v. Viener (1937) 179 Miss 872, 176 So 731
Missouri
Oliver v. Kessler (1936, Mo App) 95 SW2d 1226
New York
Agar v. Kelsey (1937) 253 App Div 726, 300 NYS 630
Morgan v. New York C. R. Co. (1939) 256 App Div 177, 9 NYS2d 339 (imprisonment by officer on charge of committing felony)
Pennsylvania
Fagan v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp. (1930) 299 Pa 109, 149 A 159 (officer)
Washington
Coles v. McNamara (1924) 131 Wash 377, 230 P 430
Without a showing of justification, any restraint is unlawful and constitutes false imprisonment. Crews-Beggs Dry Goods Co.
v. Bayle (1935) 97 Colo 568, 51 P2d 1026.
However, in Titus v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1938) 232 Mo App 987, 123 SW2d 574, the court, dismissing a contention that
probable cause is a defense to false arrest and imprisonment, and refusing to follow the decision in Collyer v. S.H. Kress &
Co. (1936) 5 Cal2d 175, 54 P2d 20, supra, which had been cited in support of such contention, said: "This opinion may declare
the law in that state, but it is in direct conflict with the rule adopted and uniformly followed by the courts of Missouri. Our
courts have held that probable cause has no place in a plaintiff's suit for false arrest if compensatory damages only are asked. …
However, probable cause may be shown in mitigation of damages, especially if exemplary or punitive damages are involved."
And in Daniels v. Milstead (1930) 221 Ala 353, 128 So 447, the fact that the defendant, a game warden, had probable cause
for believing the offense for which he made an arrest was committed, or that he acted with good intent, was held not to justify
or excuse the trespass.
In Burk v. Knott (1924) 20 Ala App 316, 101 So 811, it was held that while reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff had
committed a felony, not in the presence of the defendant officer, would be a proper defense in an action against such officer for
false imprisonment, although the plaintiff was actually innocent of such crime, reasonable ground to suspect that the plaintiff
was guilty of committing a misdemeanor did not constitute a justification for such a detention.
Information, belief, or suspicion as to the commission of felony, as justification for arrest by private person without warrant,
is the subject of an annotation in 133 ALR 608.
As to justification in action for false imprisonment by proof of existence of ground other than that on which arrest was made,
or one of several grounds on which it was made, see annotation in 64 ALR 653.
Malice, as affecting the civil liability of judicial officer for false imprisonment, is considered in an annotation in 13 ALR 1344.
As to liability of individual or private corporation for false arrest or imprisonment caused by agent or servant, see annotation
in 35 ALR 645, supplemented in 77 ALR 927.
As to charge of larceny and circumstances accompanying same as detention that will support action for false imprisoment, see
annotation in 31 ALR 314.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Detention of customers suspected of shoplifting by store security officers 45 minutes after they left the store was not
unreasonable, and, thus, store was not deprived of statutory immunity from false arrest claims, given that two separate security
officers reported customers' suspicious activity, and security supervisor and security officer reviewed surveillance videotape

before questioning customers, who were detained in the store after they were unable to explain the possession of items not listed
on receipt. LSA–C.Cr.P. art. 215. Davis v. J.C. Penney Stores, 930 So.2d 130.
Police had probable cause to arrest arrestee, thus precluding his claims of false arrest and false imprisonment brought against
city and police department; shooting victim identified arrestee as the person who shot him, identified him by name, and provided
the police with a physical description of him before the arrest, and victim's admission that the shooting was over drugs and not
over a woman, as originally claimed, as well as minor inconsistencies in complaint reports did not require further inquiry to
confirm that a crime had been committed or raise a question as to whether the officers' reliance on the victim's identification
was reasonable. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Nolasco v. City of New York, 131 A.D.3d 683, 2015 WL 5023639 (2d Dep't 2015).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest suspect for criminal contempt in the second degree, such that they could not be
liable to suspect for false arrest or false imprisonment, based on individual's statement that she had order of protection directing
suspect to stay away from her, copy of such order of protection, and witness's statement that he had observed suspect approach
within a few feet of individual. Nasca v. Sgro, 130 A.D.3d 588, 2015 WL 3971346 (2d Dep't 2015).
Defense of good faith and probable cause available to officers in a common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment is
also available to them in an action under the Civil Rights Act for damages for deprivation of such rights. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967).
Even if state trooper did violate freelance photographer's Fourth-Amendment rights when, without a warrant, he seized
photographer's camera at scene of vehicle crash, photographer failed to identify clearly established law placing illegality
of trooper's conduct beyond debate, and so trooper was entitled to qualified immunity from photographer's § 1983 suit;
photographer did not show that clearly established law then precluded reasonable trooper from believing that the exigent-
circumstances exception applied, where trooper believed photographer had violated numerous state laws, providing probable
cause to arrest him, trooper believed that photographer knew he was being investigated for possible criminal violations, trooper
believed camera and memory card contained evidence of photographer's presence at scene, camera and memory card could be
destroyed quickly, and trooper consulted with prosecutor before seizing camera. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Belsito Communications, Inc. v. Decker, 845 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2016).
Thirteen-year-old victim of hit-and-run by motor vehicle, while victim was riding on his bicycle, provided sufficiently reliable
single-suspect "show up" identification of suspect, via closed-circuit television during suspect's interview with detective, to
assist in establishing probable cause to support arrest of suspect who was allegedly passenger in vehicle, as required to overcome
arrestee's § 1983 and state-law claim of unlawful arrest against officers. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Robinson v. Cook, 706 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2013).
Grand jury's finding that there was probable cause for arrest for breaking car windows and fighting precluded arrestees' claims
for false arrest and malicious prosecution, under Massachusetts law, even though they were eventually acquitted. Kennedy v.
Town Of Billerica, 617 F.3d 520 (1st Cir. 2010).
Under Maine law, police officer was not liable, on theory of false arrest, for driving intoxicated pedestrian home after offering
him alternative of drive home or arrest for obstruction of public way; assuming that insisting on driving pedestrian home as
alternative to police station was arrest, and that officer was not protected under principle of community caretaking, officer
nonetheless had probable cause to arrest pedestrian, who had been weaving drunkenly between roadway and shoulder of well-
travelled road, causing passing cars to move in order to avoid him. 17"A M.R.S.A. § 505. Lewry v. Town of Standish, 984
F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1993).
Under Massachusetts law, police officer would not have statutory immunity from suit for false arrest if officer, while having
probable cause to arrest for one act, arrested for different act for which he had no probable cause. M.G.L.A. c. 231, § 94A; c.
263, § 3. Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1989).

Allegations that state Democratic party representatives engaged in conspiracy with police to effect unlawful arrest, when
representatives enlisted aid of police to remove plaintiff from speakersplatform at candidatesforum after plaintiff refused to
leave voluntarily, were insufficient to state claims against party representatives for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution;
after plaintiff had twice refused requests to leave speakersplatform, where he was not authorized to be, police officers had
probable cause to arrest plaintiff for criminal trespass, and plaintiff made no allegation that party representatives played any
role in determining length of plaintiff confinement or on what charge plaintiff would be prosecuted. Kay v. New Hampshire
Democratic Party, 821 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1987).
Police officers, who arrested blind diabetic for failure to exit bus at terminal under mistaken belief that diabetic was drunk
or under influence of drugs, were not liable, under Maine law, for false imprisonment for time during which diabetic was
transported, handcuffed in back floor well of police car, as no information came to officersattention which would give rise to
doubts negating initial probable cause finding. Thompson v. Olson, 798 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1986).
Police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's claim of false arrest, absent even an arguable presence of
probable cause to arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Cocroft v. Smith, 95 F. Supp. 3d 119 (D. Mass. 2015).
It was objectively reasonable for police officers to believe they had probable cause to arrest for disguise with intent to obstruct or
hinder an investigation, as required for officers to be entitled to qualified immunity in arrestee's § 1983 action alleging violations
of the Fourth Amendment; arrestee provided false identification information during lawful Terry stop. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Prall v. City of Boston, 985 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. Mass. 2013).
Town police officers' discovery of marijuana operation on suspect's property during execution of search warrant provided
officers with probable cause to arrest suspect, thus precluding his § 1983 unlawful arrest claims against town and officers.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Opalenik v. LaBrie, 945 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Mass. 2013).
Finding for disc jockey on his § 1983 false arrest claim would imply that his prior conviction for resisting arrest would be
invalid, and, thus, his false arrest claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, where the evidence deemed sufficient to convict
beyond a reasonable doubt was the same information that defendant officers had at time of arrest, and, although defendant was
initially arrested for disorderly conduct, he was arrested based solely upon his conduct at party, not upon events occurring after
he was transported from party. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Turkowitz v. Town of Provincetown, 914 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 2012).
Police had probable cause to arrest for violation of a restraining order, precluding arrestee's claim of false imprisonment under
Massachusetts law; officers confirmed restraining order was in effect and obtained statement from arrestee's mother-in-law, who
had the order against arrestee, that she saw arrestee in violation of order by coming onto her porch. Titus v. Town of Nantucket,
840 F. Supp. 2d 404 (D. Mass. 2011).
A police officer is liable for false imprisonment under Massachusetts law if he arrests, or causes the arrest, of the plaintiff,
without probable cause. Goddard v. Kelley, 629 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. Mass. 2009).
Arrest supported by probable cause is not a false arrest for purposes of imposing civil liability on officer where arrestee is later
determined to be innocent. Finucane v. Town of Belchertown, 808 F. Supp. 906 (D. Mass. 1992).
Reasonable police officer could have believed that there was probable cause to arrest arrestee for violation of New Hampshire
statute prohibiting repeated communications in offensively coarse language with purpose to annoy or alarm another, and thus
officers were entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim; reasonable officer
could have concluded that four e-mails sent over course of two and one half days, including three e-mails sent over two and
one half hours, were repeated communications, arrestee accused former girlfriend of turning into a "tramp," accused her of
spending her tax return on "crazy shit," and called her "little slut," and reasonable officer could have inferred purpose to annoy

from arrestee's assertion that he had heard everyone at girlfriend's place of employment had seen her new nipple piercings, and
his rhetorical question: "WHY HAVE YOU TURNED INTO SUCH A TRAMP?".U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983; N.H.RSA 644:4. Farrelly v. City of Concord, N.H., 902 F. Supp. 2d 178, 2012 DNH 166 (D.N.H. 2012), order vacated
in part on other grounds on reconsideration, 2012 WL 6643278 (D.N.H. 2012) (applying New Hampshire law).
Police official who was superintendent at time of arrestee's arrest and detention was not entitled to qualified immunity from
arrestee's § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims arising from police sergeant's alleged false accusation of domestic violence
crime and illegal detention of arrestee; arrestee alleged that superintendent received investigative report on sergeant's unlawful
incarceration of arrestee and failed to take any corrective measures, and that incident was not isolated one, but rather that
superintendent's administrative records held complaints that were similarly closed without any corrective measures. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Sayan-Resto v. Berrios, 933 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D.P.R. 2013).
Government was not liable on a false arrest/false imprisonment claim, governed by Puerto Rico law and asserted under Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), in connection with misidentification of arrestee as the person named Junior for whom arrest warrant
was issued in drug investigation; federal drug enforcement agent had probable cause for arrest and a reasonable belief that
arrestee was Junior, despite some discrepancies between arrestee appearance and description of Junior in warrant, based in part
on old photograph of arrestee that an informant had identified as being that of Junior. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1346(b), 2674, 2680; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 125. Abreu-Guzman v. Ford, 69 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.P.R. 1999).
Defense of qualified immunity barred action for false arrest against Puerto Rican officers who had reasonable grounds for their
actions, mainly plaintiff decision to flee scene of crime when he saw police officers and they chased him. Deodatti Colon v.
Rosado Rivera, 846 F. Supp. 156 (D.P.R. 1993).
Deputy chief of university's department of public safety had probable cause to arrest attendee of round table lecture on health
care reform at university, and thus attendee could not maintain false imprisonment claim against deputy chief in § 1983 action;
attendee had refused to leave the premises peacefully after he had been repeatedly requested to conclude his remarks, his
disruption of the event had escalated, and he resisted university police officers' efforts to remove him from lecture hall. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Young v. Brown University ex rel. Paxson, 63 F. Supp. 3d 198 (D.R.I. 2014).
Municipality had independent obligation to verify citizenship of arrestee who was subject to immigration detainer, and its failure
to do so vitiated probable cause as defense to claim under § 1983 that official policy wrongfully caused his detention, where
name on detainer did not match arrestee's name, arrestee told multiple department of correction (DOC) employees that he was
U.S. citizen, and municipality easily could have verified his citizenship by checking DOC Inmate Lookup Service, which listed
his nativity as New York, or his rap sheet, which apparently noted that he was U.S. citizen. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983. Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2019).
No reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause to arrest high school student for obstruction of
governmental administration under New York law, based on student's refusal to cooperate with unlawful Terry stop, his
noncompliance with officer's order that he put away his cell phone, and his asserted attempt to flee, and thus officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 false arrest claim; student's attempts to use his cell phone to contact his
mother did not suggest that he was trying to obstruct, or that he did obstruct, officer's investigation, and student had right under
New York constitution not to respond to officer's questions and to flee officer. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y.
Penal Law § 195.05. Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2016).
Arresting officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability, in suspect's § 1983 false arrest claim, for his alleged
conduct in arresting suspect for theft of services under New York law, after suspect attempted to board city bus from back
entrance and was allegedly waiting in line to pay bus fare, when officer had previously allegedly witnessed bus driver attempting
to fix broken mechanical lift in front of the bus and telling all the passengers to go around to the back entrance; officers of

reasonable competence would not disagree on whether probable cause existed to support arrest under the alleged circumstances.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Simpson v. City of New York, 793 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 2015).
Arguable probable cause to arrest exists, entitling arresting officer to qualified immunity in false arrest suit, if either (1) it was
objectively reasonable for officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (2) officers of reasonable competence could disagree
on whether probable cause test was met. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2015).
Police officers arguably had probable cause to arrest, as defense to claim for false arrest arising out of her use of debit
card belonging to another to withdraw money from automated teller machine, even if arrest was supported by little more
than complaint by individual whom officers were aware had preexisting, antagonistic relationship with arrestee. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Morris v. Silvestre, 604 Fed. Appx. 22 (2d Cir. 2015).
An officer is entitled to qualified immunity against a suit for false arrest if he can establish that he had arguable probable cause
to arrest plaintiff. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Garcia v. Does, 764 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014).
Arresting officers had arguable probable cause for the arrest, and therefore were entitled to qualified immunity on arrestee's §
1983 claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, in light of arrestee's wife's accusation of assault;
arresting officers were entitled to believe the wife's accusation absent credible reasons not to. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983. Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2014).
Arresting officers had arguable probable cause to arrest suspect, and thus were entitled to qualified immunity from suspect's §
1983 false arrest claim, where officers overheard him telling informant, who was obviously trawling for drugs in an area known
for drug sales, that he could get him whatever he needed. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Gonzalez v. City of
Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2013).
"Arguable probable cause" warranting grant of qualified immunity to arresting officer exists if either (1) it was objectively
reasonable for officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (2) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether
probable cause test was met. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2013).
Probable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84
(2d Cir. 2013).
Probable cause existed for arrest, barring arrestee's § 1983 and state-law claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution, where
fire investigator concluded that fire was caused by human involvement, arrestee's clothing smelled like gasoline, her shoes,
socks, and underneath her fingernails all tested positive for accelerants, and receipt in her pocket that showed market purchase
at time of fire did not identify the purchaser. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Waldron v. Milana, 541 Fed. Appx. 5 (2d Cir. 2013).
Police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 claim for false arrest based on alleged misstatements and
omissions in officer's warrant application, since a reasonable officer would have believed that probable cause for arrest existed;
although a corrected affidavit would have disclosed that the two robbers were Hispanic and spoke Spanish, it also would have
revealed that robbery victims both identified arrestee as one of the two robbers in photo array. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983. Norwood v. Mason, 524 Fed. Appx. 762 (2d Cir. 2013).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest for criminal tampering, as defense to claims for false arrest and malicious
prosecution, in action brought under § 1983, regardless of whether city or private citizen owned property at issue, in view of
arrestee's damage to margin of grass separating neighbor's property from road. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Pacicca v. Stead, 456 Fed. Appx. 9 (2d Cir. 2011).

Police had probable cause to arrest for arrestee's cursing at his next door neighbor, as defense to claims against police officers
for false arrest and malicious prosecution, in action brought under § 1983, where cursing was in violation of order for protection
obtained by neighbor against arrestee. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Pacicca v. Stead, 456 Fed. Appx. 9 (2d
Cir. 2011).
Sworn statement submitted by mentally disabled twelve-year old student provided probable cause to arrest, detain, and file
charges against suspect, thus barring suspect's claims under § 1983 and New York law for false arrest, false imprisonment,
and malicious prosecution, even though arresting officer did not conduct any further investigation before arrest. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Kilburn v. Village of Saranac Lake, 413 Fed. Appx. 362 (2d Cir. 2011).
Deputy had probable cause to effectuate arrest for criminal trespass in the second degree as a lesser included offense of burglary,
so as to preclude arrestee's § 1983 recovery for false arrest, even though arrestee shared title to the home and ownership of the
items removed, where deputy received report of a burglary at address of arrestee and her husband, deputy knew that arrestee
no longer resided at the premises, that a divorce proceeding between arrestee and her husband was pending, that husband had
changed the locks, that husband was away, and that arrestee had entered the premises and had removed property, and a neighbor,
who was watching the house for arrestee's husband, had no idea how arrestee entered the premises. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law §§ 140.15, 140.25. Finigan v. Marshall, 574 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2009).
Arrestee's alleged belief that her legal title to property shared with her husband, from whom she was separated, conferred a
right of entry to the premises did not defeat a finding of probable cause to effectuate arrest for trespass in the second degree,
precluding arrestee's § 1983 recovery for false arrest, even though such an alleged belief would negate the "knowing" unlawful
entry element of criminal trespass. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law § 140.15.
Finigan v. Marshall, 574 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2009).
Arrestee's conviction had to be invalidated before he could bring § 1983 action on claim that arrest was unlawful. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Fifield v. Barrancotta, 353 Fed. Appx. 479 (2d Cir. 2009).
Evidence obtained as result of allegedly unlawful arrest had to have been essential to arrestee's subsequent conviction to preclude
civil rights claim, as required by Heck rule, that arrest had been made without probable cause and that warrantless entry into
home had been made to effect arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Fifield v. Barrancotta, 353 Fed. Appx.
479 (2d Cir. 2009).
Deputy sheriff reasonably relied on eyewitness reports of the store's employees and surveillance videotape in determining that
there was probable cause to arrest shopper for shoplifting, and therefore shopper was precluded from bringing federal and state
law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution; fact that the lost goods were not ultimately recovered
by defendants was not so exculpatory that it undermined probable cause for shopper's prosecution. Jones v. J.C. Penny's Dept.
Stores Inc., 317 Fed. Appx. 71 (2d Cir. 2009).
The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest, whether
that action is brought under New York law or under § 1983. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.Y.McKinney's Const. Art. 1, § 12;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2007).
Under New York law, probable cause to arrest is a complete defense to a claim of false arrest. Posr v. Court Officer Shield No.
207, 180 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 1999).
Although the common law tort of false arrest or false imprisonment allows plaintiffs to seek damages from the time of detention
up until issuance of process or arraignment, but not more, the existence of probable cause defeats any such claim. Townes v.
City of New York, 176 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999).

that action is brought under state law or under § 1983. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Covington v. City of
New York, 171 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999).
Existence of probable cause gives police officer privilege to arrest and is complete defense to action for false arrest. Marshall
v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1996).
that action is brought under state law or under § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1996).
Under New York law elements of false imprisonment claim are (1) defendant intended to confine plaintiff, (2) plaintiff was
conscious of confinement, (3) plaintiff did not consent to confinement and (4) confinement was not otherwise privileged. Singer
v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1995).
Existence of probable cause is complete defense to action for false arrest under New York law. Bernard v. U.S., 25 F.3d 98
(2d Cir. 1994).
Arrest without probable cause in contravention of section 1983 and false arrest under New York state tort law may be complete
without either formal arrest or detention until subject is arraigned. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.
1991).
Warrantless arrest is presumptively unlawful under New York law, and plaintiff bringing false arrest action need not prove either
malice or want of probable cause; rather, defendant has burden of proving that arrest was justified by reasonable cause. Raysor
v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 768 F.2d 34, 19 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 211 (2d Cir. 1985).
Under New York law, finding of probable cause will defeat state tort claims for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious
prosecution. Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1985).
Defendant in an action for false arrest has the burden of proving legal justification as an affirmative defense. Rosario v.
Amalgamated Ladies' Garment Cutters' Union, Local 10, I.L.G.W.U., 605 F.2d 1228, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2958, 86 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) P 11436, 5 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 113 (2d Cir. 1979).
Any illegality in traffic stop of motorist did not taint his subsequent arrest, with respect to motorist's § 1983 false arrest claim
under Connecticut law, arising out of his arrest for driving with a suspended license, after officer allegedly refused to look at
letter from Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) motorist carried, which indicated his license had recently been
reinstated; fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine did not apply to § 1983 claims. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Marchand v. Hartman, 395 F. Supp. 3d 202 (D. Conn. 2019).
Police officer who was not in close proximity to suspect who was hiding in a drainage ditch located alongside railroad tracks
could not be held personally liable on suspect's § 1983 excessive force claim arising from second officer's alleged act of throwing
rocks at suspect while he was in ditch, causing suspect to lose consciousness; officer was not in a position to intervene to prevent
rocks from being thrown. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Gonzalez v. Waterbury Police Dept., 199 F. Supp. 3d 616 (D. Conn. 2016), as
amended, (Aug. 9, 2016).
Detective was unaware that detainee may have been unlawfully seized by a show of police authority and therefore that it would
be unlawful for him to transport detainee to the police station for questioning, and thus detective was entitled to qualified
immunity on § 1983 claim that detainee was subject to false arrest and imprisonment when he was transported by detective from
his home to the police station; detective did not order the seizure, did not arrive on the scene until after detainee was secured

in the police car, and did not order detainee to go to the police station for questioning. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983. Ozga v. Elliot, 150 F. Supp. 3d 178 (D. Conn. 2015).
Detective was entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims; although
there may have been issue of material fact with underlying false arrest claim, detective had "arguable probable cause" for arrest
based on detective's mistaken belief that arrestee owned business which purchased merchandise with checks that had insufficient
funds. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Sharnick v. D'Archangelo, 935 F. Supp. 2d 436 (D. Conn. 2013).
Following arrestee's confession to bank robberies, restraints police officers imposed on occupants of arrestee's home to prevent
them from leaving or making phone calls for five hours while officers waited in living room until search warrant was obtained
were limited and tailored reasonably to secure law enforcement needs while protecting occupants' privacy interests, and thus
seizure of occupants and home was reasonable under Fourth Amendment, so that officers were not liable under § 1983 for
false imprisonment; arrestee told police that clothing, BB gun, and bag he used in robberies were in home, officers had reason
to suspect home's occupants, who were arrestee's wife, son, and daughter, were complicit in robberies, and officers allowed
occupants to move throughout home during their detention. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Seifert v. Rivera,
933 F. Supp. 2d 307 (D. Conn. 2013).
Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, failed to allege that the United States Marshals were acting unlawfully by detaining plaintiffs in
their office and house, respectively, for a limited period of time so that agents representing company that had sued husband and
his company for misappropriation of trade secrets could search the office and house pursuant to a court order in the underlying
lawsuit, as required to state a plausible claim of false imprisonment or false arrest under Connecticut law. Bowers v. U.S., 931
F. Supp. 2d 358 (D. Conn. 2013).
Police officer had arguable probable cause to arrest animal rights protestors, and thus, was entitled to qualified immunity from
protestors' § 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution; it was objectively reasonable for officer to believe that
protestors standing stationary with large banner in middle of steps leading up to tent where hundreds of people would shortly
be accessing was hindrance to free passage, and therefore an illegal obstruction of pedestrians under Connecticut law, and it
was objectively reasonable for an officer to believe there was probable cause, under Connecticut disorderly conduct statute,
when protestors refused to comply with reasonable and lawful request to move to area nearby. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1, 4;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; C.G.S.A. § 53a–182(a)(5, 6). Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 838 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D. Conn. 2012).
A claim for false imprisonment against an arresting officer under Connecticut law cannot survive if the defendant can establish
the existence of probable cause for the confinement; moreover, in order to defeat a claim for false imprisonment, it is not
necessary for the defendant to show that probable cause existed as to each individual charge, or as to any charge actually invoked
by the arresting officer, and instead, a claim for false imprisonment will fail so long as the imprisonment itself was supported by
probable cause, regardless of whether probable cause supported any charge actually identified by the arresting officer. Odom
v. Matteo, 772 F. Supp. 2d 377 (D. Conn. 2011).
To succeed on false arrest claim under § 1983, plaintiff must show that: (1) defendant intentionally arrested him or had him
arrested; (2) plaintiff was aware of arrest; (3) there was no consent to arrest; and (4) arrest was not supported by probable cause.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Peruta v. Town of Rocky Hill, 640 F. Supp. 2d 186 (D. Conn. 2009).
There can be no federal civil rights claim for false arrest where arresting officer had probable cause. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Peruta
v. Town of Rocky Hill, 640 F. Supp. 2d 186 (D. Conn. 2009).
Existence of probable cause to arrest bar patrons who were involved in altercation with off-duty city police officers in bar
parking lot precluded false arrest/false imprisonment claim under § 1983 and Connecticut law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983. Zainc v. City of Waterbury, 603 F. Supp. 2d 368 (D. Conn. 2009).

A plaintiff cannot prevail on either false arrest or a false imprisonment claims if the arresting officer had probable cause to
arrest him. White v. Martel-Moylan, 586 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D. Conn. 2008).
Existence of probable cause is a complete defense to claims of false imprisonment and false arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
Johnson v. Ford, 496 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D. Conn. 2007).
Conviction is conclusive proof of probable cause that will defeat any claim of false arrest under Connecticut law. Presnick v.
Delaney, 110 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Conn. 1999).
A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 action for an arrest without probable cause if: (1) it was objectively
reasonable for the officer to believe there was probable cause to make the arrest, or (2) reasonably competent police officers
could disagree as to whether there was probable cause to arrest. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Mihalick v. Cavanaugh, 26 F. Supp. 2d
391 (D. Conn. 1998).
Landlord did not establish that he was falsely arrested by police officer for allegedly harassing a tenant as she attempted to
move out of her apartment; officer relied on tenant two complaints to establish probable cause to arrest landlord, and landlord
alleged only that he was arrested after he denied tenant allegations and that such denial should have led officer to disbelieve
tenant. Craig v. Krzeminski, 764 F. Supp. 248 (D. Conn. 1991).
Magistrate finding of probable cause in issuing warrant creates presumption in false arrest action that probable cause existed, and
that presumption is rebuttable only where plaintiff establishes fraud, perjury, or misrepresentation or falsification of evidence.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Lo Sacco v. City of Middletown, 745 F. Supp. 812 (D. Conn. 1990).
Restraint of arrestee was lawful and did not constitute false imprisonment under Connecticut law, where state trooper had good-
faith belief in existence of probable cause to arrest. Butts v. Carey, 706 F. Supp. 158 (D. Conn. 1988).
that action is brought under state law or under § 1983. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Esperanza v. City of New
York, 325 F. Supp. 3d 288 (E.D. N.Y. 2018).
City police officer did not know or have reason to know arrest of off-duty officer lacked probable cause, and thus was not liable
under § 1983 for failing to intervene in false arrest, where he arrived on the scene late and did not observe arrest, and was not
informed of circumstances negating probable cause to arrest. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Jackson v. Tellado,
295 F. Supp. 3d 164 (E.D. N.Y. 2018).
Rental property agent sufficiently stated § 1983 claim for false arrest against town officials based on 21 charges filed against
him for alleged violations of town rental permit law, where agent alleged that he was arrested for the alleged violations, that
rental permit law only applied to property owners, and that town officials knew, or should have known that agent was neither
the owner nor occupant of any of the 21 houses. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Mazzone v. Town of Southampton,
283 F. Supp. 3d 38 (E.D. N.Y. 2017).
Arrestee's allegations in § 1983 action that she was wrongfully accused of being responsible for her infant daughter's death and
held for more than four years in pretrial detention, and that defendants, including hospital and its employee, encouraged this
for the purpose of using her confinement as a "bargaining chip" to pressure her husband to plead guilty, were insufficient to
support speedy trial claim against hospital and its employee, absent allegations supporting a causal link between conduct of
hospital and its employee and the delay in arrestee's criminal case being resolved. U.S. Const. Amend. 6; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F. Supp. 3d 578 (E.D. N.Y. 2017).

Qualified immunity protects a police officer from liability for civil damages for false arrest claims if (1) it was objectively
reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (2) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on
whether the probable cause test was met. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Folk v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 3d 363 (E.D. N.Y. 2017).
City police officer did not lack probable cause to believe that arrestee could be successfully prosecuted for attempted rape, and
thus arrestee was not maliciously prosecuted under § 1983; officer had probably cause to arrest arrestee, officer did not have
contact with prosecutor's office after testifying at grand jury proceeding, arrestee was indicted by grand jury, and officer never
obtained any exculpatory evidence. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Angevin v. City of New York, 204 F. Supp.
3d 469 (E.D. N.Y. 2016).
Under New York law, existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to an action for false arrest. Frederique
v. County of Nassau, 168 F. Supp. 3d 455 (E.D. N.Y. 2016).
State police officers had arguable probable cause to arrest employee of licensed gun dealer for unlawful selling of a firearm and
selling an assault weapon, following undercover investigation in which arrestee sold rifle to undercover state police investigator
without requiring investigator to produce proof that he was lawfully authorized to possess or carry the firearm, and thus officers
were entitled to qualified immunity, in arrestee's § 1983 action; at time of arrest, it was reasonable for officer to believe that
arrestee was an employee of the gun dealership, that he sold the rifle to the undercover investigator, that investigator did
not unlawfully modify the rifle, and that the investigator's testing revealed certain characteristics such that the rifle was an
assault weapon under New York law. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 265.10(3)(a), 400.00(12).
Sanseviro v. New York, 158 F. Supp. 3d 131 (E.D. N.Y. 2016).
Officers had probable cause to prosecute arrestee for first degree robbery in violation of New York law, and thus officers could
not be liable under § 1983 for malicious prosecution; officers had probable cause to arrest, evidence that arrestee was third
person to receive cut from robbery came to light after arrest, and arrestee's post-arrest statements confirmed reasonableness of
officers' belief that arrestee and other robber purchased zip-ties used on victim. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;
N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law § 20.00. Soto v. City of New York, 132 F. Supp. 3d 424 (E.D. N.Y. 2015).
Police officers did not have arguable probable cause to arrest wife for falsely imprisoning her husband, and thus, officers were
not entitled to qualified immunity from wife's § 1983 claim for false arrest; although husband's domestic incident report indicated
that doors in couples' home had locks that could not be opened without key, and that wife often locked him in home so he could
not "sneak out," husband claimed that he explained to officers at time of arrest that he did not have key to locks by choice, that
locks and screwed-in windows were intended to keep bugs and intruders away, and that front door was locked only when he
and wife were both out, and husband had freely visited police precinct on at least two occasions. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983. Selvaggio v. Patterson, 93 F. Supp. 3d 54 (E.D. N.Y. 2015).
The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Lozada v. Weilminster, 92 F. Supp. 3d 76 (E.D. N.Y. 2015).
Fact that one of the actual perpetrators of robbery told law enforcement officers that suspect had not participated in robbery did
not vitiate probable cause for suspect's arrest established by victim's identification of suspect, as would support arrestee's § 1983
false arrest claim, given complete absence of any evidence that identification procedure was suggestive. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Crews v. County of Nassau, 996 F. Supp. 2d 186 (E.D. N.Y. 2014).
The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest, and will defeat a claim of malicious
prosecution. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Adams v. City of New York, 993 F. Supp. 2d 306, 93 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 700 (E.D.
N.Y. 2014).

City detective was not entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 false arrest claim; although Fourth Amendment right
to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly established, reasonable officers could not disagree about existence
of probable cause under circumstances faced by detective, where probable cause was based solely on an incredible, unreliable
photographic identification that officer had reason to believe was inaccurate and had the time and means to further investigate
or seek to corroborate. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Harewood v. Braithwaite, 64 F. Supp. 3d 384 (E.D.
N.Y. 2014).
Police officer clearly had probable cause when he took arrestee into custody, warranting dismissal of false imprisonment claim
in arrestee's § 1983 action; a crossing guard at a school had reported seeing arrestee approach an elementary school girl and
invite her back to his apartment to play video games, and a criminal background check performed after arrestee had been taken
into custody showed that arrestee had three open cases against him, including a complaint filed after he destroyed his former
girlfriend's televisions. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Pittman v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 49 F.
Supp. 3d 307 (E.D. N.Y. 2014).
Even if police department employees were involved in police officer's arrest for structuring monetary transactions, Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) agent who performed the arrest had probable cause to arrest officer, precluding officer's § 1983
false arrest claim against employees; agent's investigation revealed that officer made 25 cash withdrawals for large sums over
the course of 25 days, and many of the withdrawals were just under $10,000 per day, raising concerns that officer was attempting
to avoid reporting requirements. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Lewis v. City of New York, 18 F. Supp. 3d
229 (E.D. N.Y. 2014).
Existence of probable cause is complete defense to action for false arrest whether that action is brought under state law or under
§ 1983. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Tretola v. County of Nassau, 14 F. Supp. 3d 58 (E.D. N.Y. 2014).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest mother of seven-year-old son for kidnapping and custodial interference, and thus
officers had complete defense to mother's false arrest claim, where they relied on a facially valid arrest warrant from Michigan
state court in arresting mother. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Justice v. Kuhnapfel, 985 F. Supp. 2d 334 (E.D. N.Y. 2013).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest suspect for assault, for purposes of suspect's § 1983 false arrest claim against officers;
officers found suspect at scene shortly after it occurred, and there was no evidence that officers saw anyone else matching
perpetrator's description. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Alla v. Verkay, 979 F. Supp. 2d 349 (E.D. N.Y. 2013).
Police officer has arguable probable cause to arrest suspect, and thus is entitled to qualified immunity from liability on § 1983
claim of false arrest, if either (1) it was objectively reasonable for officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (2) officers
of reasonable competence could disagree on whether probable cause test was met. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983. Powell v. Murphy, 972 F. Supp. 2d 335 (E.D. N.Y. 2013).
Given that arrestee, who raised false arrest and false imprisonment claims, was in close proximity to controlled substances
found in apartment, the location of individuals other than arrestee in the apartment was irrelevant as to whether the officers
had probable cause to arrest him under New York law; furthermore, facts that another occupant informed officer that the illegal
items belonged to him and that fellow officer was present when occupant signed his confession did not vitiate probable cause
to arrest arrestee. N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law § 220.25(2). Waddlington v. City of New York, 971 F. Supp. 2d 286 (E.D. N.Y.
2013), appeal dismissed, (2nd Cir. 13-2071)(Oct. 24, 2013) (applying New York law).
Information provided by identified citizen accusing another individual of committing specific crime is sufficient to provide
police with probable cause to arrest, as would preclude false imprisonment claim under § 1983. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983. Blythe v. City of New York, 963 F. Supp. 2d 158, 301 Ed. Law Rep. 750 (E.D. N.Y. 2013).

Police officers had arguable probable cause to arrest for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and therefore,
officers were entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 Fourth Amendment false arrest claim; arrestee possessed
five firearms and a sworn statement alleged that arrestee had waved and pointed a gun at a civilian. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Burbar v. Incorporated Village of Garden City, 961 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D. N.Y. 2013).
City police officers who initially ordered arrestee to stop were not entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 Fourth
Amendment claims for unlawful seizure and false arrest; officers ordered arrestee to stop and attempted to stop her without
justification, and it was not objectively reasonable for officers to initiate and conduct arrestee's unlawful seizure and false arrest.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Jackson v. City of New York, 939 F. Supp. 2d 235 (E.D. N.Y. 2013).
Police officers made a reasonable mistake in concluding they had probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment to arrest
a citizen who wielded a two inch paring knife to defend his wife against two verbally aggressive people while he and his wife
were on a picnic, entitling them to qualified immunity in citizen's § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, where,
based on the wielding of the knife, and a conditional threat made by the citizen, officers could have reasonably believed that
the citizen was engaging in unlawful activity. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Levy v. City of New York, 935
F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. N.Y. 2013).
Arrest warrant issued upon return of grand jury indictment against arrestee was supported by probable cause, and thus, arrestee
could not prevail in § 1983 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, absent showing that police or other grand jury
witnesses lied, misrepresented the evidence, or presented false evidence to the grand jury. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983. Williams v. City of New York, 916 F. Supp. 2d 235 (E.D. N.Y. 2012).
Existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is complete defense to action for false arrest. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Alexiadis v. New York College of Health Professions, 891 F. Supp. 2d 418 (E.D. N.Y. 2012).
Under New York law, probable cause serves as a complete defense to an action for false arrest. Anderson v. City of New York,
817 F. Supp. 2d 77 (E.D. N.Y. 2011).
Under New York law, probable cause in a malicious prosecution claim is not the same as probable cause to arrest in a false
arrest claim. Anderson v. City of New York, 817 F. Supp. 2d 77 (E.D. N.Y. 2011).
Arresting officer could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed to arrest arrestee for falsely reporting a bomb threat,
such that officer was entitled to qualified immunity on arrestee's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, where multiple
witnesses told officer that, based on hearing 911 tape, they believed with varying degrees of certainty that arrestee was the person
who made the bomb threat, and one of those witnesses said she was absolutely certain that arrestee was the caller and signed a
sworn statement to that effect. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Castro v. County of Nassau, 739 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D. N.Y. 2010).
Allegations in complaint were sufficient to show that county police officers arrested plaintiff without warrant or probable cause,
in support of § 1983 claim alleging false arrest at anti-war protest; although complaint admitted to possibility that plaintiff was
illegally in street prior to his arrest, it did not specifically describe any illegal acts, and fact that other protesters engaged in "civil
disobedience" did not necessarily indicate that any illegal activity occurred or affect whether officers had probable cause to arrest
plaintiff. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Morgan v. County of Nassau, 720 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. N.Y. 2010).
To establish the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendants intended
to confine her, (2) she was conscious of her confinement, (3) she did not consent to be confined, and (4) the confinement was
not otherwise privileged. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Pace v. Town of Southampton, 678 F. Supp. 2d 79
(E.D. N.Y. 2010).

A claim for false arrest and imprisonment will fail where a defendant establishes that probable cause existed, as the existence
of probable cause constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest and imprisonment. Wong v.
Yoo, 649 F. Supp. 2d 34 (E.D. N.Y. 2009).
Police officers had probable cause to make arrest, precluding arrestee's claims in civil rights action under § 1983 for false
arrest and false imprisonment, although arrestee was not convicted of all crimes for which she was arrested, where arrestee
was eventually convicted of several of the crimes for which she was arrested, and those convictions were upheld on appeal.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Ostroski v. Town of Southold, 443 F. Supp. 2d 325 (E.D. N.Y. 2006).
that action is brought under state law or under § 1983. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Breitbard v. Mitchell,
390 F. Supp. 2d 237 (E.D. N.Y. 2005).
Under New York law, false arrest is considered to be a species of false imprisonment, and the two claims have identical elements.
Mejia v. City of New York, 119 F. Supp. 2d 232 (E.D. N.Y. 2000).
Probable cause defeats any false arrest claim. Jocks v. Tavernier, 97 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D. N.Y. 2000).
To prevail on a claim for false arrest under New York law, plaintiff must demonstrate the absence of probable cause to arrest;
put differently, the existence of probable cause to arrest is a complete defense to a claim for false arrest. Strong v. Montava,
64 F. Supp. 2d 101 (E.D. N.Y. 1999).
Existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes complete defense to action for false arrest, irrespective of whether action is
brought under New York law or under § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Tucker v. Gross, 39 F. Supp. 2d 244 (E.D. N.Y. 1999).
Claim for false arrest will not stand where the arresting officer had probable cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983. Carson v. Lewis, 35 F. Supp. 2d 250, 51 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 537 (E.D. N.Y. 1999).
Existence of probable cause gives officer privilege to arrest and is complete defense under New York law to action for false
arrest. Peterson v. County of Nassau, 995 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. N.Y. 1998).
Successful assertion of entrapment defense does not strip otherwise lawful arrest of probable cause, as will allow arrest to
support claims under New York law for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and false arrest. Labensky v. County of
Nassau, 6 F. Supp. 2d 161 (E.D. N.Y. 1998).
Existence of probable cause to arrest is a complete defense to an action for false arrest, whether that action is brought under state
law or under § 1983. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F. Supp. 2d 128 (E.D. N.Y. 1998).
Essential elements of cause of action for false arrest or false imprisonment under Illinois law are that plaintiff was restrained
or arrested by defendant and that defendant acted without having reasonable grounds to believe that an offense was committed
by plaintiff. Hyatt v. U.S., 968 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. N.Y. 1997).
Under New York law, claims for false imprisonment can be defeated if defendant can establish existence of probable cause for
arrest. Oliver v. Cuttler, 968 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. N.Y. 1997).
Under New York law, finding of probable cause serves as complete defense to charges of false arrest and malicious prosecution.
Graebe v. Falcetta, 726 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. N.Y. 1989).

Under New York law, existence of probable cause to support false arrest and imprisonment plaintiff arrest precluded her false
imprisonment claim against police officer which arose out of plaintiff postarrest detention. Parker v. Hearn, 695 F. Supp. 1421
(E.D. N.Y. 1988).
Under New York and federal law, probable cause supported arrest of assault defendant and warranted dismissal of his later
civil rights action against police officers based on false arrest; competing claims by participants in altercation as to who was
at fault and what happened was sufficient to justify arrest. Collom v. Incorporated Village of Freeport, N.Y., 691 F. Supp. 637
(E.D. N.Y. 1988).
Arresting officer advised of crime by person who claims to be victim, and who has signed complaint or information charging
someone with crime, has probable cause to effect arrest, as would preclude § 1983 false arrest claim, absent circumstances that
raise doubts as to victim's veracity. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Hogan v. County of Lewis, N.Y., 929 F.
Supp. 2d 130 (N.D. N.Y. 2013).
Officer had sufficient probable cause to arrest and detain defendant following bank robbery, as would defeat any subsequent
false arrest claim brought by defendant under § 1983; defendant was arrested five minutes after attempted robbery, was identified
by bank employee as person who attempted to rob bank, and fit unique description of perpetrator. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Krug v. County of Rennselaer, 559 F. Supp. 2d 223 (N.D. N.Y. 2008).
There was probable cause to arrest of skateboarder, precluding claim of false arrest, when arresting officer personally observed
him skateboarding in prohibited area, and skateboarder was found to possess recreational amount of marijuana. Ahern v. City
of Syracuse, 411 F. Supp. 2d 132 (N.D. N.Y. 2006).
Probable cause is a justification for, and a complete defense to, a claim for false arrest and imprisonment under both § 1983
and New York law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Swindell v. New York State Dept. of Environmental Conservation, 371 F. Supp. 2d
172 (N.D. N.Y. 2005).
To establish a cause of action alleging false arrest and false imprisonment under § 1983 and New York law, plaintiff must show
that: (1) defendant intended to confine the plaintiff; (2) plaintiff was conscious of the confinement; (3) plaintiff did not consent
to the confinement; and (4) confinement was not otherwise privileged. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Bordeau v. Village of Deposit, 113
F. Supp. 2d 292 (N.D. N.Y. 2000).
Confinement is privileged for purposes of false arrest claim if probable cause existed at time of arrest. Martinetti v. Town of
New Hartford Police Dept., 112 F. Supp. 2d 251 (N.D. N.Y. 2000).
Where arrest or imprisonment is extrajudicial, burden is on defendant to prove justification by showing that arrest was based
on probable cause existing at time of arrest. Mason v. Town of New Paltz Police Dept., 103 F. Supp. 2d 562 (N.D. N.Y. 2000).
Under New York or federal law, existence of probable cause is complete defense to actions for false arrest and malicious
prosecution. Rarick v. DeFrancesco, 94 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D. N.Y. 2000).
Under New York law, plaintiff must establish the same elements for a false imprisonment claim as are necessary for a false
arrest claim. Rivers v. O'Brien, 83 F. Supp. 2d 328 (N.D. N.Y. 2000).
In case of warrantless arrest, existence of probable cause constitutes justification and is complete defense to § 1983 and New
York common-law tort claims for false arrest. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Campanaro v. City of Rome, 999 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. N.Y.
1998).

In cases where arrest was made without warrant, defendant against whom claim for false arrest is brought under New York
law may establish that arrest was otherwise justified, and thus will not support recovery, when it was based on probable cause.
Pawlicki v. City of Ithaca, 993 F. Supp. 140 (N.D. N.Y. 1998).
Evidence that police officer only description of alleged perpetrators of larceny and assault was that they were white males in
their teens provided sufficient basis for reasonable jury to conclude that officer did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff,
supporting jury finding for plaintiff on false arrest claim. Mendoza v. City of Rome, N.Y., 872 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. N.Y. 1994).
Under New York's automobile presumption, there was probable cause to believe that arrestee possessed the gravity knife and
pepper spray that police officer discovered in plain view in center console of vehicle that arrestee was riding in as a passenger,
and thus officer could not be held liable to arrestee under § 1983 for false arrest, despite absence of videos and photographs
depicting the location of search; none of the vehicle's occupants claimed possession of items or possessed items to the exclusion
of the others in car, there were no indications that items belonged to any one of the vehicle's occupants in particular, and officer
was not duty bound to ask occupants whether items belonged to one of them after establishing probable cause. U.S. Const.
Amends. 4, 14; N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15. Heard v. City of New York, 319 F. Supp. 3d 687 (S.D. N.Y. 2018).
Transgender woman of color sufficiently alleged discriminatory intent, as required to establish claims for intentional
discrimination under § 1983 based on gender and gender identity, against police officers who arrested her for alleged violations
of New York statute prohibiting loitering for purpose of prostitution; woman alleged that officers arrested her after she spoke
with a man for around 30 to 45 minutes, did not arrest the man despite fact that he engaged in same conduct as she did, that
officers lacked probable cause to arrest her, and that officers falsified arrest paperwork. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983; N.Y. Penal Law § 240.37. D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52 (S.D. N.Y. 2018).
Police officers on "catch team," which participated with "observation team" in pursuit of narcotics activity, could not be held
liable under § 1983 for failure to intervene in alleged false arrest; arrest was result of information communicated by observation
team, no arresting officer understood information they received to be false or untrustworthy, and officers thus had no reason to
believe that arrestee's constitutional rights were being violated. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Rodriguez v. City
of New York, 291 F. Supp. 3d 396 (S.D. N.Y. 2018).
Police officers executing a Family Court order for removal of a child had at least arguable probable cause to arrest mother and
daughter for obstructing governmental administration, and thus officers were entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims
asserting false arrest and false imprisonment; officers were acting with the authority of the state on behalf of a child in executing
order, and mother and daughter's refusal to allow officers entry into their home to execute order, despite officers' announcement
of reason for their presence, reasonably could have been understood by an officer to be obstruction through interference. U.S.
Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05; N.Y. Family Court Act § 1011. Shaheed v. City of New York,
287 F. Supp. 3d 438 (S.D. N.Y. 2018).
Undercover police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 claim for false arrest, following jury
verdict in favor of arrestee on claim; although officer's assertion that he saw arrestee holding numerous glassines of heroin
would have supplied arguable probable cause, only finding jury made as to officer's knowledge was that he had reasonably
believed he had observed arrestee hand an object or objects to his acquaintance, which did not, alone, supply arguable probable
cause to arrest. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Johnson v. Burns, 252 F. Supp. 3d 353 (S.D. N.Y. 2017).
"Arguable probable cause" warranting grant of qualified immunity to arresting officer exists if either: (1) it was objectively
reasonable for officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (2) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether
probable cause test was met. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Adams v. City of New York, 2016 WL 7413520 (S.D. N.Y. 2016).
There was neither actual nor arguable probable cause for arrest for possession of a weapon, and no reasonable police officer
could possibly have thought there was, such that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment stage in

arrestee's § 1983 action alleging false arrest under New York law, although arrestee's manner of dress and physical appearance
were generally consistent with description given by 911 caller reporting gun possession, and arrestee was found standing in
general area described by caller at time of call; police did not find gun after pat-down, item seized was not a weapon described
in penal statute, and arrestee was not in possession of seized item, but rather it was found in jacket pocket hanging ten to 15
feet from where arrestee stood. U.S. Const. Amend. 4, 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Harris v. City of New York,
222 F. Supp. 3d 341 (S.D. N.Y. 2016).
Arrestee's allegations that police officers were aware that arrestee was in possession of construction equipment, that arrestee
claimed he had lien on equipment for non-payment of towing services, that arrestee provided evidence of compliance with
state lien law, and that arrestee provided evidence by other police departments from investigations into dispute over equipment
were sufficient to plead his arrest was not privileged, as required for his § 1983 action against officers, alleging false arrest in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Alvarez v. County of Orange, N.Y., 95
F. Supp. 3d 385 (S.D. N.Y. 2015).
Existence of probable cause to arrest is a complete defense to an action for false arrest, whether that action is brought under state
law or under § 1983. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Williams v. Savory, 87 F. Supp. 3d 437 (S.D. N.Y. 2015).
Police officers were entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 and state law claims of false arrest and malicious
prosecution, since officers of reasonable competence could disagree about whether arrestee's arrest and prosecution were
supported by probable cause; officer either observed or had reasonably trustworthy information suggesting that arrestee ran
red light, left scene of accident without reporting it, and drove wrong way down one-way street, and while facts suggested
that arrestee's reckless driving was justified as emergency measure to avoid imminent injury from robbers holding knife to his
throat, a reasonably competent police officer could have reasonably believed that those facts were not sufficient to establish
such a defense to the extent that probable cause was eliminated. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Diop v. City
Arrestee's conviction of offense for which he was arrested barred his § 1983 false arrest claims arising from incident. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983. Corsini v. Bloomberg, 26 F. Supp. 3d 230 (S.D. N.Y. 2014).
Husband's phone calls to police department, complaining that wife had threatened to kill him, established probable cause to
arrest wife without further investigation, and, thus, officers had complete defense to § 1983 claim based on wrongful arrest, even
though couple was in process of divorcing at time of arrest; divorce lent credibility to husband's story that wife had threatened
him because of marital discord, officers were not required to credit wife's assertions that she had moved out of house and made
no threats, and they were aware of protection order against wife. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Kanderskaya
v. City of New York, 11 F. Supp. 3d 431 (S.D. N.Y. 2014).
Police officers had probable cause to believe that arrestees had committed crime of criminal trespass at bank, precluding § 1983
false arrest claim, where bank employees had made repeated statements requesting protesters inside bank, including arrestees,
to move their protest activities outside bank, arrestees admitted to hearing employees' statements, officers had observed one
arrestee videotaping protest inside bank, which he had been explicitly told by employees was not allowed, officer had been
told that protesters would be closing their bank accounts as part of plan to occupy banks and one arrestee had closed her bank
account during the protest, and the arrestees had stayed inside bank for five minutes after employees' statements. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983; N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law § 140.05. Carpenter v. City of New York, 984 F. Supp. 2d 255 (S.D. N.Y. 2013), certificate
of appealability denied, (Feb. 13, 2014) (applying New York law).
Police officer who was working undercover in adult video section of store apparently known as destination for gay sex had
arguable probable cause to arrest male customer for prostitution, and thus officer was entitled to qualified immunity from
customer's § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims; after officer approached customer and began flirting with him,
customer informed officer that he enjoyed, and was good at, oral sex, officer told customer before leaving store that he wanted

to pay customer $50 to "suck his dick," and although customer decided that there was no possibility of "engaging in anything"
with officer, based on "strangeness" of situation, customer and officer continued to walk in same direction, engaging in sexual
banter. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Pinter v. City of New York, 976 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D. N.Y. 2013),
certification denied, (Nov. 25, 2013).
An arrest of a criminal suspect by a law enforcement officer with probable cause is a privileged confinement even if it is non-
consensual; thus, for arrests by law enforcement officers, the existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes a complete defense
to an action for false arrest, whether that action is brought under § 1983 or state law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983. Biswas v. City of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 504 (S.D. N.Y. 2013).
Police officer's recovery of marijuana from suspect's person after stopping vehicle in which suspect was passenger gave rise to
probable cause to arrest suspect, thus precluding arrestee's § 1983 false arrest claim. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983. Cooper v. City of New Rochelle, 925 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D. N.Y. 2013).
Probable cause to arrest is a complete defense to an action for false arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Paulin v. Figlia, 916 F.
Supp. 2d 524 (S.D. N.Y. 2013).
Police officer commits false arrest if he or she arrests person without probable cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Thomas v.
Kelly, 903 F. Supp. 2d 237 (S.D. N.Y. 2012).
Existence of probable cause is absolute defense to false arrest claim. Garcia v. Bloomberg, 865 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D. N.Y. 2012).
Inmate's entry of guilty plea in New York state court to charges which arose from his arrest precluded his subsequent § 1983 false
arrest claim. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Hayes v. County of Sullivan, 853 F. Supp. 2d 400 (S.D. N.Y. 2012).
Under New York law, the existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim. Gaston v. City of New York,
851 F. Supp. 2d 780 (S.D. N.Y. 2012).
Existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest. Santos v.
New York City, 847 F. Supp. 2d 573 (S.D. N.Y. 2012).
Existence of probable cause to arrest is complete defense to false imprisonment claim under New York law. N.Y.McKinney's
CPL § 140.10(1). 5 Borough Pawn, LLC. v. Marti, 753 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D. N.Y. 2010).
Police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity for initial arrest of pawnshop owner under § 1983 or New York law, with
respect to owner's claims alleging false arrest and false imprisonment, since fact issues existed whether officer had probable
cause to arrest owner after demanding free access to pawnshop's restricted areas and safe. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y.McKinney's CPL § 140.10(1). 5 Borough Pawn, LLC. v. Marti, 753 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D. N.Y. 2010).
Police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity for second arrest of pawnshop owner under § 1983 or New York law, with
respect to owner's claims alleging false arrest and false imprisonment, since fact issues existed whether officer had probable
cause to arrest owner after purported "reverse sting" operation concerning purchase of stolen goods. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 5
Borough Pawn, LLC. v. Marti, 753 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D. N.Y. 2010).
The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest under New York law. Bryant v. Crowe, 697
F. Supp. 2d 482 (S.D. N.Y. 2010).
Under New York law, the existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim. Coward v. Town and Village
of Harrison, 665 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).

Even assuming police officers did not have probable cause to arrest for suspected first-degree placing of a false bomb or
hazardous substance under New York law, officers had arguable probable cause for arrest, and thus were entitled to qualified
immunity on arrestee's claims for false arrest under § 1983 and New York law; arrestee left unknown device on counter at cafe,
and was carrying similar device at time of his arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y.McKinney's Penal
Law § 240.62. Alhovsky v. Ryan, 658 F. Supp. 2d 526 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).
that action is brought under New York state law or under § 1983. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Searles v.
Pompilio, 652 F. Supp. 2d 432 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).
Under New York law, existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to false arrest claim. Newton v. City of New York,
640 F. Supp. 2d 426 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).
City police officers had probable cause to detain rape suspect prior to lineup after only two known eye-witnesses selected
suspect from photo arrays, and thus city defendants could not be liable for false arrest under New York law. Newton v. City
Under New York law, the existence of probable cause to arrest is a complete defense to claims of false arrest or false
imprisonment. 5 Borough Pawn, LLC v. City of New York, 640 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).
Deputy sheriff lacked probable cause to arrest prisoner's mother for menacing in the third degree under New York law, based
on her conduct in placing dead flowers and allegedly threatening card on unmanned security desk at probation department, as
would provide complete defense to mother's false arrest claim against deputy sheriff, where probation officers were not placed in
fear of imminent physical injury. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law § 120.15. Holley v. County of Orange,
NY, 625 F. Supp. 2d 131 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).
Under New York law, the existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim. Ambrose v. City of New
York, 623 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).
Police officers lacked probable cause to arrest, and thus arrestee stated § 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment in violation
of Fourth Amendment; defendant had hard plaster cast on his arm when he was arrested and defendant was arraigned despite
confirmation that his arm was in cast at time of shootings and that perpetrators used both hands during shootings. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Ambrose v. City of New York, 623 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).
Detective had probable cause to arrest arrestee on charge of first degree robbery, precluding arrestee's § 1983 false arrest claim;
victim identified arrestee as her assailant from photo array that showed six men similar in appearance to arrestee, and victim
subsequently identified arrestee from in-person lineup. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Thompson v. City of
New York, 603 F. Supp. 2d 650 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).
Probable cause existed for arrest, such that Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent was not liable for false arrest or
imprisonment, based on evidence provided by confidential informants regarding drug activities of person using alias,
corroboration of this information during execution of search warrants, and linking of alias to arrestee's name, through statement
of his girlfriend and photographic identification of arrestee by other witnesses as person they knew as drug dealer. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Rodriguez v. Wolbach, 499 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D. N.Y. 2007).
Though plaintiff claiming false arrest and false imprisonment bears the burden of establishing the absence of probable cause,
the burden shifts to the defendant when no arrest warrant has been issued. Brenner v. Heavener, 492 F. Supp. 2d 399 (S.D.
N.Y. 2007).

A finding that police officers had probable cause to make an arrest is a complete defense to an action for false arrest. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Rivera v. City of Yonkers, 470 F. Supp. 2d 402 (S.D. N.Y. 2007).
At the time police officers confronted a motorist in a hospital, the officers had probable cause to believe she had been driving
while intoxicated, thus defeating her claims of false arrest, unlawful search and seizure, and malicious prosecution under both
§ 1983 and New York law, and her conspiracy claims under § 1983 and § 1985; officers relied on statements made to them
by emergency medical personnel who directly examined the motorist and reported that she: (1) was involved in an automobile
accident, in which she crossed into oncoming traffic; (2) admitted that she had consumed alcohol prior to the accident; and (3)
smelled of alcohol when she was extricated from the vehicle. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985. D'Angelo-
Fenton v. Town of Carmel, 470 F. Supp. 2d 387 (S.D. N.Y. 2007).
Arrestee stated claim for false arrest under New York law, given allegations that arrestee was approached by two men who called
out a name, that arrestee answered "what?" only in reaction to being addressed and not to affirm his identity as person named,
and that one of men, who were police officers dressed in plain clothes and without visible police insignia, immediately grabbed
arrestee and attempted to take him into custody. Williams v. City of Mount Vernon, 428 F. Supp. 2d 146 (S.D. N.Y. 2006).
Under New York law, torts of false arrest and false imprisonment are synonymous. Fincher v. County of Westchester, 979 F.
Supp. 989 (S.D. N.Y. 1997).
While arrest without warrant is presumed unlawful, arresting officer can show legal justification by proving that arrest was
based on probable cause. Haussman v. Fergus, 894 F. Supp. 142 (S.D. N.Y. 1995).
Defendants can defeat constitutional claim for false arrest by demonstrating that there was probable cause for arrest. Dukes v.
City of New York, 879 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. N.Y. 1995).
Claim of false arrest, whether framed as unconstitutional deprivation of civil rights or as tortious conduct under state law, may
be established upon showing that there was no probable cause to support plaintiff arrest and detention. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Grant v. City of New York, 848 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. N.Y. 1994).
Under New York and federal law, claims for unreasonable search and false arrest must be founded on lack of probable cause.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Elk v. Townson, 839 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. N.Y. 1993).
If probable cause to arrest is not clearly lacking, officer will be shielded by qualified immunity from civil liability for false
arrest, even when existence of probable cause may be questionable at time of arrest. Thomas v. Culberg, 741 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.
N.Y. 1990).
Since conviction is viewed as establishing existence of probable cause for arrest, arrestee can under no circumstances recover
for false arrest if he was convicted of offense for which he was arrested. Unger v. Cohen, 718 F. Supp. 185 (S.D. N.Y. 1989).
Under New York law, family court protective order was valid, despite lack of specific cessation date as order was limited to
one year by state law; thus, order could provide probable cause for police officer to arrest civil rights plaintiff who now alleged
false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution after his arrest for violating the order. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1985, 1986;
N.Y.McKinney Family Court Act §§ 168, 842, 846. Otero v. Jennings, 698 F. Supp. 42 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).
Police officers were liable for false arrest for arresting occupants of a hotel room which had been booked using a counterfeit
credit card, since presence of arrestees in hotel room and their failure to react when individual who had used counterfeit credit
card to book room was addressed under false name used on credit card failed to establish reasonable grounds to believe arrestees
knew credit card was forged. Broadaway v. City of New York, 601 F. Supp. 624 (S.D. N.Y. 1985).

That plaintiff could not recover on claim of false arrest because of fact that arrest warrant was properly issued did not preclude
her from obtaining relief under 1871 civil rights statute, in light of fundamental distortion of judicial process involved. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983. Morrison v. Lefevre, 592 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D. N.Y. 1984).
Under New York law, a private citizen who makes an arrest does so at his peril; if person arrested did not in fact commit crime
for which he is arrested, person who arrests him is liable even if he acts in good faith or has probable cause to make arrest. CPL
N.Y. 140.30. Scanlon v. Flynn, 465 F. Supp. 32 (S.D. N.Y. 1978).
Probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest brought under New York law or § 1983. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Schnitter v. City of Rochester, 931 F. Supp. 2d 469 (W.D. N.Y. 2013).
Finding of probable cause is complete defense to action for false arrest under New York law. Johnston v. Town of Greece, 983
F. Supp. 348 (W.D. N.Y. 1997).
False imprisonment consists of unlawful restraint against his will of individual personal liberty or freedom of locomotion or
any illegal imprisonment without any process, or under color of process wholly illegal, without regard to the question whether
any crime has been committed, or a debt due, and the gist of false imprisonment is unlawful detention. Riegel v. Hygrade Seed
Co., 47 F. Supp. 290 (W.D. N.Y. 1942).
There was arguable probable cause for police officer to arrest suspect for violations of conditions of release, under which suspect
was prohibited from leaving county, as required for police officer who conducted arrest to be entitled to qualified immunity
from suspect's § 1983 and Vermont false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, where several witnesses indicated that they
had seen suspect outside of county. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Simuro v. Shedd, 176 F. Supp. 3d 358 (D. Vt. 2016).
Arrestee who ultimately was convicted of offense underlying arrest was barred from asserting claims for false arrest and false
imprisonment against arresting officers. Decker v. Fish, 126 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D. Vt. 2000).
Public safety officer recklessly omitted information from affidavit of probable cause submitted in connection with arrest warrant
application for college student accused of sexual assault, including witness statements indicating that student and alleged victim
were light-hearted and playful prior to being alone in student's room and had engaged in similar activities before, that student
and alleged victim were alone together for only "about a minute," that alleged victim was laughing when they came back into
the hall, and that alleged victim, not student, was the aggressor in the hall, reports from witnesses in the hall as to what they
did and did not hear from the room when student and alleged victim were alone together, and alleged victim's expressions of
remorse to her friends and her action in asking her resident advisor not to file a report; "any reasonable person" would know
that a judge would want to know these particular statements in making a probable cause determination. U.S. Const. Amend. 4.
Dempsey v. Bucknell University, 834 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 2016).
Witness's statements to officers and grand jury with respect to identification of arrestee supported probable cause for his arrest in
connection with murder, thus precluding arrestee's § 1983 Fourth Amendment false arrest and imprisonment claims against state
defendants. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Woodyard v. County of Essex, 2013 WL 791634 (3d Cir. 2013).
Probable cause existed for arrests for assault, and thus prosecution of arrestees was not malicious and arrest was not false under
Pennsylvania law, where alleged victim of crime and eyewitness to that crime had stated that he had been assaulted by arrestees,
he identified them as his attackers, victim had been treated for lacerations to his face on date that he said he had been attacked,
and there was no evidence that victim had fabricated his story. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Lincoln v. Hanshaw, 375 Fed. Appx.
185 (3d Cir. 2010).

Police officer was entitled to qualified immunity on arrestee's § 1983 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment; although
officer violated arrestee's clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizures by mistakenly making
arrest after arrestee had turned herself in to police, such mistake was reasonable, where arrest was made only hours after arrestee
had done so. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Adams v. Selhorst, 779 F. Supp. 2d 378 (D. Del. 2011).
Officer's use of force was reasonable, rather than excessive, where he handcuffed arrestee in connection with what he believed
was a valid arrest warrant, and as soon as arrestee informed him that she had already turned herself in to police on the warrant,
he confirmed that what she said was true, and removed the handcuffs. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Adams v. Selhorst, 779 F.
Supp. 2d 378 (D. Del. 2011).
Existence of valid capias supplied arresting officers with probable cause sufficient to defeat arrestee claim for negligent, grossly
negligent and intentional imprisonment in violation of his rights to prompt hearing before magistrate. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends.
4, 14. Heine v. Connelly, 644 F. Supp. 1508 (D. Del. 1986).
It was not clearly established that arrestee's constitutional rights to due process were violated when arresting officers failed to
investigate and confirm arrestee's identity post-arrest on facially valid warrant, despite arrestee's immediate indication and offer
of proof of mistaken identity, and thus officers were entitled to qualified immunity in arrestee's § 1983 action alleging false arrest
and imprisonment; officers were not prosecuting officers, officers had probable cause to make arrest, mistaken identity was
reasonable, arrestee and suspect were both males, had the same first and last names and middle initial, and were approximately
the same height and age, though not the same weight, and arrestee confirmed his name and that he had been issued a ticket
while in Maryland. U.S. Const. Amends. 4, 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Diaz v. Bullock, 268 F. Supp. 3d 640 (D.N.J. 2017).
It was clearly established, for qualified immunity purposes in arrestee's § 1983 action for false arrest and malicious prosecution,
that probable cause for arrest did not exist where circumstances did not suggest that individual had committed or was about to
commit crime. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 3d 208 (D.N.J. 2015).
Under New Jersey law, city police officer had probable cause to arrest nightclub patron for disorderly persons offense, and
thus officer did not falsely arrest patron; officer observed several security guards removing patron from nightclub while patron
was screaming. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.J.S.A. 2C:33–2. Aksanov v. Harrah's Casino Hotel Atlantic City, 109 F. Supp.
3d 709 (D.N.J. 2015).
When the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on
a detention pursuant to that arrest, as well as a claim for false arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Palma
v. Atlantic County, 53 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D.N.J. 1999).
Probable cause to detain and arrest suspect for shooting precluded his claim of false arrest. Green v. City of Paterson, 971 F.
Supp. 891 (D.N.J. 1997).
Tort of false imprisonment or false arrest is established upon a showing that plaintiff liberty was unlawfully constrained as a
result of force, or the threat of force, on part of the defendant. Roth v. Golden Nugget Casino/Hotel, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 262
(D.N.J. 1983).
Police officer, who applied for arrest warrant, was not entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim stemming from officer's refusal to investigate and confirm arrestee's claim that he could not have been suspect named
in warrant because of his previous incarceration; officer potentially violated arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights in failing to
investigate his claim that wrong person had been arrested, and proposition that no citizen could be imprisoned without probable
cause would be self-evident to any officer. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Kelly v. Jones, 148 F. Supp. 3d 395
(E.D. Pa. 2015), order vacated in part, 2015 WL 5144187 (E.D. Pa. 2015).

Officers had probable cause to arrest and by extension, imprison arrestee, and thus officers were not liable for § 1983 false arrest
or false imprisonment, where officers witnessed arrestee violate motor vehicle code, arrestee fled officers when they attempted
to pull him over, and arrestee pleaded guilty to fleeing or attempting to elude police and driving under influence (DUI). U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Rosembert v. Borough of East Lansdowne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 631 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
Police officers had probable cause to make arrest for Pennsylvania law crime of hindering apprehension, and thus officers were
not liable to arrestee under § 1983 for unlawful seizure or false imprisonment, or under Pennsylvania state law for false arrest
or false imprisonment; when the officers arrived at arrestee's residence looking for her brother, who was a fugitive from a work
release program, she lied to the officers about her brother's whereabouts, and she had become aware that her brother had walked
away from work release when the police arrived at the residence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Stewart v.
Moll, 717 F. Supp. 2d 454 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
In Pennsylvania, a false arrest is defined as 1) an arrest made without probable cause or 2) an arrest made by a person without
privilege to do so. Russoli v. Salisbury Tp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
Unlawful arrest gives rise to cause of action for false imprisonment as well as false arrest under Pennsylvania law, but where
arrest was based on probable cause and thus was not unlawful, false imprisonment claim also failed. Gilbert v. Feld, 842 F.
Supp. 803 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Prisoner's § 1983 claim against police officers for unlawful arrest and confinement in violation of the Fourth Amendment was in
effect a claim for malicious prosecution, and thus was barred by the Heck v. Humphrey rule barring § 1983 claims that impugn
the validity of a conviction unless the conviction has been overturned; prisoner's initial confinement was supported by other,
valid warrants for unrelated offenses, and his resulting conviction for use of a communication facility in the commission of a
felony drug offense had not been overturned. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Clouser v. Johnson, 40 F. Supp.
3d 425 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
Officer did not recklessly disregard truth by failing to include in his affidavit in support of arrest warrant that alleged rape
victim told nurse at hospital that arrestee had not penetrated her anus with his penis, but victim had told officer that arrestee had
done so, as would support arrestee's § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims; purported
discrepancy was not objective information within officer's ken which reasonable judge would have wanted to know. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Meketa v. Kamoie, 955 F. Supp. 2d 345 (M.D. Pa. 2013).
Arrestee's § 1983 unlawful arrest claim against arresting officers directly implicated validity of his nolo contendere plea for
resisting lawful arrest, and thus Heck barred unlawful arrest claim. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Broadwater
v. Fow, 945 F. Supp. 2d 574 (M.D. Pa. 2013).
Under Pennsylvania law, juvenile was not required to allege lack of probable cause to arrest in order to state claim for
false imprisonment, based on incarceration allegedly resulting from scheme to divert juvenile offenders to newly constructed
privately-owned juvenile detention facilities in return for kickbacks. Clark v. Conahan, 737 F. Supp. 2d 239 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
Claims of unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment each require a plaintiff
to show that he or she was arrested without probable cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Crouse v. South Lebanon Tp., 668 F.
Supp. 2d 664 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
In the context of an arrest, a plaintiff may establish liability for false imprisonment under Pennsylvania law by proving either
that the arrest occurred without probable cause or that the person effecting the arrest lacked a privilege to do so. Dull v. West
Manchester Tp. Police Dept., 604 F. Supp. 2d 739 (M.D. Pa. 2009).

Arrestee's guilty plea to Pennsylvania crime of harassment and concession that police officers had probable cause at the time
of his arrest to believe he had committed harassment precluded arrestee's § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims
against officers and municipalities, despite argument that harassment was merely a summary offense under Pennsylvania
law, authorizing officers to issue a ticket but not to arrest; states were free to regulate arrests for crimes committed in an
officer's presence however they desired, but state restrictions could not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F. Supp. 2d 581 (M.D. Pa. 2008) [applying Pennsylvania law].
Cornerstone of false arrest claim under Pennsylvania law is that process used for arrest was void on its face; arrestee must show
that arrest was made without probable cause and for improper purpose. Boykin v. Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, 893
F. Supp. 378, 102 Ed. Law Rep. 981 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
In civil action for assault and battery and false imprisonment, trial court did not err in admitting testimony of U. S. Marshal
as to remarks of assailant to marshal many months after incident in view of fact that remarks went directly to question of
maliciousness of assailant attack, put into issue by victim allegation in complaint. Clarke v. Bruckner, 93 F.R.D. 666, 11 Fed.
R. Evid. Serv. 305 (D.V.I. 1982).
Police officer had objectively reasonable belief in existence of probable cause to arrest detainee for misdemeanor larceny and,
thus, officer was not liable to detainee for false arrest under North Carolina law, where officer saw woman drop money, detainee
pick it up, and detainee keep money, it appeared to officer that detainee knew identity of owner of money when he took it,
officer observed detainee leave bus station where incident took place, which could be construed as flight, and officer confirmed
with woman that money had not been returned before officer gave chase. N.C.G.S. § 14 "72(a). Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d
167 (4th Cir. 1994).
Under Maryland law of false arrest, existence of legal justification for deprivation of liberty is judged according to principles
derived from law of arrest; in case of police officers, warrantless arrest is justified only if misdemeanor or felony was committed
in their presence or if officers have probable cause to believe that felony has been or is about to be committed. Cooper v. Dyke,
814 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1987).
Arrest of plaintiff, after discovery of cocaine prepared for packaging and lying on mirror on bed where he had been sitting, as
well as discovery of cocaine in belt at same time, was based on abundant probable cause and thus would not support action for
false arrest. Simons v. Montgomery County Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1985).
Under Virginia law gist of action for false imprisonment is illegal detention of person without lawful process, or unlawful
execution of lawful process. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Freeman, 199 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1952).
Journalist's right to not be arrested or have his property seized without probable cause was clearly established when police
officer allegedly arrested him and permanently seized his camera's video card without probable cause, and thus officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity on journalist's § 1983 claims for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. U.S. Const. Amend.
4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Garcia v. Montgomery County, Maryland, 145 F. Supp. 3d 492 (D. Md. 2015).
Tort of false arrest is predicated upon knowing misconduct; negligence or other mistake in providing incorrect information to
lawful authorities does not give rise to liability. Reaves v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 683 F. Supp. 521, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 107, 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1827 (D. Md. 1988).
Under Maryland law, claim for false imprisonment does not require a showing of malice or evil intention. Majors v. U.S. Air,
Inc., 525 F. Supp. 853, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3012, 96 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 14067 (D. Md. 1981).
To succeed on an action for false arrest under § 1983, arrestee must demonstrate that his arrest was not supported by probable
cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Wilkerson v. Hester, 114 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. N.C. 2000).

Under South Carolina law, Air Force officials and Office of Special Investigations (OSI) agents acted with sufficient malice in
deciding to retain civilian employees of Air Force base's officers' club to support employees' false arrest claims against them,
where there was no evidence that any employees were guilty of any crime, OSI agent who initiated investigation had threatened
to have employees fired if they did not apologize to his wife, and agent's wife complained about not being promoted after
employees were terminated. Zimbelman v. Savage, 745 F. Supp. 2d 664 (D.S.C. 2010).
To establish cause of action for false imprisonment under South Carolina law, plaintiff must prove that: (1) defendant restrained
plaintiff; (2) restraint was intentional; and (3) restraint was unlawful. Zimbelman v. Savage, 745 F. Supp. 2d 664 (D.S.C. 2010).
Allegations by arrestee that police officer knowingly and deliberately had him arrested without probable cause, that officer
sought arrest warrants against arrestee for attempted first–degree murder, aggravated malicious wounding, and abduction based
on purported victim's written statement that did not contain facts, real or fabricated, that would support the issuance of such
warrants, that officer knew that the theory of the crime implicating arrestee was not supported by the evidence and was not
plausible, and that other officers arrested him based on the implausible statements in the warrants, stated § 1983 claim against
officer for false arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Willis v. Blevins, 966 F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. Va. 2013).
Arrestee alleged sufficient facts to state a § 1983 false arrest claim against non-arresting police officer; arrestee's complaint
alleged that the officer responded to a call in which he was provided with the name, physical description, social security number,
and date of birth of an alleged assailant, whose middle and last name differed from the arrestee's, and in response to that
information, the officer incorrectly selected the arrestee's information on police department's computer system and provided
sworn statement based on which a warrant for the arrestee's arrest was issued, leading his arrest by another officer, and complaint
alleged that the non-arresting officer's conduct was willful, malicious, oppressive and/or reckless. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. McPhearson v. Anderson, 873 F. Supp. 2d 753 (E.D. Va. 2012).
In Virginia, probable cause must justify an arrest; thus, an allegation that an officer conducted warrantless arrest without probable
cause can state claim for false arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Harrison v. Prince William County Police Dept., 640 F. Supp.
2d 688 (E.D. Va. 2009).
Arrestee's allegations in his § 1983 complaint that county police officer did not have probable cause to seize or arrest him stated
valid claims for constitutional violations of false arrest and illegal search and seizure. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983. Harrison v. Prince William County Police Dept., 640 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. Va. 2009).
Entire duration of plaintiff confinement at city jail was justified by, first, the arresting officer on-the-scene assessment of probable
cause, by, next, the judgment of the jail medical staff that plaintiff was in need of immediate medical attention, and by, lastly, the
order in civil commitment proceeding directing sheriff to make provision for the care of plaintiff until he could be transferred
to the state hospital. Code Va.1950, §§ 37.1"1 et seq., 37.1"67.3, 37.1"68. Kenny v. Warden, Richmond City Jail, 476 F. Supp.
197 (E.D. Va. 1979).
Emergency services and intake clinician for mental health care provider had probable cause to believe that involuntary
detainee suffered from mental illness and that he posed danger to others, supporting clinician's petition for temporary detention
order, where clinician observed that detainee appeared to be reacting to visual stimuli not visible to her, that he displayed
inappropriate affect, including laughing at inappropriate times, and that he was disoriented to time, clinician noted that detainee
was perseverating on topic of his neighbors controlling his television, and clinician knew detainee owned firearm. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Goines v. Valley Community Services Bd., 103 F. Supp. 3d 791 (W.D. Va. 2015).
Arrestee's complaint provided sufficient allegations to support a claim that his arrest for the Virginia law offense of obstruction
of justice lacked probable cause, as required to state a § 1983 claim against arresting police officer for unlawful arrest; arrestee
alleged that at the point of his arrest, his only interaction with the officer, who had followed arrestee's son's vehicle into arrestee's

driveway after observing the son driving over the speed limit, had been to walk to the police cruiser at a measured and even
pace while waving to signal his approach, and respectfully contest the officer's assessment of his son's driving speed. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; West's V.C.A. § 18.2–460. Jackson v. Brickey, 771 F. Supp. 2d 593 (W.D. Va. 2011).
In civil rights action for false arrest, lawfulness of arrest is determined under law of state in which arrest is made. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983. Robinson v. Goff, 517 F. Supp. 350 (W.D. Va. 1981).
Arrestee alleged a clearly established violation of his constitutional right to be free from police arrest without a good faith
showing of probable cause, as required to overcome sheriff's deputy's claim of qualified immunity in arrestee's § 1983 action
alleging unlawful arrest and imprisonment; arrestee provided evidence that deputy made false statements in his arrest warrant
affidavit by excluding jailhouse informant's statements that were contradicted by the physical evidence, misstating that drop-
trail from victim's house to arrestee's house used arrestee's scent, and excluding informant's inconsistencies between his two
statements. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018).
Arrestee sufficiently alleged, as required to survive motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, that arrest warrants were tainted
by false and misleading affidavits, so that magistrate's issuance of warrants did not insulate Louisiana parish council members
and officers from sheriff's office from liability for false arrest; arrestee alleged that after he made comments on social networking
website criticizing council members, members and officers, acting with knowledge that arrestee's speech was constitutionally
protected, conspired to create false and misleading affidavits, which were the basis for issuance of arrest warrants. U.S. Const.
Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2017).
Under Louisiana law, city police officer's detention of citizen, which took place after officer removed citizen from parish council
meeting on councilman's orders, did not amount to false arrest; citizen was never arrested nor questioned by officer, detention
took place while officer conferred with his supervisor to determine whether citizen should be placed under arrest or released,
and detention was brief enough to not require probable cause. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795 (5th
Cir. 2017).
Excessive force claim brought by arrestee individually and on behalf of her minor son against parish sheriff and deputies was
not barred under Heck, based on fact that they pled guilty to charges of resisting an officer, where arrestee and son did not
allege that defendants used excessive force merely in effectuating their arrest, but also alleged that defendants used excessive
force while they were imprisoned in parish jail, during which time arrestee and son claimed they remained for an extended
period of time without proper maintenance, were denied medical treatment, and were continually battered and assaulted by the
defendants. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:108. Thomas v. Pohlmann, 681 Fed. Appx.
401 (5th Cir. 2017).
Taint exception to independent intermediary doctrine did not apply to arrest for interfering with police duties while arrestee
filmed officers' interactions with other citizens, in arrestee's action alleging that arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights;
although arrestee pointed to alleged inconsistencies between videos of arrest incidents, his own affidavit, and other witnesses'
accounts, on the one hand, and officers' reports, arrest affidavits, and deposition testimony, on the other, much of his evidence
simply showed that his actions and those of arresting officers were subject to different interpretations, grand jury returned
indictments even though it heard testimony from arrestee and several witnesses who testified in his favor, and expert report
opining that officers did not have probable cause to arrest arrestee, and targeted him for arrest and prosecution, did not show
that grand jury proceedings were tainted. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Buehler v. City of Austin/Austin Police Department, 824 F.3d
548 (5th Cir. 2016).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest 17-year-old for unlawful carrying of a weapon, and thus were entitled to qualified
immunity on claim by teenager under § 1983 for false arrest. U.S.C.A Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Cole v. Carson,
802 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2015).

Police officers were not objectively unreasonable in believing there was probable cause to make arrests, and thus officers were
entitled to qualified immunity from arrestees' § 1983 false-arrest claims in action seeking damages for injury suffered as result
of arrestees' imprisonment following arrest on murder charges that were subsequently dropped; arrestees admittedly had been
drinking heavily and argued with victim the night of his death, they were the last people to see victim alive, and officers had been
told that arrestees had admitted to killing victim. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Crostley v. Lamar County,
Texas, 717 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2013).
False arrest claim arising from arrest that allegedly occurred when arrestee had confrontation with police officer and others at
county jail was barred by arrestee conviction for aggravated assault of officer, which necessarily implied that probable cause
existed for arrest at that time. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; V.T.C.A., Penal Code § 22.02(a)(1). Sappington
v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999).
Under Louisiana law, torts of false arrest and malicious prosecution both require malice as essential element. Morin v. Caire,
77 F.3d 116, 144 A.L.R. Fed. 719 (5th Cir. 1996).
Officer had objectively reasonable basis to arrest plaintiff for public intoxication based on smell of alcohol on his breath,
information that arrestee had been drinking beer, arrestee belligerence and cumulative circumstances of the night, and therefore
officer was entitled to qualified immunity on false arrest, malicious prosecution, and § 1983 claims to extent they were grounded
on wrongful arrest. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1995).
Officer who arrested store owner without valid warrant or even probable cause could be held liable, under Louisiana law, for
tort of false arrest; there was evidence that officer arrested owner out of anger for owner persisting in refusal to sign consent to
search form. Duboue v. City of New Orleans, 909 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1990).
Elements of a common law false imprisonment cause of action are: (1) intent to confine; (2) acts resulting in confinement; and
(3) consciousness of victim of confinement or resulting harm. Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980).
Lack of malice, presence of good faith, or presence of probable cause do not affect existence of wrong, for purposes of false
imprisonment cause, when detention is unlawful. Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963).
Pawn shop employee refusal to relinquish possession of stolen ring that was in plain view and could be seized by police officers
placed employee in probable violation of statutory prohibition against resisting officer and, therefore, would have justified
arrest; thus, procuring arrest warrant was not actionable, even though employee believed in good faith that officers did not
have authority to seize ring. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; LSA-R.S. 14:108; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Loustalot v. Rice, 764 F. Supp.
1080 (M.D. La. 1991).
Fact that city ordinance violations for impeding flow of traffic and wearing pants below the waist, i.e., "sagging," did not provide
authority to arrest did not preclude finding of probable cause, for purposes of arrestee's § 1983 false arrest claims against police
officers. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Adams v. City of Shreveport, 269 F. Supp. 3d 743 (W.D. La. 2017).
Even if detective could be said to have arrested suspect in child pornography investigation, reasonable officer in detective's
position could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest him, and thus detective was entitled to qualified immunity on
suspect's Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest brought under § 1983; at the time the purported arrest was made, detective had
obtained information indicating that an internet protocol (IP) address assigned to suspect had downloaded child pornography,
even though suspect denied that he was involved. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Tuskan v. Jackson County,
134 F. Supp. 3d 1041 (S.D. Miss. 2015).
In Texas, false imprisonment transpires when there is willful detention without consent of the detained and without authority
of law. Landry v. A-Able Bonding Inc., 870 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Tex. 1994).

There is no cause of action for false arrest under § 1983 unless arresting officer lacked probable cause. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Richardson v. Oldham, 811 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
Police officers did not act maliciously in mistakenly obtaining arrest warrant for wrong person and, therefore, did not violate
Fourth Amendment or due process clause; nothing indicated that probable cause deliberations of magistrate or grand jury were
tainted by actions of officers, nothing indicated that officers suppressed or ignored exculpatory evidence, and officers were
candid with prosecutor in telling him that they were unable to positively identify arrestee and that confidential informant could
not be relied upon. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4, 5, 14. Patterson v. Armatys, 808 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
While false arrest is considered a violation of arrestee rights, of kind which may support civil rights claim, there is no cause
of action for false or unlawful arrest unless arresting officer lacked probable cause. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Hazelton v. City of
Grand Prairie, Tex., 8 F. Supp. 2d 570 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
State trooper had at least arguable probable cause when he made an arrest for driving while intoxicated, as required for qualified
immunity from arrestee's false arrest/false imprisonment claim under § 1983, where trooper had within his knowledge that a
911 caller had reported that arrestee was driving dangerously, he was informed by a municipal police officer that arrestee had
been swerving in her vehicle, walking unsteadily, and not following directions, and he observed arrestee slurring her speech.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Goldman v. Williams, 101 F. Supp. 3d 620 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
Arrestee's allegations that police officers were aware of facts establishing the affirmative defense under Texas law that a threat
of force was used in defense of property, and thus, that the officers arrested him without probable cause to believe he committed
the Texas-law offense of making a terroristic threat, were sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 for false arrest; arrestee
alleged that the officers were lurking outside of his house attempting to steal his generator, that he only came out of his house
after hearing his dogs barking, seeing flashlights, and seeing at least two individuals moving near the generator, and that prior
to making any threat, he loudly requested several times that the individuals identify themselves. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;
V.T.C.A., Penal Code §§ 9.02, 22.07(a)(2). Thomas v. City of Galveston, Texas, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
To establish the intentional tort of false arrest or false imprisonment under Texas law, the plaintiff must show (1) willful
detention, (2) without consent, and (3) without authority of law. Lewis v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 686 (S.D.
Tex. 1999).
Under Texas law, police officers had authority to make warrantless arrest of hunters who exchanged gunfire with officers and
thus did not engage in false imprisonment of hunters; one hunter stood and fired weapon in direction of officer, who received
minor injuries to face and chest as result, which, in combination with other facts known to officers, gave officers probable cause
to believe that offense had been committed within their view. Wicker v. City of Galveston, 944 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
Suspects did not have false arrest or false imprisonment claims against border patrol agents under Texas law, where agents had
reasonable suspicion necessary to stop and detain them, and detention lasted only as long as necessary to clear agentssuspicion
of criminal activity. Garza v. U.S., 881 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
Under Texas common law, essential elements of false imprisonment are wilful detention of the person, detention without
authority of law, and detention against the consent of the party detained. Clark v. Heard, 538 F. Supp. 800 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
Under Texas law, reasonable grounds for searching a suspected offender in order to prevent consequences of theft are a defense
to an action for false imprisonment. Vernon Ann.C.C.P.Tex. art. 325; Vernon Ann.P.C.Tex. art. 1169. Burnaman v. J. C. Penney
Co., 181 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Tex. 1960).

Gun rights activists who refused to comply with state troopers' orders to leave grounds of Texas State Capitol and place their
fake guns in their vehicles before entering Capitol Building were brought before magistrate judge, who found probable cause
to support their arrests for criminal trespass, and thus independent-intermediary doctrine applied to bar activists' § 1983 false
arrest claims against troopers, absent evidence that troopers in any way tainted magistrate judges' finding. U.S. Const. Amend.
4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 411.062(a); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.05(a). Holcomb v. McCraw, 262 F.
Supp. 3d 437 (W.D. Tex. 2017).
Sheriff's deputy was not liable for false arrest, in arrestee's § 1983 action; deputy was merely present and watched while arrestee
was arrested by city police officers, and it was not deputy, but rather officer, who handcuffed arrestee, frisked her, placed her
in patrol car, and told her she was under arrest. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Alexander v. Carter for Byrd, 733
Fed. Appx. 256 (6th Cir. 2018).
Former school counselor's right to be free from arrest pursuant to warrant that, but for deliberate or reckless omission of material
facts, never would have been issued was clearly established at time of his arrest, and, thus, arresting police officer did not
have qualified immunity from counselor's § 1983 wrongful arrest claim. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Wesley
v. Campbell, 864 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2017).
Arrestee who was indicted for, and later acquitted of, perjury, arising from arrestee's purportedly false testimony at a custody
hearing, failed to state a claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution against deputy sheriff whose investigation led to her
indictment; grand jury found existence of probable cause for offense and arrestee's complaint did not allege that deputy sheriff
presented any testimony to grand jury, let alone false testimony. Gonzalez v. Kovacs, 687 Fed. Appx. 466 (6th Cir. 2017).
Former school counselor plausibly alleged that police officer effected his arrest for sexual abuse of student without probable
cause, as required to state § 1983 claim of false arrest under Fourth Amendment; counselor alleged that student was a young
child, student's allegations were facially implausible and inconsistent, student had a history of psychological problems, results
of student's medical examination showed no evidence of abuse-related injury, and officer was unable to uncover any evidence
corroborating student's story. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2015).
Police officer who stopped arrestee, stood by his truck while another officer questioned him, and contacted arrestee's son's
daycare to question them, did not violate any clearly established law, and thus was entitled to qualified immunity in arrestee's
§ 1983 action against officers for false arrest and malicious prosecution, even though he did not stop other officer's arrest of
arrestee; arrestee's truck had crossed the yellow line on the road, giving officers probable cause to stop him, and other officer
had probable cause to arrest him. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Apsey v. Chester Township, 608 Fed. Appx.
335 (6th Cir. 2015).
State and federal law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity from arrestees' § 1983 and Bivens false arrest
claims, absent evidence demonstrating that the individual officers relied on an arrest warrant they knew had issued without
probable cause, or that any individual officer influenced DEA agent's grand jury testimony, causing him to lie to or mislead
the grand jury, thereby leading to the arrests. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d
606 (6th Cir. 2014).
Ranking officer who was last to arrive at arrestee's residence, and was informed by junior officer that arrestee had pushed first
responding officer, was entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 unlawful entry and arrest claims; it would not
have been clear to ranking officer that entry into arrestee's home and his arrest were unlawful. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983. Saad v. Keller, 546 Fed. Appx. 552 (6th Cir. 2013).
Police officers were entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim; video evidence
demonstrated that probable cause supported arrestee's obstruction charge based on his repeated failed to comply with the officers

during his booking. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; M.C.L.A. § 750.81d(7)(a). Khother v. DeEulis, 527 Fed.
Appx. 461 (6th Cir. 2013).
Police officers who had probable cause to arrest motorist for failing to produce his driver's license during traffic stop were not
liable for false arrest or false imprisonment under Michigan law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Hoover v. Walsh, 682 F.3d 481
(6th Cir. 2012).
Arrestee's right to receive a prompt determination of probable cause was not violated, for purpose of § 1983 claim, where
arrestee received a probable cause hearing either the next day after his arrest, when he was arraigned, or ten days later when it
was determined that sufficient probable cause existed to hold arrestee until trial. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Sanders v. Detroit Police Dept., 490 Fed. Appx. 771 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 655, 184 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2012).
Liability for false arrest and false imprisonment attaches only when the claimant is arrested without probable cause. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 1999 FED App. 0280P (6th Cir. 1999).
To prevail on claim of false arrest and false imprisonment, plaintiff must show that his arrest was without probable cause and
thus not legal; whether actual conviction could have occurred is irrelevant because actual innocence is not element of tort of
false arrest. Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 1994 FED App. 0277P (6th Cir. 1994).
Probable cause determinations for arrest, even if wrong, are not actionable as long as such determinations pass the test of
reasonableness and reasonableness is question of law to be decided by trial judge. Jeffers v. Heavrin, 10 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 1993).
Whether officer had probable cause to arrest motorist on DWI charge was question for jury, in motorist action against officer
for false imprisonment and arrest, notwithstanding undisputed testimony of officer that motorist had moderate smell of alcohol
upon his breath and staggered as he walked. Ross v. Meyers, 883 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1989).
Essence of a claim for false imprisonment is that the imprisonment is false, that is, without probable cause. Carr v. National
Discount Corp., 172 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1949).
Law enforcement officers had a reasonable, good-faith belief that a felony was committed in their presence, and thus their arrest
of plaintiff on wanton endangerment charge was not false imprisonment under Kentucky law, where officers had witnessed
plaintiff point his gun at an officer and refuse to put it down. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.060. Naselroad v. Mabry, 184 F. Supp.
3d 534 (E.D. Ky. 2016).
Given "minimal" burden at prima facie stage, school counselor alleged sufficient circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent
to state claim under § 1983 that police detective's arrest of counselor for sexual abuse of child was in retaliation for counselor's
appeal of finding of substantiated abuse made by detective's social worker friend; only after learning of counselor's appeal did
detective, without discovering any additional inculpatory information, file her affidavit seeking an arrest warrant. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Wesley v. Rigney, 913 F. Supp. 2d 313, 84 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 733 (E.D. Ky. 2012).
Under Kentucky law, shoplifting arrestee admission that retail store manager had probable cause to stop her precluded arrestee
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and abuse of process claims against store owner and mall owner following dismissal
of shoplifting charges. KRS 433.236. Pennington v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 710 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
Under Kentucky law, arrestee who was arrested following police pursuit of his vehicle could not bring claims of unlawful
imprisonment and malicious prosecution, where there was probable cause to arrest arrestee. Tapp v. Banks, 72 F. Supp. 2d 739
(E.D. Ky. 1999).

Under Kentucky law, action for false imprisonment will lie only when imprisonment lacks lawful authority, and where arrest
is made lawfully, remedy is action for malicious prosecution, in which malice and lack of probable cause are essential. Dean
v. Earle, 866 F. Supp. 336 (W.D. Ky. 1994).
To hold officer liable under § 1983 for making material false statements in warrant, a plaintiff must establish: (1) substantial
showing that officer stated deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard for truth and (2) that allegedly false or omitted
information was material to finding of probable cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Tobias v. Pletzke, 933
F. Supp. 2d 892 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
Former employee voluntarily agreed to stay in meeting with regional manager and loss prevention regional manager in manager's
office, precluding her claim against employer of false imprisonment under Michigan law; employee voluntarily accompanied
managers to office, door to office remained open throughout meeting, managers remained seated during meeting, and managers
did not raise their voices or prevent employee from leaving room. Miller v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 2d 683 (E.D.
Mich. 2011).
State police officers did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights by failing to continue to investigate
case after establishing probable cause to arrest for extortion under Michigan law, and thus officers were entitled to qualified
immunity in arrestee's § 1983 action for false arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; M.C.L.A. § 750.213.
Ghaith v. Rauschenberger, 778 F. Supp. 2d 787 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
Officers who assisted their colleague in arrest for extortion, under Michigan law, were entitled to rely on their co-officer's
determination of probable cause, and thus were also entitled to qualified immunity in arrestee's subsequent § 1983 civil rights
action for false arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; M.C.L.A. § 750.213. Ghaith v. Rauschenberger, 778
F. Supp. 2d 787 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
Officer had probable cause to arrest driver for failing to pull over until approximately a quarter mile after officer had activated
his lights under state statute prohibiting a driver from willfully failing to obey hand, voice, emergency light or siren, a visual
or audible signal by a police officer directing the driver to bring his or her motor vehicle to a stop, and thus, driver could not
establish claims of false arrest, false imprisonment or malicious prosecution under Michigan law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;
M.C.L.A. § 257.602a. Hardesty v. City of Ecorse, 623 F. Supp. 2d 855 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
To establish a claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution under Michigan law, an arrestee must show
the absence of probable cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Hardesty v. City of Ecorse, 623 F. Supp. 2d 855 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
False imprisonment involves an unlawful restraint on a person's liberty or freedom of movement; to constitute false
imprisonment, the restraint must have occurred without probable cause to support it. Solovy v. Morabito, 608 F. Supp. 2d 859
(E.D. Mich. 2009).
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agents had probable cause to justify arrest, precluding arrestee's state law claims
for malicious prosecution and false arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Sutherland v. Mizer, 625 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Mich.
2008).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest high school student for assaulting police officer and resisting arrest, in violation of
Michigan law, and thus, officers were not liable to student under § 1983 for unlawful arrest, or under Michigan law for false
arrest or false imprisonment, or for defamation for communicating fact of arrest to third parties; student admitted that he threw
a punch at officer and bit officer while officer was attempting to subdue him when he resisted pat-down search for item he
possessed in violation of school rules, officer required medical treatment for bites and scratches sustained in encounter with
student, and student and officers testified student struggled with officer throughout the incident. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;
M.C.L.A. § 750.81(d). Johnson v. City of Lincoln Park, 434 F. Supp. 2d 467 (E.D. Mich. 2006).

Police officers had probable cause to make arrest for violation of city ordinance prohibiting disorderly disturbance that disturbed
peace and good order of neighborhood, and thus, officers were not liable to arrestee under § 1983 for false arrest, or under
Michigan law for false arrest or false imprisonment; officer who was outside of house could hear arrestee yelling and screaming
and swearing inside house, arrestee's friend testified she was standing at curb outside house and she heard arrestee screaming
inside house, and another friend who was inside house testified that officers tried to calm arrestee down but she continued to
scream and yell. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Sterling-Ward ex rel. Sterling v. Tujaka, 414 F. Supp. 2d 727 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
Police officer, who executed facially valid arrest warrant issued following a probable cause hearing at which judge found
probable cause to arrest individual for obstruction of justice, was not liable under state law tort claims for false arrest, assault
and battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Hansel v. Bisard, 30 F. Supp. 2d 981
(E.D. Mich. 1998).
Under Michigan law, essential element of false imprisonment claim is that there was arrest without probable cause. White v.
Tamlyn, 961 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
Plaintiff alleging false imprisonment under Michigan law must prove that she was imprisoned or restrained of her liberty and
that this restraint was unlawful, i.e., without probable cause. Weatherholt v. Meijer Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1227, 153 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2132, 132 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 11697 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
Elements of false arrest require that arrest be made without probable cause. Smith v. Yono, 613 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
It was not clearly established that placing suspect in handcuffs without probable cause converted his investigative stop into
unlawful arrest, and thus, immigration officer was entitled to qualified immunity from suspect's civil rights claim of unlawful
arrest under the Fourth Amendment; suspect arrived with his mother on scene of ongoing raid of address connected to alien
fugitives, one suspect had recently attempted to flee, once inside suspect's eyes widened, and he quickly turned, shifted his
weight, and stepped toward officer, and within 30 minutes of handcuffing, officers clarified situation, concluded that suspect
was presenting no ongoing threat to safety, and released him with his mother. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Valdez v. U.S., 58
F. Supp. 3d 795 (W.D. Mich. 2014).
Determination that police officer did not have probable cause to arrest detainee, for failure to disclose his identity, precluded
dismissal of claims, under Michigan law, that officer violated statute governing warrantless arrests, and committed false arrest,
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. M.C.L.A. § 764.15. Risbridger v. Connelly, 122 F. Supp. 2d 857 (W.D. Mich.
2000).
Where an arrest is pursuant to an invalid warrant, and without probable cause, a claim cognizable under section 1983 may be
alleged. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Lopez v. Ruhl, 584 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Mich. 1984).
Police officer properly relied on assertion from sheriff's deputy that there was probable cause to arrest suspect, and thus, officer
was entitled to qualified immunity from suspect's § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Crawford v. Geiger, 131 F. Supp. 3d 703 (N.D. Ohio 2015).
Arrestee's allegations that she was charged with disorderly conduct and making false alarms were not sufficient to state § 1983
claim of wrongful seizure of her person, since arrestee failed to allege that she was arrested for her conduct in conjunction with
charged misdemeanors that were later dismissed before trial. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Ghaster v. City
of Rocky River, 913 F. Supp. 2d 443 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
Township police chief was entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 false arrest claim; there was no indication
that chief knowingly or with reckless disregard for truth procured warrant for arrestee's arrest or knew warrant was based

upon allegedly false information or material omission, and chief had good faith basis for relying upon warrant. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Ruble v. Escola, 898 F. Supp. 2d 956 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
Under Ohio law, tort of false arrest or false imprisonment consists of depriving the plaintiff of his liberty without lawful
justification. Van Hull v. Marriott Courtyard, 87 F. Supp. 2d 771 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
County sheriff and police officers were not liable on arrestee's claim for false arrest under § 1983 or Ohio law, where officers
had probable cause to arrest for obstruction, arrestee was detained lawfully at county jail, and his detention was accomplished
pursuant to accepted legal procedures. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Day v. DeLong, 358 F. Supp. 3d 687 (S.D.
Ohio 2019).
Police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from liability in § 1983 action alleging civil rights violations, civil conspiracy
and an equal protection violation, all arising out of plaintiff's arrest on drug trafficking charges; officer's conduct of relying
on an FBI agent's investigation notes when seeking a warrant for plaintiff's arrest was reasonable under the circumstances,
and his failure to double-check accuracy of the information, although perhaps tantamount to negligence, did not equate to a
constitutional violation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Snyder v. U.S., 990 F. Supp. 2d 818 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
Officers had probable cause to arrest, for purposes of immunity from liability for false arrest under Ohio law, when former
tenant accused landlady, in the presence of police and in landlady office, of having stolen her welfare check and stated that she
had seen check on landlady desk. Fenstermaker v. City of Dayton, Ohio, 712 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
In action for compensatory and punitive damages for airline removal of passenger from commercial aircraft, passenger claim of
false imprisonment which allegedly occurred when passenger was arrested on charge of disorderly conduct was not precluded
by fact that passenger was convicted in state court on disorderly conduct charges. Sherrod v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 516 F.
Supp. 39 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
Police detectives reasonably believed that they had probable cause to arrest suspect for concealing murder and hiding body,
and thus were entitled to qualified immunity from liability on suspect's § 1983 false arrest claim, where, at time of arrest,
detectives knew or believed that suspect claimed she had not seen or talked to victim day of his disappearance, that she admitted
having had keys to his house over following weekend, including having been in house and having spoken to victim's wife, that
video surveillance showed wife and suspect entering local store and purchasing shower curtain liners and hooks on night that
victim went missing, that witnesses indicated that curtains were replaced after victim went missing, and that search at victim's
residence had turned up "projectile" from bathtub plumbing pipes. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Ewell v. Toney,
853 F.3d 911 (7th Cir. 2017).
Arrestee alleged that city police officers never received complaint of animal abuse or that they knew any such complaint was
false, and thus officers could not rely on Illinois statute, which allowed officers to conduct warrantless search of non-residence
after receiving complaint of animal cruelty, as basis for qualified immunity at motion to dismiss phase of arrestee's § 1983
illegal search action. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 510 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 70/10. Neita v. City of Chicago,
830 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2016).
Investigator for county sheriff's department had arguable probable cause to arrest suspect for allegedly sexually assaulting 11-
year old girl while transporting her for medical purposes, and thus investigator was entitled to qualified immunity on suspect's
§ 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims, where girl repeated detailed story to different individuals, there was no
indication that she was lying or suggestible, trip from counseling services to her home took two hours when it should have taken
40 minutes, and county attorney independently determined that probable cause existed and instructed investigator to make the
arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 2015).

Under Illinois law, police officers had probable cause to believe that suspect was individual named in arrest warrant, and thus
were not liable for false imprisonment, where officers had valid warrant for suspect's brother, brother had previously used
suspect's name, birthday, and social security number as alias, and brothers resembled each other. Hull v. City of Chicago, 624
Fed. Appx. 436 (7th Cir. 2015).
City police officers who arrived at burning house to find homeowner's neighbor banging on locked door to rouse anyone inside
were not entitled to qualified immunity from neighbor's § 1983 false arrest claim; reasonable officer could not have mistakenly
believed that probable cause existed to arrest neighbor for arson or criminal trespass. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983. Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2013).
Licensed private investigator's prolonged detention for carrying a concealed handgun due to the process for verifying his gun
carrying license was caused by systemic failures outside the arresting officers' control, supporting the officers' claim for qualified
immunity on investigator's § 1983 wrongful arrest claim; when one of the arresting officers was presented with the license, he
did not sit there scratching his head, but promptly turned to other channels in an attempt to verify it. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Rabin v. Flynn, 725 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2013).
To prevail on § 1983 false arrest claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that police officer lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Harney v. City of Chicago, 702 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2012).
Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any claim under § 1983 against police officers for wrongful arrest. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Thayer v. Chiczewski, 697 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2012).
Where police officers had probable cause to make arrest for resisting peace officer, arrestee's remedy for allegedly unlawful
procurement of arrest warrant was claim for malicious prosecution under state law, not federal constitutional claim for false
arrest under § 1983, although encounter had been precipitated by that warrant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Brooks v. City of Aurora, Ill., 653 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2011).
Police officers lacked probable cause to arrest suspect for assault or attempted battery, in violation of Illinois law, based on
suspect's alleged conduct of threatening to punch officer who accused suspect of murdering his daughter, and thus, they were
not entitled to qualified immunity, in suspect's § 1983 action for false arrest and malicious prosecution; suspect's alleged threat
did not provoke the slightest apprehension of assault. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4, 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;S.H.A. 720 ILCS
5/12–1, 5/12–2(a)(6), 5/12–3. Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2010).
Under Indiana law, where the police arrest a suspect without probable cause, they can be held liable for false imprisonment.
Bentz v. City of Kendallville, 577 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2009).
Police officer had probable cause to arrest store owner for battery against employee, as defined by Illinois law, and thus absolute
bar existed to owner's § 1983 action against officer and city, alleging unlawful arrest; employee had told officer that owner
had hit her in head while forcibly removing her from store after verbal altercation, and officer saw that employee's eye was
slightly swollen and that she had small scratch on her forehead. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; S.H.A. 720 ILCS 5/12–3. McBride v.
Grice, 576 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2009).
Finding that arrest warrant was supported by probable cause precluded arrestee from recovering on his Illinois claims of false
arrest and malicious prosecution, since lack of probable cause was essential element of both torts. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
Mannoia v. Farrow, 476 F.3d 453 (7th Cir. 2007).
That arrestee was not prosecuted does not establish absence of probable cause to arrest, as would support civil rights action
for false arrest; evidentiary requirements for probable cause are more stringent at preliminary hearing than at arrest stage. 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Boyce v. Fernandes, 77 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 1996).

Arresting officer had probable cause to believe that arrestee had committed battery so as to bar arrestee unlawful arrest action;
officer was aware of altercation between arrestee and alleged victim who had previously obtained order of protection against
arrestee, and officer was aware of state law obligating law enforcement officers to take steps to ensure safety of victims of
domestic violence. 720 ILCS 5/12"3 (1992 Bar Ed.) Simmons v. Pryor, 26 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1993).
Judicial approval of a warrant affidavit cannot serve as an absolute bar to Section 1983 liability of officer who submitted it;
where judicial finding of probable cause is based solely on information officer knew to be false or would have known was false
had he not recklessly disregarded the truth, not only does the arrest violate Fourth Amendment, but officer will not be entitled
to good-faith immunity. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Olson v. Tyler, 771 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1985).
Customer who was falsely imprisoned and slandered by the manager of a grocery store suffered damage in the sum of $5,000
and became entitled to recover punitive damages in a similar amount. Clark v. Kroger Co., 382 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1967).
Mere fact that one of the defendants in action for false imprisonment was an assistant United States District Attorney, and that
another defendant was an agent of Federal Bureau of Investigation, would not per se establish immunity of either from plaintiff
claim, and relief might be granted unless, on facts, such defendants were acting lawfully in respect to plaintiff in participating
in or causing his arrest, continued imprisonment, and prosecution. Fine v. Paramount Pictures, 171 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1948).
County sheriff's deputy had probable cause to arrest suspect for driving under the influence (DUI), precluding suspect's § 1983
claims for false arrest and false imprisonment against county and deputy; suspect admitted to drinking one beer, suspect smelled
of alcohol, deputy smelled odor of cannabis when speaking to suspect at his car, suspect's pupils were dilated, and suspect
refused to submit to portable breath test (PBT).U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Ryan v. Koester, 78 F. Supp. 3d
935 (C.D. Ill. 2015).
False imprisonment claims require a lack of probable cause. Bey v. Cimarossa, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
To state cause of action for false imprisonment under Illinois law, plaintiff must prove same elements necessary to establish
claim of false arrest. Cornish v. Papis, 962 F. Supp. 1103 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
To recover damages for false imprisonment under Illinois law, a plaintiff must establish that his personal liberty was
unreasonably or unlawfully restrained against his will and that defendant caused or procured the restraint. Mayorov v. United
States, 84 F. Supp. 3d 678 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any claim under § 1983 against police officers for false arrest. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Powell v. City of Berwyn, 68 F. Supp. 3d 929 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
Police officers who witnessed other officers move to arrest individuals and were told by other officers that arrestees had been
involved in throwing bottles at officers reasonably believed that there was probable cause to arrest, and therefore, officers were
entitled to qualified immunity in arrestees' § 1983 action alleging false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. U.S. Const.
Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Wilbon v. Plovanich, 67 F. Supp. 3d 927 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
Even if they did not have probable cause for arrest, police officers acted in objectively reasonable manner in believing that
probable cause existed, and thus they were entitled to qualified immunity against individual's § 1983 claim for false arrest for
solicitation of prostitution, based on one officer's personal observation that individual stopped his vehicle in front of undercover
officer posing as prostitute and that undercover officer then approached vehicle and subsequently gave signal to indicate that
individual had solicited her for sex acts, and, moreover, individual was inside vehicle, and thus could easily drive away, leaving
officers with little time to reflect or make further inquiries concerning existence of probable cause if they were expected to

apprehend individual. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Holmes v. City of Chicago, 63 F. Supp. 3d 806 (N.D. Ill.
2014).
Police officer had probable cause to believe arrestee was violating protection order, precluding recovery in arrestee's Sec.
1983 false arrest action, where officer relied on official government database to determine that there was existing order of
protection against arrestee, arrestee was on scene with individual who was subject of the order of protection, order prohibited
arrestee from taking or concealing individual's property, individual had called police and reported that arrestee had taken her
cell phone, and officer was present when individual yelled at arrestee to return her phone. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A.
Sec. 1983Dakhlallah v. Zima, 42 F. Supp. 3d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
To prevail on his constitutional claim for false arrest, arrestee must show there was no probable cause for his arrest. U.S. Const.
Amend. 4. London v. Guzman, 26 F. Supp. 3d 746 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
There was no evidence that police officers who responded to call for assistance from other officers who were engaged in physical
altercation with arrestee had a realistic opportunity to prevent the alleged violation of arrestee's rights, precluding arrestee's §
1983 claim against responding officers for failing to intervene to prevent the alleged violation; evidence only showed that the
responding officers may have been present during the time he was allegedly beaten, not that they witnessed the alleged beating.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Boyle v. Torres, 756 F. Supp. 2d 983 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
Officers who responded to call for assistance from other officers who were engaged in physical altercation with arrestee had
probable cause to arrest arrestee, precluding his claim of malicious prosecution under Illinois law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
Boyle v. Torres, 756 F. Supp. 2d 983 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest day care provider for first degree murder of infant, thus precluding provider's §
1983 false arrest claim; provider was arrested pursuant to facially valid warrant, and officers stated that physician who treated
infant at hospital told them that effects of infant's injuries would have been immediate, and that another physician told them
that injuries were "fresh." U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Aleman v. Village of Hanover Park, 748 F. Supp.
2d 869 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
For purposes of § 1983 false arrest claim, existence of probable cause to arrest day care provider for first degree murder of
infant was not vitiated by evidence that one officer deliberately provided doctor who performed autopsy with false or misleading
evidence during autopsy, since probable cause to arrest provider existed based on treating doctors' initial statements to officers,
with or without autopsy findings. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Aleman v. Village of Hanover Park, 748 F.
Supp. 2d 869 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
Even if police officers act upon a malicious motive, existence of probable cause serves as an absolute defense to arrestee's
cause of action for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Phillips v. Allen, 743 F. Supp. 2d 931
(N.D. Ill. 2010).
Existence of probable cause for an arrest precludes any § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment or malicious
prosecution, regardless of whether defendant had malicious motives for arresting plaintiff. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Nugent v. Hayes,
88 F. Supp. 2d 862 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
Existence of probable cause for arrest is an absolute bar to § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious
prosecution. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 82 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
Probable cause is an absolute bar to claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, under Illinois law. Neal v. City of Harvey,
Ill., 1 F. Supp. 2d 849 (N.D. Ill. 1998).

Under Illinois law, plaintiff in false imprisonment action must show that restraint was either unreasonable or without probable
cause. Hvorcik v. Sheahan, 847 F. Supp. 1414 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
Police officer who makes arrest with probable cause is not liable for false arrest under either § 1983 or Illinois common law.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Jones v. Village of Villa Park, 815 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
Under Illinois law, as under federal law, existence of probable cause is absolute defense to action for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Myatt v. City of Chicago, 816 F. Supp. 1259, 82 Ed. Law Rep. 104, 25 Fed. R. Serv.
3d 1511 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
Under Illinois law, existence of probable cause to arrest was absolute defense to arrestee action against police officer for false
arrest and imprisonment. Mosley v. La Mastus, 741 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
Savings and loan association criminal complaint gave police officers probable cause to arrest and detain patron for alleged
forgery and defeated claims against police officers and city for false imprisonment and false arrest under Illinois law. Adrian
v. Skokie Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 730 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
Existence of probable cause for arrest is an absolute defense against a claim for false arrest or imprisonment. Turner v. Green,
704 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
Probable cause is absolute defense to false arrest claim. O'Leary v. Luongo, 692 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
Parents of individual who alleged that he was arrested and jailed without probable cause as a result of city police department
policy of suppressing exculpatory material had not been deprived of any constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14. Jones v. City of Chicago, 639 F. Supp. 146 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest suspect without a warrant on charges of intimidation, attempted residential entry,
invasion of privacy, and resisting arrest, so as to bar suspect's § 1983 claim for false arrest, despite suspect's claim that the arrest
was based on false reports provided to police by complainant; the information provided to officers, which they had no reason
to question, identified the suspect as a potential suspect, facts and circumstances within officers' knowledge were sufficient to
warrant prudent person in believing that suspect was involved in intimidation and invasion of privacy, and officers personally
observed suspect attempting residential entry and resisting arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Fields v.
Roswarski, 469 F. Supp. 2d 599 (N.D. Ind. 2007).
The Seventh Circuit grants qualified immunity to police officers from claim of wrongful arrest asserted under § 1983 when the
probable cause determination was sufficiently close that an officer reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed,
even if that belief ultimately was mistaken. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Tibbett v. McPherson, 5 F. Supp.
3d 989 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
Arrestee's § 1983 Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, since only "seizure" officers
conducted was arrestee's arrest, and that arrest was deemed lawful, eventually resulting in arrestee's conviction for cocaine
possession. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Ebeyer v. Rodriguez, 909 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (S.D. Ind. 2012).
Under Indiana law, liability for false imprisonment stems from liability for false arrest, so probable cause for an arrest generally
will preclude false imprisonment claim. Lessley v. City of Madison, Ind., 654 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (applying
Indiana law).
Police officer's reviewing probable cause statement by other officers could not, alone, form basis for § 1983 failure to intervene
claim by arrestee based on allegedly wrongful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42

U.S.C.A. § 1983. Flint v. City of Milwaukee, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1032 (E.D. Wis. 2015), reconsideration denied in part, 2015 WL
1523891 (E.D. Wis. 2015).
State prosecutor's resistance to dismissal of charge against arrestee for obstructing legal process was not significant when
determining whether officers' mistaken belief, that arrestee had been obstructing legal process in violation of Minnesota law,
was objectively reasonable, as would be required for qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 based on warrantless arrest
without probable cause; prosecutor was not neutral and detached. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 609.50, subd. 1(2). Hoyland v. McMenomy, 869 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2017).
Objectively reasonable county sheriff's officer with arresting officer's training and experience could have reasonably believed
that the leaves he found in arrestee's car were marijuana, giving him probable cause to arrest, and thus officer had qualified
immunity from arrestee's § 1983 claim that he was arrested for possession of marijuana without probable cause, although
lab testing showed that the leaves did not contain detectable amounts of Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC); arresting officer had
extensive training and experience in drug interdiction, he identified the two leaves as marijuana leaves, he knew that arrestee
and his passenger had prior arrests for marijuana possession, and his actions after finding the leaves were consistent with the
routine police work by an officer who genuinely believed he had found a controlled substance. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983. New v. Denver, 787 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 2015).
Officer who arrested intoxicated operator of a personal assistive mobility device was entitled to qualified immunity from
operator's § 1983 unreasonable search and seizure claims, even if officer lacked probable cause to arrest operator for driving
while intoxicated; officer had probable cause to arrest operator based on a reasonable belief that he was violating state traffic
laws by operating his device on a roadway and without due care, and officer also had, at a minimum, arguable probable cause
to conclude that the violation was committed in a manner or under circumstances so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any
person or property. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2015).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest driver of motor vehicle, and were protected by qualified immunity from any liability
for improper arrest, based on his admitted possession of firearm recovered from glove compartment in vehicle and upon
information that they received from police dispatcher indicating that driver had a prior felony conviction, thereby making his
possession of firearm illegal, notwithstanding that, after being informed by driver that his prior offense was only a misdemeanor
and performing additional investigation to determine that this was indeed the case, they ultimately released him roughly one hour
after detaining him initially for investigatory stop. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Williams v. Decker, 767 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2014).
Officer may be liable for unlawful arrest despite magistrate's authorization where reasonably well-trained officer would
have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for warrant. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Small v. McCrystal, 708 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2013).
Under Minnesota law, a plaintiff who seeks to state a claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution must show that the defendants
acted against him without probable cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Sherbrooke v. City of Pelican Rapids, 577 F.3d 984 (8th
Cir. 2009).
Because probable cause to arrest precluded arrestee recovery from arresting officers on false arrest claim, there could be no
recovery on false imprisonment claim. Anderson v. Franklin County, Mo., 192 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 1999).
Officers were entitled to qualified immunity for making arrest of plaintiff; officers heard plaintiff yelling obscenity from porch
some 100 yards away, and had reasonable suspicion that plaintiff had committed offense of disorderly conduct and arguably
had probable cause to make arrest when plaintiff fled. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Kelly v. Bender, 23 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1994).
Under Arkansas disorderly conduct statute, state troopers did not have probable cause to arrest political activist at political
luncheon and they were therefore liable under Arkansas law on claims of false arrest and false imprisonment; activist stated

intention of entering banquet hall and his agitated state were insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest, without words
or conduct that in themselves created disruption or disturbance. Ark.Stats. § 41"2908(1)(d). McIntosh v. Arkansas Republican
Party-Frank White Election Committee, 816 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1987).
A police officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because the innocence of the
suspect is later proved. Hannah v. City of Overland, Mo., 795 F.2d 1385, 21 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 130 (8th Cir. 1986).
Police officer may defend against claim for false arrest or imprisonment under Missouri law by establishing that there were
reasonable grounds or probable cause to believe that person arrested had committed a crime. Duncan v. Clements, 744 F.2d
48 (8th Cir. 1984).
Where officers when arresting employee for assisting in maintaining a common liquor nuisance knew only that employee was
engaged in washing dishes and peeling potatoes in kitchen of night club consisting of large building including dining and
ballroom, bar and basement gambling room, and did not see employee serving intoxicating beverages or participate in their
sale, arrest without warrant was made without probable cause and officers were liable for false arrest and imprisonment. Laws
S.D.1939, c. 15, § 1, as amended by Laws 1943, c. 13, § 1; SDC 13.0203, 24.9903, 34.1609. Anderson v. Sager, 173 F.2d 794
(8th Cir. 1949).
Police had probable cause to arrest promoter of cockfight for operating gambling house, precluding operator from maintaining
civil false arrest claim; sheriff deputy had attended cockfight and placed wagers on outcome. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
McDougal v. Odom, 850 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
Probable cause to arrest suspect on theft charges, arising from eyewitness identifications of suspect as perpetrator, precluded
claims under Arkansas law for false arrest and false imprisonment based on arrest which occurred before police learned of
misidentification of suspect. Davis v. Tamburo, 849 F. Supp. 1294 (E.D. Ark. 1993).
In order to establish a cause of action for false arrest or malicious prosecution under pendent tort claims raised in civil rights
action brought by black plaintiff who was arrested for disorderly conduct following his exclusion from political luncheon,
plaintiff was required to show that police officers who effected arrest were not acting in good faith and upon probable cause.
McIntosh v. White, 582 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
Because officer did not violate arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights when he mistakenly arrested her based on a facially valid
warrant issued for another woman, who had the same first and last name as arrestee, was born just a few months apart, was of
the same race, and had similar height and weight, arrestee could not maintain § 1983 claim against city based on an underlying
Fourth Amendment violation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Peterson v. City of Pine River, 36 F. Supp. 3d
843 (D. Minn. 2014).
City police officers had, at a minimum, arguable probable cause to arrest firearms owner for possession of short-barreled
shotguns, and thus, officers were entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages for false arrest; during search of
owner's home pursuant to a search warrant, three officers measured the shotguns and found them to be less than the minimum
legal length, and owner previously admitted that the guns were his when the officers responded to a potential gas leak at owner's
home, though on day of arrest owner claimed that the guns were of a legal length and that he was not the true owner. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Fagnan v. City of Lino Lakes, Minn., 914 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (D. Minn. 2012).
There was no Fourth Amendment violation by police officers in detaining individuals not mentioned in search warrant for
apartment, and thus, individuals who were detained had no § 1983 cause of action against police officers based on their detention,
where individuals were present at premises while search was being conducted. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4. Liggins v. Morris, 749 F. Supp. 967 (D. Minn. 1990).

State tax investigator had reasonable basis to believe majority owner of taxpayer, an automobile dealership, knew of his
responsibility to remit sales and withholding taxes, collected such taxes, and consciously chose not to remit the money to the
state, and thus investigator had probable cause to charge owner with violation of Missouri law, precluding owner's claims of
submission of false affidavit for arrest, wrongful arrest, and malicious prosecution; investigator did not include false information
in her probable cause statement nor did she recklessly disregard the truth or file a false, misleading, incorrect, or incomplete
affidavit by omitting owner's inability to pay taxes as that would not have negated reasonable belief that owner intended to not
pay taxes. U.S. Const. Amends. 4, 6, 14; Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 143.221, 144.080. Brittingham v. Gove-Ortmeyer, 174 F. Supp.
3d 1043 (E.D. Mo. 2016).
In malicious prosecution the plaintiff must allege and prove malice, want of probable cause, and the termination of the
proceeding favorably to plaintiff; whereas in an action of false imprisonment the allegation of want of probable cause is not
essential. Robinson v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 144 F. Supp. 713 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
Sergeant and trooper were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrestee's § 1983 action for false arrest; when sergeant
initiated arrest, he knew that arrestee had been drinking and observed arrestee speaking in a loud voice and standing close to
trooper, and reasonable officer in sergeant's position could have concluded that arrestee stood close to trooper and spoke loudly
in order to challenge him, thereby provoking trooper to push him back. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Bartlett v. Nieves, 712 Fed. Appx.
613 (9th Cir. 2017).
Even if one suspect's arrest was not supported by probable cause to believe that he committed armed robbery, as victims said
they did not know whether he was one of three alleged robbers, police officers were entitled to qualified immunity from suspect's
Fourth Amendment claim; reasonable officers would not have disagreed as to legality of suspect's arrest for armed robbery, as
officers knew that alleged robbers were three African-American males, that suspect was one of three African-American males
in car, and that suspect's clothing matched that of third robber. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Gillis v. City
and County of San Francisco, 560 Fed. Appx. 665 (9th Cir. 2014).
First arrest inside home and second that occurred once arrestee was brought outside and placed under citizen's arrest were
independent Fourth Amendment events that could independently support separate causes of action under § 1983; second arrest
did not occur in process of formalizing first arrest, which was accomplished, at latest, when arrestee was led from home in
handcuffs. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2009).
Police officers had reasonable cause to believe that arrest was supported by probable cause, and thus officers were immune
from liability, under California law, as to arrestee's state-law claims relating to his arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; West's
Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 847(b)(1); West's Ann.Cal.Gov.Code § 820.2. Collins v. City of Sacramento, 328 Fed. Appx. 361 (9th
Cir. 2009).
To prevail on § 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment, plaintiff would have to demonstrate that there was no probable
cause to arrest him. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 41 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1223 (9th
Cir. 1998).
Customs agentsconduct in investigating parked automobile in which occupants appeared to be struggling, ordering male
occupant to leave vehicle, and physically forcing male occupant from vehicle, did not constitute false imprisonment, as
investigatory stop was justified under circumstances. Pellegrino v. U.S., 73 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 1996).
Under Arizona law, probable cause is absolute defense to claim of false arrest and imprisonment, but defendant bears burden
of production and persuasion for any defense. Gasho v. U.S., 39 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1994).
Existence of probable cause is necessary but not by itself sufficient to establish an arrest lawfulness for purposes of section of
the California Penal Code protecting police officers from civil liability for false arrest or imprisonment arising out of an arrest

if the arrest was lawful or the officer had reasonable cause to believe it was lawful. West Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 847(a). George
v. City of Long Beach, 973 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1992).
Under California law, cause of action for false arrest or imprisonment is stated where it is alleged that there was arrest without
process, followed by imprisonment and damages. Ting v. U.S., 927 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1991).
No liability would accrue for exemplary damages unless acts complained of in false imprisonment suit were done willfully and
maliciously. Bujaki v. Egan, 237 F. Supp. 822 (D. Alaska 1965).
A plaintiff establishes prima facie of false arrest under § 1983 by showing that he was arrested by defendant without warrant,
and burden then devolves upon defendant to establish that arrest was founded upon probable cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Donahoe v. Arpaio, 986 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (D. Ariz. 2013).
Member of county board of supervisors alleged that there was no probable cause to support his arrest, thus shifting burden to
county sheriff and deputy county attorney to establish that there was probable cause in boardmember's action alleging false
arrest under Arizona law. Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1020, R.I.C.O. Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) P 12203 (D. Ariz. 2012),
motion for stay pending appeal denied, 2012 WL 2063455 (D. Ariz. 2012).
Officers had probable cause to arrest arrestee for aggravated assault in connection with shooting in nightclub parking lot,
precluding arrestee's Fourth Amendment claims under § 1983 for false arrest and false detention, where arrestee was present
at nightclub on morning of shooting and was in possession of firearm, arrestee, while seated in rear passenger seat of vehicle
that was departing parking lot, extended firearm and fired it multiple times and also admitted possibly shooting in direction
of nightclub, witness saw arrestee extend his arm from vehicle and fire numerous shots, and bullet found near phone booth
used by shooting victim was fired from, or consistent with being fired from, arrestee's gun, given that arrestee's allegations of
misconduct by investigating detective did not affect such evidence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Lacy v.
County of Maricopa, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Ariz. 2008).
If there was probable cause for any of the charges made against arrestee, arrest was supported by probable cause, and claim for
false arrest fails. Lacy v. County of Maricopa, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Ariz. 2008).
Law enforcement officer reasonable good-faith belief that he had probable cause to arrest and detain a person is a defense to
§ 1983 action. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. United Steelworkers of America v. Milstead, 705 F. Supp. 1426, 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
3168 (D. Ariz. 1988).
There was no probable cause for sheriff lieutenant to arrest plaintiff and proceed with prosecution for driving while under
influence of intoxicating liquor where arrest was based on cursory examination at scene of minor accident, plaintiff protested
her innocence, relatively short conversation would have dispelled any question with respect to asserted intoxication, contrary
to statute no effort was made to present plaintiff to a magistrate or justice of the peace, test indicated no detectable amount of
alcohol, and criminal action, which was dismissed for want of evidence, was pending long after plaintiff was released on bail.
A.R.S. §§ 28"692[A], 28"1053; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 8. Shore v. Mohave County, 472 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Ariz. 1979).
Pro se inmate failed to allege that there was no probable cause for involuntary detention under California statute permitting a
police officer to detain a person who, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, as required
to state claim for false imprisonment. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150. Lofthus v. Long Beach Veterans
Hospital, 214 F. Supp. 3d 908 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
Peace officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because innocence of suspect is later
proved. Hebert v. Morley, 273 F. Supp. 800 (C.D. Cal. 1967).

Arrestee sufficiently alleged excessive force through use of handcuffs that were too tight, and failure to adjust those handcuffs,
after police officers allegedly effectuated an arrest without probable cause, and thus stated a claim under California statute
providing a cause of action for violations of constitutional and statutory rights. U.S. Const. Amend. 4.; Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1.
McFarland v. City of Clovis, 163 F. Supp. 3d 798 (E.D. Cal. 2016).
Individual alleged that he was arrested inside his residence, without warrant and without probable cause, approximately 30
minutes after young boy placed emergency call from residence, stating that his parents were "about to fight," as required to state
§ 1983 claim against officers for false arrest, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983. Williams v. County of Alameda, 26 F. Supp. 3d 925 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Under California law, animal rights activists' allegations that police officer threatened to arrest and cite them for demonstrating
outside of city park's overly restrictive free speech zone, and tore down their banner were sufficient to state plausible claim
under Bane Act. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 52.1(1). Cuviello v. City and County of San Francisco,
940 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
Police officers were entitled to qualified immunity for arrest of pedestrian in pedestrian's § 1983 false arrest and malicious
prosecution proceedings, where it was not clearly established that witnessing someone intentionally kicking a police vehicle
and causing damage was insufficient to create probable cause for arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Meas
v. City and County of San Francisco, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Under California law, police officers are not liable for false imprisonment arising out of any arrest where arrest was lawful
or officer had reasonable cause to believe it was lawful. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 847(b)(1).
Knapps v. City of Oakland, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2009), amended in part, (Sept. 8, 2009).
Under California law, county peace officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for hate crimes, and thus, arrest was valid
and county was immunized from liability in plaintiff false imprisonment action, where ten credible, independent corroborating
witnesses testified as to plaintiff behavior. West Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 847(a); West Ann.Cal.Gov.Code § 815.2(b). Goehring
v. Wright, 858 F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
Under Hawaii law, probable cause is affirmative defense to claim of false imprisonment; defense applies to both police officers
and private citizens. Fraser v. County of Maui, 855 F. Supp. 1167 (D. Haw. 1994).
City police officers had probable cause for arrest on charges of aggravated assault and battery, under Idaho law, thus precluding
arrestee's § 1983 wrongful arrest claim against city, city police chief, and officers; officers were dispatched to arrestee's home
on call of domestic violence, upon arriving at home officers were informed by arrestee's son-in-law that arrestee had pointed
gun at him and struck arrestee's daughter, one officer observed redness on daughter's jaw, and arrestee admitted to slapping
daughter and pointing gun at son-in-law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; West's I.C.A. §§ 18–903, 18–905.
Law v. City of Post Falls, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (D. Idaho 2011).
Vehicle passenger's right to be free from arrest without probable cause was a clearly established constitutional right, as element
for determining whether county police sergeant was entitled to qualified immunity from passenger's § 1983 claim. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983. Freece v. Clackamas County, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Or. 2006), judgment entered, 2006 WL 2380633 (D. Or. 2006).
Under Oregon law, actor may be liable for false arrest and false imprisonment, regardless of whether actual malice existed and
regardless of whether there was probable cause. Arnsberg v. U.S., 549 F. Supp. 55 (D. Or. 1982).
Arrestees, who were attendees at anarchist rally, failed to point to any conduct by city police officers that would constitute
invasion of any individual arrestees' privacy, let alone one that would shock one's conscience, as would support arrestees' §
1983 invasion of privacy claim against officers. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Dunn v. Hyra, 676 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2009).

Probable cause is complete defense to action for false arrest or false imprisonment under Washington law. Dunn v. Hyra, 676
F. Supp. 2d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2009).
Plaintiff's false imprisonment and false arrest claims arising from her arrest during search of her home and person were precluded
by existence of probable cause supporting search warrant for plaintiff's home and person and her arrest. Cassette v. King County,
625 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (W.D. Wash. 2008), judgment aff'd, 2009 WL 1974938 (9th Cir. 2009).
Under Washington law, the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest or false imprisonment.
Bradford v. City of Seattle, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (W.D. Wash. 2008).
Because police officer acted with probable cause when he arrested suspect, restraint on suspect personal liberty was not unlawful
or without legal authority, so suspect claim of false arrest or false imprisonment had to fail as a matter of law. Hennick v.
Bowling, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
Officer who makes arrest without warrant is immune from liability if he has reasonable cause to believe that crime is being
committed in his presence and acts in good faith on that belief; liability cannot be imposed simply on basis that officer decision,
viewed in hindsight, was incorrect. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 840 F. Supp. 784, 21 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2177 (W.D. Wash.
1993).
Factor of whether suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight weighed in favor of estate of driver's
brother in § 1983 action alleging that state police officer used excessive force by fatally shooting brother through window of
his home while investigating earlier road rage incident involving driver, where grounds to arrest driver did not exist when law
enforcement officers went to residence of driver and brother and brother was shot. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Pauly v. White, 874 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2017).
Initial warrantless arrest of cognitively and developmentally disabled sexual assault suspect did not invalidate his § 1983 Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution claim based on detectives' alleged use of confession that they knew to be untrue, and confine
him to false imprisonment claim; after warrantless arrest, there were multiple judicial determinations of probable cause to detain
suspect on all pending charges, and based on that legal process, he spent additional 125 days in jail. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d 750 (10th Cir. 2016).
Sheriff's deputy who assisted in stop of truck and arrest of its occupants was entitled to qualified immunity from liability in
occupants' § 1983 false arrest action, where deputy relied on another officer's statement that truck was stolen, deputy did not
have reasonable opportunity to investigate on his own and double-check accuracy of other officer's conclusion before initiating
arrest, and there was no indication that deputy's reliance on that statement was in bad faith or unreasonable under circumstances.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Maresca v. Bernalillo County, 804 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2015).
Arrestee's guilty plea to public intoxication did not bar widow's § 1983 unlawful arrest claim against police officer alleging
excessive force in act of throwing arrestee to the ground; lawfulness of takedown was question distinct from lawfulness of public
intoxication citation, finding that officer lacked probable cause to take arrestee down would not invalidate public intoxication
conviction, which was based on facts acquired subsequent to takedown, and arrestee was never in custody for public intoxication
but merely received citation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2012).
Under New Mexico law, good faith belief in the lawfulness of action, which will render officer not liable for false imprisonment
or false arrest, ordinarily requires probable cause to arrest. Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines Co., 439 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir.
2006).

Whether department store had probable cause to detain customer whom store employees suspected of shoplifting was for jury
in customer wrongful detention action against store, in light of customer testimony that she had not stolen anything from store
and did absolutely nothing that would justify store employees in stopping her and accusing her of shoplifting. 22 Okl.St.Ann.
§ 1343. Taylor v. Dillards Dept. Stores, Inc., 971 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1992).
Where arrest is made for violation of ordinance in presence of officer, arrest is lawful and no claim for false arrest can arise out
of it, if ordinance is invalid. 1953 Comp. N.M. § 14-17-6. Miller v. Stinnett, 257 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1958).
Front desk officer at police station was entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 unlawful arrest claim arising from
his mistaken identity arrest; it was reasonable for officer to make arrest, given the fact that the warrant upon which arrest was
made included all of the arrestee's identifying information, including his name, birth date, social security number, height, and
weight. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Robinson v. Keita, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Colo. 2014).
Police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 claim that he was falsely arrested for assaulting agent of
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) by allegedly hitting her leg with his roller bag at airport; it was clearly established
that arrest without probable cause violated Fourth Amendment, and officer made reasonable mistake in believing that probable
cause existed to support arrest for misdemeanor assault. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Shimomura v. Carlson,
17 F. Supp. 3d 1120 (D. Colo. 2014).
Showing of probable cause is defense to claim of false arrest or false imprisonment under Missouri law. Lemons v. Lewis, 963
F. Supp. 1038 (D. Kan. 1997).
Probable cause existed for store security officers to effect warrantless arrest of patron for criminal trespass, thus foreclosing
patron claim under Kansas law for false arrest; admitted facts showed that patron was loud, profane, disruptive, and hostile
toward officers, that officers told patron that she would have to leave or be arrested for trespass if she did not calm down, and
that patron did not do so. Daniels v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 505 (D. Kan. 1995).
Under Kansas law, for purposes of action for false arrest or malicious prosecution, finding of probable cause at preliminary
hearing is not complete defense but only prima facie evidence of probable cause which can be overcome by preponderance of
evidence to contrary. Swanson v. Fields, 814 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Kan. 1993).
False arrest claim could not be based upon charges made against arrestee that were later dismissed, where there was probable
cause for arrest upon at least one charge brought against arrestee. Elbrader v. Blevins, 757 F. Supp. 1174 (D. Kan. 1991).
False imprisonment is necessarily a wrongful interference with personal liberty of individual which may be committed by words
alone, or by acts alone, or by both, and by merely operating on the will of the individual, or by personal violence, or by both;
it is not necessary that individual be confined within prison, or within walls or that he be assaulted, or even touched and it is
not necessary that there should be any injury done to individual person, or to his character or reputation; nor is it necessary
that wrongful act be committed with malice, or ill-will, or even with slightest wrongful intention and all that is necessary is,
that individual be restrained of his liberty without any sufficient legal cause therefore, and by words or acts which he fears to
disregard. Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F. Supp. 331 (D. Kan. 1982).
Although arresting deputy had some knowledge of disability of suspect, who was disabled due to degenerative joint disease,
kidney disease, diabetes and nephropathy, it was not obvious he required an accommodation for disability during field sobriety
tests and during his arrest and thus county, its sheriff's department, and deputy were not liable to suspect on his reasonable
accommodation during arrest claim under Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); although suspect initially requested
to use his cane, deputy was not required to accommodate that request, but he still provided reasonable accommodations when
suspect had an obvious need. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 §§ 102, 202, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12132.
Trujillo v. Rio Arriba County ex rel. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Department, 319 F.R.D. 571 (D.N.M. 2016).

Police officers of aviation police department had probable cause to arrest traveler, who was video recording official conduct
of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents at New Mexico airport security screening checkpoint, for refusing to
produce identification upon officers' demand, thus precluding arrestee's § 1983 claim for false arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 3 F. Supp. 3d 1002 (D.N.M. 2014).
Police officer did not have an obligation to intervene in deputy sheriff's investigative detention and subsequent arrest, and, thus,
she was entitled to qualified immunity in arrestee's § 1983 action alleging false arrest; officer arrived on scene after deputy
and did not have a conversation with him before detention and arrest occurred, she was not required to second guess deputy's
reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations, she observed arrestee failing to comply with deputy's requests, and
she had information that arrestee had committed a battery. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Tanner v. San Juan
County Sheriff's Office, 864 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D.N.M. 2012).
Under New Mexico law, if an officer had probable cause to obtain the warrant for a plaintiff's arrest, then he acted with authority
when he arrested her, and he cannot be held liable for false imprisonment, false arrest, or for malicious abuse of process based
on a lack of probable cause. Kerns v. Board of Com'rs of Bernalillo County, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D.N.M. 2010).
A reasonable officer under circumstances presented to city police officers could have concluded that probable cause existed to
arrest for obstructing police officer in violation of municipal code, and thus officers were entitled to qualified immunity from
arrestee's § 1983 unlawful seizure claim; although officers were undercover as they attempted to arrest other individual, it was
reasonable for officers to believe that arrestee, who was working as security guard at nightclub, knew they were police officers
engaged in lawful arrest and that arrestee willfully disobeyed orders to step back from scene. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983. Martin v. City of Oklahoma City, 180 F. Supp. 3d 978 (W.D. Okla. 2016).
State university's public safety officers had arguable probable cause to arrest off-duty state trooper for affray at tailgate outside
college football stadium, as required for qualified immunity in § 1983 suit, even if he was not the initial aggressor and acted in
self defense. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-32. Rankin v. Board of Regents of University
System of Georgia, 732 Fed. Appx. 779 (11th Cir. 2018).
County sheriff deputy had arguable probable cause to arrest man for lewd or lascivious offenses committed upon or in presence
of persons less than 16 years of age, and thus was entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim; arrestee exposed his genitals in front of two minor girls and there were factual disputes about whether arrestee actually
"smirked" at girls. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 800.04 (7)(a)(2). Johnson v. White, 725 Fed.
Appx. 868 (11th Cir. 2018).
Police officer, who was called to detainee's residence to assist emergency medical technicians after detainee's brother was unable
to wake detainee, had arguable probable cause to seize detainee and transport her to hospital for psychological evaluation, and
thus, officer was entitled to qualified immunity from detainee's § 1983 claim challenging officer's decision to seize and transport
detainee; two medical technicians told officer that detainee had been combative to herself, was upset, and was clasping her fists
and hitting herself in the head, officer observed that detainee's hair was all over her head in disarray, and detainee's family did
not protest officer's announcement that he was taking her to the hospital. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. May v.
City of Nahunta, Georgia, 846 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2017).
Arresting officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on arrestee's § 1983 unlawful detention claim; no reasonable officer
could have believed there was probable cause to continue arrestee's detention after arrest for driving under the influence (DUI),
as, upon arrival at police station, two blood-alcohol content (BAC) tests were performed and both produced results of 0.000,
and officer ordered urine analysis to test for drugs despite having no evidence that arrestee was impaired by drugs. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983. Barnett v. MacArthur, 715 Fed. Appx. 894 (11th Cir. 2017).

Freelance photojournalist's excessive force claim was subsumed in his illegal seizure and false arrest claims in pro se § 1983
action alleging that he was photographing an arrest when officers arrested him without probable cause and unlawfully seized
his camera and the pictures on it; photojournalist did not contend that the amount of force police used in effectuating his arrest
would be unlawful even if the arrest itself was valid. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Bowens v. Superintendant
of Miami South Beach Police Dept., 557 Fed. Appx. 857 (11th Cir. 2014).
Police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment phase of arrestee's § 1983 action alleging false arrest;
under arrestee's alleged facts, officer's arrest for violating county law making it unlawful to act in loud and boisterous, reckless,
unruly or violent manner for purpose of insulting, degrading, or inciting another or group of individuals in public place was
without arguable probable cause and violated Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Wilkerson
v. Seymour, 736 F.3d 974 (11th Cir. 2013).
Bare allegations that officer who searched ranch and arrested owner for animal cruelty acted out of personal animosity in an
attempt to ruin the ranch owner did not prevent finding of arguable probable cause, for purposes of owner's § 1983 claims
alleging Fourth Amendment violations. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Bloom v. Alvereze, 498 Fed. Appx.
867 (11th Cir. 2012).
Undersheriff who detained arrested robbery suspects was not liable, under § 1983, for false imprisonment, even if his son had
told him about mistaken identifications soon after incident, as undersheriff was under no duty to believe and investigate his
son's claims. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Hendricks v. Sheriff, Collier County, Florida, 492 Fed. Appx. 90 (11th Cir. 2012).
Presence of probable cause to arrest citizen for obstruction was absolute bar to false imprisonment claim. Siler v. Floyd, 476
Fed. Appx. 710 (11th Cir. 2012).
Claim of false imprisonment, absent misidentification, depends on an absence of probable cause to make the arrest. Case v.
Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2009).
In the context of a claim for false arrest, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity where that officer had "arguable probable
cause," that is, where reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the defendants could
have believed that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff. Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759 (11th Cir. 2006).
Existence of probable cause for arrest defeated arrestee's claims alleging false arrest and false imprisonment under Florida law.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Williams v. City of Homestead, Fla., 206 Fed. Appx. 886 (11th Cir. 2006).
Existence of probable cause for shoplifting arrest defeated any claim of false arrest. Brown v. Dillard's Inc., 170 Fed. Appx.
99 (11th Cir. 2006).
Security guards employed by power company, sued for false imprisonment, properly detained subcontractor employee where
after car in which employees were riding was stopped because security guards saw beer cans being thrown therefrom while
employees were reporting for work the employees voluntarily consented to be searched, security guard discovered package of
what appeared to be marijuana under driver seat and remains of marijuana cigarettes in an ashtray accessible to all occupants
and all three employees denied ownership or knowledge of the contraband; a crime, possession of a controlled substance, had
been committed within presence and immediate knowledge of security guards, justifying guards holding employees until deputy
sheriff arrived. O.C.G.A. §§ 17"4"20, 17"4"20(a), 17"4"60, 51"7"20. Hill v. Georgia Power Co., 786 F.2d 1071, 122 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2779, 104 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 11928 (11th Cir. 1986).
City police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 claim that officer failed to prevent unlawful arrest
carried out by his partner; even if officer could incur personal liability for partner's initiation of unlawful arrest, arrestee failed
to point to case holding that officer's inaction violated constitutional right, there was no indication that officer realistically could

have intervened to stop initial arrest, and officer stated that he never saw altercation, meaning that he had no basis to realistically
gauge whether partner lacked probable cause for arrest to begin with. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Exford
v. City of Montgomery, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
Because arrestees' false imprisonment claim under § 1983 was derivative of false arrest claim, it also depended on absence
of probable cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Daniels v. City of Hartford, Ala., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1036
(M.D. Ala. 2009).
Where a police officer lacks probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under section 1983 for false imprisonment
based on a detention pursuant to that arrest. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Martin v. Anderson, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
Under Alabama law, police officer who responded to domestic dispute call had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for disorderly
conduct, and was thus not liable to plaintiff for false imprisonment, where plaintiff was in or near vehicle when officer arrived
on scene, officer repeatedly asked plaintiff to leave premises, plaintiff repeatedly refused to leave, and plaintiff stepped out
of vehicle and began calling out to third party and cursing at him. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Ala.Code 1975, §§ 6"5"170,
13A"11"7. Rose v. Town of Jackson's Gap, 952 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
City police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 unlawful seizure claim arising from his arrest
at scene of fire investigation; officer had no arguable probable cause for arrest, and law was clearly established that warrantless
arrest without probable cause violated Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Ruffino v. City of
Hoover, 891 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2012).
There was no evidence that police officer acted with deliberate indifference when imprisoning arrestee for bank robbery, and
retaining him in custody for 66 days, as required to support arrestee's § 1983 claim for false imprisonment, even though arrestee
was later found to be innocent; there was no evidence that officer knew, or should have known, of significant risk that arrestee
was wrongfully imprisoned, as officer had probable cause to believe at time of arrest that arrestee had robbed bank, none of
the information officer learned between date of arrest and date of his release from jail, including inconclusive comparison of
arrestee's fingerprints and fingerprints from bank, caused, or reasonably could have caused, officer to believe that there was
significant risk that he had arrested and detained wrong man, and officer went to great lengths in attempt to determine validity
of arrestee's alibi. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Mears v. McCulley, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (N.D. Ala. 2012).
County drug task force agent had probable cause to arrest the founder of drug treatment facility, for unlawful possession of
a controlled substance in violation of Alabama law, and, therefore, arrestee could not establish § 1983 claims for malicious
prosecution and illegal seizure; court referral officer told agent about her observations of arrestee at statewide court referral
officer conference, her belief that arrestee was then "under the influence of something," and that she "had heard in the recovery
community that [arrestee] was doctor shopping, but that [she] was not sure of that," and the agent independently corroborated
the information that the referral officer provided by requesting and receiving a list of controlled substance prescriptions arrestee
had filled. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Ala.Code 1975, § 13A–12–212. Tucker v. City of Florence, Ala.,
765 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
Under Alabama law, probable cause for arrest precluded false arrest claim and claim of false imprisonment claim based upon
the arrest. Nolin v. Town of Springville, 45 F. Supp. 2d 894 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
There was no evidence that police officer who accompanied two detectives to suspect's home was arresting officer, as required
to support arrestee's § 1983 claim against officer, in his individual capacity, for unlawful arrest under Fourth Amendment. U.S.
Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Rogers v. City of Selma, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1222 (S.D. Ala. 2016), judgment entered, (11th
Cir. 16-12212)2016 WL 1425667 (S.D. Ala. 2016) and appeal dismissed, (11th Cir. 16-12212)(June 16, 2016).

Arguable probable cause for arrest, as would support grant of qualified immunity from § 1983 unlawful arrest claim, does not
require arresting officer to prove every element of crime before making arrest, because such requirement would negate concept
of probable cause and transform arresting officers into prosecutors. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Black v.
City of Mobile, 963 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (S.D. Ala. 2013).
Arrestee's right to be free from arrest in his home absent consent, a warrant, or exigent circumstances was clearly established
at time police officers extracted arrestee from confines of his home and thrust him upon floor of porch, where he was forcibly
arrested, and thus, officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 claim of unreasonable arrest under the
Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Montanez v. Celaya, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (M.D. Fla. 2014).
Police officers had arguable probable cause to arrest, and therefore, were entitled to qualified immunity in arrestee's § 1983 action
alleging false arrest and imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where arrestee had called emergency services
and told operator he had shot an assailant in self-defense, and arrestee was detained while police questioned witnesses about
what happened. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Brown v. Ridgway, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
Deputy did not have arguable probable cause to arrest for obstruction of police investigation under Florida law as arrestee
entered her apartment while deputy attempted to speak with her about boyfriend's son leaving with grandfather, for purposes
of determining deputy's entitlement to qualified immunity in arrestee's § 1983 action alleging false arrest in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, where arrestee was not a suspect in any crime, arrestee did not say anything to deputy, and arrestee had no
obligation to speak to deputy. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Frias v. Demings, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (M.D.
Fla. 2011).
Probable cause constitutes complete defense to false arrest claim. Ruszala v. Walt Disney World Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D.
Fla. 2000).
To state a cause of action for false imprisonment under Florida law, plaintiff must allege unlawful restraint without color of
authority. Patterson v. Downtown Medical and Diagnostic Center, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1379, 7 A.D.D. 523, 3 A.D. Cas. (BNA)
1345 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
Where plaintiff had been arrested pursuant to a properly issued warrant and tried on charges in a grand jury indictment, even
if federal drug agent had acted with malice during incident when he was engaged in investigatory surveillance, he could not be
held liable under federal common law for the arrest, indictment and trial that resulted from plaintiff interjection when plaintiff
suspected prowler on premises and instead confronted drug enforcement agent. 18 U.S.C.A. § 111. Walker v. U.S., 471 F. Supp.
38 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
Police officers who stopped arrestee's vehicle had either probable cause or arguable probable cause for her arrest, precluding her
§ 1983 Fourth Amendment false arrest claim; arrestee was observed driving five miles per hour in a 25-mile-per-hour zone and
drifting a few feet off the road onto the grass for a distance of 10 to 15 feet and officer stopped vehicle and smelled alcohol upon
approaching. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. O'Boyle v. Bradshaw, 952 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
Police officers had arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff for trespassing, and thus officers were entitled to qualified
immunity against plaintiff's § 1983 claim for false arrest in violation of Fourth Amendment, based on allegation and criminal
complaint initiated by restaurant club's manager, absent any facts suggesting that officers' reliance on manager's statement was
unreasonable. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Lawson v. City of Miami Beach, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D.
Fla. 2012).
Police officer had "arguable probable cause" to arrest animal owner for intentionally depriving an animal of necessary sustenance
or shelter in violation of Florida law, and thus officer had qualified immunity from owner's § 1983 false arrest claims, where

officer observed on owner's property several dead, sick, and underweight animals, and animals without food, water, or bedding.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Bloom v. Miami-Dade County, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
Existence of probable cause to arrest plaintiff for animal cruelty constituted an absolute bar to his § 1983 claim for wrongful
arrest against supervising police sergeant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Bloom v. Miami-Dade County, 816
F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
Probable cause existed to arrest a motorist for driving under the influence, thus defeating his Florida law claims for false arrest/
false imprisonment and for malicious prosecution; police officer noted arrestee's erratic driving in swerving in and out of his lane
of travel, his noticeably diminished motor skills, coordination, and balance, his slurred speech, his watery and bloodshot eyes,
his failure to successfully complete road side sobriety tests, his strong odor of alcohol, and his admission to having been drinking
immediately prior to driving. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Ball v. City of Coral Gables, 548 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
Probable cause is an absolute bar to claims for false arrest under state law and § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Mills v. Town of
Davie, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
Although probable cause is defense under Florida law to claims of false arrest and false imprisonment, it is an affirmative
defense, so that burden is on defendant to establish existence of probable cause by showing that facts and circumstances known
to arresting officer were sufficient to cause reasonably cautious person to believe that suspect was guilty of committing a crime.
Hernandez v. Metro-Dade County, 992 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
Probable cause is absolute defense under Florida law to claim for false arrest and/or false imprisonment. Marx v. Gumbinner,
716 F. Supp. 1434 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
Police officers were entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee § 1983 claims for unlawful arrest and false imprisonment;
law was clearly established that an arrest without probable cause to believe a crime had been committed violated the Fourth
Amendment, and officers collectively and individually believed that probable cause for arrest existed. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Wheeler v. City of Macon, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Ga. 1999).
To be entitled, under Georgia law, to assert shopkeeper privilege in defense of claim of false imprisonment, shopkeeper must
show that reasonable person would have believed that plaintiff was shoplifting and must also show that manner and length of
detention were reasonable. O.C.G.A. §§ 51"7"20, 51"7"60. Jackson v. Kmart Corp., 851 F. Supp. 469, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA)
976 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
Person arrested under Georgia statute based on belief that peace or property was in danger of being disturbed had no cause of
action for false imprisonment where there was probable cause for the arrest. O.C.G.A. §§ 17"6"90, 51"7"20. Britt v. Whitehall
Income Fund '86, 891 F. Supp. 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
Constitutional violation in police officer's arrest of bystander for violation of state's obstruction statute, assuming that such
arrest lacked arguable probable cause, was clearly established, as could support denial of qualified immunity in bystander's §
1983 action against officer for false arrest, where clearly-established circuit precedent at time of bystander's arrest stated that
an arrest without arguable probable cause violated Fourth Amendment. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Ga. Code
Ann. § 16-10-24(a). Johnson v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (N.D. Ga. 2019).
County police officer had arguable probable cause for the arrest of § 1983 plaintiff on simple assault charges, and therefore,
officer was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim for false arrest, where off-duty officer had informed him that
plaintiff had threatened off-duty officer and her daughter, and assured responding officer that she had explained the situation to
a magistrate judge and the judge had approved the arrest and would issue a warrant. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; West's Ga.Code Ann.
§ 16–5–20(a)(2). Payne v. DeKalb County, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (N.D. Ga. 2004).

Police officer is not liable under Georgia false imprisonment statute for warrantless arrest if he had probable cause to make
arrest. O.C.G.A. § 51"7"20. Ellis v. City of Fairburn, Ga., 852 F. Supp. 1568 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
Police officer did not have probable cause to arrest restaurant patron for theft of services, supporting patron's § 1983 false
arrest claim, as well as her common law false arrest and imprisonment claims under District of Columbia law, against officer;
restaurant's 911 call to police accusing patron of theft of services was placed after restaurant already charged patron's bill to her
credit card and received approval from credit card company, and there was no indication that officer took even simplest steps
to verify details of ostensible payment refusal. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; D.C. Code § 22-3211(c). Hall v.
District of Columbia, 867 F.3d 138 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Where false arrest claim is based on warrantless arrest, officers must establish probable cause to arrest. Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1
F.3d 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Officer of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority transit police had probable cause to arrest passenger for failing to
pay fare, and thus was immune from suit for alleged false arrest; passenger was observed exiting subway station before gates had
closed on previous passenger, in spite of fact that passenger own farecard was rejected by machine. Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Regulation Compact, § 1 et seq., 90 Stat. 672. Dant v. District of Columbia, 829 F.2d 69 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
In the context of arrests, two types of claims have been recognized under Title II of the ADA: (1) wrongful arrest, where police
arrest a suspect based on his disability, not for any criminal activity, and (2) reasonable accommodation, where police properly
arrest a suspect but fail to reasonably accommodate his disability during the investigation or arrest, causing him to suffer greater
injury or indignity than other arrestees. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 202, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132. Sacchetti v.
Gallaudet University, 181 F. Supp. 3d 107 (D.D.C. 2016).
Arresting officer reasonably relied on supervisory officer's determination that there was probable cause to arrest for assault on
a police officer (APO) under District of Columbia law, when arrestee attempted to defuse confrontation between her boyfriend
and officers by stepping between boyfriend and officer and covering boyfriend's mouth with one hand, and thus, was entitled
to qualified immunity with respect to arrestee's false arrest claim in § 1983 action. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983; D.C. Code § 22-405(b). Kyle v. Bedlion, 177 F. Supp. 3d 380 (D.D.C. 2016).
Police officer's action in arresting train passenger was privileged, and thus, officer was not liable for false arrest; officer had
probable cause to arrest after he received radio communication to be on lookout for train passenger with black "FBI" visor
and "hoodie" who was reported to be screaming and yelling at passengers, officer approached passenger because he matched
description, passenger voluntarily provided officer with his identification, officer's check of police department's criminal
databases revealed outstanding warrant for passenger, officer received code signaling that "for officer safety, [passenger] should
be put in handcuffs," and passenger appeared to have knowledge of warrant. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Brown v. Metro Transit
Police Department, 87 F. Supp. 3d 145 (D.D.C. 2015).
Police officer is entitled to qualified immunity in a civil rights suit when the officer could have believed that probable cause
existed to arrest. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Hall v. District of Columbia, 73 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. 2014).
District of Columbia police officers did not have probable cause to arrest father for possession of marijuana pipe which was
found in his daughter's bedroom during execution of search warrant, as supported father's § 1983 false arrest claim; contrary
to officers' argument, there was no indication that father controlled premises at issue, in that he lived in apartment with his 18-
year-old son and 16-year old daughter, and father's living space was the living room, one officer told father that "someone" was
going to be arrested for possession of pipe, and that it was up to father who that would be, and father "offered" to be arrested
if that meant that his daughter would not be arrested. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Littlepage v. Quigley, 69
F. Supp. 3d 136 (D.D.C. 2014).

It was not unreasonable for police officers to believe that probable cause existed to arrest protestors for violating municipal
ordinance prohibiting use of tents as temporary places of abode without mayor's permission, and thus officers were entitled
to qualified immunity from liability in protestors' § 1983 false arrest action, even if there was no visible sleeping or living
equipment inside or around tents, and tent had signs and messages on it; it was not unreasonable for officers to believe that
protestors could have temporarily resided in tent without additional equipment, and other protestors were using tents as both
instruments of protest and abodes several blocks away. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Dukore v. District of
Columbia, 970 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2013).
Regardless of whether detention was constitutional, police officer may justify arrest, for purpose of false arrest claim under
District of Columbia law, by demonstrating that (1) he or she believed, in good faith, that his or her conduct was lawful and (2)
this belief was reasonable. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Olaniyi v. District of Columbia, 876 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2012).
The elements of a constitutional claim for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment are substantially identical to the
elements of a common-law false arrest claim under District of Columbia law; for either claim, the focal point of the action is the
question whether the arresting officer was justified in ordering the arrest of the plaintiff, and, if so, the conduct of the arresting
officer is privileged and the action fails. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Magliore v. Brooks, 844 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2012).
Under District of Columbia law, for purposes of claims of false arrest and false imprisonment, justification for an arrest can be
established by showing that the arresting officer had probable cause for arrest of the plaintiff on the grounds charged or that
he had a reasonable basis to believe that a crime had been committed and the officer acted in good faith in making the arrest.
Edwards v. Okie Dokie, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2007).
Under District of Columbia law, chess coach's arrest for unlawful entry into chess organizations's premises was reasonable and
justified, and thus organization was not liable for false imprisonment; officers arrested coach on organization's premises after
receiving call from someone at organization, and coach refused to step outside of building when asked to do so by officers.
Bennett v. U.S. Chess Federation, 468 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D.D.C. 2006).
United States could not be held liable, under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), for false arrest or false imprisonment for overnight
detention of resident arrested by United States Park Police during execution of search warrant, even though resident should
have been issued citation and released, given that desk clerk had probable cause to imprison resident, based on his unlawful
possession of firearm. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq.Wright v. U.S., 963 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1997).
In order to prevail on claim of false imprisonment plaintiff must prove that there was detention or restraint against her will and
that detention was unlawful. Joyce v. U.S., 795 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1992).
Claim for false arrest can be defeated by arresting officer demonstration that he had either probable cause or reasonable basis
to believe that crime had been committed and that officer acted in good faith. James v. U.S., 709 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1989).
Under District of Columbia law, plaintiff must show that he was imprisoned and that the imprisonment was unlawful in order
to maintain a tort action for false imprisonment. Kroll v. U.S. Capitol Police, 590 F. Supp. 1282 (D.D.C. 1983).
Officer had arguable probable cause to arrest for possession of controlled substances and drug trafficking under Alabama law,
and thus was entitled to qualified immunity on arrestee's § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim, where officer was told that arrestee
had pulled gun on hotel guest, arrestee had gun, wadded-up cash, and labeled pill case containing prescription drugs on his
person, ansd arrestee never told officer that he had prescription for pills. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;
Ala.Code 1975, §§ 13A–12–212, 20–2–25(1). Roddy v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 580 Fed. Appx. 844 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying
Alabama law).

City police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 unlawful arrest and detention claims arising
from his arrest for disorderly conduct while handing out newspapers at public assembly; officers did not have arguable probable
cause to arrest arrestee for disorderly conduct, as that crime was defined under Alabama law, absent evidence that arrestee was
forcing anyone to take newspapers, or that he was using loud, abusive, or profane language, making threats or obscene gestures,
blocking pedestrian or vehicular traffic, or making unreasonable noise, and arrestee's Fourth Amendment right to be free from
warrantless arrest and detention without probable cause was clearly established at time of his arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Ala.Code 1975, § 15–10–3(a)(1). Childress v. Walker, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (applying
Alabama law).
Probable cause existed to support police chief's arrest for theft of property in the third degree, in violation of Alabama law,
and thus, chief could not prevail in § 1983 unlawful arrest claim, where chief admitted that he kept possession of his official
computer and phone after he was terminated as police chief, and town official requested that he return the property, but he failed
to do so. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Ala.Code 1975, § 13A–8–5(a). Woodard v. Town of Oakman, Ala.,
970 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (applying Alabama law).
City police officers had probable cause for arrests, thus precluding arrestees' false arrest and imprisonment claims against city
and officers under Alabama law; upon responding to 911 call from hotel management alleging that one arrestee pulled gun on
hotel guest, officers found gun, pills, and large amount of wadded-up cash in various denominations on that arrestee's person, and
upon searching arrestees' hotel room, officers found at least 987 pills, over 300 of which were controlled substances. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Roddy v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (applying Alabama law).
It was clearly established that drinking in private residence did not provide probable cause to arrest for drinking in public
under Alabama law, and therefore, police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity in arrestee's § 1983 claims of malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4, 14; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983. James v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 926 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (applying Alabama law).
County sheriff's deputy was entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 false arrest claim; deputy had at least arguable
probable cause to arrest arrestee for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest under Alabama law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983; Ala.Code 1975, §§ 13A–10–41, 13A–11–7. Zann v. Whidby, 904 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (applying
Alabama law).
City police officers had arguable probable cause to arrest suspect for disorderly conduct, under Alabama law, and thus officers
were entitled to qualified immunity from suspect's § 1983 Fourth Amendment false arrest and imprisonment claims; officers
discovered suspect standing in roadway holding gas can, suspect refused to comply with officer's repeated requests and
instructions to get off roadway, suspect refused at least seven officer requests to calm down, suspect's speech was extremely
loud, hostile, and aggressive, and in addition to officers, present on the scene were multiple members of the public, including
stranded driver, suspect's neighbor, and passing motorists. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Ala.Code 1975, §
13A–11–7(a)(2, 5). Windham v. City of Fairhope, Ala., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1323 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (applying Alabama law).
Evidence established that store, acting through its employee/agent, had probable cause to detain patrons in effort to recover
goods, thus precluding patrons from establishing claims of false arrest; agent/employee had been instructed to watch for patrons
and monitor their activities to determine whether they were shoplifting merchandise and then returning it for cash, one patron
attempted to return merchandise without having cash receipt, employee/agent saw second employee putting set of draperies
into her purse, and patrons incriminated each other while detained. Code 1975, § 6"5"170. Kmart Corp. v. Perdue, 708 So.
2d 106 (Ala. 1997).
Deputy sheriff arrest of drug store customers for allegedly obtaining drugs by presenting altered prescription was not false
imprisonment, as arrest was made pursuant to valid arrest warrant issued by county warrant magistrate. Karrick v. Johnson,
659 So. 2d 77 (Ala. 1995).

Information from store security personnel, particularly the statement of female security guard that she had observed customers
concealing several swimsuits on their persons, was sufficiently trustworthy to constitute probable cause for arrest, and, thus,
police officer could not be held liable for false imprisonment of one customer, even though customer denied committing act for
which she was arrested. Code 1975, § 15"10"3. Upshaw v. McArdle, 650 So. 2d 875 (Ala. 1994).
Fact that former employee possessed engineering drawings taken from employer and told undercover officer to not reveal that
copies of drawings were being sold was probable cause for believing that employee committed theft of property and precluded
false imprisonment claim based on warrantless arrest of employee. Code 1975, §§ 6"5"170, 15"10"3, 15"10"4. Drill Parts and
Service Co., Inc. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 619 So. 2d 1280 (Ala. 1993).
Hotel had probable cause to charge guest with theft of services for attempting to leave hotel without paying his telephone
bill, notwithstanding that guest may have reasonably believed that his employer would handle charges, where hotel manager
had spoken with guest employer and been informed that charges were guest responsibility; no malicious prosecution or false
imprisonment claim would lie based on hotel employee conduct in summoning police to detain guest and proffering criminal
charges against him. Thomas v. Hamilton, 611 So. 2d 1038 (Ala. 1992).
Despite her claim that she mistakenly failed to pay rental fee, store had probable cause to believe that customer had unlawfully
taken videotapes when she walked out of the store and thus had probable cause to detain customer, precluding damages for false
imprisonment, particularly in light of fact that district court at preliminary hearing found probable cause to bind customer case
over to grand jury and she was subsequently indicted by grand jury. Whitlow v. Bruno's Inc., 567 So. 2d 1235 (Ala. 1990).
Off-duty police officer in arresting false imprisonment plaintiff, was acting in his capacity as a police officer and not as security
officer at time of arrest in light of evidence that he witnessed some of events leading up to his arrest of plaintiff and thus, the
arrest was not invalid. Dinmark v. Farrier, 510 So. 2d 819 (Ala. 1987).
Assistant manager of retail store had probable cause to arrest suspect for shoplifting, and thus store was not liable to suspect for
false arrest, where customer observed suspect shoplifting and customer husband reported same to assistant manager; that report
of shoplifting was made to assistant manager by customer husband, who lacked personal knowledge of incident, did not compel
different result, where assistant manager then requested customer to pick out person she observed shoplifting and customer
pointed out suspect. Code 1975, § 15"10"14(a). Frison v. Delchamps Store No. 11, 507 So. 2d 478 (Ala. 1987).
A private citizen may make an arrest for an offense committed in his presence; however, if person who was forcibly detained did
not commit a crime, detainee may bring an action for false imprisonment and good faith of person making arrest or existence
of probable cause does not justify the trespass. Code 1975, § 15"10"7. Yancey v. Farmer, 472 So. 2d 990 (Ala. 1985).
When considering whether arrest is valid, police officer subjective intent is immaterial; only requisite is that at time arrest is
made, police officer have probable cause. Carruth v. Barker, 454 So. 2d 539 (Ala. 1984).
In order to maintain action for false imprisonment, plaintiff was not required to prove that the arrest and imprisonment were
obtained by malice and without probable cause. De Armond v. Saunders, 243 Ala. 263, 9 So. 2d 747 (1942).
For purposes of customer false imprisonment claim against department store owner and its employee in action arising from
customer arrest and prosecution for shoplifting, mere fact that customer was acquitted in criminal proceeding did not prove
that owner and employee lacked probable cause to arrest customer. Code 1975, § 15"10"14(a, c). Phillips v. K-Mart Corp., 682
So. 2d 1390 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).

Store had reasonable cause to believe that customer shoplifted and, thus, had reasonable cause to detain her for questioning
where customer picked up sandals, placed them in cart, covered them with advertising flier, and left store without paying for
sandals. A.R.S. § 13"1805. Gau v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 183 Ariz. 107, 901 P.2d 455 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1995).
Subsequent dismissal of charges does not make arrest unlawful, for purposes of suit for false arrest, where arrest was originally
made with probable cause. Hansen v. Garcia, Fletcher, Lund and McVean, 148 Ariz. 205, 713 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1985).
Plaintiff could not prevail on claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, as plaintiff had been convicted in magistrate court,
thus conclusively establishing probable cause, even though that conviction was reversed on appeal. Creamer v. Raffety, 145
Ariz. 34, 699 P.2d 908 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1984).
Reasonable cause to detain suspected shoplifter is only threshold requirement for statutory shopkeeper privilege; inquiry is
required as well into whether purpose of shopkeeper action was proper and whether detention was carried out in reasonable
manner and for reasonable length of time. A.R.S. § 13"1805. Gortarez By and Through Gortarez v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc.,
140 Ariz. 97, 680 P.2d 807 (1984).
The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to claims of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Hockett v.
City of Tucson, 139 Ariz. 317, 678 P.2d 502 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1983).
Merchant may detain, for reasonable length of time, person he or she has reasonable cause to believe is shoplifting. A.C.A. §
5 "36"116. Limited Stores, Inc. v. Wilson-Robinson, 317 Ark. 80, 876 S.W.2d 248 (1994).
Probable cause is a defense to a civil action for false arrest or false imprisonment in connection with a misdemeanor. Mendenhall
v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 285 Ark. 236, 685 S.W.2d 805 (1985).
Instruction, in false imprisonment action, in stating that it was required to be proved that arrest was without legal authority before
action could be maintained, contained reversible error by imposing on plaintiff burden of proving legality of imprisonment.
Wells v. Adams, 232 Ark. 873, 340 S.W.2d 572 (1960).
In action for false imprisonment against former sheriff, question whether former sheriff acted willfully, intentionally and
maliciously was for jury. Arnold v. State ex rel. Burton, 220 Ark. 25, 245 S.W.2d 818 (1952).
In action against store proprietor and its manager for false imprisonment, based on causing plaintiff arrest for petty larceny,
whether manager acted in good faith, with reasonable grounds, in stopping plaintiff after she left the store and asking her to
return into the store to pay for an article in her possession, and in going to the police station with the officers and plaintiff, was
question for jury. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Waller, 208 Ark. 1063, 189 S.W.2d 361 (1945).
Deputy sheriff had lawful privilege to detain individual, given that there was probable cause for his arrest, and could not be
liable under California law for false imprisonment. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Shay v. County of Los Angeles, 762 Fed. Appx. 416
(9th Cir. 2019) (applying California law).
Officers' decision to detain arrestee while they investigated apparent hit-and-run accident further was reasonable, for purposes
of arrestee's unlawful detention claim against officers under California law; although arrestee argued that he could not have
committed crime of hit-and-run because he was not in the process of running, officers were not required to wait for suspected
crime to be completed before detaining him, officers were told by witness that there was an accident in drive-through lane,
observed damage to arrestee's car that was inconsistent with arrestee's claim that he had merely hit a curb, and officers had
reasonable suspicion to believe that arrestee was committing a hit and run. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. White v. County of San
Bernardino, 503 Fed. Appx. 551 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying California law).

Police officers were not liable in § 1983 action for unlawful arrest or false arrest in violation of Fourth Amendment, relating to
motorist's arrest following a car accident, in absence of evidence that officers had lacked probable cause to believe motorist had
violated state law addressing a motorist's reporting duty when property is damaged. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983; West's Ann.Cal.Vehicle Code § 20002(a). Fahy v. Tarbox, 493 Fed. Appx. 892 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying California law).
Even if police officer lacked probable cause to arrest individual, who was allegedly involved in altercation with store employees,
under California statute prohibiting a person from resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer, officer was entitled to
qualified immunity from unlawful arrest claim; a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest
individual, given officer's attempt to maintain order and interview other witnesses at the scene and individual's refusal to comply
with officer's order not to interfere with those interviews. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 148. Arias
v. Amador, 61 F. Supp. 3d 960 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (applying California law).
City police officer had probable cause to arrest suspect for resisting arrest, in violation of California law, thus precluding suspect's
§ 1983 false arrest claim based on that offense, and his related claim under California law for false arrest and imprisonment; by
turning his body away from officer and walking in different direction, suspect wilfully delayed officer's ability to discharge duty
to issue suspect traffic citation, and officer's actions of identifying herself as an officer, flashing her badge, and discussing traffic
violations would lead reasonable person to conclude that she indeed was police officer. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983. Jaramillo v. City of San Mateo, 76 F. Supp. 3d 905 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (applying California law).
Merchants who detain individuals whom they have probable cause to believe are about to injure their property are privileged
against false imprisonment action, as long as detention is carried out for reasonable time and in reasonable manner. Fermino v.
Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18, 872 P.2d 559, 59 Cal. Comp. Cas. (MB) 296, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1132 (1994).
Ordinarily, plaintiff is deemed to have established prima facie case of false imprisonment by showing his arrest by defendant
police officer without warrant, and burden then rests on defendant to plead and prove proper justification for arrest. West
Ann.Pen.Code, § 836. Hughes v. Oreb, 36 Cal. 2d 854, 228 P.2d 550 (1951).
Unlawful interference with the personal liberty of another affords a civil right of action for the recovery of damages. Gogue v.
MacDonald, 35 Cal. 2d 482, 218 P.2d 542, 21 A.L.R.2d 639 (1950).
Evidence was sufficient to support verdict that police officers acted with the particular purpose of depriving arrestee of his right
to be free from arrest without probable cause, supporting arrestee's Bane Act civil rights claim against officers; arrest was made
while arrestee was out for a run, after officers chased arrestee on mere basis that he was in a high drug activity area officers
pointed a gun at arrestee during arrest, and officers retaliated against arrestee, who was a police officer trainee, by issuing him
a citation which would preclude him from pursuing career in law enforcement. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1.
Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco, 2017 WL 5495096 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2017), as modified, (Nov. 17, 2017).
Dismissal of arrestee's conviction for resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer following successful completion of
probation did not invalidate conviction and allow arrestee to bring § 1983 excessive force claim against arresting officer, which
was barred by jury's finding in criminal action that officer's conduct was lawful and not an unreasonable use of force. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983; Cal. Penal Code §§ 148(a)(1), 1203.4. Baranchik v. Fizulich, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1210, 2017 WL 1399708 (2d Dist. 2017).
Upon proof that an arrest and confinement occurred without process and that the false imprisonment plaintiff was damaged, the
defendant has the burden of persuasion to prove that the arrest was justified. Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal. App. 4th
1033, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158 (2d Dist. 2007), as modified on denial of reh'g, (Feb. 21, 2007).
Although a police officer is not granted governmental immunity for false arrest and imprisonment, he is not liable if he had
reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful. West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 847(b). O'Toole v. Superior Court, 140 Cal.
App. 4th 488, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 531 (4th Dist. 2006).

Nurse, who was authorized to admit persons for 72"hour detention, had probable cause to believe that individual detained
was mentally disordered and posed danger to himself or to others, and thus detention of individual did not constitute false
imprisonment where nurse evaluated individual and determined that he was mentally disordered and danger based on individual
abuse of alcohol, statements that he planned to get even with persons who murdered his brother, and by statements that he
entertained suicidal thoughts. West Ann.Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code § 5150. Heater v. Southwood Psychiatric Center, 42 Cal. App.
4th 1068, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880 (4th Dist. 1996).
Deputy sheriff and county were not liable for false arrest and imprisonment based on deputy arrest of pawnshop owner for
interfering with officer performance of his duties when owner refused to give deputy allegedly stolen ring in exchange for
receipt; ring was displayed in plain view in case in pawnshop, police had probable cause to believe that ring was evidence of
crime as it had been identified by its owner as stolen. West Ann.Cal.Fin.Code § 21206.7. Christians v. Chester, 218 Cal. App.
3d 273, 267 Cal. Rptr. 124 (3d Dist. 1990).
Police officer could not be held liable for false arrest based on his alleged inadequate investigation of reported robbery, where
there was probable cause to arrest plaintiffs. West Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 847; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Hamilton v. City of
San Diego, 217 Cal. App. 3d 838, 266 Cal. Rptr. 215 (4th Dist. 1990).
A cause of action for false arrest or imprisonment may lie where the same facts also support a cause of action for malicious
prosecution. Harden v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 215 Cal. App. 3d 7, 263 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1st Dist. 1989).
Defendant insurance company which had caused false imprisonment plaintiff to be arrested on insurance fraud charges,
presented sufficient evidence to defeat that cause of action; insurer belief, that insured material misrepresentations during claim
processing violated Insurance Code, was sufficient to defeat the action. West Ann.Cal.Ins.Code § 556. Cummings v. Fire Ins.
Exchange, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1407, 249 Cal. Rptr. 568 (2d Dist. 1988).
Complaint alleging that police officer acted with malice both in obtaining arrest warrant and in executing it was sufficient to
state cause of action for false imprisonment and arrest. West Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 43.5(a). Laible v. Superior Court, 157 Cal.
App. 3d 44, 203 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1st Dist. 1984).
Where natural father was unaware of court order awarding temporary custody to mother, he was not subject to charges of false
imprisonment by his taking of children. People v. Johnson, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1021, 199 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1st Dist. 1984).
Where investigator for office of district attorney allegedly presented false information to court, obtained arrest warrant, and
personally arrested those named in warrant on false charges, employee could not satisfy requirement of statute governing
immunity of peace officer for arrest made pursuant to warrant regular on its face that arrest be made without malice and thus
neither employee nor public employer were immune from action for false imprisonment in connection with such arrest. West
Ann.Civ.Code, § 43.5(a). McKay v. County of San Diego, 111 Cal. App. 3d 251, 168 Cal. Rptr. 442 (4th Dist. 1980).
Peace officer must obey order of court, but if he had actual knowledge that arrest warrant did not constitute order of court because
it had been recalled, then he could not rely upon warrant, and if he had actual knowledge that warrant had been recalled and
nevertheless purported to arrest plaintiff pursuant to warrant, the trier of fact would be entitled to infer that he acted with malice
and thus immunity of applicable statute would not be available in action for false arrest and imprisonment. West Ann.Civ.Code,
§ 43.5(a). Milliken v. City of South Pasadena, 96 Cal. App. 3d 834, 158 Cal. Rptr. 409 (2d Dist. 1979).
Storekeeper, on probable cause to believe theft has been committed, may detain suspected person for reasonable time, to conduct
investigation in reasonable manner. King v. Andersen, 242 Cal. App. 2d 606, 51 Cal. Rptr. 561 (3d Dist. 1966).

Probable cause is a good defense to a claim of false arrest and imprisonment without a warrant. White v. Martin, 215 Cal. App.
2d 641, 30 Cal. Rptr. 367 (2d Dist. 1963).
Establishment of lack of probable or reasonable cause is necessary element in action for false arrest or false imprisonment;
overruling Collins v. Jones, 131 Cal.App. 747, 22 P.2d 39. Whaley v. Kirby, 208 Cal. App. 2d 232, 25 Cal. Rptr. 50 (4th Dist.
1962).
Where evidence material to issue of probable cause in false arrest action is without substantial conflict, it is question of law
for court to decide whether there was probable cause for arrest. Cole v. Johnson, 197 Cal. App. 2d 788, 17 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1st
Dist. 1961).
Complaint alleging that defendant, a jailer, despite knowledge that plaintiff was not man for whom an arrest warrant was issued,
wrongfully arrested and imprisoned, and refused to release plaintiff, and in so doing acted maliciously, was sufficient to state
a cause of action for false arrest and imprisonment against jailer. Smith v. Madruga, 193 Cal. App. 2d 543, 14 Cal. Rptr. 389
(1st Dist. 1961).
The elements of malice and lack of probable cause are not necessary to a proper cause of action for false arrest, but such elements
must be alleged and proved in an action for malicious prosecution. Stallings v. Foster, 119 Cal. App. 2d 614, 259 P.2d 1006
(3d Dist. 1953).
In action against turf club, and detective agency employed to keep race track under surveillance, for wrongful arrest, evidence
sustained finding that plaintiff was not detained for a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner for the purpose of investigation.
West Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 19400 et seq., 19561. Alterauge v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 97 Cal. App. 2d 735, 218 P.2d
802 (2d Dist. 1950).
False arrest or false imprisonment is a trespass committed by one person against another person by unlawful arrest or detention
without authority. West Ann.Pen.Code, § 236. Kaufman v. Brown, 93 Cal. App. 2d 508, 209 P.2d 156 (4th Dist. 1949).
In action for false arrest and imprisonment, question of reasonable or probable cause for arrest is one for the courts. Aitken v.
White, 93 Cal. App. 2d 134, 208 P.2d 788 (2d Dist. 1949).
Entry of defendants, as city police officers, into hotel room occupied by plaintiffs, who were husband and wife, under pretended
color of official right was an abuse of authority invested in them as peace officers and relegated them to category of trespassers,
so as to be liable for damages for assault and false imprisonment, even though they acted on reasonable belief that a misdemeanor
was being committed. West Ann.Pen.Code, §§ 236, 240, 836, subd. 1, 840; Const. art. 1, § 19; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 4. Ware
v. Dunn, 80 Cal. App. 2d 936, 183 P.2d 128 (2d Dist. 1947).
In action for false imprisonment of plaintiff by general contractor constructing airfield for army air corps who caused plaintiff
arrest for disturbing the peace by interfering with movement of truck loaded with lumber for the project, whether boundaries
of project were clearly marked was for jury. West Ann.Pen.Code, § 415. Hill v. Nelson, 71 Cal. App. 2d 528, 162 P.2d 927
(2d Dist. 1945).
Police officer had arguable probable cause to arrest certified public accountant, who provided accounting services to company,
for health insurance fraud under Connecticut law, and thus was entitled to qualified immunity on accountant's § 1983 false
arrest claim; information obtained in investigation strongly suggested that at the time accountant was enrolled in company's
health insurance plan, he was not an employee, much less one who worked 30 hours per week or more, as required to qualify
for coverage, but rather that he had arranged to secure health insurance benefits in exchange for accounting services. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; C.G.S.A. § 53–442. Plude v. Adams, 100 F. Supp. 3d 172 (D. Conn. 2015) (applying
Connecticut law).

Police officer, who responded to complaint about a loud party and disturbance, had arguable cause to arrest resident, who
allegedly refused to comply with officer's order to return to his home, for interference with an officer's performance of his duties
under Connecticut law, and thus officer was entitled to qualified immunity on § 1983 false arrest claim; reasonable officers
would have believed probable cause existed to make arrest based on a charge of interference. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983; C.G.S.A. § 53a–167a. Coffey v. Callaway, 86 F. Supp. 3d 111 (D. Conn. 2015) (applying Connecticut law).
Police officer did not have probable cause to arrest arrestee for parking on left-hand side of road in violation of Connecticut
traffic statute, for purposes of arrestee's § 1983 false arrest action, since violation of such statute was considered motor vehicle
"infraction," for which Connecticut law did not permit arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; C.G.S.A. § 14–
251. Marchand v. Simonson, 16 F. Supp. 3d 97 (D. Conn. 2014) (applying Connecticut law).
False imprisonment, or false arrest, is the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another. Green v. Donroe,
186 Conn. 265, 440 A.2d 973 (1982).
Law applicable to causes of action for false arrest and for false imprisonment is identical. Outlaw v. City of Meriden, 43 Conn.
App. 387, 682 A.2d 1112 (1996).
Testimony that buck knife and pistol grip were seized from defendant by police was clearly relevant to establish defendant
identity as perpetrator of sexual assault and unlawful restraint offenses and to corroborate other direct evidence in case, where
one victim identified defendant as perpetrator, and both victims had already described implements used in commission of
offense, including knife and pistol grip. State v. Sherwood, 25 Conn. App. 725, 596 A.2d 470 (1991).
Probable cause is knowledge of facts sufficient to justify reasonable person belief that there are grounds to make arrest and is
determined by existence or nonexistence of certain facts, as determined by trier of fact. Beinhorn v. Saraceno, 23 Conn. App.
487, 582 A.2d 208 (1990).
Under District of Columbia law, the existence of probable cause for arrest defeats claims for false arrest and imprisonment.
Harris v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 776 F.3d 907 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (applying District of Columbia law).
Police officers' unquestioning reliance on a supervisor's order to arrest occupants of a home for unlawful entry was not
reasonable, and thus did not entitle the officers to qualified immunity in the occupants' § 1983 false arrest action against the
officers, where the officers had independent authority to make arrests, a reasonably competent officer would have known that
he lacked probable cause to make an arrest, and the officers were actively involved in surveying the scene and gathering
information. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. § 22–3302(a)(1). Wesby v. District
of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying District of Columbia law).
Transit police officer stationed inside bus had reasonable basis to believe that there was probable cause to arrest passenger for
fare evasion, under District of Columbia law, and thus officers who participated in arrest were entitled to qualified immunity
from arrestee's § 1983 false imprisonment claim; officer observed passenger board bus without paying his fare, and when he
rescanned passenger's bus card, it showed that card had not been processed, and officer could not have been expected know
when he observed passenger board bus whether he was transferring from one bus to another during two-hour window when
passenger could board second bus without paying additional fare. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; D.C. Code §
35-216. Cutchin v. District of Columbia, 369 F. Supp. 3d 108 (D.D.C. 2019) (applying District of Columbia law).
Arrest of United States Supreme Court visitor for unlawful entry pursuant to District of Columbia statute, while he was wearing
a jacket in the building bearing the message "Occupy Everywhere," was supported by either probable cause, or a reasonable
good faith belief that there was probable cause, and thus United States was entitled to complete defense in visitor's action under
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging false arrest and imprisonment; visitor remained after police asked him to either leave

or remove jacket, worn in violation federal statute barring display of items designed to bring public attention to movements
while in Supreme Court building, and police officers could reasonably view visitor's actions to fall squarely within the display
clause, even if they did not have probable cause to arrest. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b); 40 U.S.C.A. § 6135; D.C.Code § 22–3302(b).
Scott v. U.S., 952 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2013) (applying District of Columbia law).
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) police officers had good faith, reasonable belief in arresting and citing patient for disorderly
conduct, and VA thus was not liable for false arrest or false imprisonment under District of Columbia law, where patient was
arrested because he attempted to re-enter group therapy room against officers' unequivocal directive not to do so. Harris v. U.S.
Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 949 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2013) (applying District of Columbia law).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest assault suspect on street outside her apartment, thus precluding suspect's false arrest
and false imprisonment claims under District of Columbia law; after officers had found apparent victim of assault on street,
eyewitness informed them of facts of attack, identities of assailants, and where they could be apprehended, and eyewitness then
led officers to where assailants lived and identified suspect as individual who had been involved in fight. Garay v. Liriano, 943
F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (applying District of Columbia law).
Even if police officers who detained arrestee at police station following his arrest for District of Columbia offense of driving
under the influence (DUI) did not have probable cause to continue to detain arrestee after breathalyzer test administered to him
at station registered blood alcohol level of.00, it was reasonable for officers to conclude that circumstances continued to warrant
reasonable belief that arrestee had committed DUI, and thus, officers were entitled to qualified immunity on arrestee's § 1983
unlawful imprisonment claim; arrestee had failed walk-and-turn and nystagmus field sobriety tests, he admitted to drinking a
beer, he had been driving without headlights at night, and before pulling over, he had driven six blocks followed by police car
with lights and sirens activated. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. § 50–2201.05(b).
Reiver v. District of Columbia, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (applying District of Columbia law).
Under District of Columbia law, a police officer can demonstrate justification for detaining or restraining a plaintiff who later
asserts a claim for false arrest and imprisonment by showing that: (1) she had probable cause to seize the plaintiff, or (2) she
believed in good faith that her conduct was lawful and her belief was reasonable. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Chen v. District
of Columbia, 256 F.R.D. 267 (D.D.C. 2009) (applying District of Columbia law).
Under District of Columbia law, the existence of probable cause for the arrest or imprisonment is a valid defense to a claim of
false arrest or imprisonment. Lyles v. Micenko, 468 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2006) (applying District of Columbia law).
Fact of plaintiff's conviction for second-degree murder and related crimes did not establish that there was probable cause to
arrest as matter of law, as affirmative defense to plaintiff's claims of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, in action
against District of Columbia, detectives and others brought after convictions were vacated on his motion under Innocence
Protection Act and he was granted new trial, in view of plaintiff's assertions that his arrest and conviction were obtained
through erroneous testimony regarding eyewitness identifications, manipulation of line-up, and intimidation of witness who
later implicated plaintiff in killing, and thus, that arrest, conviction and continued detention were obtained through fraud and
corruption. D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. § 22–4135. DeWitt v. District of Columbia, 43 A.3d 291 (D.C. 2012).
To avoid liability for common law false arrest, a police officer must demonstrate either (1) that he or she had probable cause to
make the arrest or (2) that he or she believed in good faith that the arrest was lawful and that this belief was reasonable. District
of Columbia v. Minor, 740 A.2d 523 (D.C. 1999).
If police officer has so-called constitutional probable cause to arrest, determined by reference to objective standard used to
determine probable cause in criminal proceeding, arrest will be lawful and officer accordingly will have complete defense to
false arrest claim. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Tillman v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 695 A.2d 94 (D.C.
1997).

Probable cause for arrest and detention constitutes valid defense to claim of false arrest or imprisonment. Magwood v. Giddings,
672 A.2d 1083 (D.C. 1996).
If police officer has so-called constitutional probable cause to arrest, determined by reference to objective standard used to
determine probable cause in criminal proceeding, arrest will be lawful and officer accordingly will have complete defense to
false arrest claim. District of Columbia v. Murphy, 635 A.2d 929 (D.C. 1993).
Whether police officer had legal right to arrest arrestee was question for jury in arrestee common-law action for false arrest.
Etheredge v. District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 908, 33 A.L.R.5th 795 (D.C. 1993).
In action for false arrest or false imprisonment, police officer need not demonstrate probable cause for arrest in constitutional
sense; rather, it will suffice if officer can demonstrate reasonable and good faith belief in lawfulness of conduct. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. District of Columbia v. Murphy, 631 A.2d 34 (D.C. 1993).
Off-duty police officer acting as security guard for restaurant had probable cause to arrest customer for unlawful entry after
refusing to comply with officer order to leave, and, thus, restaurant was not liable on theory of false arrest. D.C.Code 1981, §
22"3102. Bauldock v. Davco Food, Inc., 622 A.2d 28 (D.C. 1993).
Where police officers had probable cause to make warrantless arrest, officers did not bear additional burden of establishing good
faith in order to interpose valid defense to arrestee subsequent action for, inter alia, false arrest. Welch v. District of Columbia,
578 A.2d 175 (D.C. 1990).
False arrest claim fails if there was probable cause; if there is no probable cause, arresting officer may still defend false arrest
claim on grounds that he had good faith and reasonable belief that arrest was lawful. Fisher v. District of Columbia, 498 A.2d
198 (D.C. 1985).
In actions for false arrest and false imprisonment, arresting officer can justify his conduct upon a showing that he used only
reasonable force to maintain the arrest and that he made the arrest in good faith and with probable cause. Scott v. District of
Columbia, 493 A.2d 319 (D.C. 1985).
Probable cause for an arrest and detention constitutes valid defense to claim of false arrest or imprisonment, and defendant
need not show probable cause in constitutional sense; it is sufficient that arresting officer have good faith, reasonable belief in
validity of the arrest and detention. Gabrou v. May Dept. Stores Co., 462 A.2d 1102 (D.C. 1983).
Probable cause existed for security guard working in grocery store to arrest customer when customer had no constitutional or
statutory right to remain on premises against wishes of grocery store manager and, therefore, grocery store could not be held
liable for false arrest. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Kelly, 448 A.2d 856 (D.C. 1982).
Probable cause becomes material in false imprisonment action if defendant arrests or detains party without warrant or if he
claims to be acting in protection of his person or property, and in such circumstances liability will not be imposed if there are
reasonable grounds to justify the detention and the detention is accomplished in a reasonable manner. Faniel v. Chesapeake and
Potomac Tel. Co. of Maryland, 404 A.2d 147 (D.C. 1979).
In actions under Maryland law by two bus passengers for false arrests, evidence supported finding that bus driver, in having
passengers removed from bus by police officer, acted wrongfully, without just cause or excuse, and with a reckless disregard of
the rights of plaintiffs, so as to justify award of punitive damages. Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Schmidt, 225 A.2d 317 (D.C. 1967).

There is no material distinction between reasonable grounds for detention in false imprisonment and probable cause in malicious
prosecution. Prieto v. May Dept. Stores Co., 216 A.2d 577 (D.C. 1966).
Probable cause existed to support customer's arrest for passing a fraudulent check, and thus police officer was not liable for false
imprisonment of customer, even though officer made false statements in warrant; even after eliminating falsehoods, affidavit
alleged that check cashed at store was counterfeit and that customer's driver's license was used as identification in presenting
counterfeit check. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; West's F.S.A. § 832.07. Harder v. Edwards, 174 So. 3d 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
Under Florida law, city police officer had arguable probable cause to arrest man dressed in gorilla costume who disturbed
public celebration at park for breach of the peace, and so officer was entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's First and
Fourth Amendment false arrest claims asserted in § 1983 civil rights action; officers responded to emergency call from event
chairperson, event attendees complained arrestee had disrupted program and scared children, and five minutes after officer's
verbal trespass warning, arrestee stood at edge of park and yelled into park at event attendees. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1,
4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; West's F.S.A. § 877.03. Anderson v. City of Naples, 501 Fed. Appx. 910 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying
Florida law).
City police officers had probable cause to detain and arrest off-duty deputy for simple domestic battery under Florida law, and
officers involved in arrest all believed that county's mutual aid agreement authorized arrest outside usual jurisdiction of city,
and so deputy did not have cause of action for § 1983 civil rights violation based on the arrest or for false arrest under Florida
law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. McDaniel v. Sheriff of Palm Beach County, Fla., 491 Fed. Appx. 981
(11th Cir. 2012) (applying Florida law).
Under Florida law, false imprisonment claims fail if there was probable cause for a plaintiff's arrest. U.S. Const. Amend. 4.
Cruz v. Green, 352 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (applying Florida law).
City could not be held liable, under Florida law, for false arrest of arrestee, since there was probable cause to arrest him for
charge of possession with intent to sell marijuana. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Smart v. City of Miami, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1271
(S.D. Fla. 2015) (applying Florida law).
Police officer's observation of driving on suspended license and driver's admission of previous suspension without explicitly
repudiating knowledge of new suspension charge provided arguable probable cause for arrest, and, thus, officer was entitled to
qualified immunity on § 1983 claim of false arrest, even though driver's statement that issue of previous suspension had been
resolved could be construed as implication he did not know his license had been suspended again. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; West's F.S.A. § 322.34(2). McKally v. Perez, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (applying Florida law).
The existence of probable cause is a defense to false imprisonment under Florida law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Cutino v.
Untch, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (applying Florida law).
Under Florida law, arresting officer had probable cause to make arrest for intentional masturbation in presence of victim less
than 16 years old, and thus county was not liable to arrestee for false arrest, although arresting officer received information
from other officers indicating absence of probable cause, where off-duty officer told arresting officer that he observed arrestee
touching himself in presence of children. West's F.S.A. §§ 800.04(7), 901.15(3). Delgado v. City of Miami, 990 F. Supp. 2d
1381 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (applying Florida law).
A defendant may raise probable cause as an affirmative defense to a claim for false arrest under Florida law. Amato v. Cardelle,
56 F. Supp. 3d 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (applying Florida law).
Under Florida law, probable cause is a defense to false arrest and false imprisonment claims. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Perez
v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County, Fla., 917 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (applying Florida law).

Where bank employees at no time detained either of two deaf-mutes who entered bank allegedly for purpose of obtaining
coin bag, and never requested FBI to arrest either of the two deaf-mutes, but rather reported possible attempted robbery and
identified the deaf-mutes as the suspects, employeesactions, if reasonable, did not constitute direct procurement of an arrest
so as to subject bank to liability in tort for false imprisonment and unlawful detention. Pokorny v. First Federal Sav. & Loan
Ass'n of Largo, 382 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1980).
Officers established affirmative defense to arrestee's false arrest claim, in that officers had probable cause to believe that arrestee
committed theft by conversion when arrestee, who failed to sign new financing paperwork, refused to relinquish the vehicle
owned by car dealership; arrestee attempted to purchase a vehicle from dealership, but the transaction was not completed
because the dealership could not obtain financing for arrestee, and consequently, arrestee did not own the vehicle, and fact that
arrestee initially took possession of the vehicle pursuant to a contract did not defeat, ipso facto, probable cause to arrest. Lewis
v. Morgan, 79 So. 3d 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2012).
Existence of probable cause to arrest is an affirmative defense to false arrest. Lewis v. Morgan, 79 So. 3d 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1st Dist. 2012).
Action for false arrest and false imprisonment was barred because probable cause existed for arrestee initial arrest and detention
by police. Bolanos v. Metropolitan Dade County, 677 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1996).
To succeed on affirmative defense of probable cause to false arrest claim, defendants were required to show that facts and
circumstances known to arresting officers were sufficient to cause reasonably cautious person to believe that suspect was guilty
of committing crime. Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Com'n v. Dockery, 676 So. 2d 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1996).
Malicious prosecution arises out of wrongful commencement of judicial proceeding, while false imprisonment occurs where
there is improper restraint which is not result of judicial proceeding. Jackson v. Navarro, 665 So. 2d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
4th Dist. 1995).
Probable cause is affirmative defense to claim of false arrest or false imprisonment. Miller v. City of Jacksonville, 603 So. 2d
1310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1992).
Store employees acted within scope of privilege by detaining two children after viewing video tape which showed them handling
merchandise and passing it back and forth and showed one of the children placing something in his pocket; they did not search
the children but, rather, called the sheriff office and employee who accompanied one child to the restroom did not go inside the
stall. Canto v. J.B. Ivey and Co., 595 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1992).
Probable cause is defense in false arrest action. West F.S.A. § 901.15. LeGrand v. Dean, 564 So. 2d 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
5th Dist. 1990).
Showing of lack of probable cause, although sufficient to sustain award of compensatory damages for malicious prosecution
and false imprisonment, did not support award of punitive damages; there was no showing of willful and wanton disregard
of store customer rights, excessive or reckless disregard of her rights, or any other outrageous conduct. Jack Eckerd Corp. v.
Smith, 558 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1990).
Off-duty police officer who observed motorist throw a cup filled with liquid and ice from his vehicle had probable cause to
arrest defendant for littering, precluding county from being held liable in motorist action for false arrest and false imprisonment.
West F.S.A. §§ 403.413(4)(a), (5)(a), 790.052, 901.15(1). Metropolitan Dade County v. Norton, 543 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1989).

Arrestee could not maintain false arrest claim against sheriff or deputy sheriff, as deputy had probable cause to arrest plaintiff
on outstanding warrants from another state, even though hold from other state was subsequently withdrawn based on inability
to make positive identification. Johnson v. Heinrich, 543 So. 2d 831 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1989).
Undisputed evidence established that arresting police officers were informed by witnesses to incident that plaintiff had
committed aggravated battery on civilian, and that plaintiff committed battery on auxiliary police officer while arresting officers
were investigating incident, and thus police had ample probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and seek to have plaintiff criminally
prosecuted, so that city could not be held liable for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution. Bettez v. City of
Miami, 510 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1987).
Unlike action for malicious prosecution, plaintiff in false arrest action is not required to prove lack of probable cause as element
of cause of action and is required only to establish imprisonment contrary to his will and unlawfulness of detention, although
probable cause may then be raised and proven by defendant as affirmative defense. Rotte v. City of Jacksonville, 509 So. 2d
1252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1987).
Tort of false imprisonment does not require proof that legal proceeding was commenced without probable cause, and with
malice; rather, all that is required are allegations that person has been unlawfully restrained without color of authority. Everett
v. Florida Institute of Technology, 503 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1987).
Standard of proving probable cause for merchant to detain suspected shoplifter is less than probable cause required to support
later prosecution. Hernandez v. K-Mart Corp., 497 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1986).
Plaintiff in an action for false imprisonment is entitled to punitive damages on proper showing of malice, i.e., that act causing
the wrongful restraint is without reasonable cause and shows moral turpitude or wanton and outrageous disregard of plaintiff
rights. Harris v. Lewis State Bank, 482 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1986).
Fact that citizen was arrested on charges which were predicated on statute subsequently determined to be unconstitutional by
state Supreme Court did not bear on issues of malice and probable cause for police officersarrest of defendant on those charges
in citizen action against city and officers for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Sussman v. City of
Daytona Beach, 462 So. 2d 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1985).
Police officer making arrest for alleged commission of misdemeanor in his presence is not liable for false arrest if he has
probable cause or substantial reason to believe arrested person was committing misdemeanor in his presence. City of Hialeah
v. Rehm, 455 So. 2d 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1984).
Lack of probable cause is essential element of a malicious prosecution action which must be shown by plaintiff, while existence
of probable cause is part of defense to false arrest action and must be shown by defendant. DeMarie v. Jefferson Stores, Inc.,
442 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1983).
In contrast to criminal false imprisonment, no malicious motive need be shown to establish tort of false imprisonment. Rauso
v. State, 425 So. 2d 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1983).
Investigation or police procedure can be so inadequate as to constitute lack of probable cause for prosecution or arrest for
purposes of malicious prosecution or false arrest action. Lee v. Geiger, 419 So. 2d 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1982).
Information furnished to police officer by chief security officer of store was sufficient to provide police officer with probable
cause to believe that suspect had shoplifted, so as to exempt police officer from liability for false arrest. West F.S.A. § 812.015(4).
Weissman v. K-Mart Corp., 396 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1981).

Probable cause to support a temporary detention of a suspected shoplifter by a merchant or merchant employee is less than
probable cause required to support a later prosecution. Gatto v. Publix Supermarket, Inc., 387 So. 2d 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
3d Dist. 1980).
Malice and want of probable cause are essential elements to be proved in an action for malicious prosecution, but neither of such
elements need be proved to prevail in a false arrest action. Toomey v. Tolin, 311 So. 2d 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1975).
Use of no greater force in detention than would have been necessary had plaintiffs been guilty of alleged theft would not of
itself support award for punitive damages for false imprisonment. Grand Union Super Markets, Inc. v. De Aquinos, 135 So.
2d 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1961).
Plaintiff possession of article of merchandise belonging to defendant store, having placed it around her waist and proceeded to
move away from rack where merchandise belonged, when no sales personnel were present, gave store employee probable cause
to believe that goods of his employer had been unlawfully taken and that he could recover them by taking plaintiff person into
custody within statute authorizing such action so as to afford store defense to false arrest action. F.S.A. § 811.022. Rothstein v.
Jackson's of Coral Gables, Inc., 133 So. 2d 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1961).
City police officers had probable cause to arrest suspect for first degree burglary, thus precluding suspect's false arrest claims
against officers under § 1983 and Georgia law; suspect entered vacant home with "for sale" sign in front yard, when officers
arrived at home they noticed that back door of home appeared to have been forced open and observed personal property placed
in pile, as well as two functioning upright pianos inside home, and when officers confronted suspect in upstairs portion of home,
suspect initially indicated that real estate agent had given him permission to be in home, but later admitted that he had entered
home without permission. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; West's Ga.Code Ann. §§ 16–7–1(b), 51–7–1. Gray v. Ector, 541 Fed.
Appx. 920 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying Georgia law).
Plaintiff's act of commenting that law enforcement officer was a "fucking asshole" did not provide probable cause to arrest him
for disorderly conduct under Georgia law, and thus officer was not entitled to qualified immunity in § 1983 action alleging
that his arrest of plaintiff was not supported by probable cause; comment was not made loudly and was not heard by any other
person. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; West's Ga.Code Ann. § 16–11–39(a)(3). Merenda v. Tabor, 506 Fed.
Appx. 862 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying Georgia law).
Police officer lacked probable cause or arguable probable cause to support arrest of driver for obstructing a police officer in
the lawful discharge of his official duties, in violation of Georgia law, for purpose of driver's § 1983 false arrest and malicious
prosecution claims; although officer had his patrol car positioned to block the street from passersby due to a downed power line,
the driveway to driver's residence was blocked by the patrol car, driver's alleged conduct in asking officer to pull his patrol car
one foot forward could not have impeded the officer's discharge of his duties, and the officer admitted that driver did not hinder
him from directing others away from the scene or otherwise hinder him from performing his duties. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; West's Ga.Code Ann. § 16–10–24(a). Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2007)
(applying Georgia law).
Sheriff's deputies who were conducting search of residence had arguable probable cause to arrest residents for marijuana
possession under Georgia law, and thus deputies were entitled to qualified immunity from residents' § 1983 Fourth Amendment
unlawful arrest claim; reasonable officer would have believed that substance found in ashtray in residents' bedroom was
marijuana, and even though substance was later tested and found not to be marijuana, reasonable officer could have believed
that one resident, who said that she was not going to let the other resident "go to jail for nothing," was taking responsibility for
illegal substance. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Mitchell v. Stewart, 26 F. Supp. 3d 1322 (M.D. Ga. 2014)
(applying Georgia law).

County sheriff's deputy was entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's § 1983 false arrest claim; deputy had arguable probable
cause to arrest arrestee for obstruction, under Georgia law, since arrestee refused to follow fellow deputy's orders to get back in
front of law enforcement vehicle when "she was hollering" as she approached deputy during his search of arrestee's husband, and
continued causing fellow deputy to repeat order several times and even threaten to handcuff her before she eventually stepped
back, and arrest under circumstances was not so egregious that it violated unreasonableness standard of Fourth Amendment
with obvious clarity. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; West's Ga.Code Ann. § 16–10–24. Richardson v. Quitman
County, Ga., 912 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (M.D. Ga. 2012) (applying Georgia law).
Police officer had probable cause to arrest former wife for family violence battery, and thus former wife could not maintain
claim against former husband for false arrest and malicious prosecution, where it was undisputed that former wife scratched
former husband in the course of a scuffle during which former husband was holding the couple's infant. West's Ga.Code Ann.
§§ 16–5–23.1(f), 51–7–1, 51–7–3, 51–7–43. Wills v. Arnett, 306 Ga. App. 503, 702 S.E.2d 646 (2010).
Existence of probable cause for an officer to make an arrest without a warrant is not a complete defense to a false imprisonment
claim because, even if probable cause existed to believe a crime was committed, a warrantless arrest is still unlawful unless
made pursuant to one of the exigent circumstances applicable to law enforcement officers. West's Ga.Code Ann. § 17–4–20(a).
Kline v. KDB, Inc., 673 S.E.2d 516 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
The only essential elements of an action for false imprisonment being the detention and its unlawfulness, malice and the want
of probable cause need not be shown. West's Ga.Code Ann. § 51–7–20. Todd v. Byrd, 640 S.E.2d 652 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
To make out a claim of false arrest or malicious prosecution under applicable statutes, the plaintiff must show both the presence
of malice and the absence of probable cause. O.C.G.A. §§ 51"7"1, 51"7"40. Fleming v. U-Haul Co. of Georgia, 246 Ga. App.
681, 541 S.E.2d 75 (2000).
Probable cause existed to arrest and prosecute arrestee for rape, and thus he could not maintain claims against city and police
officer for false arrest or malicious prosecution, where alleged victim identified arrestee as the man who raped her, officer
observed that victim conduct and demeanor were consistent with behavior commonly observed in rape victims, other witnesses
reported to officer that victim informed them arrestee had raped her, arrestee exhibited extraordinary nervousness during
questioning, and he admitted engaging in sexual intercourse with victim at time and location of alleged rape. O.C.G.A. §§
51"7"1, 51"7"3, 51"7"40. Stanford v. City of Manchester, 246 Ga. App. 129, 539 S.E.2d 845 (2000).
If an arrest or prosecution lacks probable cause and is prompted by malice, then a person may have a claim for false arrest or
malicious prosecution. O.C.G.A. §§ 51"7"1, 51"7"2, 51"7"40. Desmond v. Troncalli Mitsubishi, 243 Ga. App. 71, 532 S.E.2d
463 (2000).
Probable cause to effect arrest for robbery existed, thus precluding arrestee recovery on false arrest and malicious prosecution
claims against arresting officer; three people identified arrestee from photo lineup as perpetrator of that robbery. O.C.G.A. §§
51"7"1, 51"7"3, 51"7"40. Franklin v. Consolidated Government of Columbus, Georgia, 236 Ga. App. 468, 512 S.E.2d 352
(1999).
Defense of a warrantless arrest in a false imprisonment case must show that the arrest was made on probable cause and pursuant
to the appropriate exigent circumstances. O.C.G.A. § 51"7"20. Mitchell v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 339, 506
S.E.2d 381 (1998).
Only essential elements in action to recover damages for illegal arrest or false imprisonment are arrest or detention and
unlawfulness thereof; malice and lack of probable cause need not be shown. Drug Emporium, Inc. v. Peaks, 227 Ga. App. 121,
488 S.E.2d 500 (1997).

Automatic activation of electronic antitheft device provided store security guard with reasonable cause to forcibly stop customer
and triggered statutory immunity of store from liability for false arrest, regardless of whether store clerk was negligent in failing
to deactivate merchandise tag which activated antitheft device. O.C.G.A. §§ 51"7"60(1, 2), 51"7"61(b). Mitchell v. Walmart
Stores, Inc., 223 Ga. App. 328, 477 S.E.2d 631 (1996).
In action alleging false arrest and false imprisonment, whether manner and length of detention were reasonable may be
determined as matter of law only in rare cases where evidence is uncontroverted. Brown v. Super Discount Markets, Inc., 223
Ga. App. 174, 477 S.E.2d 839 (1996).
Store owner could not be held liable to customer for false imprisonment for detaining customer suspected of shoplifting, pursuant
to statute granting qualified immunity to stores regarding detention or arrest of shoplifters; magistrate finding of probable cause
established, as matter of law, that customer conduct was sufficient to justify store belief that customer was shoplifting, and
customer voluntary entry into pretrial diversion program and acceptance of community service penalties imposed therein, when
coupled with magistrate findings, established that she was not one who is in fact innocent of any such misconduct under statute.
O.C.G.A. § 51"7"60. Gerry v. K-Mart, 222 Ga. App. 364, 474 S.E.2d 260 (1996).
In action for malicious arrest, unless facts regarding probable cause are undisputed, it is question for the jury. O.C.G.A. § 51"7"3.
Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 219 Ga. App. 710, 466 S.E.2d 221 (1995).
Defense of warrantless arrest in false imprisonment case must show that arrest was made on probable cause and pursuant to
appropriate exigent circumstances. O.C.G.A. §§ 17"4"20(a), 17"4"60. Arbee v. Collins, 219 Ga. App. 63, 463 S.E.2d 922 (1995).
Probable cause for arrest may exist without verification of information provided to arresting person; but if reasonable person
would investigate further before beginning prosecution, that person may be liable for failure to do so, and factors such as
reliability of source, availability of further information, difficulty of obtaining it, reputation of accused, opportunity to offer
explanation, and apparent necessity of prompt action are to be considered in determining reasonableness of acting without
verification. O.C.G.A. § 51"7"1. Simmons v. Kroger Co., 218 Ga. App. 721, 463 S.E.2d 159 (1995).
Probable cause requirement for malicious prosecution or false arrest is same: in determining whether probable cause existed,
question is not whether plaintiff was guilty, but whether defendants had reasonable cause to so believe, that is, whether
circumstances were such as to create in minds of defendants a reasonable belief that there was probable cause for arrest or
prosecution. McGonagil v. Treadwell, 216 Ga. App. 850, 456 S.E.2d 260 (1995).
Statute allowing for detention if there is probable cause to suspect person of theft did not apply to person being detained for
reason other than suspected shoplifting. O.C.G.A. § 51"7"60. Hampton v. Norred & Associates, Inc., 216 Ga. App. 367, 454
S.E.2d 222 (1995).
Store employee good faith identification of customer as robber, coupled with discovery of handgun in customer truck similar to
gun used in robbery, established probable cause for warrantless arrest which thus precluded liability of store on claim of false
arrest. Mayor & Aldermen of City of Savannah v. Wilson, 214 Ga. App. 170, 447 S.E.2d 124 (1994).
Probable cause is totally absent in malicious prosecution or false arrest action when circumstances would satisfy reasonable
person that accuser had no ground for proceeding except desire to injure accused. O.C.G.A. § 51"7"44. Lolmaugh v. T.O.C.
Retail, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 605, 436 S.E.2d 708 (1993).
Owner of store in high crime area owed no duty to protect customer from attack during which customer was robbed and shot
with sawed-off shotgun while leaving store absent pattern of prior substantially similar criminal assaults on the premises; prior
assaults which were not substantially similar included purse snatching without use of weapon, clerk striking woman in dispute

over correct change, woman cut in domestic dispute with boyfriend, and man being beaten with pipe when he refused to say
where friends went with the assailant money. O.C.G.A. § 51"3"1. Woods v. Kim, 207 Ga. App. 910, 429 S.E.2d 262 (1993).
Malice in action for malicious prosecution or malicious arrest consists in personal spite or in general disregard of right
consideration of mankind directed by chance against individual injured. O.C.G.A. §§ 51"7"2, 51"7"3, 51"7"40. Kemp v. Rouse-
Atlanta, Inc., 207 Ga. App. 876, 429 S.E.2d 264 (1993).
To avoid liability for false imprisonment, it must be shown not only that arrest was valid but also that arresting officer had
probable cause to believe charged offense had been committed. O.C.G.A. §§ 17"4"20(a), 17"4"60. Amason v. Kroger Co., 204
Ga. App. 695, 420 S.E.2d 314 (1992).
Shopkeeper privilege statute precludes recovery for false imprisonment when it is shown that owner or operator of store
reasonably believed that person detained was engaged in shoplifting; thus, shop owner has implicit right to protect against
shoplifting by detaining customer who acts in suspicious manner. O.C.G.A. §§ 51"7"20, 51"7"60. Fields v. Kroger Co., 202
Ga. App. 475, 414 S.E.2d 703 (1992).
Unless facts regarding probable cause for arrest are undisputed, it is a question for jury in action alleging false arrest. O.C.G.A.
§§ 51"7"1, 51"7"43. Gantt v. Patient Communications Systems, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 35, 406 S.E.2d 796 (1991).
Malicious prosecution differs from malicious arrest only in that in the former case there must be a carrying on of the prosecution;
in either action, however, it is essential to show absence of probable cause. McQueary v. Atlanta Airlines Terminal Corp., 198
Ga. App. 318, 401 S.E.2d 333 (1991).
Arrestee arrested in connection with robbery of restaurant failed to establish requisite malice to succeed in malicious arrest
and prosecution action against restaurant owner; there was no direct evidence of any type of fraudulent conduct or improper
motive on part of owner or employees. O.C.G.A. § 51"7"40. Barber v. H & H Muller Enterprises, Inc., 197 Ga. App. 126, 397
S.E.2d 563 (1990).
Action for false imprisonment will lie where person is unlawfully detained under void process, or under no process at all, and
cannot be maintained where process is valid, no matter how corrupt may be the motives of the person suing out the process or
how unfounded the imprisonment may be. Hudgins v. Bawtinhimer, 196 Ga. App. 386, 395 S.E.2d 909 (1990).
Arresting officers established that they had probable cause to arrest arrestee on charge of disorderly while intoxicated, and thus
established that malice and lack of probable cause requirements for false arrest claim and unlawful detention requirement for
false imprisonment were not satisfied, in suit brought by arrestee against arresting officers; arrestee testified that he was not
drunk or disorderly, but made statement admitting that he was at fire in public place with alcohol, displayed weapon, and refused
to put out fire. O.C.G.A. §§ 51"7"1 to 51"7"3, 51"7"20. Pinkston v. City of Albany, 196 Ga. App. 43, 395 S.E.2d 587 (1990).
Statute providing defense to claims of false arrest and false imprisonment for store owner who has reasonable belief that plaintiff
was shoplifting or that the manner of detention or arrest was reasonable is to be read in the conjunctive, notwithstanding the
use of the disjunctive in the statute. O.C.G.A. § 51"7"60. K Mart Corp. v. Adamson, 192 Ga. App. 884, 386 S.E.2d 680 (1989).
Evidence of previous warrants taken out by defendant and of termination of those warrants by dismissal, nolle prosequi, or no
bill was relevant to issue of malice and was admissible in action for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Worn v. Warren,
191 Ga. App. 448, 382 S.E.2d 112 (1989).
Among the essential elements of a claim for malicious prosecution are a prosecution instituted maliciously and without probable
cause, which has terminated favorably to plaintiff. O.C.G.A. §§ 51"7"40, 51"7"41. J.C. Penney Co., Inc. v. Miller, 182 Ga.
App. 64, 354 S.E.2d 682 (1987).

Unlike an action for malicious arrest, in an action for false imprisonment based upon a warrantless arrest the mere existence
of probable cause standing alone has no real defensive bearing on the issue of liability. O.C.G.A. § 51"7"20. Scott Housing
Systems, Inc. v. Hickox, 174 Ga. App. 23, 329 S.E.2d 154 (1985).
Actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution both require evidence of malice and lack of probable cause to obtain a verdict.
O.C.G.A. §§ 51"7"1, 51"7"40. El-Amin v. Trust Co. Bank, 171 Ga. App. 35, 318 S.E.2d 655 (1984).
In a false imprisonment case premised upon warrantless arrest, mere existence of probable cause standing alone has no real
defensive bearing on the issue of liability; such is true since probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed may
otherwise exist and a warrantless arrest yet be illegal. O.C.G.A. § 51"7"1. Collins v. Sadlo, 167 Ga. App. 317, 306 S.E.2d
390 (1983).
Where material facts in malicious prosecution and false imprisonment action were essentially undisputed, whether or not
probable cause existed was for determination by court. Melton v. LaCalamito, 158 Ga. App. 820, 282 S.E.2d 393 (1981).
Where there was no evidence of bad faith or malice in the investigation, arrest, and subsequent indictment of plaintiff, plaintiff
could not recover for malicious prosecution, malicious arrest, false imprisonment or slander. Corbin v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta,
151 Ga. App. 33, 258 S.E.2d 697 (1979).
Probable cause which is determinative factor under statute regarding liability for detention for shoplifting is the existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on facts within knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime. Code, § 105"1005. Dixon v. S. S. Kresge, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 776, 169 S.E.2d
189 (1969).
To sustain action for false imprisonment, it is not necessary to show malice and want of probable cause, but only that
imprisonment was unlawful. Lowe v. Turner, 115 Ga. App. 503, 154 S.E.2d 792 (1967).
Termination of original action in favor of accused must be shown in cases of malicious arrest and malicious prosecution but not
in cases of false imprisonment. Code, §§ 105-901, 105-1001. Smith v. Embry, 103 Ga. App. 375, 119 S.E.2d 45 (1961).
The defense to a suit for false imprisonment that defendant acted upon probable cause will not defeat the plaintiff recovery but
will serve to reduce the amount of his recovery. Code, § 27"207. Hill v. Henry, 90 Ga. App. 93, 82 S.E.2d 35 (1954).
Existence of probable cause to arrest and imprison arrestee precluded his claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest and
false imprisonment brought under Hawai'ian law. Annan-Yartey v. Honolulu Police Dept., 351 Fed. Appx. 243 (9th Cir. 2009)
(applying Hawaii law).
Determination of probable cause is defense to common-law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution. Reed v. City and County of Honolulu, 76 Haw. 219, 873 P.2d 98 (1994).
Where arrest is effectuated without warrant, existence of probable cause to arrest is affirmative defense to action for false
imprisonment; officer who makes arrest with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because suspect subsequently
is proven innocent. Kalilikane v. McCravey, 69 Haw. 145, 737 P.2d 862 (1987).
Probable cause is an affirmative defense to a claim for false imprisonment. Lopez v. Wigwam Dept. Stores No. 10, Inc., 49
Haw. 416, 421 P.2d 289 (1966).

Motorist did not have a claim for false arrest against police officers since officers, who observed motorist vehicle weaving back
and forth across center line, were entitled to stop vehicle on reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, and to thereafter order
motorist out of vehicle and to thereafter arrest him for driving under the influence upon detecting odor of alcoholic beverage
on or about the motorist person and observing motorist to have glassy and bloodshot eyes as well as incoherent speech. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983. Sprague v. City of Burley, 109 Idaho 656, 710 P.2d 566 (1985).
Claimant guilty plea to disorderly conduct charge conceded probable cause for arrest on charge and precluded claim for return
of bail for false arrest on such charge. Herrera v. Conner, 111 Idaho 1012, 729 P.2d 1075 (Ct. App. 1986).
Because reasonable minds could differ as to whether deputy had probable cause to arrest mother for committing obstruction
by trying to help her son escape from custody or for resisting her own arrest, deputy was entitled to qualified immunity on
mother's § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims; deputy had arguable probable cause where mother, who did not flee
or physically clash with deputy, did not comply with his order to stop her approach, and began arguing and yelling. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983;S.H.A. 720 ILCS 5/31–1(a). Abbott v. Sangamon County, Ill., 705 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2013) (applying Illinois law).
Police officers had arguable probable cause to order dispersal and arrest under Chicago's disorderly conduct ordinance, for
purposes of false arrest claim, when crowd appeared at busy intersection in heart of downtown, which was location where
permit for anti-war march had been denied, and were hindering flow of pedestrian traffic; there were more than 50 protestors
at the intersection, officers had legitimate reasons to be concerned with the blockage of pedestrian and vehicular traffic and
the manner in which the protestors intended to convey their message, and it was reasonable to believe that protestor who was
attempting to cross police line was not following police orders to disperse toward permitted location of the march. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying Chicago law).
To succeed on a claim for false arrest or false imprisonment under Illinois law, a plaintiff must show that he was arrested
or restrained by police officers who did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the plaintiff had committed an offense.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Mutter v. Sanders, 611 F. Supp. 2d 837 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (applying Illinois law).
Under Illinois law, to prove false arrest and false imprisonment, bar patron was required to show that village police officer
restrained or arrested her without having reasonable grounds to believe that she was committing an offense. Gill v. Village of
Melrose Park, 35 F. Supp. 3d 956 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (applying Illinois law).
Under Illinois law, claim for false imprisonment requires a showing that plaintiff was restrained or arrested by defendant, and
that defendant acted without having reasonable grounds to believe that an offense was committed by plaintiff; put another way,
to succeed on a claim for false imprisonment, plaintiff must show that he was restrained unreasonably or without probable
cause. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Makowski v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 3d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (applying Illinois law).
Officer had probable cause to arrest for criminal damage to property under Illinois law, precluding arrestee's § 1983 false arrest
claim; arrestee alleged that he intentionally struck officer's vehicle after officer drove his vehicle into the pedestrian crowd,
almost running into arrestee and other pedestrians, while attempting to turn from an alleyway onto a street, and he alleged
that officer demanded that he pay for the damage to his car, indicating officer's belief that arrestee caused damage. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;S.H.A. 720 ILCS 5/21–1(a)(1). Beiles v. City of Chicago, 987 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D.
Ill. 2013) (applying Illinois law).
City police officers lacked probable cause to arrest suspect for delivering cocaine, as supported arrestee's false arrest and
imprisonment claims under § 1983 and Illinois law; at time of arrest suspect was standing alone outside and did not possess
any drugs. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Padilla v. City of Chicago, 932 F. Supp. 2d 907 (N.D. Ill. 2013)
(applying Illinois law).

Law enforcement officer and prosecutor had probable cause to bring criminal proceedings against arrestee for attempting to
start fire at her ex-boyfriend's residence, thus precluding arrestee's malicious prosecution and false arrest and imprisonment
claims against those individuals under Illinois law; officer and prosecutor were aware of history of domestic problems between
arrestee and ex-boyfriend, of arrestee's reported threat to burn ex-boyfriend's house down, and fact that shortly thereafter, there
was fire at ex-boyfriend's house. Johnson v. Dossey, 878 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (applying Illinois law).
Existence of probable cause to arrest driver for theft of services, arising from her refusal to pay parking fee upon exiting parking
facility, barred her Illinois claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;S.H.A. 720 ILCS 5/16–3.
Gray v. Burke, 466 F. Supp. 2d 991 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (applying Illinois law).
State gaming agent was not required to pursue reasonable avenues of investigation to have probable cause to detain casino
patron, and thus probable cause defense barred patron's false imprisonment action against agent, even though agent detained
patron on mistaken belief that patron's valid driver's license had been altered. Grainger v. Harrah's Casino, 2014 IL App (3d)
130029, 18 N.E.3d 265 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2014).
Essentially, a plaintiff alleging false arrest and false imprisonment has to show that she was unreasonably restrained without
probable cause. Ross v. Mauro Chevrolet, 861 N.E.2d 313 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2006).
A claim for false imprisonment requires a showing that the plaintiff was restrained or arrested by the defendant, and that the
defendant acted without having reasonable grounds to believe that an offense was committed by the plaintiff. Reynolds v.
Menard, Inc., 850 N.E.2d 831 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2006).
Arrestee failed to establish lack of probable cause for arrest or malice on part of arresting officer as would support false arrest
claim against city or officer where valid arrest warrant was issued by court such that arrest itself could not give rise to claim of
false imprisonment. Davis v. Temple, 284 Ill. App. 3d 983, 220 Ill. Dec. 593, 673 N.E.2d 737 (5th Dist. 1996).
Probable cause to arrest defeats any claim for false arrest. Kincaid v. Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 283 Ill. App. 3d 555, 219 Ill.
Dec. 215, 670 N.E.2d 1103 (1st Dist. 1996).
If probable cause existed for arrest, action for false arrest cannot lie. Lappin v. Costello, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 174 Ill. Dec.
114, 598 N.E.2d 311 (4th Dist. 1992).
In action for false imprisonment, plaintiff must show that restraint was unreasonable or without probable cause. Martel
Enterprises v. City of Chicago, 223 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 164 Ill. Dec. 945, 584 N.E.2d 157 (1st Dist. 1991).
False imprisonment is unreasonable restraint of plaintiff liberty against his will caused or procured by defendant. Meerbrey v.
Marshall Field & Co., 189 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 137 Ill. Dec. 191, 545 N.E.2d 952 (1st Dist. 1989).
Existence of cause for any detention by peace officer is an absolute bar to claim for damages. Fulk v. Roberts, 164 Ill. App.
3d 194, 115 Ill. Dec. 412, 517 N.E.2d 1098 (5th Dist. 1987).
Finding of good faith on part of owner and operator of retail store, in false imprisonment action, would not have prevented
award of compensatory damages but would have precluded award of punitive damages. Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA Ins. Companies,
134 Ill. App. 3d 134, 88 Ill. Dec. 968, 479 N.E.2d 988 (1st Dist. 1985).
In a civil prosecution for false imprisonment, in which defendant relies on criminal trespass statute to justify its conduct in
causing plaintiff arrest, defendant need only establish that it had reasonable grounds to believe that plaintiff received notice,
rather than that plaintiff believed such notice had been given. Dutton v. Roo-Mac, Inc., 100 Ill. App. 3d 116, 55 Ill. Dec. 458,
426 N.E.2d 604 (2d Dist. 1981).

Burden of justifying arrest made without warrant fell upon officer making arrest in false arrest and false imprisonment action.
McKendree v. Christy, 29 Ill. App. 2d 195, 172 N.E.2d 380 (3d Dist. 1961).
False imprisonment consists of unlawful restraint against will of person of his liberty or freedom of locomotion and false arrest
is one means of committing false imprisonment. Shemaitis v. Froemke, 6 Ill. App. 2d 323, 127 N.E.2d 648 (1st Dist. 1955).
Among elements tending to establish willfulness and maliciousness of defendant in action for false imprisonment are
recklessness and want of probable cause. Aldridge v. Fox, 348 Ill. App. 96, 108 N.E.2d 139 (1st Dist. 1952).
False imprisonment consists in the unlawful restraint against his will of an individual personal liberty or freedom of locomotion.
Shelton v. Barry, 328 Ill. App. 497, 66 N.E.2d 697 (1st Dist. 1946).
Prima facie, any restraint put by fear or force upon the actions of another is unlawful and constitutes a false imprisonment
unless a showing of justification makes it legal imprisonment, and false imprisonment is necessarily a wrongful interference
with the personal liberty of an individual, and the wrong may be committed by words alone or by acts alone or both, and it is
not necessary that the individual be confined, assaulted or touched, or that there be an injury to the individual person, character
or reputation, or that the wrongful act be committed with malice, ill will or wrongful intention. Hassenauer v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., 314 Ill. App. 569, 41 N.E.2d 979 (1st Dist. 1942).
Officer had probable cause to arrest homeowner's neighbor, after homeowner reported an assault and break-in at the home,
and thus, officer was not liable to neighbor for false arrest under Indiana law; homeowner positively identified neighbor as his
assailant, discrepancies about reported color and type of shirt that assailant had been wearing, and neighbor's shirt, were minor
details, and neighbor's arrest was not based solely on homeowner's description of assailant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Howlett
v. Hack, 794 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying Indiana law).
Judgment in arrestee's favor on his § 1983 false arrest claim against state trooper, alleging that state trooper caused him to be
arrested and imprisoned without probable cause and that he was not resisting officer, would necessarily impugn the validity of
his conviction for resisting law enforcement, which required that state trooper be lawfully engaged, and thus claim was barred
by Heck v. Humphrey, where arrestee pleaded guilty to charging document, which set out events that provided probable cause
for the arrest, "as charged." U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; I.C. 35–44–3–3(1) (Repealed). Ocasio v. Turner,
2014 WL 1922927 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (applying Indiana law).
Town police officers were entitled to qualified immunity from motorists' § 1983 claims that they were illegally detained and
unlawfully arrested, in violation of Fourth Amendment, to extent that claims were based on officers' decision to pull motorists
over and to handcuff and place motorist who allegedly disobeyed officers' orders under arrest; at time of incident, officers would
have had reasonable grounds to think that, regardless of whether initial order to stop was lawful, failure to obey order to stop
created probable cause to stop motorists for violating Indiana's Resisting Arrest statute and that stop did not violate Fourth
Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; West's A.I.C. 9–21–8–35, 35–44.1–3–1. Reiner v. Dandurand,
33 F. Supp. 3d 1018 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (applying Indiana law).
Generally, to succeed upon a claim of false arrest or false imprisonment, Indiana law requires a plaintiff to establish the absence
of probable cause for the arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. McConnell v. McKillip, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (S.D. Ind. 2008)
(applying Indiana law).
An arrest by a law enforcement officer without probable cause can give rise to civil liability for false arrest under Indiana
common law. Row v. Holt, 864 N.E.2d 1011 (Ind. 2007).

Merchant limited authority under shoplifting detention statute to detain person suspected of theft is triggered when merchant
agent has probable cause to believe that theft has occurred or is occurring on or about store premises. West A.I.C. 35 "33 "6
"2(a). Haltom v. Bruner and Meis, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
Proof of absence of probable cause is essential to plaintiff cause of action for false arrest, and if plaintiff in false arrest action
fails to demonstrate absence of probable cause, or if record as whole reflects probable cause for arrest, then plaintiff case must
fail and inquiry comes to a halt. Conwell v. Beatty, 667 N.E.2d 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
For purposes of false imprisonment claim, probable cause to initiate criminal prosecution exists where facts found on reasonable
inquiry would induce reasonably intelligent and prudent person to believe that accused has committed crime; probable cause
is normally issue for jury determination. West A.I.C. 35 "33 "6 "2. Street v. Shoe Carnival, Inc., 660 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996).
To succeed upon claim of false arrest, plaintiff must generally establish absence of probable cause for arrest. Roddel v. Town
of Flora, 580 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1991).
Customer false imprisonment action against merchant, which was based upon his detention on shoplifting charges, was properly
dismissed; merchant had probable cause to detain customer, who was observed placing items in his pockets. Duvall v. Kroger
Co., 549 N.E.2d 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1990).
False imprisonment is the unlawful detention of a person against his or her will. Lazarus Dept. Store v. Sutherlin, 544 N.E.2d
513 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1989).
Neither store owner nor employee could be held liable to detained customer for false imprisonment, though employee did not
conduct inventory of merchandise to determine whether any was missing, upon determination that probable cause existed to
believe that customer had committed conversion of store property. IC 35"33"6"2, 35"33"6"4 (1982 Ed.) Chestnet v. K-Mart
Corp., 529 N.E.2d 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1988).
If plaintiff fails to demonstrate absence of probable cause, or if record as whole reflects probable cause for arrest, then plaintiff
false arrest case must fail. Garrett v. City of Bloomington, 478 N.E.2d 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1985).
Security officer who had been informed that plaintiff was disturbing resident of apartment building, who discovered plaintiff
sleeping in an automobile in apartment building parking lot, who determined that plaintiff was intoxicated, and who noted that
plaintiff was resistant and hostile had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, thus precluding plaintiff from recovering for false
arrest or malicious prosecution. Gomez v. Adams, 462 N.E.2d 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1984).
Proof of absence of probable cause for arrest was essential to action for false arrest. City of South Bend v. Fleming, 397 N.E.2d
1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1979).
An improper motive or malice is not an element of false imprisonment. Dubreuil v. Pinnick, 178 Ind. App. 526, 383 N.E.2d
420 (1st Dist. 1978).
Instruction, in action by supermarket customer for slander and false imprisonment, that probable cause constituted a complete
defense to action for false imprisonment even if customer had not as a matter of fact wrongfully taken merchandise which she
was accused of taking was not a correct statement of the law but was not ground for reversal where jury found by special verdict
that plaintiff had wrongfully taken the merchandise. Hancock v. York, 141 Ind. App. 212, 227 N.E.2d 187 (Div. 2 1967).
The elements of the tort of false imprisonment are (1) detention or restraint against a person will, and (2) unlawfulness of the
detention or restraint. Nelson v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 619 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 2000).

Essential elements of a claim for false arrest are detention or restraint against one will, and unlawfulness of detention or restraint;
false arrest is indistinguishable from false imprisonment. Kraft v. City of Bettendorf, 359 N.W.2d 466 (Iowa 1984).
The good faith of the actor is no justification for false imprisonment and presence of probable cause for detention is no defense
to an action for false imprisonment, and it is not necessary for one detained to recover for false imprisonment that consequential
prosecution should have terminated in his favor. Sergeant v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 244 Iowa 185, 52 N.W.2d 86 (1952).
Terms false arrest and false imprisonment are both used to mean unlawful physical restraint by one of another liberty, whether
in prison or elsewhere. Brown v. State, 261 Kan. 6, 927 P.2d 938 (1996).
Where officers making warrantless arrest of defendant acted with probable cause, officers were immune from liability for false
arrest under Kansas Tort Claims Act. K.S.A. 75"6104(d). Mendoza v. Reno County, 235 Kan. 692, 681 P.2d 676 (1984).
Action of false imprisonment always includes element of assault in the technical sense. Thompson v. General Finance Co., 205
Kan. 76, 468 P.2d 269 (1970).
False arrest and false imprisonment are indistinguishable as causes of action, as both consist of illegal restraint of one person
liberty by act of another person. Holland v. Lutz, 194 Kan. 712, 401 P.2d 1015 (1965).
Once probable cause exists, merchant defense to false imprisonment includes right to reasonably detain suspected shoplifter
for sole purpose of investigation by law enforcement officer. K.S.A. 21"3424, 21"3424(3). Melia v. Dillon Companies, Inc.,
18 Kan. App. 2d 5, 846 P.2d 257 (1993).
Arrestee, who alleged that Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources (KDFW) officer made warrantless arrest of
arrestee, stated false imprisonment claim under Kentucky law; arrestee alleged that officer arrested him because he told officer
that officer needed to leave home of arrestee's son unless officer had warrant, that arrestee was not doing anything illegal, that
he did not actively resist arrest, that officer had no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe any illicit activity was
afoot, and that charges against arrestee were dismissed for lack of evidence. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Estep v. Combs, 366 F.
Supp. 3d 863 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (applying Kentucky law).
In making warrantless arrest, police officer had reasonable and good-faith belief that arrestee was committing crime of disorderly
conduct, based on arrestee's actions during physical altercation as observed by officer, and therefore officer was not liable
for false imprisonment under Kentucky law, even though charge against arrestee was subsequently dismissed. KRS 525.060.
Woosley v. City of Paris, 591 F. Supp. 2d 913 (E.D. Ky. 2008), as amended, (Dec. 4, 2008) (applying Kentucky law).
In making warrantless arrest, police officer had reasonable and good-faith belief that arrestee was committing crime of disorderly
conduct, based on arrestee's actions during physical altercation as observed by officer, and therefore officer was not liable
for false imprisonment under Kentucky law, even though charge against arrestee was subsequently dismissed. KRS 525.060.
Woosley v. City of Paris, 591 F. Supp. 2d 913, 52 A.L.R.6th 755 (E.D. Ky. 2008), as amended, (Dec. 4, 2008) (applying
Kentucky law).
In false arrest cases, punitive damages are not justified absent a showing that the acts were either willful or malicious or that
they were performed in such a way as would indicate a gross neglect or disregard for rights of the person wronged. Horton v.
Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1985).
The basis of a cause of action for false imprisonment is an unlawful detention or restraint of the person of the plaintiff, and
in stating a claim of false imprisonment it is only necessary that the plaintiff aver in concise and direct language that he was

damaged by the wrongful or unlawful detention or imprisonment by the defendant. CR 8.01, 8.05(1), and 8.06. Callihan v.
Kirk, 419 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1967).
Officer making an arrest without a warrant in reasonable and good faith belief that a misdemeanor is being committed in his
presence is not liable for false imprisonment even though it develops that the arrestee is not guilty of any offense, and it is
general rule that a judicial officer having jurisdiction is not rendered liable by fact that he has acted under an invalid statute or
ordinance. McCray v. City of Lake Louisvilla, 332 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. 1960).
Though fact that jailers had no personal knowledge that plaintiff was being unlawfully held in jail without a mittimus or other
valid order for his detention after he had served sentence for drunkenness did not constitute a complete defense to action for
false imprisonment, such fact showed a lack of malice on part of jailers and minimized damages to which plaintiff was entitled.
KRS 71.020. Garvin v. Muir, 306 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1957).
In action against policeman, and surety for false arrest and imprisonment, refusal to give requested instruction of policeman
and surety that there was no liability if officer acted in good faith and on reasonable grounds to believe that plaintiff was drunk
was error. Cr.Code Prac. § 36; KRS 244.020(2). Sizemore v. Hoskins, 314 Ky. 436, 235 S.W.2d 1011 (1951).
Statute providing limited defense to merchants against charges of false imprisonment by suspected shoplifters does not authorize
merchant employees to manhandle or browbeat a child in an attempt to discover whether he has unlawfully taken merchandise
from the premises. KRS 433.236(1). Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Mitchell, 877 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).
Customer action in placing store items in her purse, even if only partially hidden from view, was sufficient to warrant store
personnel taking customer in custody to inform peace officer or law enforcement agency of detention of person and surrender
customer to custody of police officer; accordingly, customer could not recover from store on claims of false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution. KRS 433.234, 433.234(1), 433.236, 433.236(1). Taylor Drugstores, Inc. v. Story, 760 S.W.2d 102 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1988).
Police officers could be held liable for false arrest and imprisonment only if they did not believe at time of arrest, and have
probable cause to believe, that complainant had committed offense in their presence. Myers v. City of Louisville, 590 S.W.2d
348 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
Although initial aggravated-assault and simple-battery charges were dismissed, lawfulness of arrestee's detention was presumed,
for purposes of his false arrest claim under Louisiana law, where he was subsequently convicted of disturbing the peace based
on same underlying events and that conviction still stood, and presumption was not overcome, absent evidence that arresting
officers lacked honest and reasonable belief in arrestee's guilt at time charges were filed. Cormier v. Lafayette City-Parish
Consol. Government, 493 Fed. Appx. 578 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying Louisiana law).
Deputies had reasonable suspicion to detain, precluding detainee's false arrest and imprisonment claims under Louisiana law;
detainee was in vicinity where deputies were seeking two potentially armed suspects, he was with another man, they were seen
moving items out of a house, and other man attempted to get on his bike. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Elphage v. Gautreaux, 969
F. Supp. 2d 493 (M.D. La. 2013) (applying Louisiana law).
Damages for false arrest are allowed only where there has been insufficient probable cause to sustain the arrest and the party
has not been convicted. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Gibson v. State, 758 So. 2d 782 (La. 2000).
Police had probable cause for arrest based on information, from victim of armed robbery, that arrestee was one of the armed
robbers and that victim believed that arrestee had recognized her as well, and on information from those present in store in
which arrestee was seen, that they thought they had seen outline of the gun in his pocket; accordingly, police officers were not
liable for damages for false arrest or imprisonment. Wolfe v. Wiener Enterprises, Inc., 648 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1995).

Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any claim against police officers for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment,
or malicious prosecution. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. McMasters v. Department of Police, 172 So. 3d 105 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 2015).
If there was probable cause to arrest, then there is no false arrest cause of action. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Dyas v. Shreveport
Police Dept., 136 So. 3d 897 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2014).
Police officer's one-day, cursory investigation of identity of suspect in stabbing fell short of reasonableness or probable cause,
and thus officer breached his duty of care to arrestee to properly discern whether or not she was correct suspect prior to
transmitting report to district attorney's office that caused arrest, booking, and jailing of arrestee; although victim provided
arrestee's name as his girlfriend and the person who had stabbed him, officer should have proceeded with greater caution given
that victim had already falsely identified his attacker, officer's identification search on computer database produced list of 18
female state residents with arrestee's name and revealed no association between arrestee and address at which victim resided
with his attacker, and officer failed to conduct additional measures to ensure more accurate investigation. LSA–C.C. art. 2315.
Brown v. City of Monroe, 135 So. 3d 792 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2014).
Police officer had probable cause to arrest driver for felony offense of public intimidation, and thus driver could not maintain
action against town and officer for false arrest/false imprisonment where, upon being issued a citation for improper lane usage,
driver cursed at police officers, threatened their jobs, and tried to physically take the ticket book out of officer's hand. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amends. 1, 4; LSA–R.S. 14:122. O'Brien v. Town of Glenmora, 997 So. 2d 753 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008).
Deputy city marshall's detention of homeowner was lawful, and thus homeowner could not maintain action for false
imprisonment; deputy was attempting to sequester property listed on writ of sequestration, and believed to be in homeowner's
home, and homeowner, who had been drinking, became aggressive and committed battery on deputy. Wilson v. City of
Shreveport, 921 So. 2d 254 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2006).
Reasonable cause to believe that the suspect committed a theft of goods, immunizing merchant from liability for false
imprisonment, is defined as something less than probable cause and requires that the detaining officer have articulable
knowledge of particular facts sufficiently reasonable to suspect the detained person of criminal activity. LSA"C.Cr.P. art. 215.
Vaughn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 734 So. 2d 156 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1999).
Reasonable cause for investigatory detention, for purposes of statute setting forth requirements of authorized detention for
which merchant and others will be immune from civil liability, is something less than probable cause; person detaining another
must have articulable knowledge of particular facts sufficiently reasonable to suspect detained person of criminal activity.
LSA"C.Cr.P. art. 215, subd. A(1). Freeman v. Kar Way, Inc., 686 So. 2d 51 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
Police officersactions in omitting fact from arrest warrant affidavit and in failing to investigate victim ex-convict neighbor prior
to plaintiff arrest did not amount to negligence, where probable cause existed to arrest plaintiff. LSA"C.C. art. 2315. Winn v.
City of Alexandria, 685 So. 2d 281 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
Civil cause of action for false imprisonment requires proof of restraint without color of legal authority, and there is no
requirement of proving that confinement was intentional. Prisk v. Palazzo, 668 So. 2d 415 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
Test of store liability for false imprisonment of patron suspected of shoplifting is not based on patron actual guilt or innocence,
but rather on reasonableness of store employee actions under all circumstances. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 215. McNeely v. National Tea
Co., 653 So. 2d 1231 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995).

Arrest and subsequent detention of plaintiff did not constitute false imprisonment, since arrest was made with probable cause.
Tabora v. City of Kenner, 650 So. 2d 319 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995).
Tort of false arrest requires detention of person and unlawfulness of detention. Slaydon v. State Through Dept. of Wildlife &
Fisheries, 636 So. 2d 1151 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
Tort of false arrest and imprisonment occurs when one arrests and restrains another against his will without warrant or other
statutory authority; two essential elements are: (1) detention of person, and (2) unlawfulness of such detention. Barry v. Dennis,
633 So. 2d 806 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
If questioning of customer by merchant and reasonable investigation is performed and probable cause to suspect shoplifting is
established, merchant may hold detained person for arrest by police officer and there is no false imprisonment. LSA-C.Cr.P.
art. 215, subd. A(1). Derouen v. Miller, 614 So. 2d 1304 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
Elements of malicious prosecution action are: commencement or continuance of original criminal or civil judicial proceeding;
its legal causation by present defendant; its bona fide termination in favor of present plaintiff; absence of probable cause; and
damage. Brimmer v. A. Copeland Enterprises, Inc., 609 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1992).
Test of whether merchant is liable for unauthorized detention of suspected shoplifter is not based on suspect actual guilt or
innocence, but on reasonableness of store employeesaction under all of the circumstances. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 215. Estorge v.
Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 604 So. 2d 1012 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1992).
To recover from a merchant for tort of false imprisonment, plaintiff must prove that a detention occurred under one or more of
the following circumstances: unreasonable force was used, no reasonable cause to believe that suspect had committed a theft of
goods existed, or the detention lasted more than 60 minutes, unless it was reasonable under the circumstances that the suspect
be detained longer. Noel v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 594 So. 2d 1138 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
Tort of false imprisonment, or false arrest, has two essential elements, detention of a person and the unlawfulness of such
detention. Restrepo v. Fortunato, 556 So. 2d 1362 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
Sheriff who arrested commercial fishermen for trespassing on canal had probable cause for arrest and, thus, was not liable for
false arrest; sheriff had been told by district attorney and adjoining landowners that canal could not be used by public for boating
or fishing. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 213. Brown v. Rougon, 552 So. 2d 1052 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
Reasonable cause within meaning of statute exempting merchant from liability for false imprisonment when he has reasonable
cause to believe that person has committed theft of goods is something less than probable cause; detaining officer must have
articulable knowledge of particular facts sufficient reasonable to suspect detained person of criminal activity. LSA-C.Cr.P. art.
215. West v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 539 So. 2d 1258 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
Store alleged detention of suspected shoplifter was not unreasonable; alleged detention was effected by security guard and
store manager, detention occurred on store premises and lasted only 25 minutes, evidence indicated sufficient notice of use of
antitheft buzzer, and there was no evidence of any type of abuse or unreasonable force. LSA-C.Cr.P. arts. 215, 215(e). Causey
v. Katz & Bestoff, Inc., 539 So. 2d 944 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
Employee failed to establish that employer detained him as was required to sustain employee false imprisonment action.
Harrison v. Phillips, 539 So. 2d 911 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
In order for merchant to be immune from civil liability for detaining suspected shoplifter, it must be shown that the person
effecting the detention was a police officer, merchant, or specifically authorized employee of a merchant, that the party making

the detention had reasonable cause to believe that the detained person had committed theft, that unreasonable force was not
used in detaining the suspect for interrogation, that the detention occurred on the merchant premises, and that the detention
did not last longer than 60 minutes. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 215, subd. A(1). Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 525 So. 2d 111 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
Employer had probable cause to detain and question employee, who subsequently pled guilty to misdemeanor theft; therefore,
employer detention of employee could not form basis for false arrest action. Rabalais v. Blanche, 524 So. 2d 772 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 1988).
Tort of false arrest, or false imprisonment, has two essential elements: detention of a person and unlawfulness of such detention.
Touchton v. Kroger Co., 512 So. 2d 520 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
In suit for false arrest for misdemeanor, there can be no liability if arresting officer had probable cause to believe the
misdemeanor had been committed in his presence. Boyer v. City of Lake Charles, 499 So. 2d 1064 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
Storekeeper liability for detaining suspected shoplifter depends first upon whether store employees had reasonable cause to
suspect detainee, and secondly, upon whether subsequent inquiry was carried out in reasonable manner. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 215.
Attaldo v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 469 So. 2d 1132 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
False imprisonment is restraint without color of legal authority. Johnson v. State Through Dept. of Public Safety, 451 So. 2d
104 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
In a suit for damages for false imprisonment plaintiff must show that he was arrested at instance of defendant, who acted
maliciously and without probable cause. Albright v. Prentice, 425 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
Where police officer had no probable cause to believe that citizen had committed any crime at time citizen was placed under
arrest, officer use of physical violence to overcome citizen resistance constituted battery, and subsequent detention of citizen
was without color of legal authority and constituted false arrest and imprisonment. Norrell v. City of Monroe, 375 So. 2d 159
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
Malice is not a necessary element of the tort of false imprisonment, and, thus, dismissal of action to recover damages resulting
from alleged false imprisonment on ground that plaintiff failed to prove malice was error. LSA"C.C. art. 2315. Fontenot v.
Lavergne, 365 So. 2d 1168 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
Deputy sheriff who caused arrest without warrant lacked reasonable cause to believe that person arrested had committed felony,
where arrest was ordered on oral complaint of stranger with respect to issuance of check on which payment was stopped and
ensuing events, there was no need for prompt action but week elapsed in which deputy neither heard anything further from
complainant nor took any action himself, amount involved was only $300 and there was no reason to fear escape. LSA"R.S.
14:2, 14:71, 15:59, 15:60, 33:1443. Abraham v. Boat Center, Inc., 146 So. 2d 23 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
Police officer is not liable for damages, even though arrested person is found innocent, where arrest for misdemeanor is made
when officer in good faith has probable cause to believe that misdemeanor is being committed in his presence. LSA"R.S. 15:59,
15:60(1). Wells v. Gaspard, 129 So. 2d 245 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
Arrestee's state probation before judgment (PBJ) disposition, for his offense of fleeing or eluding a police officer under Maryland
law, demonstrated that state police officers had probable cause to arrest arrestee during traffic stop, and thus the PBJ disposition
precluded arrestee's claim against officers for false arrest under Maryland law. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; Md. Code Ann., Transp.
§ 21-904(c). Stutzman v. Krenik, 350 F. Supp. 3d 366 (D. Md. 2018) (applying Maryland law).

Police officer had legal justification to arrest demonstrator for failing to obey officer's order to move his leafleting activities
outside of designated area near arena, which violated city protocol regulating location of demonstrators outside of arena, and
thus, demonstrator could not prevail in his false arrest and false imprisonment claims, under Maryland law. Ross v. Early, 899
F. Supp. 2d 415 (D. Md. 2012) (applying Maryland law).
Tort of false imprisonment does not lie against individual who wrongfully procures plaintiff arrest where there was no detention
prior to issuance of arrest warrant and where arrest is made by police officer executing facially valid arrest warrant; overruling
Newton v. Spence, 20 Md.App. 126, 316 A.2d 837; Kairys v. Douglas Stereo, 83 Md.App. 667, 577 A.2d 386; K-Mart Corp.
v. Salmon, 76 Md.App. 568, 547 A.2d 1069. Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 664 A.2d 916 (1995).
While the presence or absence of probable cause to believe that crime was committed may be pertinent in some cases with
regard to the lawfulness of an arrest, the actual element of the tort of false imprisonment is legal justification rather than probable
cause. Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995).
Punitive damages may be recovered where there is actual malice, or where malice may be implied from wantonness, or from
want of probable cause in a case of false arrest or malicious prosecution. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Keulemans, 275
Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975).
Whether plaintiff who sued department store for false imprisonment and false arrest had slipped socket into his pocket as
testified by store detective was jury question. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Cliser, 267 Md. 406, 298 A.2d 16 (1972).
Probable cause to suspect plaintiffs and detain them could be considered in mitigation of damages, but not as defense to charge
of false imprisonment. Clark's Brooklyn Park, Inc. v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178, 227 A.2d 726 (1967).
The necessary elements of a case for false imprisonment are a deprivation of the liberty of another without his consent and
without legal justification; and although intent is necessary, malice is not and probable cause is not a defense. Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 122 A.2d 457 (1956).
Evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant, a policeman, acted wantonly or with malice and ill-will in subjecting
plaintiff to an unjustified arrest in connection with an investigation regarding an automobile accident involving plaintiff wife,
and hence plaintiff could not recover punitive damages in action for assault and battery and false imprisonment. Code 1939,
art. 56, §§ 198, 210. Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917 (1942).
Police officers who handcuffed nine-year-old minor hands behind back after allegedly forcing her to her knees were not liable
for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false arrest, assault, and battery; probable cause existed for arrest based on
reports from apartment complex resident that minor had refused to stop throwing acorns at windows. Branch v. McGeeney,
123 Md. App. 330, 718 A.2d 631 (1998).
Where probable cause is shown, merchant will not be liable for false arrest. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 5"307.
Montgomery Ward Stores v. Wilson, 101 Md. App. 535, 647 A.2d 1218 (1994).
Though intent is a necessary element of false imprisonment, neither malice nor lack of probable cause is required. Shipp v.
Autoville Ltd., 23 Md. App. 555, 328 A.2d 349 (1974).
Arrestee pled sufficient facts to show a constitutional violation by coercion, as required to state a claim under the Massachusetts
Civil Rights Act (MCRA) against police officer, where she alleged that officer coerced her by arresting her and charging her
for elder abuse and neglect based on false and omitted evidence. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, § 11I. Lucien-Calixte v. David,
405 F. Supp. 3d 171 (D. Mass. 2019) (applying Massachusetts law).

City police officer had probable cause to arrest and initiate criminal charges against arrestee for assaulting liquor store employee
with dangerous weapon and disorderly conduct, removing any factual basis for arrestee's malicious prosecution claim under
Massachusetts law; officer conducted interviews with liquor store employees at scene of incident, arrestee's behavior and
statements in liquor store indicated he would become violent or threatening, and arrestee mentioned several times in surveillance
video that he was carrying knife and threatened to use it. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 53. Watson v. Mita, 396 F. Supp.
3d 220 (D. Mass. 2019)(applying Massachusetts law).
Town police officers had probable cause to arrest motorist for crossing marked lanes and resisting arrest, in violation of
Massachusetts law, thus precluding motorist's § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against officers; one officer
observed motorist driving erratically, specifically that motorist's van crossed into west bound travel lane, causing vehicles
traveling west to swerve to the right to avoid collision, and motorist struggled against officers and resisted arrest. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Morrissey v. Town of Agawam, 883 F. Supp. 2d 300 (D. Mass. 2012) (applying
Massachusetts law).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest bank robbery suspect, and, since arrestee's detention was lawful, arrestee had no
cause of action against officers for false imprisonment under Massachusetts law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; M.G.L.A. c. 231,
§ 94A. Godette v. Stanley, 490 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D. Mass. 2007) (applying Massachusetts law).
In action brought against police officers to recover for assault, assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligent denial
of medical care, burden was on defendants to prove justification; they did not need to show that felony had actually been
committed, but it was enough if they believed upon reasonable cause that person being arrested had committed a felony, and
there was no requirement of probable cause to believe that plaintiff, as the person injured, was a felon, unless he was the person
being arrested. Julian v. Randazzo, 380 Mass. 391, 403 N.E.2d 931 (1980).
In suit for damages for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, essential to the right to recover is the want of defendant
part of probable cause to believe the plaintiff guilty of the offense charged, and when a defendant has in good faith fully and
fairly stated all the material facts within his knowledge to the prosecutor and signed the complaint on the latter advice, a case
of probable cause is established barring plaintiff right to recover. Gooch v. Wachowiak, 352 Mich. 347, 89 N.W.2d 496 (1958).
Evidence was sufficient to establish that casino lacked probable cause to detain customer, in trial of false imprisonment claim
brought by customer who was detained by casino after allegedly committing an assault and battery on casino security officer;
there was testimony that customer's arm gestures were nonchalant, that customer was distant from security officer when such
officer was allegedly subject to an assault and battery, and that customer did not poke, punch, strike or otherwise touch security
officer. Moore v. Detroit Entertainment, L.L.C., 279 Mich. App. 195, 755 N.W.2d 686 (2008).
Claim of false arrest requires proof that arrest lacked probable cause. Burns v. Olde Discount Corp., 212 Mich. App. 576, 538
N.W.2d 686 (1995).
Probable cause existed for arrest of complainant as prostitute, precluding civil action for damages when complainant, asked for
identification while sitting in vehicle in area known for crime and prostitution activity, gave name which was alias for known
prostitute, even though complainant had given date of birth different from that shown in computer for prostitute; complainant
had no identification or other confirmation of her asserted date of birth, two dates were only about two years apart and there
was no obvious difference in age between complainant and prostitute, and complainant could not be fingerprinted on street.
M.C.L.A. § 691.1407(2). Bell v. Fox, 206 Mich. App. 522, 522 N.W.2d 869 (1994).
Warrant that was valid on its face did not shield state trooper from liability on claims for false arrest and false imprisonment,
in light of state trooper failure to investigate or disclose exculpatory information which tended to defeat probable cause for
issuance of warrant. Flones v. Dalman, 199 Mich. App. 396, 502 N.W.2d 725 (1993).

Guilty plea was procured by unfair means and, therefore, was not conclusive evidence of probable cause defeating claims of
false arrest and malicious prosecution, if judge stated belief that prosecution would win, suggested plea bargain, and set forth
terms of bargain. Blase v. Appicelli, 195 Mich. App. 174, 489 N.W.2d 129 (1992).
To prevail on claim of false arrest or false imprisonment, plaintiff must show that arrest was not legal; i.e., that arrest was made
without probable cause. Tope v. Howe, 179 Mich. App. 91, 445 N.W.2d 452 (1989).
To prevail on a claim for false arrest or imprisonment, a plaintiff must show that the arrest was not legal, that it was not based
on probable cause. Young v. Barker, 158 Mich. App. 709, 405 N.W.2d 395 (1987).
Restaurant employee had acted in good faith in contacting police based on belief that restaurant patrons had committed robbery
several days earlier, and thus restaurant was not liable to patron for false arrest. Hall v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 153 Mich.
App. 609, 396 N.W.2d 809, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2364 (1986).
To prevail on count of complaint charging employees of police department with false arrest and false imprisonment, plaintiff had
to show that arrest was not legal, i.e., without probable cause. Brewer v. Perrin, 132 Mich. App. 520, 349 N.W.2d 198 (1984).
Storekeeper privilege to investigate upon reasonable belief of shoplifting extends to detention of one who has left premises but
is in their immediate vicinity. Bonkowski v. Arlan's Dept. Store, 12 Mich. App. 88, 162 N.W.2d 347 (1968).
Public transit officer had at least arguable probable cause to arrest individual for trespass at bus stop based on his nonverbal
conduct, and thus was entitled to qualified immunity from liability in arrestee's § 1983 wrongful arrest action, despite arrestee's
contention that his delay in departing was due to disassembling his hookah and asking for officer's badge number, where officer
had asked arrestee and others to leave bus stop, but arrestee remained seated on bicycle lockers until officer pulled him down,
never made move to stand up, and took out his phone. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; M.S.A. § 609.605.
Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2014) (applying Minnesota law).
Detective's belief that probable cause existed to arrest for failing to register Belize address as arrestee's primary address in
violation of Minnesota sex offender registration laws was objectively reasonable, and therefore, detective was entitled to
qualified immunity in arrestee's § 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; detective had
received information that arrestee spent winters in Belize in house he had owned for approximately six years and Minnesota
courts had not interpreted whether "primary address" included mailing address of out-of-state building where person lived for
months at a time. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4, 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; M.S.A. § 243.166. Saterdalen v. Spencer, 725 F.3d 838
(8th Cir. 2013) (applying Minnesota law).
Arrestee, an alien who was a Mexican citizen, stated false imprisonment claim under Minnesota law regarding initial arrest for
traffic violation of driving without a driver's license, by alleging that she was arrested by police officer who was not present
while arrestee was driving without a license, that officer unreasonably extended arrest beyond what was necessary, that arrest
was willful or malicious, and that city deliberately engaged in racial profiling. Parada v. Anoka County, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1229
(D. Minn. 2018) (applying Minnesota law).
Where police officer had probable cause to arrest driver, driver had no claim for false arrest or false imprisonment against
officer. Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31 (Minn. 1990).
Deputy sheriff had probable cause to arrest occupants of cabin without warrant for purpose of occupantsfalse arrest lawsuit
against deputy and others, on basis of complaint by occupantsson that occupants had kicked him out of his leased cabin, where
son provided lease running in his favor, survey, and deed to lessor. M.S.A. § 629.34, subd. 1(c). Perkins v. St. Louis County,
397 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).

Merchant can escape liability for false imprisonment under statute allowing detention of customer suspected of shoplifting
under M.S.A. § 629.366, only if he detains suspect for sole purpose of delivering him to a peace officer. Altman v. Knox Lumber
Co., 381 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
Store owner or store employee asserting qualified immunity from liability for questioning suspected shoplifter bears burden
of proof to show that probable cause based on reasonable grounds existed to detain and question customer, and detention
and questioning of customer was done in reasonable manner; mere suspicion or conjecture does not meet probable cause
requirement. Code 1972, § 97"23"95. Turner v. Hudson Salvage, Inc., 709 So. 2d 425 (Miss. 1998).
Existence of probable cause to investigate suspected shoplifting is mixed question of law and fact. Southwest Drug Stores of
Miss., Inc. v. Garner, 195 So. 2d 837, 29 A.L.R.3d 953 (Miss. 1967).
Probable cause is a defense to false arrest, under Missouri law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Dowell v. Lincoln County, 927 F.
Supp. 2d 741 (E.D. Mo. 2013) (applying Missouri law).
Deputy sheriff's alleged misstatements in probable cause affidavit, concerning intent with which mother admittedly caused
injuries to her child during a moment of anger, may have been inconsistent with transcript of mother's interview but they were
not material to finding of probable cause necessary for arrest, and thus, because deputy did not commit a Fourth Amendment
violation, he was entitled to qualified immunity from mother's civil rights claim brought under § 1983; although a corrected
statement may not have provided probable cause that mother "knowingly" inflicted injuries, it would have provided an objective
basis to believe that mother committed some criminal offense because she admitted to heaving child into the tub. U.S. Const.
Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Copeland v. Wicks, 468 S.W.3d 886 (Mo. 2015).
Justification for detention of a person based on reasonable cause may be pleaded and by instruction submitted to jury, provided
there is evidence to justify such submission. Vanneman v. W. T. Grant Co., 351 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. 1961).
False arrest or false imprisonment occurs when there is confinement without legal justification by wrongdoer of person wronged.
Bramon v. U-Haul, Inc., 945 S.W.2d 676 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1997).
Justification is complete defense to cause of action for false arrest. Edwards v. McNeill, 894 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D.
1995).
Elements of both false imprisonment and false arrest are functionally virtual. MAI No. 23.04. Palcher v. J.C. Nichols Co., 783
S.W.2d 166 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1990).
Malice is not an element of false imprisonment. MAI No. 23.04. Wilton v. Cates, 774 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1989).
Punitive damages may be awarded in cases of false arrest where defendant acts maliciously. Stewart v. K-Mart Corp., 747
S.W.2d 205 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1988).
Whether manager had reasonable grounds to detain store employees suspected of theft was question for jury, in employeesfalse
imprisonment action, where employees maintained that certain merchandise was omitted from sales slip purely by accident,
first employee had worked as cashier for only two weeks, and second employee had made no attempt to conceal merchandise
she brought to first employee register. Redican v. K Mart Corp., 734 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1987).
Police officer and railroad security officer were justified in acting on reasonable grounds then apparent to them to believe that
railroad ties found in truck of arrestee were stolen, rather than accepting arrestee explanation that he had obtained ties through
a friend and immediately freeing arrestee, for purposes of false imprisonment action by arrestee against railroad officer and
railroad. Routh v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 708 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1986).

Punitive damages may be recovered in cases of false imprisonment where captor acts maliciously. Dorris v. Zayre Corp., 619
S.W.2d 326 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1981).
Defendant department store was not entitled to benefit of statute establishing, as affirmative defense in suits for false
imprisonment, that defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that its merchandise was being stolen and that detention was
in reasonable manner for reasonable length of time, where defendant did not suspect plaintiff of taking its property and it was
plaintiff sister whom defendant suspected and at time when plaintiff was not even present in store. Section 537.125 RSMo 1959,
V.A.M.S. Peak v. W. T. Grant Co., 386 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
In action against railroad and its assistant special agent for false arrest and imprisonment on a charge of receiving stolen property
belonging to railroad, evidence was sufficient to make a submissible case against railroad and agent. Winegar v. Chicago, B.
& Q. R. Co., 163 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942).
A court's determination of probable cause is a complete defense to a claim of false arrest or imprisonment leveled against the
charging party. Kichnet v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 2012 MT 68, 364 Mont. 347, 2012 WL 966320 (2012).
Probable cause for arrest is a complete defense to claims of false arrest and false imprisonment under Montana law. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. In re Roberts Litigation, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (D. Mont. 2015) (applying Montana law).
In order for a warrantless arrest to be lawful for purposes of a false imprisonment claim, it is necessary that, at the time of the
arrest, the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the arrestee committed or was committing an offense and existing
circumstances required her immediate warrantless arrest. MCA 46–6–311. Dean v. Sanders County, 2009 MT 88, 204 P.3d 722
(Mont. 2009).
Merchant could not claim protection from civil liability for false imprisonment where detention of suspected shoplifter, though
arguably lawfully made, was unreasonable because it continued after detainers knew that their suspicions were groundless and
that they had made a mistake. Neb.Rev.St. § 29 "402.01. Latek v. K Mart Corp., 224 Neb. 807, 401 N.W.2d 503 (1987).
Probable cause to believe that plaintiff has committed a crime is a defense in an action against police officer for false
imprisonment. State ex rel. Douglas v. Ledwith, 204 Neb. 6, 281 N.W.2d 729 (1979).
City police officer and police department were not liable for false imprisonment of arrestee based on theory that officer
intentionally charged arrestee with four false charges, causing his bail to be excessive and preventing him from posting bail;
officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for disturbing the peace, disorderly conduct, assault, and battery on an officer, and
even assuming that setting excessive amount of bail can constitute false imprisonment, plaintiff never showed that officer or
department were responsible for setting amount of bail. Yada v. Simpson, 112 Nev. 254, 913 P.2d 1261 (1996).
If police officer arrested complainant, who was arrested pursuant to warrant for another fugitive, based solely on their matching
birth dates and similarity between fugitive alias and complainant name, police officer lacked probable cause for arrest. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Plaza v. City of Reno, 111 Nev. 814, 898 P.2d 114 (1995).
Casino was not immune from civil liability for false imprisonment of patron suspected of violating gaming statutes, where
reasonable person would not have believed that patron violated gaming statute, and casino employees failed to obtain more
information concerning patron possible violation. N.R.S. 465.070, subd. 3, 465.101, subd. 1. Hazelwood v. Harrah's, 109 Nev.
1005, 862 P.2d 1189 (1993).
Plaintiff in false arrest/false imprisonment case need not prove lack of probable cause for arrest as part of his prima facie case.
Garton v. City of Reno, 102 Nev. 313, 720 P.2d 1227 (1986).

In action based upon an allegedly false arrest and subsequent false imprisonment, plaintiff case in chief did not make a sufficient
showing against the city of Reno, where Reno police arrested plaintiff on probable cause, established by the near perfect match
between the NCIC Want and plaintiff name, age, and physical characteristics, and plaintiff subsequent detention in the Reno
city jail was not without any legal cause or justification as Salt Lake City authorities gave city of Reno verbal assurances that
plaintiff was their intended suspect, that they would extradite him, and that a certified warrant of arrest and complaint were
forthcoming to accomplish this purpose during the course of plaintiff two week detention. Hernandez v. City of Reno, 97 Nev.
429, 634 P.2d 668 (1981).
Appellant, who had been arrested for violation of statute prohibiting indecent or obscene exposure, was not entitled to maintain
suit seeking damages for false arrest against county, city, city police department, and police officers, in that police officers had
probable cause to arrest appellant. N.R.S. 201.220. Grover v. Clark County, 97 Nev. 104, 625 P.2d 85 (1981).
False imprisonment is a restraint of one liberty without any sufficient cause therefor. Lerner Shops of Nev., Inc. v. Marin, 83
Nev. 75, 423 P.2d 398 (1967).
Although a lack of probable cause is not an element of false imprisonment, probable cause is a defense to a claim for false
imprisonment resulting from a warrantless detention. Farrelly v. City of Concord, 130 A.3d 548 (N.H. 2015).
Given allegations of substantial inconsistencies between plaintiff's physical appearance on morning of his arrest and alleged
kidnapping victim's description of assailant, including inconsistencies in age, hairstyle, and facial hair, police lacked probable
cause for arrest, as defense to claim for false imprisonment. Ojo v. Lorenzo, 64 A.3d 974 (N.H. 2013).
False imprisonment and malicious prosecution are two distinct torts; false imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of an individual
personal freedom; malicious prosecution is the institution of criminal proceedings by valid process of law but with malice and
without probable cause. Hickox v. J. B. Morin Agency, Inc., 110 N.H. 438, 272 A.2d 321 (1970).
Police officers were entitled to qualified immunity in arrestee's civil rights action arising from filing of unlawful possession
charge, even though charge was later dismissed; arrestee was sitting in idled car parked in driveway at his mother's address, it
was not clear that the circumstances fell under the statutory exemption from prosecution for unlawful possession for a person
who carries a firearm at his "residence, premises or other land owned or possessed by him," and officers sought advice of
prosecutor as to whether arrestee should be charged with weapons offense. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5(b)(1), 2C:39–
6(e), 10:6–1 to 10:6–2. Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 117 A.3d 1206 (2015).
False arrest, or false imprisonment, is the constraint of the person without legal justification. Mesgleski v. Oraboni, 330 N.J.
Super. 10, 748 A.2d 1130 (App. Div. 2000).
Probable cause is a defense to claims of false arrest and false imprisonment. Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 316 N.J. Super.
487, 720 A.2d 645 (App. Div. 1998).
Police officersfailure to issue a complaint-summons and to obtain a probable cause determination from a neutral judicial officer
did not result in an actionable false imprisonment, where plaintiff was properly arrested for simple assault and brought to police
headquarters, and probable cause for detaining plaintiff on additional complaint charging stalking was apparent on face of
alleged victim sworn statement. Sanducci v. City of Hoboken, 315 N.J. Super. 475, 719 A.2d 160 (App. Div. 1998).
Because pharmacy which detained customer on suspicion of shoplifting had burden of proving probable cause for such detention
in action by customer for false imprisonment, objective view of customer actions could have afforded probable cause to detain
her only if manager had asserted that he had observed actions which would have supported reasonable belief that shoplifting
had occurred. Liptak v. Rite Aid, Inc., 289 N.J. Super. 199, 673 A.2d 309 (App. Div. 1996).

Existence of probable cause is defense to claim of false arrest or false imprisonment provided it serves to validate the arrest.
Fleming v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 255 N.J. Super. 108, 604 A.2d 657 (Law Div. 1992).
Probable cause which will constitute defense to false arrest action is the same probable cause which confers a merchant immunity
from false arrest under the shoplifting statute. N.J.S.A. 2C:20 "11, subd. e. Carollo v. Supermarkets General Corp., 251 N.J.
Super. 264, 597 A.2d 1105 (App. Div. 1991).
Patron deposition statement regarding similarity between patron photograph and photograph of suspected credit marker forger
was irrelevant to determination of whether casino had probable cause to detain patron, within meaning of statute freeing casinos
from criminal and civil liability for detaining persons suspected of cheating, in action for unlawful arrest and detention; probable
cause for detention must exist at time detention took place, and nothing that occurs thereafter is relevant. N.J.S.A. 5:12"121,
subd. b. Pantalone v. Bally's Park Place Casino Hotel, 228 N.J. Super. 121, 549 A.2d 55 (App. Div. 1988).
Legal justification or probable cause for detention are defenses to action for false arrest or imprisonment and are the only
defenses available to public employee who otherwise would be entitled to good-faith immunity. N.J.S.A. 59:3"3. Hayes v.
Mercer County, 217 N.J. Super. 614, 526 A.2d 737 (App. Div. 1987).
Where it appears a person has illegally instituted a criminal proceeding resulted in a confinement, elements of false imprisonment
have been demonstrated but, since such confinement or imprisonment comprises a part of, or is an incident to, larger offense
of malicious prosecution, public policy decrees that person instituting such action should be afforded same rights as any other
person accused of malicious prosecution, whether or not that proceeding culminates in an imprisonment, so that there must be
a showing of malice and lack of probable cause on part of person who institutes action, termination of proceeding in favor of
accused, and resulting damage. Di Giovanni v. Pessel, 104 N.J. Super. 550, 250 A.2d 756 (App. Div. 1969).
In actions for false imprisonment, existence of legal justification or probable cause for detention is the crucial element of the
defense. Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 38 N.J. Super. 317, 118 A.2d 854 (App. Div. 1955).
The gist of false imprisonment in unlawful detention, and malice is not an essential element of the right of action as in malicious
prosecution. Baldwin v. Point Pleasant Beach & Surf Club, 3 N.J. Super. 284, 66 A.2d 62 (Law Div. 1949).
Common-law defense to civil wrongful arrest or false imprisonment suit requires that officer prove that he acted in good faith
and with probable cause and therefore lawfully under circumstances. State v. Johnson, 1996-NMSC-075, 122 N.M. 696, 930
P.2d 1148 (1996).
Under New Mexico law, an officer who has probable cause to arrest a person cannot be held liable for false arrest or
imprisonment, since probable cause provides him with the necessary authority to carry out the arrest. N.M. Const. art. 2, § 10.
Ganley v. Jojola, 402 F. Supp. 3d 1021 (D.N.M. 2019) (applying New Mexico law).
Reasonable cause is a pivotal question in cases of false imprisonment. 1953 Comp. §§ 40"45"24 to 40"45"27. Stienbaugh v.
Payless Drug Store, Inc., 75 N.M. 118, 401 P.2d 104 (1965).
Officer had reasonable belief at time he made arrest that arrestee was guilty of assault on a peace officer, such that arrest was
supported by probable cause, entitling officer to qualified immunity in arrestee's § 1983 action alleging false imprisonment;
arrestee aggressively argued his innocence in connection with automobile accident, threw his wallet on the ground near officers,
raised his arms in the air, pointing at officers, and yelled at the top of his lungs, calling officers names and swearing at them.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; West's NMSA Const. Art. 2, § 10; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; West's NMSA § 30–22–21(A) (1971).
Benavidez v. Shutiva, 2015-NMCA-065, 350 P.3d 1234 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).

The existence of probable cause to arrest serves as a legal justification for an arrest and is a complete defense to false arrest and
false imprisonment claims. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Roberts v. City of New York, 97 N.Y.S.3d 3 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2019).
Police officers were liable for false arrest under § 1983 and under New York law, since they lacked both probable cause and
arguable probable cause to arrest arrestee for third-degree menacing under New York law, and they did not contend that they
had probable cause to arrest arrestee for any other crime. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y.McKinney's
Penal Law § 120.15. Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended, (Dec. 4, 2012) (applying New
York law).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest residential tenant, who failed to allow firefighters into her home, in what firefighters
described as a water emergency, for purposes of tenant's false arrest claim under New York law; lieutenant told officers that
tenant was refusing the fire department entry into her apartment to address an emergency situation in violation of New York
law, and tenant's claim that officers were mistaken in their belief that she refused fire department's entry into her apartment
could not save her false arrest claim, as probable cause existed even when it was based upon mistaken information. Theobald
v. City of New York, 406 F. Supp. 3d 270 (E.D. N.Y. 2019) (applying New York law).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest father, who was living at homeless shelter with his two children, for endangering
welfare of a child under New York law, precluding father's false arrest claims under § 1983 and New York law, where officers
were responding to 911 call by shelter's security guard, who reported at 2:30 A.M. that two children, ages 5 and 13, had been
left alone in an apartment, and officers personally observed the children unattended in the apartment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law § 260.10. Callahan v. City of New York, 90 F. Supp. 3d 60 (E.D. N.Y.
2015) (applying New York law).
County police officer and sergeant, who responded to a complaint made by arrestee's 12-year old son that arrestee had thrown
his 8-year old brother against the car wall, had probable cause to arrest for endangering the welfare of a minor and harassment
in violation of New York State Penal Law, as defense for claim of false arrest under § 1983, where son's statements were
corroborated by his brother, and police found both son and brother to be truthful and their interviews to be consistent. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amends. 4, 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law §§ 240.26(1), 260.10(1). Weiner v. McKeefery, 90 F.
Supp. 3d 17 (E.D. N.Y. 2015) (applying New York law).
Police officer had arguable probable cause to arrest resident, who was not the target of search warrant, for possession of
controlled substances under theory of constructive possession, and thus was entitled to qualified immunity on resident's false
arrest claim under § 1983, where resident lived at the house that was the target of search warrant, officers discovered drugs in
a jacket pocket in common area of the house, resident's husband, who was the target of the search warrant, did not admit the
drugs belonged to him, and there was no indication that resident did not have dominion or control over the house. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law § 220.06(5). Jackson ex rel. Jackson v. Suffolk County, 87
F. Supp. 3d 386 (E.D. N.Y. 2015) (applying New York law).
Probable cause is a complete defense to a cause of action for false arrest under New York law. Carrillos v. Incorporated Village
of Hempstead, 87 F. Supp. 3d 357 (E.D. N.Y. 2015) (applying New York law).
State court officer was not entitled, following trial in § 1983 action alleging false arrest under New York law, to judgment as
a matter of law on basis of qualified immunity; circumstances of arrest did not support a finding of objective probable cause
for arrest, no reasonable officer could believe that the arrest was lawful, and jury's verdict, as well as its award of punitive
damages, indicated that it credited plaintiff's testimony that he was doing nothing wrong before officer engaged in the dispute
with him, rather than officer's contrary testimony. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
50, 28 U.S.C.A.; N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law § 240.20. Milfort v. Prevete, 3 F. Supp. 3d 14 (E.D. N.Y. 2014) (applying New
York law).

A police officer has probable cause to arrest, which acts as a defense to a civil action for false arrest under § 1983 and New
York law, when he or she has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient
to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Hoyos v. City of New York, 2013 WL 7811754 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) (applying
New York law).
In deciding whether probable cause existed for arrest, as would preclude false arrest claim under § 1983 or New York law, court
assesses whether facts known by arresting officer at time of arrest objectively provided probable cause to arrest; same holds
true for false imprisonment claims because, under New York law, claim is identical to false arrest claim and federal claim looks
to elements of state claim. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Chillemi v. Town of Southampton, 943 F. Supp. 2d
365 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) (applying New York law).
Reasonable police officers in defendants' position would not have believed that officer had probable cause to stop arrestee's
vehicle and arrest for obstructing government administration, under New York law, and thus, defendant officers were not entitled
to qualified immunity from suit under § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution, absent showing of any unlawful behavior
by arrestee. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Jackson v. City of New York, 939 F. Supp. 2d 219 (E.D. N.Y.
that action is brought under New York law or under § 1983. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Genovese v. Town
of Southampton, 921 F. Supp. 2d 8 (E.D. N.Y. 2013) (applying New York law).
Police officers were entitled to qualified immunity from automobile passengers' false arrest claim, arising under New York law,
since officers had, at minimum, arguable probable cause to arrest passengers after discovering firearm in vehicle; New York
Penal Law's automobile presumption provided that existence of a firearm in an automobile created permissive presumption that
all occupants of vehicle have common constructive possession of firearm, and officers were able to arrest all passengers after
discovering firearm. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law § 265.15(3). Matthews v. City of New York, 889
F. Supp. 2d 418 (E.D. N.Y. 2012) (applying New York law).
Under New York law, existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to the claims of false arrest and
imprisonment. Hunter v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 863 F. Supp. 2d 190 (E.D. N.Y. 2012) (applying New York law).
Evidence permitted jury to find, in arrestee's action against police officers for false arrest and false imprisonment under § 1983
and New York state law, that police officers did not have probable cause to arrest arrestee for domestic disorderly conduct under
New York law, and therefore falsely arrested and imprisoned him; although officers testified that arrestee had been yelling at
his wife, swearing, gesticulating with his hands, and slamming the front door as he exited, jury was free to credit arrestee's
and his wife's testimony that while arrestee was speaking loudly, he was not yelling or violently moving his arms, and while
he opened the front door with force, it hit the handrail causing the loud noise, over testimony of officers. U.S. Const. Amend.
4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y. CPL § 530.11; N.Y. Penal Law § 240.20. Grant v. City of Syracuse, 357 F. Supp. 3d 180 (N.D.
N.Y. 2019) (applying New York law).
Journalist's allegations were sufficient to plead police did not have probable cause to arrest him for disorderly conduct under
New York law for refusing to comply with lawful order to disperse, as required for his § 1983 claims against police officers,
alleging false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment; journalist alleged that he was covering a protest, that police ordered
him only to come down from a telephone booth and into the crowd, rather than to disperse, and that he did not refuse to comply.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law § 240.20(6). Higginbotham v. City of New York,
105 F. Supp. 3d 369 (S.D. N.Y. 2015) (applying New York law).

Jury's findings in trial arising when officers arrested suspect who allegedly had his feet on subway seats in violation of transit
rules did not indicate that officers had probable cause to make the arrest, and thus officers were not entitled to qualified immunity
on suspect's false arrest claims under § 1983 and New York law; even though jury found that the officers believed that suspect
had his feet on the seats, it also found that he actually had his feet on the floor, and the officers' subjective beliefs were irrelevant
to the objective probable cause inquiry. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Rucks v. City of New York, 96 F. Supp.
3d 138 (S.D. N.Y. 2015) (applying New York law).
Officer had arguable probable cause to arrest arrestee, who was found in unlocked vestibule of apartment building, for trespass
in violation of New York statute, under which entry onto premises "open to the public" was privileged, and thus officer was
entitled to qualified immunity in arrestee's § 1983 false arrest action; New York courts had not agreed on meaning of phrase
"open to the public" in the statute. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law § 140.05. McKay
v. City of New York, 32 F. Supp. 3d 499 (S.D. N.Y. 2014) (applying New York law).
Campus police officers had arguable probable cause to arrest state university student for operating vehicle while impaired,
and thus were entitled to qualified immunity from liability in student's § 1983 false arrest action against officers, even though
vehicle was parked at time, where officer observed that student's eyes were bloodshot and glassy, that his breath smelled of
alcohol, and that he had difficulty following simple directions, student and four other individuals were sitting in car in parking
lot and student was in driver's seat with keys, and there were no visible alcohol containers in car. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; N.Y.McKinney's Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(1). Costello v. Milano, 20 F. Supp. 3d 406 (S.D. N.Y.
Complaint alleging that restrictions placed, by city university's public safety officers, on plaintiff's distribution of leaflets on a
public sidewalk were not valid time, place, or manner restrictions, and that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff for
trespassing, was sufficient to state claims for false arrest and false imprisonment under New York law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
1; N.Y.McKinney's Penal Law § 140.05. Hershey v. Goldstein, 938 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D. N.Y. 2013) (applying New York law).
Port Authority (PA) officers did not intend to confine airline passenger after Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers
discovered there was an outstanding order of protection in favor of passenger against her traveling companion, as required
to support passenger's claim against PA officers for false arrest under § 1983 and New York law; CBP was in charge when
passenger waited for over five hours to fill out New York State Domestic Incident Report form for PA officers, PA did not ask
that passenger be held, it was CBP's policy to hold both people involved in an order of protection case, PA did not learn that
passenger was detained until four hours into her detention, and passenger never refused to comply with PA's request that she
fill out form. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Pelayo v. Port Authority, 893 F. Supp. 2d 632 (S.D. N.Y. 2012) (applying New York law).
The existence of probable cause is a defense to both false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims under New York law.
U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Williams v. Goodfriend, 347 F. Supp. 3d 169 (W.D. N.Y. 2018) (applying New York law).
that action is brought under New York law or under § 1983. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Boans v. Town of
Cheektowaga, 5 F. Supp. 3d 364 (W.D. N.Y. 2014) (applying New York law).
Under New York law, probable cause constitutes absolute defense to claim of false arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Murphy
v. City of Rochester, 986 F. Supp. 2d 257, 2013 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 142841 (W.D. N.Y. 2013) (applying New York law).
Issue of probable cause in action for false arrest and malicious prosecution could not be resolved as matter of law and was
properly submitted to jury, where evidence at trial gave rise to number of factual disputes bearing on issue. McKinney Penal
Law § 155.05, subd. 1. Parkin v. Cornell University, Inc., 78 N.Y.2d 523, 577 N.Y.S.2d 227, 583 N.E.2d 939, 71 Ed. Law Rep.
863, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 56790 (1991).

Arrestee alleging false arrest and imprisonment and malicious prosecution could not prevail on either cause of action if police
had probable cause to believe that the arrestee, who was defendant in criminal case, was the person who committed rape. Gisondi
v. Town of Harrison, 72 N.Y.2d 280, 532 N.Y.S.2d 234, 528 N.E.2d 157, 81 A.L.R.4th 1021 (1988).
Where plaintiff arrest was effected by defendant private security officers, and plaintiff was not only acquitted of criminal trespass
charge for which he was arrested, but preponderance of the evidence established his factual innocence as well, action for false
arrest could be maintained against defendant; furthermore, punitive damages could be recovered, given evidence from which
jury could conclude that the false arrest was motivated by ill will. (Per dissenting opinion of Greenblott, J., in the Appellate
Division, 75 A.D.2d 921, 427 N.Y.S.2d 534.) CPL 140.30; Penal Law §§ 140.00, subd. 5, 140.10. Morrello v. Saratoga Harness
Racing, Inc., 53 N.Y.2d 775, 439 N.Y.S.2d 359, 421 N.E.2d 851 (1981).
Whenever there has been an arrest and imprisonment without a warrant, officer has acted extrajudicially and the presumption
arises that such an arrest and imprisonment are unlawful. Barr v. Albany County, 50 N.Y.2d 247, 428 N.Y.S.2d 665, 406 N.E.2d
481 (1980).
Justification as affirmative defense to false imprisonment action may be established by showing that arrest was based on probable
cause. Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 (1975).
In action for false imprisonment, at what time and on what ground the arrest was made, on what ground or under what charge
the subsequent detention was imposed, whether the arrest with or without detention was justifiable, and what the facts were
upon which the defense of probable cause was based, were questions for jury, and grant of nonsuit was error. Clark v. Nannery,
292 N.Y. 105, 54 N.E.2d 31 (1944).
Probable cause for an arrest constitutes a complete defense to the claims of false arrest and unlawful imprisonment. U.S. Const.
Amend. 4. Jenkins v. State, 171 A.D.3d 1368, 99 N.Y.S.3d 99 (3d Dep't 2019).
Police had probable cause to believe that arrestee had committed crimes underlying his arrest and incarceration, and thus arrestee
could not recover damages for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution; police recovered marijuana and what
appeared to be a gun from arrestee's person. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. Adams v. City of New York, 167 A.D.3d 825, 90 N.Y.S.3d
149 (2d Dep't 2018).
The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment,
and malicious prosecution including causes of action asserted pursuant to § 1983 to recover damages for the deprivation of
Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law that are the federal-law equivalents of state common-law false arrest and
malicious prosecution causes of action. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Ball v. Miller, 164 A.D.3d 728, 83 N.Y.S.3d
169 (2d Dep't 2018).
Probable cause afforded a complete defense for assistant district attorney against arrestee's claims for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under state law, as well as related claims under § 1983; felony complaint brought
against arrestee established that there was probable cause to arrest him, and there was no allegation to indicate the assistant
district attorney's involvement with the case until some time after arrestee was formally charged. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983. Savane v. District Attorney of New York County, 148 A.D.3d 591, 50 N.Y.S.3d 71 (1st Dep't 2017).
Undisputed essential facts underlying arrest gave rise to probable cause to believe that arrestee intentionally aided in commission
of gunpoint robbery and knowingly possessed stolen property, and thus city was not liable to arrestee for false arrest or malicious
prosecution. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; McKinney's Penal Law §§ 20.00, 160.15(2), 165.45(2). Shaw v. City of New York,
139 A.D.3d 698, 31 N.Y.S.3d 155 (2d Dep't 2016).

The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment,
and malicious prosecution, including causes of action asserted pursuant to § 1983 to recover damages for deprivation of Fourth
Amendment rights under color of state law that are federal-law equivalents of state common-law false arrest and malicious
prosecution causes of action. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Paulos v. City of New York, 122 A.D.3d 815,
997 N.Y.S.2d 452 (2d Dep't 2014).
City had probable cause to arrest arrestee, and thus established affirmative defense to arrestee's claim of false imprisonment,
since identified citizen accused arrestee of specific crime. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Williams v. City of New York, 114 A.D.3d
852, 981 N.Y.S.2d 114 (2d Dep't 2014).
"Extrajudicial arrest," that is, one made without a warrant, is presumptively unlawful, but the existence of probable cause serves
as a legal justification for the arrest and an affirmative defense to a claim of false imprisonment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
Moulton v. State, 977 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2013).
Probable cause to believe that a person committed a crime is a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest and
malicious prosecution. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Okunubi v. City of New York, 971 N.Y.S.2d 338 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2013).
Probable cause to believe that a person committed a crime is a complete defense to an action alleging false arrest or false
imprisonment, whether brought under state law or § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Rodgers v. City of New York, 106 A.D.3d 1068,
966 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't 2013).
A showing of probable cause is a complete defense to an action alleging false arrest or false imprisonment. Lewis v. Caputo,
2012 WL 1166126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2012).
Existence of probable cause to arrest is a complete defense to claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious
prosecution. Hernandez v. City of New York, 953 N.Y.S.2d 199 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2012).
Arrestee's confinement was privileged, thus foreclosing his false arrest and false imprisonment claims against arresting officer,
under New York law and pursuant to § 1983, where arrest was conducted pursuant to facially valid arrest warrant based on
probable cause and issued by court with jurisdiction. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Washington-Herrera v.
Town of Greenburgh, 101 A.D.3d 986, 956 N.Y.S.2d 487 (2d Dep't 2012).
A plaintiff cannot prevail on causes of action based upon false arrest and false imprisonment if the arresting officers had probable
cause to believe that the plaintiff committed the underlying offense. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Petrychenko v. Solovey, 99
A.D.3d 777, 952 N.Y.S.2d 575 (2d Dep't 2012).
A demonstration that police officers acted with probable cause is an affirmative defense to a claim for false imprisonment.
Martin v. Rosenzweig, 70 A.D.3d 1112, 894 N.Y.S.2d 228 (3d Dep't 2010).
A conviction which survives appeal is conclusive evidence of probable cause, for purposes of claims for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and/or malicious prosecution. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Swinton v. City of New York, 877 N.Y.S.2d 68 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 2009).
Probable cause to believe that a person committed a crime is a complete defense to claims of false arrest and malicious
prosecution. Fortunato v. City of New York, 63 A.D.3d 880, 882 N.Y.S.2d 195 (2d Dep't 2009).
There was probable cause to arrest, for disturbing the peace, protestors who were taunting police and throwing rocks and bottles
in response to request that they stop handing out literature, precluding claim of false imprisonment. Rivera v. City of New York,
40 A.D.3d 334, 836 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1st Dep't 2007).

Arrestee's action in chest-butting officer, while shouting obscenities and asking in threatening tone to be arrested, constituted
sufficient physical contact to give officer probable cause, when coupled with intent to annoy, harass, or alarm, which could
be inferred from circumstances, to make arrest for harassment in second degree, and thus arrestee's subsequent confinement
was justified, and could not form basis for false imprisonment claim. McKinney's Penal Law § 240.26(1). Lynn v. State, 822
N.Y.S.2d 600 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006).
Unsigned arrest report and inadmissible hearsay statements attributed to arrestee's former wife were insufficient to establish
that arresting officers reasonably concluded that arrestee, who was merely standing approximately 200 to 350 feet away from
his former wife and the marital residence, had violated stay-away provision of order of protection, as would establish defense
of probable cause to arrestee's false arrest and imprisonment claims. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Rakidjian v. County of Suffolk,
28 A.D.3d 734, 814 N.Y.S.2d 248 (2d Dep't 2006).
Existence of probable cause constitutes complete defense to claims for false arrest and imprisonment. Molina v. City of New
York, 28 A.D.3d 372, 814 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1st Dep't 2006).
No cause of action to recover damages for false arrest lies when it is established that probable cause for arrest existed. Zwecker
v. Clinch, 279 A.D.2d 572, 720 N.Y.S.2d 150 (2d Dep't 2001).
While the absence of probable cause is not an element of a false imprisonment claim, probable cause by the police is an
affirmative defense. Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 276 A.D.2d 993, 714 N.Y.S.2d 572 (3d Dep't 2000).
Cause of action alleging false imprisonment does not lie where the defendants can establish the existence of probable cause for
the plaintiff arrest. Ben-Zaken v. City of New Rochelle, 273 A.D.2d 426, 710 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dep't 2000).
To establish a cause of action alleging false arrest and false imprisonment, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant intended
to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4)
the confinement was not otherwise privileged. Lee v. City of New York, 272 A.D.2d 586, 709 N.Y.S.2d 102 (2d Dep't 2000).
Detective had probable cause to arrest suspect for rape and sodomy, and thus detective was not liable to suspect for false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and civil rights violations; complainant reported alleged crime within hours of its
occurrence, complainant endured rape kit examination, and complainant presented herself in such a way that detective believed
her accusations to be true. Orminski v. Village of Lake Placid, 268 A.D.2d 780, 702 N.Y.S.2d 181 (3d Dep't 2000).
Having observed a registration violation, police were justified in making initial arrest of driver, and that constituted a complete
defense to allegations of false arrest and imprisonment. Morel v. Crimaldi, 256 A.D.2d 188, 683 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1st Dep't 1998).
Conviction for disorderly conduct upon plea of guilty conclusively established probable cause for individual arrest, thus negating
essential element of his cause of action sounding in malicious prosecution, and established affirmative defense to causes of
action for false arrest and false imprisonment. Bennett v. New York City Housing Authority, 245 A.D.2d 254, 665 N.Y.S.2d
91 (2d Dep't 1997).
Once probable cause has been established, causes of action to recover damages for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, and constitutional rights claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution under § 1983 may not be maintained.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Kandekore v. Town of Greenburgh, 243 A.D.2d 610, 663 N.Y.S.2d 274 (2d
Dep't 1997).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest former employee of Port Authority subcontractor for trespass in restricted area
of Port Authority bus terminal, warranting dismissal of employee causes of action for false arrest and malicious prosecution,

where former employee entered restricted area without exhibiting his identification and did not immediately respond to
officerscommand to stop. Freeman v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 243 A.D.2d 409, 663 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1st
Dep't 1997).
Justification precluding liability in action for false arrest may be established by showing that the arrest was based on probable
cause. Guzman v. City of New York, 236 A.D.2d 444, 653 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2d Dep't 1997).
Warrantless arrest in New York, based on information provided to state police that Maryland had issued arrest warrant
for claimant, was privileged under New York statute, thus providing state a complete defense to claim for false arrest and
imprisonment and eliminating essential element of claim for malicious prosecution, regardless of any negligence on state part
in not conducting fingerprint comparison within 24 hours of arrest. McKinney CPL § 570.34. Heath v. State, 229 A.D.2d 912,
645 N.Y.S.2d 366 (4th Dep't 1996).
Only probable cause existing at time of arrest can validate arrest and relieve defendants of liability for false arrest and false
imprisonment. Lawson v. New York City Housing Authority, 223 A.D.2d 532, 636 N.Y.S.2d 126 (2d Dep't 1996).
Pretrial determination of probable cause creates presumption of probable cause for purposes of later action for false
imprisonment. Brown v. Roland, 215 A.D.2d 1000, 627 N.Y.S.2d 791 (3d Dep't 1995).
There was probable cause to arrest claimants for criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree where motor
vehicle inspection stickers removed from their automobiles were forged, even though each claimant denied knowledge that
stickers had been forged, which was an essential element of the offense, and thus claimants could not recover for false arrest
or false imprisonment, nor could they recover for malicious prosecution where no unequivocal, exonerating evidence became
available to the State after the arrests and before charges were dropped because People were not ready for trial in a timely
manner. Jenks v. State, 213 A.D.2d 513, 623 N.Y.S.2d 916 (2d Dep't 1995).
Question of whether there was probable cause for arrest was properly submitted to jury, in false arrest action; conflicting
testimony regarding whether arrestee slammed police car door on officer leg and attempted to flee created credibility issue for
jury to decide. Willinger v. City of New Rochelle, 212 A.D.2d 526, 622 N.Y.S.2d 321 (2d Dep't 1995).
Arrest warrant does not insulate arresting officer from liability for false arrest if arrest warrant was procured based upon officer
own false or unsubstantiated evidence. Melito v. City of Utica, 210 A.D.2d 888, 620 N.Y.S.2d 648 (4th Dep't 1994).
Absence of probable cause was necessary element of cause of action for false imprisonment and cause of action for violation
of civil rights predicated on false imprisonment. Hugar v. Nigro, 207 A.D.2d 954, 616 N.Y.S.2d 833 (4th Dep't 1994).
Probable cause to arrest plaintiff for disorderly conduct, justifying dismissal of unlawful arrest claim by commuter train
passenger, was established by officer reasonable belief that plaintiff statements were causing an immediate danger of breach of
the peace. McKinney Penal Law § 240.20, subd. 3. Goldstein v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co., 207 A.D.2d 723, 616 N.Y.S.2d
595 (1st Dep't 1994).
Police officer reliance on witnessidentification of robbery suspect was reasonable, and thus city met its burden of establishing
probable cause for arrest and suspect could not recover for false arrest and imprisonment, or malicious prosecution. Stratton v.
City of Albany, 204 A.D.2d 924, 612 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dep't 1994).
Once probable cause has been established, legal justification has been proven and cause of action for false arrest must fail.
Minott v. City of New York, 203 A.D.2d 265, 609 N.Y.S.2d 334 (2d Dep't 1994).

Retail merchant has defense in action for false arrest and imprisonment for its detention of suspect shoplifter if detention was
reasonable, even if criminal action was dismissed. McKinney General Business Law § 218. Richardson v. New York University,
202 A.D.2d 295, 609 N.Y.S.2d 180, 90 Ed. Law Rep. 332 (1st Dep't 1994).
Warrantless arrest for obstructing governmental administration was supported by evidence that arrestees resisted efforts of court
officer to keep them away from and restrain them in area where disturbance was taking place, thus precluding arresteesclaim for
damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Linehan v. State, 201 A.D.2d 706, 608 N.Y.S.2d
294 (2d Dep't 1994).
Victim statement that arrestee in photograph would be her assailant if he had shorter hair and thinner face did not establish
probable cause for arrest, and, thus, city and police officers were liable for false arrest; victim did not positively identify arrestee
as assailant when she viewed photograph. Williams v. Moore, 197 A.D.2d 511, 602 N.Y.S.2d 199 (2d Dep't 1993).
Evidence that former union president had submitted voucher seeking reimbursement for expenses incurred during personal
vacation provided probable cause for his arrest, requiring dismissal of his cause of action for false arrest and malicious
prosecution. Stuart v. Porcello, 193 A.D.2d 311, 603 N.Y.S.2d 597, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1700 (3d Dep't 1993).
Elements of false imprisonment claim are that defendant intended to confine plaintiff, that plaintiff was conscious of
confinement, that defendant did not consent to confinement, and that confinement was not otherwise privileged. Ostrover v.
City of New York, 192 A.D.2d 115, 600 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1st Dep't 1993).
Once probable cause to arrest has been established, causes of action to recover damages for false arrest, false imprisonment,
and malicious prosecution do not lie. Holmes v. City of New Rochelle, 190 A.D.2d 713, 593 N.Y.S.2d 320 (2d Dep't 1993).
Passenger refusal to pay one-way fare or leave commuter train provided lawful basis for arrest for disorderly conduct, and fact
that passenger may have felt aggrieved because monthly commutation tickets were unavailable for purchase on day involved
did not render actionable conduct of defendant railroad company employees in removing passenger from train and effectuating
arrest. Goldstein v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co., 155 Misc. 2d 1, 597 N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Term 1993).
Plaintiff who was incorrectly indicted for bank robbery and served time in jail until actual perpetrator confessed failed to state
cause of action for false imprisonment against bank where bank agents and employees merely provided information to police
and there was no showing that bank intended to confine plaintiff or that they lacked reasonable cause for belief in plaintiff
culpability. DeFilippo v. County of Nassau, 183 A.D.2d 695, 583 N.Y.S.2d 283 (2d Dep't 1992).
Plaintiff could not recover from city for false arrest; police had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for attempted rape based on
eyewitnessesstatements that plaintiff attempted to rape a woman, woman disheveled appearance, plaintiff attempt to flee or
move in a wild and erratic manner, woman tearful repeated appeal to get plaintiff away from her, and fact that plaintiff fly was
unzipped. McKinney CPL § 70.10, subd. 2. Coleman v. City of New York, 182 A.D.2d 200, 588 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1st Dep't 1992).
Evidence that police officer was told by complainant that her purse had been stolen and that purse containing her photograph
was found in plaintiffscar established probable cause for arresting the plaintiffs, justifying setting aside verdict for plaintiffs in
their civil false arrest case. Kramer v. City of New York, 173 A.D.2d 155, 569 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1st Dep't 1991).
Lack of probable cause to arrest or prosecute is integral element of both false arrest and malicious prosecution. Parkin v. Cornell
University, Inc., 164 A.D.2d 240, 562 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 64 Ed. Law Rep. 1148 (3d Dep't 1990).
Evidence in arrestee suit against city for false arrest established existence of probable cause to make arrest even though arrestee
was subsequently exonerated; witness made positive prearrest identification of arrestee from photo array. Maxwell v. City of
New York, 156 A.D.2d 28, 554 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1st Dep't 1990).

By filing criminal petit larceny complaint against automobile owner to settle dispute over repair bill, repair shop acted without
probable cause and malice was inferred sufficient to support automobile owner false imprisonment suit following her arrest.
Pantazis v. Bleau Towing Service, Inc., 145 A.D.2d 816, 535 N.Y.S.2d 802 (3d Dep't 1988).
Where facts leading up to arrest are undisputed, existence of probable cause to make arrest is for court to determine as matter
of law in action for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution. Weingarten v. Halfpenny Auto Parts, Inc., 138 A.D.2d 373,
525 N.Y.S.2d 657 (2d Dep't 1988).
Lack of probable cause is necessary element of cause of action for false arrest and imprisonment. Coffey v. Town of Wheatland,
135 A.D.2d 1125, 523 N.Y.S.2d 267 (4th Dep't 1987).
Evidence in action for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution established there was probable cause for
plaintiff arrest, his initial confinement, and commencement of criminal charges against him; arrest warrant was based on a felony
complaint and on supporting depositions of two witnesses who positively identified plaintiff as the individual who robbed them
on two occasions. Romeo v. Oneida County, 135 A.D.2d 1099, 523 N.Y.S.2d 318 (4th Dep't 1987).
In order to recover damages for false imprisonment, absence of probable cause is not essential ingredient of such action and
need not be alleged by plaintiff; rather, burden rests upon defendant to plead and prove legal justification as affirmative defense,
which may be established by showing that arrest or imprisonment was based upon probable cause. Luppo v. Waldbaum, Inc.,
131 A.D.2d 443, 515 N.Y.S.2d 871 (2d Dep't 1987).
Verified complaint which merely pleaded conclusory allegations was insufficient to overcome presumption of probable cause
arising from Grand Jury indictment and thus, was insufficient to state claim against county for false arrest, false imprisonment
or malicious prosecution. Varanelli v. Suffolk County, 130 A.D.2d 653, 515 N.Y.S.2d 584 (2d Dep't 1987).
Plaintiff could not maintain action for false imprisonment against witness to crime who erroneously identified plaintiff as
perpetrator, as plaintiff arrest was privileged, as it was made pursuant to lawful warrant and there was no showing of malice.
Collins v. Brown, 129 A.D.2d 902, 514 N.Y.S.2d 538 (3d Dep't 1987).
City established probable cause to arrest individual bringing false arrest action on two separate occasions within two weeks for
having committed four rapes and one attempted assault, where complainantsdescription of attacker closely matched individual
physical appearance and individual was positively identified by complainants five times. Berson v. City of New York, 122
A.D.2d 7, 504 N.Y.S.2d 177 (2d Dep't 1986).
Where police officers, on routine patrol in civilian clothes in unmarked car, were operating outside of their geographical and
legal jurisdiction when they stopped plaintiff, without probable cause to arrest him, and used mace, county which employed
them was liable for battery and false imprisonment. McKinney CPL §§ 1.20, subd. 34(a, b), 140.50, subd. 1. Brewster v. City
of New York, 111 A.D.2d 892, 490 N.Y.S.2d 601 (2d Dep't 1985).
Affirmative defenses to claim for false arrest, that arrest was made in good faith and without malice, are not substitutes for
probable cause. Tetreault v. State, 108 A.D.2d 1072, 485 N.Y.S.2d 864 (3d Dep't 1985).
Award of punitive damages against store, resulting from an incident involving the ridiculing and handcuffing of a patently
mentally retarded customer by store security officer, was appropriate even though no such award was made against the security
officer, where evidence supported a finding that security officer acted maliciously. O'Donnell v. K-Mart Corp., 100 A.D.2d 488,
474 N.Y.S.2d 344 (4th Dep't 1984).

Since there were two or more persons with same name as claimant on arrest warrant, state police were privileged to arrest person
whom they reasonably believed to be person intended, provided that they used due diligence to identify person to whom warrant
applied, and whether such due diligence was exercised by state officers, when they failed, after claimant repeated protestations,
to inquire into possibility of mistaken identification, presented triable issue of fact, in claimant action seeking damages for false
arrest. Dennis v. State, 96 A.D.2d 1143, 467 N.Y.S.2d 737 (4th Dep't 1983).
Where confinement or detention of an individual against his will is privileged, action for false arrest will not lie. Saunsen v.
State, 81 A.D.2d 252, 440 N.Y.S.2d 281 (2d Dep't 1981).
Elements of malicious prosecution action consist of: commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by defendant
against plaintiff; termination of proceeding in favor of accused; absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding, and
actual malice. Loeb v. Teitelbaum, 77 A.D.2d 92, 432 N.Y.S.2d 487 (2d Dep't 1980).
In action brought against harness racing track for false imprisonment, plaintiff established necessary elements of false arrest in
that jury could properly have concluded that defendant security officers intended to confine plaintiff and temporarily did confine
him without his consent and that plaintiff was conscious of the confinement and it was not privileged. Varriale v. Saratoga
Harness Racing, Inc., 76 A.D.2d 991, 429 N.Y.S.2d 302 (3d Dep't 1980).
Malice is not an essential element of cause of action for false imprisonment. Marks v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 284 A.D. 251,
131 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1st Dep't 1954).
Good faith is no excuse in action for false imprisonment if innocent person is mistakenly arrested without warrant on charge
of misdemeanor. Code Cr.Proc. §§ 177, 183. Gill v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 284 A.D. 36, 129 N.Y.S.2d 288, 49 A.L.R.2d
1452 (3d Dep't 1954).
Lack of malice and the existence of reasonable and probable cause are neither complete nor partial defenses to an action for
false imprisonment against a private person making an arrest without warrant, but such rule is not altogether true in respect
of the damages that may be recovered in such an action. Code Cr.Proc. §§ 177, 183. Sanders v. Rolnick, 188 Misc. 627, 67
N.Y.S.2d 652 (App. Term 1947).
Hospital was not liable for false imprisonment based on its refusal to return five-month-old infant to parents, in absence of proof
that infant was conscious of her confinement and that hospital had intention to unlawfully confine child. Sager v. Rochester
General Hosp., 169 Misc. 2d 643, 647 N.Y.S.2d 408 (Sup 1996).
Elements of valid claim for false arrest are: defendant intended to confine plaintiff; plaintiff was conscious of confinement;
plaintiff did not consent to confinement; and confinement was not otherwise privileged. Murphy v. County of Nassau, 154 Misc.
2d 605, 585 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup 1992).
Police officer did not have probable cause to continue detention of plaintiff once robbery complainant was unable to identify
him as perpetrator in on-the-scene viewing, and thus, plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for false arrest. Rodriguez v.
City of New York, 149 Misc. 2d 295, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup 1990).
Legal justification is established for purposes of false arrest action by showing that arrest is based upon probable cause.
Tepperman v. New York City Transit Authority, 133 Misc. 2d 788, 508 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1986).
To recover on cause of action for false arrest claimant had to establish that defendant intended to confine him, that he was
conscious of the confinement, that he did not consent to the confinement, and that the confinement was not privileged. Mubarez
v. State, 115 Misc. 2d 57, 453 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Ct. Cl. 1982).

Tort of false arrest is essentially the same as tort of false imprisonment and every false arrest is itself false imprisonment, with
imprisonment commencing at time of arrest. Blanchfield v. State, 104 Misc. 2d 21, 427 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
In action for false imprisonment or false arrest, acquittal after trial or other dismissal of criminal action is not dispositive of
civil suit, and key issue in civil action involving department store defendant is whether it had reasonable grounds for detention.
General Business Law § 218. Maxie v. Gimbel Bros. Inc., 102 Misc. 2d 296, 423 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup 1979).
Lack of probable cause is not element of cause of action for false imprisonment. Krafft v. State, 52 Misc. 2d 35, 275 N.Y.S.2d
109 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
Fact that one who was wrongfully arrested accompanied officers peaceably and did not resist arrest did not remove necessity for
probable cause or reasonable diligence to develop probable cause; nor did it indicate consent to false arrest and imprisonment.
Maracle v. State, 50 Misc. 2d 348, 270 N.Y.S.2d 439 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
Where detention is illegal, action for false imprisonment will lie, without regard to innocence of defendant in his intentions.
Pawloski v. State, 45 Misc. 2d 933, 258 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
Issue of probable cause is one of law in action for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution where there is no dispute as to
facts and no conflicting inferences. Caminito v. City of New York, 45 Misc. 2d 241, 256 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup 1965).
Absence of malice in any wrongful withholding by city agents of evidence at criminal trial would not be defense in action
for wrongful imprisonment. General Municipal Law, §§ 50"e, 50"i. Zimmerman v. City of New York, 40 Misc. 2d 179, 242
N.Y.S.2d 791 (Sup 1963).
Probable cause is no element of false imprisonment, but issue is whether there was reasonable cause for believing that accused
had committed crime, so as to justify arrest without warrant. Code Cr.Proc. § 177, subds. 3, 4. Barnes v. Bollhorst, 28 Misc.
2d 866, 215 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup 1961).
In action against Transit Authority for false arrest of plaintiff by member of Authority police force after clerk in change booth
of Authority was robbed and clerk had described robber, who was apprehended later, as man who was of same race and color
as defendant, who answered to call of same abbreviated first name, and who had a noticeable limp as defendant had, plaintiff
failed to show that member of police force did not have reasonable cause for believing that it was plaintiff who had committed
the felony. Code Cr.Proc. § 177, subd. 3; Rules of Civil Practice, rule 113; Public Authorities Law, § 1204, subd. 16. Stearns v.
New York City Transit Authority, 24 Misc. 2d 216, 200 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sup 1960).
In action by wife and husband against city and police officer to recover on behalf of wife for assault and for malicious prosecution
and false arrest, and to recover on behalf of husband for loss of services and medical expenses, good motives and probable
cause were immaterial, in so far as affirmative defense of city purported to be a justification for the false arrest, and therefore
were unavailable as an affirmative defense. Versosa v. City of New York, 22 Misc. 2d 597, 194 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup 1959).
Gist of action for false imprisonment is unlawful detention. Guzy v. Guzy, 16 Misc. 2d 975, 184 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Sup 1959).
Malice is not an essential ingredient of tort of false arrest, and hence good faith or probable cause, though a good defense to
action for malicious prosecution, constitutes no defense to action for false arrest. Kenyon v. Lord & Taylor, Inc., 143 N.Y.S.2d
391 (Sup 1955).
Malice is not an essential element of tort of false imprisonment, and therefore, subsequent disposition of criminal charge is not
controlling in determining existence of such tort. Traversara v. Pinelli, 140 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup 1955).

In action for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, defendant, to establish defense of probable cause, need not show
that plaintiff was actually guilty of offense for which plaintiff was arrested. Vallon v. Ramage, 196 Misc. 740, 93 N.Y.S.2d
56 (Sup 1949).
Effect of charge in action for false arrest that plaintiff conviction before justice of the peace was prima facie evidence
of probable cause for arrest notwithstanding subsequent reversal on appeal restricted jury to a determination of whether
defendant, notwithstanding presumption of probable cause, instituted action maliciously by presentation of false testimony or
by withholding from justice of peace facts which would explain suspicious appearance and exonerate plaintiff from criminal
charge. Van Buren v. Ford, 189 Misc. 352, 71 N.Y.S.2d 551 (County Ct. 1947).
Police officers possessed ample probable cause to arrest robbery suspect, even absent fabricated evidence in written reports of
witness interview and victim's identification of suspect in photo lineup, thus precluding suspect's § 1983 Fourth Amendment
malicious prosecution claim based on fabrication of evidence, as well his claims under North Carolina law for malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment; second person independently identified suspect from same lineup as having been near
scene of crime during relevant period, and third person confirmed his identity and related that she last saw him in vicinity of
crime several hours earlier. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2014)
(applying North Carolina law).
An action for false arrest will lie for arrest of a party on a charge which does not constitute a criminal offense. Alexander v.
Lindsey, 230 N.C. 663, 55 S.E.2d 470 (1949).
In action for false arrest, instruction that in determining whether there was actual malice, which would justify the award of
punitive damages, jury had right to consider lack of probable cause, was not erroneous. Caudle v. Benbow, 228 N.C. 282, 45
S.E.2d 361 (1947).
Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim for false arrest. Adams v. City of Raleigh, 782 S.E.2d 108 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).
Test whether probable cause exists, for purposes of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claim based on false arrest,
is whether facts and circumstances known at time were such as to induce reasonable police officer to arrest, imprison, and/or
prosecute another. Moore v. Evans, 124 N.C. App. 35, 476 S.E.2d 415 (1996).
False imprisonment is illegal restraint of person against his will. Marlowe v. Piner, 119 N.C. App. 125, 458 S.E.2d 220 (1995).
Store manager did not have probable cause to believe that customer had willfully concealed merchandise from store, and was
not immune from liability in customer subsequent false imprisonment action; clerk told manager that customer had entered store
and gone to area that she could not see, that clerk heard sound like rustling paper coming from area when customer was joined
by companion, and that customer walked with a limp when she left store, but admitted that she never saw customer conceal
anything. G.S. § 14"72.1(c). Mullins by Mullins v. Friend, 116 N.C. App. 676, 449 S.E.2d 227 (1994).
For purposes of false imprisonment action, existence of legal justification for deprivation of liberty is determined in accordance
with law of arrest. G.S. § 15A"401 et seq. Myrick v. Cooley, 91 N.C. App. 209, 371 S.E.2d 492 (1988).
State law enforcement officials sued under § 1983 for false arrest have qualified immunity from suit. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Wishnatsky v. Bergquist, 550 N.W.2d 394, 110 Ed. Law Rep. 1246 (N.D. 1996).
In action for false imprisonment, want of probable cause is not an essential element of the cause of action, and plaintiff is not
required to plead or prove it. Haggard v. First Nat. Bank of Mandan, 72 N.D. 434, 8 N.W.2d 5 (1942).

Finding of probable cause to support arrest warrant on charges for attempted murder and related crimes arising out of shooting
incident involving arrestee's estranged husband was fatal to arrestee's claim under Ohio law against detective for false arrest.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Meakens v. Benz, 515 Fed. Appx. 414 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying Ohio law).
Allegations were sufficient to support claim for false arrest under Ohio law; complaint adequately alleged that one officer lacked
probable cause for the arrest and that the other officer knew the arrest lacked probable cause. Williams v. Crosby, 43 F. Supp.
3d 794 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (applying Ohio law).
City police officers had probable cause to arrest and hold high school student for questioning in connection with threatening
message written on school's restroom wall, thus precluding student's false arrest/imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims
against officers under Ohio law; information officers obtained from school officials, comparison of writing samples taken from
student and writing on wall, and notebook found in student's locker containing racially demeaning statements supported officers'
determination that student should be first person they questioned. Lausin ex rel. Lausin v. Bishko, 727 F. Supp. 2d 610 (N.D.
Ohio 2010) (applying Ohio law).
False arrest under Ohio law requires the deprivation of a person of his or her liberty without lawful justification; specifically,
plaintiff must show that he or she was detained and that detention was unlawful. Shoup v. Doyle, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (S.D.
Ohio 2013) (applying Ohio law).
Under Ohio law, a finding of probable cause defeats a claim of false imprisonment. LeFever v. Ferguson, 956 F. Supp. 2d 819
(S.D. Ohio 2013) (applying Ohio law).
Arrest is unlawful if it is made without probable cause or by person unauthorized to make arrest. Buchheit v. Youngstown State
Univ., 79 Ohio Misc. 2d 64, 670 N.E.2d 1379, 113 Ed. Law Rep. 415 (Ct. Cl. 1996).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest bar patron girlfriend for assault upon state liquor control agent, such that girlfriend
could not recover on false arrest and imprisonment theory, given evidence that girlfriend, upon exiting bathroom and seeing that
agent was involved in scuffle with her boyfriend, came to boyfriend aid by attacking agent from behind, ripping his shirt, and
splitting his lip. R.C. § 2903.13. Matlock v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control, 77 Ohio Misc. 2d 13, 665 N.E.2d 771 (Ct. Cl. 1996).
Claimant seeking damages from state as result of being wrongfully imprisoned must prove he or she is wrongfully imprisoned
individual within meaning of statute. R.C. § 2743.48. Gover v. State, 67 Ohio St. 3d 93, 616 N.E.2d 207 (1993).
Police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that store customer had committed criminal offense of shoplifting, justifying
his arrest of customer for failing to disclose his identity to officer and providing officer with qualified immunity from suit for
false arrest, even though customer ultimately proved that he had purchased items in his possession from store; customer's refusal
to provide identification was made despite knowing that officer thought that store had a right to verify that shoppers had not
committed theft by forcing them to wait in long lines and present their receipts and recent purchases for inspection before being
allowed to leave the store. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.29(A). McKee v. McCann, 2017-Ohio-4072, 102 N.E.3d 38 (Ohio Ct.
App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 2017).
In arrestee action against police officers for false arrest, officersalleged failure to investigate incidents involving neighbors of
theft suspects did not show that officers acted maliciously, recklessly or with bad faith toward arrestee in arresting him for
impersonating a police officer. R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6). Piro v. Franklin Twp., 102 Ohio App. 3d 130, 656 N.E.2d 1035 (9th Dist.
Summit County 1995).
When authority to arrest and detain individual without warrant was derived from statute requiring reasonable ground, reasonable
cause, or probable cause to believe that arrestee or detainee committed criminal offense, determination for purposes of malicious
prosecution claim that arrest and detention were undertaken without probable cause effectively determines issue, relevant to

false arrest or false imprisonment claim, of whether individual was arrested or detained without lawful justification. Evans v.
Smith, 97 Ohio App. 3d 59, 646 N.E.2d 217 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 1994).
Wrongful imprisonment statutes were added to authorized civil actions against state, for specified monetary amounts, for certain
wrongfully imprisoned individuals, and were intended to replace former practice of compensating wrongfully imprisoned
persons by ad hoc moral-claims legislation. R.C. §§ 2305.02, 2743.48. Chandler v. State, 95 Ohio App. 3d 142, 641 N.E.2d
1382 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1994).
Existence of probable cause to defeat claim for malicious prosecution does not necessarily mean that there is also lawful
justification for detention to defeat claim for false arrest or false imprisonment. McFinley v. Bethesda Oak Hosp., 79 Ohio App.
3d 613, 607 N.E.2d 936 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 1992).
Hospital security guards, who observed private duty nurse setting off security alarm when she attempted to leave gift shop
and who saw pair of glasses on floor near nurse feet when she was taken back into shop, had probable cause to detain nurse
for suspected shoplifting, thus precluding nurse from maintaining false imprisonment claim against hospital. R.C. § 2935.041.
Ashcroft v. Mt. Sinai Medical Ctr., 68 Ohio App. 3d 359, 588 N.E.2d 280 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1990).
Generally, in an action for false imprisonment, plaintiff need only show that he has been restrained of his liberty, and presumption
then arises that he was unlawfully restrained and it is for defendant to show legal justification therefor. R.C. § 2935.041. Isaiah
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 111 Ohio App. 537, 15 Ohio Op. 2d 291, 174 N.E.2d 128, 86 A.L.R.2d 430 (9th Dist.
Summit County 1959).
In an action for false arrest, allegation of want of probable cause is helpful, and may be required as a basis for punitive damages.
McCoy v. Baer, 100 Ohio App. 274, 60 Ohio Op. 226, 136 N.E.2d 66 (2d Dist. Franklin County 1955).
Whether complaint on which arrest was made was true or false is immaterial in an action for false imprisonment, though it may
be essential to an action in malicious prosecution. Click v. Parish, 89 Ohio App. 318, 46 Ohio Op. 38, 60 Ohio L. Abs. 169,
98 N.E.2d 333 (3d Dist. Hardin County 1950).
In action against a store operator for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution arising out of plaintiff attempt to pass an
allegedly worthless check in the store, plaintiff evidence was sufficient to take case to the jury. Thomas v. F. & R. Lazarus &
Co., 3 Ohio Op. 2d 61, 40 Ohio L. Abs. 29, 57 N.E.2d 103 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. Franklin County 1941).
False arrest is unlawful restraint of individual against his will. Delong v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept. of Public Safety, 1998
OK CIV APP 32, 956 P.2d 937 (Div. 1 1998).
Warrantless arrest made by officer without due and legal process, i.e., probable cause, is a false arrest and is tortious even if
officer acted in good faith; mental intent of the officer making the arrest is irrelevant. Overall v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public
Safety, 1995 OK CIV APP 107, 910 P.2d 1087 (Ct. App. Div. 4 1995).
False arrest is unlawful restraint of individual against his will. Irwin v. SWO Acquisition Corp., 1992 OK CIV APP 48, 830
P.2d 587 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1992).
Whether probable cause existed for plaintiff arrest in defendant store for allegedly switching price tag on an item was question
of fact for jury in action for false arrest and imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Moore v. Target Stores, Inc., 1977 OK
CIV APP 35, 571 P.2d 1236 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1977).
Where defendants were called upon to assist marshal, did so, and actions taken by them were in response to marshal request or
requirement for assistance, and testimony wholly failed to disclose any act on part of defendants which influenced town marshal

in any way or to show any ill will or any motive on part of defendants to cause marshal to take action against plaintiff, defendants
were not liable to plaintiff for false arrest or false imprisonment upon dismissal of charges against plaintiff. 21 O.S.1941 § 537;
22 O.S.1941 § 91. Moyer v. Foster, 1951 OK 203, 205 Okla. 26, 234 P.2d 415 (1951).
State police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on arrestee's section 1983 claim of unlawful arrest on basis that he
had made mistaken legal conclusion regarding scope of Oklahoma's felon-in-possession statute, since information available to
officer at time of arrest made clear that officer lacked probable cause to make arrest for violation of felon-in-possession statute.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 21 Okl.St.Ann. § 1283. Courtney v. Oklahoma ex rel., Dept. of Public Safety,
722 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2013) (applying Oklahoma law).
Existence of probable cause is not an essential element of, nor a defense to, action for false imprisonment, but probable cause
may be an essential element in case where it appears that defendant acted in protection of his person or property in causing
plaintiff alleged unlawful detention. Swafford v. Vermillion, 1953 OK 227, 261 P.2d 187 (Okla. 1953).
Robert, by demonstrating that he was arrested by police officer under outstanding warrant for Ronald, established prima facie
case of false imprisonment, placing on officer the burden to persuade jury that he had reasonable good-faith belief that he was
arresting person named in warrant and that he acted with due diligence in arriving at such decision. Pierson v. Multnomah
County, 301 Or. 48, 718 P.2d 738 (1986).
In action for false imprisonment arising out of incident in which representative of landlord made citizen arrest of tenant for
her refusal to leave recreation room of apartment complex following demand by such representative to do so, trial court did
not err in submitting issue of punitive damages to jury. Vandermeer v. Pacific Northwest Development Corp., 274 Or. 221,
545 P.2d 868 (1976).
Neither actual malice nor want of probable cause is an essential element necessary to recovery of general damages in action for
false imprisonment. McNeff v. Heider, 216 Or. 583, 337 P.2d 819 (1959).
Proof that arrest was lawful is defense in false arrest action. ORS 133.225(1). O'Brien v. Eugene Chemical Exports, Inc., 63
Or. App. 284, 664 P.2d 1106 (1983).
While evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant had falsely imprisoned 13-year-old boy, evidence did not establish
that defendant was guilty of such aggravated conduct as to warrant award of punitive damages, and court properly withdrew
issue of punitive damages from jury. ORS 131.655; Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 63, subd. B. Wolf v. Nordstrom, Inc., 51
Or. App. 715, 626 P.2d 953 (1981).
To recover in action for false arrest, it was necessary for plaintiff to establish that defendant intended to confine him, that
defendant did confine him and that plaintiff was aware of his confinement. Napier v. Sheridan, 24 Or. App. 761, 547 P.2d 1399
(1976).
Department store's director of loss prevention had probable cause to report his suspicions to police that arrestee was accomplice
to employee in making fraudulent return at store, and thus police had probable cause to make arrest, as would negate arrestee's
claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania law, even though prosecution withdrew
all charges against arrestee, where director possessed employee's signed statement implicating arrestee, receipts corroborating
her confession, and video footage placing arrestee at employee's register within minutes of at least one fraudulent transaction
that required an accomplice. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. DiStefano v. Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., 616 Fed. Appx. 478 (3d
Cir. 2015) (applying Pennsylvania law).
State troopers had probable cause to arrest motorist for driving under influence (DUI), thus precluding liability under § 1983
for false imprisonment and for malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania law; trooper testified that motorist had admitted to

consuming single alcoholic beverage earlier that night, that motorist had blood-shot eyes and smelled of alcohol, and that he
failed field sobriety tests, and preliminary breath test indicated that motorist's blood alcohol content was above legal limit of.08
percent. U.S. Const. Amend. 4; 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1547. Sarin v. Magee, 333 F. Supp. 3d 475 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (applying
Pennsylvania law).
Even assuming arrestee was acting in self-defense during an altercation, police officers had probable cause to arrest him for
simple assault committed against a family or household member under Pennsylvania law, as defense to arrestee's action brought
under § 1983 against officers for allegedly violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from false arrest
and imprisonment, where assault victim identified himself as arrestee's boyfriend, told officers that arrestee hit him with an
iron, and arrestee admitted that he hit victim with an iron. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4, 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 2701, 2711. Berrios v. City of Philadelphia, 96 F. Supp. 3d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (applying Pennsylvania law).
There was probable cause to arrest police officer for aggravated assault and related offenses, thus precluding officer's false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims against city and police department officials under Pennsylvania law; while off-
duty, officer drew pistol, hit restaurant patron with pistol, and then forced patron out of restaurant. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4).
Gorman v. Bail, 947 F. Supp. 2d 509 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (applying Pennsylvania law).
Casino patrons sufficiently pled that police officers lacked probable cause to arrest them for criminal trespass, as required to
state claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under § 1983 and Pennsylvania law, where patrons
alleged that officers relied on information that casino security guards provided, specifically that patrons were not permitted on
the premises, that officers did not question patrons or pursue any other investigation, and that, rather, officers acted solely on
command of security guards, lacking any information to support the belief that patrons knowingly lacked privilege to be on
casino property. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(2). Luck v. Mount Airy No. 1, LLC,
901 F. Supp. 2d 547 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (applying Pennsylvania law).
County detective was entitled to qualified immunity from probationer's § 1983 false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution claims arising from detective's investigating probationer for failing to register as sex offender, as required under
Pennsylvania law, and obtaining warrant for probationer's arrest; it would not have been clear to reasonable officer in position
of detective that his actions violated clearly established law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9795.2; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915 (Expired). Spiker v. Allegheny County Bd. of Probation and Parole, 920 F. Supp. 2d 580 (W.D.
Pa. 2013) (applying Pennsylvania law).
Probable cause to arrest is conclusively established to have existed at time that arrest was made, which thus precludes action
for false arrest, if there is guilty plea or conviction. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 667(1). McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d
797 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
In context of arrestee subsequent claims against arresting officer for false imprisonment and defamation, probable cause for
arrest existed as a matter of law even though officer had no record of description he gave to authorities in neighboring jurisdiction
in attempting to ascertain whether arrestee was perpetrator and whether complaint should be lodged against arrestee; officer
consulted with district attorney prior to presenting complaint and affidavit to magistrate, and district attorney found information
complete and descriptive enough to warrant arrest and advised officer to go ahead and file complaint. Leonard v. Cole, 134
Pa. Commw. 14, 578 A.2d 53 (1990).
Police officer against whom action was brought for false arrest and imprisonment and malicious prosecution had probable cause,
based on passengersstatements and motorist own admission, to arrest motorist for driving under the influence of alcohol even
though officer did not see motorist driving. 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1547, 3731(c). Cassidy v. Abington Tp., 131 Pa. Commw. 637,
571 A.2d 543 (1990).

Just as it is to a claim of malicious prosecution, the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a false arrest claim.
Horton v. Portsmouth Police Dept., 22 A.3d 1115 (R.I. 2011).
When probable cause exists to initiate a proceeding, a claim of malicious prosecution must fail; likewise, when probable cause
exists to arrest, a claim of false arrest must fail as well. Horton v. Portsmouth Police Dept., 22 A.3d 1115 (R.I. 2011).
Damages for false arrest or false imprisonment are available only when imprisonment is improper or unjustified. Dyson v. City
of Pawtucket, 670 A.2d 233 (R.I. 1996).
Guilt or innocence of underlying charge is not relevant to determination of whether arresting officer committed false
imprisonment. Moody v. McElroy, 513 A.2d 5 (R.I. 1986).
In action against police officer for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution in connection with arrest made under ordinance
proscribing disturbing peace, evidence was sufficient for jury on question whether the officer had probable cause to believe that
peaceable inhabitants of town or any portion of them were being annoyed or disturbed by behavior proscribed by the ordinance.
Johnson v. Palange, 122 R.I. 361, 406 A.2d 360 (1979).
Essential element of false imprisonment is restraint of another without legal justification. Barth v. Flad, 99 R.I. 446, 208 A.2d
533 (1965).
Gist of false imprisonment is detention of another without consent. Cioci v. Santos, 99 R.I. 308, 207 A.2d 300 (1965).
Whether detaining officer, who was charged with false arrest, was warranted in concluding that reasonable grounds existed to
detain plaintiff whom he suspected had committed a crime was a question for the jury in false imprisonment trial. Gen.Laws
1956, § 12"7"1. Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 93 R.I. 252, 174 A.2d 560 (1961).
Law enforcement officer did not lack probable cause to arrest political consultant for alleged violation of South Carolina
statute prohibiting politically-related unsolicited calls made by automatically dialed announcing devices (ADAD), as required
for political consultant to state claim, under South Carolina law, for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015) (applying South Carolina law).
False imprisonment claim requires lack of probable cause to arrest. Jackson v. City of Abbeville, 366 S.C. 662, 623 S.E.2d
656 (Ct. App. 2005).
False imprisonment is defined as deprivation of person liberty without justification. Caldwell v. K-Mart Corp., 306 S.C. 27,
410 S.E.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1991).
Probable cause, when used as a defense by store owner in action against it by shopper detained for investigation of suspected
shoplifting, is defined as a good-faith belief that a person is guilty of a crime when this belief rests on such grounds as would
introduce ordinarily prudent and cautious man, under circumstances, to believe likewise. Code 1976, § 16"13"140. Gathers v.
Harris Teeter Supermarket, Inc., 282 S.C. 220, 317 S.E.2d 748 (Ct. App. 1984).
Existence of probable cause to arrest is a complete bar to false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, because proof of the
absence of probable cause is an essential element in both causes of action. Heib v. Lehrkamp, 2005 SD 98, 704 N.W.2d 875
(S.D. 2005), reh'g denied, (Oct. 24, 2005).
False imprisonment is an unlawful detention or restraint of a person against his or her will. Hart v. Miller, 2000 SD 53, 609
N.W.2d 138 (S.D. 2000).

Sheriff alleged good faith and probable cause for arresting plaintiff as an embezzler, as result of mistaken identity, was no defense
and could not be considered in mitigation of compensatory damages where plaintiff was not named or otherwise described in
warrant under which sheriff purported to act and there was no showing that plaintiff had ever used or been known by embezzler
name. Const. art. 6, § 11; SDC 34.1616. Bean v. Best, 77 S.D. 433, 93 N.W.2d 403 (1958).
Under Heck, arrestee who pled guilty to underage drinking, in violation of Tennessee law, and received judicial diversion was
precluded from pursuing § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful arrest and false imprisonment against county, sheriff,
and sheriff's deputies. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Holloran v. Duncan, 92 F. Supp. 3d 774 (W.D. Tenn.
2015) (applying Tennessee law).
University's private security officers had probable cause to temporarily detain former student pending their investigation to
determine whether there were any outstanding warrants, and thus, university was not liable for false imprisonment, after
student had failed to obtain a parking decal or updated identification card as instructed, and, instead chose to flee. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Brown v. Christian Bros. University, 428 S.W.3d 38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013), appeal denied, (Jan. 15, 2014).
False imprisonment requires that defendant must have acted without probable cause. Brown v. SCOA Industries, Inc., 741
S.W.2d 916 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
In action against police officers for damages for false arrest and imprisonment, issue whether police officers had probable cause
to arrest plaintiff was for jury. Woods v. Harrell, 596 S.W.2d 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).
Gravamen of suit for false arrest and malicious prosecution is that prosecutor charged plaintiff with committing criminal
offense without probable and reasonable cause to believe that accused was guilty of such offense and out of a sense of malice.
McLaughlin v. Smith, 56 Tenn. App. 715, 412 S.W.2d 21 (1966).
In action for slander and false imprisonment in accusing plaintiff of failing to pay for groceries purchased at defendant store and
detaining her therein, jury had right to accept plaintiff testimony as to what occurred, instead of contrary testimony of defendant
clerk. Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W.2d 13 (1943).
To prevail on Texas law claim for false arrest and imprisonment, arrestee was required to show that reasonable officer in officer's
position could not have reasonably believed he had probable cause to arrest. Holguin v. Lopez, 584 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Tex.
2008) (applying Texas law).
Arresting officers had probable cause to arrest suspected grease thief, and thus, suspect could not maintain false imprisonment
or false arrest claim, where arresting police officers had authority to detain her without a warrant based on fact that their
observations and exchanged information gave rise to a reasonable belief that a theft had been committed. Vernon Ann.Texas
C.C.P. art. 14.01(b); V.T.C.A., Penal Code § 31.03(b)(1). Villegas v. Griffin Industries, 975 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App. Corpus
Christi 1998).
In context of claim for false imprisonment, legal authority or legal justification for detention is met either by the procurement
of an arrest warrant or by the showing of existence of probable cause. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Odem, 929 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.
App. San Antonio 1996).
Essential elements of false imprisonment are willful detention, without consent, and without authority of law. Bossin v. Towber,
894 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1994).
Essential elements of false imprisonment are: willful detention of the person; against the consent of the party detained; and
detention without authority of law. Moore's, Inc. v. Garcia, 604 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. Corpus Christi 1980).

Pleadings filed by former university student, who alleged that he was unlawfully confined in state hospital, did not adequately
allege that university dean and associate dean had intentionally committed an unlawful act injurious to plaintiff. Vernon
Ann.Civ.St. art. 3193o-1. Morris v. University of Tex., 348 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1961).
To prevail on civil claims against city for false arrest and malicious prosecution, former criminal defendant whose prosecution
for making a false alarm ended with directed verdict in his favor was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
members of city police department acted without probable cause in having him arrested and prosecuted. Peak Alarm Co., Inc.
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2010 UT 22, 243 P.3d 1221 (Utah 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 660 (2010).
Officers had probable cause to make arrest when plaintiff who brought suit for false imprisonment failed to disclose whereabouts
of vehicle he had removed from premises, even though officers did not provide plaintiff with any evidence of ownership of
vehicle prior to making demands. Penrod v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987).
Where store customer merely got up and left when told he was free to do so after being stopped on shoplifting charges, customer
consented to be released from store custody; thus, act of releasing customer without first taking him before magistrate did
not itself constitute abuse of privilege of arrest and did not give rise to liability for false imprisonment. McFarland v. Skaggs
Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).
While association may be contributing factor in overall determination of whether probable cause exists to arrest and detain
suspected shoplifter, it standing alone cannot be exclusive basis for probable cause to arrest or detain someone. U.C.A.1953,
77"13"32. Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).
Arrested protesters were not subjected to false imprisonment, under Vermont law, because police officers had probable cause to
arrest protesters for trespass on private property. Crowell v. Kirkpatrick, 667 F. Supp. 2d 391 (D. Vt. 2009) (applying Vermont
law).
Law enforcement officer making warrantless arrest acts in good faith, as element of requirements for qualified official immunity,
though officer makes mistake in finding probable cause to make arrest, if officer has objectively reasonable belief that
probable cause existed, or if officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether there was probable cause. Long
v. L'Esperance, 166 Vt. 566, 701 A.2d 1048 (1997).
Statutory immunity granted to merchant as exemption from civil liability in connection with detention of suspected shoplifter
is not absolute. Code 1950, § 18.2"105. Jury v. Giant of Maryland, Inc., 254 Va. 235, 491 S.E.2d 718 (1997).
False imprisonment is restraint of one liberty without any sufficient cause therefor. Zayre of Va., Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47,
147 S.E.2d 710 (1966).
That circumstances were such as to justify arrest of store patron and companion for suspected theft, if not sufficient to show that
they were guilty of the charge, was no defense to action for actual damages for false imprisonment based on arrest by police
officer without warrant. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Wickline, 188 Va. 485, 50 S.E.2d 387 (1948).
Police officer who makes warrantless misdemeanor arrest based upon mistakes of fact or law may not be subjected to civil
liability for false imprisonment, provided that officer acted in good faith and reasonable belief in validity of arrest. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Ford v. City of Newport News, 23 Va. App. 137, 474 S.E.2d 848 (1996).
Sheriff's deputies had probable cause to restrain emergency patient, and thus patient's restraint did not support patient's claims
for false arrest and imprisonment under Washington law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Goldsmith v. Snohomish County, 558 F.
Supp. 2d 1140 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (applying Washington law).

Probable cause is complete defense to action for false arrest and imprisonment. Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wash. 2d
552, 852 P.2d 295 (1993).
Otherwise lawful arrest does not become unlawful even if prompted by malicious motives, and existence or nonexistence of
malice is immaterial to question of liability for false arrest or false imprisonment. Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wash. 2d 582,
664 P.2d 492, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2101 (1983).
Where plaintiff arrest was based upon probable cause, plaintiff could not recover for either arrest or for being placed in jail
pursuant to such arrest unless he was held in jail after the authorities knew or should have known that he was held falsely. Tufte
v. City of Tacoma, 71 Wash. 2d 866, 431 P.2d 183 (1967).
In action against store detective, who was a deputy city police officer, and her employer for damages for alleged false arrest and
false imprisonment of one accused of shoplifting, trial court refusal to submit defense of probable cause to jury as requested by
store detective and her employer was reversible error. Sennett v. Zimmerman, 50 Wash. 2d 649, 314 P.2d 414 (1957).
A probable cause for an arrest, which will relieve an officer from liability for false arrest, is a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing the accused to be guilty.
Kalkanes v. Willestoft, 13 Wash. 2d 127, 124 P.2d 219 (1942).
Sheriff's deputy who obtained and executed arrest warrant against arrestee had probable cause to arrest him, as defense to
arrestee's claims against officer and county for false arrest and false imprisonment; at time of arrest, deputy located rifle and
ammunition under arrestee's bed, she had confirmed that it was unlawful for him to have the gun in light of his prior conviction,
and by the time of county's second arrest of arrestee, deputy had obtained statements from others that rifle belonged to arrestee.
Youker v. Douglas County, 162 Wash. App. 448, 258 P.3d 60 (Div. 3 2011), published at, 161 Wash. App. 1014, 2011 WL
1468352 (Div. 3 2011).
The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.
McBride v. Walla Walla County, 95 Wash. App. 33, 975 P.2d 1029 (Div. 3 1999).
Probable cause is complete defense to action for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution. Jacques v. Sharp,
83 Wash. App. 532, 922 P.2d 145 (Div. 1 1996).
Manslaughter conviction of claimant alleging malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment would establish
probable cause precluding those claims, in absence of proof that conviction was obtained by fraud, perjury, or other corrupt
means, even though defendant had been originally charged with second-degree murder; availability of probable cause as defense
was not lessened by jury conclusion that facts proved different (but related crime), as jury had concluded that some offense had
been committed. Fondren v. Klickitat County, 79 Wash. App. 850, 905 P.2d 928 (Div. 3 1995).
Dancersstipulation that police officer had probable cause to arrest dancers precluded any state claims for false arrest. Torrey v.
City of Tukwila, 76 Wash. App. 32, 882 P.2d 799 (Div. 1 1994).
For false arrest purposes, probable cause for warrantless arrest exists where facts and circumstances within arresting officer
knowledge, and of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to permit person of reasonable caution
to believe that offense has been or is being committed. Gurno v. Town of LaConner, 65 Wash. App. 218, 828 P.2d 49 (Div.
1 1992).
Arrest or imprisonment is false if it is unlawful. Noel v. King County, 48 Wash. App. 227, 738 P.2d 692 (Div. 1 1987).

Elements of false imprisonment are detention of the person and the unlawfulness of the detention and restraint. Riffe v.
Armstrong, 197 W. Va. 626, 477 S.E.2d 535 (1996).
Owner of merchandise, his employee having called police to premises to investigate possible shoplifting, is not liable for any
unreasonable detention of suspected shoplifter by police under statute which provides that merchant cannot be deemed liable to
person detained so long as merchant had reasonable grounds to believe that person had committed shoplifting and detained that
person in reasonable manner, and for reasonable length of time not to exceed 30 minutes. Code, 61"3A"4. Lusk v. Ira Watson
Co., 185 W. Va. 680, 408 S.E.2d 630 (1991).
Police officer was entitled to qualified immunity for her conduct in arresting suspect for misdemeanor disorderly conduct under
Wisconsin law, and for her subsequent search of suspect's motor vehicle incident to that arrest, in suspect's § 1983 action
alleging that arrest and search violated his Fourth Amendment rights; officer had received report that suspect was driving fast
on city streets while pointing an unholstered gun at the ceiling of his car, and despite officer's knowledge of Wisconsin's recent
enactment of statute expanding concealed carry rights, it was not clearly established at the time of the arrest and the search that
the suspect's reported conduct did not violate the disorderly conduct statute. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;
W.S.A. 947.01. Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2014) (applying Wisconsin law).
Arrestee's fleeing from vehicle stop and frisk did not provide police officers with probable cause to make arrest for violation
of Wisconsin statute prohibiting resisting or obstructing officers, and thus officer's making of an arrest was a false arrest in
violation of arrestee's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, where officers were not acting
with "lawful authority" in conducting the initial vehicle stop, since they lacked reasonable suspicion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4. Hardy v. City of Milwaukee, 88 F. Supp. 3d 852 (E.D. Wis. 2015) (applying Wisconsin law).
False imprisonment involves the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another. Laska v. Steinpreis, 69 Wis.
2d 307, 231 N.W.2d 196 (1975).
False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of a person physical liberty. Lane v. Collins, 29 Wis. 2d 66, 138 N.W.2d 264 (1965).
Where doubt existed as to whether plaintiff was man named in warrant and, after plaintiff was arrested, no effort was made by
sheriff or police officials to either connect or disassociate plaintiff with person named in warrant, although there was opportunity
for inquiry and investigation, whether sheriff and police officials failed to use required caution in performance of their duty
in making the arrest was for jury. Wallner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 253 Wis. 66, 33 N.W.2d 215, 10 A.L.R.2d
745 (1948).
Officer who makes arrest under warrant, valid on its face, is not liable in action for false imprisonment or false arrest. Kimbley
v. City of Green River, 663 P.2d 871 (Wyo. 1983).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]

RESEARCH REFERENCES
A.L.R. Library
• Construction and Application of State Statutes Providing Compensation for Wrongful Conviction and Incarceration,
53 A.L.R.6th 305
• Application in State Narcotics Cases of Collective Knowledge Doctrine or Fellow Officers' Rule Under Fourth
Amendment—Cocaine Cases, 4 A.L.R.6th 599
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Malice and want of probable cause as element or factor..., 137 A.L.R. 504...

137 A.L.R. 504 (Originally published in 1942)

Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules

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Sayan-Resto v. Berrios, 933 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D.P.R. 2013) — Supp

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Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F. Supp. 2d 128 (E.D. N.Y. 1998) — Supp

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Strong v. Montava, 64 F. Supp. 2d 101 (E.D. N.Y. 1999) — Supp

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Duncan v. Clements, 744 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1984) — Supp

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Williams v. County of Alameda, 26 F. Supp. 3d 925 (N.D. Cal. 2014) — Supp

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Mills v. Town of Davie, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (S.D. Fla. 1999) — Supp

District of Columbia Circuit

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Karrick v. Johnson, 659 So. 2d 77 (Ala. 1995) — Supp

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(Supplementing annotation in 19 ALR 671.)

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American R. Exp. Co. v. McDermott (1930, CCA 3d) 44 F2d 955

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Wilson v. Emery (1921) 1 Pa D & C 517

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