al-Kindi

Universally recognised as the first true philosopher of the Islamic

world, Abu Yusuf Ya'qllb b. Is}:laq al-Kindi (c. 801--c. 873)
is known as' the Philosopher of the Arabs'. 60 Taking his theologi-
cal stance in the Mu'tazilite tradition, Kindi proceeds to develop
a philosophy that can best be characterised as a Neoplatonised
Aristotelianism. Kindi stands historically as the bridge between
kafam and falsafa, and it was his conviction that revelation
and philosophy attain identical truths, albeit in different ways. 61
Therefore, it is not surprising to find in him a strange blend
of philosophical and theological doctrines not to be seen in
the more purely philosophical thinkers who followed him. While
his concept of God is thoroughly Neoplatonic, 62 he nevertheless
sided with the theologians with regard to his argument for
the existence of God. For unlike his philosophical successors,
Kindi argued that God's existence may be demonstrated by
proving that the universe was created in time. Indeed, the
'most important argument for God's existence in the philosophy
of al-Kindi' is his argument for creation, and he stands apart
as the only Arabian philosopher not believing in the eternity
of the universe and matter. 63 Despite the influence of Aristotle
and Plotinus upon his thought, he consistently upheld creatio
ex nihilo: God creates the universe out of nothing (al-mubdi'),
and Kindi uses the word ibdii~ to specifically denote God's action
as a creation in time out of nothing. 64 He reasons that if it
may be proved that the universe began to exist a finite number

W. L. Craig, The Kalām Cosmological Argument

© William Lane Craig 1979
20 The Kalam Cosmological Argument

of years ago, then the existence of a Creator may be legitimately

inferred. Kindi's argument for creation may be found in his
treatise On First Philosophy. 65 Here he utilises three arguments
for the creation of the universe: an argument from space, time,
and motion, an argument from composition, and another argu-
ment from time.
The first argument may be summarised as follows :66 There
are several self-evident principles: ( 1) two bodies of which one
is not greater than the other are equal; (2) equal bodies are
those where the dimensions between their limits are equal in
actuality and potentiality; (3) that which is finite is not infinite;
(4) when a body is added to one of two equal bodies, the
one receiving the addition becomes greater than it was before
and, hence, the greater of the two bodies; (5) when two bodies
of finite magnitude are joined, the resultant body will also
be of finite magnitude; (6) the smaller of two generically related
things is inferior to the larger. Given these premisses, it may
be shown that no actual infinite can exist. For if one has
an infinite body and removes from it a body of finite magnitude,
then the remainder will be either a finite or infinite magnitude.
If it is finite, then when the finite body that was taken from
it is added back to it again, the result would have to be
a finite magnitude (principle five), which is self-contradictory,
since before the finite body was removed, it was infinite. On
the other hand, if it remains infinite when the finite body
is removed, then when the finite body is added back again,
the result will be either greater than or equal to what it was
before the addition. Now if it is greater than it was, then
we have two infinite bodies, one of which is greater than the
other. The smaller is, then, inferior to the greater (principle
six) and equal to a portion of the greater. But two things
are equal when the dimensions between their limits are the
same (principle two). This means the smaller body and the
portion to which it is equal have limits and are therefore finite.
But this is self-contradictory, for the smaller body was said
to be infinite. Suppose, then, on the other hand, that the
result is equal to what it was before the addition. This means
that the two parts together make up a whole that is equal
to one of its parts; in other words, the whole is not greater
than its part-which, according to Kindi, is hopelessly contra-
dictory. All this goes to show that no actual infinite magnitude