2007 Case Digest in Land Registration

GULLAS LAW SCHOOL

UNIVERSITY OF THE VISAYAS

Property Registration Decree

(P.D. 1529) and Related laws
Case Studies

A Digest of Selected 2007 Supreme Court Decisions

Prepared by:

Dean Teodoro A. Almase

For a full and comprehensive understanding of the following 

doctrinal jurisprudence, the students of law must still read the entire text 
(not just the syllabi) of these selected Supreme Court Decisions

SURVEY OF 2007 CASES INVOLVING LAND TITLES AND LAND REGISTRATION 

I. LAND TITLES:

ACTIONS INVOLVING TITLES

Ingusan vs. Hrs. of Reyes (531 SCRA 315) No collateral attack on title allowed

Invoking the invalidity of an original certificate of title as an affirmative defense in an

answer and the prayer for the declaration of its nullity is a collateral attack on a
certificate of title and is not allowed.

Taparuc vs. Loquellano vda de Mende (512 SCRA 97) No collateral attack on title 
A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The question on the validity of a Torrens
title, whether fraudulently issued or not, can be raised only in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed,
altered, modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled in a collateral proceeding. The
action for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale commenced by the petitioners in the
RTC is not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens certificate of title.

Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez (532 SCRA 642) No collateral attack on title

A Torrens certificate of title is indefeasible. The power to pass upon the validity of such
certificate of title at first instance belongs to the Regional Trial Court in a direct
proceeding for the cancellation of title. The alleged invalidity of a Torrens certificate of
title may not be raised by way of a defense in an ejectment case where the question of
ownership may be provisionally ruled upon only for the sole purpose of determining who
is entitled to possession de facto.

Azana vs. Lumbo (518 SCRA 707) Quieting of Title

An action for quieting of title may be brought by the owner of a property who is disturbed
in any way in his right by an unfounded claim.

Heirs of Marcelino Doronio vs. Hrs. of Fortunato Doronio 

(G.R. No. 169454. December 27, 2007.]

The rules on quieting of title expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title
shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action.

Hrs. of Rosa Dumaliang vs. Serban (516 SCRA 343) Reconveyance is

imprescriptible if title still in name of person who caused wrongful registration

The real owner has the right to sue for reconveyance (an action in personam) of a
property. The action is imprescriptible if the land wrongfully registered is still in the name
of the person who caused the registration.

Pedrano vs. Hrs. Benedicto Pedrano 

[G.R. No. 159666. December 4, 2007.] No prescription where no title issued

An action for the reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive

trust, as we have already explained in this case, prescribes in 10 years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title of the property; however, where no OCT has yet been issued despite
an order from the court to title the lots, the date from whence the prescriptive period
could be reckoned is unknown and it could not be determined if indeed the period had
already lapsed or not. Thus, we agree with the CA that prescription has not yet set in. 

Llemos vs. Llemos (513 SCRA 128) 

Santos vs. Lumbao (519 SCRA 408) Reconveyance is imprescriptible where
plaintiff is in possession 
An action for annulment of title/reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where
the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the acts.

Antonio vs. Santos (538 SCRA 1) Reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes 4
years from discovery of fraud which discovery is deemed to have taken place
upon issuance of certificate of title

Note should be taken of the established doctrine that an action for reconveyance
resulting from fraud prescribes four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title over
the property. Registration of real property is considered constructive notice to all
persons, thus, the four-year period shall be counted therefrom.

Hrs. of Zoilo Espiritu vs. Landrito (520 SCRA 383) Reconveyance based on
implied trust prescribes 10 years after date of registration 

An action for reconveyance prescribes 10 years from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale if the action is based on implied trust arising from a wrongful
foreclosure with iniquitous interest. The principal obligation still stands however the
interest is set at 12% per annum which should be paid.

Azana vs. Lumbo (518 SCRA 707)

Non-declaration of property for tax purposes does not necessarily negate ownership.

Tapuroc vs. Loquellano vda de Mende (512SCRA 100)

If title to property is coupled with payment of realty taxes and possession in concept of
owner for more than 30 years, then the title to land became indefeasible and
possession by registered owner cannot be disturbed

Pascual vs. Coronel (527 SCRA 474)

A registered owner with title has a better right to possess the land as opposed to a
vendee with an unregistered sale.
LACHES

Hrs. of Dumaliang vs. Serban (516 SCRA 343)

It is the better rule that courts under the principle of equity will not be guided by the
doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice will result.

Llemos vs. Llemos (513 SCRA 128)

Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud or injustice.

D’Oro Land Realty & Devt. Corporation vs. Claunan (516 SCRA 681) Squatters
cannot invoke defense of laches

A squatter has no right of possession that may be prejudiced by his eviction. Unless
there are intervening rights of third persons which may be affected or prejudiced by a
decision ordering the return of the lots to the registered owner, the equitable defense of
laches will not apply as against the latter.

Although a registered owner may lose his right to recover possession of his registered
property by reason of laches, the equitable defense is unavailing to one who has not
shown any color of title to the property such as a squatter.

Estate of the Late Jesus Yujuico vs. Republic (537 SCRA 513) 

An action to recover lands of the public domain is imprescriptible. Such right however
can be barred by laches/estoppel under Sec. 32 of P.D. 1529 which recognizes the
rights of innocent purchasers for value above the interests of the government.

Taparuc vs. Loquellano vda. De Mende (512 SCRA 97)

A complaint for declaration of nullity of an alleged forged deed filed 29 years from
execution was held barred by laches.

MISCELLANEOUS

Life Homes Realty vs. Court of Appeals (516 SCRA 6) Corrections in Plans

“ The Court agrees with the CA that such defects in plans prepared in connection with
areas adjudicated in ordinary or voluntary registration proceedings may be corrected
after the cadastral survey in accordance with Sec. 108 of P.D. No. 1529, thus:

SEC. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. — No erasure, alteration, or

amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of
title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by Register of Deeds,
except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person
having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with
the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the
court upon the ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and
ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been
created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any
memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; . . . or upon any other reasonable
ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in
interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or
cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such
terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper;
Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to
reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered
by the court, which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a
certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their
written consent. . . . 

All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other provision of
this Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in
which the decree or registration was entered. 

The last paragraph above provides that a petition for correction shall be filed and
entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered. As stated by
the CA, the jurisdiction to entertain the petition lies with the Land Registration Court
which heard and decided the voluntary registration proceedings filed by private
respondent. The rule aims to prevent confusion and to avoid difficulty in tracing the
origin of entries in the registry. (Noblejas, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1986
ed., p. 190.11)

Manotok Realty Inc. vs. CLT Realty Devt. Corp. Jurisdiction of Cadastral Courts
[G.R. No. 123346. December 14, 2007.]

The reality that cadastral courts may have jurisdiction over lands already registered in
ordinary land registration cases was acknowledged by this Court in Pamintuan v. San
Agustin. 43 Phil. 558 (1922). Such jurisdiction is "limited to the necessary correction of
technical errors in the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair
the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate
to deprive a registered owner of his title." (Id. at 561.) It was further clarified in Timbol v.
Diaz (44 Phil. 587 (1923))that the limited jurisdiction of the cadastral court over such
lands even extends to the determination of "which one of the several conflicting
registered titles shall prevail[, as such] power would seem to be necessary for a
complete settlement of the title to the land, the express purpose of cadastral
proceedings, and must therefore be considered to be within the jurisdiction of the court
in such proceedings." (Id. at 590.)
Alfonso vs Office of the President (520 SCRA 64) Duty of Register of Deeds To
Require Submission of Approved Subdivision Plan, Technical Description &
Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of Title Before Issuing New Titles

The observations of the LRA and the DOJ on petitioner's failure to require the
presentation of the subdivision plan for Rivera's three titles are in keeping with the
provisions of Sections 50 and 58 of P.D. No. 1529, as follows:

SEC. 50. Subdivision and consolidation plans. — Any owner subdividing a tract of
registered land into lots which do not constitute a subdivision project as defined and
provided for under P.D. 957, shall file with the Commissioner of Land Registration or
with the Bureau of Lands a subdivision plan of such land on which all boundaries,
streets, passageways and waterways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately
delineated. 

If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly approved by the Commissioner of

Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands together with the approved technical
descriptions and the corresponding owner's duplicate certificate of title is presented for
registration, the Register of Deeds shall, without requiring further court approval of said
plan, register the same in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act,
as amended. . . . 
xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 58. Procedure where conveyance involves portion of land. — If a deed of

conveyance is for a part of the land described in a certificate of title, the Register of
Deeds shall not enter any transfer certificate of title to the grantee until a plan of such
land showing all the portions or lots into which it has been subdivided and the
corresponding technical descriptions shall have been verified and approved pursuant to
Section 50 of this Decree. . . .

Upon the approval of the plan and technical descriptions, the original of the plan,
together with a certified copy of the technical descriptions shall be filed with the Register
of Deeds for annotation in the corresponding certificate of title and thereupon said
officer shall issue a new certificate of title to the grantee for the portion conveyed, and at
the same time cancel the grantor's certificate partially with respect only to the said
portion conveyed. . . . 

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) 

It is clearly evident from the above provisions that for petitioner- register of deeds to
issue a new certificate of title, she must require the submission of the approved
subdivision plan together with the approved technical descriptions and the
corresponding owner's duplicate certificate of title. Therefore, she could not have
dispensed with the submission of the subdivision plan and relied solely on the technical
descriptions provided in the court's Order. 
Likewise, this Court holds that petitioner should have required proof of payment of
inheritance tax over the portions that were transferred to Rivera because these lots
were conveyances from the estate of her alleged grandmother, Maria Consolacion
Vidal, in whose name the lots were originally registered under OCT No. 994.

PATENTS/GOVERNMENT AWARD

Taguinod vs. Court of Appeals (533 SCRA 403)

The rights of a homestead patentee are superior to that of a tenant under the Agrarian
Reform Law.

Justalero vs. Gonzales (517 SCRA 341)

Where the predecessor of a free patent applicant did not avail of any legal remedy to
assail a decision adverse to him, his successors are bound thereby.

Estate of the Late Jesus Yujuico vs Republic (537 SCRA 513)

Reversion suits were originally utilized to annul titles/patents administratively issued by

the Director of the Lands Management Bureau or the Secretary of the DENR.

National Housing Authority vs. Soledad Pascual, 

[G.R. No. 158364. November 28, 2007.] Nullification of award by the government if
it involves annulment of a title issued, may be filed in court.

In a number of cases decided by this Court, we have sustained the propriety of the
action for annulment of title and the consequent nullification of awards granted by the
government in favor of wrongful grantees who obtained said grants in violation of public
policy or through fraudulent means. In Swan v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No. 97319,
August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 114) this Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the complaint for annulment and cancellation of title which also prayed for
the annulment of the award by the NHA of the disputed lot. In sustaining the stand of
petitioner therein, the Court held:

. . . Their action in the court below . . . being one for annulment of title of the private
respondents, the Regional Trial Courts have original jurisdiction to entertain the same.
What Raymundo prohibits is the cognizance by the courts of actions to annul NHA
awards of sale of its lots. Actually, the next step for annulling an NHA award of sale is
an appeal to the Office of the President within 33 days from receipt of the NHA decision
awarding the lot to another party. After which step, the aggrieved party can go to the
Courts via Rule 65. (Id. at 121-122.29)

National Housing Authority vs. Soledad Pascual, 

[G.R. No. 158364. November 28, 2007. Courts may not review power of
government agencies to grant awards if no nullification of title is involved.

The ruling of this Court in Raymundo v. People's Homesite and Housing

Corporation(200 Phil. 191 (1982) still stands that the power to dispose of the lands
placed under the administration of the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation
(now National Housing Authority) is lodged in said body. There is no provision of law
authorizing courts to review decisions of respondent PHHC and to take cognizance of
actions to annul awards of sale of any other action made by it pursuant to the authority
granted it by law, unless a prayer for nullification of title is in the Complaint. 

REGISTRATION OF DEEDS

Tanglao vs. Parungao (535 SCRA 123)

The act of registration by the second buyer must be coupled with good faith and no
knowledge of any defect or lack of title of the vendor or that he is not aware of facts
which should put him upon inquiry and investigation as must be necessary to acquaint
him with defects in the title.

Fudot vs. Cattleya Land Inc. (533 SCRA 351)

Knowledge gained by first buyer of second sale cannot defeat first buyer’s rights, except
where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first. It is
essential to merit the protection of Art. 1544 of the New Civil Code, that the second
realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale.

Hrs. of Rosa Dumaliang vs. Serban (516 SCRA 343) 

Registration under the Torrens system does not create nor vest title if title was based on
a forged deed.

Amodia vda de Melencion vs. Court of Appeals (534 SCRA 62) Registration Under
Art. 1544 of the New Civil Code; Registration of Sale of Titled Land Under Act
3344

The registration under Art. 1544 of the New Civil Code refers to registration under the
torrens system which considers the act of registration as the operative act that gives
validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
If a parcel of land is registered under the Land Registration Act and has a torrens
certificate of title and is sold and the sale is registered not under Land Registration Act
but under Act 3344, such sale is not considered registered as the term is used under
Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.

The loss of a certificate of title of a titled land does not convert the land into unregistered
land.

Hrs. of Zoilo Espiritu vs. Landrito (520 SCRA 385)

Registration of a foreclosure sale (where debtors were not given opportunity to settle
their debt at the correct amount without iniquitous interest) cannot transfer any rights
over mortgaged property – even after the expiration of 1 year from registration of sale.

Santos vs. Lumbao (519 SCRA 408)

The failure of a contracting party to have a document registered does not affect its
validity and enforceability as between the contracting parties for registration serves
chiefly to bind third persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the
property has been entered into.

Pineda vs. Arcalas (538 SCRA 596) A levy on execution registered takes
preference over a prior unregistered sale – a registered lien is entitled to preferential
consideration. An exception to the preference given to a registered lien is the case
where a party has actual knowledge of the claimant’s actual, open, continuous and
notorious possession of the disputed property at the time the levy or attachment is
registered.

The Court held that a registered writ of attachment is a proceeding in rem. It is against a
particular property, enforceable against the whole world. The attaching creditor acquires
a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except
the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. An exception to the preference given
to a registered lien is the case where a party has actual knowledge of the claimant’s
actual, open, continuous and notorious possession of the disputed property at the time
the levy or attachment is registered

Heirs of Marcelino Doronio vs. Hrs. of Fortunato Doronio 

(G.R. No. 169454. December 27, 2007.] No registration is made in cases of illegal
transfers

The system merely confirms ownership and does not create it. Certainly, it cannot be
used to divest the lawful owner of his title for the purpose of transferring it to another
who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. It cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of
another. Where such an illegal transfer is made, as in the case at bar, the law presumes
that no registration has been made and so retains title in the real owner of the land. 

Sanchez vs. Mapalad Realty Corporation

[G.R. No. 148516. December 27, 2007.] Buyer acquires no title if sale was done
with fraud

Where a deed of sale was attended by fraud and proved to be fictitious, the buyer
acquired no title to the subject property. The sale of four parcels of prime land along
Roxas Boulevard surrendered by a former associate of President Marcos to the Aquino
government bears the earmarks of a grand scam perpetrated by the very same persons
appointed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to safeguard
the assets of the sequestered companies. 

Heirs of Marcelino Doronio vs. Hrs. of Fortunato Doronio 

(G.R. No. 169454. December 27, 2007.] Conveyance of real estate must be made in
a proper instrument to transfer title

It is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code, is
void unless made by public instrument. In the instant case, the donation propter nuptias
executed when the Old Civil Code was in effect, did not become valid. Neither did it
create any right because it was not made in a public instrument. Hence, it conveyed no
title to the land in question to petitioners' predecessors.

SALE OF REAL ESTATE

Domingo Realty Inc vs. Court of Appeals (513 SCRA 40) Caveat Emptor Principle

Hopefully this case will serve as a precaution to prospective parties to a contract

involving titled lands for them to exercise the diligence of a reasonably prudent person
by undertaking measures to ensure the legality of the title and the accurate metes and
bounds of the lot embraced in the title. It is advisable that such parties (1) verify the
origin, history, authenticity, and validity of the title with the Office of the Register of
Deeds and the Land Registration Authority; (2) engage the services of a competent and
reliable geodetic engineer to verify the boundary, metes, and bounds of the lot subject
of said title based on the technical description in the said title and the approved survey
plan in the Land Management Bureau; (3) conduct an actual ocular inspection of the lot;
(4) inquire from the owners and possessors of adjoining lots with respect to the true and
legal ownership of the lot in question; (5) put up signs that said lot is being purchased,
leased, or encumbered; and (6) undertake such other measures to make the general
public aware that said lot will be subject to alienation, lease, or encumbrance by the
parties. Respondent Acero, for all his woes, may have a legal recourse against lessor
David Victorio who inveigled him to lease the lot which turned out to be owned by
another. 

Esguerra vs. Trinidad (518 SCRA 186) Unit Price Contract vs. Lump Sum

In a unit price contract, the statement of area of immovable is not conclusive and the
price may be reduced or increased depending on the area actually delivered. If the
vendor delivers less than the area agreed upon, the vendee may oblige the vendor to
deliver all that may be stated in the contract or demand for the proportionate reduction
of the purchase price if delivery is not possible. If the vendor delivers more than the
area stated in the contract, the vendee has the option to accept only the amount agreed
upon or to accept the whole area, provided he pays for the additional area at the
contract rate.

In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a
unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price, although
there be a greater or less areas or number than that stated in the contract.

In a contract of sale of land in a mass, it is well established that the specific boundaries
stated in the contract must control over any statement with respect to the area
contained within its boundaries. It is not of vital consequence that a deed or contract of
sale of land should disclose the area with mathematical accuracy. It is sufficient if its
extent is objectively indicated with sufficient precision to enable one to identify it. An
error as to the superficial area is immaterial. Thus, the obligation of the vendor is to
deliver everything within the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that
distinguishes the determinate object. 

TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

Borbe vs. Calalo (535 SCRA 89) Torrens Certificate Is Constructive Notice

The issuance of a torrens certificate of title is constructive notice to the whole word that
the person in whose name it is issued has become the owner of the lot described
therein.

Republic vs. Mendoza, Sr. (519 SCRA 203) Reliability of Title

One who deals with property registered under Torrens system may safely rely on the
title and is charged only with burdens and claims annotated on the title.

Tanglao vs. Parungao (535 SCRA 123) 

Indefeasibility of title does not extend to transferees who take the certificate of title in
bad faith. 
D’Oro Land Realty & Devt Corp vs. Claunan (516 SCRA 681)

A certificate of title can not be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession by
third persons.

Ochoa vs. Apeta (533 SCRA 235)

No title to registered land in derogation to that of registered owner or his hereditary

successors (who merely step into the shoes of the decedent) shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.

Barstowe vs. Republic (519 SCRA 148)

The Republic may not go after innocent purchasers of lots of a subdivision owner (who
is guilty of securing titles fraudulently) who looked into TCTs of developer and found
nothing to raise doubts as to their validity and authenticity.

Antonio vs. Santos (538 SCRA 1) When two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail and
Holder of a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a
subsequent certificate.

This court has ruled that, when two certificates of title are issued to different persons
covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier date must prevail; and in case of
successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the same land,
the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who
relies on a subsequent certificate.

II. LAND REGISTRATION:

P.D. 1529 SEC. 14 (1) AND (2)

Buenaventura vs. Republic (517 SCRA 271) 
Limcoma Multipurpose Cooperative vs. Republic (527 SCRA 233)
Applicant may acquire title by prescription under Sec. 14(2) of P.D. 1529 even if
he cannot prove possession since June 12, 1945

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No.
1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain,
possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the
application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws." 

It becomes crystal clear from the aforesaid ruling of the Court that even if the
possession of alienable lands of the public domain commenced only after 12 June
1945, application for registration of the said property is still possible by virtue of Section
14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree which speaks of prescription.

Under the Civil Code, prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership. Article
1106 of the Civil Code provides:

By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time
in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. 

Also in Article 1113 of the Civil Code, it is provided that:

All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivision not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.

Likewise, Article 1137 of the Civil Code states that: 

Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
(Emphasis supplied.) 

It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be

converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession
of at least 30 years. Such property now falls within the contemplation of "private lands"
under Section 14 (2), over which title by prescription can be acquired. Hence, because
of Section 14 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, those who are in possession of
alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as open,
continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to register their title
to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land commenced only after 12
June 1945. 29
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE

Republic vs. San Lorenzo (513 SCRA 294) 

Reyes vs. Republic (512 SCRA 217)

Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended (Public Land Act), and
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, require that the applicants must prove that the land is alienable
and disposable public land; and that they or through their predecessors in interest, have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.

Republic vs. Sarmiento (518 SCRA 250 ) Applicant Under Act 141 must prove how
his title was acquired from State
It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is indispensable that the person
claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any
other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 

Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative vs. Republic (527 SCRA 233) Difference

Between Registration Proceedings Under P.D. 1529 and Act 141

Notably, Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, are original registration proceedings, against the whole
world, and the decree of registration issued for both is conclusive and final. It is evident
from the above-cited provisions that an application for land registration must conform to
three requisites: (1) the land is alienable public land; (2) the applicant's open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof must be since
June 12, 1945, or earlier; and (3) it is under a bona fide claim of ownership. 

The laws vary only with respect to their operation. Under the Property Registration
Decree, there already exists a title which the court need only confirm while the Public
Land Act works under the presumption that the land applied for still pertains to the
State, and the occupants and possessors merely claim an interest in the land by virtue
of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession thereof. 

CERTIFICATE OF ALIENABILITY

Republic vs. Bibonia (525 SCRA 268) Land must be alienable and disposable as
of time of filing of application for registration of title not necessarily as of June
12, 1945

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the
time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the
property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case,
then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.

Republic vs. Mendoza (519 SCA 203) Courts cannot inquire into reasons why a
land is reclassified into alienable and disposable land

X X X it cannot be gainsaid that the prerogative of classifying public lands pertains to

administrative agencies which have been specially tasked by statutes to do so and that
the courts will not interfere on matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government and/or quasi-judicial agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under their special technical knowledge and training. It should be stressed that
the function of administering and disposing of lands of the public domain in the manner
prescribed by law is not entrusted to the courts but to executive officials. And as such,
courts should refrain from looking into the underlying reasons or grounds which impelled
the classification and declaration of Silot Bay as timberland and its subsequent release
as alienable and disposable land. From the facts of the case, it is evident that the
Bureau of Forestry released Silot Bay as alienable and disposable by virtue of the
Memorandum issued by then President Marcos on 16 January 1967 which clearly
empowered said bureau to identify and locate the 700,000 hectares of fishpond areas
and to release said areas as alienable and disposable. Hence, the courts, in view of the
clear legal directive by which said area was released as alienable and disposable, will
refrain from questioning the wisdom of such classification or declaration.

Domingo vs. Landicho (531 SCRA 606)

Republic vs. Barandiaran (538 SCRA 705)
Applicant must prove positive act of government that land is alienable and
disposable

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State, and unless it has been shown that they have been reclassified by
the State as alienable or disposable to a private person, they remain part of the
inalienable public domain. 

To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence
of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order, or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator
or a legislative act or statute. 

Republic vs. San Lorenzo (513 SCRA 294) Certificate of Alienability Is Not Proof
of Possession
Second, the acceptance by the courts a quo of the CENRO certificate of alienability and
disposability as evidence of possession since the date of said certificate is patently
erroneous. According to the CENRO certification, the subject land was alienable and
disposable public land since June 7, 1938. This certification does not in any way
indicate that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of
the property as far back as 1938.

Republic vs. Sarmiento (518 SCRA 250 ) Surveyor’s Certification Is Not Proof That
Land Is Alienable and Disposable

A mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying
solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the
land in question has been declared alienable. It is not enough to rely on blue print copy
of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the
notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and
disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by
the Bureau of Forestry." 

Republic vs. Barandiaran (538 SCRA 1) A mere notation on the advance plan to
the effect that said properties are alienable and disposable is not the kind of
proof required by law to prove that land is alienable. 

Republic vs. Consunji (533 SCRA 269) 

Republic vs. Barandiaran (538 SCRA 705)
Buenaventura vs. Republic (517 SCRA 271)
Certification from the Government/DENR that land is alienable and disposable is
sufficient to prove its status as such.

The certification from the DENR that the land subject of the application is within the
alienable and disposable project, is sufficient to establish the true nature and character
of the subject properties. Similarly, it enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence
of contradictory evidence. 

APPLICATION
Herce, Jr. vs. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna (512 SCRA 332, 333) The Court may
order the striking out of one or more parcels or the severance of the application for
registration of title which refers to more than one parcel of land

An application for land registration may include two or more parcels of land, but the
court may at any time order an application to be amended by striking out one or more of
the parcels or order a severance of the application.

DEATH OF AN APPLICANT DURING PENDENCY OF 

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE
Domingo vs. Landicho ((531 SCRA 606) The Court must order the substitution of
heirs of an applicant who died during pendency of the land registration case

When a party dies in an action that survives and no order is issued by the court for the
appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased in substitution of
the deceased, and as a matter of fact no substitution has ever been effected, the
proceedings held by the court without such legal representatives or heirs and the
judgment rendered after such trial are null and void because the court acquired no
jurisdiction over the person of the legal representative or of the heirs upon whom the
trial and judgment would be binding. Unlike, however, jurisdiction over the subject
matter which is conferred by law, jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case
may, however, be waived either expressly or impliedly.

INITIAL HEARING
Republic vs. San Lorenzo (513 SCRA 294) Initial Hearing Beyond the 90-Day
Period

The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land registration court. After
an applicant has filed his application, the law requires the issuance of a court order
setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court document. The
notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the
clerk of court to the LRA [Land Registration Authority]. This involves a process to which
the party applicant absolutely has no participation. X X X Respondent should not be
faulted if the initial hearing that was conducted on September 23, 1995 was outside the
90-day period set forth under Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, and (b) that
respondent might have substantially complied with the requirement thereunder relating
to the registration of the subject land." Hence, on the issue of jurisdiction, we find for the
respondent, in that its application for registration was rightfully given due course by the
MTCC.

PUBLICATION
Hrs. of Regalado vs. Republic (516 SCRA 38) Technical Description of Smaller
Lots Sought to Be Registered Must Be Published

If what is sought to be registered are sublots of a bigger lot, the publication must contain
the technical descriptions of the smaller lots since the adjoining owners of the mother lot
are not the adjoining owners of the smaller lots. 

EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION
A. TAX DECLARATIONS
Republic vs. Consunji (533 SCRA 269) Even if earliest tax declarations do not
date back to 1945, still if there is credible testimony, court will grant petition for
registration.

The fact that the earliest tax declarations of the lots were for the year 1955 will not
mitigate against respondent. In Recto v. Republic (440 SCRA 79) it was held that:

. . . the belated declaration of the lot for tax purposes does not necessarily mean that
possession by the previous owners thereof did not commence in 1945 or earlier. As
long as the testimony supporting possession for the required period is credible, the
court will grant the petition for registration.

Hrs. of Marina Regalado vs. Republic (516 SCRA 38) Delayed declaration for tax
purpose negates claim of continuous, exclusive and uninterrupted possession as
owner
While it is a good indication of possession in the concept of owner, delayed declaration
of property for tax purposes negates a claim of continuous, exclusive, and interrupted
possession in the concept of an owner. 

Republic vs. Sta. Ana Burgos (523 SCRA 309)

Buenaventura vs. Republic (517 SCRA 271) Tax declarations especially dating
back to 1948 or 1945 are good indicia of ownership

As a rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
his actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has
a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to
the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such
an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 

Republic vs. Barandiaran (538 SCRA 1) Tax receipts and declarations when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property become evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription.

It is settled that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership; they only become evidence of ownership
acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. 

TRACING CLOTH/SURVEY PLAN

Republic vs. Munoz (536 SCRA 108) Original tracing cloth plan may be dispensed
with if there is duly certified blue print copy of tracing cloth with technical
description 

In the case of Recto vs. Republic (440 SCRA 79), the Supreme Court held that a duly
certified blue print copy of the tracing cloth with the technical description is sufficient
compliance and the submission of the survey plan on tracing cloth may be dispensed
with.

Dolino vs. Court of Appeals (401 SCRA 695) DENR officials may be compelled to
conduct a survey of land subject of an application for registration of title notwithstanding
the PP No. 932 which DENR says has withdrawn subject lot from entry, sale, disposition
and settlement.

A survey of the land subject of an application for registration is an essential requirement

for without the lot being surveyed, an applicant would not be able to initiate proper land
registration proceedings. The DENR may be compelled to conduct a survey and
inspection of lots subject of application for registration for this would not automatically
result in the adjudication of lots to the applicants if the land is not alienable and
disposable and if they have not possessed it for the length of time and manner required
by law. 

JUDGMENT
Ting vs. Hrs. of Lirio (518 SCRA 336) Final and executory judgment in land
registration case need not be enforced by motion or an action under Sec 6 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court

Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. (111 Phil. 947, 951 (1961) enunciates the raison d'etre why
Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above

assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land
registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of
10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority
for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be
enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action
(Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable
to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a
civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse
party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in
the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established.
After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing
party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him
therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule
39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to
place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

Republic vs. Nillas (512 SCRA 286) Failure of administrative authorities to issue
decree cannot oust prevailing party from ownership of land

The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the
judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is
imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition
to the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land
court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in
turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies
of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land Registration
Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration and the
transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the
officers charged with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of
amendment or review.

The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of
the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land.
Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate
goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive
determination of real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an
additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had
attained finality would simply frustrate such goal. 

ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

Hrs. of Regalado vs. Republic (516 SCRA 38)

The failure of the Republic to file any opposition or answer to the application for
registration, despite receipt of notice thereof, did not deprive its right to appeal the RTC
decision. 

Barstowe Philippines Corporation vs. Republic (519 SCRA 238) 

Republic vs. Mendoza (519 SCRA 203)
Exception to rule that estoppel does not lie vs. government

The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of
its officials or agents. However, like all general rules, this is also subject to exceptions,
viz:

"Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in
rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to
defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be
applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where
the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be
allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an
ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . . the doctrine of equitable
estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private
individuals."
xxx xxx xxx
It is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by laches
against the government to avoid an injustice to the innocent purchasers for value.
Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot
disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. Such cancellation
would impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance
whether the title has been regularly issued or not. This would be contrary to the very
purpose of the law, which is to stabilize land titles. Verily, all persons dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefor, and the law or the courts do not oblige, them to go behind the certificate in
order to investigate again the true condition of the property. They are only charged with
notice of the lions and encumbrances on the property that are noted on the certificate.

Estate of Late Jesus Yujuico vs. Republic (537 SCRA 513) Estoppel may lie against the
Government if it did not act to contest title for unreasonable length of time

Subject to its limitations, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against
public authorities when the lot is alienated to innocent purchasers for value and the
government did not undertake any act to contest the title for an unreasonable length of
time. 

ISSUANCE OF A DECREE
Hrs. of Tama Tan Buto vs. Luy (528 SCRA 522)
Petition for Review of Decree must be filed within 1 year from issuance of decree
otherwise title becomes indefeasible

When the petition for review of decree is filed after the expiration of one (1) year from
the issuance of the decree of registration, the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon.
The certificate of title that was issued attained the status of indefeasibility one year after
its issuance. The aggrieved party cannot defeat title previously issued by subsequently
filing an application for registration of land previous registered.

See also Esguerra vs. Trinidad (518 SCRA 186)

Ingusan vs. Hrs. of Aureliano Reyes (513 SCRA 315) 

When an original certificate of title is secured fraudulently and in breach of trust, a direct
attack on the title is a petition for review of decree of registration under Sec. 32 of P.D.
1529.

Hrs. of Maximo Labanon vs. Hrs. of Constancio Labanon (530 SCRA 97) If petition
for review of decree is not possible, there are other remedies for reconveyance of
property to rightful owner

Contrary to petitioners' interpretation, Sec. 32 of P.D. 1529 does not totally deprive a
party of any remedy to recover the property fraudulently registered in the name of
another. Section 32 of PD 1529 merely precludes the reopening of the registration
proceedings for titles covered by the Torrens System, but does not foreclose other
remedies for the reconveyance of the property to its rightful owner. As elaborated in
Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac (403 SCRA 291, 297):

While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration
becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party
of a remedy in law. The acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is
utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners. 7

A more succinct explanation is found in Vda. De Recinto v. Inciong (77 SCRA 196,
201.) thus: 

The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not
necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein for he
does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally
included. It is evident from the records that the petitioner owns the portion in question
and therefore the area should be conveyed to her. The remedy of the land owner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one
year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree
as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. 

Manotok Realty Inc. vs. CLT Realty Devt. Corp.

[G.R. No. 123346. December 14, 2007.] It is from date of issuance of a title when
the decree of registration is transcribed that a certificate of title is to take effect

With the plain language of the law as mooring, this Court in two vintage and sound
rulings made it plain that the original certificate of title is issued on the date the decree
of registration is transcribed. In the first ruling, it was held that there is a marked
distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of title; the
entry of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the
certificate of title is made by the register of deeds. (Antiporda v. Mapa, 55 Phil. 89, 91
(1930). Such difference is highlighted by Sec. 31 of Act No. 496 as it provides that the
certificate of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. In the second, it
was stressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree
of registration made by the registrar of deeds in the registry. (PNB v. Tan, 51 Phil. 317,
321 (1927))
Otherwise stated, what is actually issued by the register of deeds is the certificate of title
itself, not the decree of registration, as he is precisely the recipient from the land
registration office of the decree for transcription to the certificate as well as the
transcriber no less. Since what is now acknowledged as the authentic OCT No. 994
indicates that it was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on 3
May 1917, it is that date that is the date of registration since that was when he was able
to transcribe the decree in the registration book, such entry made in the book being the
original certificate of title. (See Act No. 496, Sec. 41.) Moreover, it is only after the
transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the certificate of title is to take
effect..

RES JUDICATA
Hrs. Tama Tan Buto vs. Luy (528 SCRA 522)

A previous final and executory judgment awarding the lot in favor of a party bars the
losing party from later filing an application for registration of title covering the same lot. 

RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES
Hrs. of Venturanza vs. Republic (528 SCRA 238)

A court has no jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of title over land which was never
registered. The records of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur, do not show how
the land covered by TCT No. 140 supposedly in the name of Florencio Mora was
registered. A land may be considered as not having been originally registered if there is
no decree number, original certificate of title number or LRC Record.

Barstowe Philippines Corporation vs. Republic (519 SCRA 148) Judicially

reconstituted titles are superior to administratively reconstituted titles.

Reconstituted titles shall have the same validity and legal effect as the originals thereof"
unless the reconstitution was made extrajudicially. In contrast to the judicial
reconstitution of a lost certificate of title which is in rem, the administrative reconstitution
is essentially ex-parte and without notice. The reconstituted certificates of title do not
share the same indefeasible character of the original certificates of title for the following
reason —

The nature of a reconstituted Transfer Certificate Of Title of registered land is similar to

that of a second Owner's Duplicate Transfer Certificate Of Title. Both are issued, after
the proper proceedings, on the representation of the registered owner that the original
of the said TCT or the original of the Owner's Duplicate TCT, respectively, was lost and
could not be located or found despite diligent efforts exerted for that purpose. Both,
therefore, are subsequent copies of the originals thereof. A cursory examination of
these subsequent copies would show that they are not the originals. Anyone dealing
with such copies are put on notice of such fact and thus warned to be extra-careful. .
REVERSION BY THE GOVERNMENT

Hrs. of Venturanza vs. Republic (528 SCRA 238) The Government can file
reversion proceedings to recover inalienable lands of public domain even if in
hands of innocent purchasers for value.

It is, thus, safe to conclude that the land subject of TCT No. 2574 could not have been
registered in the name of petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest for the simple
reason that under the Constitution, timberlands, which are part of the public domain,
cannot be alienated. A certificate of title covering inalienable lands of the public domain
is void and can be cancelled in whosever hand said title may be found. Thus, we have
ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain
classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on non-disposable
lands even if in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. 

Estate of the Late Jesus Yujuico vs. Republic (537 SCRA 513) Action for reversion
which seeks to cancel a judgment of the RTC awarding lot to an applicant should
be filed before Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure

While CA No. 141 did not specify whether judicial confirmation of titles by a land
registration court can be subject of a reversion suit, the government availed of such
remedy by filing actions with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel titles and decrees
granted in land registration applications, but the situation changed on 14 August 1981
upon the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which gave the Intermediate Appellate
Court the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
Regional Trial Courts. When the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure became effective on 1
July 1997, it incorporated Rule 47 on annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts. Effective 1 July 1997, any action for reversion
of public land instituted by the Government was already covered by Rule 47 and the
same should be filed with the Court of Appeals, not the Regional Trial Court.