 differentiated as not Bantu.

 Their opponents, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), Obote's government and army,
were usually referred to as 'northerners' in general, 'Nilotes', 'Bacholi', or 'Abacholi'. But

 In Northern Uganda, meanwhile, even with the uncertainty caused by the often halting nature
of Juba talks, a transition on the ground from war to peace was underway.
 In Acholi, people were no longer being forcibly kept in camps and were leaving in ever growing
numbers.
 Even many of those who had not yet gone home had begun to go out to farm once again. The
roads were busy as people traveled freely without fear.
 The relative peace that had come to northern Uganda since the GoSS and LRA/M began
negotiations in late 2005 that led to the Juba peace talks. It was still fragile, but it was real and
noticeable. Peace was returning to Northern Uganda.
 Meanwhile, the situation for the rebels in Garamba was changing. For more than 2 years, as the
LRA/M established and built up their base in the expansive Garamba forest, rebel attacks and
abductions were relatively rare, although certainly not absent. It was accompanied by a de facto
arrangement between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government and the rebels to
leave each other.

April 10, 2008

- After a number of delays, Kony was scheduled to add his signature, with President Museveni to
sign four (4) days later.
- In confused circumstances that reflected continuing divisions between and within rebel
delegation fighters, Kony did not sign, since he wanted further clarification about DDR and the
mix of "traditional" and formal legal proceedings that he and his fighters faced, including the
role of the ICC.
May 09, 2008
- Kony invited leaders and elders from Northern Uganda for a meeting the next month to discuss
the contested issues of restorative and retributive justice.

May 13, 2008

- The assembled leaders who had come to meet Kony issued a "communique" that lamented his
failure to show up.
- Commended the patience and efforts of Chief Mediator Riek Machar who had waited with the
group.
- Urged Kony to sign the final peace agreement.
- Urged continued commitment to peace on the part of all concerned.

May 25, 2008

- Kony had rejected signing any peace agreement with the GoU, saying that he would rather die in
the bush than turn himself in to the GoU or ICC and "be hanged".
- The Juba peace process, after nearly two (2) years of talks that had produced landmark
agreements, was sent reeling.

 Still,
- nt, signaled an end to South Sudan's open-ended commitment to the Juba talks.
- In a message to the GoSS National Assembly, he stated that Kony should no longer have an Kony
once more failed to show up.
- For almost all concerned, the Juba peace process was dead.
- There were a few feints suggesting otherwise over the next ten (10) days including Museveni
saying that he would agree to talk directly by phone with Kony.
- But immediately after the November 30th deadline passed, Uganda began actively
implementing plans to send the UPDF into Congo on a military mission to destroy the LRA.
- Reports from the rebel camp indicate that they too were preparing for war.

 Operation Lightning Thunder was bout to begin.

February 11, 2008

- Considerably higher figures for rescued abductees were given: 280 in total, 120 "reporting" to
the UPDF, and 165 to the FARDC. (New Vision)

February 15, 2008

- The number of rebels reported killed was upped to 146, although 100 of these were identified
only as "dead bodies our troops have come across in the bombarded forests." (New Vision)

Mid-March 2008
 - 12 UPDF members killed, 1 jet down, 100 rebels claimed dead were bodies found in the forest,
not killed in direct ground engagements, 50 rebels killed, 5 LRA commanders captured, and 300
abductees rescued.

March 15, 2018

- Announced ending of the operation.

 However, government spokesperson and supporters trying to paint the most positive picture
possible have had a difficult time doing so.
 New Vision, government newspaper
 UPDF failed to kill or capture top rebel leaders, inflict serious losses on rebel fighters in
general, rescue more than limited numbers of LRA abductees, or - crucially - provide or
even plan for the protection of local civilians.
 Upwards of 1000 were killed, hundreds abducted, and up to 200,000 displaced during the 3
months after Operation Lightning Thunder began.
 UPDF disclaimed responsibility for protecting civilians from LRA reprisals, and instead blamed
FARDC and UN in Congo and SPLA in South Sudan, for failing to do so.
 Due to the failure of capturing or killing Joseph Kony and many other senior commanders, it led
to strong criticism of Uganda for poor planning, intelligence gathering and execution.

HR VIOLATIONS

1. Forced Recruitment
o Often killed those who were reluctant to join the LRA or hacked off their ears, lips, and
limbs.
2. Violence Against Women & Children such as:
o Raided a girl's school;
o Female abductees were often forced to become wives of the rebels and some incurred
aids;
o A mother was instructed to eat her son and was beaten to death with a padlock when
she refused.
3. The heads of the disabled were crushed with the butts of rifles.
4. Mutilated those who stood in their way, or those simply in the wrong place at the wrong time,
cutting off innocent civilians' noses, lips, and hands.
5. Local leaders are forbidden to report their location to the Ugandan army or else their lips will be
speared.
6. Individuals caught riding bicycles would have their legs and buttocks cut off.
7. People would be forced to torture one another;
8. Structural Violence by the government:
o October 04, 2002: A headline that took up more than a quarter of the front page of The
Daily Monitor screamed, "Army Gives Acholi 48 Hours to Quit Homes";
o UPDF has ordered people living in the 3 districts of Pader, Gulu and Kitgum to vacate
their homes.
o According to a letter by the commander of "Operation Iron Fist", Brig. Aronda
Nyakairima, the villages must move to or near designated camps for Internally Displaced
People within 48 hours.
o Nyakairima said the people should vacate with immediate effect from 7:00am of Oct.
o This announcement goes to all law-abiding citizens in the abandoned villages of Gulu,
Pader and Kitgum districts to vacate with immediate effect."
o After LRA attacks extended in 2003-2004 into the Lango and Teso subregions, nearly a
million more were displaced (although without government fiat), creating the conditions
that in 2005 Egeland described as "the biggest neglected humanitarian emergency in
the world."
o Nearly 2 million northern Ugandans now lived in camps, more than a million of whom in
Acholi (over 90 percent of the subregion) were forced to do so by the government
policy. It also left most of the encamped people with little or no protection from the
rebels. The camps were no longer even euphemistically called "protected villages" but
IDP camps.
o Government provision of basic services - water, sanitation, health care, education to the
camps was inadequate. It was impossible for most households to grow food or make a
living in another way. Huts could be so close together their thatched roofs touched.
Poverty and congestion led to high levels of alcoholism, domestic and sexual violence,
and crime.
o Forced encampment means forced dependency, forced vulnerability, forced humiliation,
forced congestion within camps, and forced isolation from outside. The physical,
psychological, economic, social, and cultural damage caused by forced encapment is
almost unimaginable. Human resilience and strength of will helped many people to cope
creatively and positively with the extreme circumstances forced upon them.
o Of adults surveyed in camps in Gulu and Kitgum districts, over 50% had been abducted
during the war, nearly 40% had their own child abducted, over 2/3 had witnessed a child
being abducted; nearly half had witnessed a family member being killed, over half had
been threatened with death, and nearly 20% had been physically mutilated, maimed, or
injured. (2005 survey)
o The statistics do not incorporate much of the domestic violence endemic in the camps,
nor do they include evidence of most UPDF violence.
o Conditions in the camps were resulting in 1,000 excess deaths a week. Thus the
structural violence of camp life produced a far greater number of deaths than those
caused by the LRA, just more quietly and unobtrusively. (2005 study by WHO & Ugandan
Ministry of Health)
 o Report rates of trauma in northern Uganda is higher than in either Darfur or Iraq, with 2
most common causes being: (1) lack of food and water; (2) lack of shelter and housing.
(2008 study by the London School of Tropical Medicine)
o The inadequacy of government protection and services so glaring that an eventual flood
of nongovernmental organizations and other humanitarian aid agencies tried to fill the
void.
o However, according to Sverker Finnström, structural violence is relatively easy to ignore,
mask, or deny. This is not yet the "official discourse" of the Northern Uganda war.

COMMON LIES TOLD BY JOSEPH KONY AND HIS TOP COMMANDERS TO

BRAINWASH THE ABDUCTEES

1. SPREADING FEAR OF ESCAPE

o Double-edged sword of fear:
a. Fighters will be beaten and killed by Kony's army if they attempt to escape; and
b. If they happen to successfully escape, then they will be killed by the
communities that they escape to.
2. PERFORMING SPECIFIC RITUALS TO FOSTER A UNIQUE LRA IDENTITY
o LRA forbids certain foods and practices that will remind kidnapped soldiers of their
culture.

Example:
The 'calabash gourd', an important ceremonial instrument in Uganda, is forbidden by
LRA.

Whispering is considered a taboo because it is a sign of plotting.

Killing as a way to ensure one's favor in the eyes of LRA commanders and potentially
receive a promotion through the ranks:
"If you didn't want to kill, the commanders would say, are you not one of us? Please,
come forward and kill." -One rescued soldier
3. LIES ABOUT SPIRITUAL MYSTICISM
o Making others believe that he is a superior, godly being.

 An estimated 300,000 children under the age of 18 actively took part in combat and served as
support personnel for armed groups in more than 30 conflicts worldwide.
 Outside of Uganda, the LRA's abductees include those with different backgrounds, language,
and culture, adding a layer of complexity to the 'forced indoctrination process' as their historical
exploitation of the Acholi tribal identity as a reason to fight with the group is no longer relevant.
 United Nations, in its report to the Security Council, estimated that between July 2009 and
February 2012, the LRA had abducted 591 children, with a roughly even split between girls and
boys in the DRC, South Sudan, and CAR.
 LRA's recipe for making children, killers:
1. They must abandon all hope of returning home;
2. They must be blooded by the act of a murder; and
 3. Through superstition and ritual, their new persona is inflated with its own sense of
esteem.

CHILD SOLDIERS

1. ABDUCTION
o Abductees are assigned to an older combatant who already had an existing 'family
structure';

 Family Structure: Consists of 1 or multiple women who are forced to act as

wives and them as their children as a strategy or sustainable way to condition
new members. Once they were already contracted out to smaller units, effective
supervision was possible.

o Subject to beatings and abuse;

 Girls are controlled not only by the combatant they are assigned to, but also by
other wives and family members in that social unit.

2. FORCED RECRUITMENT
o Commanders are instructing the newcomers to step forward and select a weapon;

3. PROLONGED EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE

o Killing or harming others;
o Committing atrocities against their own family in order to prove their loyalty;
o Children would often deny their mother or father or else LRA would make them kill their
parents so that they'd have no family to escape to.

4. SEXUAL VIOLENCE

5. ISOLATION AND CONTROL OF COMMUNICATION: Focused on ensuring that fellow abductees did
not interact or bond with each other.
o Many new abductees reported being forced to march for hours and sometimes days
into forest;
o Abductees were not allowed to speak in their native languages or communicate with
others;

 These measures were intended to prevent children from bonding with each
other and from forming escape plans.

o Congolese children describe spending days hiking and transporting looted goods or
sitting in groups to rest in total silence.

6. FORCED LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AND LANGUAGE AS INDICATION OF IDENTITY: recruits have

different backgrounds, language and culture than the majority of the LRA, adding a layer of
complexity to the process of forced indoctrination.
 o Severe beatings to any new members who talk amongst themselves;
o Severe beatings to those who use a language other than Acholi;

 This compels abductees to quickly learn the language of the LRA in order to
communicate.

o Children were assigned new names to strip them of their identities and
rechristening them as members of the LRA;
o Children often avoided speaking their language once they returned to their
communities because it served as a marker of being an outsider and emphasized
their previous identity with LRA.

7. PUBLIC PUNISHMENT TO INTIMIDATE: a way to ensure that abducted children were aware of
the price of disobedience.
o Killings and beatings were used to discourage escape in particular;
o LRA will kill one of those children in front of the other abductees in order to send a
public message;

 Served to intimidate children into staying in the group and obeying orders.

o Forcing abductees to kill or beat their peers;

 Used to break social ties and make children feel complicit in the brutality.

8. CHILDREN HAD NO SENSE OF STABILITY

o Forced to search for food in the forest;

o Underwent spontaneous fasting periods until the next raid.

 Basic survival became linked to obedience to the command structure and to

staying in the group.

o Daily life in the LRA was a roundelay of hunger, marching, bullying and beatings,
interrupted by violent raids.

9. SEVERE KILLINGS
o Once they scream, they will kill them;
o Upon asking if an abducted child wants to rest and then the child answered yes,
they will take the child under the tree and kill him;
o Toddlers were tossed into burning buildings;

NOTE:

×× The process involves staying with the LRA for a significant amount of time. After a year or more,
abductees especially boys were given difficult tasks to test their loyalty just like being sent on an errand
to a distant place. His return was seen as an indication of his loyalty to the group. Successful children
were lined up as their brigade clapped and sang and handed new weapons sprinkled with holy water.
The process of becoming a soldier can then begin and is characterized by the use of witchcraft and
secretive rituals. In the final phase, a boy is given a gun and eventually a wife so he can start his own
family.

×× Witchcraft or "gris gris" was used at several points during the abduction and conscription process;
immediately upon abduction, and later as a symbol of transition into becoming "true LRA". A number of
children describe undergoing a magical ritual after first being abducted, often in the form of oil or
cutting. While some noted that magic was applied immediately after abduction, it was also common to
hear of gris gris as a way to signal the transition from an abductee to a true soldier. This was echoed by
family members of abductees and the children themselves, who looked at receiving witchcraft as an
indication of the mental changes one undergoes in the group.

TESTIMONIES
(refer to reference)

 "Kony's not scary. He will talk with you in a friendly manner. He doesn't want you to be afraid of
him. He wants you to be a very strong man and look him in the eyes. And he can talk! From
morning to sunset about very many things, mostly, political. By the way a person behaves, you
will recognise they're possessed. When he's talking, he's shouting, his face looks changed. We
see that. A common man could not speak from morning until sunset while standing."
-Norman Okello, former LRA child soldier.

LRA TODAY

 LRA's numbers appear to have declined greatly in recent years following initiatives such as
Operation Lightning Thunder.
 According to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, they estimates that LRA forces now appear to
be as low as 250-300 members, traveling on foot and equipped with small arms. They travel in
small bands, remain highly mobile, and continued to move across a wide area.
 The UK Foreign Office Ministers said that although the scale of its activities has declined, the LRA
continues to pose an unprincipled and violent threat to the civilian populations in all areas in
which it is active.
  Attacks by the LRA on civilian communities continue:
o 2008: They reportedly killed over 2,400 people and abducted a further 3,400.
o December 2008: Large-scale massacres in DRC. Over 700 people were killed in the
districts of Faradje, Duru, and Doruma.
o 2009: More than 300 people were reportedly killed in Makombo, 206 abducted,
including 80 children.
o Between January and August 2011: United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs received reports of 254 attacks by the LRA on civilians in the DRC,
South Sudan, and CAR. It resulted to 126 deaths and 368 recorded abductions. An
estimated 440,000 people are also currently internally displaced or living as refugees
owing to LRA attacks, 335,000 of those within DRC.

"The LRA continues to pose a substantial threat to regional security in Central Africa. The atrocities that
they commit have serious humanitarian and human rights consequences. The United Kingdom
condemns in the strongest terms their continued violations of humanitarian law and their human rights
abuses, which have resulted in the displacement of 440,000 people across the region. The LRA's
campaign has the potential to cause further instability in the DRC, South Sudan and the Central African
Republic and hamper the efforts of these countries to progress towards peace and security. Removing
the threat of the LRA is important in terms of creating and consolidating a secure and stable
environment in the affected countries."
- Michael Tatham, Ambassador and Political Coordinator of the UK Mission to the UN (November 14,
2011)

DIFFICULTIES IN LITIGATION

Difficulties persist in bringing senior members of the LRA to justice if and when they are captured.

January 2010
 Mr. Thomas Kwoyelo, former LRA commander, applied for amnesty under the Uganda Amnesty
Act.

July 2011
 The High Court of Uganda commenced his trial for war crimes.

September 22, 2011

 The Constitutional Court ruled that the failure of the State to grant such amnesty violated his
constitutional right to equal protection of the law.

The State has filed an appeal to the Supreme Court and the trial has been put on hold.

EFFORTS OF UGANDA TO PROSECUTE WARCRIMES

2000
  Ugandan government enacted an amnesty for Ugandan citizens including LRA fighters involved
in an armed rebellion against the state if they renounced their involvement.
 More than 12,906 people affiliated with the LRA have been granted amnesty, including a
number of former high-ranking LRA commanders.

Note: Amnesties for war crimes and crimes against humanity violate international law, which rejects
immunity from prosecution for the gravest crimes.

2011
- Uganda established an International Crimes Division to try war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and other crimes.
- Serious legal obstacles have emerged that call into question whether the division can fulfill its
potential as a meaningful forum to ensure accountability.
- Only one case related to the conflict to in northern Uganda has been brought before the
International Crimes Division, that of Thomas Kwoyelo, a former LRA member captured in Congo
in March 2009 who is charged with war crimes.

International Criminal Court

December 2003
- President Museveni deferred the situation concerning the LRA in the north of the country to the
International Criminal Court.

July 2004
- The Prosecutor of the ICC formally opened investigations.

July 08, 2005

- International Criminal Court (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber II issued 5 warrants of arrest for 5 senior
leaders of the LRA that was transmitted to Uganda, Congo, & Sudan:
1. Joseph Kony
2. Vincent Otti
o Presumed deceased though the circumstances of his death remain
contentious.
3. Okot Odhiambo
4. Dominic Ongwen
o a former abducted child
5. Raska Lukwiya
o Terminated following confirmation of his death in 2007.

Note: "the remaining three fugitives are still actively involved in the atrocities committed by the
LRA in the subregion"
-UN Secretary General

- Allegations in the arrest warrant:

 In the middle of the year 2002, Joseph Kony ordered LRA forces to begin a campaign of attacks
against civilians in Uganda.

In late 2003, Kony issued orders to kill, loot and abduct civilian populations, including those
living in camps for internally displaced persons.

In response, senior LRA commanders and all of the brigade commanders including the persons
named in the warrants of arrest began attacking several regions in Uganda.

- CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES committed in Uganda from 2002 to 2005.

"We expect our evidence to show that the LRA systematically committed crimes against the civilian
population, including abducting children to use them as soldiers and sex slaves. We also have evidence
that rapes were committed directly by the LRA commanders. We believe the best way to stop the
conflict and restore security to the region is to arrest the top leaders. The LRA is an involuntary army and
the majority of the fighters are formerly abducted children. Arresting the top leaders is the best way to
ensure that these crimes are stopped and not exported to other countries."
-Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ICC's Prosecutor

AS TO RASKA LUKWIYA

 4 counts of his individual criminal responsibility (Article 25[3][b]) of the Statute including:

× 1 count of CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

a. Enslavement - Art. 7(1)(c).

× 3 counts of WAR CRIMES

a. Cruel Treatment of Civilians - Art. 8(2)(c)(i);
b. Intentionally Directing An Attack Against A Civilian Population - Art. 8(2)(e)(i);
c. Pillaging - Art. 8(2)(e)(v).

 August 13, 2006: Uganda's military announced that it had killed Lukwiya.
 April 2007: Following a DNA analysis, the Office of the Prosecutor requested the withdrawal of
his arrest warrant.
 July 11, 2007: Pre-Trial Chamber terminated the proceedings thereby rendering the warrant of
arrest without effect.

AS TO DOMINIC ONGWEN

 7 counts of his individual criminal responsibility (Article 25[3][b]) of the Statute including:

× 3 counts of CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

 a. Murder - Art. 7(1)(a);
b. Enslavement - Art. 7(1)(c);
c. Inhumane Acts of Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury and Suffering - Art. 7(1)(k).

× 4 counts of WAR CRIMES

a. Murder - Art. 8(2)(c)(i);
b. Cruel Treatment of Civilians - Art. 8(2)(c)(i);
c. Intentionally Directing An Attack Against A Civilian Population - Art. 8(2)(e)(i);
d. Pillaging - Art. 8(2)(e)(v).

AS TO OKOT ODIAMBO

 10 counts of his individual criminal responsibility (Article 25[3][b]) of the Statute including:

× 2 counts of CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

a. Murder - Art. 7(1)(a);
b. Enslavement - Art. 7(1)(c).

× 8 counts of WAR CRIMES

a. Murder - Art. 8(2)(c)(i);
b. Intentionally Directing An Attack Against A Civilian Population - Art. 8(2)(e)(i);
c. Pillaging - Art. 8(2)(e)(v);
d. Forced Enlisting of Children - Art. 8(2)(e)(vii).

 Allegedly killed during fighting between different rebel groups in April 2008.
 March 2015: The Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) unearthed the remains of a body in
the south-east region of the Central African Republic (CAR), near the border of the Democratic
Republic of Congo.
 DNA identification established that the body is that of Odiambo.

AS TO VINCENT OTTI

 32 counts of his individual criminal responsibility (Article 25[3][b]) of the Statute including:

× 11 counts of CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

a. Murder - Art. 7(1)(a);
b. Sexual Enslavement - Art. 7(1)(g);
c. Inhumane Acts of Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury and Suffering - Art. 7(1)(k).
 × 21 counts of WAR CRIMES
a. Inducing rape - Art. 8(2)(e)(vi);
b. Intentionally Directing An Attack Against a Civilian Population - Art. 8(2)(e)(i);
c. Forced Enlisting of Children - Art. 8(2)(e)(vii);
d. Cruel Treatment of Civilians - Art. 8(2)(c)(i);
e. Pillaging - Art. 8(2)(e)(v); &
f. Murder - Art. 8(2)(c)(i).

 The LRA has insisted Mr. Otti was under house arrest;
 October 02, 2007: Otti was executed by fellow officers at the home of Joseph Kony.

AS TO JOSEPH KONY

 33 counts of his individual criminal responsibility (Article 25[3][b]) of the Statute including:

× 12 counts of CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

a. Murder - Art. 7(1)(a);
b. Enslavement - Art. 7(1)(c);
c. Sexual Enslavement - Art. 7(1)(g);
d. Rape - Art. 7(1)(g)
e. Inhumane Acts of Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury and Suffering - Art. 7(1)(k)

× 21 counts of WAR CRIMES

a. Murder - Art. 8(2)(c)(i);
b. Cruel treatment of civilians - Art. 8(2)(c)(i);
c. Intentionally Directing An Attack Against A Civilian Population - Art. 8(2)(e)(i);
d. Pillaging - Art. 8(2)(e)(v);
e. Rape - Art. 8(2)(e)(vi);
f. Forced enlistment of children - Art. 8(2)(e)(vii)

 Kony and his forces are highly flexible and it is difficult to know their exact whereabouts. They
move on foot in small separate groups with their fighters and abductees through remote bush
terrain between the borders of Congo, Central African Republic, and South Sudan. They do not
have permanent camps, avoid roads, and often make great efforts to cover their tracks. They
send messages via runners, letters posted on trees or left under rocks, or occasional face-to-face
meetings at pre-determined locations in isolated areas.
ACTION CURRENTLY TAKEN

 Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) has subsequently deployed to LRA-affected regions of
South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR). This is with the permission of local
authorities and an ongoing logistics support from the United States.
 UN Peacekeeping Missions have also contributed to counter LRA efforts & attempted to
engender closer cooperation amongst regional partners.
o UN peacekeeping missions in Congo (MONUSCO);
o UN peacekeeping missions in South Sudan (UNMISS);
 o UN peacekeeping missions in Central African Republic (BINUCA);
o New Central Africa Office to coordinate peace efforts in the region (UNOCA).
 UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)
o Most active of any of the UN mission in LRA-related activities maybe because of the
LRA's activities in Congo since 2006;
o Fewer than 5℅ of MONUSCO's peacekeepers are deployed to LRA- affected areas;
o Conducted joint operations with the Congolese army to help protect civilians but have
not been involved in efforts to apprehend LRA leaders since their failed attempt in 2006;
o Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Repatriation, and Resettlement (DDRRR)
program has encouraged LRA fighters to leave the LRA's ranks through FM radio
broadcasts and leaflet distribution, among other tactics;
o 'Operation Welcome' to urge LRA fighters to surrender by setting up and publicizing five
assembly points in northern Congo's Haut Uele district to which fighters can go.
 UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
o Has not been as highly engaged, but has participated in regional anti-LRA coordination
and demobilisation initiatives.
 UN peacekeeping missions in Central African Republic (BINUCA)
o Has no mandate to protect civilians and has no personnel in LRA affected areas.
 New Central Africa Office to coordinate peace efforts in the region (UNOCA)
o Based in Gabon, to help consolidate peace in the region and prevent future conflict.
 United States has also directly supported regional operations since 2008 to capture and kill LRA
leaders.
o May 2010: Enactment of US legislation which is the 'LRA Disarmament and Northern
Uganda Recovery Act' which calls on the US government to develop a comprehensive
strategy to protect civilians and to work with the governments in central Africa to
"apprehend or otherwise remove from the battlefield" the LRA leaders.
o October 2011: Former President Obama announced that he had authorised the specific
deployment of 100 US armed forces representatives to the region.
o Former President stated that these forces would not engage in combat (unless self-
defense) but would provide information, advice, and assistance to partner nation forces
in order to work "toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield".
 "In Uganda, the Department for International Development (DFID) is supporting post conflict
recovery and national reconciliation. This year, DFID will fund the construction of over 1,000
new houses for teachers and health workers; create new vocational training and job
opportunities for over 4,000 young people and provide grants to small businesses especially
those run by women affected by the conflict."
- Stephen O'Brien, Department for International Development Minister (May 2011)
 "The action being taken by the British Government includes allocating £16 million of funding to
help young and vulnerable individuals as part of a wider program in Northern Uganda, and a
contribution of $35 million towards a World Bank led effort to support the demobilization and
reintegration of ex-combatants in the greater Great Lakes region of Central Africa."
-Henry Bellingham, Foreign Office (December 2011)
 The European Union (EU) and its member countries have provided humanitarian assistance
through financial support to the African Union secretariat for its LRA initiative.
o UK: Supported the UN's efforts to demobilize LRA fighters including distributing leaflets.
o Belgium: Supporting a rehabilitation center for former LRA abductees in Dungu,
northern Congo.
 o France: Provided support to the army of the Central African Republic though not
specifically for counter LRA operations or protection of civilians in the affected areas.
 The African Union (AU) has recently set up a regional office in Bangui, Central African Republic
to work on the LRA issue and says it is working to develop a joint AU-UN regional strategy for
addressing the LRA.
 July 2011: Creation of 'self-defence groups' with the support of the UPDF to protect some
communities against the LRA, particularly in Western Equatoria.
 Uganda: Most of the 1.8 million people formerly displaced have returned to their villages or
integrated locally elsewhere. However, some 80,000 IDPs remain in six camps in Northern
Uganda. They were unable to return home as a result of obstacles such as the presence of land
mines and land disputes.

CRITICISMS

 Widespread criticism on this issue arose despite widespread support for the operation in its
early stages especially that LRA has evaded capture for 25 years.
 Tufts University's Feinstein International Center (US); Iku Pax Christi (Netherlands); and
Conciliation Reports (UK), criticize the operation in numerous and varied ways.
 ENOUGH Project (US-based advocacy group) is critical on the issue of the failure to protect
civilians after the launch of the original Operation Lightning Thunder.

UN Secretary General has expressed concern over the limited movement of commercial goods
in regions affected by the LRA, particularly in the Central African Republic (CAR) where goods
and humanitarian convoys require military protection and humanitarian personnel and light
goods are required to be transported predominantly by air.

1. Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) capacity to coordinate effectively with other regional
forces.
o Tensions have repeatedly flared between Congolese officials and Ugandan military
commanders.
o Despite the prevalence of LRA attacks in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
Congolese government has made repeated calls for the withdrawal of Ugandan troops,
accusing them of having insufficient will to tackle the LRA and remaining in the
Democratic Republic of Congo solely to profit from international support for military
operations. That is why the UPDF movement within the Democratic Republic of Congo
reportedly remain severely restricted.
2. Human Rights Watch accusation to UPDF
o UPDF committed multiple abuses of the rights of northern Ugandans, such as summary
execution, torture, rape, child recruitment, and inhuman conditions of detention in
unauthorized detention locations. Also, the troops have rarely been prosecuted for
crimes committed against civilians, leading to a perceived culture of impunity within its
ranks.
3. Lack of capacity amongst regional governments and militaries particularly within the remote and
isolated regions affected by the LRA.
4. Competition for external financing and technical assistance, language and communication gaps,
and by distrust linked to recent history.
 Example: Ugandan incursions into the Democratic Republic of Congo territory during the
Second Congo War (1998-2003)

EFFECTS TO CHILDREN

 Two forms of violence - killing and rape - were particularly damaging to long-term mental health
outcomes for children formerly associated with armed groups.
 An evidence from a study with former child soldiers in Uganda found that being forced to kill
and witnessing killing were reportedly the two worst kinds of experiences they underwent.
 Psychological damage was severe.
 They were robbed of many of the standard opportunities for physical, emotional, and
intellectual development.

KONY 2012
 March 05, 2012
o The campaign group, "Invisible Children" posted a video on the social media site
YouTube named Kony 2012.
o It was shot by Jason Russell, an American filmmaker together with his colleagues and it
explains how Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army have operated.
o It focused on the story of Jacob Acaye, a young man from Uganda kidnapped by the LRA
at the same time as his brother was killed in 2002.
o According to the Invisible Children website, the aim of the video is to "make Joseph
Kony famous, not to celebrate him, but to raise support for his arrest and set a
precedent for international justice".

RESOLUTION

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO STOP LRA ABUSES?

1. Deploy well-trained, capable troops in the numbers needed to protect civilians and arrest LRA
leaders.
o Ensure that these forces have sufficient transport capacity, including helicopters, to
reach threatened civilians quickly;
 o Ensure that these UN and other forces respect international human rights and
humanitarian law is crucial.
2. Enhance early warning and intelligence gathering.
o Focus on LRA movements and to identify communities vulnerable to attack.
3. Improve communications, including by building cellphone towers.
o Will provide mobile phone coverage in LRA affected areas and effects to ensure that
high-frequency radios are available in all key population centers should also be
supported.
4. Ensure fair trials for serious crimes.
o This is in accordance with international standards. Uganda's amnesty act should be
amended so that those responsible for war crimes and other crimes in violation of
international law are not immune from prosecution.